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2
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
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1fd1b04432 | ||
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575f1658ae |
@@ -2065,9 +2065,12 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
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`wallet_requestPermissions` and is on neither the allowed nor the denied list.
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A site is its full origin, `scheme://host[:port]`, on both lists and for a
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connection allowed without "Remember": a choice for `https://dapp.example`
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says nothing about `http://dapp.example` or another port of that host. The
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background script prefers the toolbar popup (`action.openPopup()`) and falls
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back to a separate popup window (`src/background/index.js`,
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says nothing about `http://dapp.example` or another port of that host. A page
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with an opaque origin, such as one its server sandboxes with a
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Content-Security-Policy, is reported with the origin `null`, which is no site:
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every request from it is refused with EIP-1193 code `4100` and opens no
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prompt. The background script prefers the toolbar popup (`action.openPopup()`)
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and falls back to a separate popup window (`src/background/index.js`,
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`requestApproval()`). Only one exists per site at a time: a further connection
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request from a site whose prompt is still unanswered is refused with EIP-1193
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code `-32002` and opens no new prompt. If that prompt was in a toolbar popup
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@@ -2100,8 +2103,10 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
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artifact can be compared with it field for field. A nonce the site supplies is
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ignored: the nonce is always the account's next nonce from the node, so a site
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cannot replace one of the user's pending transactions or leave this one stuck
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behind a gap. A gas limit the site supplies, as `gas` or `gasLimit`, is used
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in place of the node's estimate; a request giving both with different values
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behind a gap. A gas limit the site supplies, as `gas` or `gasLimit`, is the
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one shown and signed in place of the node's estimate, but the node still
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estimates the transaction with that limit, as the check that it neither
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reverts nor runs out of gas; a request that gives both with different values
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is refused. A request that cannot be populated — unreachable node, reverting
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gas estimate — opens no window and is failed back to the site. Only one
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transaction approval exists at a time: populating fixes the nonce, so a second
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@@ -1428,6 +1428,11 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
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// the origin of sender.url is used: the frame that sent the message,
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// not the tab's page, which may be another site embedding that
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// frame. With neither, the request is refused.
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//
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// A page with an opaque origin, such as one its server sandboxes with
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// a Content-Security-Policy, is reported with the origin "null". That
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// is no site, so the request is refused too, and not credited to the
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// site its URL names.
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let trustedOrigin = sender.origin;
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if (!trustedOrigin && sender.url) {
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try {
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@@ -1436,7 +1441,7 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
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// an unparseable URL leaves the origin unknown
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}
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}
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if (!trustedOrigin) {
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if (!trustedOrigin || trustedOrigin === "null") {
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sendResponse({
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error: {
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code: 4100,
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@@ -201,6 +201,7 @@ async function prepareApprovalTx(provider, from, txParams) {
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throw fail("There is no active address to send this transaction from.");
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}
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const request = requestFrom(txParams || {}, from);
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const signer = new VoidSigner(getAddress(from), provider);
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let populated;
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try {
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@@ -208,10 +209,20 @@ async function prepareApprovalTx(provider, from, txParams) {
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// nonce, gas, fee and chain id are populated exactly as they were when
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// the popup did this. VoidSigner cannot sign, which is the point: the
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// background prepares, the popup signs.
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//
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// ethers asks the node for a gas estimate only when the request has
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// no gas limit, and that estimate is the only check that the
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// transaction does not revert. So a request carrying the site's gas
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// limit is estimated first, with that limit: one that reverts, or
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// needs more gas than the site gave it, fails here as well. The
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// site's gas limit is still the one populated.
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populated = await withTimeout(
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new VoidSigner(getAddress(from), provider).populateTransaction(
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request,
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),
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(async () => {
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if (present(request.gasLimit)) {
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await signer.estimateGas(request);
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}
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return signer.populateTransaction(request);
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})(),
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POPULATE_TIMEOUT_MS,
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"The transaction could not be prepared: the network did not answer in time.",
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);
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@@ -139,14 +139,20 @@ describe("prepareApprovalTx", () => {
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});
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// `gas` is the JSON-RPC name for the gas limit and the one sites send.
