fix: the connection prompt shows the shared address whole (closes #517)

The element holding the address on the connection prompt was a flex row,
so the title line and the address that renderAddressHtml() returns sat
side by side and the address got only the width left over, which hid its
last nine characters. It is now a plain block, as on the signature
screen, so the address has a row of its own. The Chrome browser suite's
connection test now measures that row with the check the other screens
already use.

Model: opus-5-5

README.md

@@ -2128,12 +2128,7 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
       blocklist)
     - Site origin (bold, scheme and port included) + "wants you to sign a
       message"
-    - Warning box, shown for `eth_sign`: "This site used the older eth_sign
-      method. The data will be signed as a personal message." An `eth_sign`
-      request names the address first and the data second. Its data is signed
-      exactly as a `personal_sign` message is, as an EIP-191 personal message,
-      which is what the Ethereum JSON-RPC specification defines `eth_sign` to
-      return.
+    - Danger warning box (shown for `eth_sign`, which signs a raw hash)
     - Type: "Personal message" or "Typed data (EIP-712)"
     - From: color dot + full address + etherscan link
     - Message: for `personal_sign` and `eth_sign`, the text the message's bytes
@@ -2668,8 +2663,7 @@ plaintext list of anyone's domain names.
 When a dApp on a blocklisted domain requests a wallet connection, transaction
 approval, or signature, the approval popup displays a prominent red warning
 banner alerting the user. The domain checker matches exact hostnames and all
-parent domains (subdomain matching), and checks a hostname written with a
-trailing dot (`name.`) as `name`.
+parent domains (subdomain matching).
 
 #### Transaction Decoding
 

src/background/index.js

@@ -988,8 +988,9 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
 
         if (method === "eth_sign") {
             signParams.dangerWarning =
-                "This site used the older eth_sign method. " +
-                "The data will be signed as a personal message.";
+                "\u26a0\ufe0f DANGER: This site is requesting to sign a raw hash. " +
+                "This can be used to sign transactions that drain your funds. " +
+                "Only proceed if you fully understand what you are signing.";
         }
 
         if (findPendingApproval(origin, "sign")) {

src/popup/index.html

@@ -1716,10 +1716,7 @@
                     <div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">
                         Address that will be shared:
                     </div>
-                    <div
-                        id="approve-address"
-                        class="text-xs flex items-center mb-2"
-                    ></div>
+                    <div id="approve-address" class="text-xs mb-2"></div>
                 </div>
                 <div class="mb-3">
                     <label

src/popup/views/approval.js

@@ -725,7 +725,7 @@ function showSignApproval(details) {
             "This message is plain text, not hex, so it cannot be signed.";
     }
 
-    // The warning the background attaches to an eth_sign request.
+    // Display danger warning for eth_sign (raw hash signing)
     const warningEl = $("approve-sign-danger-warning");
     if (warningEl) {
         if (sp.dangerWarning) {

src/shared/phishingDomains.js

@@ -110,14 +110,11 @@ function hashListed(hash) {
  * Generate hostname variants for subdomain matching.
  * "sub.evil.com" yields ["sub.evil.com", "evil.com"].
  *
- * A trailing dot is dropped: "evil.com." is the fully qualified spelling of
- * "evil.com", and the browser loads the same site from either.
- *
  * @param {string} hostname
  * @returns {string[]}
  */
 function hostnameVariants(hostname) {
-    const h = hostname.toLowerCase().replace(/\.$/, "");
+    const h = hostname.toLowerCase();
     const variants = [h];
     const parts = h.split(".");
     // Parent domains: a.b.c.d -> b.c.d, c.d

src/shared/walletDefects.js

@@ -36,13 +36,11 @@ const DEFECTS = {
                 "derivation path beneath that key instead of from a master " +
                 "key, so the addresses listed here are not the ones that key " +
                 "produces under the standard path.",
-            "Signing, sending and private key export are disabled for this " +
-                "wallet. Anything these addresses hold can be reached outside " +
-                "this wallet with the extended private key you imported, if " +
-                "you kept a copy of it, or with the master extended private " +
-                "key or recovery phrase it came from, in software that " +
-                "repeats the same non-standard derivation. Check the " +
-                "addresses in a block explorer before deciding what to do.",
+            "Signing and sending are disabled for this wallet. The addresses " +
+                "do descend from the extended private key you imported, so " +
+                "anything they hold is still reachable by software that " +
+                "repeats the same non-standard derivation. Check them in a " +
+                "block explorer before deciding what to do.",
             "To see the addresses this key produces under the standard path, " +
                 "import the master extended private key, or the recovery " +
                 "phrase it came from, as a new wallet. Nothing here has been " +

tests/backgroundApproval.test.js

@@ -1606,55 +1606,6 @@ describe("what the approval is verified against", () => {
     });
 });
 
