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Author SHA1 Message Date
clawbot d1751beb32 harden: one connection and one signature prompt per site at a time (closes #405)
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e2e / e2e-firefox (push) Waiting to run
Each eth_requestAccounts or personal_sign call opened another approval
window, so a page calling in a loop could cover the screen with identical
prompts. While a site's connection or signature prompt is unanswered, a
further request of that kind from the same site is now refused with
EIP-1193 -32002 and opens no window; all signing methods count as one
kind. A connection prompt whose toolbar popup closed before it connected,
and which the toolbar popup no longer opens, is shown again by the site's
next request instead of refusing the site until the address changes.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-04 19:43:11 +02:00
7 changed files with 391 additions and 248 deletions
+11 -17
View File
@@ -1844,7 +1844,11 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
says nothing about `http://dapp.example` or another port of that host. The
background script prefers the toolbar popup (`action.openPopup()`) and falls
back to a separate popup window (`src/background/index.js`,
`requestApproval()`).
`requestApproval()`). Only one exists per site at a time: a further connection
request from a site whose prompt is still unanswered is refused with EIP-1193
code `-32002` and opens no new prompt. If that prompt was in a toolbar popup
that closed before it connected, and the toolbar popup has since been set to
open something else, the refused request shows that prompt again.
- **Elements**:
- "Connection Request" heading
- Phishing warning banner (shown when the hostname is on the phishing
@@ -1910,7 +1914,10 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
- **When**: A connected website requests a message signature via
`personal_sign`, `eth_sign`, or `eth_signTypedData_v4`. Opened the same way as
TxApproval, in a separate popup window.
TxApproval, in a separate popup window. Only one exists per site at a time: a
further signature request, by any of these methods, from a site whose
signature request is still unanswered is refused with EIP-1193 code `-32002`
and opens no window.
- **Elements**:
- "Signature Request" heading
- Phishing warning banner (shown when the hostname is on the phishing
@@ -1920,13 +1927,8 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
- Danger warning box (shown for `eth_sign`, which signs a raw hash)
- Type: "Personal message" or "Typed data (EIP-712)"
- From: color dot + full address + etherscan link
- Message: for `personal_sign` and `eth_sign`, the text the message's bytes
decode to as UTF-8, with each control or format character (zero-width and
bidirectional characters among them) shown as a bordered `U+XXXX` mark
instead of acting on the text, so it reads in the order of the bytes that
are signed; a line feed is shown as a line break. Bytes that are not UTF-8
are shown as "This message is not text." For typed data, formatted
domain/type/message fields (EIP-712). The primary type shown is the one
- Message: decoded UTF-8 text (personal_sign) or formatted domain/type/
message fields (EIP-712 typed data). The primary type shown is the one
ethers signs, derived from the typed data's `types`, not the type the site
states.
- Token permission warning, at the top of the message (typed data whose
@@ -1940,20 +1942,12 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
domain's `verifyingContract`; any those fields do not give is shown as
`Unknown`, and the domain, type and message lines still follow. Only typed
data that cannot be read at all is shown as raw text.
- Raw data (`personal_sign` and `eth_sign`): the message's hex exactly as
the site sent it. The bytes it encodes are what is signed, as an EIP-191
personal message.
- Password input and an error line
- "Sign" / "Reject" buttons
- **Transitions**:
- Typed data that states no primary type, or one other than the type it
would be signed as, or that cannot be read → shown with the error line
saying so and "Sign" disabled; only "Reject" remains
- A `personal_sign` or `eth_sign` message that is not hex (`0x` and an even
number of hex digits) → shown as plain text, with the error line "This
message is plain text, not hex, so it cannot be signed." and "Sign"
disabled; signing takes the bytes from the hex, so such a message has none
to sign
- "Sign" (correct password) → signs locally → closes popup (returns
signature)
- "Sign" (wrong password, or a signing failure) → error line, no screen
+11 -9
View File
@@ -45,15 +45,17 @@ but the review is broader than any of them.
