Compare commits

..
1 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
sneak 7b99d421b8 harden: show a personal message's hex and its text in byte order, hidden characters marked (closes #403)
check / check (push) Failing after 3s
e2e / e2e-chrome (push) Failing after 2s
e2e / e2e-firefox (push) Failing after 2s
The signature screen showed only the text a personal message decodes
to, with bidirectional, right-to-left and zero-width characters acting
on it, so a site could make the message read differently from the
bytes that are signed, and a message that was not hex was decoded into
NUL characters. The screen now shows the hex as "Raw data" alongside
the text, lays the text out left to right in byte order, and shows each
control character, line and paragraph separator, and character that
paints nothing (the set src/shared/symbolSpoof.js already strips) as a
U+XXXX mark. A message is hex when getBytes, which signing uses, reads
it; one that is not cannot be signed, so it is shown as plain text with
"Sign" disabled.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-04 19:00:59 +00:00
53 changed files with 267 additions and 2303 deletions
+5 -4
View File
@@ -22,10 +22,11 @@ on: [push]
# These jobs REPORT, they do not gate. Whether a check blocks a merge is
# Gitea branch protection, which this repo does not configure, so a failure
# here is a red mark a reviewer has to account for rather than a hard
# block. Making e2e-chrome a required check is blocked while reports of the
# Chrome suite failing under load are still open; the "In CI" section of
# README.md names them. A gate that fails at random teaches people to merge
# past red.
# block. Making e2e-chrome a required check is blocked on the measured
# flake in the dApp signing wait -- two of six runs of unmutated code on a
# loaded machine -- tracked as
# https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/287. A gate that fails at
# random teaches people to merge past red.
#
# Nothing here may pass vacuously. There is no continue-on-error and no
# `|| true`. Both scripts exit non-zero when docker is missing, when the
+52 -140
View File
@@ -619,13 +619,14 @@ The jobs **report, they do not gate.** A failure is a red mark against the
commit that a reviewer has to account for, not a hard block: whether a check
blocks a merge is Gitea branch protection, which this repo does not configure.
That is not only a statement about configuration. A report of the Chrome suite
**failing under load** is still open:
[#290](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/290), runs on a busy machine
failing with `the extension opened no approval window within 30000ms`. So a red
`e2e-chrome` has to be read before it is believed, and those failures are the
blocker to ever making this a required check. Do not answer them with a retry
wrapper: a suite that reruns until it is green stops being evidence.
That is not only a statement about configuration. The Chrome suite is
**measurably flaky under load** — two of six runs of unmutated code on a busy
machine lost the approval popup out from under the dApp signing wait, always in
the `#183` section, tracked as
[#287](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/287). So a red `e2e-chrome`
has to be read before it is believed, and that flake is the blocker to ever
making this a required check. Do not answer it with a retry wrapper: a suite
that reruns until it is green stops being evidence.
Nothing in either job can pass vacuously. There is no `continue-on-error` and no
`|| true`; both scripts exit non-zero when docker is missing, when the image
@@ -694,7 +695,6 @@ src/
balances.js — ETH + ERC-20 balance fetching via RPC + Blockscout
constants.js — chain IDs, default RPC endpoint, ERC-20 ABI
ens.js — ENS forward/reverse resolution (popup only)
holders.js — holder-count parsing and the low-holder rule
prices.js — ETH/USD and token/USD via CoinDesk API
scamlist.js — known fraud contract addresses
state.js — persisted state (extension storage)
@@ -846,20 +846,6 @@ wherever shown. If a formatting rule applies in one place, it applies in every
place. Users should never see the same value rendered differently on two
screens.
The native token's label is a network's `nativeCurrency` in
`src/shared/networks.js`: `ETH` on mainnet, `SepoliaETH` on Sepolia. The
wallet's balances and the Send and confirmation screens, which send on the
active network, use the active network's. A transaction's figures use the one of
the network its chain id names, whichever network is active: the value and fee
on the approval screen, the amount on the wait, success and error screens, the
transaction history and the transaction detail screen, and the refusal of a fee
above 1 ETH. A chain id that names no network reads `ETH`. Wherever this
document shows ETH as the label of a native balance, value or fee, in a "Native
ETH transfer" type line, in the contract-recipient warning or in that refusal,
Sepolia shows `SepoliaETH`. The swap lines keep `ETH`, the router's own name for
the native currency, and the ETH/USD price line, shown on mainnet only, keeps
its fixed wording.
**Specific Exception — Truncation:** On some non-critical display locations, we
may truncate _a small number_ of characters from the middle of an address solely
due to display size constraints. Wherever possible, and, notably, **in all
@@ -901,9 +887,7 @@ Truncation stays truncation: `0.99999` shows as `0.9999`, never rounded up. The
rule still renders a genuine zero as `0.0000`. Two lines of a swap say a zero in
words instead: `Min. received` reads `None (no minimum guaranteed)` for a zero
minimum, and `Amount` reads `All available (V4 open delta)` when the amount it
shows is a V4 exact-in `amountIn` of zero and
`Whatever an earlier step sent to the pair (V2 already paid)` when it is a V2
exact-in `amountIn` of zero.
shows is a V4 exact-in `amountIn` of zero.
The rule and its exception live in `src/shared/amountDisplay.js` as
`truncateAmount()` and `truncateAmountNeverZero()`. Everything the approval and
@@ -942,10 +926,7 @@ rule: the ERC-20 `transfer`/`approve` line (`src/popup/views/approval.js`) and
the swap's `Amount` and `Min. received` lines (`src/shared/uniswap.js`). The
token permission warning on the signature screen takes the same rule for its
amounts. An unbounded allowance or permit needs no scale to describe and is
still shown as `Unlimited`. A source's answer counts only if it is a whole
number from 0 to 80: `decimals()` returns a `uint8`, but `formatUnits()` cannot
format more than 80 decimal places, so a token that reports 81 to 255 is shown
as one whose scale nothing knows.
still shown as `Unlimited`.
The rule holds only if nothing invents a scale UPSTREAM of it. Those three
sources are read as authoritative, so a value written into one of them cannot be
@@ -996,8 +977,7 @@ read:
exact-out step, whichever step set the line, including the `WRAP_ETH` of a
swap paid in ETH and a `PERMIT2_PERMIT`. The swap spends at most that figure,
not necessarily all of it; the wait, success and error screens show it with
the same words. `Unlimited`, `All available (V4 open delta)` and
`Whatever an earlier step sent to the pair (V2 already paid)` keep their
the same words. `Unlimited` and `All available (V4 open delta)` keep their
wording. When a V2 exact-out step sets `Min. received`, that line shows its
`amountOut`, the exact amount it buys.
- `All available (V4 open delta)`: the swap's `Amount` line, when the amount it
@@ -1008,22 +988,11 @@ read:
V2 exact-out, `WRAP_ETH` or V4 swap step. A V2 exact-out step gives its
`amountInMax`, and a V4 swap step the `amountIn` of its first readable
exact-in action.
- `Whatever an earlier step sent to the pair (V2 already paid)`: the swap's
`Amount` line, when the amount it shows is a V2 exact-in `amountIn` of zero.
The router reads that zero as "the pair already holds the input tokens": the
step pays nothing itself and swaps whatever an earlier step sent to the pair,
so the calldata states no quantity. A V3 exact-in `amountIn` of zero has no
such meaning and is shown as a zero.
- `None (no minimum guaranteed)`: the swap's `Min. received` line, when the
minimum it shows is zero, whether a V2, V3 or V4 swap's minimum or a
`BALANCE_CHECK_ERC20` step's `minBalance`. Before
[#359](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/359), a zero `minBalance`
read `0.0000` when the token's scale was known. The router passes a balance
check whenever the balance is at least `minBalance`, so a zero `minBalance`
guarantees nothing: it sets `Token Out` and `Min. received` only when the
output side holds no minimum, not even a zero one, at the point the check is
reached, and otherwise leaves the current token and figure in place. A nonzero
`minBalance` sets both lines, as a swap step does.
read `0.0000` when the token's scale was known.
The swap's `Token In` and `Token Out` lines name a currency, not an amount; each
reads `Unknown (not named in the calldata)` when the decoder found no token for
@@ -1036,12 +1005,6 @@ unwraps the WETH it did not spend shows USDC. The token permission warning on
the signature screen has its own amount wording, including `Unknown`; the
SignApproval section below describes it.
The swap's `Deadline` line is the router's deadline as a UTC date and time, e.g.
`2026-02-27 08:25:51`. A JavaScript date reaches only to 275760-09-13 00:00:00
UTC, so a later deadline, such as the `uint256` maximum, reads
`After 275760-09-13 00:00:00 (no deadline in practice)` rather than leaving the
whole swap undecoded.
#### Partial USD totals
Prices are fetched for the top 25 tokens only, so an address can hold assets the
@@ -1120,21 +1083,15 @@ balance is nonzero and it is in the bundled known-token list, is tracked by the
user, or has 1,000 or more holders; a token claiming a symbol from the bundled
list from any other contract address is always dropped, and so is any token
claiming a symbol that belongs to the native asset and therefore has no
legitimate contract at all (`"ETH"`, and every network's `nativeCurrency`, such
as `"SepoliaETH"`, on every network). That filter is unconditional — the "Hide
legitimate contract at all (`"ETH"`). That filter is unconditional — the "Hide
tokens with fewer than 1,000 holders" setting governs the transaction history
and the send-screen token selector, not this list. A token's holder count is
unknown when the explorer reports none, or reports anything other than a whole
number written in digits alone, such as `1,000` or `1e3` (`parseHoldersCount()`
in `src/shared/holders.js`). This list does not take an unknown count as 1,000
or more, so such a token is shown only when it is on the bundled list or
tracked. `fetchTokenBalances()` stores every nonzero holding of a token it
admits, however small, but a holding below 0.000001 is left out of the balance
lists, the send-screen token selector, the address total and the remove-address
warning (`isBelowOneMillionth()` in `src/shared/amountDisplay.js`). The Send and
confirmation screens show it when its token is the one being sent. Tracked
tokens with a zero balance are listed as well while "Show tracked tokens with
zero balance" is on.
and the send-screen token selector, not this list. `fetchTokenBalances()` stores
every nonzero holding of a token it admits, however small, but a holding below
0.000001 is left out of the balance lists, the send-screen token selector, the
address total and the remove-address warning (`isBelowOneMillionth()` in
`src/shared/amountDisplay.js`). The Send and confirmation screens show it when
its token is the one being sent. Tracked tokens with a zero balance are listed
as well while "Show tracked tokens with zero balance" is on.
#### Stored state and its version
@@ -1154,18 +1111,16 @@ because bumping for one would send every older install to StateRecovery for
nothing.
Every read of the record goes through `assertStateUsable()` first, on the raw
bytes, before normalization: `loadState()` and every `saveState()` for the
popup, and `getState()` for the background. It refuses a record that is not an
object, a `schemaVersion` this build does not understand (a newer one included),
a `wallets` that is not a list of wallet records with address records in them,
and a `networkId` that is not a network in `src/shared/networks.js`. Refusing is
the whole point — a record the wallet cannot vouch for is never normalized,
never written back, and never half-loaded. The popup shows StateRecovery,
whether it finds the record unreadable when it opens or at a save while it is
open; a dApp gets a specific error (`-32007`, an EIP-1474 server-error code the
spec leaves unassigned) saying the saved data cannot be read and that nothing
was signed or sent, rather than the generic `-32603` every request used to
answer.
bytes, before normalization: `loadState()` for the popup and `getState()` for
the background. It refuses a record that is not an object, a `schemaVersion`
this build does not understand (a newer one included), a `wallets` that is not a
list of wallet records with address records in them, and a `networkId` that is
not a network in `src/shared/networks.js`. Refusing is the whole point — a
record the wallet cannot vouch for is never normalized, never written back, and
never half-loaded. The popup shows StateRecovery; a dApp gets a specific error
(`-32007`, an EIP-1474 server-error code the spec leaves unassigned) saying the
saved data cannot be read and that nothing was signed or sent, rather than the
generic `-32603` every request used to answer.
Every other field of the record is floored in `normalizePersisted()` rather than
gated, and the floor is not the same for every field. Some are type-checked as a
@@ -1209,9 +1164,8 @@ now also reported rather than swallowed: `onSaveFailure()` in
`src/shared/state.js` is called for every failed save, awaited or not, and the
popup puts up a persistent "NOT SAVED" banner (`showSaveFailureBanner()` in
`src/popup/views/helpers.js`). Storage can still fail for reasons no floor
covers — a quota, a revoked permission — and the wallet must never look healthy
while that is true. A save that fails because the stored record fails the gate,
such as one a newer build wrote, gets StateRecovery instead of the banner.
covers — a quota, a revoked permission, a record a newer build wrote — and the
wallet must never look healthy while that is true.
The `networkId` check is not cosmetic: that value is an object KEY into
`state.networkEndpoints`, so an unvalidated `"__proto__"` would set the map's
@@ -1443,9 +1397,7 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
- Send / Receive buttons
- Token contract well (ERC-20 only): full contract address (tap to copy,
etherscan link) plus name, symbol, decimals, holder count and project
website where known. The "Holders:" row is left out, not shown as 0, when
the token's balance-list entry has no holder count: the explorer did not
report a readable one, or the token is not in the balance list
website where known
- Token-filtered transaction list (only this token's transfers)
- **Transitions**:
- "Send" → **Send** (token locked: the dropdown is replaced by a static
@@ -1611,9 +1563,7 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
- "Transaction" heading, "Back" button
- Transaction hash: full hash (tap to copy) + etherscan link
- Type: transaction classification — one of: Native ETH Transfer, ERC-20
Token Transfer, Swap, Token Approval, Contract Call, Contract Creation. A
transfer with a token contract is an ERC-20 Token Transfer whatever symbol
the token reports.
Token Transfer, Swap, Token Approval, Contract Call, Contract Creation
- Status: "Success" or "Failed"
- From: blockie + color dot + full address (tap to copy) + etherscan link;
ENS name if available
@@ -1787,10 +1737,7 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
new password — and, in bold, that without that phrase written down the
deletion loses everything the wallet holds, forever
- That the other wallets are not touched
- The wallet's name, and a text input asking for it to be typed back. A name
that shows nothing at all (only spaces, or only characters that paint
nothing) is shown as "Wallet N", its position in the list, and that is
what is typed back.
- The wallet's name, and a text input asking for it to be typed back
- Error line
- "Delete This Wallet Forever" button
- **Transitions**:
@@ -1798,9 +1745,9 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
outcomes as "Confirm Delete" above, through the same `finishDelete()`, so
the selection repair, permission cleanup and `AUTISTMASK_ACTIVE_CHANGED`
broadcast are identical on both routes
- "Delete This Wallet Forever" (name does not match, or the field is empty)
→ "That is not the name of this wallet. Type <name> to confirm." on
the error line, nothing deleted
- "Delete This Wallet Forever" (name does not match) → "That is not the name
of this wallet. Type <name> to confirm." on the error line, nothing
deleted
- "Back" → **DeleteWallet**, re-entered through its `show()` so the wallet
selection comes back with it. The two delete screens are siblings rather
than parent and child: nothing is pushed on the way here, so both have
@@ -1809,13 +1756,8 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
secret protects nobody: an attacker at the popup who wants the wallet gone can
uninstall the extension, so the only person such a gate stops is the owner who
forgot it. The typed name is a check that the user knows which wallet they are
on, not a secret, so it is matched as the user can see it: letter case,
surrounding spaces and repeated inner spaces are ignored, and characters that
paint nothing (format characters such as the zero-width space,
default-ignorable characters, and DELETE — the same set
`src/shared/symbolSpoof.js` strips) are removed from both sides before
comparing. An empty field, or one holding only spaces or such characters, is
refused whatever the wallet is called.
on, not a secret, so it is matched with surrounding spaces and letter case
ignored.
- Not in `RESTORABLE_VIEWS`, alongside `delete-wallet-confirm`: a popup reopened
by accident must not land on a screen whose button erases key material.
@@ -2033,19 +1975,9 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
#### StateRecovery (`state-recovery`)
- **When**: the stored profile fails `assertStateUsable()`. At open, that is
`loadState()` refusing it, so the popup has no profile at all. While the popup
is open, on any screen, it is a save refusing it: every `saveState()` reads
the stored record and runs the same check before writing, so the popup finds
it at the next navigation or ten-second refresh, whether or not the network
answers ([#373](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/373)). A save that
fails for any other reason, such as a storage read or write that errors, gets
the "NOT SAVED" banner instead and leaves the screen as it is. The screen it
replaces is left as any navigation leaves it, so a revealed phrase or key, or
a typed password, is wiped. Once up, the screen stays until the popup closes
or reloads: work still running in the popup, such as a transaction wait,
cannot replace it, even after the record is erased in another window. It is
the only screen that never appears during ordinary use.
- **When**: `loadState()` refused the stored profile, so the popup has no
profile at all. It is the only screen reached without one, and the only one
that never appears during ordinary use.
- **Why it exists**: a record the wallet cannot read used to render nothing — no
view, no message, no control — while every dApp call answered a generic
internal error, and no reset or wipe control existed anywhere in the product.
@@ -2072,20 +2004,16 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
Nothing was erased." on the error line
- **No other control is reachable.** The Settings gear is hidden while this
screen is up, because every screen behind it renders from the profile that
could not be read. `showView()` is not used to raise it, for the same reason:
it reads and writes the state singleton. Under an open popup the screen is
passed to `showView()` only to run the replaced screen's cleanup; from then on
`showView()` shows nothing else in that popup.
could not be read, and `showView()` is not used to raise it for the same
reason — it reads and writes the state singleton.
- **Both controls are required.** An export with no reset leaves the user
looking at a broken profile with no way to use the wallet again; a reset with
no export destroys the only copy of a record that may hold recoverable key
material. The typed phrase is the same barrier DeleteWalletLostPassword uses,
and for the same reason: there is no password to gate this with, since there
is no profile to check one against.
- Not in `RESTORABLE_VIEWS`, and never recorded as the current view: the record
can become readable again under an open popup, erased in another window, and
the next save from that popup then succeeds. A popup opened after that opens
normally.
- Not in `RESTORABLE_VIEWS`: it is never persisted as the current view, because
nothing on this path writes state at all.
### External Services
@@ -2257,17 +2185,6 @@ the log level and turns the banner on, and that is all it may ever do: it feeds
constant directly, so no runtime toggle in a release build can reach the
hardcoded test phrase.
