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AutistMask/tests/buildForbiddenInputs.test.js
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harden: stop the background reading the shared state singleton, and enforce it at build time (closes #324)
Five defects, one of which destroyed every wallet, came from src/background reading and writing the module-level state singleton the MV3 worker never populates, which silently served DEFAULT_STATE. Each point fix created the next defect. The background now has its own per-call getState() and a queued read-modify-write updateState(); the singleton is unreachable from it, and an unpopulated read throws instead of serving defaults.

The prohibition is enforced by the build, not by review: build.js asserts over esbuild's own metafile that no forbidden module is an input of a background bundle, so every specifier syntax esbuild resolves is covered, and both halves of the table are checked for rot -- a stale key, a stale module, an empty list, or an unlisted entry point under src/background/ all fail the build. The ESLint rule remains as fast local feedback and reads the same shared table. Known bounds are documented where the table lives.

Also closes #320: getProvider() now requires a validated network id, so a cold worker no longer prepares a non-mainnet dApp transaction for mainnet and gets refused by the wallet's own verifier. backgroundRefresh() no longer mutates address objects across a network round trip, the broadcast path takes its endpoint and chain id from one snapshot, and eight test storage stubs now structured-clone on get as the real chrome.storage.local does.

closes #320
2026-08-23 17:57:30 +02:00

367 lines
14 KiB
JavaScript

// build.js's FORBIDDEN_INPUTS assertion — the mechanical guarantee that the
// MV3 background bundle cannot contain src/shared/state.js
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324).
//
// Why this file exists: `make check` does not run `make build`. CI executes
// the assertion (Dockerfile runs `make build`), but executing is not testing —
// invert its condition, or make the table lookup always come back undefined,
// and every check in this repo stays green while the singleton walks back into
// the worker. Five defects, one destroyed wallet, and the whole argument for
// the scoped loud-read guard rest on this assertion, so it is pinned here.
//
// The subject is build.js's exported helpers plus the table's own
// well-formedness check, driven against SYNTHETIC metafiles in esbuild's
// shape. Nothing here shells out to a build or writes dist/: the assertion's
// job is to read a metafile correctly, and a metafile is data. That the real
// shapes reach it is the build's own business and is measured in the PR that
// introduced it.
//
// Every vacuous pass this guarantee has been found to have is pinned below,
// because each one was a way for `make check`, `make lint` and `make build` to
// be green over a background bundle containing the singleton: a stale key, a
// stale module, an entry that lists no modules, an entry recorded as checked
// before its bundle was in hand, and a background entry point nobody added to
// the table.
//
// Paths are absolute on the way in, because the helpers normalize whatever
// esbuild gave them to repo-relative and this file should not depend on the
// working directory jest was started from.
const path = require("path");
const {
importChain,
newForbiddenRecord,
recordBundledInputs,
assertNoForbiddenInputs,
assertForbiddenTableCovered,
} = require("../build");
const {
BACKGROUND_ENTRY_PREFIX,
FORBIDDEN_INPUTS,
assertTableWellFormed,
} = require("../script/lib/forbiddenBundleInputs");
const ROOT = path.resolve(__dirname, "..");
const abs = (p) => path.join(ROOT, p);
const ENTRY = "src/background/index.js";
const OUT = "dist/chrome/src/background/index.js";
const STATE = "src/shared/state.js";
const HOP = "src/shared/chainSwitchFields.js";
const SECOND = "src/background/worker2.js";
const SECOND_OUT = "dist/chrome/src/background/worker2.js";
const POPUP = "src/popup/index.js";
const POPUP_OUT = "dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js";
// The real table's shape: entry point -> modules its bundle may not contain.
const TABLE = { [ENTRY]: [STATE] };
// A metafile as esbuild emits one: `outputs[out].inputs` is the flat list of
// every input that contributed to that output, and `inputs[file].imports` is
// the edge list, which is what the chain walk follows.
function metafile({ outputs = {}, imports = {} } = {}) {
return {
outputs: Object.fromEntries(
Object.entries(outputs).map(([out, inputs]) => [
abs(out),
{
inputs: Object.fromEntries(
inputs.map((input) => [