# Completed Steps
- 2026-10-04: The signature screen shows a personal message as the bytes that
are signed ([#403](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/403)). It
showed only the decoded text, with bidirectional and zero-width characters
acting on it, so a site could make the message read differently from what is
signed, and a message that was not hex was shown as NUL characters. The hex is
now shown as "Raw data" alongside the decoded text, control and format
characters in the text are shown as `U+XXXX` marks, and a message that is not
hex is shown as plain text with "Sign" disabled, since signing takes the bytes
from the hex and such a message has none to sign.
- 2026-10-04: A site has at most one connection prompt and one signature prompt
open at a time ([#405](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/405)). Each
`eth_requestAccounts` or `personal_sign` call opened another approval window,
so a page calling in a loop could cover the screen with identical prompts. A
further request of the same kind from a site whose prompt is still unanswered
is now refused with EIP-1193 `-32002`, the code a second transaction already
gets, and opens no window. Signing by `personal_sign`, `eth_sign` and
`eth_signTypedData_v4` counts as one kind. Other sites are not affected, and
the site may ask again once the user has answered. A connection prompt whose
toolbar popup closed before it connected, and which nothing shows any more, is
shown again when the site asks again.
- 2026-10-04: A nonce the site supplies with `eth_sendTransaction` is ignored
([#404](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/404)). It was passed on to
+85 -15
View File
@@ -87,7 +87,8 @@ const pendingApprovals = {};
// authority on a nonce the network has not accepted, which an abandoned
// approval then leaves a hole in.
//
// Sign approvals are not gated: a signature consumes no nonce.
// Sign approvals do not take this slot: a signature consumes no nonce. They are
// limited per site instead; see findPendingApproval().
//
// The slot is null when free, and otherwise the handle of the request holding
// it. Once that request has raised its approval the handle carries the
@@ -99,7 +100,7 @@ let txApprovalSlot = null;
// EIP-1474 "resource unavailable": the standard code for a request that is
// refused because another one is already pending.
const TX_APPROVAL_PENDING_CODE = -32002;
const APPROVAL_PENDING_CODE = -32002;
// True at every moment this can be sent: the slot is taken immediately before
// the transaction is populated, so the other request is either being prepared
@@ -136,6 +137,22 @@ function releaseTxApprovalSlotFor(approvalId) {
}
}
// One site-connection approval and one sign approval per site at a time: a
// page that asks again before the user has answered is refused with the code
// above instead of opening another window, so it cannot bury the user in
// prompts. The pending approval itself holds the place, so a caller must test
// this and raise its approval with nothing awaited in between.
function findPendingApproval(origin, type) {
return Object.values(pendingApprovals).find(
(approval) => approval.origin === origin && approval.type === type,
);
}
const APPROVAL_PENDING_MESSAGE =
"AutistMask is already waiting for your answer to a request of this kind" +
" from this site, so this one was not shown. Please answer that one," +
" then send this one again.";
// Nonces this worker has already handed to the node, per chain and address.
// This is the wallet's own knowledge that a nonce is spent, and it is checked
// before a broadcast rather than after: a node's pending count can lag a
@@ -288,7 +305,12 @@ async function proxyRpc(method, params) {
return json.result;
}
// The site-connection approval the toolbar popup is set to open, or null while
// it opens the wallet. Set only by resetPopupUrl() and showInToolbarPopup().
let toolbarPopupApprovalId = null;
function resetPopupUrl() {
toolbarPopupApprovalId = null;
if (actionNs && typeof actionNs.setPopup === "function") {
actionNs.setPopup({ popup: "src/popup/index.html" });
}
@@ -466,26 +488,33 @@ async function openApprovalWindow(id) {
function requestApproval(origin) {
return new Promise((resolve) => {
const id = crypto.randomUUID();
pendingApprovals[id] = { id, origin, resolve };
pendingApprovals[id] = { id, origin, resolve, type: "site" };
if (actionNs && typeof actionNs.openPopup === "function") {
actionNs.setPopup({
popup: "src/popup/index.html?approval=" + id,
});
try {
const result = actionNs.openPopup();
if (result && typeof result.catch === "function") {
result.catch(() => openApprovalWindow(id));
}
} catch {
openApprovalWindow(id);
}
showInToolbarPopup(id);
} else {
openApprovalWindow(id);
}
});
}
// Show a site-connection approval in the toolbar popup, or in a separate popup
// window when the browser will not open the toolbar popup.
function showInToolbarPopup(id) {
toolbarPopupApprovalId = id;
actionNs.setPopup({
popup: "src/popup/index.html?approval=" + id,
});
try {
const result = actionNs.openPopup();
if (result && typeof result.catch === "function") {
result.catch(() => openApprovalWindow(id));
}
} catch {
openApprovalWindow(id);
}
}
// Open a tx-approval popup and return a promise that resolves with txHash or error.
