fix: version the stored profile, and give a record that cannot be read a way out (closes #311)

The stored profile carried no version, so nothing could tell a record this build wrote from one a later build did, and loadState() coerced scalars while trusting the structure. A wallets that was a string, an array of nulls, or a later schema's wallet records reached the popup and threw on the first dereference: no view, no message, no control, and every dApp call answering a generic -32603 because getActiveAddress() dereferenced the same record. There was no reset or wipe control anywhere in the product, so the only escape was clearing extension storage through browser internals.

saveState() and updateState() now both stamp STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION, and every read goes through assertStateUsable() on the raw bytes before normalization can paper over them. Version 1 is the shape that shipped unversioned, so the profile every existing install holds loads normally and is migrated in place by being stamped on the first write; an upgrade shows nobody a wipe prompt for a wallet that is fine. A record this build cannot vouch for is refused instead, and refused all the way: not normalized, not written back, not half-loaded, and not overwritten by a save either.

The popup shows a new StateRecovery screen. It names the problem in a sentence, exports the raw record verbatim into a text box on the page (and downloads it where the browser allows one), and offers an erase behind a typed ERASE MY WALLET. Both controls are required: an export with no reset leaves the user stuck, and a reset with no export destroys the only copy of possibly recoverable key material. The Settings gear is hidden while it is up, and showView() is not used to raise it, because both read the state singleton that by then refuses to be read.

The background refuses the same record and answers dApps -32001 with a message saying the saved data cannot be read and that nothing was signed or sent, rather than the -32603 it also answers when a signing attempt breaks.

networkById() now throws on an id it does not know instead of quietly answering mainnet, which also stops NETWORKS["constructor"] resolving off the prototype chain. Every key test in the gate is an own-property test, because networkId is an object key into networkEndpoints and an unvalidated "__proto__" set that map's prototype instead of an own key, dropping the user's endpoint silently; normalizePersisted() copies endpoint entries with defineProperty for the same reason.

The three corrupt blobs from the issue drive the real popup entry point and the real worker in tests; each rendered nothing at all and answered -32603 before this, and the unversioned-but-valid case is tested too. Three test files used fixture wallets the product cannot produce (a bare address string where an address record belongs, a wallet with no address list) and now use whole records. src/popup/restorableViews.js moved to src/shared/restorableViews.js, since persistedState.js requires it and that module is in the background bundle.

.dockerignore

@@ -4,3 +4,4 @@
 node_modules
 .DS_Store
 dist
+release

.gitignore

@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@ node_modules/
 # Build output
 dist/
 
+# Release artifacts (make package). Derived from dist/, never committed.
+release/
+
 # Yarn
 .yarn-integrity
 package-lock.json

.prettierignore

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 node_modules/
 yarn.lock
 dist/
+release/
 .claude/

Makefile

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.PHONY: bootstrap setup install test test-e2e test-e2e-firefox lint fmt fmt-check check check-censored docker hooks build build-debug vendor-blocklist clean dev
+.PHONY: bootstrap setup install test test-e2e test-e2e-firefox lint fmt fmt-check check check-censored docker hooks build build-debug package vendor-blocklist clean dev
 
 # Standard targets are thin shims; the implementations live in script/
 # per the scripts-to-rule-them-all pattern (see the Entrypoints section
@@ -41,6 +41,9 @@ check:
 check-censored:
 	@script/check-censored
 
+package:
+	@script/package
+
 docker:
 	@script/docker
 
@@ -60,19 +63,31 @@ hooks:
 # scrubbed from the build itself: with AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1 exported, this target
 # compiles a debug bundle and then fails on it, loudly, rather than quietly
 # handing back something other than the release build that was asked for.
+#
+# Every step of this target is wrapped in script/discard-dist-on-failure, so a
+# release build that fails removes dist/ instead of leaving a complete, loadable
+# debug bundle there for whoever runs the build, sees it fail, and loads
+# dist/chrome/ anyway. A step that succeeds removes nothing, and build-debug is
+# deliberately not wrapped.
 build:
 	@echo "Building extension..."
 	@set -eu; \
 	receipt="$$(mktemp "$${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/autistmask-build-receipt.XXXXXX")"; \
 	trap 'rm -f "$$receipt"' EXIT INT TERM; \
-	AUTISTMASK_BUILD_RECEIPT="$$receipt" yarn run build 2>&1; \
+	script/discard-dist-on-failure \
-	env -u AUTISTMASK_DEBUG script/verify-build --expect release \
+		env AUTISTMASK_BUILD_RECEIPT="$$receipt" yarn run build 2>&1; \
+	script/discard-dist-on-failure \
+		env -u AUTISTMASK_DEBUG script/verify-build --expect release \
 		--receipt "$$receipt"
-	@script/check-censored --require-dist
+	@script/discard-dist-on-failure script/check-censored --require-dist
 
 # Development-only build: enables the red DEBUG / INSECURE banner and makes
 # the hardcoded test recovery phrase the output of wallet creation. Never
 # distribute the artifacts this produces.
+#
+# No discard-dist-on-failure here, on purpose: a debug build that fails is not
+# producing an artifact anyone could mistake for a release one, and its dist/ is
+# the evidence of what went wrong.
 build-debug:
 	@echo "Building extension (DEBUG)..."
 	@set -eu; \
@@ -90,7 +105,7 @@ vendor-blocklist:
 	@script/vendor-blocklist
 
 clean:
-	@rm -rf dist/
+	@rm -rf dist/ release/
 
 dev:
 	@echo "Building in watch mode..."