At the raised log level the console also shows the wallet's addresses with their
balances and ENS names, the token contracts looked up, and a line for each
request made through `debugFetch` in `src/shared/log.js` (the explorer, the
price feed, the RPC calls a site makes, and the endpoint checks in settings) and
for its response. A request is logged by its HTTP method, the origin of its URL
(scheme, host and port) and, for a JSON-RPC call, the method name; the balance
refresh, the token lookup and a failed endpoint check in settings name the
endpoint by its origin too. The URL's path and query string, where RPC providers
put API keys, any user name and password in it, and the request body are never
logged.
### Key Decisions
- **No framework**: The popup UI is vanilla JS and HTML. The extension is small
@@ -2394,8 +2311,7 @@ indexes it as a real token transfer.
act on and what the user believes they own rather than what the history
displays. All three surfaces read the rule from `src/shared/symbolSpoof.js`,
so they cannot answer the question differently. A symbol the list maps to no
contract at all — the native asset's labels: `"ETH"` and every network's
`nativeCurrency`, such as `"SepoliaETH"`, on every network — may be borne by
contract at all — `"ETH"`, the native asset, is the only one — may be borne by
no contract, so every ERC-20 claiming it is a spoof on all three. The user's
real ETH balance is not an ERC-20 and is read over RPC, so the rule never sees
it.
@@ -2404,8 +2320,7 @@ indexes it as a real token transfer.
fewer than 1,000 holders are hidden from transaction history by default.
Legitimate tokens have substantial holder counts; poisoning tokens typically
have zero. This catches new poisoning contracts that use novel symbols not in
the known token list. A transfer whose token's holder count is unknown (see
Data Model) is kept: only a reported count below 1,000 hides it.
the known token list.
- **Fraud contract blocklist**: AutistMask maintains a local list of known fraud
contract addresses. Token transfers involving these contracts are filtered
@@ -2415,9 +2330,7 @@ indexes it as a real token transfer.
- **Send-side token filtering**: Tokens with fewer than 1,000 holders are
excluded from the token selector on the send screen. This prevents users from
accidentally interacting with a spoofed token that appeared in their balance
via a fake Transfer event. A token whose holder count is unknown is kept in
the selector. The selector offers only tokens in the balance list, so such a
token is one on the bundled list or one the user tracks.
via a fake Transfer event.
- **Dust transaction filtering**: A second wave of the same attack used real
native ETH transfers instead of fake tokens. Transaction
@@ -2441,9 +2354,8 @@ indexes it as a real token transfer.
both cases identically to the history. The fraud contract blocklist is applied
unconditionally on that selector and is not consulted by the balance list at
all. The low-holder setting also gates the send selector, while the balance
list's own 1,000-holder floor is unconditional (see Data Model). An unknown
holder count passes the history and send-selector filters but not that floor.
The dust threshold applies to the transaction history alone.
list's own 1,000-holder floor is unconditional (see Data Model). The dust
threshold applies to the transaction history alone.
#### Phishing Domain Protection
-141
View File
@@ -45,126 +45,6 @@ but the review is broader than any of them.
# Completed Steps
- 2026-10-05: A token scale of zero decimals is tested
([#325](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/325)).
`resolveTokenDecimals()` already used a scale of 0 from the bundled list or
from a tracked token, but no test said so: turning either of its `d !== null`
checks into a plain truthiness check left every test green while a
zero-decimal token fell through to the next source, or to "decimals unknown".
The approval tests now assert a scale of 0 from each of those two sources,
both where it is resolved and on the approval screen's Amount line. The second
half of the issue, one shared `toDecimals()`, had already landed with
[#349](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/349).
- 2026-10-05: The e2e suite waits for a save to land before it closes the popup
([#446](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/446)). The Settings round
trip switched the theme and the network and closed the popup at once, and a
close before the save lands loses the switch; with the network left on
Sepolia, a dozen later tests failed too. Each Settings switch and spam-filter
toggle is now waited for in storage before the close, and `reopenPopup()`
waits until the view it expects to reopen on is the saved one. The restore
half of the round trip and the second filter toggle change a setting right
after a reopen, while the reopened popup's own saves may still be running;
they rely on the fix for
[#448](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/448).
- 2026-10-05: A change made while an earlier save from the same page is still
running is stored ([#448](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/448)).
`saveStateOnce()` took its baseline from the page's state after the write, so
a change made while the save waited on storage counted as already stored and
the save queued after it wrote nothing. A setting changed during the read was
lost; so was a wallet added, a site revoked or an endpoint changed during the
write, and a wallet deleted then stayed in storage. The save now copies the
page's fields when it starts, writes from that copy, and keeps the copy as the
baseline.
- 2026-10-05: The extension no longer opens a window for a site-connection
prompt already answered
([#287](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/287)). When the prompt was
decided before the toolbar popup raised for it had loaded, that popup was torn
down, `chrome.action.openPopup()` rejected, and the background opened its
fallback window for the answered approval and then removed it. In the Chrome
end-to-end suite the next test could take that window for its own prompt and
lose it under its wait. `openApprovalWindow()` now opens nothing for an
approval that is no longer pending. The blocklist test's Reject, whose window
closes itself, is clicked as the other site Reject is, with the click
witnessed. Making `e2e-chrome` a required check is still blocked: other
reports of the Chrome suite failing under load are open, among them
[#290](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/290) and
[#446](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/446), as `README.md` says.
- 2026-10-05: The lost-password delete confirmation refuses an empty field and
ignores characters that paint nothing
([#336](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/336)). A wallet named only
with spaces compared equal to an empty field, so typing nothing would have
deleted it, and a zero-width space in a name made the name impossible to type
back. An empty field is now refused whatever the name is, the same invisible
characters `src/shared/symbolSpoof.js` strips are removed from both sides, and
a name that shows nothing is shown and typed back as "Wallet N".
- 2026-10-05: A `holders_count` that is not a whole number in plain digits is
unknown, not read in part
([#251](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/251)). `parseInt` read
`1,000` as 1, `0x10` as 0 and `1e3` as 1, a reported low count that hides the
token in the transaction history and the send-screen token selector. A count
above `Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER` is unknown too, not rounded or `Infinity`. The
balance list's `holders !== null` check, which did nothing, is dropped.
`README.md` and `docs/README.md` now say how each filter treats an unknown
count and that the token screen leaves out its "Holders:" row then, and
`README.md` lists `src/shared/holders.js`.
- 2026-10-04: A popup boot in the tests loads transactions without failing
([#429](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/429)). The stand-in for
`filterTransactions` in `tests/support/popupBoot.js` returned a bare list,
while the real one returns `{ transactions, newFraudContracts }`, so every
boot onto Home, AddressDetail or AddressToken failed inside its transaction
loading and logged `loadHomeTxs failed` or `loadTransactions failed`; the rest
of that code never ran. The stand-in now returns the real shape, and
`tests/persistedFieldContract.test.js` boots onto each of the three and
asserts neither message is logged. `make test` time did not change measurably.
- 2026-10-04: The native token's label follows the network
([#372](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/372)). `networks.js` gives
each network a `nativeCurrency` and nothing read it: every screen wrote `ETH`,
so on Sepolia the balance, the value and the fee all read `ETH`. Every native
figure now reads `nativeCurrency`, which is `ETH` on mainnet and `SepoliaETH`
on Sepolia: the balance lists, Send and confirmation screens and the
contract-recipient warning the active network's; the approval, wait, success,
error and transaction detail screens, the transaction history and the refusal
of a fee above the limit that of the network the transaction's chain id names.
A token claiming any network's `nativeCurrency` is dropped as a fake, as one
claiming `ETH` already was, and the transaction detail screen calls an entry a
token transfer when it has a token contract, not by its symbol.
- 2026-10-04: A popup that is already open when the stored profile becomes
unreadable moves to the recovery screen
([#373](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/373)). It used to stay on
the last good profile, with the "NOT SAVED" banner at most, until reopened.
Every save already ran the check the popup runs at open, so the popup finds
the record at the next navigation or ten-second refresh, whether or not the
network answers; a save that fails that check now raises the recovery screen
and stops the refresh. The screen it replaces is left as any navigation leaves
it, so a revealed phrase or key or a typed password is wiped. Once up, nothing
else in that popup can replace it, and a later save or a transaction wait that
ends does not clear an export or a typed confirmation. It is never saved as
the current view, so a popup opened after the record is erased in another
window opens normally. Any other failed save still gets the banner and leaves
the screen alone.
- 2026-10-04: A swap whose deadline is later than a JavaScript date can hold is
decoded ([#437](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/437)). A date
reaches only to 275760-09-13, so a later deadline, such as the `uint256`
maximum, made the `Deadline` line throw, and the approval screen showed the
swap as an undecoded contract call with nothing saying why. That line now
reads `After 275760-09-13 00:00:00 (no deadline in practice)`.
- 2026-10-04: The swap decoder reads two router zeros the way the router does
([#415](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/415)). A V2 exact-in
`amountIn` of zero means an earlier step already sent the tokens to the pair;
`Amount` showed `0.0000` for it and now reads
`Whatever an earlier step sent to the pair (V2 already paid)`. A
`BALANCE_CHECK_ERC20` with a zero `minBalance` guarantees nothing, yet it
replaced the minimum an earlier swap step stated, so `Min. received` read
`None (no minimum guaranteed)`; it now sets the output side only when that
side holds no minimum at the point the check is reached. A nonzero
`minBalance` still sets the output side.
- 2026-10-04: The signature screen shows a personal message as the bytes that
are signed ([#403](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/403)). It
showed only the decoded text, with bidirectional and zero-width characters
@@ -175,27 +55,6 @@ but the review is broader than any of them.
characters that paint nothing are shown as `U+XXXX` marks, and a message that
is not hex by the rule signing reads it with is shown as plain text with
"Sign" disabled, since such a message has no bytes to sign.
- 2026-10-04: A token that reports more than 80 decimal places has no known
scale ([#350](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/350)). The shared
scale check `toDecimals()` accepted any `uint8`, but `formatUnits()` throws
above 80, so such a token left a swap or an ERC-20 call on the approval screen
undecoded, with nothing saying why. The check now stops at 80, and both
approval paths show the base-unit amount with the scale stated as unknown. The
balance list and the history list use the same check, so the same token no
longer stops an address's token balances from refreshing or its history from
loading.
- 2026-10-04: Debug mode no longer writes RPC API keys to the console
([#410](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/410)). `debugFetch` logged
every request's full URL and body, so an RPC endpoint with a key in its path
or query string printed that key on every request. It now logs the HTTP
method, the URL's origin and, for a JSON-RPC call, the method name. The
balance refresh and token lookup log the RPC endpoint by its origin too. A
failed RPC call's error line prints the error's short message, which names the
HTTP status, not its full message, which carries the request URL. A failed
endpoint check in settings names the endpoint by its origin, not the `fetch`
error's message, which carries the whole URL, password included, for a URL
with a user name and password. The README's DEBUG Mode Policy says what debug
mode logs.
- 2026-10-04: A site has at most one connection prompt and one signature prompt
open at a time ([#405](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/405)). Each
+1 -7
View File
@@ -333,13 +333,7 @@ it is hidden from your transaction history and from the send token list.
from transaction history and the send token list, and are left out of your
balances unless they are on the bundled known-token list or you added them
yourself. Legitimate tokens have substantial holder counts; scam tokens deployed
for address poisoning typically have zero. When the explorer reports no holder
count for a token, or reports something other than a whole number in plain
digits (such as "1,000"), the count is unknown. An unknown count does not hide a
token from your transaction history or the send token list, and it does not get
a token into your balances either: such a token is listed only if it is on the
bundled known-token list or you added it yourself. The screen you reach by
clicking a token balance shows a "Holders:" line only when the count is known.
for address poisoning typically have zero.
**Fraud contract blocklist.** When AutistMask detects a fraudulent transfer, it
adds the contract address to a local blocklist. Future transactions from that
+1 -5
View File
@@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ function releaseApproval(approval) {
}
}
// Open approval in a separate popup window, unless it is no longer pending.
// Open approval in a separate popup window.
// This is the primary mechanism for tx/sign approvals (triggered programmatically,
// not from a user gesture) and the fallback for site-connection approvals.
// Never rejects. Its callers raise it from inside a Promise executor and drop
@@ -446,10 +446,6 @@ async function openApprovalWindow(id) {
);
}
// Already answered: a site-connection prompt decided before the toolbar
// popup raised for it had loaded, whose openPopup() rejects only now.
if (!pendingApprovals[id]) return;
let win = null;
try {
win = await windowsCreate(opts);
+14 -7
View File
@@ -640,13 +640,19 @@
Double-check the address before sending.
</div>
</div>
<!-- Its sentence names the network's native token, so show()
in confirmTx.js sets it. -->
<div
id="confirm-contract-warning"
class="mb-2 border border-red-500 border-dashed p-2 text-xs font-bold text-red-500"
class="mb-2"
style="visibility: hidden"
></div>
>
<div
class="border border-red-500 border-dashed p-2 text-xs font-bold text-red-500"
>
WARNING: The recipient is a smart contract. Sending ETH
or tokens directly to a contract may result in permanent
loss of funds.
</div>
</div>
<div
id="confirm-burn-warning"
class="mb-2"
@@ -684,13 +690,14 @@
Your balance does not cover this amount plus the network
fee. Please go back and send a smaller amount.
</div>
<!-- Its sentence names the network's native token, so show()
in confirmTx.js sets it. -->
<div
id="confirm-gas-error"
class="mb-2 border border-border border-dashed p-2 text-xs"
style="visibility: hidden"
></div>
>
You do not have enough ETH to pay the network fee for this
transfer. Please add ETH to this address and try again.
</div>
<!-- Its sentence names why the fee could not be estimated,
so show() in confirmTx.js sets it. -->
<div
+2 -27
View File
@@ -50,10 +50,6 @@ function renderWalletList() {
let refreshInFlight = false;
// The ten-second refresh init() starts, stopped when the popup moves to the
// recovery screen: there is no profile left to refresh.
let refreshTimer = null;
async function doRefreshAndRender() {
if (refreshInFlight) return;
refreshInFlight = true;
@@ -159,28 +155,7 @@ async function init() {
// reported rather than being swallowed by the save queue
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/362). Registered ahead of
// the approval-window branch below too, since that window saves as well.
//
// Every save first reads the stored record and refuses it with the same
// check loadState() runs below. So a record that becomes unreadable while
// the popup is open is found by the next save, a navigation or the
// ten-second refresh, and gets the screen it would get at open
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/373). Passing the recovery
// screen to showView() first leaves the current screen as any navigation
// does, so a phrase, key or password on it is wiped, and from then on
// showView() shows nothing else. A later save that fails the same way,
// such as a refresh already in flight, comes back here, where both calls
// see the screen already up and do nothing. Any other failed save is a
// read or write that failed, and gets the banner without changing the
// screen.
onSaveFailure((e) => {
if (e instanceof StateUnusableError) {
clearInterval(refreshTimer);
showView("state-recovery");
stateRecovery.show(e);
} else {
showSaveFailureBanner(e);
}
});
onSaveFailure(showSaveFailureBanner);
try {
await loadState();
} catch (e) {
@@ -269,7 +244,7 @@ async function init() {
renderWalletList();
restoreView();
doRefreshAndRender();
refreshTimer = setInterval(doRefreshAndRender, 10000);
setInterval(doRefreshAndRender, 10000);
}
}
+1 -2
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ const {
goBack,
pushCurrentView,
} = require("./helpers");
const { state, saveState, currentNetwork } = require("../../shared/state");
const { state, saveState } = require("../../shared/state");
const { formatAddressTotal, getAddressValue } = require("../../shared/prices");
const {
fetchRecentTransactions,
@@ -153,7 +153,6 @@ async function loadTransactions(address) {
const rawTxs = await fetchRecentTransactions(
address,
state.blockscoutUrl,
currentNetwork().chainId,
);
const result = filterTransactions(rawTxs, {
hideSpoofedSymbols: state.hideSpoofedSymbols,
+2 -4
View File
@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ const {
addressTitle,
escapeHtml,
displaySymbol,
nativeCurrency,
balanceLine,
unknownableAmount,
renderAddressHtml,
@@ -18,7 +17,7 @@ const {
goBack,
pushCurrentView,
} = require("./helpers");
const { state, saveState, currentNetwork } = require("../../shared/state");
const { state, saveState } = require("../../shared/state");
const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS, resolveSymbol } = require("../../shared/tokenList");
const { formatUsd, getPrice } = require("../../shared/prices");
const {
@@ -107,7 +106,7 @@ function show() {
let symbol, amount, price;
const knownToken = TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.get(tokenId.toLowerCase());
if (tokenId === "ETH") {
symbol = nativeCurrency();
symbol = "ETH";
amount = parseFloat(addr.balance || "0");
price = getPrice("ETH");
} else {
@@ -227,7 +226,6 @@ async function loadTransactions(address, tokenId) {
const rawTxs = await fetchRecentTransactions(
address,
state.blockscoutUrl,
currentNetwork().chainId,
);
const result = filterTransactions(rawTxs, {
hideSpoofedSymbols: state.hideSpoofedSymbols,
+4 -19
View File
@@ -12,10 +12,7 @@ const {
formatFee,
} = require("./helpers");
const { state, saveState } = require("../../shared/state");
const {
networkByChainId,
nativeCurrencyByChainId,
} = require("../../shared/networks");
const { networkByChainId } = require("../../shared/networks");
const {
formatEther,
formatUnits,
@@ -222,12 +219,8 @@ function showTxFee(approvedTx) {
const gasLimit = BigInt(approvedTx.gasLimit);
const feePerGas = BigInt(approvedTx.maxFeePerGas || approvedTx.gasPrice);
// Through formatFee(), as the confirmation screen's fee is, so the same
// fee reads the same on both. In the native currency of the network shown
// above, as the value is.
$("approve-tx-fee").textContent = formatFee(
gasLimit * feePerGas,
nativeCurrencyByChainId(approvedTx.chainId),
);
// fee reads the same on both.
$("approve-tx-fee").textContent = formatFee(gasLimit * feePerGas);
let detail =
gasLimit.toString() +
@@ -271,7 +264,6 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
amount: formatTxValue(ethValue),
token: "ETH",
tokenSymbol: null,
chainId: approvedTx.chainId,
};
// If this is an ERC-20 call, try to extract the real recipient and amount
@@ -337,15 +329,8 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
const ethPrice = getPrice("ETH");
const ethUsd = ethPrice ? parseFloat(ethValueFormatted) * ethPrice : null;
const usdStr = formatUsd(ethUsd);
// In the native currency of the network the transaction is for, which the
// Network line names, not the active network's: a site can switch the
// active network after this transaction is prepared and back before it is
// signed.