// Uses windows.create() directly because tx approvals are triggered programmatically
// (from a dApp RPC call), not from a user gesture, so action.openPopup() is
@@ -641,6 +670,31 @@ async function handleConnectionRequest(origin) {
return { result: [activeAddress] };
}
const pending = findPendingApproval(origin, "site");
if (pending) {
// A toolbar popup that closed before it connected leaves its prompt
// pending, and once the toolbar popup is set to open something else
// nothing shows that prompt: the site would be refused until the
// address changed. Show it again. A prompt in a window or in a
// connected popup is settled when that closes, and one the toolbar
// popup is still set to open is a click away, so those are left alone.
if (
actionNs &&
typeof actionNs.openPopup === "function" &&
!pending.windowId &&
!pending.portConnected &&
toolbarPopupApprovalId !== pending.id
) {
showInToolbarPopup(pending.id);
}
return {
error: {
code: APPROVAL_PENDING_CODE,
message: APPROVAL_PENDING_MESSAGE,
},
};
}
// Open approval popup
const decision = await requestApproval(origin);
@@ -865,6 +919,14 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
"Only proceed if you fully understand what you are signing.";
}
if (findPendingApproval(origin, "sign")) {
return {
error: {
code: APPROVAL_PENDING_CODE,
message: APPROVAL_PENDING_MESSAGE,
},
};
}
const decision = await requestSignApproval(
origin,
signParams,
@@ -898,6 +960,14 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
},
};
}
if (findPendingApproval(origin, "sign")) {
return {
error: {
code: APPROVAL_PENDING_CODE,
message: APPROVAL_PENDING_MESSAGE,
},
};
}
const decision = await requestSignApproval(
origin,
signParams,
@@ -969,7 +1039,7 @@ async function handleSendTransaction(params, origin) {
if (!slot) {
return {
error: {
code: TX_APPROVAL_PENDING_CODE,
code: APPROVAL_PENDING_CODE,
message: TX_APPROVAL_PENDING_MESSAGE,
},
};
-9
View File
@@ -1698,15 +1698,6 @@
></div>
</div>
<div id="approve-sign-hex-section" class="mb-3 hidden">
<div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">Raw data</div>
<div
id="approve-sign-hex"
class="text-xs break-all"
style="max-height: 6rem; overflow-y: auto"
></div>
</div>
<div class="mb-2">
<label class="block mb-1 text-xs">Password</label>
<input
+11 -33
View File
@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ const {
getBigInt,
getBytes,
Interface,
isHexString,
MaxUint256,
toUtf8String,
TypedDataEncoder,
@@ -381,28 +380,20 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
);
}
// The text the hex message's bytes decode to as UTF-8, or null when they are
// not UTF-8. The caller has checked that the message is hex.
function decodeHexMessage(hex) {
try {
return toUtf8String(getBytes(hex));
const bytes = Uint8Array.from(
hex
.slice(2)
.match(/.{1,2}/g)
.map((b) => parseInt(b, 16)),
);
return toUtf8String(bytes);
} catch {
return null;
}
}
// The text as HTML, with each control or format character (zero-width and
// bidirectional characters among them) shown as a bordered U+XXXX mark
// instead of acting on the text, so it reads in the order of its bytes. Line
// feeds are shown as line breaks.