-// eth_sign names the address first and the data second, the reverse of
-// personal_sign, and is answered as the JSON-RPC specification defines it:
-// with an EIP-191 personal message signature over the data, the same
-// signature personal_sign returns
-// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/409). The signature below is
-// made by the test; that the sign screen makes the same one is tested in
-// tests/ethSign.test.js.
-describe("eth_sign", () => {
-    test("is read address first, and returns a personal message signature over the data", async () => {
-        const bg = loadBackground();
-        const page = bg.send(
-            {
-                type: "AUTISTMASK_RPC",
-                method: "eth_sign",
-                params: [signer.address, MESSAGE],
-            },
-            { origin: ORIGIN },
-        );
-        await settle();
-        const id = approvalIdIn(bg.created.map((c) => c.url));
-
-        const details = bg.send(
-            { type: "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL", id },
-            { url: bg.fromPopup.url },
-        );
-        const { signParams } = details.sendResponse.mock.calls[0][0];
-        expect(signParams).toMatchObject({
-            method: "eth_sign",
-            message: MESSAGE,
-            from: signer.address,
-        });
-        expect(signParams.dangerWarning).toBe(
-            "This site used the older eth_sign method. " +
-                "The data will be signed as a personal message.",
-        );
-
-        const signature = await signer.signMessage(
-            Buffer.from(MESSAGE.slice(2), "hex"),
-        );
-        bg.send(
-            { type: "AUTISTMASK_SIGN_RESPONSE", id, approved: true, signature },
-            { url: bg.fromPopup.url },
-        );
-        await settle();
-
-        expect(page.sendResponse).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ result: signature });
-    });
-});
-
 // The interlock must not cost the retry the approval exists to allow.
 describe("the interlock releases a failed attempt", () => {
     test("a retryable failure before the broadcast leaves the approval usable", async () => {

tests/e2e/run.js

@@ -3857,6 +3857,9 @@ test("eth_requestAccounts approved returns the selected address (#183)", async (
             shown.toLowerCase().includes(env.expectedAddress.toLowerCase()),
             "the site prompt shows the wrong address: " + JSON.stringify(shown),
         );
+        // The text above is there even when the row is too narrow to show it
+        // all; this measures that the whole address is visible (#517).
+        await assertAddressesFit(popup, "the connection prompt");
 
         // Remembered, so the connection survives a background worker that MV3
         // terminates after 30 seconds idle. The in-memory connectedSites map