$("approve-tx-value").textContent =
ethValueFormatted +
" " +
nativeCurrencyByChainId(approvedTx.chainId) +
(usdStr ? " (" + usdStr + ")" : "");
ethValueFormatted + " ETH" + (usdStr ? " (" + usdStr + ")" : "");
showTxFee(approvedTx);
+12 -42
View File
@@ -11,14 +11,13 @@ const {
addressTitle,
escapeHtml,
displaySymbol,
nativeCurrency,
renderAddressHtml,
attachCopyHandlers,
goBack,
onViewLeave,
formatFee,
} = require("./helpers");
const { state, currentNetwork } = require("../../shared/state");
const { state } = require("../../shared/state");
const { getSignerForAddress } = require("../../shared/wallet");
const { decryptWithPassword } = require("../../shared/vault");
const { formatUsd, getPrice } = require("../../shared/prices");
@@ -91,7 +90,7 @@ function show(txInfo) {
// The raw symbol is the price-table key; the capped one is what the
// screen says. Truncating before the lookup would silently drop the
// price of any token whose symbol is long enough to be capped.
const rawSymbol = isErc20 ? txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?" : nativeCurrency();
const rawSymbol = isErc20 ? txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?" : "ETH";
const symbol = displaySymbol(rawSymbol);
// Transaction type
@@ -99,7 +98,7 @@ function show(txInfo) {
$("confirm-type").textContent =
"ERC-20 token transfer (" + symbol + ")";
} else {
$("confirm-type").textContent = "Native " + symbol + " transfer";
$("confirm-type").textContent = "Native ETH transfer";
}
// Token contract section (ERC-20 only)
@@ -163,7 +162,7 @@ function show(txInfo) {
const bal = txInfo.balance || "0";
const balUsd = ethPrice ? parseFloat(bal) * ethPrice : null;
$("confirm-balance").textContent = valueWithUsd(
truncateAmountNeverZero(bal) + " " + symbol,
truncateAmountNeverZero(bal) + " ETH",
balUsd,
);
}
@@ -198,19 +197,6 @@ function show(txInfo) {
// estimate landing later never moves anything.
$("confirm-amount-fee-error").classList.toggle("hidden", isErc20);
$("confirm-gas-error").classList.toggle("hidden", !isErc20);
$("confirm-gas-error").textContent =
"You do not have enough " +
nativeCurrency() +
" to pay the network fee for this transfer. Please add " +
nativeCurrency() +
" to this address and try again.";
// Shown later, once checkRecipientHistory() finds a contract.
$("confirm-contract-warning").textContent =
"WARNING: The recipient is a smart contract. Sending " +
nativeCurrency() +
" or tokens directly to a contract may result in permanent loss of" +
" funds.";
// The fee-unknown message names its cause, which is also known here.
// Without the token's scale estimateGas() cannot encode the transfer, so
@@ -259,9 +245,7 @@ function show(txInfo) {
// touches already occupies its space, so re-running it never moves anything.
function renderValidation(txInfo) {
const isErc20 = txInfo.token !== "ETH";
const symbol = isErc20
? displaySymbol(txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?")
: nativeCurrency();
const symbol = isErc20 ? displaySymbol(txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?") : "ETH";
const { canSend, codes } = validateTransfer({
isErc20,
@@ -274,7 +258,7 @@ function renderValidation(txInfo) {
// Messages carrying the user's own numbers are built here; the fixed
// sentences live in the reserved elements in index.html, except the
// gas and fee-unknown ones, which show() sets.
// fee-unknown one, which show() sets.
const messages = [];
if (codes.includes(CODES.AMOUNT_INVALID)) {
messages.push("Please enter a valid amount to send.");
@@ -303,13 +287,9 @@ function renderValidation(txInfo) {
messages.push(
"Insufficient balance. You have " +
truncateAmountNeverZero(txInfo.balance || "0") +
" " +
symbol +
" but are trying to send " +
" ETH but are trying to send " +
txInfo.amount +
" " +
symbol +
".",
" ETH.",
);
}
@@ -398,30 +378,24 @@ async function estimateGas(txInfo) {
// The fee line goes through formatFee(), as the approval screen's
// does, so the same fee reads the same on both.
if (estimateWei !== null && estimateWei < gasCostWei) {
$("confirm-fee-amount").textContent =
"~" + formatFee(estimateWei, nativeCurrency());
$("confirm-fee-amount").textContent = "~" + formatFee(estimateWei);
$("confirm-fee-reserve").textContent =
"up to " +
truncateAmountNeverZero(formatEther(gasCostWei)) +
" " +
nativeCurrency() +
" reserved";
" ETH reserved";
setVisible("confirm-fee-reserve", true);
} else {
// No spread to report: either there is no estimate, or the node
// quotes a gas price at or above maxFeePerGas, so the expected
// cost is not below the reserve. Show the reserve alone.
$("confirm-fee-amount").textContent = formatFee(
gasCostWei,
nativeCurrency(),
);
$("confirm-fee-amount").textContent = formatFee(gasCostWei);
setVisible("confirm-fee-reserve", false);
}
feeStatus = FEE_KNOWN;
feeWei = gasCostWei;
renderValidation(txInfo);
} catch (e) {
log.errorf("gas estimation failed:", e.shortMessage || e.message);
log.errorf("gas estimation failed:", e.message);
if (pendingTx !== txInfo) return;
$("confirm-fee-amount").textContent = "Unable to estimate";
setVisible("confirm-fee-reserve", false);
@@ -534,10 +508,6 @@ function init(_ctx) {
$("btn-confirm-send").disabled = true;
$("btn-confirm-send").classList.add("text-muted");
// The network it is sent on. The wait, success and error screens
// label its amount by this, not by the network active when they draw.
pendingTx.chainId = currentNetwork().chainId;
let tx;
try {
const signer = getSignerForAddress(
+13 -26
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ const {
removeWalletFromState,
broadcastActiveChanged,
} = require("../../shared/walletDelete");
const { INVISIBLE_CHARACTERS } = require("../../shared/symbolSpoof");
let deleteWalletIndex = null;
let lostPasswordIndex = null;
@@ -21,31 +20,21 @@ let ctx = null;
// The name shown for a wallet, and on the lost-password screen the string
// the user has to type back. One function so the two cannot disagree: a
// confirmation that asks for a name other than the one on screen is
// unusable. A name that shows nothing at all (only spaces, or only
// zero-width characters) is replaced by "Wallet N" for the same reason:
// there would be nothing on screen to type back.
// unusable.
function displayName(walletIdx) {
const wallet = state.wallets[walletIdx];
const name = wallet && wallet.name;
if (name && confirmKey(name)) return name;
return "Wallet " + (walletIdx + 1);
return (wallet && wallet.name) || "Wallet " + (walletIdx + 1);
}
// What the typed confirmation and the wallet name are compared as. HTML
// collapses runs of whitespace when it renders the name, so a wallet named
// "My Wallet" with two spaces DISPLAYS as "My Wallet": the user cannot
// see the second space and cannot type a string that matches the stored
// name. Characters that paint nothing, such as a zero-width space, are
// invisible the same way and are removed first. Comparing this form on
// both sides is what keeps the confirmation satisfiable, on the one screen
// whose whole purpose is unwedging a user who is already stuck. Case and
// surrounding space go the same way.
// name. Comparing collapsed on both sides is what keeps the confirmation
// satisfiable, on the one screen whose whole purpose is unwedging a user
// who is already stuck. Case and surrounding space go the same way.
function confirmKey(name) {
return name
.replace(INVISIBLE_CHARACTERS, "")
.trim()
.replace(/\s+/g, " ")
.toLowerCase();
return name.trim().replace(/\s+/g, " ").toLowerCase();
}
// Drop the password from the DOM and the wallet selection from the
@@ -185,16 +174,14 @@ function init(_ctx) {
return;
}
// Case, surrounding spaces, repeated inner spaces and invisible
// characters are not part of the confirmation; see confirmKey().
// This asks whether the user knows which wallet they are on; it is
// not a secret, and refusing "wallet 2" for "Wallet 2" would only
// teach the user to distrust the control. An empty field is
// refused whatever the wallet is called, so no stored name can
// ever be confirmed by typing nothing.
const typed = confirmKey($("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value);
// Case, surrounding spaces and repeated inner spaces are not part
// of the confirmation; see confirmKey(). This asks whether the
// user knows which wallet they are on; it is not a secret, and
// refusing "wallet 2" for "Wallet 2" would only teach the user to
// distrust the control.
const typed = $("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value;
const expected = displayName(lostPasswordIndex);
if (typed === "" || typed !== confirmKey(expected)) {
if (confirmKey(typed) !== confirmKey(expected)) {
$("delete-wallet-lost-flash").textContent =
"That is not the name of this wallet. Type " +
expected +
+9 -40
View File
@@ -52,8 +52,9 @@ const VIEWS = [
"export-privkey",
"show-phrase",
// Shown by src/popup/views/stateRecovery.js when the stored profile
// cannot be read, never by showView() (see there), but listed so that
// every view-hiding loop covers it.
// cannot be read. It is never reached through showView() — by then the
// state singleton this file writes on every navigation refuses to be read
// — but it is listed so that every view-hiding loop covers it.
"state-recovery",
];
@@ -84,28 +85,12 @@ function hideError(id) {
el.style.visibility = "hidden";
}
// Set when src/popup/index.js passes the recovery screen to showView(), and
// never cleared. Kept in memory for this popup's life, never in
// state.currentView, which is saved: a popup opened later must not inherit it.
let stateRecoveryShown = false;
function showView(name) {
// The recovery screen, once up, is never replaced: work still running
// when it went up, such as a transaction wait, must not take the user off
// it or clear what they exported or typed there
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/373).
if (stateRecoveryShown) return;
const leaving = state.currentView;
if (leaving && leaving !== name) {
const onLeave = viewLeaveHandlers.get(leaving);
if (onLeave) onLeave();
}
// Passed here only so the screen it replaces is left like any other;
// stateRecovery.show() raises it, and it is never the current view.
if (name === "state-recovery") {
stateRecoveryShown = true;
return;
}
for (const v of VIEWS) {
const el = document.getElementById(`view-${v}`);
if (el) {
@@ -267,31 +252,16 @@ function unknownableAmount(balance) {
return Number.isFinite(n) ? n : null;
}
// The active network's native token symbol, `ETH` on mainnet and `SepoliaETH`
// on Sepolia, as src/shared/networks.js names it. The wallet's balances and
// the Send and confirmation screens, which send on the active network, label a
// native amount with this; a transaction already made or requested is labelled
// by its own chain id, through nativeCurrencyByChainId() in networks.js. The
// "ETH" that state.selectedToken and txInfo.token hold is the native token's
// id, not its label, and stays "ETH" on every network.
function nativeCurrency() {
return currentNetwork().nativeCurrency;
}
// A network fee in wei as the confirmation and approval screens both show it:
// the ETH figure through truncateAmountNeverZero() and labelled `symbol`, the
// native currency of the network the fee is paid on, then its USD value when
// the ETH price is known. The USD value is of the exact fee, not of the
// truncated figure.
function formatFee(wei, symbol) {
// the ETH figure through truncateAmountNeverZero(), then its USD value when the
// ETH price is known. The USD value is of the exact fee, not of the truncated
// figure.
function formatFee(wei) {
const eth = formatEther(wei);
const ethPrice = getPrice("ETH");
const usd = ethPrice ? formatUsd(parseFloat(eth) * ethPrice) : "";
return (
truncateAmountNeverZero(eth) +
" " +
symbol +
(usd ? " (" + usd + ")" : "")
truncateAmountNeverZero(eth) + " ETH" + (usd ? " (" + usd + ")" : "")
);
}
@@ -333,7 +303,7 @@ function balanceLine(symbol, amount, price, tokenId) {
function balanceLinesForAddress(addr, trackedTokens, showZero) {
let html = balanceLine(
nativeCurrency(),
"ETH",
parseFloat(addr.balance || "0"),
getPrice("ETH"),
"ETH",
@@ -690,7 +660,6 @@ module.exports = {
balanceLinesForAddress,
addressHoldsFunds,
unknownableAmount,
nativeCurrency,
formatFee,
addressColor,
addressDotHtml,
+3 -13
View File
@@ -10,17 +10,11 @@ const {
addressTitle,
escapeHtml,
displaySymbol,
nativeCurrency,
renderAddressHtml,
attachCopyHandlers,
pushCurrentView,
} = require("./helpers");
const {
state,
saveState,
currentAddress,
currentNetwork,
} = require("../../shared/state");
const { state, saveState, currentAddress } = require("../../shared/state");
const { notify } = require("../../shared/browserApi");
const {
updateSendBalance,
@@ -74,7 +68,7 @@ function renderTotalValue() {
return;
}
const ethBal = parseFloat(addr.balance || "0");
const ethStr = ethBal.toFixed(4) + " " + nativeCurrency();
const ethStr = ethBal.toFixed(4) + " ETH";
const ethUsd = ethPrice ? " (" + formatUsd(ethBal * ethPrice) + ")" : "";
el.textContent = ethStr + ethUsd;
@@ -188,11 +182,7 @@ async function loadHomeTxs(ctx) {
try {
const fetches = allAddresses.map((addr) =>
fetchRecentTransactions(
addr,
state.blockscoutUrl,
currentNetwork().chainId,
),
fetchRecentTransactions(addr, state.blockscoutUrl),
);
const results = await Promise.all(fetches);
+2 -5
View File
@@ -5,8 +5,6 @@ const {
showFlash,
addressTitle,
displaySymbol,
escapeHtml,
nativeCurrency,
renderAddressHtml,
attachCopyHandlers,
goBack,
@@ -126,7 +124,7 @@ function updateToValidation() {
function renderSendTokenSelect(addr) {
const sel = $("send-token");
sel.innerHTML = `<option value="ETH">${escapeHtml(nativeCurrency())}</option>`;
sel.innerHTML = '<option value="ETH">ETH</option>';
const fraudSet = new Set(
(state.fraudContracts || []).map((a) => a.toLowerCase()),
);
@@ -206,8 +204,7 @@ function updateSendBalance() {
$("send-balance").textContent =
"Current balance: " +
truncateAmountNeverZero(addr.balance || "0") +
" " +
nativeCurrency();
" ETH";
} else {
const symbol = resolveSymbol(
token,
+5 -14
View File
@@ -16,12 +16,7 @@ const {
} = require("../dustThreshold");
const { state, saveState, currentNetwork } = require("../../shared/state");
const { onChainSwitch } = require("../../shared/chainSwitch");
const {
log,
debugFetch,
urlOrigin,
setRuntimeDebug,
} = require("../../shared/log");
const { log, debugFetch, setRuntimeDebug } = require("../../shared/log");
const deleteWallet = require("./deleteWallet");
const showPhrase = require("./showPhrase");
const { walletHasRecoveryPhrase } = require("../../shared/wallet");
@@ -277,11 +272,8 @@ function init(ctx) {
showFlash("Wrong network: expected " + net.name + ".");
return;
}
} catch {
// Not the error's message: fetch puts the whole URL, password and
// key included, in the message of the error it throws for a URL
// with a user name and password or one it cannot parse.
log.errorf("RPC validation fetch failed:", urlOrigin(url));
} catch (e) {
log.errorf("RPC validation fetch failed:", e.message);
showFlash("Could not reach endpoint.");
return;
}
@@ -303,9 +295,8 @@ function init(ctx) {
showFlash("Endpoint returned HTTP " + resp.status + ".");
return;
}
} catch {
// Not the error's message, as for the RPC check above.
log.errorf("Blockscout validation failed:", urlOrigin(url));
} catch (e) {
log.errorf("Blockscout validation failed:", e.message);
showFlash("Could not reach endpoint.");
return;
}
+2 -9
View File
@@ -3,10 +3,8 @@
// Everything else in the popup assumes a loaded profile: showView() reads and
// writes the state singleton, every view renders from it, and the Settings
// gear leads to a screen that does both. None of that is available here — by
// the time this runs, the stored record has been REFUSED, deliberately: at
// open loadState() refused it and reading the singleton throws
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/311), and under an open popup
// a save refused it (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/373).
// the time this runs, loadState() has REFUSED, deliberately, and reading the
// singleton throws (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/311).
//
// So this module talks to the DOM directly and touches no state at all. It is
// the one screen that must work when nothing else can, which is also why it
@@ -172,11 +170,6 @@ function wire() {
* refused, or its sentence.