function markControlCharacters(text) {
return escapeHtml(text).replace(/[\p{Cc}\p{Cf}]/gu, (c) => {
if (c === "\n") return "<br>";
const code = c.codePointAt(0).toString(16).toUpperCase();
return `<span class="border border-border">U+${code.padStart(4, "0")}</span>`;
});
}
// The type ethers will sign typed data as. ethers does not read the page's
// `primaryType`: it takes the one struct in `types` that no other struct
// refers to. Throws when the types name no such single struct, which ethers
@@ -666,29 +657,15 @@ function showSignApproval(details) {
? "Typed data (EIP-712)"
: "Personal message";
// A personal message is signed as the bytes its hex encodes, so the hex
// is shown as well as any text it decodes to. Signing reads the bytes
// from the hex, so a message that is not hex cannot be signed: it is
// shown as the text it is, and refused.
let refusal = null;
$("approve-sign-hex-section").classList.add("hidden");
if (isTyped) {
$("approve-sign-message").innerHTML = formatTypedDataHtml(sp.typedData);
refusal = typedDataRefusal(sp);
} else if (isHexString(sp.message, true)) {
} else {
const decoded = decodeHexMessage(sp.message);
if (decoded !== null) {
$("approve-sign-message").innerHTML =
markControlCharacters(decoded);
$("approve-sign-message").textContent = decoded;
} else {
$("approve-sign-message").textContent = "This message is not text.";
$("approve-sign-message").textContent = sp.message;
}
$("approve-sign-hex").textContent = sp.message;
$("approve-sign-hex-section").classList.remove("hidden");
} else {
$("approve-sign-message").innerHTML = markControlCharacters(sp.message);
refusal =
"This message is plain text, not hex, so it cannot be signed.";
}
// Display danger warning for eth_sign (raw hash signing)
@@ -710,6 +687,7 @@ function showSignApproval(details) {
showView("approve-sign");
attachCopyHandlers("view-approve-sign");
const refusal = typedDataRefusal(sp);
if (refusal) {
showError("approve-sign-error", refusal);
$("btn-approve-sign").disabled = true;
+273 -3
View File
@@ -74,6 +74,22 @@ const NONCE = 7;
// "Hello AutistMask" as the hex string a dApp passes to personal_sign.
const MESSAGE = "0x48656c6c6f204175746973744d61736b";
// An EIP-712 document as a dApp passes it to eth_signTypedData_v4. The
// background only carries it to the approval screen, so a small one does.
const TYPED_DATA = JSON.stringify({
domain: { name: "AutistMask Test", version: "1", chainId: 1 },
primaryType: "Note",
types: {
EIP712Domain: [
{ name: "name", type: "string" },
{ name: "version", type: "string" },
{ name: "chainId", type: "uint256" },
],
Note: [{ name: "contents", type: "string" }],
},
message: { contents: "Hello AutistMask" },
});
// The transaction the background populates and the approval screen displays.
// The nonce is a parameter because the duplicate case turns on two artifacts
// differing in a field the dApp fixed nothing for.
@@ -229,6 +245,7 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
// raised through action.openPopup() opens no window at all, so this is
// the only place its id appears.
const actionPopups = [];
const openPopup = jest.fn(() => Promise.resolve());
global.chrome = {
storage,
@@ -283,7 +300,7 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
// popup: no window is created, so windows.onRemoved can never
// fire for it and the port disconnect is the only close signal
// that exists.
...(opts.actionPopup ? { openPopup: () => Promise.resolve() } : {}),
...(opts.actionPopup ? { openPopup } : {}),
},
};
@@ -330,7 +347,7 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
// The same for a message-signing approval, which pins the signing address
// at approval time in exactly the same way.
function requestSign(from) {
function requestSign(from, origin) {
let rpcResult = null;
messageListener(
{
@@ -338,7 +355,7 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
method: "personal_sign",
params: [MESSAGE, from || signer.address],
},
{ origin: ORIGIN },
{ origin: origin || ORIGIN },
(r) => {
rpcResult = r;
},
@@ -352,6 +369,24 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
};
}
// The same through eth_signTypedData_v4, whose params name the address
// first and the typed data second.
function requestTypedData() {
let rpcResult = null;
messageListener(
{
type: "AUTISTMASK_RPC",
method: "eth_signTypedData_v4",
params: [signer.address, TYPED_DATA],
},
{ origin: ORIGIN },
(r) => {
rpcResult = r;
},
);
return { result: () => rpcResult };
}
// A dApp asking to connect. The origin defaults to one the persisted
// state has never allowed, so the request really does raise a prompt
// instead of being answered from allowedSites.