README.md

@@ -44,7 +44,107 @@ Load the extension:
 - **Chrome**: Navigate to `chrome://extensions/`, enable "Developer mode", click
   "Load unpacked", and select the `dist/chrome/` directory.
 - **Firefox**: Navigate to `about:debugging#/runtime/this-firefox`, click "Load
-  Temporary Add-on", and select `dist/firefox/manifest.json`.
+  Temporary Add-on", and select `dist/firefox/manifest.json`. Read
+  [Installing on Firefox](#installing-on-firefox) before relying on this: a
+  temporary add-on does not survive closing the browser.
+
+### Release Artifacts
+
+`make package` runs `make build` and then writes one self-contained, versioned
+archive per browser into `release/`, plus a `SHA256SUMS` for them:
+
+```bash
+make package
+```
+
+```
+release/autistmask-chrome-<version>.zip
+release/autistmask-firefox-<version>.xpi
+release/SHA256SUMS
+```
+
+Nothing is published by this. Tagging, CRX packing and any upload are
+outward-facing acts and are the owner's alone.
+
+The archives are deterministic — entries sorted, timestamps fixed, compression
+level fixed — so two builds of one commit produce byte-identical files and the
+recorded digest is a property of the input rather than of the clock.
+
+**Self-containment is checked, not assumed.** `build.js` writes the compiled
+Tailwind output to `dist/styles.css` at the `dist/` ROOT, outside both browser
+directories, and copies it into each of them as `src/popup/styles.css`; a naive
+`zip -r dist/chrome` is therefore correct only by accident. So the packager
+resolves every path referenced by the manifest and by every HTML document in the
+archive, requires each to be inside the archive, and fails on any reference that
+climbs out of the extension root. Files left at the `dist/` root are printed as
+deliberately not shipped rather than dropped by a glob. The archive is then read
+back off disk and compared member by member against the directory it was built
+from: an archive nobody opened is a claim, not an artifact.
+
+There is one version, and the build enforces it. `package.json`,
+`manifest/chrome.json` and `manifest/firefox.json` each declare one and none is
+derived from another — the manifests are copied to `dist/` verbatim, which is
+what `tests/manifest.test.js` asserts — so `script/lib/version.js` requires all
+three to agree and **fails the build when they do not**, naming each file and
+what it said. `tests/version.test.js` covers that rule in `make check`.
+
+### Installing on Chrome
+
+`manifest/chrome.json` carries a fixed `key`: the public half of an RSA keypair,
+base64-encoded DER. It exists for one reason. An unpacked Chrome extension with
+no `key` gets an extension id derived from the **absolute path it was loaded
+from**, and `chrome.storage.local` — which is where the wallet lives — is
+partitioned by that id. Move the checkout, re-clone it, or load a second copy
+from anywhere else, and the extension comes up on a fresh, empty storage
+partition: the wallet is simply gone, with no error and nothing in the UI to say
+so. With the `key` in place the id is derived from the key instead, and follows
+the extension wherever it is loaded from. That id is
+`gipbhkogfopeahplcjhipkgpcimdpkip`, pinned in `tests/extensionId.test.js` and
+observed against a real Chrome in `tests/e2e/storagePartition.js`.
+
+**Changing `key` changes the extension id, and orphans every wallet stored under
+the old one.** It is a migration, not an edit.
+
+The **private** half is a credential. It is not in this repository, no target
+generates one into the working tree, `*.pem` and `*.key` are gitignored, and
+`tests/extensionId.test.js` fails if such a file is ever committed. It is not
+needed to build, load or test anything here — it signs a CRX, and this repo does
+not pack one. A packer would take it from outside the repo, e.g.
+`chrome --pack-extension=dist/chrome --pack-extension-key=<path to the .pem>`.
+
+### Installing on Firefox
+
+**The XPI this repo produces is UNSIGNED, and release Firefox and Firefox ESR
+will refuse to install it.** Those builds enforce add-on signing with no working
+override — `xpinstall.signatures.required` does nothing on them — so a permanent
+install needs Firefox Developer Edition, Nightly, or an Unbranded build, with
+`xpinstall.signatures.required` set to `false` in `about:config`.
+
+Signing means submitting to AMO (self-distribution is enough, and does not
+require listing), which needs credentials this repository does not have and is
+the owner's decision.
+
+The other route is `about:debugging#/runtime/this-firefox` -> "Load Temporary
+Add-on", which works on every Firefox including release. **A temporary add-on is
+unloaded when Firefox exits**, so daily use means re-adding it by hand on every
+browser start.
+
+**The wallet survives the restart.** `manifest/firefox.json` declares a fixed
+`browser_specific_settings.gecko.id`, and Firefox keys the extension's storage
+area on that id rather than on the install, so adding the temporary add-on again
+in the same profile finds the vault where it left it. That is asserted, not
+assumed: `tests/e2e/firefox/reinstall.js` installs the packaged XPI in a real
+Firefox, creates a wallet through the UI, quits the browser, starts it again on
+the same profile, adds the add-on again, and decrypts the vault with the
+original password back to the original recovery phrase. The `moz-extension://`
+origin the popup is served from is _not_ stable across installs and does not
+need to be — nothing durable is keyed on it.
+
+**Removing the add-on does not.** An explicit uninstall — about:addons "Remove"
+— destroys the extension's storage, and the vault with it. That is ordinary,
+correct browser behaviour and it is observed in the same suite, but for a wallet
+it is worth saying out loud: **on Firefox, Remove is irreversible, and the
+recovery phrase is the only way back.**
 