*/
function show(problem) {
// Already up: a later save that trips over the same record, such as a
// refresh that was in flight when the screen went up, must not clear what
// the user has exported or typed here.
if (!$("view-state-recovery").classList.contains("hidden")) return;
const sentence =
(problem && (problem.problem || problem.message)) || String(problem);
+7 -15
View File
@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ const {
goBack,
} = require("./helpers");
const { state } = require("../../shared/state");
const { nativeCurrencyByChainId } = require("../../shared/networks");
const { formatEther, formatUnits } = require("ethers");
const makeBlockie = require("ethereum-blockies-base64");
const { log, debugFetch } = require("../../shared/log");
@@ -42,10 +41,8 @@ function getTransactionType(tx) {
return "Token Approval";
return "Contract Call";
}
// By the token contract, not the symbol: a token chooses its own symbol
// and can report the native token's, but only a token transfer has one.
if (tx.contractAddress) return "ERC-20 Token Transfer";
return "Native " + nativeCurrencyByChainId(tx.chainId) + " Transfer";
if (tx.symbol && tx.symbol !== "ETH") return "ERC-20 Token Transfer";
return "Native ETH Transfer";
}
function blockieHtml(address) {
@@ -87,11 +84,6 @@ function show(tx) {
isContractCall: tx.isContractCall || false,
method: tx.method || null,
contractAddress: tx.contractAddress || null,
// The network the history entry was read from. The type line and
// the fee are in its native currency, not the active network's:
// a site can switch the active network before a later popup
// shows this screen again.
chainId: tx.chainId,
},
};
render();
@@ -187,7 +179,7 @@ function render() {
if (el) el.classList.add("hidden");
}
loadFullTxDetails(tx.hash, tx.to, tx.chainId);
loadFullTxDetails(tx.hash, tx.to);
const isoStr = isoDate(tx.timestamp);
$("tx-detail-time").innerHTML =
@@ -205,7 +197,7 @@ function showDetailField(sectionId, contentId, value) {
section.classList.remove("hidden");
}
function populateOnChainDetails(txData, chainId) {
function populateOnChainDetails(txData) {
// Block number
if (txData.block_number != null) {
const blockLink = explorerUrl("block", String(txData.block_number));
@@ -235,7 +227,7 @@ function populateOnChainDetails(txData, chainId) {
showDetailField(
"tx-detail-fee-section",
"tx-detail-fee",
feeEth + " " + nativeCurrencyByChainId(chainId),
feeEth + " ETH",
);
}
@@ -295,7 +287,7 @@ function populateOnChainDetails(txData, chainId) {
}
}
async function loadFullTxDetails(txHash, toAddress, chainId) {
async function loadFullTxDetails(txHash, toAddress) {
const section = $("tx-detail-calldata-section");
const actionEl = $("tx-detail-calldata-action");
const detailsEl = $("tx-detail-calldata-details");
@@ -312,7 +304,7 @@ async function loadFullTxDetails(txHash, toAddress, chainId) {
const txData = await resp.json();
// Populate on-chain detail fields (block, nonce, gas, fee)
populateOnChainDetails(txData, chainId);
populateOnChainDetails(txData);
const inputData = txData.raw_input || txData.input || null;
if (!inputData || inputData === "0x") return;
+7 -13
View File
@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ const {
} = require("./helpers");
const { resolveTokenSymbol } = require("../../shared/approvalAmount");
const { state } = require("../../shared/state");
const { nativeCurrencyByChainId } = require("../../shared/networks");
const { getProvider } = require("../../shared/balances");
const { log } = require("../../shared/log");
@@ -87,13 +86,9 @@ function startWait(txInfo, txHash, broadcastTime, pollNow) {
endWait();
const id = waitId;
// A native amount, here and on the success and error screens, is in the
// native currency of txInfo.chainId, the network the transaction was sent
// on, not the active network's: a site can switch the active network
// while this screen is open or before a later popup resumes it.
const symbol =
txInfo.token === "ETH"
? nativeCurrencyByChainId(txInfo.chainId)
? "ETH"
: displaySymbol(txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?");
$("wait-tx-summary").textContent = txInfo.amount + " " + symbol;
$("wait-tx-to").innerHTML = toAddressHtml(txInfo.to);
@@ -138,7 +133,7 @@ function startWait(txInfo, txHash, broadcastTime, pollNow) {
// failed — which matters most on a resumed wait, where the
// first poll is already past the deadline.
answered = false;
log.errorf("poll receipt failed:", e.shortMessage || e.message);
log.errorf("poll receipt failed:", e.message);
}
// The lookup is async: the wait may have ended while it was in
// flight, in which case this result must not touch the view.
@@ -198,10 +193,9 @@ function showWait(txInfo, txHash) {
// an object merely missing one of them throws a TypeError out of
// restoreView() — which init() does not guard, skipping the rest of popup
// init and leaving wait-tx on screen with no back control. A non-numeric
// broadcastTime leaves an unexitable wait counting "NaNs". txInfo.token,
// txInfo.tokenSymbol and txInfo.chainId are deliberately unchecked: they are
// compared and coalesced rather than dereferenced, and tokenSymbol is null for
// ETH.
// broadcastTime leaves an unexitable wait counting "NaNs". txInfo.token and
// txInfo.tokenSymbol are deliberately unchecked: they are compared and
// coalesced rather than dereferenced, and tokenSymbol is null for ETH.
function restoreWait() {
const d = state.viewData;
if (!d || !d.pendingWait) return false;
@@ -229,7 +223,7 @@ function showSuccess(txInfo, txHash, blockNumber) {
const symbol =
txInfo.token === "ETH"
? nativeCurrencyByChainId(txInfo.chainId)
? "ETH"
: displaySymbol(txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?");
state.viewData = {
amount: txInfo.amount,
@@ -326,7 +320,7 @@ function showError(txInfo, txHash, message) {
const symbol =
txInfo.token === "ETH"
? nativeCurrencyByChainId(txInfo.chainId)
? "ETH"
: displaySymbol(txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?");
state.viewData = {
amount: txInfo.amount,
+2 -2
View File
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ async function getFullWarnings(address, provider, options = {}) {
});
}
} catch (e) {
log.errorf("contract check failed:", e.shortMessage || e.message);
log.errorf("contract check failed:", e.message);
}
// Skip tx count check for contracts — they may legitimately have
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ async function getFullWarnings(address, provider, options = {}) {
});
}
} catch (e) {
log.errorf("tx count check failed:", e.shortMessage || e.message);
log.errorf("tx count check failed:", e.message);
}
}
+5 -5
View File
@@ -23,11 +23,11 @@
// disputed is refused rather than guessed at.
// Solidity's decimals() is a uint8, and every source here is ultimately
// reporting that call's result. toDecimals() is that check, stopping at the 80
// places formatUnits() accepts, and shared with the send path rather than
// copied: the bundled list stores numbers, the explorer's copy arrives as a
// string, and a token the user added by hand carries whatever lookupTokenInfo()
// got back, so the accepted types are enumerated rather than coerced.
// reporting that call's result. toDecimals() is that check, shared with the
// send path rather than copied: the bundled list stores numbers, the
// explorer's copy arrives as a string, and a token the user added by hand
// carries whatever lookupTokenInfo() got back, so the accepted types are
// enumerated rather than coerced.
const { toDecimals } = require("./transferAmount");
const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("./tokenList");
const { isSpoofedSymbol } = require("./symbolSpoof");
+2 -13
View File
@@ -54,11 +54,9 @@ const {
formatEther,
getAddress,
getBytes,
toQuantity,
verifyMessage,
verifyTypedData,
} = require("ethers");
const { nativeCurrencyByChainId } = require("./networks");
// The only transaction types this wallet signs: legacy, EIP-2930 and
// EIP-1559. populateTransaction() produces nothing else, so nothing else can
@@ -409,21 +407,12 @@ function assertWithinCeilings(tx) {
price = normalizeQuantity(tx.gasPrice, "gas price");
}
if (price !== null && gasLimit * price > MAX_TOTAL_FEE) {
// The fee is paid in the native currency of the network the
// transaction is for. Every caller's transaction names it.
const nativeCurrency = nativeCurrencyByChainId(
present(tx.chainId) ? toQuantity(tx.chainId) : null,
);
throw refuse(
"This transaction would allow a network fee of up to " +
formatEther(gasLimit * price) +
" " +
nativeCurrency +
", which is more than the " +
" ETH, which is more than the " +
formatEther(MAX_TOTAL_FEE) +
" " +
nativeCurrency +
" this wallet will sign for.",
" ETH this wallet will sign for.",
);
}
}
+13 -16
View File
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ const {
} = require("ethers");
const { ERC20_ABI } = require("./constants");
const { NETWORKS } = require("./networks");
const { log, debugFetch, urlOrigin } = require("./log");
const { log, debugFetch } = require("./log");
const { deriveAddressFromXpub } = require("./wallet");
const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("./tokenList");
const { LOW_HOLDER_THRESHOLD, parseHoldersCount } = require("./holders");
@@ -147,20 +147,20 @@ async function fetchTokenBalances(address, blockscoutUrl, trackedTokens) {
// null is a holding of an amount that cannot be stated, which is
// not the same as a holding of zero, and must never render as one.
const bal = scale === null ? null : formatTokenBalance(raw, scale);
// null means the explorer reported no readable count, which is
// not the same as a count of zero. This gate is not the
// low-holder display filter: it has no user-facing off switch and
// governs the whole balance list, so it stays strict and admits a
// token only on a reported count — an unreported one is no
// evidence, and `null >= LOW_HOLDER_THRESHOLD` is false. A
// legitimate token still reaches the list through the known
// null means the explorer reported no count, which is not the
// same as a count of zero. This gate is not the low-holder
// display filter: it has no user-facing off switch and governs
// the whole balance list, so it stays strict and admits a token
// only on a reported count — an unreported one is no evidence.
// A legitimate token still reaches the list through the known
// token list or by the user tracking it, and the null is carried
// through to the views, where the two low-holder filters treat
// an unknown count as "do not judge" rather than as zero.
const holders = parseHoldersCount(item.token.holders_count);
const isKnown = TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.has(tokenAddr);
const isTracked = trackedSet.has(tokenAddr);
const hasEnoughHolders = holders >= LOW_HOLDER_THRESHOLD;
const hasEnoughHolders =
holders !== null && holders >= LOW_HOLDER_THRESHOLD;
// Skip spam tokens the user never asked to see
if (!isKnown && !isTracked && !hasEnoughHolders) continue;
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ async function refreshBalances(
trackedTokens,
networkId,
) {
log.debugf("refreshBalances start, rpc:", urlOrigin(rpcUrl));
log.debugf("refreshBalances start, rpc:", rpcUrl);
const provider = getProvider(rpcUrl, networkId);
const updates = [];
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ async function refreshBalances(
log.errorf(
"ENS reverse failed",
addr.address,
e.shortMessage || e.message,
e.message,
);
// Keep existing addr.ensName if we had one
}),
@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ async function refreshBalances(
// Look up token metadata from its contract.
// Calls symbol() and decimals() to verify it implements ERC-20.
async function lookupTokenInfo(contractAddress, rpcUrl, networkId) {
log.debugf("lookupTokenInfo", contractAddress, "rpc:", urlOrigin(rpcUrl));
log.debugf("lookupTokenInfo", contractAddress, "rpc:", rpcUrl);
const provider = getProvider(rpcUrl, networkId);
const contract = new Contract(contractAddress, ERC20_ABI, provider);
@@ -305,10 +305,7 @@ async function lookupTokenInfo(contractAddress, rpcUrl, networkId) {
name = await contract.name();
log.debugf("name() =", name);
} catch (e) {
log.warnf(
"name() failed, using symbol as name:",
e.shortMessage || e.message,
);
log.warnf("name() failed, using symbol as name:", e.message);
name = symbol;
}
+1 -5
View File
@@ -42,11 +42,7 @@ async function resolveEnsName(address, rpcUrl, networkId) {
setCache(address, name);
return name;
} catch (e) {
log.errorf(
"ENS reverse lookup failed",
address,
e.shortMessage || e.message,
);
log.errorf("ENS reverse lookup failed", address, e.message);
// Don't cache failures — let subsequent lookups retry
return null;
}
+6 -15
View File
@@ -9,22 +9,13 @@
const LOW_HOLDER_THRESHOLD = 1000;
// Parse an explorer-supplied holders_count into a number, or null when it is
// not one. Only a whole number of zero or more, or a string made of nothing
// but the digits 0-9, is a count. Anything else is null, never read in part:
// "1,000", "0x10" and "1e3" are unknown, not 1, 0 and 1, because a count we
// cannot read is not a low count. A count above Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER is
// null too: a number cannot hold it exactly, so it would come back rounded,
// or as Infinity.
// Parse an explorer-supplied holders_count into a number, or null when the
// explorer did not report one. Anything unparseable is unknown too: a count
// we cannot read is not a count of zero.
function parseHoldersCount(raw) {
if (typeof raw === "number") {
return Number.isSafeInteger(raw) && raw >= 0 ? raw : null;
}
if (typeof raw === "string" && /^[0-9]+$/.test(raw)) {
const count = Number(raw);
return Number.isSafeInteger(count) ? count : null;
}
return null;
if (raw === null || raw === undefined || raw === "") return null;
const n = parseInt(raw, 10);
return Number.isFinite(n) ? n : null;
}
// True only for a token the explorer reported as having fewer holders than
+5 -25
View File
@@ -42,34 +42,14 @@ const log = {
},
};
// The origin (scheme, host and port) of a URL, for logging in place of the
// URL: RPC providers put API keys in the path or the query string, and a URL
// can carry a user name and password, which the origin leaves out. A URL that
// does not parse gives "", so logging never stops a request.
function urlOrigin(url) {
try {
return new URL(url).origin;
} catch {
return "";
}
}
// Fetch wrapper that debug-logs every request and response. It logs the
// URL's origin and, for a JSON-RPC body, the method name: never the full URL
// or body, which can carry an API key or a signed transaction.
// Fetch wrapper that debug-logs every request and response.
async function debugFetch(url, opts) {
const method = (opts && opts.method) || "GET";
const origin = urlOrigin(url);
let rpcMethod = "";
try {
rpcMethod = JSON.parse(opts.body).method || "";
} catch {
// no body, or a body that is not JSON
}
log.debugf("fetch →", method, origin, rpcMethod);
const body = opts && opts.body;
log.debugf("fetch →", method, url, body || "");
const resp = await fetch(url, opts);
log.debugf("fetch ←", resp.status, origin);
log.debugf("fetch ←", resp.status, url);
return resp;
}
module.exports = { log, debugFetch, urlOrigin, setRuntimeDebug, isDebug };
module.exports = { log, debugFetch, setRuntimeDebug, isDebug };
-10
View File
@@ -76,15 +76,6 @@ function networkByChainId(chainId) {
return null;
}
// The native currency of the network with this chain id. A transaction's
// value and fee are labelled with the one of the chain the transaction is on,
// which need not be the active network. `ETH` when the chain id is missing or
// no network here has it.
function nativeCurrencyByChainId(chainId) {
const network = networkByChainId(chainId);
return network ? network.nativeCurrency : "ETH";
}
// Build a block explorer link for the given path type and value.
// type: "address" | "tx" | "token" | "block"
function explorerLink(network, type, value) {
@@ -98,6 +89,5 @@ module.exports = {
isKnownNetworkId,
networkById,
networkByChainId,
nativeCurrencyByChainId,
explorerLink,
};
+5 -12
View File
@@ -122,9 +122,9 @@ function currentNetwork() {
return networkById(state.networkId);
}
// The persisted fields as this page held them when its last loadState()
// finished, or when its last successful saveState() began. saveState() diffs
// the live state against this to find only the fields THIS page changed since.
// The persisted fields as they stood at the end of this page's last
// loadState() or saveState(). saveState() diffs the live state against this
// to find only the fields THIS page actually changed.
//
// Deep-cloned, not a reference: callers mutate persisted objects and arrays
// in place (state.wallets.push(...)), and a reference baseline would mutate
@@ -464,10 +464,7 @@ function mergeNetworkEndpoints(base, ours, theirs) {
// does not own goes on being whatever its last loadState() saw, same as
// before this fix; only the persisted record is guaranteed current.
async function saveStateOnce() {
// A copy, so what this save compares and writes is the page's state as it
// stood when the save began. A change made while it waits on storage is
// left for the next save, which compares against this copy.
const current = structuredClone(snapshotPersisted());
const current = snapshotPersisted();
const result = await storageGet("autistmask");
// The record in storage right now is about to be merged into and written
// back, so it is validated exactly like a load validates it. Without this,
@@ -524,11 +521,7 @@ async function saveStateOnce() {
// exactly as it stood; see the note above.
rawState.hasWallet = rawState.wallets.length > 0;
// What this save compared and wrote, not the page's state now: a change
// made during the save must still differ from the baseline, or the save
// queued after it finds nothing to store
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/448).
baseline = current;
baseline = structuredClone(snapshotPersisted());
}
// showView() calls saveState() on every navigation without awaiting it, so
+2 -2
View File
@@ -11,8 +11,8 @@
// KNOWN_SYMBOLS maps a symbol to the set of lowercased contract addresses
// that may bear it, or to null. Null means the symbol belongs to the native
// asset, which has no contract at all, so no contract may bear it and every
// one that does is a spoof. "ETH" is one such entry, and every network's
// `nativeCurrency` in networks.js (`SepoliaETH`) is another, on every network.
// one that does is a spoof. "ETH" is the only such entry today; the rule is
// written so that a second one needs no change here or at any call site.
//
// The value is a set because a ticker is not unique: seven symbols in the
// bundled list belong to two real contracts each, and answering with one of
+1 -7
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@
// 511 tokens.
const { debugFetch } = require("./log");
const { NETWORKS } = require("./networks");
const COINDESK_API = "https://data-api.coindesk.com/index/cc/v1/latest/tick";
@@ -3611,9 +3610,7 @@ for (const t of TOKENS) {
// Build a map of symbol (uppercased) -> the set of contract addresses
// (lowercased) that legitimately bear it. Used for spoofed-symbol detection.
// "ETH" maps to null: the native asset has no contract, so no contract may
// bear its symbol. So does every network's `nativeCurrency` in networks.js
// (`SepoliaETH`), on every network, since that is the label the wallet shows
// its native asset under on that network.
// bear its symbol.
//
// The value is a set and not a single address because tickers are not unique
// and the list above proves it: seven of these 512 tokens share a symbol with
@@ -3627,9 +3624,6 @@ for (const t of TOKENS) {
// loosen the rule, because a contract outside the set is still a spoof.
const KNOWN_SYMBOLS = new Map();
KNOWN_SYMBOLS.set("ETH", null);
for (const network of Object.values(NETWORKS)) {
KNOWN_SYMBOLS.set(network.nativeCurrency.toUpperCase(), null);
}
for (const t of TOKENS) {
const upper = t.symbol.toUpperCase();
if (!KNOWN_SYMBOLS.has(upper)) {
+9 -23
View File
@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ const { log, debugFetch } = require("./log");
const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("./tokenList");
const { parseHoldersCount, isLowHolderCount } = require("./holders");
const { isSpoofedSymbol } = require("./symbolSpoof");
const { nativeCurrencyByChainId } = require("./networks");
// The uint8 test every scale in this wallet goes through. Shared, not copied:
// a scale is either reported or it is unknown, and "unknown" must mean the
// same thing here as it does on the screens that refuse to format one.
@@ -29,7 +28,7 @@ function normalizeAddress(addr) {
return (addr || "").toLowerCase();
}
function parseTx(tx, addrLower, chainId) {
function parseTx(tx, addrLower) {
const from = tx.from?.hash || "";
const to = tx.to?.hash || "";
const rawWei = tx.value || "0";
@@ -37,7 +36,7 @@ function parseTx(tx, addrLower, chainId) {
const method = tx.method || null;
// For contract calls, produce a meaningful label instead of "0.0000 ETH"
let symbol = nativeCurrencyByChainId(chainId);
let symbol = "ETH";
let value = formatTxValue(formatEther(rawWei));
let exactValue = formatEther(rawWei);
let rawAmount = rawWei;
@@ -91,11 +90,10 @@ function parseTx(tx, addrLower, chainId) {
holders: null,
isContractCall: toIsContract,
method: method,
chainId: chainId,
};
}
function parseTokenTransfer(tt, addrLower, chainId) {
function parseTokenTransfer(tt, addrLower) {
const from = tt.from?.hash || "";
const to = tt.to?.hash || "";
// The explorer's own answer, or null. Never a default: a transfer of
@@ -137,12 +135,10 @@ function parseTokenTransfer(tt, addrLower, chainId) {
contractAddress: normalizeAddress(
tt.token?.address_hash || tt.token?.address || "",
),
// null when the explorer reported no readable count: unknown, not
// zero. The low-holder filter declines to judge a null, so a
// legitimate token is not hidden because a field went missing
// upstream.