@@ -426,12 +461,15 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
send,
requestTx,
requestSign,
requestTypedData,
requestSite,
connectApproval,
closeWindow,
broadcastTransaction,
created,
removed,
actionPopups,
openPopup,
storage,
// The user switching account in the toolbar popup, as the background
// sees it: the persisted active address changes underneath a pending
@@ -821,6 +859,238 @@ describe("one transaction approval at a time", () => {
});
});
// A page that asks again before the user has answered its last connection or
// signature request is refused, instead of opening one more window per call.
describe("one connection and one signature approval per site at a time", () => {
const PENDING_REFUSAL = {
error: {
code: -32002,
message: expect.stringMatching(/already waiting for your answer/),
},
};
test("a loop of eth_requestAccounts opens one approval and refuses the rest", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground();
const requests = [];
for (let i = 0; i < 5; i++) requests.push(bg.requestSite());
await settle();
expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(1);
expect(requests[0].result()).toBeNull();
for (const extra of requests.slice(1)) {
expect(extra.result()).toEqual(PENDING_REFUSAL);
}
// Once the user has answered, the site may ask again.
bg.closeWindow(1);
await settle();
expect(requests[0].result()).toEqual({
error: { code: 4001, message: "User rejected the request." },
});
const again = bg.requestSite();
await settle();
expect(again.result()).toBeNull();
expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(2);
});
test("a loop of personal_sign opens one approval and refuses the rest", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground();
const requests = [];
for (let i = 0; i < 5; i++) requests.push(bg.requestSign());
await settle();
expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(1);
expect(requests[0].result()).toBeNull();
for (const extra of requests.slice(1)) {
expect(extra.result()).toEqual(PENDING_REFUSAL);
}
});
test("a loop of eth_signTypedData_v4 opens one approval and refuses the rest", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground();
const requests = [];
for (let i = 0; i < 5; i++) requests.push(bg.requestTypedData());
await settle();
expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(1);
expect(requests[0].result()).toBeNull();
for (const extra of requests.slice(1)) {
expect(extra.result()).toEqual(PENDING_REFUSAL);
}
});
test("a pending personal_sign also refuses eth_signTypedData_v4", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground();
bg.requestSign();
const typed = bg.requestTypedData();
await settle();
expect(typed.result()).toEqual(PENDING_REFUSAL);
expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(1);
});
test("in the toolbar popup, a loop of eth_requestAccounts opens it once", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
const requests = [];
for (let i = 0; i < 5; i++) requests.push(bg.requestSite());
await settle();
expect(bg.openPopup).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
for (const extra of requests.slice(1)) {
expect(extra.result()).toEqual(PENDING_REFUSAL);
}
});
// A toolbar popup that closes before it connects tells the background
// nothing, so its prompt stays pending. Once the toolbar popup has been set
// to open something else, nothing shows that prompt, and the site asking
// again must show it again rather than be refused for good.
test("a toolbar prompt nothing shows any more is shown again when the site asks again", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
const first = bg.requestSite();
await settle();
const id = first.id();
// Its popup closed without connecting. Another site's prompt takes the
// toolbar popup and is answered, which sets it back to the wallet.
const other = bg.requestSite(UNCONNECTED_ORIGIN);
await settle();
const otherPort = bg.connectApproval(other.id());
otherPort.decide(false, false);
otherPort.disconnect();
await settle();
expect(bg.actionPopups[bg.actionPopups.length - 1]).toBe(
"src/popup/index.html",
);
const repeat = bg.requestSite();
await settle();
expect(repeat.result()).toEqual(PENDING_REFUSAL);
expect(bg.openPopup).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(3);
expect(bg.actionPopups[bg.actionPopups.length - 1]).toBe(
"src/popup/index.html?approval=" + id,
);
// The user answers it, and the first request gets that answer.
bg.connectApproval(id).decide(true, false);
await settle();
expect(first.result()).toEqual({ result: [signer.address] });
});
// The user rejects a signature request from another site, which is
// connected already. Answering any approval sets the toolbar popup back to
// the wallet.
