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sneak a6605e5b60 fix: eth_sign's warning and the README say what it signs (closes #409)
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eth_sign is signed as an EIP-191 personal message over its data, which is
what the Ethereum JSON-RPC specification defines it to return. Its warning
on the signature prompt said the site was asking to sign a raw hash that
could drain funds, and the README said the same; neither was true. The
warning now says the site used the older eth_sign method and that the data
will be signed as a personal message, and the README's SignApproval section
says so too. Tests pin that the background reads eth_sign address first and
data second, and that the sign screen answers it with the personal message
signature over the data.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-14 10:44:54 +00:00
6 changed files with 166 additions and 128 deletions
+7 -7
View File
@@ -2128,7 +2128,12 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
blocklist)
- Site origin (bold, scheme and port included) + "wants you to sign a
message"
- Danger warning box (shown for `eth_sign`, which signs a raw hash)
- Warning box, shown for `eth_sign`: "This site used the older eth_sign
method. The data will be signed as a personal message." An `eth_sign`
request names the address first and the data second. Its data is signed
exactly as a `personal_sign` message is, as an EIP-191 personal message,
which is what the Ethereum JSON-RPC specification defines `eth_sign` to
return.
- Type: "Personal message" or "Typed data (EIP-712)"
- From: color dot + full address + etherscan link
- Message: for `personal_sign` and `eth_sign`, the text the message's bytes
@@ -2143,12 +2148,7 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
Bytes that are not UTF-8 are shown as "This message is not text." For
typed data, formatted domain/type/message fields (EIP-712). The primary
type shown is the one ethers signs, derived from the typed data's `types`,
not the type the site states. The message shows only the fields that type
declares, at every level of nesting and in the type's order: ethers signs
those and drops any other key. Typed data carrying other keys is not
refused; each such key is listed after the message under "Not part of the
signature", by its place in the message (`details.note`,
`details[1].note`) and its value.
not the type the site states.
- Token permission warning, at the top of the message (typed data whose
primary type is `Permit`, as in EIP-2612, or one of Permit2's signature
types): "⚠️ TOKEN PERMISSION: Signing this lets the spender below take the
+2 -3
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@@ -988,9 +988,8 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
if (method === "eth_sign") {
signParams.dangerWarning =
"\u26a0\ufe0f DANGER: This site is requesting to sign a raw hash. " +
"This can be used to sign transactions that drain your funds. " +
"Only proceed if you fully understand what you are signing.";
"This site used the older eth_sign method. " +
"The data will be signed as a personal message.";
}
if (findPendingApproval(origin, "sign")) {
+5 -51
View File
@@ -626,38 +626,10 @@ function permitWarningHtml(types, primaryType, domain, message) {
return html;
}
// What ethers signs of a message value of type `type`: a struct keeps only
// the fields its type declares, in the type's order, and a list is read item
// by item. ethers drops every other key, so each one is added to `notSigned`
// with its place in the message and its value, for the screen to list apart.
function signedValue(types, type, value, path, notSigned) {
const itemType = type.replace(/\[\d*\]$/, "");
if (itemType !== type) {
if (!Array.isArray(value)) return value;
return value.map((item, i) =>
signedValue(types, itemType, item, `${path}[${i}]`, notSigned),
);
}
const fields = types[type];
if (!fields || !value || typeof value !== "object") return value;
const at = (name) => (path ? `${path}.${name}` : name);
for (const [key, val] of Object.entries(value)) {
if (!fields.some((f) => f.name === key)) notSigned.push([at(key), val]);
}
return Object.fromEntries(
fields.map((f) => [
f.name,
signedValue(types, f.type, value[f.name], at(f.name), notSigned),
]),
);
}
// The typed data as the screen shows it. The primary type shown is the one
// ethers signs, never the page's word for it; typedDataRefusal() keeps the two
// from differing on anything that can be signed. The Message section shows
// only what is signed, and any other key the page sent is listed after it as
// not part of the signature. Only typed data that cannot be read at all is
// shown as raw text, and typedDataRefusal() refuses it.