 ### Debug Builds
 
@@ -63,8 +163,12 @@ that runs `make build`, that target compiles a debug bundle and then **fails**,
 because it tells `script/verify-build` in so many words that it was supposed to
 produce a release build. It used to be that the verifier read the same variable
 out of its own environment, agreed with itself, and reported a debug artifact as
-verified. The build prints which mode it used. See the
+verified. The build prints which mode it used. A release build that fails also
-[DEBUG Mode Policy](#debug-mode-policy) for what the flag changes. **Never
+**removes `dist/`**, and says so: the bundle it had already written is loadable,
+and a loud failure is no protection against someone loading `dist/chrome/`
+anyway. `make build-debug` keeps its `dist/` on failure — that output is not
+mistakable for a release build, and it is the evidence of what went wrong. See
+the [DEBUG Mode Policy](#debug-mode-policy) for what the flag changes. **Never
 distribute a debug build** — every wallet it creates gets the same publicly
 known test recovery phrase.
 
@@ -81,17 +185,21 @@ lives.
 one of the bundles containing `src/shared/constants.js` — into a build receipt,
 and `script/verify-build` checks `dist/` against that receipt: every recorded
 file present with exactly the recorded bytes, every audited bundle carrying the
-requested `DEBUG` marker, and nothing under `dist/` that the build did not
+requested `DEBUG` marker, and no regular file or symlink under `dist/` that the
-write. The `Makefile` creates the receipt path with `mktemp` per invocation,
+build did not write. The `Makefile` creates the receipt path with `mktemp` per
-outside the repo, and deletes it afterwards.
+invocation, outside the repo, and deletes it afterwards.
 
 That is what ties the check to a build rather than to a directory. What it
 establishes is narrow and worth stating exactly: `dist/` is byte for byte the
-output of the `build.js` run that just finished, with nothing added, removed or
+output of the `build.js` run that just finished, with no regular file or symlink
-altered in between. It establishes nothing about whether the source tree or
+added, removed or altered in between. Regular files and symlinks are the whole
-`build.js` were honest, and it offers nothing to someone handed a `dist/` from
+of what the tree walk covers; fifos, sockets, device nodes and empty directories
-elsewhere — without the receipt from its own build there is no input to the
+under `dist/` are not checked, because a build emits none of them, none can
-check. Verifiable provenance for a third party is signing, which this is not.
+carry a shippable payload, and `grep` on a fifo would hang rather than fail. It
+establishes nothing about whether the source tree or `build.js` were honest, and
+it offers nothing to someone handed a `dist/` from elsewhere — without the
+receipt from its own build there is no input to the check. Verifiable provenance
+for a third party is signing, which this is not.
 
 There is deliberately no target that re-verifies an existing `dist/` on its own.
 The list of files to check has to come from the build that produced them; read
@@ -138,31 +246,45 @@ provide:
   fails anywhere else. Part of `make check`, which inspects `dist/` when there
   is one and says loudly when there is not; `make build` re-runs it with
   `--require-dist`, so a build artifact is always covered
+- `script/package` — produce the release artifacts: `make build` first, so the
+  archives can only ever be made from a `dist/` that has been verified against
+  that build's own receipt as a RELEASE build, then one self-contained,
+  versioned archive per browser into `release/` (see
+  [Release Artifacts](#release-artifacts)). It packages and does not publish
 - `script/vendor-blocklist` — refresh `src/shared/phishingBlocklist.json` from
   its upstream, pinned to a commit and to the sha256 of the bytes that commit
   serves. Run deliberately, never as part of a build: the output is committed
   and there is no runtime fetch, so the shipped list is as fresh as the last
   vendoring run that was released
-- `script/verify-build --expect release|debug --receipt PATH` — assert that
+- `script/verify-build --expect release|debug --receipt PATH` — assert that the
-  `dist/` is exactly what the build that just ran emitted, and that the compiled
+  regular files and symlinks under `dist/` are exactly what the build that just
-  `DEBUG` state of the bundles in it is the one that was asked for. Both
+  ran emitted (other file types are out of scope), and that the compiled `DEBUG`
-  arguments are required and neither has a default: the expected mode is stated
+  state of the bundles in it is the one that was asked for. Both arguments are
-  by the caller rather than read from `AUTISTMASK_DEBUG`, and the file list
+  required and neither has a default: the expected mode is stated by the caller
-  comes from the build's receipt rather than from `dist/` (see
+  rather than read from `AUTISTMASK_DEBUG`, and the file list comes from the
+  build's receipt rather than from `dist/` (see
   [Build Receipts](#build-receipts)). Run automatically at the end of
   `make build` and `make build-debug`; fails loudly rather than passing whenever
   it cannot determine something. Not part of `make check`, which does not depend
   on build artifacts existing.
+- `script/discard-dist-on-failure COMMAND [ARG...]` — run one step of the
+  **release** build and, if it fails, remove `dist/` before returning that
+  step's exit status, saying on stderr that it did and why. Every step of
+  `make build` runs through it; `make build-debug` runs none of them through it.
+  A step that succeeds removes nothing, and a removal that cannot be completed
+  is reported as loudly as one that was
 - `script/test-verify-build` — exercise every failure mode of
   `script/verify-build` against a fixture tree in a temp dir, asserting the exit
-  status and the message of each, and read the `make build` and
+  status and the message of each, assert the state of `dist/` on disk after a
+  failing and a succeeding release build step, and read the `make build` and
   `make build-debug` recipes back out of `make -n` to check that they pass the
-  mode as an argument on a scrubbed environment. Part of `make check`; it reads
+  mode as an argument on a scrubbed environment and wrap only the release path.
-  no build artifacts and writes nothing under `dist/`. The cases that depend on
+  Part of `make check`; it reads no build artifacts and writes nothing under
-  file permissions cannot mean anything for a process that is not subject to
+  `dist/`. The cases that depend on file permissions cannot mean anything for a
-  them, so the harness proves its runner against a mode-000 file before counting
+  process that is not subject to them, so the harness proves its runner against
-  them, dropping to an unprivileged user when run as root; if it cannot, it
+  a mode-000 file before counting them, dropping to an unprivileged user when
-  skips those cases and says so in a banner rather than passing them.
+  run as root; if it cannot, it skips those cases and says so in a banner rather
+  than passing them.
 - `script/docker` — build the Docker image tagged via `script/projectname`
 - `script/cibuild` — CI entrypoint: plain `docker build .`
 - `script/precommit` — run by the git pre-commit hook; runs `script/check`
@@ -176,10 +298,12 @@ The Makefile shims to those. It also carries a few targets that have no
   silently rewritten. Use `make setup` for a fresh clone.
 - `make hooks` — shims to `script/install-precommit`
 - `make build` — build the extension into `dist/chrome/` and `dist/firefox/`,
-  then verify the result against the build's receipt as a release build
+  then verify the result against the build's receipt as a release build. A
+  failure at any step removes `dist/`
 - `make build-debug` — the same build with `AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1`, verified as a
-  debug build (see [Debug Builds](#debug-builds))
+  debug build, and keeping its `dist/` on failure (see
-- `make clean` — remove `dist/`
+  [Debug Builds](#debug-builds))
+- `make clean` — remove `dist/` and `release/`
 - `make dev` — build in watch mode
 