async function rejectSignatureFromAnotherSite(bg) {
const sign = bg.requestSign(undefined, ORIGIN);
await settle();
bg.send(
{
type: "AUTISTMASK_SIGN_RESPONSE",
id: sign.id(),
approved: false,
},
{ url: bg.fromPopup.url },
);
await settle();
expect(sign.result()).toEqual({
error: { code: 4001, message: "User rejected the request." },
});
expect(bg.actionPopups[bg.actionPopups.length - 1]).toBe(
"src/popup/index.html",
);
}
test("a toolbar prompt is shown again after another site's signature request is answered", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
const first = bg.requestSite();
await settle();
const id = first.id();
// Its popup closed without connecting.
await rejectSignatureFromAnotherSite(bg);
const repeat = bg.requestSite();
await settle();
expect(repeat.result()).toEqual(PENDING_REFUSAL);
expect(bg.openPopup).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
expect(bg.actionPopups[bg.actionPopups.length - 1]).toBe(
"src/popup/index.html?approval=" + id,
);
});
test("a prompt in a window is not opened again when the site asks again", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
// The browser will not open the toolbar popup, so the prompt goes to a
// window of its own.
bg.openPopup.mockImplementation(() =>
Promise.reject(new Error("no toolbar popup")),
);
bg.requestSite();
await settle();
expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(1);
await rejectSignatureFromAnotherSite(bg);
expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(2);
const repeat = bg.requestSite();
await settle();
expect(repeat.result()).toEqual(PENDING_REFUSAL);
expect(bg.openPopup).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(2);
});
test("a prompt in a connected toolbar popup is not opened again when the site asks again", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
const first = bg.requestSite();
await settle();
// The popup is open and showing the prompt.
bg.connectApproval(first.id());
await rejectSignatureFromAnotherSite(bg);
const repeat = bg.requestSite();
await settle();
expect(repeat.result()).toEqual(PENDING_REFUSAL);
expect(bg.openPopup).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(bg.actionPopups[bg.actionPopups.length - 1]).toBe(
"src/popup/index.html",
);
});
test("another site's connection request is not held up", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground();
bg.requestSite();
const repeat = bg.requestSite();
const other = bg.requestSite(UNCONNECTED_ORIGIN);
await settle();
expect(repeat.result()).toEqual(PENDING_REFUSAL);
expect(other.result()).toBeNull();
expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(2);
});
test("another site's signature request is not held up", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground();
// Connect a second site, so that it may ask for a signature at all.
const connecting = bg.requestSite();
await settle();
const port = bg.connectApproval(connecting.id());
port.decide(true, false);
port.disconnect();
await settle();
expect(connecting.result()).toEqual({ result: [signer.address] });
bg.requestSign();
const repeat = bg.requestSign();
const other = bg.requestSign(signer.address, FRESH_ORIGIN);
await settle();
expect(repeat.result()).toEqual(PENDING_REFUSAL);
expect(other.result()).toBeNull();
expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(3);
});
});
// A nonce collision found before the transaction reaches the network is the
// one send failure the wallet can speak about with certainty. The user is told
// it did not go out and to send it again, rather than being warned it might
-162
View File
@@ -1,162 +0,0 @@
// The signature prompt shows a personal message as the bytes that are signed
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/403): the raw data in hex, the
// text it decodes to with control, zero-width and bidirectional characters
// marked rather than obeyed, and a message that is not hex as plain text that
// cannot be signed.
//
// Driven against a minimal DOM stub in the shape
// tests/approvalOrigin.test.js uses.
globalThis.chrome = {
storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
};
const { hexlify, toUtf8Bytes } = require("ethers");
const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
const approval = require("../src/popup/views/approval");
const FROM = "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000a11";
// Built from their code points so that this file holds none of them.