// from differing on anything that can be signed. Only typed data that cannot
// be read at all is shown as raw text, and typedDataRefusal() refuses it.
function formatTypedDataHtml(jsonStr) {
let data;
let primaryType;
@@ -691,30 +663,12 @@ function formatTypedDataHtml(jsonStr) {
html += `<div class="mb-2"><div class="text-muted">Primary type</div>`;
html += `<div class="font-bold">${escapeHtml(primaryType)}</div></div>`;
const lineHtml = (key, val) =>
`<div><span class="text-muted">${escapeHtml(key)}:</span> <span class="break-all">${escapeHtml(display(val))}</span></div>`;
if (data.message) {
const notSigned = [];
const message = signedValue(
data.types,
primaryType,
data.message,
"",
notSigned,
);
html += `<div class="mb-2"><div class="text-muted">Message</div>`;
for (const [key, val] of Object.entries(message)) {
html += lineHtml(key, val);
for (const [key, val] of Object.entries(data.message)) {
html += `<div><span class="text-muted">${escapeHtml(key)}:</span> <span class="break-all">${escapeHtml(display(val))}</span></div>`;
}
html += `</div>`;
if (notSigned.length > 0) {
html += `<div class="mb-2"><div class="text-muted">Not part of the signature</div>`;
for (const [key, val] of notSigned) {
html += lineHtml(key, val);
}
html += `</div>`;
}
}
return html;
@@ -771,7 +725,7 @@ function showSignApproval(details) {
"This message is plain text, not hex, so it cannot be signed.";
}
// Display danger warning for eth_sign (raw hash signing)
// The warning the background attaches to an eth_sign request.
const warningEl = $("approve-sign-danger-warning");
if (warningEl) {
if (sp.dangerWarning) {
+49
View File
@@ -1606,6 +1606,55 @@ describe("what the approval is verified against", () => {
});
});
// eth_sign names the address first and the data second, the reverse of
// personal_sign, and is answered as the JSON-RPC specification defines it:
// with an EIP-191 personal message signature over the data, the same
// signature personal_sign returns
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/409). The signature below is
// made by the test; that the sign screen makes the same one is tested in
// tests/ethSign.test.js.
describe("eth_sign", () => {
test("is read address first, and returns a personal message signature over the data", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground();
const page = bg.send(
{
type: "AUTISTMASK_RPC",
method: "eth_sign",
params: [signer.address, MESSAGE],
},
{ origin: ORIGIN },
);
await settle();
const id = approvalIdIn(bg.created.map((c) => c.url));
const details = bg.send(
{ type: "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL", id },
{ url: bg.fromPopup.url },
);
const { signParams } = details.sendResponse.mock.calls[0][0];
expect(signParams).toMatchObject({
method: "eth_sign",
message: MESSAGE,
from: signer.address,
});
expect(signParams.dangerWarning).toBe(
"This site used the older eth_sign method. " +
"The data will be signed as a personal message.",
);
const signature = await signer.signMessage(
Buffer.from(MESSAGE.slice(2), "hex"),
);
bg.send(
{ type: "AUTISTMASK_SIGN_RESPONSE", id, approved: true, signature },
{ url: bg.fromPopup.url },
);
await settle();
expect(page.sendResponse).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ result: signature });
});
});
// The interlock must not cost the retry the approval exists to allow.
describe("the interlock releases a failed attempt", () => {
test("a retryable failure before the broadcast leaves the approval usable", async () => {
+102
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@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
// The sign screen signs an eth_sign request the way it signs personal_sign: as
// an EIP-191 personal message over the bytes of the data
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/409). Booted through the real
// popup entry point as the approval window. The background's half, which reads
// the address first and the data second and checks the signature, is tested in
// tests/backgroundApproval.test.js.
// Mocked so that no password has to be hashed: the stored secret decrypts to
// the test key below.
jest.mock("../src/shared/vault", () => ({
decryptWithPassword: jest.fn(),
encryptWithPassword: jest.fn(),
}));
const { Wallet, getBytes } = require("ethers");
const {
bootPopup,
cleanupPopup,
unversionedValidProfile,
} = require("./support/popupBoot");
// A published test key, never used for real funds.
const SIGNER_KEY =
"0x59c6995e998f97a5a0044966f0945389dc9e86dae88c7a8412f4603b6b78690d";
const signer = new Wallet(SIGNER_KEY);
// "Hello AutistMask", as the hex a page sends.
const MESSAGE = "0x48656c6c6f204175746973744d61736b";
const ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
afterEach(cleanupPopup);
test("the sign screen answers eth_sign with a personal message signature over the data", async () => {
const sent = [];
const page = await bootPopup(
unversionedValidProfile({
wallets: [
{
type: "key",
name: "Wallet 1",
encryptedSecret: "encrypted-key",
addresses: [
{
address: signer.address,
balance: "0.0000",
tokenBalances: [],
},
],
},
],
activeAddress: signer.address,
allowedSites: { [signer.address]: [ORIGIN] },
}),
{
search: "?approval=approval-1",
runtime: {
connect: () => ({ postMessage: () => {} }),
// Answered as the background answers: with the eth_sign
// approval this window was opened for, and by handing back
// the signature the popup sends.