abs(input),
{ bytesInOutput: 1 },
]),
),
},
]),
),
inputs: Object.fromEntries(
Object.entries(imports).map(([file, targets]) => [
abs(file),
{ imports: targets.map((target) => ({ path: abs(target) })) },
]),
),
};
}
function check(mf, table = TABLE, record = newForbiddenRecord()) {
recordBundledInputs(mf, record);
assertNoForbiddenInputs(abs(ENTRY), abs(OUT), mf, record, table);
return record;
}
describe("assertNoForbiddenInputs()", () => {
test("a forbidden module in the bundle fails, naming the import chain", () => {
const mf = metafile({
outputs: { [OUT]: [ENTRY, HOP, STATE] },
imports: {
[ENTRY]: [HOP],
[HOP]: [STATE],
},
});
expect(() => check(mf)).toThrow(
`${OUT} bundles ${STATE}, which ${ENTRY} must not reach: ` +
`${ENTRY} -> ${HOP} -> ${STATE}.`,
);
});
test("a bundle without the forbidden module passes, and is recorded as checked", () => {
const mf = metafile({
outputs: { [OUT]: [ENTRY, HOP, "src/background/state.js"] },
imports: { [ENTRY]: [HOP, "src/background/state.js"] },
});
const record = check(mf);
expect([...record.entriesChecked]).toEqual([ENTRY]);
expect(record.bundledInputs.has(STATE)).toBe(false);
});
test("the failure still names the bundle when no import chain can be shown", () => {
// esbuild resolves `import("../shared/" + variable)` as a glob: the
// module is an input of the output, but no single edge leads to it.
// The message must degrade to no chain rather than crash.
const mf = metafile({
outputs: { [OUT]: [ENTRY, STATE] },
imports: { [ENTRY]: [] },
});
expect(() => check(mf)).toThrow(
`${OUT} bundles ${STATE}, which ${ENTRY} must not reach.`,
);
});
// The lookup this covers is the fragile step in the whole assertion:
// repoRelative() resolves against process.cwd() and esbuild's output keys
// are cwd-relative, so a change to where the build runs from, or to
// outfile vs outdir, makes it miss. It must be loud, and the entry must
// NOT already be marked checked when it does — otherwise a later edit
// turning this throw into an early return leaves both halves of the
// guarantee satisfied by a bundle nothing looked at.
test("an output esbuild did not report fails, and records nothing as checked", () => {
const mf = metafile({
outputs: { "dist/chrome/src/background/renamed.js": [ENTRY] },
imports: { [ENTRY]: [] },
});
const record = newForbiddenRecord();
recordBundledInputs(mf, record);
expect(() =>
assertNoForbiddenInputs(abs(ENTRY), abs(OUT), mf, record, TABLE),
).toThrow(`esbuild reported no metafile output for ${OUT}`);
expect([...record.entriesChecked]).toEqual([]);
// So even if that throw became `return`, the coverage half catches it.
record.bundledInputs.add(STATE);
expect(() => assertForbiddenTableCovered(record, TABLE)).toThrow(
`${ENTRY} is listed in FORBIDDEN_INPUTS but was not bundled`,
);
});
});
// Finding from the fifth review of this change: adding a second worker entry
// point is exactly the accident this guarantee exists for, and the person
// adding one has no reason to know a table elsewhere needs a line. So the
// default for the background directory is protected, not unprotected.
describe("background entry points are protected by default", () => {
test("a bundled background entry point with no line in the table fails", () => {
const mf = metafile({
outputs: { [SECOND_OUT]: [SECOND, STATE] },
imports: { [SECOND]: [STATE] },
});
const record = newForbiddenRecord();
recordBundledInputs(mf, record);
expect(() =>
assertNoForbiddenInputs(
abs(SECOND),
abs(SECOND_OUT),
mf,
record,
TABLE,
),
).toThrow(
`${SECOND} is a background entry point with no line in ` +
`FORBIDDEN_INPUTS`,
);
});
test("an entry point outside the background directory needs no line", () => {
// The popup legitimately bundles the singleton; that is its model.
const mf = metafile({
outputs: { [POPUP_OUT]: [POPUP, STATE] },
imports: { [POPUP]: [STATE] },
});
const record = newForbiddenRecord();
recordBundledInputs(mf, record);
expect(() =>
assertNoForbiddenInputs(
abs(POPUP),
abs(POPUP_OUT),
mf,
record,
TABLE,
),
).not.toThrow();
expect([...record.entriesChecked]).toEqual([]);
});
test("the prefix is the one the lint rule is scoped to", () => {
expect(BACKGROUND_ENTRY_PREFIX).toBe("src/background/");
expect(SECOND.startsWith(BACKGROUND_ENTRY_PREFIX)).toBe(true);
expect(POPUP.startsWith(BACKGROUND_ENTRY_PREFIX)).toBe(false);
});
});
describe("recordBundledInputs()", () => {
// The sole data source for the module half of the anti-rot check, and
// every other case here hand-seeds what it produces. Driven for real,
// across two outputs, and then handed straight to the check that reads it.
test("records every input of every output, satisfying the module half", () => {