const RIGHT_TO_LEFT_OVERRIDE = String.fromCodePoint(0x202e);
const POP_DIRECTIONAL_FORMATTING = String.fromCodePoint(0x202c);
const ZERO_WIDTH_SPACE = String.fromCodePoint(0x200b);
function makeElement(id) {
const classes = new Set();
return {
id,
textContent: "",
value: "",
innerHTML: "",
disabled: false,
style: {},
dataset: {},
classList: {
add: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.add(n)),
remove: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.delete(n)),
contains: (n) => classes.has(n),
toggle: (n, force) => {
const on = force === undefined ? !classes.has(n) : force;
if (on) classes.add(n);
else classes.delete(n);
return on;
},
},
addEventListener: () => {},
querySelectorAll: () => [],
appendChild: () => {},
};
}
function makeDocument() {
const els = new Map();
return {
getElementById(id) {
if (id === "debug-banner") return null;
if (!els.has(id)) els.set(id, makeElement(id));
return els.get(id);
},
createElement: () => makeElement("created"),
body: { prepend: () => {} },
};
}
function node(id) {
return globalThis.document.getElementById(id);
}
// Open the signature prompt for a personal_sign of `message`, the way the
// popup does: it asks the background for the approval and show() draws it.
async function openPersonalSign(message) {
globalThis.document = makeDocument();
globalThis.window = { location: { search: "" } };
globalThis.chrome.runtime = {
connect: () => ({ postMessage: () => {} }),
sendMessage: (msg, reply) => {
if (!reply) return;
if (msg.type !== "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL") return reply(null);
reply({
type: "sign",
origin: "https://dapp.example",
isPhishingDomain: false,
approvedFrom: FROM,
signParams: { method: "personal_sign", message, from: FROM },
});
},
};
approval.init({});
await approval.show(1);
}
// The message box's markup as the text a reader sees: tags dropped.
function shownMessage() {
return node("approve-sign-message").innerHTML.replace(/<[^>]*>/g, "");
}
beforeEach(() => {
state.wallets = [];
state.activeAddress = FROM;
state.viewData = {};
state.viewStack = [];
state.currentView = null;
});
test("a right-to-left override is marked, so the text reads in byte order", async () => {
// Obeyed, the override shows "0001" as "1000".
const text =
"Pay " +
RIGHT_TO_LEFT_OVERRIDE +
"0001" +
POP_DIRECTIONAL_FORMATTING +
" ETH";
await openPersonalSign(hexlify(toUtf8Bytes(text)));
const html = node("approve-sign-message").innerHTML;
expect(html).not.toContain(RIGHT_TO_LEFT_OVERRIDE);
expect(html).not.toContain(POP_DIRECTIONAL_FORMATTING);
expect(shownMessage()).toBe("Pay U+202E0001U+202C ETH");
});
test("a zero-width character is marked", async () => {
await openPersonalSign(
hexlify(toUtf8Bytes("pay" + ZERO_WIDTH_SPACE + "pal.com")),
);
expect(node("approve-sign-message").innerHTML).not.toContain(
ZERO_WIDTH_SPACE,
);
expect(shownMessage()).toBe("payU+200Bpal.com");
});
test("a line feed is shown as a line break", async () => {
await openPersonalSign(hexlify(toUtf8Bytes("Sign in\nNonce: 7")));
expect(node("approve-sign-message").innerHTML).toBe("Sign in<br>Nonce: 7");
});
test("the raw hex is shown alongside the text", async () => {
await openPersonalSign("0x48656c6c6f");
expect(shownMessage()).toBe("Hello");
expect(node("approve-sign-hex").textContent).toBe("0x48656c6c6f");
expect(node("approve-sign-hex-section").classList.contains("hidden")).toBe(
false,
);
});
test("bytes that are not text are shown only as hex", async () => {
await openPersonalSign("0xff00");
expect(node("approve-sign-message").textContent).toBe(
"This message is not text.",
);
expect(node("approve-sign-hex").textContent).toBe("0xff00");
});
test("a message that is not hex is shown as text and cannot be signed", async () => {
await openPersonalSign("Hello world");
expect(shownMessage()).toBe("Hello world");
expect(node("approve-sign-error").textContent).toBe(
"This message is plain text, not hex, so it cannot be signed.",
);
expect(node("btn-approve-sign").disabled).toBe(true);
expect(node("approve-sign-hex-section").classList.contains("hidden")).toBe(
true,
);
});