 ## End-to-End Tests
@@ -315,6 +439,23 @@ class before a browser is involved, so this suite is no longer the only thing
 standing between it and a release — but a static rule only sees identifiers, and
 the runtime errors this suite catches are broader than one rule.
 
+`make test-e2e` then runs a second program in the same image,
+`tests/e2e/storagePartition.js`, which answers where `chrome.storage.local`
+lives. It loads the built extension from one temporary directory in a fresh
+profile, writes a sentinel key the extension itself never touches, closes the
+browser, and loads a **copy at a different path into the same profile** — then
+does it again with `key` stripped out of the manifest, and reports what each
+pair actually did rather than what it expected. It needs its own browser
+sessions, four of them, because the whole subject is what happens ACROSS loads.
+
+The observed behaviour, on the pinned Chromium: **with `key`, both paths get the
+same extension id and the second load reads the first load's storage. Without
+`key`, the two paths get different ids and the second load sees an empty
+partition** — the wallet, silently gone. Loading both keyed copies at once in
+one profile yields a single extension id, not two: Chrome does not load a second
+copy of an id it already has. The assertions are annotated as observations, so a
+Chrome that ever changes this fails the run instead of passing it.
+
 ### Firefox (`make test-e2e-firefox`)
 
 `make test-e2e-firefox` builds `dist/firefox/` and drives the **real popup in a
@@ -332,6 +473,33 @@ runner rather than believed from the extension, and the stub node has to answer
 `eth_sendRawTransaction` with the hash `ethers` computes for the artifact it
 sent, or `provider.broadcastTransaction()` refuses the answer.
 
+`make test-e2e-firefox` then runs a second program in the same image,
+`tests/e2e/firefox/reinstall.js`, and it installs the **packaged XPI** rather
+than the unpacked directory — the only place a real Firefox is asked to load the
+artifact that would actually be handed to someone. It runs two browsers over one
+profile, because it asks two questions that have different answers:
+
+- **Restart.** Install, create a wallet through the UI, record the vault, quit
+  the browser, start it again on the same profile, add the add-on again. The
+  extension must not come up as a fresh install; the vault, xpub and first
+  address must be unchanged; and the vault must still **decrypt** with the
+  original password to the original recovery phrase, through the real Show
+  Recovery Phrase screen. "The ciphertext is still in storage" and "the wallet
+  still works" are different claims and only the second one is worth anything.
+  This is what a user does every day, because a temporary add-on is unloaded
+  when Firefox exits.
+- **Removal.** Then, in the same browser, an explicit uninstall and a fresh
+  install. Observed: **Firefox destroys the extension's storage on uninstall**,
+  so the vault is gone. Recorded as an assertion, so a Firefox that ever changes
+  it fails the run, and stated in
+  [Installing on Firefox](#installing-on-firefox) because for a wallet it means
+  Remove is irreversible except from the recovery phrase.
+
+It also pins down something worth knowing about the harness: the
+`moz-extension://` uuid the popup is served from is not stable across installs,
+and navigating to a stale one does not fail — it hangs. The program reads the
+live uuid out of `extensions.webextensions.uuids` after every install.
+
 Both suites build their own image, each with the repo and a fresh extension
 build baked in; what differs is the base. The Chrome image layers those on top
 of a published Playwright image, whereas this one is assembled from a `node`
@@ -689,6 +857,51 @@ Both are click-copyable. Truncating to 4 decimals in summary views is acceptable
 for scannability, but the detail view must never discard precision — it is the
 one place the user can always use to verify exact details.
 