tests/ethSign.test.js

@@ -1,102 +0,0 @@
-// The sign screen signs an eth_sign request the way it signs personal_sign: as
-// an EIP-191 personal message over the bytes of the data
-// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/409). Booted through the real
-// popup entry point as the approval window. The background's half, which reads
-// the address first and the data second and checks the signature, is tested in
-// tests/backgroundApproval.test.js.
-
-// Mocked so that no password has to be hashed: the stored secret decrypts to
-// the test key below.
-jest.mock("../src/shared/vault", () => ({
-    decryptWithPassword: jest.fn(),
-    encryptWithPassword: jest.fn(),
-}));
-
-const { Wallet, getBytes } = require("ethers");
-const {
-    bootPopup,
-    cleanupPopup,
-    unversionedValidProfile,
-} = require("./support/popupBoot");
-
-// A published test key, never used for real funds.
-const SIGNER_KEY =
-    "0x59c6995e998f97a5a0044966f0945389dc9e86dae88c7a8412f4603b6b78690d";
-const signer = new Wallet(SIGNER_KEY);
-// "Hello AutistMask", as the hex a page sends.
-const MESSAGE = "0x48656c6c6f204175746973744d61736b";
-const ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
-
-afterEach(cleanupPopup);
-
-test("the sign screen answers eth_sign with a personal message signature over the data", async () => {
-    const sent = [];
-    const page = await bootPopup(
-        unversionedValidProfile({
-            wallets: [
-                {
-                    type: "key",
-                    name: "Wallet 1",
-                    encryptedSecret: "encrypted-key",
-                    addresses: [
-                        {
-                            address: signer.address,
-                            balance: "0.0000",
-                            tokenBalances: [],
-                        },
-                    ],
-                },
-            ],
-            activeAddress: signer.address,
-            allowedSites: { [signer.address]: [ORIGIN] },
-        }),
-        {
-            search: "?approval=approval-1",
-            runtime: {
-                connect: () => ({ postMessage: () => {} }),
-                // Answered as the background answers: with the eth_sign
-                // approval this window was opened for, and by handing back
-                // the signature the popup sends.
-                sendMessage: (msg, reply) => {
-                    sent.push(msg);
-                    if (msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL") {
-                        reply({
-                            type: "sign",
-                            origin: ORIGIN,
-                            isPhishingDomain: false,
-                            approvedFrom: signer.address,
-                            signParams: {
-                                method: "eth_sign",
-                                message: MESSAGE,
-                                from: signer.address,
-                            },
-                        });
-                    } else if (msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_SIGN_RESPONSE") {
-                        reply({ signature: msg.signature });
-                    } else {
-                        reply(undefined);
-                    }
-                },
-            },
-        },
-    );
-    globalThis.window.close = jest.fn();
-    const { decryptWithPassword } = require("../src/shared/vault");
-    decryptWithPassword.mockResolvedValue(SIGNER_KEY);
-
-    expect(page.visibleViews()).toEqual(["approve-sign"]);
-    page.node("approve-sign-password").value = "any password";
-    await page.click("btn-approve-sign");
-
-    expect(
-        sent.filter((msg) => msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_SIGN_RESPONSE"),
-    ).toEqual([
-        {
-            type: "AUTISTMASK_SIGN_RESPONSE",
-            id: "approval-1",
-            approved: true,
-            signature: await signer.signMessage(getBytes(MESSAGE)),
-        },
-    ]);
-    expect(globalThis.window.close).toHaveBeenCalled();
-});

tests/phishingDomains.test.js

@@ -89,12 +89,6 @@ describe("vendored blocklist", () => {
         expect(isPhishingDomain(LISTED[0].toUpperCase())).toBe(true);
     });
 
-    test("a hostname ending in a dot is the same host", () => {
-        expect(isPhishingDomain(LISTED[1] + ".")).toBe(true);
-        expect(isPhishingDomain("wallet." + LISTED[1] + ".")).toBe(true);
-        expect(isPhishingDomain(CLEAN[0] + ".")).toBe(false);
-    });
-
     test("returns false for an empty or missing hostname", () => {
         expect(isPhishingDomain("")).toBe(false);
         expect(isPhishingDomain(null)).toBe(false);
@@ -139,13 +133,6 @@ describe("hostnameVariants", () => {
     test("lowercases hostnames", () => {
         expect(hostnameVariants("Evil.COM")).toEqual(["evil.com"]);
     });
-
-    test("drops the trailing dot of a fully qualified hostname", () => {
-        expect(hostnameVariants("sub.evil.com.")).toEqual([
-            "sub.evil.com",
-            "evil.com",
-        ]);
-    });
 });
 
 describe("domain hashing", () => {

tests/walletDefects.test.js

@@ -153,18 +153,6 @@ describe("the explanatory copy", () => {
         expect(all).not.toMatch(/\blost\b|\bstolen\b|\bgone\b/i);
     });
 
-    // The wallet holds the imported key but will not export it, so the copy
-    // must name every key the user may hold that reaches the addresses
-    // outside it.
-    test("it names the keys that reach the addresses outside this wallet", () => {
-        const body = defect.paragraphs.join(" ");
-
-        expect(body).toMatch(/private key export are disabled/);
-        expect(body).toMatch(
-            /with the extended private key you imported, if you kept a copy of it, or with the master extended private key or recovery phrase it came from, in software that repeats the same non-standard derivation/,
-        );
-    });
-
     test("it says the wallet is not deleted and what the user can do", () => {
         const body = defect.paragraphs.join(" ");