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AutistMask/script/lib/eslint/noStateSingletonInBackground.js
sneak 4343d8fc77
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harden: make the background physically unable to read the shared state singleton (closes #324)
Five defects traced to one fact: src/background/index.js read and wrote the
module-level `state` singleton in src/shared/state.js, which the MV3 service
worker never populates and which answered an unpopulated read out of
DEFAULT_STATE in silence. Every previous fix added a loadState() before the
access, and that is what produced the fifth: a load detaches the objects an
in-flight handler is holding.

So the reachability goes rather than a sixth call site.

The background now has its own storage layer, src/background/state.js:
getState() is a detached, normalized per-call read, and updateState() is a
queued read-modify-write whose read is one storage round trip ahead of its
write. Nothing in the background holds an in-memory copy of the profile.

- Every handler takes one snapshot and answers from it, including the address
  it names: activeAddressOf(s) replaced a second, later storage read that
  could disagree with the first.
- wallet_switchEthereumChain applies applyChainSwitchFields() (split out of
  chainSwitch.js, which keeps the singleton path for the popup) inside
  updateState() instead of calling onChainSwitch() on the singleton.
- The remembered site decision is a read-modify-write, not a load-mutate-save
  around a prompt the user takes seconds to answer.
- backgroundRefresh() refreshes a private copy of the wallets and applies the
  balances that came back by address, so it never publishes an object other
  in-flight work holds, and a wallet added or deleted during the round trip
  survives its write.
- The transaction attempt takes its chain id and its endpoint from the same
  snapshot. They used to come from different moments, so a chain switch
  committed in between moved the endpoint under an artifact already verified
  against the old chain.

getProvider(rpcUrl, networkId) now REQUIRES the network id and validates it
against networks.js. That closes the cold-worker wrong-chain send at its shape
rather than at one call site: the hint used to default to currentNetwork() off
the unpopulated singleton, so the endpoint was the user's chain and ethers
fixed chainId at 0x1, and the wallet's own verifySignedTx then refused every
non-mainnet dApp send. refreshBalances(), lookupTokenInfo(), scanForAddresses()
and resolveEnsName() carry the id through; balances.js no longer requires
state.js at all.

The prohibition is enforced mechanically, not by review: a custom ESLint rule
walks the CommonJS require graph from every src/background/ file and fails the
lint when src/shared/state.js is reachable, naming the chain. A re-export from
any shared module cannot put the singleton back in the bundle unnoticed.
Reading a persisted field of the singleton before any load now throws
StateNotLoadedError instead of serving DEFAULT_STATE.

Test stubs: chrome.storage.local is a serialization boundary, and eight files
stubbed it with an aliasing get, so the object a module held and the object
"storage" held were one object — an assertion could pass on a build that never
wrote anything. They all go through tests/support/storageStub.js now, which
structured-clones in both directions.

closes #320
2026-08-23 13:44:19 +00:00

131 lines
4.7 KiB
JavaScript

// ESLint rule: the background bundle may not reach the shared state singleton.
//
// src/shared/state.js holds a module-level `state` object, loaded once by
// loadState() and mutated in place from then on. That is the popup's model. In
// the MV3 service worker there is no "once": the worker is terminated when
// idle and revived by the next message, nothing loads state at module scope,
// and an unpopulated read used to be served DEFAULT_STATE without complaint —
// five defects, one cause
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324). The background has its
// own per-call storage layer in src/background/state.js instead.
//
// A convention nobody can violate beats a convention everyone remembers, so
// this is a lint error rather than a review item. It checks REACHABILITY, not
// just the direct require: the singleton is one `require()` away from any
// shared module the background pulls in, and a re-export would put it back in
// the bundle without any background file naming it. So each background file is
// the root of a walk over the CommonJS require graph, and the error names the
// whole chain that brought the singleton in.
//
// The walk reads sources from disk and matches `require("...")` textually.
// That over-approximates — a require inside a comment or a string counts — and
// over-approximating is the safe direction for a prohibition: the failure mode
// is a spurious error naming an exact file and line, not a silent hole.
const fs = require("fs");
const path = require("path");
// The module this rule exists to keep out, relative to the repo root.
const FORBIDDEN = path.join("src", "shared", "state.js");
const REQUIRE_RE = /\brequire\(\s*["']([^"']+)["']\s*\)/g;
// Resolve a relative require to a file path, trying the extensions node would.
function resolveRelative(fromFile, spec) {
if (!spec.startsWith(".")) return null; // a package, not our tree
const base = path.resolve(path.dirname(fromFile), spec);
for (const candidate of [
base,
base + ".js",
base + ".json",
path.join(base, "index.js"),
]) {
try {
if (fs.statSync(candidate).isFile()) return candidate;
} catch {
// Not this candidate.
}
}
return null;
}
function requiresOf(file) {
let source;
try {
source = fs.readFileSync(file, "utf8");
} catch {
return [];
}
const out = [];
for (const match of source.matchAll(REQUIRE_RE)) {
const resolved = resolveRelative(file, match[1]);
if (resolved) out.push(resolved);
}
return out;
}
// Breadth-first from `entry`, returning the shortest chain of files that ends
// at the forbidden module, or null when it is not reachable.
function chainToForbidden(entry, forbidden) {
const seen = new Set([entry]);
const queue = [[entry]];
while (queue.length > 0) {
const chain = queue.shift();
for (const next of requiresOf(chain[chain.length - 1])) {
if (next === forbidden) return chain.concat([next]);
if (seen.has(next)) continue;
seen.add(next);
queue.push(chain.concat([next]));
}
}
return null;
}
const rule = {
meta: {
type: "problem",
docs: {
description:
"the background bundle must not be able to reach the" +
" module-level state singleton in src/shared/state.js",
},
schema: [],
messages: {
reachable:
"The background must not reach the shared state singleton:" +
" {{chain}}. The MV3 worker never populates it, so reading it" +
" serves DEFAULT_STATE. Use getState()/updateState() from" +
" src/background/state.js instead.",
},
},
create(context) {
return {
"Program:exit"(node) {
const filename = context.filename;
// ESLint lints from the repo root, which is also where the
// forbidden path is anchored.
const forbidden = path.resolve(context.cwd, FORBIDDEN);
const chain = chainToForbidden(
path.resolve(filename),
forbidden,
);
if (!chain) return;
context.report({
node,
messageId: "reachable",
data: {
chain: chain
.map((file) => path.relative(context.cwd, file))
.join(" -> "),
},
});
},
};
},
};
module.exports = {
rules: { "no-state-singleton-in-background": rule },
};