+**Specific Exception — nonzero floor on the approval screens:** A nonzero amount
+must never render as zero. Truncating to 4 decimals does exactly that to an
+amount below 0.0001 — 1 base unit of an 18-decimal token, 500 base units of an
+8-decimal one — and on the dApp approval screen and the wait/success/error
+screens that carry its amount forward, a real transfer or allowance then reads
+as "nothing is being moved". A swap's `Min. received` is the sharper case: a
+slippage floor shown as `0.0000` states that the swap may return nothing.
+
+On those screens, when the truncated string would contain no digit from 1 to 9
+and the value does, the amount is extended to its first significant digit
+instead: `0.000000000000000001 DAI`, not `0.0000 DAI`. The test is on the whole
+truncated string, integer part included, so `1.00005` still shows as `1.0000` —
+the exception only fires where the entire displayed figure would read as zero. A
+genuine zero still renders `0.0000`, and truncation stays truncation: `0.99999`
+shows as `0.9999`, never rounded up.
+
+The rule and its exception live in `src/shared/amountDisplay.js` as
+`truncateAmount()` and `truncateAmountNeverZero()`. Everything the approval and
+confirmation screens display goes through the floored one — the ERC-20 amount,
+the ETH value and max fee (`src/popup/views/approval.js`), and the swap's
+`Amount` and `Min. received` lines (`src/shared/uniswap.js`). The history and
+balance lists (`src/shared/transactions.js`) use the unfloored one: the
+transaction detail view is the authoritative record and already shows exact
+precision. The 4-decimal rule is unchanged everywhere else, including for
+amounts at or above the floor on the approval screens.
+
+The floor applies only where the token's scale is known. Where it is not, the
+approval screen states base units instead of a quantity — see Unknown token
+scale below — and no truncation happens at all.
+
+**Specific Exception — unknown token scale:** Calldata carries base units and no
+scale, so every amount on the dApp approval screen needs the token's `decimals`.
+It is resolved from the bundled token list, then from the tokens the user
+tracks, then from what the block explorer reported for the contract
+(`resolveTokenDecimals()` in `src/shared/approvalAmount.js`). Where none of them
+answers, the amount is not formatted: the line reads
+`5000000000 base units (decimals unknown)`. A guessed scale is not an
+approximation but a different number — 1,000 units of a 6-decimal token
+formatted at 18 decimals reads `0.000000001` — on the screen whose only job is
+to state what is being authorized. Both amount paths of that screen take this
+rule: the ERC-20 `transfer`/`approve` line (`src/popup/views/approval.js`) and
+the swap's `Amount` and `Min. received` lines (`src/shared/uniswap.js`). An
+unbounded allowance or permit needs no scale to describe and is still shown as
+`Unlimited`.
+
 #### Partial USD totals
 
 Prices are fetched for the top 25 tokens only, so an address can hold assets the
@@ -772,6 +985,41 @@ tokens with fewer than 1,000 holders" setting governs the transaction history
 and the send-screen token selector, not this list. Tracked tokens with a zero
 balance are listed as well while "Show tracked tokens with zero balance" is on.
 
+#### Stored state and its version
+
+The whole profile lives under a single extension-storage key, `autistmask`, and
+carries a `schemaVersion` — `STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION` in
+`src/shared/stateSchema.js`, currently `1`. Every write stamps it: the popup's
+`saveState()` and the background's `updateState()` both do, so whichever context
+wrote last, the record says which build's shape it is in.
+
+Version 1 is the shape that shipped before versions existed, so a stored record
+with no `schemaVersion` is version 1 rather than a defect: it loads normally and
+is migrated in place by being stamped on the first write. An upgrade never shows
+an existing user a warning about a profile that is perfectly good. The version
+is bumped only when the MEANING of a stored field changes — a new field with a
+sensible absent value is handled by `normalizePersisted()` and is not a bump,
+because bumping for one would send every older install to StateRecovery for
+nothing.
+
+Every read of the record goes through `assertStateUsable()` first, on the raw
+bytes, before normalization: `loadState()` for the popup and `getState()` for
+the background. It refuses a record that is not an object, a `schemaVersion`
+this build does not understand (a newer one included), a `wallets` that is not a
+list of wallet records with address records in them, and a `networkId` that is
+not a network in `src/shared/networks.js`. Refusing is the whole point — a
+record the wallet cannot vouch for is never normalized, never written back, and
+never half-loaded. The popup shows StateRecovery; a dApp gets a specific error
+(`-32001`) saying the saved data cannot be read and that nothing was signed or
+sent, rather than the generic `-32603` every request used to answer.
+
+The `networkId` check is not cosmetic: that value is an object KEY into
+`state.networkEndpoints`, so an unvalidated `"__proto__"` would set the map's
+prototype instead of an own key and the user's endpoint would silently not be
+recorded. Every key test in the gate is an own-property test for that reason,
+and `networkById()` throws on an id it does not know rather than quietly
+answering mainnet.
+
 #### Navigation
 
 The main view shows all addresses grouped by wallet, with ETH balances inline.
@@ -798,14 +1046,18 @@ Three elements sit outside the screens and are present on all of them: the title
 bar ("AutistMask by @sneak" plus the Settings gear), the flash message line
 under it, and the red banner at the very top that appears on a debug build, when
 runtime debug mode is on, or when the active network is a testnet. They are not
-repeated in the element lists below.
+repeated in the element lists below. StateRecovery is the one screen they are
+not all present on: it hides the Settings gear, because it is shown precisely
+when there is no profile for the screens behind that gear to render from.
 
 Closing and reopening the popup returns to the screen the user was last on only
-for the views listed in `RESTORABLE_VIEWS` (`src/popup/restorableViews.js`).
+for the views listed in `RESTORABLE_VIEWS` (`src/shared/restorableViews.js`).
 Every other screen falls back to Home. The screens that display a secret —
 ExportPrivKey and ShowRecoveryPhrase — are deliberately absent from that list,
 so the popup can never reopen onto one of them with no password prompt in front
-of it.
+of it. So are the two that destroy one, DeleteWallet and
+DeleteWalletLostPassword: a popup reopened by accident must not land on a screen
+whose button erases key material.
 