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// The node would estimate 21000; the site's 200000 is what is shown and
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// what is signed.
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// The node is still asked for its estimate, with the site's gas limit,
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// because the estimate is the check that the transaction does not revert.
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// It estimates 21000; the site's 200000 is what is shown and what is
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// signed.
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test("uses the gas limit a site sends as gas", async () => {
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const estimateGas = jest.fn(async () => 21000n);
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const approved = await prepareApprovalTx(
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providerWith(),
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providerWith({ estimateGas }),
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signer.address,
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{ ...TX_PARAMS, gas: "0x30d40" },
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);
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expect(estimateGas).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
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expect.objectContaining({ gasLimit: 200000n }),
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);
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expect(approved.gasLimit).toBe("0x30d40");
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const signed = Transaction.from(
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await signer.signTransaction({ ...approved }),
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@@ -297,6 +303,22 @@ describe("prepareApprovalTx", () => {
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expect(thrown.message).toMatch(/^[A-Z].*\.$/);
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});
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test("fails back a reverting request that sends its own gas limit", async () => {
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const reverting = providerWith({
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estimateGas: async () => {
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throw new Error("execution reverted: ERC20: transfer amount");
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},
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});
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await expect(
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prepareApprovalTx(reverting, signer.address, {
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...TX_PARAMS,
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gas: "0x30d40",
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}),
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).rejects.toThrow(
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/^The transaction could not be prepared: execution reverted/,
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);
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});
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// Without a bound, an unreachable node leaves the page's promise pending
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// with nothing on screen to explain it.
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test("gives up on a node that never answers", async () => {
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@@ -319,6 +341,28 @@ describe("prepareApprovalTx", () => {
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jest.useRealTimers();
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}
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});
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// The estimate of a request carrying the site's gas limit is a call of its
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// own, made before populating, and is bounded the same way.
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test("gives up on a node that never answers the estimate of a request that sends its own gas limit", async () => {
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jest.useFakeTimers();
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try {
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const hanging = providerWith({
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estimateGas: () => new Promise(() => {}),
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});
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const pending = prepareApprovalTx(hanging, signer.address, {
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...TX_PARAMS,
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gas: "0x30d40",
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});
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const settled = expect(pending).rejects.toThrow(
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/did not answer in time/,
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);
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await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(POPULATE_TIMEOUT_MS + 1);
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await settled;
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} finally {
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jest.useRealTimers();
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}
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});
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});
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describe("serializeApprovedTx", () => {
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+28
-2
@@ -8,8 +8,14 @@
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// and a request the browser said nothing about was credited to whatever the
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// page wrote (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/407).
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//
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// Every sender here lacks sender.origin, as on old Firefox. The connection
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// check on eth_accounts is what shows which site a request was credited to.
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// A page with an opaque origin, such as one its server sandboxes with a
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// Content-Security-Policy, is reported with the origin "null". That names no
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// site, so its request is refused
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// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/527).
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//
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// Every other sender here lacks sender.origin, as on old Firefox. The
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// connection check on eth_accounts is what shows which site a request was
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// credited to.
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const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
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@@ -144,3 +150,23 @@ describe("a request the browser does not say the sender of", () => {
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});
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});
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});
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describe("a request from a page with an opaque origin", () => {
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test("is refused, whatever the page's URL says", async () => {
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const accounts = loadBackground();
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const result = await accounts({
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origin: "null",
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url: CONNECTED_ORIGIN + "/sandboxed.html",
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tab: { url: CONNECTED_ORIGIN + "/sandboxed.html" },
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});
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expect(result).toEqual({
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error: {
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code: 4100,
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message:
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"The wallet could not tell which site sent this request.",
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},
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});
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});
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});
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