// null when the explorer reported no count: unknown, not zero. The
// low-holder filter declines to judge a null, so a legitimate token
// is not hidden because a field went missing upstream.
holders: parseHoldersCount(tt.token?.holders_count),
chainId: chainId,
};
}
@@ -225,15 +221,7 @@ function mergeTransactions(txs, tokenTransfers) {
return merged;
}
// `chainId` is the chain id of the network `blockscoutUrl` serves. Every entry
// carries it, and a native entry is labelled with that network's
// `nativeCurrency` from networks.js (`ETH`, `SepoliaETH`).
async function fetchRecentTransactions(
address,
blockscoutUrl,
chainId,
count = 25,
) {
async function fetchRecentTransactions(address, blockscoutUrl, count = 25) {
log.debugf("fetchRecentTransactions", address);
const addrLower = normalizeAddress(address);
@@ -266,10 +254,8 @@ async function fetchRecentTransactions(
const ttJson = ttResp.ok ? await ttResp.json() : {};
const txs = mergeTransactions(
(txJson.items || []).map((tx) => parseTx(tx, addrLower, chainId)),
(ttJson.items || []).map((tt) =>
parseTokenTransfer(tt, addrLower, chainId),
),
(txJson.items || []).map((tx) => parseTx(tx, addrLower)),
(ttJson.items || []).map((tt) => parseTokenTransfer(tt, addrLower)),
);
const result = txs.slice(0, count);
+4 -6
View File
@@ -27,11 +27,9 @@
const { parseUnits } = require("ethers");
// Solidity's decimals() returns a uint8, but ethers' formatUnits() and
// parseUnits() refuse more than 80 decimal places ("invalid FixedNumber
// decimals (too large)"). A scale of 81 to 255 can be neither displayed nor
// encoded, so it is not an answer this wallet can use, the same as no answer.
const MAX_DECIMALS = 80;
// Solidity's decimals() returns a uint8, so anything outside that range is not
// an answer this wallet can use.
const MAX_DECIMALS = 255;
const UNKNOWN_DISPLAYED_DECIMALS_MESSAGE =
"The transfer was not sent, because the number of decimal places this" +
@@ -57,7 +55,7 @@ function mismatchMessage(displayed, onChain) {
// A decimals value from any source as a number, or null if it is not one.
// decimals() comes back from ethers as a bigint and the explorer's copy arrives
// as a string, so both of those are accepted alongside a plain number; anything
// fractional, negative, above MAX_DECIMALS, or of any other type at all is not.
// fractional, negative, out of uint8 range, or of any other type at all is not.
//
// The types are enumerated rather than coerced because Number() is far too
// willing: Number([]) is 0 and Number(true) is 1, so a coercing check would
+15 -47
View File
@@ -84,31 +84,17 @@ function present(value) {
//
// `amountOutMinimum` gets no such mapping: V4Router compares it directly
// (`if (amountOut < params.amountOutMinimum) revert V4TooLittleReceived`), so
// a zero minimum is a literal zero slippage floor and is stated as one. Nor
// does the V3 path have it — universal-router's `V3SwapRouter.v3SwapExactInput`
// a zero minimum is a literal zero slippage floor and is stated as one. Nor do
// the V2/V3 paths have it — universal-router's `V3SwapRouter.v3SwapExactInput`
// special-cases only `ActionConstants.CONTRACT_BALANCE` (1<<255), never zero —
// so a zero V3 `amountIn` is a literal zero and is displayed as one. The V2
// exact-in path gives zero a meaning of its own: see ALREADY_PAID.
// so a zero `amountIn` there is a literal zero and is displayed as one.
const OPEN_DELTA = Symbol("v4-open-delta");
// The Universal Router's V2 exact-in spells "the pair already holds the input
// tokens" as an amount of zero: universal-router
// `contracts/libraries/Constants.sol` declares
// `uint256 internal constant ALREADY_PAID = 0` ("Used for identifying cases
// when a v2 pair has already received input tokens"), and
// `V2SwapRouter.v2SwapExactInput` makes no payment of its own when `amountIn`
// equals it. The swap then spends whatever an earlier step sent to the pair.
// As with OPEN_DELTA, the calldata states no quantity, and "0.0000" would say
// that nothing is swapped.
const ALREADY_PAID = Symbol("v2-already-paid");
// The amount lines that state a fact instead of a quantity. Same register as
// UNNAMED_CURRENCY — a sentence in the value slot, so it cannot be misread as a
// number — and deliberately not another phrasing of "not named": these say
// different things.
// The two amount lines that state a fact instead of a quantity. Same register
// as UNNAMED_CURRENCY — a sentence in the value slot, so it cannot be misread
// as a number — and deliberately not a third phrasing of "not named": these
// say different things.
const OPEN_DELTA_AMOUNT = "All available (V4 open delta)";
const ALREADY_PAID_AMOUNT =
"Whatever an earlier step sent to the pair (V2 already paid)";
const NO_MINIMUM = "None (no minimum guaranteed)";
// Permit2 amounts are uint160; the maximum is Permit2's "unbounded".
@@ -199,7 +185,6 @@ function decodeBalanceCheck(input) {
// Decode V2_SWAP_EXACT_IN (command 0x08) input bytes.
// ABI: (address recipient, uint256 amountIn, uint256 amountOutMin,
// address[] path, bool payerIsUser)
// A zero `amountIn` is read the way the router reads it, as ALREADY_PAID.
function decodeV2SwapExactIn(input) {
try {
const d = coder.decode(
@@ -207,7 +192,7 @@ function decodeV2SwapExactIn(input) {
input,
);
return {
amountIn: d[1] === 0n ? ALREADY_PAID : d[1],
amountIn: d[1],
amountOutMin: d[2],
tokenIn: d[3][0],
tokenOut: d[3][d[3].length - 1],
@@ -517,13 +502,7 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, sources) {
if (cmdId === 0x0e) {
const b = decodeBalanceCheck(inputs[i]);
// The router passes this check whenever the owner holds at
// least minBalance, so a zero one guarantees nothing and
// does not replace a minimum an earlier step stated. Any
// other minBalance sets the output side as a swap does.
if (b && !(b.minBalance === 0n && present(minOutput))) {
setOutput(b.token, b.minBalance);
}
if (b) setOutput(b.token, b.minBalance);
}
if (cmdId === 0x00) {
@@ -644,20 +623,14 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, sources) {
}
if (present(inputAmount)) {
// Three amounts need no scale to describe and are named rather
// than formatted: V4's open delta and V2's already-paid zero,
// neither of which is a quantity at all (see OPEN_DELTA and
// ALREADY_PAID), and an unbounded permit. Those two tests come
// first — the sentinels are not bigints and cannot be compared
// with one.
// Two amounts need no scale to describe and are named rather than
// formatted: V4's open delta, which is not a quantity at all (see
// OPEN_DELTA), and an unbounded permit. The open-delta test comes
// first — the sentinel is not a bigint and cannot be compared with
// one.
let amount;
if (inputAmount === OPEN_DELTA) {
amount = { raw: OPEN_DELTA_AMOUNT, display: OPEN_DELTA_AMOUNT };
} else if (inputAmount === ALREADY_PAID) {
amount = {
raw: ALREADY_PAID_AMOUNT,
display: ALREADY_PAID_AMOUNT,
};
} else if (inputAmount >= MAX_UINT160) {
amount = { raw: "Unlimited", display: "Unlimited" };
} else if (hasV2ExactOut) {
@@ -724,15 +697,10 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, sources) {
details.push({ label: "Steps", value: commandNames.join(" \u2192 ") });
// A JavaScript date reaches only to 275760-09-13 00:00:00 UTC. A
// later deadline, such as the uint256 maximum, makes an invalid date,
// and toISOString() throws on one, so that deadline is said in words.
const deadlineDate = new Date(Number(deadline) * 1000);
details.push({
label: "Deadline",
value: isNaN(deadlineDate.getTime())
? "After 275760-09-13 00:00:00 (no deadline in practice)"
: deadlineDate.toISOString().replace("T", " ").slice(0, 19),
value: deadlineDate.toISOString().replace("T", " ").slice(0, 19),
});
return {
-50
View File
@@ -31,15 +31,11 @@ const iface = new Interface(ERC20_ABI);
const NOVEL_TOKEN = "0xE2E0000000000000000000000000000000000E2e";
// In the bundled list, at 6 decimals.
const USDC = "0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48";
// In the bundled list, at 0 decimals.
const SLP = "0xCC8Fa225D80b9c7D42F96e9570156c65D6cAAa25";
const RECIPIENT = "0xC0FfEE0000000000000000000000000000c0fFEe";
const SPENDER = "0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111";
// 5,000 units of a 6-decimal token, the amount from the issue.
const FIVE_THOUSAND_AT_SIX = 5000000000n;
// 5,000 units of a 0-decimal token, which are 5,000 tokens.
const FIVE_THOUSAND_AT_ZERO = 5000n;
const MAX_UINT256 = (1n << 256n) - 1n;
function transferData(amount) {
@@ -117,21 +113,6 @@ describe("resolveTokenDecimals", () => {
expect(resolveTokenDecimals(NOVEL_TOKEN, state)).toBe(6);
});
// Zero decimals is a real scale, not a missing one, so a source that
// answers 0 is used rather than fallen past like the unusable entry above.
test("uses a bundled scale of zero", () => {
state.trackedTokens = [{ address: SLP, symbol: "SLP", decimals: 18 }];
expect(resolveTokenDecimals(SLP, state)).toBe(0);
});
test("uses a tracked scale of zero", () => {
state.trackedTokens = [
{ address: NOVEL_TOKEN, symbol: "NOVEL", decimals: 0 },
];
state.wallets = walletsHolding(NOVEL_TOKEN, 18);
expect(resolveTokenDecimals(NOVEL_TOKEN, state)).toBe(0);
});
test("refuses a scale the explorer's own entries disagree about", () => {
const wallets = walletsHolding(NOVEL_TOKEN, 6);
wallets[0].addresses.push({
@@ -203,22 +184,6 @@ describe("decodeCalldata amount", () => {
expect(line).not.toMatch(/0\.0000/);
});
// A token added by hand carries whatever its decimals() returned, and a
// uint8 reaches 255, but formatUnits() throws above 80. The throw left the
// call undecoded rather than refused
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/350).
test("a token reporting more than 80 decimals shows base units", () => {
state.trackedTokens = [
{ address: NOVEL_TOKEN, symbol: "NOVEL", decimals: 81 },
];
expect(
amountLine(transferData(FIVE_THOUSAND_AT_SIX), NOVEL_TOKEN),
).toBe("5000000000 base units (decimals unknown)");
expect(amountLine(approveData(FIVE_THOUSAND_AT_SIX), NOVEL_TOKEN)).toBe(
"5000000000 base units (decimals unknown)",
);
});
test("an unbounded allowance is still named, with or without a scale", () => {
expect(amountLine(approveData(MAX_UINT256), NOVEL_TOKEN)).toBe(
"Unlimited",
@@ -232,21 +197,6 @@ describe("decodeCalldata amount", () => {
);
});
test("a bundled token with zero decimals shows the true quantity", () => {
expect(amountLine(transferData(FIVE_THOUSAND_AT_ZERO), SLP)).toBe(
"5000.0000 SLP",
);
});
test("a tracked token with zero decimals shows the true quantity", () => {
state.trackedTokens = [
{ address: NOVEL_TOKEN, symbol: "NOVEL", decimals: 0 },
];
expect(
amountLine(transferData(FIVE_THOUSAND_AT_ZERO), NOVEL_TOKEN),
).toBe("5000.0000 NOVEL");
});
test("the amount carried to the status screens is the same string", () => {
const decoded = decodeCalldata(
transferData(FIVE_THOUSAND_AT_SIX),
-18
View File
@@ -599,24 +599,6 @@ describe("verifySignedTx field comparison", () => {
expect(e.message).toContain("1.0 ETH");
}
});
// The fee is in the native currency of the network the transaction is
// for, whether its chain id is the hex string the background prepares
// or the number ethers parses from a signed transaction.
test.each([
["0x1", "ETH"],
[1n, "ETH"],
["0xaa36a7", "SepoliaETH"],
[11155111n, "SepoliaETH"],
])("the refusal on chain %p names %s", (chainId, nativeCurrency) => {
expect(() => assertWithinCeilings({ ...OVER, chainId })).toThrow(
"up to 3000.0 " +
nativeCurrency +
", which is more than the 1.0 " +
nativeCurrency +
" this wallet",
);
});
});
test("every field mismatch is a refusal, not a warning", async () => {
-21
View File
@@ -2235,27 +2235,6 @@ describe("a site connection decided as the popup closes", () => {
});
});
// The prompt is decided before the toolbar popup raised for it has
// loaded; that popup is torn down and openPopup() rejects only after.
test("a toolbar prompt already decided opens no window when openPopup() rejects", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
const opening = deferred();
bg.openPopup.mockImplementation(() => opening.promise);
const pending = bg.requestSite();
await settle();
const port = bg.connectApproval(pending.id());
port.decide(true, false);
port.disconnect();
await settle();
expect(pending.result()).toEqual({ result: [signer.address] });
opening.reject(new Error("the toolbar popup closed before it loaded"));
await settle();
expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(0);
});
// The port carries a decision now, so it carries the sender check the
// one-off message used to carry. A content script that guessed an
// approval id must not be able to connect the site it is running on.
-53
View File
@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
// What debugFetch writes to the console in debug mode.
//
// RPC providers put the API key in the URL's path or query string, and the
// debug log used to print the whole URL and request body, so turning debug
// mode on wrote the key to the console
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/410). The log now names the
// HTTP method, the URL's origin and the JSON-RPC method, and nothing else of
// the request.
const { debugFetch, urlOrigin, setRuntimeDebug } = require("../src/shared/log");
const realFetch = globalThis.fetch;
afterEach(() => {
globalThis.fetch = realFetch;
setRuntimeDebug(false);
jest.restoreAllMocks();
});
test("logs the origin and JSON-RPC method, not the key in the URL", async () => {
setRuntimeDebug(true);
const consoleLog = jest.spyOn(console, "log").mockImplementation(() => {});
globalThis.fetch = jest.fn(async () => ({ status: 200 }));
await debugFetch(
"https://rpc.example.invalid/v3/PATHKEY123?token=QUERYTOKEN456",
{
method: "POST",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
body: JSON.stringify({
jsonrpc: "2.0",
id: 1,
method: "eth_chainId",
params: [],
}),
},
);
const logged = consoleLog.mock.calls.flat().join(" ");
expect(logged).not.toContain("PATHKEY123");
expect(logged).not.toContain("QUERYTOKEN456");
expect(logged).toContain("https://rpc.example.invalid");
expect(logged).toContain("eth_chainId");
});
test("the origin leaves out a user name and password in the URL", () => {
expect(
urlOrigin("https://user:SECRETPASS@rpc.example.invalid/v3/KEY"),
).toBe("https://rpc.example.invalid");
expect(urlOrigin("wss://user:SECRETPASS@rpc.example.invalid:8546/")).toBe(
"wss://rpc.example.invalid:8546",
);
});
-69
View File
@@ -46,9 +46,6 @@ const A1 = "0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7";
const B0 = "0x2260FAC5E5542a773Aa44fBCfeDf7C193bc2C599";
const C0 = "0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48";
// U+200B, built from its code point so that it can be seen in this file.
const ZERO_WIDTH_SPACE = String.fromCodePoint(0x200b);
// ------------------------------------------------------------ DOM stub
function makeElement(id) {
@@ -345,72 +342,6 @@ describe("the typed confirmation", () => {
"secret-three",
]);
});
// A name of only spaces compares as nothing, and so does an empty
// field. Typing nothing must still delete nothing.
test.each(["", " "])(
"typing %j deletes nothing when the name is only spaces",
async (typedValue) => {
const { deleteWallet, state, storage } = load();
state.wallets[1].name = " ";
await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = typedValue;
await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
expect(node("delete-wallet-lost-flash").style.visibility).toBe(
"visible",
);
expect(state.wallets).toHaveLength(3);
expect(await persistedWallets(storage)).toHaveLength(3);
},
);
// A name that shows nothing would leave nothing on screen to type
// back, so the screen names the wallet by its position instead, and
// that is what the user types.
test.each([
["spaces", " "],
["a zero-width space", ZERO_WIDTH_SPACE],
])(
"a name of only %s is shown and typed back as Wallet 2",
async (_label, storedName) => {
const { deleteWallet, state, storage } = load();
state.wallets[1].name = storedName;
await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
expect(node("delete-wallet-lost-name").textContent).toBe(
"Wallet 2",
);
node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "Wallet 2";
await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
const persisted = await persistedWallets(storage);
expect(persisted.map((w) => w.encryptedSecret)).toEqual([
"secret-one",
"secret-three",
]);
},
);
// A zero-width space paints nothing, so "My", a zero-width space and
// "Wallet" reads as "MyWallet", and that is all the user can type. HTML
// does not collapse it the way it collapses spaces, so it has to be
// removed explicitly.
test("a zero-width space inside the name is not part of it", async () => {
const { deleteWallet, state, storage } = load();
state.wallets[1].name = "My" + ZERO_WIDTH_SPACE + "Wallet";
await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "MyWallet";
await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
const persisted = await persistedWallets(storage);
expect(persisted.map((w) => w.encryptedSecret)).toEqual([
"secret-one",
"secret-three",
]);
});
});
describe("deleting without the password", () => {
+34 -110
View File
@@ -204,51 +204,40 @@ async function goHome(page) {
await visible(page, "#view-main");
}
// One field of the popup's state as it was actually persisted, read out of
// extension storage rather than inferred from what is on screen.
function persistedField(page, field) {
// The navigation stack as it was actually persisted, read out of extension
// storage rather than inferred from which screen is showing. A stale entry
// left behind by a forward navigation that threw is invisible on screen
// until the user presses Back one time too many — which is exactly the
// second-order damage #150 did — so the stack itself is what gets asserted.