 A reopened popup renders the wallet list and the one screen it restores onto,
 and nothing else, so every screen on the stack behind that one is still the
@@ -828,7 +1080,10 @@ exit from that screen rather than only on its "Back" button, so nothing secret
 survives in a hidden view once the user has navigated away by any route. That
 covers the revealed private key and recovery phrase, the recovery phrase,
 private key or extended private key entered on AddWallet, and the password typed
-on ConfirmTx, DeleteWallet, ApproveTx and ApproveSign.
+on ConfirmTx, DeleteWallet, ApproveTx and ApproveSign. DeleteWalletLostPassword
+registers one as well, for the neighbouring reason rather than that one: a
+wallet name is not a secret, but a typed confirmation left standing in a hidden
+view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
 
 #### Welcome (`welcome`)
 
@@ -889,7 +1144,13 @@ on ConfirmTx, DeleteWallet, ApproveTx and ApproveSign.
         - **From xprv**: instruction text and a masked extended private key
           input
     - Password + confirm password inputs, with a hint line whose wording depends
-      on the selected tab
+      on the selected tab. Every wording says that the password cannot be
+      recovered or reset and names what the only backup of the wallet is — the
+      recovery phrase, the private key or the extended private key, according to
+      the tab. This is the only warning the user gets before the wallet exists;
+      without it, the lost-password route on DeleteWallet is the first they
+      would hear of it. The hint line reserves its height, so switching tabs
+      cannot move the password fields under the pointer.
     - "Import" button
 - **Transitions**:
     - "Import" with a valid entry and a matching password of at least 12
@@ -1244,6 +1505,7 @@ on ConfirmTx, DeleteWallet, ApproveTx and ApproveSign.
     - Error line
     - Password input
     - "Confirm Delete" button
+    - An underlined "I have lost my password" control
 - **Transitions**:
     - "Confirm Delete" (correct password, other wallets remain) → deletes the
       wallet and its site permissions, then → **Settings** with a "Wallet
@@ -1253,10 +1515,54 @@ on ConfirmTx, DeleteWallet, ApproveTx and ApproveSign.
     - Either way, the active address moves only if it belonged to the deleted
       wallet, and `AUTISTMASK_ACTIVE_CHANGED` is broadcast when it does
       (`src/shared/walletDelete.js`)
-    - "Confirm Delete" (wrong password) → "Wrong password." on the error line,
+    - "Confirm Delete" (wrong password) → "That password is incorrect. Please
-      nothing deleted
+      try again." on the error line, nothing deleted
+    - "I have lost my password" → **DeleteWalletLostPassword**
     - "Back" → previous screen (Settings)
 
+#### DeleteWalletLostPassword (`delete-wallet-lost-password`)
+
+- **When**: User tapped "I have lost my password" on DeleteWallet.
+- **Why it exists**: without it, a user who has forgotten the password but still
+  holds the recovery phrase has no route back into the product at all. Deletion
+  was password-gated, and importing the phrase again is refused as a duplicate
+  xpub by `findWalletByXpub()` while the wallet is still stored, so the only
+  escape was clearing extension storage through browser internals — which takes
+  every other wallet with it.
+- **Elements**:
+    - "Back" button, "Delete Wallet Without a Password" heading
+    - A statement that the password cannot be recovered or reset, so the wallet
+      cannot be unlocked again, and that no password is needed to delete it
+    - What deletion does and does not do: it erases the copy of the key stored
+      on this device; nothing on chain changes and no money is moved
+    - The route back — adding the wallet again with the recovery phrase and a
+      new password — and, in bold, that without that phrase written down the
+      deletion loses everything the wallet holds, forever
+    - That the other wallets are not touched
+    - The wallet's name, and a text input asking for it to be typed back
+    - Error line
+    - "Delete This Wallet Forever" button
+- **Transitions**:
+    - "Delete This Wallet Forever" (name typed correctly) → the same two
+      outcomes as "Confirm Delete" above, through the same `finishDelete()`, so
+      the selection repair, permission cleanup and `AUTISTMASK_ACTIVE_CHANGED`
+      broadcast are identical on both routes
+    - "Delete This Wallet Forever" (name does not match) → "That is not the name
+      of this wallet. Type &lt;name&gt; to confirm." on the error line, nothing
+      deleted
+    - "Back" → **DeleteWallet**, re-entered through its `show()` so the wallet
+      selection comes back with it. The two delete screens are siblings rather
+      than parent and child: nothing is pushed on the way here, so both have
+      Settings as their Back target.
+- **Deliberately not password-gated.** A password in front of _discarding_ a
+  secret protects nobody: an attacker at the popup who wants the wallet gone can
+  uninstall the extension, so the only person such a gate stops is the owner who
+  forgot it. The typed name is a check that the user knows which wallet they are
+  on, not a secret, so it is matched with surrounding spaces and letter case
+  ignored.
+- Not in `RESTORABLE_VIEWS`, alongside `delete-wallet-confirm`: a popup reopened
+  by accident must not land on a screen whose button erases key material.
+
 #### DeleteAddress (`delete-address-confirm`)
 