sendMessage: (msg, reply) => {
sent.push(msg);
if (msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL") {
reply({
type: "sign",
origin: ORIGIN,
isPhishingDomain: false,
approvedFrom: signer.address,
signParams: {
method: "eth_sign",
message: MESSAGE,
from: signer.address,
},
});
} else if (msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_SIGN_RESPONSE") {
reply({ signature: msg.signature });
} else {
reply(undefined);
}
},
},
},
);
globalThis.window.close = jest.fn();
const { decryptWithPassword } = require("../src/shared/vault");
decryptWithPassword.mockResolvedValue(SIGNER_KEY);
expect(page.visibleViews()).toEqual(["approve-sign"]);
page.node("approve-sign-password").value = "any password";
await page.click("btn-approve-sign");
expect(
sent.filter((msg) => msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_SIGN_RESPONSE"),
).toEqual([
{
type: "AUTISTMASK_SIGN_RESPONSE",
id: "approval-1",
approved: true,
signature: await signer.signMessage(getBytes(MESSAGE)),
},
]);
expect(globalThis.window.close).toHaveBeenCalled();
});
+1 -67
View File
@@ -233,26 +233,6 @@ function warningOf(data) {
return html.slice(0, html.indexOf(">Domain<"));
}
const NOT_SIGNED = ">Not part of the signature<";
// The Message section alone, without the keys listed after it as not part of
// the signature.
function messageOf(data) {
const html = formatTypedDataHtml(JSON.stringify(data));
const end = html.indexOf(NOT_SIGNED);
return html.slice(
html.indexOf(">Message<"),
end === -1 ? html.length : end,
);
}
// The keys listed as not part of the signature, or "" when there are none.
function notSignedOf(data) {
const html = formatTypedDataHtml(JSON.stringify(data));
const start = html.indexOf(NOT_SIGNED);
return start === -1 ? "" : html.slice(start);
}
function request(data) {
return { method: "eth_signTypedData_v4", typedData: JSON.stringify(data) };
}
@@ -332,8 +312,7 @@ describe("the warning reads only the fields the signed type declares", () => {
});
// A Permit whose type names its spender `operator`; the page adds a
// `spender` key the type does not declare. The Message section names
// only the operator, and the added key is listed apart as not signed.
// `spender` key the type does not declare.
test("an added key is not named as the spender", () => {
const data = {
...PERMIT,
@@ -352,10 +331,6 @@ describe("the warning reads only the fields the signed type declares", () => {
const warning = warningOf(data);
expect(warning).toContain(WARNING);
expect(warning).not.toContain(DECOY);
expect(messageOf(data)).toContain(SPENDER);
expect(messageOf(data)).not.toContain(DECOY);
expect(notSignedOf(data)).toContain("spender:");
expect(notSignedOf(data)).toContain(DECOY);
});
// The permit for a Uniswap v3 position NFT: a `Permit` with no amount
@@ -396,47 +371,6 @@ describe("the warning reads only the fields the signed type declares", () => {
});
});
// ethers signs only the declared fields at every level of nesting, so an
// added key inside a struct is not signed either. Such typed data is not
// refused; the added key is listed apart, with where it sits in the message.
describe("the Message section shows only the fields that are signed", () => {
const NOTE = "This signature only signs you in";
test("an added key inside a nested struct is listed as not signed", () => {
const data = {
...PERMIT_SINGLE,
message: {
...PERMIT_SINGLE.message,
details: { ...PERMIT_SINGLE.message.details, note: NOTE },
},
};
expect(messageOf(data)).toContain("expiration");
expect(messageOf(data)).not.toContain(NOTE);
expect(notSignedOf(data)).toContain("details.note:");
expect(notSignedOf(data)).toContain(NOTE);
expect(typedDataRefusal(request(data))).toBeNull();
});
test("an added key inside a list item is listed with its index", () => {
const [first, second] = PERMIT_BATCH.message.details;
const data = {
...PERMIT_BATCH,
message: {
...PERMIT_BATCH.message,
details: [first, { ...second, note: NOTE }],
},
};
expect(messageOf(data)).not.toContain(NOTE);
expect(notSignedOf(data)).toContain("details[1].note:");
expect(notSignedOf(data)).toContain(NOTE);
});
test("nothing is listed apart when every key is declared", () => {
expect(notSignedOf(PERMIT_SINGLE)).toBe("");
expect(notSignedOf(LOGIN)).toBe("");
});
});
describe("the primary type shown is the one ethers signs", () => {
// A drain stated as a sign-in: the page says Login, the types say
// PermitSingle, and ethers would sign PermitSingle.