function persistedViewStack(page) {
return page.evaluate(
(key) =>
() =>
new Promise((resolve) => {
chrome.storage.local.get("autistmask", (r) => {
resolve(r.autistmask ? r.autistmask[key] : undefined);
resolve((r.autistmask && r.autistmask.viewStack) || []);
});
}),
field,
);
}
// The navigation stack as it was actually persisted. A stale entry left
// behind by a forward navigation that threw is invisible on screen until
// the user presses Back one time too many — which is exactly the
// second-order damage #150 did — so the stack itself is what gets asserted.
async function persistedViewStack(page) {
return (await persistedField(page, "viewStack")) || [];
}
// saveState() is fired from showView() without being awaited, so the write
// lands shortly after the screen does. Polling for the expected stack keeps
// that race out of the assertion; a stack that never becomes the expected
// one fails with what it actually was.
const VIEW_STACK_SETTLE_MS = 5000;
// Nothing here can await the popup's saves. showView() fires saveState()
// without awaiting it, and a Settings control's "change" handler awaits its
// save only after click() or selectOption() has already returned. So the
// write lands shortly after the screen or the control changes, and a popup
// closed before then loses it. Polling for the expected value keeps that
// race out of the assertion and out of the close; a value that never
// arrives fails with what it actually was.
const SAVE_SETTLE_MS = 5000;
async function waitForPersisted(page, field, expected, where) {
async function waitForViewStack(page, expected, where) {
const want = JSON.stringify(expected);
const deadline = Date.now() + SAVE_SETTLE_MS;
const deadline = Date.now() + VIEW_STACK_SETTLE_MS;
let seen;
for (;;) {
seen = await persistedField(page, field);
seen = await persistedViewStack(page);
if (JSON.stringify(seen) === want) return;
if (Date.now() >= deadline) break;
await sleep(50);
}
throw new Error(
"the persisted " +
field +
" " +
"navigation stack " +
where +
" is " +
JSON.stringify(seen) +
@@ -268,18 +257,12 @@ test("Back from Add Token unwinds the stack exactly once (#150)", async (env) =>
await env.page.locator("#wallet-list .btn-addr-info").first().click();
await visible(env.page, "#view-address");
await waitForPersisted(
env.page,
"viewStack",
base.concat("main"),
"on address detail",
);
await waitForViewStack(env.page, base.concat("main"), "on address detail");
await env.page.click("#btn-add-token");
await visible(env.page, "#view-add-token");
await waitForPersisted(
await waitForViewStack(
env.page,
"viewStack",
base.concat("main", "address"),
"on the add token screen",
);
@@ -290,16 +273,15 @@ test("Back from Add Token unwinds the stack exactly once (#150)", async (env) =>
!(await env.page.isVisible("#view-add-token")),
"the add token screen is still showing after Back",
);
await waitForPersisted(
await waitForViewStack(
env.page,
"viewStack",
base.concat("main"),
"after Back from add token",
);
await env.page.click("#btn-address-back");
await visible(env.page, "#view-main");
await waitForPersisted(env.page, "viewStack", base, "after a second Back");
await waitForViewStack(env.page, base, "after a second Back");
});
test("a common-token quick-pick fills in the contract address (#150)", async (env) => {
@@ -697,12 +679,6 @@ test("reopening the popup never lands on the phrase screen (#161)", async (env)
await openPhraseScreen(env.page);
await revealPhrase(env.page);
await waitForPersisted(
env.page,
"currentView",
"show-phrase",
"before closing the popup",
);
await env.page.close();
env.page = await openPopup(env.ctx, env.popupUrl);
await visible(env.page, "#view-main");
@@ -738,20 +714,10 @@ function addressScreenState(page) {
// Close and reopen the page rather than reload it: that is what the toolbar
// popup does, and it is the only thing that produces the unrendered views.
// The popup reopens on the view it last saved, so the close waits until
// `view` is the one saved. That wait cannot see a save that leaves the value
// as it was: a caller whose popup already had `view` saved waits for a
// screen in between first.
async function reopenPopup(env, view) {
await waitForPersisted(
env.page,
"currentView",
view,
"before closing the popup",
);
async function reopenPopup(env, restoredView) {
await env.page.close();
env.page = await openPopup(env.ctx, env.popupUrl);
await visible(env.page, "#view-" + view);
await visible(env.page, restoredView);
}
// The reproduction from the issue, step for step.
@@ -766,7 +732,7 @@ test("Back after reopening the popup renders the address screen (#268)", async (
await env.page.click("#btn-settings");
await visible(env.page, "#view-settings");
await reopenPopup(env, "settings");
await reopenPopup(env, "#view-settings");
await env.page.click("#btn-settings-back");
await visible(env.page, "#view-address");
@@ -823,18 +789,10 @@ test("Back after reopening the popup renders the Receive screen (#268)", async (
JSON.stringify(before.address),
);
// The test above left `settings` saved too, so reopenPopup() could not
// tell this page's save of it from that one without a save in between.
await waitForPersisted(
env.page,
"currentView",
"receive",
"on the Receive screen",
);
await env.page.click("#btn-settings");
await visible(env.page, "#view-settings");
await reopenPopup(env, "settings");
await reopenPopup(env, "#view-settings");
await env.page.click("#btn-settings-back");
await visible(env.page, "#view-receive");
@@ -1217,24 +1175,11 @@ const NONDEFAULT_NETWORK = "sepolia";
test("the theme and network selectors carry a non-default persisted value (#229)", async (env) => {
await openSettings(env.page);
// selectOption() fires "change", which is what the handlers bind. It
// returns before the handler's save lands, hence each wait.
// selectOption() fires "change", which is what the handlers bind.
await env.page.selectOption("#settings-theme", NONDEFAULT_THEME);
await waitForPersisted(
env.page,
"theme",
NONDEFAULT_THEME,
"after the switch",
);
await env.page.selectOption("#settings-network", NONDEFAULT_NETWORK);
await waitForPersisted(
env.page,
"networkId",
NONDEFAULT_NETWORK,
"after the switch",
);
await reopenPopup(env, "settings");
await reopenPopup(env, "#view-settings");
assertSelectors(
await selectorValues(env.page),
@@ -1253,16 +1198,9 @@ test("the theme and network selectors carry a non-default persisted value (#229)
// fixture never customised and so are the mainnet defaults
// src/shared/state.js starts with.
await env.page.selectOption("#settings-theme", "system");
await waitForPersisted(env.page, "theme", "system", "after the restore");
await env.page.selectOption("#settings-network", "mainnet");
await waitForPersisted(
env.page,
"networkId",
"mainnet",
"after the restore",
);
await reopenPopup(env, "settings");
await reopenPopup(env, "#view-settings");
assertSelectors(
await selectorValues(env.page),
@@ -1287,14 +1225,8 @@ test("a spam filter toggled in Settings survives a popup reopen (#229)", async (
immediately.checked === false,
"clicking #" + TOGGLED_FILTER + " did not clear it",
);
await waitForPersisted(
env.page,
"hideDustTransactions",
false,
"after clearing #" + TOGGLED_FILTER,
);
await reopenPopup(env, "settings");
await reopenPopup(env, "#view-settings");
const after = await checkboxStates(env.page);
for (const { id } of SPAM_FILTER_CHECKBOXES) {
@@ -1311,14 +1243,8 @@ test("a spam filter toggled in Settings survives a popup reopen (#229)", async (
test("turning the same filter back on survives a reopen too (#229)", async (env) => {
await openSettings(env.page);
await env.page.click("#" + TOGGLED_FILTER);
await waitForPersisted(
env.page,
"hideDustTransactions",
true,
"after setting #" + TOGGLED_FILTER + " again",
);
await reopenPopup(env, "settings");
await reopenPopup(env, "#view-settings");
// Restores the fixture the later sections inherit, and rules out a
// checkbox that persists "off" only because it is stuck there.
@@ -2439,7 +2365,7 @@ test("a token whose symbol() returns markup renders as text (#307)", async (env)
// Close and reopen so the refresh that runs on open fetches balances
// with the hostile symbol in them.
await reopenPopup(env, "address");
await reopenPopup(env, "#view-address");
await env.page.waitForFunction(
(addr) =>
!!document.querySelector(
@@ -2505,7 +2431,7 @@ test("a token whose symbol() returns markup renders as text (#307)", async (env)
// Put the fixture back before the next test reads it, and let the
// stored balances be rewritten with the honest symbol.
env.routeOpts.tokenSymbolOverride = null;
await reopenPopup(env, "main");
await reopenPopup(env, "#view-main");
await env.page.waitForFunction(
(addr) => {
const row = document.querySelector(
@@ -2812,7 +2738,7 @@ async function closeApprovalPages(ctx) {
// #btn-reject on the site prompt — NOT self-proving. A page that went away
// without the click landing disconnects the approval port, the background
// settles that as 4001, and 4001 is exactly what assertUserRejection
// accepts. Both call sites arm the click trace below and assert it.
// accepts. That call site arms the click trace below and asserts it.
//
// A button that is missing or unclickable raises a different error, which is
// rethrown.
@@ -3198,9 +3124,7 @@ test("a connect request from a blocklisted site is flagged (#219)", async (env)
// Not remembered: a remembered decision for this origin would
// outlive the test.
await popup.uncheck("#approve-remember");
await armClickTrace(env, popup, "#btn-reject");
await clickAndClose(popup, "#btn-reject");
await assertClickLanded(env, "#btn-reject");
await popup.click("#btn-reject");
await assertUserRejection(
phishingDapp,
-33
View File
@@ -57,39 +57,6 @@ describe("parseHoldersCount", () => {
expect(parseHoldersCount("many")).toBeNull();
expect(parseHoldersCount(NaN)).toBeNull();
});
// Each of these starts with a digit, so reading only the leading digits
// would turn it into a small reported count, and a small count is
// exactly what hides a token as spam (issue #251).
test.each(["1,000", "0x10", "1e3", "12 holders"])(
"%p is not read in part: it is unknown",
(raw) => {
expect(parseHoldersCount(raw)).toBeNull();
},
);
test("a negative count is unknown", () => {
expect(parseHoldersCount("-5")).toBeNull();
expect(parseHoldersCount(-5)).toBeNull();
});
// A number holds a whole number exactly only up to 2^53 - 1. Past that a
// string of digits would come back rounded, and a long enough one as
// Infinity, which would pass every holder-count floor.
test("a count too large for a number to hold exactly is unknown", () => {
expect(parseHoldersCount("9007199254740993")).toBeNull();
expect(parseHoldersCount("9".repeat(400))).toBeNull();
expect(parseHoldersCount(2 ** 53)).toBeNull();
});
test("the largest count a number holds exactly still parses", () => {
expect(parseHoldersCount("9007199254740991")).toBe(
Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER,
);
expect(parseHoldersCount(Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER)).toBe(
Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER,
);
});
});
describe("isLowHolderCount", () => {
-461
View File
@@ -1,461 +0,0 @@
// The native token's label on the screens that show a native amount.
//
// src/shared/networks.js gives each network a nativeCurrency, `ETH` on mainnet
// and `SepoliaETH` on Sepolia, and nothing read it: every screen wrote a
// hardcoded "ETH", so on Sepolia the balance, the value and the fee all read
// ETH (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/372). Each line is asserted
// on both networks, through the real Send, confirmation and approval screens,
// with only the node and the DOM stubbed. So is that a token cannot pass for
// the native token by reporting its label, and that a transaction's figures
// carry its own network's label when another network is active.
"use strict";
jest.mock("ethers", () => {
const actual = jest.requireActual("ethers");
class StubProvider {
async lookupAddress() {
return null;
}
// 10 gwei expected, 20 gwei reserved per gas.
async getFeeData() {
return { maxFeePerGas: 20000000000n, gasPrice: 10000000000n };
}
async estimateGas() {
return 21000n;
}
async getCode() {
return "0x";
}
async getTransactionCount() {
return 1;
}
async getTransactionReceipt() {
return { blockNumber: 21000000 };
}
}
return {
...actual,
JsonRpcProvider: StubProvider,
Network: { from: () => ({}) },
};
});
jest.mock("../src/shared/log", () => ({
log: {
debugf: () => {},
infof: () => {},
warnf: () => {},
errorf: () => {},
},
debugFetch: jest.fn(async () => ({
ok: true,
status: 200,
json: async () => ({ items: [] }),
})),
urlOrigin: () => "",
setRuntimeDebug: () => {},
isDebug: () => false,
}));
// Signing a send succeeds without a key, and sending answers with a hash.
jest.mock("../src/shared/vault", () => ({
...jest.requireActual("../src/shared/vault"),
decryptWithPassword: async () => "secret",
}));
jest.mock("../src/shared/wallet", () => ({
...jest.requireActual("../src/shared/wallet"),
getSignerForAddress: () => ({
connect: () => ({
populateTransaction: async (request) => request,
sendTransaction: async () => ({ hash: "0x" + "3".repeat(64) }),
}),
}),
}));
global.fetch = jest.fn(() => {
throw new Error("tests must not perform network requests");
});
// The approval the background hands the approval screen. Set per test.
let approvalDetails = null;
const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
global.chrome = {
storage: makeStorageStub(),
runtime: {
connect: () => ({
postMessage() {},
disconnect() {},
onDisconnect: { addListener() {} },
}),
sendMessage(message, callback) {
callback(
message.type === "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL"
? approvalDetails
: undefined,
);
},
},
};
// A stub DOM: every id resolves to a recording element.
const elements = new Map();
function makeEl(id) {
const handlers = new Map();
return {
id,
textContent: "",
innerHTML: "",
value: "",
disabled: false,
style: {},
dataset: {},
classList: {
add() {},
remove() {},
toggle() {},
contains: () => false,
},
handlers,
children: [],
addEventListener(name, fn) {
handlers.set(name, fn);
},
appendChild(child) {
this.children.push(child);
return child;
},
querySelectorAll: () => [],
querySelector: () => null,
remove() {},
focus() {},
// Views reach for .parentElement to hide whole sections.
get parentElement() {
return global.document.getElementById(id + "-parent");
},
};
}
global.document = {
getElementById(id) {
if (!elements.has(id)) elements.set(id, makeEl(id));
return elements.get(id);
},
createElement: (tag) => makeEl(tag),
body: { prepend() {}, appendChild() {} },
addEventListener() {},
};
global.navigator = { clipboard: { writeText() {} } };
const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
const { NETWORKS } = require("../src/shared/networks");
const { clearPrices } = require("../src/shared/prices");
const send = require("../src/popup/views/send");
const confirmTx = require("../src/popup/views/confirmTx");
const approval = require("../src/popup/views/approval");
const transactionDetail = require("../src/popup/views/transactionDetail");
const txStatus = require("../src/popup/views/txStatus");
const { balanceLinesForAddress } = require("../src/popup/views/helpers");
const { filterTransactions } = require("../src/shared/transactions");
const { debugFetch } = require("../src/shared/log");
const HOLDER = "0x" + "a".repeat(40);
const RECIPIENT = "0xC0FfEE0000000000000000000000000000c0fFEe";
// A token contract that is not in the bundled token list.
const TOKEN_CONTRACT = "0xd05339f9ea5ab9d9f03b9d57f671d2abd1f55c82";
function text(id) {
return global.document.getElementById(id).textContent;
}
// Press Review on the Send screen for a native send of `amount`, and show the
// confirmation screen it leads to with its fee estimate settled.
async function confirmSend(amount) {
let txInfo = null;
send.init({ showConfirmTx: (info) => (txInfo = info) });
state.selectedToken = "ETH";
global.document.getElementById("send-to").value = RECIPIENT;
global.document.getElementById("send-amount").value = amount;
await global.document
.getElementById("btn-send-review")
.handlers.get("click")();
confirmTx.show(txInfo);
for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 0));
}
// The approval screen for a dApp transaction sending 0.01 of the native token
// with 21000 gas at up to 20 gwei, on the network with `chainId`.
async function approveTx(chainId) {
approvalDetails = {
type: "tx",
origin: "https://dapp.example",
approvedFrom: HOLDER,
approvedTx: {
to: RECIPIENT,
value: "10000000000000000",
data: "0x",
chainId,
gasLimit: "21000",
maxFeePerGas: "20000000000",
nonce: 0,
},
};
await approval.show("1");
}
describe.each([
["mainnet", "ETH"],
["sepolia", "SepoliaETH"],
])("on %s the native token reads %s", (networkId, symbol) => {
beforeEach(() => {
elements.clear();
clearPrices();
state.networkId = networkId;
state.wallets = [
{
name: "Wallet 1",
addresses: [{ address: HOLDER, balance: "1.5" }],
},
];
state.selectedWallet = 0;
state.selectedAddress = 0;
state.trackedTokens = [];
state.fraudContracts = [];
state.currentView = null;
});
test("the balance", async () => {
const addr = state.wallets[0].addresses[0];
expect(balanceLinesForAddress(addr, [], false)).toContain(
`<span>${symbol}</span><span>1.5000</span>`,
);
state.selectedToken = "ETH";
send.updateSendBalance();
expect(text("send-balance")).toBe("Current balance: 1.5000 " + symbol);
await confirmSend("0.1");
expect(text("confirm-balance")).toBe("1.5000 " + symbol);
});
test("the value", async () => {
await confirmSend("0.1");
expect(text("confirm-type")).toBe("Native " + symbol + " transfer");
expect(text("confirm-amount")).toBe("0.1 " + symbol);
await approveTx(NETWORKS[networkId].chainId);
expect(text("approve-tx-value")).toBe("0.0100 " + symbol);
});
test("the fee", async () => {
await confirmSend("0.1");
// 21000 gas at 10 gwei expected, at 20 gwei reserved.
expect(text("confirm-fee-amount")).toBe("~0.0002 " + symbol);
expect(text("confirm-fee-reserve")).toBe(
"up to 0.0004 " + symbol + " reserved",
);
expect(text("confirm-gas-error")).toContain(
"You do not have enough " + symbol + " to pay the network fee",
);
await approveTx(NETWORKS[networkId].chainId);
expect(text("approve-tx-fee")).toBe("0.0004 " + symbol);
});
test("the contract-recipient warning", async () => {
await confirmSend("0.1");
expect(text("confirm-contract-warning")).toContain(
"Sending " + symbol + " or tokens directly to a contract",
);
});
// A token reports whatever symbol it likes. One reporting the label the
// wallet shows its native token under, on this network or any other, is
// a fake, exactly as one reporting `ETH` always was.