 - **When**: User tapped the `[x]` next to an address on Home. Offered only on HD
@@ -1273,13 +1579,13 @@ on ConfirmTx, DeleteWallet, ApproveTx and ApproveSign.
       refused: "+" derives the next unused index (`nextIndex` is a high-water
       mark), and re-importing the wallet's key material is rejected as a
       duplicate by `findWalletByXpub` while the wallet is still present. What
-      works is deleting the whole wallet in Settings — password-gated, and it
+      works is deleting the whole wallet in Settings — which destroys the stored
-      destroys the stored secret — then importing again, whereupon
+      secret — then importing again, whereupon `scanForAddresses()` rediscovers
-      `scanForAddresses()` rediscovers the address **only if it has on-chain
+      the address **only if it has on-chain activity**. An address that was
-      activity**. An address that was never used is not found by that scan. The
+      never used is not found by that scan. The text is written by
-      text is written by `recoveryPathText()` rather than sitting in
+      `recoveryPathText()` rather than sitting in `index.html`, so it can name
-      `index.html`, so it can name the wallet's own kind of key material: an
+      the wallet's own kind of key material: an xprv wallet has no recovery
-      xprv wallet has no recovery phrase to re-import.
+      phrase to re-import.
     - A warning when the address holds anything, ETH or any tracked ERC-20,
       followed by the holdings themselves via `balanceLinesForAddress()` and the
       USD total via `formatAddressTotal()` (see
@@ -1415,6 +1721,48 @@ on ConfirmTx, DeleteWallet, ApproveTx and ApproveSign.
     - Popup window closed without answering → the request is rejected with
       EIP-1193 code 4001
 
+#### StateRecovery (`state-recovery`)
+
+- **When**: `loadState()` refused the stored profile, so the popup has no
+  profile at all. It is the only screen reached without one, and the only one
+  that never appears during ordinary use.
+- **Why it exists**: a record the wallet cannot read used to render nothing — no
+  view, no message, no control — while every dApp call answered a generic
+  internal error, and no reset or wipe control existed anywhere in the product.
+  The only escape was clearing extension storage through browser internals
+  ([#311](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/311)).
+- **Elements**:
+    - "Saved Data Cannot Be Read" heading, and a statement that nothing has been
+      changed or erased and nothing can be signed or sent
+    - The problem, in one sentence naming what is wrong with the record
+    - "Export Saved Data" button, and the read-only text box it fills
+    - What erasing does and does not do, in bold: every wallet stored in this
+      browser is deleted; nothing on chain changes and no money is moved
+    - A text input asking for `ERASE MY WALLET` to be typed back
+    - Error line
+    - "Erase Saved Data" button
+- **Transitions**:
+    - "Export Saved Data" → the raw stored record, verbatim, in the text box on
+      the screen, and a downloaded `autistmask-saved-data.json` where the
+      browser allows one. The box is filled first and never depends on the
+      download: an export that can fail is not an export.
+    - "Erase Saved Data" (phrase typed) → the stored record is removed and the
+      popup reloads into **Welcome**
+    - "Erase Saved Data" (phrase not typed) → "Type ERASE MY WALLET to confirm.
+      Nothing was erased." on the error line
+- **No other control is reachable.** The Settings gear is hidden while this
+  screen is up, because every screen behind it renders from the profile that
+  could not be read, and `showView()` is not used to raise it for the same
+  reason — it reads and writes the state singleton.
+- **Both controls are required.** An export with no reset leaves the user
+  looking at a broken profile with no way to use the wallet again; a reset with
+  no export destroys the only copy of a record that may hold recoverable key
+  material. The typed phrase is the same barrier DeleteWalletLostPassword uses,
+  and for the same reason: there is no password to gate this with, since there
+  is no profile to check one against.
+- Not in `RESTORABLE_VIEWS`: it is never persisted as the current view, because
+  nothing on this path writes state at all.
+
 ### External Services
 
 AutistMask is not a fully self-contained offline tool. It necessarily

TODO.md

@@ -26,7 +26,8 @@ milestone is in flight on `next`; its `next` -> `main` PR is
 [#190](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/pulls/190). `make check` verified
 green on `next` at `e9fa8be` on 2026-08-10, and `make build` produces
 `dist/chrome/` and `dist/firefox/`, verified against the build's own receipt to
-be exactly what that build emitted with `DEBUG` compiled off.
+hold exactly the regular files and symlinks that build emitted, with `DEBUG`
+compiled off.
 
 The backlog lives on the
 [Gitea tracker](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues), which is
@@ -44,6 +45,242 @@ but the review is broader than any of them.
 