const mf = metafile({
outputs: {
[OUT]: [ENTRY, HOP],
[POPUP_OUT]: [POPUP, STATE],
},
imports: { [ENTRY]: [HOP], [POPUP]: [STATE] },
});
const record = newForbiddenRecord();
recordBundledInputs(mf, record);
expect([...record.bundledInputs].sort()).toEqual(
[ENTRY, HOP, POPUP, STATE].sort(),
);
// Nothing hand-seeded: the covered check passes on what the recorder
// actually collected, so a recorder that collects nothing fails here.
assertNoForbiddenInputs(abs(ENTRY), abs(OUT), mf, record, TABLE);
expect(() => assertForbiddenTableCovered(record, TABLE)).not.toThrow();
});
});
describe("importChain()", () => {
test("terminates on a cyclic input graph, and still finds the module", () => {
const mf = metafile({
imports: {
[ENTRY]: [HOP],
[HOP]: ["src/shared/log.js"],
// The cycle: log <-> hop, with the target one hop past it.
"src/shared/log.js": [HOP, STATE],
},
});
expect(importChain(mf, abs(ENTRY), STATE)).toEqual([
ENTRY,
HOP,
"src/shared/log.js",
STATE,
]);
});
test("terminates and returns null when a cycle cannot reach the module", () => {
const mf = metafile({
imports: {
[ENTRY]: [HOP],
[HOP]: ["src/shared/log.js"],
"src/shared/log.js": [HOP, ENTRY],
},
});
expect(importChain(mf, abs(ENTRY), STATE)).toBeNull();
});
});
describe("assertForbiddenTableCovered()", () => {
test("the shipped table is satisfied by a build that checked it", () => {
const record = newForbiddenRecord();
record.entriesChecked.add(ENTRY);
// The popup bundle is what legitimately contains the singleton.
record.bundledInputs.add(STATE);
expect(() => assertForbiddenTableCovered(record, TABLE)).not.toThrow();
});
// The build this drives bundles the popup and no background entry point,
// because a stale key AND a bundled background entry point is now the
// stronger failure above — the entry point that is there but unlisted is
// reported by name, before the end of the build. This case is the rot that
// is left after that one: a key naming something this build never bundled.
test("a key no bundled entry point matched fails", () => {
const mf = metafile({
outputs: { [POPUP_OUT]: [POPUP] },
imports: { [POPUP]: [] },
});
const stale = { "src/background/renamed.js": [STATE] };
const record = newForbiddenRecord();
recordBundledInputs(mf, record);
assertNoForbiddenInputs(abs(POPUP), abs(POPUP_OUT), mf, record, stale);
record.bundledInputs.add(STATE);
expect(() => assertForbiddenTableCovered(record, stale)).toThrow(
"src/background/renamed.js is listed in FORBIDDEN_INPUTS but was" +
" not bundled, so nothing checked it",
);
});
test("a forbidden module this build bundled nowhere fails", () => {
// The other half of the same rot: renaming or moving the singleton
// leaves a table that names a path nothing resolves to any more, and
// every bundle then passes it vacuously.
const mf = metafile({
outputs: { [OUT]: [ENTRY] },
imports: { [ENTRY]: [] },
});
const stale = { [ENTRY]: ["src/shared/stateRenamed.js"] };
const record = check(mf, stale);
record.bundledInputs.add(STATE);
expect(() => assertForbiddenTableCovered(record, stale)).toThrow(
"src/shared/stateRenamed.js is listed in FORBIDDEN_INPUTS for" +
` ${ENTRY}, but this build bundled it nowhere`,
);
});
// The third rot, and the worst of the three: an entry with an empty list
// is checked, is bundled, names no module that could be missing, and
// prohibits nothing — in BOTH layers at once, since the rule's forbidden
// set is Object.values(table).flat().
test("an entry that lists no modules fails", () => {
const mf = metafile({
outputs: { [OUT]: [ENTRY, STATE] },
imports: { [ENTRY]: [STATE] },
});
const empty = { [ENTRY]: [] };
const record = newForbiddenRecord();
recordBundledInputs(mf, record);
assertNoForbiddenInputs(abs(ENTRY), abs(OUT), mf, record, empty);
expect(() => assertForbiddenTableCovered(record, empty)).toThrow(
`FORBIDDEN_INPUTS["${ENTRY}"] lists no modules`,
);
});
});
describe("assertTableWellFormed()", () => {
// Runs at require time on the shipped table, in script/lib/
// forbiddenBundleInputs.js, so an empty list fails the lint run as well as
// the build — the build's own re-check cannot help a layer that never
// reaches the build.
test("the shipped table is well formed", () => {
expect(() => assertTableWellFormed(FORBIDDEN_INPUTS)).not.toThrow();
expect(Object.entries(FORBIDDEN_INPUTS).length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
});
test("an entry that lists no modules fails, naming the entry", () => {
expect(() => assertTableWellFormed({ [ENTRY]: [] })).toThrow(
`FORBIDDEN_INPUTS["${ENTRY}"] lists no modules`,
);
});
test("a table with no entries at all fails", () => {
expect(() => assertTableWellFormed({})).toThrow(
"FORBIDDEN_INPUTS is empty",
);
});
});