test.each(["ETH", symbol])(
"a token claiming %s is dropped from the history and the Send selector",
(claim) => {
const result = filterTransactions(
[
{
hash: "0x" + "1".repeat(64),
symbol: claim,
contractAddress: TOKEN_CONTRACT,
holders: 900000,
valueGwei: null,
isContractCall: false,
},
],
{ hideSpoofedSymbols: true },
);
expect(result.transactions).toEqual([]);
expect(result.newFraudContracts).toEqual([TOKEN_CONTRACT]);
send.renderSendTokenSelect({
address: HOLDER,
tokenBalances: [
{
address: TOKEN_CONTRACT,
symbol: claim,
decimals: 18,
balance: "5",
holders: 900000,
},
],
});
expect(
global.document.getElementById("send-token").children,
).toEqual([]);
},
);
// The detail screen tells the two apart by the token contract, which only
// a token transfer has, so a token reporting the native label still reads
// as a token transfer.
test("the transaction detail screen's type line", () => {
const entry = {
hash: "0x" + "2".repeat(64),
from: RECIPIENT,
to: HOLDER,
value: "1.0000",
exactValue: "1.0",
symbol,
timestamp: 1790000000,
isError: false,
direction: "received",
directionLabel: "Received",
chainId: NETWORKS[networkId].chainId,
};
transactionDetail.show({ ...entry, contractAddress: null });
expect(text("tx-detail-type")).toBe("Native " + symbol + " Transfer");
transactionDetail.show({ ...entry, contractAddress: TOKEN_CONTRACT });
expect(text("tx-detail-type")).toBe("ERC-20 Token Transfer");
});
test("the insufficient-balance error", async () => {
await confirmSend("2");
expect(
global.document.getElementById("confirm-errors").innerHTML,
).toContain(
"You have 1.5000 " +
symbol +
" but are trying to send 2 " +
symbol +
".",
);
});
});
// A transaction's value and fee are in the native currency of the network the
// transaction is on, which need not be the active one. A site can switch the
// active network after its transaction is prepared and back before it is
// signed, and a popup opened after a switch shows a sent or listed transaction
// again. The wallet's balances follow the active network; these do not.
describe.each([
["mainnet", "sepolia", "ETH"],
["sepolia", "mainnet", "SepoliaETH"],
])(
"a %s transaction shown with %s active reads %s",
(txNetworkId, activeNetworkId, symbol) => {
const chainId = NETWORKS[txNetworkId].chainId;
const hash = "0x" + "3".repeat(64);
beforeEach(() => {
elements.clear();
clearPrices();
state.networkId = activeNetworkId;
state.wallets = [
{
name: "Wallet 1",
addresses: [{ address: HOLDER, balance: "1.5" }],
},
];
state.selectedWallet = 0;
state.selectedAddress = 0;
state.trackedTokens = [];
state.fraudContracts = [];
state.currentView = null;
txStatus.init({ doRefreshAndRender() {} });
});
afterEach(() => {
txStatus.endWait();
});
test("the approval screen's value and fee", async () => {
await approveTx(chainId);
expect(text("approve-tx-network")).toBe(NETWORKS[txNetworkId].name);
expect(text("approve-tx-value")).toBe("0.0100 " + symbol);
expect(text("approve-tx-fee")).toBe("0.0004 " + symbol);
});
test("the wait, success and error screens", async () => {
const txInfo = {
from: HOLDER,
to: RECIPIENT,
amount: "0.0100",
token: "ETH",
tokenSymbol: null,
chainId,
};
txStatus.showWait(txInfo, hash);
expect(text("wait-tx-summary")).toBe("0.0100 " + symbol);
txStatus.showError(txInfo, hash, "Failed.");
expect(text("error-tx-summary")).toBe("0.0100 " + symbol);
// A later popup resumes the wait, and the receipt is there.
state.viewData = {
pendingWait: { txInfo, hash, broadcastTime: Date.now() },
};
txStatus.restoreWait();
for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 0));
}
expect(text("success-tx-summary")).toBe("0.0100 " + symbol);
});
// Sent from the Send screen on the transaction's network, then
// resumed by a popup that opens after the active network changed.
test("the wait screen after a send", async () => {
state.networkId = txNetworkId;
await confirmSend("0.1");
confirmTx.init({});
global.document.getElementById("confirm-tx-password").value = "pw";
await global.document
.getElementById("btn-confirm-send")
.handlers.get("click")();
expect(text("wait-tx-summary")).toBe("0.1 " + symbol);
state.networkId = activeNetworkId;
txStatus.restoreWait();
expect(text("wait-tx-summary")).toBe("0.1 " + symbol);
});
test("the transaction detail screen's type line and fee", async () => {
debugFetch.mockImplementationOnce(async () => ({
ok: true,
status: 200,
json: async () => ({ fee: { value: "21000000000000" } }),
}));
transactionDetail.show({
hash,
from: RECIPIENT,
to: HOLDER,
value: "1.0000",
exactValue: "1.0",
symbol,
timestamp: 1790000000,
isError: false,
direction: "received",
directionLabel: "Received",
contractAddress: null,
chainId,
});
expect(text("tx-detail-type")).toBe(
"Native " + symbol + " Transfer",
);
for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 0));
}
expect(
global.document.getElementById("tx-detail-fee").innerHTML,
).toContain("0.000021 " + symbol);
});
},
);
-22
View File
@@ -722,28 +722,6 @@ describe("the base profile the sweep corrupts", () => {
}
});
// Home, AddressDetail and AddressToken load their transactions inside a catch
// that only logs, so a boot that fails there still renders the view and passes
// the tests above while none of that code runs.
describe("the base profile loads transactions", () => {
for (const view of ["main", "address", "address-token"]) {
test(`on ${view} without logging a failure`, async () => {
const consoleError = jest.spyOn(console, "error");
try {
await bootPopup(restoringOnto(view));
const failures = consoleError.mock.calls
.map((args) => args.join(" "))
.filter((line) =>
/loadHomeTxs failed|loadTransactions failed/.test(line),
);
expect(failures).toEqual([]);
} finally {
consoleError.mockRestore();
}
});
}
});
// A field the ROUTER itself reads — the two it gates on and the two
// hasValidAddress() indexes with. A hostile value in one of these legitimately
// changes which view renders, so each gets its own boot per view and is held
-105
View File
@@ -1,105 +0,0 @@
// What reaches the console when the RPC endpoint answers with an HTTP error.
//
// RPC providers put the API key in the endpoint URL's path or query string.
// When the endpoint answers with an HTTP error (a wrong or expired key, a rate
// limit, a server error), the error ethers throws carries the full request URL
// in its message, so a line logging that message printed the key
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/410). Those lines log the
// error's short message, which names the HTTP status and not the URL.
//
// The real ethers provider runs; only its HTTP transport is replaced, by one
// that answers every request with 401 Unauthorized. Debug mode is on, so
// every log level is printed.
const { FetchRequest } = require("ethers");
const {
getProvider,
lookupTokenInfo,
refreshBalances,
} = require("../src/shared/balances");
const { getFullWarnings } = require("../src/shared/addressWarnings");
const { resolveEnsName } = require("../src/shared/ens");
const { setRuntimeDebug } = require("../src/shared/log");
const RPC_URL = "https://rpc.example.invalid/v3/PATHKEY123?token=QUERYTOKEN456";
const ADDRESS = "0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111";
const realFetch = globalThis.fetch;
let printed;
beforeEach(() => {
setRuntimeDebug(true);
printed = [];
for (const method of ["log", "warn", "error"]) {
jest.spyOn(console, method).mockImplementation((...args) => {
printed.push(args.map(String).join(" "));
});
}
FetchRequest.registerGetUrl(async () => ({
statusCode: 401,
statusMessage: "Unauthorized",
headers: {},
body: new Uint8Array(),
}));
// The explorer requests the balance refresh makes go nowhere.
globalThis.fetch = jest.fn(async () => {
throw new Error("tests must not perform network requests");
});
});
afterEach(() => {
FetchRequest.registerGetUrl(FetchRequest.createGetUrlFunc());
globalThis.fetch = realFetch;
setRuntimeDebug(false);
jest.restoreAllMocks();
});
// The line carrying `label` was printed and names the HTTP status, and nothing
// printed carries the key.
function expectFailureLoggedWithoutKey(label) {
const line = printed.find((text) => text.includes(label));
expect(line).toContain("401");
const all = printed.join("\n");
expect(all).not.toContain("PATHKEY123");
expect(all).not.toContain("QUERYTOKEN456");
}
test("ethers puts the URL in the error message, not in the short message", async () => {
const provider = getProvider(RPC_URL, "mainnet");
const error = await provider.getCode(ADDRESS).catch((e) => e);
expect(error.message).toContain("PATHKEY123");
expect(error.shortMessage).not.toContain("PATHKEY123");
});
test("the recipient checks before a send", async () => {
await getFullWarnings(ADDRESS, getProvider(RPC_URL, "mainnet"));
expectFailureLoggedWithoutKey("contract check failed");
expectFailureLoggedWithoutKey("tx count check failed");
});
test("the ENS reverse lookup", async () => {
expect(await resolveEnsName(ADDRESS, RPC_URL, "mainnet")).toBeNull();
expectFailureLoggedWithoutKey("ENS reverse lookup failed");
});
test("the balance refresh", async () => {
const wallets = [{ addresses: [{ address: ADDRESS }] }];
await refreshBalances(
wallets,
RPC_URL,
"https://explorer.example.invalid/api/v2",
[],
"mainnet",
);
expectFailureLoggedWithoutKey("ETH balance failed");
expectFailureLoggedWithoutKey("ENS reverse failed");
});
// The lookup's first line, at debug level, names the RPC endpoint; the check
// of everything printed covers it too.
test("the token lookup", async () => {
await expect(lookupTokenInfo(ADDRESS, RPC_URL, "mainnet")).rejects.toThrow(
"Not a valid ERC-20 token",
);
expectFailureLoggedWithoutKey("symbol() failed:");
});
-1
View File
@@ -66,7 +66,6 @@ jest.mock("../src/shared/log", () => ({
status: 200,
json: async () => mockExplorer.items,
})),
urlOrigin: () => "",
setRuntimeDebug: () => {},
isDebug: () => false,
}));
-148
View File
@@ -1,148 +0,0 @@
// What reaches the console when an endpoint check in Settings fails.
//
// fetch refuses a URL with a user name and password in it, or one it cannot
// parse, with an error whose message carries the whole URL: the password, and
// any API key in the path or query string. The checks behind the RPC and
// Blockscout Save buttons printed that message
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/410); they now name the
// endpoint by its origin.
//
// The real fetch runs; it throws before making any request. Debug mode is on,
// so every log level is printed.
const SECRETS = ["SECRETPASS789", "PATHKEY123", "QUERYTOKEN456"];
const RPC_WITH_PASSWORD =
"https://user:SECRETPASS789@rpc.example.invalid/v3/PATHKEY123?token=QUERYTOKEN456";
// Port 99999 is out of range, so the URL does not parse.
const RPC_UNPARSEABLE =
"https://rpc.example.invalid:99999/v3/PATHKEY123?token=QUERYTOKEN456";
const BLOCKSCOUT_WITH_PASSWORD =
"https://user:SECRETPASS789@explorer.example.invalid/PATHKEY123/api/v2";
const SAVED_RPC = "https://saved-rpc.example.invalid";
const SAVED_BLOCKSCOUT = "https://saved-explorer.example.invalid/api/v2";
let elements;
let flashes;
let printed;
let state;
// A stand-in for one DOM node: enough of an element for init() to set
// properties on it and hang listeners off it.
function fakeElement() {
return {
value: "",
checked: false,
textContent: "",
href: "",
style: {},
dataset: {},
classList: { add() {}, remove() {} },
listeners: {},
addEventListener(event, handler) {
this.listeners[event] = handler;
},
querySelectorAll: () => [],
};
}
function element(id) {
return (elements[id] ||= fakeElement());
}
function loadSettingsView() {
elements = {};
flashes = [];
jest.resetModules();
jest.doMock("../src/popup/views/helpers", () => ({
$: element,
showView: () => {},
updateDebugBanner: () => {},
showFlash: (msg) => flashes.push(msg),
escapeHtml: (s) => s,
flashCopyFeedback: () => {},
goBack: () => {},
pushCurrentView: () => {},
onViewLeave: () => {},
VIEWS: [],
}));
state = require("../src/shared/state").state;
state.rpcUrl = SAVED_RPC;
state.blockscoutUrl = SAVED_BLOCKSCOUT;
require("../src/shared/log").setRuntimeDebug(true);
require("../src/popup/views/settings").init({});
}
async function save(fieldId, buttonId, typed) {
element(fieldId).value = typed;
await element(buttonId).listeners.click();
}
// The check failed, nothing was saved, and nothing printed carries the
// password or the key.
function expectFailedWithoutSecrets(label) {
expect(flashes).toContain("Could not reach endpoint.");
expect(state.rpcUrl).toBe(SAVED_RPC);
expect(state.blockscoutUrl).toBe(SAVED_BLOCKSCOUT);
const line = printed.find((text) => text.includes(label));
expect(line).toBeDefined();
const all = printed.join("\n");
for (const secret of SECRETS) {
expect(all).not.toContain(secret);
}
return line;
}
beforeEach(() => {
printed = [];
for (const method of ["log", "warn", "error"]) {
jest.spyOn(console, method).mockImplementation((...args) => {
printed.push(args.map(String).join(" "));
});
}
globalThis.chrome = {
runtime: { sendMessage: () => {} },
storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
};
});
afterEach(() => {
jest.dontMock("../src/popup/views/helpers");
delete globalThis.chrome;
jest.restoreAllMocks();
});
test("fetch puts the whole URL in the error it throws for such a URL", async () => {
for (const url of [RPC_WITH_PASSWORD, RPC_UNPARSEABLE]) {
const error = await fetch(url).catch((e) => e);
expect(error.message).toContain("PATHKEY123");
}
});
test("the RPC check of a URL with a user name and password", async () => {
loadSettingsView();
await save("settings-rpc", "btn-save-rpc", RPC_WITH_PASSWORD);
const line = expectFailedWithoutSecrets("RPC validation fetch failed");
expect(line).toContain("https://rpc.example.invalid");
});
test("the RPC check of a URL that does not parse", async () => {
loadSettingsView();
await save("settings-rpc", "btn-save-rpc", RPC_UNPARSEABLE);
expectFailedWithoutSecrets("RPC validation fetch failed");
});
test("the Blockscout check of a URL with a user name and password", async () => {
loadSettingsView();
await save(
"settings-blockscout",
"btn-save-blockscout",
BLOCKSCOUT_WITH_PASSWORD,
);
const line = expectFailedWithoutSecrets("Blockscout validation failed");
expect(line).toContain("https://explorer.example.invalid");
});
-77
View File
@@ -423,80 +423,3 @@ describe("two wallets independently created with a colliding identity", () => {
expect(secrets).toContain("secret-b");
});
});
// showView() saves on every navigation without waiting, so the user can change
// something while that save is still waiting on storage. The change is followed
// by its own saveState(), which runs after the first save; it must be stored
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/448).
describe("a change made while an earlier save from the same page is running", () => {
// Runs `change` inside the next call to `op` (the stub's get or set),
// before that call does its work.
function runInside(op, change) {
const real = op.getMockImplementation();
op.mockImplementationOnce(async (arg) => {
change();
return real(arg);
});
}
test("a network switched during the earlier save's read is stored", async () => {
const storage = makeStorageStub({
autistmask: { wallets: [W1], networkId: "sepolia" },
});
const { state, saveState, loadState } = loadPage(storage).state;
await loadState();
let queued;
runInside(storage.get, () => {
state.networkId = "mainnet";
queued = saveState();
});
state.theme = "dark";
await saveState();
await queued;
const stored = storage.read("autistmask");
expect(stored.theme).toBe("dark");
expect(stored.networkId).toBe("mainnet");
});
test("a wallet added during the earlier save's read is stored", async () => {
const storage = makeStorageStub({ autistmask: { wallets: [W1] } });
const { state, saveState, loadState } = loadPage(storage).state;
await loadState();
let queued;
runInside(storage.get, () => {
state.wallets.push(W2);
queued = saveState();
});
await saveState();
await queued;
const stored = storage.read("autistmask");
expect(stored.wallets.map((w) => w.encryptedSecret)).toEqual([
"secret-one",
"secret-two",
]);
});
test("a wallet added during the earlier save's write is stored", async () => {
const storage = makeStorageStub({ autistmask: { wallets: [W1] } });
const { state, saveState, loadState } = loadPage(storage).state;
await loadState();
let queued;
runInside(storage.set, () => {
state.wallets.push(W2);
queued = saveState();
});
await saveState();
await queued;
const stored = storage.read("autistmask");
expect(stored.wallets.map((w) => w.encryptedSecret)).toEqual([
"secret-one",
"secret-two",
]);
});
});
-167
View File
@@ -148,173 +148,6 @@ describe("the destructive reset on the recovery screen", () => {
});
});
describe("a popup already open when the stored profile becomes unreadable", () => {
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/373. The popup used to stay
// on the wallet list with the last good balances, and only a reopen
// reached the recovery screen.
test("moves to the recovery screen at its next refresh", async () => {
const env = await bootPopup(unversionedValidProfile());
expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["main"]);
env.storage.write("autistmask", CORRUPT_BLOBS[0].blob);
await env.tick();
expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["state-recovery"]);
expect(env.text("state-recovery-problem").length).toBeGreaterThan(10);
expect(env.hidden("btn-settings")).toBe(true);
expect(env.storage.read("autistmask")).toEqual(CORRUPT_BLOBS[0].blob);
});
test("stops the ten-second refresh", async () => {
const env = await bootPopup(unversionedValidProfile());
env.storage.write("autistmask", CORRUPT_BLOBS[0].blob);
await env.tick();
const { refreshBalances } = require("../src/shared/balances");
const calls = refreshBalances.mock.calls.length;
await env.tick();
expect(refreshBalances).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(calls);
});
test("a later save does not clear what the user exported or typed", async () => {
const env = await bootPopup(unversionedValidProfile());
env.storage.write("autistmask", CORRUPT_BLOBS[2].blob);
await env.tick();
await env.click("btn-state-recovery-export");
env.node("state-recovery-reset-input").value = "erase my";
// Such as the save of a refresh already in flight when the screen
// went up.
const { saveState } = require("../src/shared/state");
await expect(saveState()).rejects.toThrow();
await env.settle();
expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["state-recovery"]);
expect(env.hidden("state-recovery-blob")).toBe(false);
expect(env.value("state-recovery-reset-input")).toBe("erase my");
});
// The record can become readable again under this popup, erased from the
// recovery screen of another window, so a save from this one can succeed.
test("a popup opened after the record is erased elsewhere shows a screen", async () => {
const env = await bootPopup(unversionedValidProfile());
env.storage.write("autistmask", CORRUPT_BLOBS[0].blob);
await env.tick();
expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["state-recovery"]);
await env.storage.remove("autistmask");
const { saveState } = require("../src/shared/state");
await saveState();
const reopened = await bootPopup(env.storage.read("autistmask"));
expect(reopened.visibleViews()).toEqual(["welcome"]);
});
test("a stored current view of the recovery screen does not blank the popup", async () => {
const env = await bootPopup(
unversionedValidProfile({ currentView: "state-recovery" }),
);
expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["main"]);
});
test("a transaction wait that ends under it does not replace it", async () => {
const env = await bootPopup(
unversionedValidProfile({
currentView: "wait-tx",
viewData: {
pendingWait: {
hash: "0x1",
txInfo: { to: ADDRESS, amount: "1", token: "ETH" },
broadcastTime: Date.now(),
},
},
}),
);
expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["wait-tx"]);
env.storage.write("autistmask", CORRUPT_BLOBS[2].blob);
await env.tick();
await env.click("btn-state-recovery-export");
env.node("state-recovery-reset-input").value = "erase my";
// The test provider answers no receipt lookup, and six that fail in
// a row end the wait with an error.
for (let i = 0; i < 6; i++) await env.tick();
expect(env.text("error-tx-message")).toMatch(/could not be reached/);
expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["state-recovery"]);
expect(env.hidden("state-recovery-blob")).toBe(false);
expect(env.value("state-recovery-reset-input")).toBe("erase my");
});
test("a storage read that fails once leaves the wallet list up", async () => {
const env = await bootPopup(unversionedValidProfile());
env.storage.local.get.mockRejectedValueOnce(
new Error("IO error: storage busy"),
);
await env.tick();
// Reported as a failed save, not mistaken for an unreadable profile.
expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["main"]);
expect(env.node("save-failure-banner")).not.toBeNull();
await env.tick();
expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["main"]);
});
// The screen it replaces is left as any navigation leaves it: the rules
// at the top of src/popup/views/showPhrase.js and exportPrivkey.js hold
// for this way off them too.
describe("from a screen holding a secret", () => {
const PHRASE =
"abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon" +
" abandon abandon abandon abandon about";
afterEach(() => jest.dontMock("../src/shared/vault"));
test("a recovery phrase on screen is wiped", async () => {
jest.doMock("../src/shared/vault", () => ({
decryptWithPassword: async () => PHRASE,
}));
const env = await bootPopup(unversionedValidProfile());
require("../src/popup/views/showPhrase").show(0);
env.node("show-phrase-password").value = "password";
await env.click("btn-show-phrase-reveal");
expect(env.text("show-phrase-value")).toBe(PHRASE);
env.storage.write("autistmask", CORRUPT_BLOBS[0].blob);
await env.tick();
expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["state-recovery"]);
expect(env.text("show-phrase-value")).toBe("");
});
test("a private key still being decrypted is never written", async () => {
let answer;
jest.doMock("../src/shared/vault", () => ({
decryptWithPassword: () =>
new Promise((resolve) => {
answer = resolve;
}),
}));
const env = await bootPopup(unversionedValidProfile());
require("../src/popup/views/exportPrivkey").show(0, 0);
env.node("export-privkey-password").value = "password";
const revealing = env.click("btn-export-privkey-confirm");
env.storage.write("autistmask", CORRUPT_BLOBS[0].blob);
await env.tick();
expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["state-recovery"]);
expect(env.value("export-privkey-password")).toBe("");
answer(PHRASE);
await revealing;
expect(env.text("export-privkey-value")).toBe("");
});
});
});
describe("an unversioned profile that is perfectly valid", () => {
// The upgrade case. Every install in the field is in this state, and the
// popup must load it, not offer to wipe it.
+6 -30
View File
@@ -40,10 +40,6 @@ jest.doMock("libsodium-wrappers-sumo", () => sodium);
jest.doMock("qrcode", () => QRCode);
jest.doMock("ethereum-blockies-base64", () => makeBlockie);
// Taken before any boot replaces them; see bootPopup().
const realSetInterval = globalThis.setInterval;
const realClearInterval = globalThis.clearInterval;
const POPUP_HTML = fs.readFileSync(
path.join(__dirname, "..", "..", "src", "popup", "index.html"),
"utf8",
@@ -263,12 +259,9 @@ async function bootPopup(stored, options) {
getProvider: () => ({}),
scanForAddresses: jest.fn(async () => []),
}));
// filterTransactions() answers in the real one's shape: Home,
// AddressDetail and AddressToken read both fields, and a bare list makes
// their transaction loading throw into a catch that only logs.
jest.doMock("../../src/shared/transactions", () => ({
fetchRecentTransactions: jest.fn(async () => []),
filterTransactions: () => ({ transactions: [], newFraudContracts: [] }),
filterTransactions: () => [],
}));
const storage =
@@ -299,20 +292,9 @@ async function bootPopup(stored, options) {
}),
addEventListener: () => {},
};
// The ten-second refresh init() starts, and a transaction wait's timers,
// would outlive the test. So every interval is recorded rather than
// started, clearInterval() removes it as a browser would, and tick() below
// runs the ones still set. Put back by cleanupPopup().
const intervals = new Map();
let lastId = 0;
globalThis.setInterval = (fn) => {
lastId += 1;
intervals.set(lastId, fn);
return lastId;
};
globalThis.clearInterval = (id) => {
intervals.delete(id);
};
// The 10s refresh loop init() starts would outlive the test.
const realSetInterval = globalThis.setInterval;
globalThis.setInterval = () => 0;
require("../../src/popup/index");
@@ -334,6 +316,8 @@ async function bootPopup(stored, options) {
}
await settle();
globalThis.setInterval = realSetInterval;
return {
storage,
document,
@@ -353,12 +337,6 @@ async function bootPopup(stored, options) {
for (const fn of fns) await fn();
await settle();
},
// Every interval still set runs once: the ten-second refresh, and a
// transaction wait's receipt poll and elapsed counter while one runs.
tick: async () => {
for (const fn of intervals.values()) await fn();
await settle();
},
settle,
// The view ids whose section is not hidden, as the audit measured them.
visibleViews: () => {
@@ -376,8 +354,6 @@ function cleanupPopup() {
delete globalThis.chrome;
delete globalThis.document;
delete globalThis.window;
globalThis.setInterval = realSetInterval;
globalThis.clearInterval = realClearInterval;
}
module.exports = {
-1
View File
@@ -44,7 +44,6 @@ jest.mock("../src/shared/log", () => ({
errorf: () => {},
},
debugFetch: jest.fn(),
urlOrigin: () => "",
setRuntimeDebug: () => {},
isDebug: () => false,
}));
+13 -66
View File
@@ -1219,7 +1219,7 @@ describe("fetchRecentTransactions merge and dedup", () => {
test("queries only the two Blockscout endpoints for the address", async () => {
respondWith([], []);
await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT, "0x1");
await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT);
expect(debugFetch).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
const urls = debugFetch.mock.calls.map((c) => c[0]);
expect(urls).toContain(
@@ -1283,7 +1283,7 @@ describe("fetchRecentTransactions merge and dedup", () => {
],
);
const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT, "0x1");
const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT);
expect(txs).toHaveLength(1);
const merged = txs[0];
// The received leg (the swap output) supplies the display amount.
@@ -1320,7 +1320,7 @@ describe("fetchRecentTransactions merge and dedup", () => {
],
);
const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT, "0x1");
const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT);
expect(txs).toHaveLength(1);
expect(txs[0].symbol).toBe("USDC");
expect(txs[0].value).toBe("1500.5000");
@@ -1346,7 +1346,7 @@ describe("fetchRecentTransactions merge and dedup", () => {
});
respondWith([], [leg("1000000"), leg("2000000")]);
const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT, "0x1");
const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT);
expect(txs).toHaveLength(1);
// Keyed by hash plus contract, so the later leg wins.
expect(txs[0].exactValue).toBe("2.0");
@@ -1386,7 +1386,7 @@ describe("fetchRecentTransactions merge and dedup", () => {
],
);
const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT, "0x1");
const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT);
expect(txs.map((t) => t.symbol).sort()).toEqual(["USDC", "WETH"]);
});
@@ -1427,13 +1427,12 @@ describe("fetchRecentTransactions merge and dedup", () => {
],
);
const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT, "0x1");
const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT);
expect(txs).toHaveLength(1);
expect(txs[0].symbol).toBe("USDC");
expect(txs[0].exactValue).toBe("1.0");
expect(txs[0].direction).toBe("sent");
expect(txs[0].contractAddress).toBe(USDC_CONTRACT);
expect(txs[0].chainId).toBe("0x1");
// The surviving row is the token row, and the filters keep it.
const kept = filterTransactions(txs, filters()).transactions;
expect(kept).toHaveLength(1);
@@ -1453,46 +1452,10 @@ describe("fetchRecentTransactions merge and dedup", () => {
});
respondWith([item(6), item(8), item(7)], []);
const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT, "0x1", 2);
const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT, 2);
expect(txs.map((t) => t.blockNumber)).toEqual([21000008, 21000007]);
});
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/372: the caller hands in
// the chain id of the network the explorer serves. Every entry carries
// it, and a native entry is labelled with that network's nativeCurrency.
test("a native entry is labelled by the chain id handed in", async () => {
respondWith(
[
{
hash: "0x" + "a".repeat(64),
block_number: 21000090,
timestamp: TS,
from: { hash: ORDINARY_PEER },
to: { hash: VICTIM, is_contract: false },
value: "10000000000000000",
method: null,
status: "ok",
},
],
[],
);
const sepolia = await fetchRecentTransactions(
VICTIM,
BLOCKSCOUT,
"0xaa36a7",
);
expect(sepolia[0].symbol).toBe("SepoliaETH");
expect(sepolia[0].value).toBe("0.0100");
expect(sepolia[0].chainId).toBe("0xaa36a7");
const mainnet = await fetchRecentTransactions(
VICTIM,
BLOCKSCOUT,
"0x1",
);
expect(mainnet[0].symbol).toBe("ETH");
expect(mainnet[0].chainId).toBe("0x1");
});
test("the fake token transfer survives fetching and is then filtered", async () => {
respondWith(
[],
@@ -1513,7 +1476,7 @@ describe("fetchRecentTransactions merge and dedup", () => {
],
);
const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT, "0x1");
const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT);
expect(txs).toHaveLength(1);
expect(txs[0].contractAddress).toBe(FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT);
expect(txs[0].holders).toBe(0);
@@ -1552,31 +1515,19 @@ describe("fetchRecentTransactions merge and dedup", () => {
test("an omitted holders_count parses to null", async () => {
respondWith([], spamTransferWithToken(OMITTED));
const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(
VICTIM,
BLOCKSCOUT,
"0x1",
);
const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT);
expect(txs[0].holders).toBeNull();
});
test("a null holders_count parses to null", async () => {
respondWith([], spamTransferWithToken(NULLED));
const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(
VICTIM,
BLOCKSCOUT,
"0x1",
);
const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT);
expect(txs[0].holders).toBeNull();
});
test("the transfer survives the low-holder filter", async () => {
respondWith([], spamTransferWithToken(OMITTED));
const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(
VICTIM,
BLOCKSCOUT,
"0x1",
);
const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT);
expect(filterTransactions(txs, filters()).transactions).toEqual(
txs,
);
@@ -1588,11 +1539,7 @@ describe("fetchRecentTransactions merge and dedup", () => {
// holder count is the only rule that can catch it.
test('a reported holders_count of "0" still parses to 0 and is filtered', async () => {
respondWith([], spamTransferWithToken(ZERO));
const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(
VICTIM,
BLOCKSCOUT,
"0x1",
);
const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT);
expect(txs[0].holders).toBe(0);
expect(filterTransactions(txs, filters()).transactions).toEqual([]);
});
@@ -1608,7 +1555,7 @@ describe("fetchRecentTransactions merge and dedup", () => {
},
}));
await expect(
fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT, "0x1"),
fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT),
).resolves.toEqual([]);
});
+2 -12
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
// contract at signing time, with nothing comparing the two, so a token whose
// on-chain scale differed signed an amount that was never displayed.
const { formatUnits, parseUnits } = require("ethers");
const { parseUnits } = require("ethers");
const {
displayedDecimals,
transferAmountUnits,
@@ -25,17 +25,7 @@ describe("displayedDecimals", () => {
expect(displayedDecimals(MAX_DECIMALS)).toBe(MAX_DECIMALS);
});
// decimals() is a uint8, but formatUnits() and parseUnits() stop at 80
// places, so a larger scale cannot be shown or encoded
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/350).
test("accepts exactly the scales the formatter accepts", () => {
expect(() => formatUnits(1n, MAX_DECIMALS)).not.toThrow();
expect(() => parseUnits("1", MAX_DECIMALS)).not.toThrow();
expect(() => formatUnits(1n, MAX_DECIMALS + 1)).toThrow();
expect(() => parseUnits("1", MAX_DECIMALS + 1)).toThrow();
});
test("refuses anything that is not a uint8 the formatter accepts", () => {
test("refuses anything that is not a uint8", () => {
for (const bad of [
null,
undefined,
-125
View File
@@ -554,33 +554,6 @@ describe("uniswap decoder", () => {
);
});
test("shows the deadline as a UTC date and time", () => {
const result = uniswap.decode(FIRST_SWAP_CALLDATA, ROUTER_ADDR);
expect(detail(result, "Deadline").value).toBe("2026-02-27 08:25:51");
});
// A JavaScript date cannot hold this deadline. It used to make the whole
// swap undecoded.
test("a deadline of the uint256 maximum is stated in words", () => {
const data = buildExecute(
"0x08", // V2_SWAP_EXACT_IN
[
encodeV2SwapExactIn(USER_ADDR, 1000000n, 500000000000000n, [
USDT_ADDR,
WETH_ADDR,
]),
],
2n ** 256n - 1n,
);
const result = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER_ADDR);
expect(result).not.toBeNull();
expect(result.name).toBe("Swap USDT \u2192 WETH");
expect(detail(result, "Deadline").value).toBe(
"After 275760-09-13 00:00:00 (no deadline in practice)",
);
});
test("formats permit amount when not unlimited", () => {
const data = buildExecute(
"0x0a",
@@ -858,104 +831,6 @@ describe("uniswap decoder", () => {
expect(detail(result, "Min. received").value).toBe("0.9900 USDC");
});
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/415 — the router's V2
// exact-in reads an amountIn of zero as universal-router
// Constants.ALREADY_PAID: an earlier step sent the tokens to the pair, and
// the swap uses all of them. Against 375998b this read "0.0000 USDT".
test("a V2 exact-in already-paid amountIn is named, not printed as zero", () => {
const data = buildExecute(
"0x08",
[
encodeV2SwapExactIn(
USER_ADDR,
0n, // Constants.ALREADY_PAID
500000000000000n,
[USDT_ADDR, WETH_ADDR],
),
],
9999999999n,
);
const result = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER_ADDR);
expect(result).not.toBeNull();
expect(detail(result, "Token In").value).toContain("USDT");
expect(detail(result, "Amount").value).toBe(
"Whatever an earlier step sent to the pair (V2 already paid)",
);
expect(detail(result, "Amount").rawValue).toBe(
"Whatever an earlier step sent to the pair (V2 already paid)",
);
expect(detail(result, "Min. received").value).toBe("0.0005 WETH");
});
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/415 — the router passes a
// BALANCE_CHECK_ERC20 whenever the balance is at least minBalance, so a
// zero one guarantees nothing. Against 375998b it replaced the swap's
// output side: Token Out = USDC, Min. received = "None (no minimum
// guaranteed)".
test("a zero balance check keeps the minimum a swap step stated", () => {
const data = buildExecute(
solidityPacked(["uint8", "uint8"], [0x08, 0x0e]),
[
encodeV2SwapExactIn(USER_ADDR, 1000000n, 500000000000000n, [
USDT_ADDR,
WETH_ADDR,
]),
encodeBalanceCheck(USER_ADDR, USDC_ADDR, 0n),
],
9999999999n,
);
const result = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER_ADDR);
expect(result).not.toBeNull();
expect(detail(result, "Token Out").value).toContain("WETH");
expect(detail(result, "Min. received").value).toBe("0.0005 WETH");
});
// A nonzero balance check still replaces the output side, as before.
test("a nonzero balance check replaces the minimum a swap step stated", () => {
const data = buildExecute(
solidityPacked(["uint8", "uint8"], [0x08, 0x0e]),
[
encodeV2SwapExactIn(USER_ADDR, 1000000n, 500000000000000n, [
USDT_ADDR,
WETH_ADDR,
]),
encodeBalanceCheck(USER_ADDR, USDC_ADDR, 2000000n),
],
9999999999n,
);
const result = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER_ADDR);
expect(result).not.toBeNull();
expect(detail(result, "Token Out").value).toContain("USDC");
expect(detail(result, "Min. received").value).toBe("2.0000 USDC");
});
// With no minimum stated before it, a zero balance check is what sets the
// output side, and it guarantees nothing.
test("a zero balance check with no earlier minimum states no minimum", () => {
const data = buildExecute(
solidityPacked(["uint8", "uint8"], [0x0b, 0x0e]),
[
encodeWrapEth(ROUTER_ADDR, 1000000000000000000n),
encodeBalanceCheck(USER_ADDR, USDT_ADDR, 0n),
],
9999999999n,
);
const result = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER_ADDR);
expect(result).not.toBeNull();
expect(detail(result, "Token Out").value).toContain("USDT");
expect(detail(result, "Min. received").value).toBe(
"None (no minimum guaranteed)",
);
});
// Pins what https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/pulls/356 changed without
// testing: a non-swap execute() carrying only PERMIT2_PERMIT names no
// output currency, so it says so and titles itself "Uniswap Swap" rather
-13
View File
@@ -126,19 +126,6 @@ describe("a swap of a token outside the bundled list", () => {
test("a bundled token on the other side still formats", () => {
expect(swapDetail(data(), "Min. received").value).toBe("0.5000 WETH");
});
// A token added by hand carries whatever its decimals() returned, and a
// uint8 reaches 255, but formatUnits() throws above 80. The throw left the
// whole swap undecoded rather than refused
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/350).
test("refuses to format when the token reports more than 80 decimals", () => {
state.trackedTokens = [
{ address: NOVEL, symbol: "NOVEL", decimals: 81 },
];
expect(swapDetail(data(), "Amount").value).toBe(
"1000000000 base units (decimals unknown)",
);
});
});
describe("the Min. received line takes the same rule", () => {