 # Completed Steps
 
+- 2026-08-23: A swap whose output token the calldata never named is said to be
+  unknown instead of being called ETH
+  ([#353](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/353)). `tokenInfo(null)`
+  answers `{symbol: "ETH", decimals: 18}`, and a V4 step could take the
+  `Min. received` figure while naming no output currency, so the approval screen
+  stated the wrong asset at the wrong scale. Null is not how V4 spells native
+  ETH: v4-core's `type Currency is address` wraps `address(0)` for it, which
+  reaches the decoder as the truthy string
+  `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000` and is named ETH there already.
+  `Token Out` now reads `Unknown (not named in the calldata)` and
+  `Min. received` falls to the base-unit refusal from
+  [#340](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/340).
+
+- 2026-08-23: The stored profile carries a schema version, and a record the
+  wallet cannot read produces a screen instead of a blank popup
+  ([#311](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/311)). `saveState()` and
+  `updateState()` both stamp `STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION`
+  (`src/shared/stateSchema.js`), and every read goes through
+  `assertStateUsable()` on the raw bytes before normalization gets a chance to
+  paper over them. Version 1 is the shape that shipped unversioned, so the
+  profile every existing install holds loads normally and is migrated in place
+  by being stamped on the first write — an upgrade shows nobody a wipe prompt
+  for a wallet that is fine. A record this build cannot vouch for is refused
+  instead: not normalized, not written back, not half-loaded. The popup shows
+  the new StateRecovery screen, which names the problem, exports the raw record
+  verbatim into the page (and downloads it where the browser allows), and offers
+  an erase behind a typed `ERASE MY WALLET` — both controls, because an export
+  with no reset leaves the user stuck and a reset with no export destroys the
+  only copy of possibly recoverable key material. The background refuses the
+  same record and answers dApps `-32001` with a message saying the saved data
+  cannot be read and that nothing was signed or sent, rather than the generic
+  `-32603` that every request used to get. `networkById()` now throws on an id
+  it does not know instead of quietly answering mainnet, and the gate's key
+  tests are all own-property tests: `networkId` is an object key into
+  `networkEndpoints`, so an unvalidated `"__proto__"` used to set that map's
+  prototype and drop the user's endpoint silently. The three corrupt blobs from
+  the issue drive the real popup entry point in `tests/stateRecovery.test.js`
+  and the real worker in `tests/stateUnusableRpc.test.js`; each rendered nothing
+  at all and answered `-32603` before this. `src/popup/restorableViews.js` moved
+  to `src/shared/restorableViews.js`, since `persistedState.js` requires it and
+  that module is in the background bundle.
+
+- 2026-08-23: The background no longer reads or writes the shared `state`
+  singleton ([#324](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324)), which
+  also closes the cold-worker wrong-chain send
+  ([#320](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/320)). One in-memory copy
+  loaded once is the popup's lifetime, not the MV3 worker's: the worker is
+  killed when idle, nothing loaded state at module scope, and an unpopulated
+  read was answered out of `DEFAULT_STATE` in silence. Five defects traced to
+  that, and every point fix added a `loadState()` that created the next one — a
+  load detaches the objects an in-flight handler is holding. The background now
+  has its own storage layer (`src/background/state.js`): `getState()` for a
+  detached per-call read, `updateState()` for a queued read-modify-write.
+  `backgroundRefresh()` refreshes a private copy and applies the balances that
+  came back by address, so a wallet added, renamed or deleted during the round
+  trip survives. The transaction attempt takes its chain id and its endpoint
+  from one snapshot, so a committed chain switch can no longer move the endpoint
+  under an artifact already verified against the old chain. `getProvider()` now
+  REQUIRES the network id, which is what closes
+  [#320](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/320) at the shape rather
+  than at the call site. The prohibition is enforced by `build.js`, which fails
+  the build when esbuild's own metafile reports `src/shared/state.js` as an
+  input of either background bundle — the resolution the shipped bundle was
+  actually built from, so no specifier syntax and no resolution rule can slip
+  past it, and `make build` runs in CI. A bundled entry point under
+  `src/background/` with no line in the table fails the build too, so a second
+  worker entry point is protected by default rather than only if whoever adds it
+  knows the table exists. The assertion itself is pinned by
+  `tests/buildForbiddenInputs.test.js`, including every way its table can rot: a
+  key no bundled entry point matched, a forbidden module this build bundled
+  nowhere, and an entry that lists no modules (which would otherwise empty the
+  lint rule's forbidden set as well, and is refused at require time). Its bound
+  is that it is keyed by path, so a COPY of the singleton at another path is
+  outside it — loud for three of the five defects and silent for the other two;
+  the bounds are recorded in full where the table lives
+  (`script/lib/forbiddenBundleInputs.js`). An ESLint rule that walks the require
+  graph textually gives the same answer in the editor, before a full bundle; it
+  reads the same table, and it is fast feedback rather than the guarantee. The
+  shapes it catches are pinned by `tests/backgroundStateLintRule.test.js`, and
+  so are the two it misses — a computed specifier and a symlink — as asserted
+  non-reports, which the build fails on. Reading an unloaded singleton now
+  throws `StateNotLoadedError` instead of serving defaults. The
+  `chrome.storage.local` stubs in eight test files aliased instead of
+  structured-cloning, which could let an assertion pass on a build that never
+  wrote anything; every test that drives real persistence now goes through
+  `tests/support/storageStub.js`.
+- 2026-08-23: A swap always names its output token
+  ([#346](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/346)). The `Token Out`
+  detail line in `src/shared/uniswap.js` was pushed only when a symbol was
+  known, so a swap whose output token is absent from the bundled list — every
+  newly listed token — showed a `Min. received` figure with nothing saying what
+  was being received. The line is now keyed on the token's address and falls
+  back to it when there is no symbol, exactly as the `Token In` line already
+  did. It composes with the unknown-scale refusal from
+  [#340](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/340): the address says
+  which token, the base-unit figure says how much and states that the scale is
+  unknown.
+- 2026-08-23: The swap approval screen no longer guesses 18 decimals for a token
+  outside the bundled list
+  ([#340](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/340)). `tokenInfo()` in
+  `src/shared/uniswap.js` returned `decimals: 18` for any such token — the same
+  assumption [#306](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/306) removed
+  from the ERC-20 amount line — so a 1,000-unit swap of a 6-decimal token was
+  stated as `0.000000001`, and every newly listed token reached it. The swap's
+  `Amount` and `Min. received` lines now resolve the scale through
+  `resolveTokenDecimals()`, the same bundled-list-then-tracked-then-explorer
+  order the ERC-20 line uses, and where nothing knows it they render
+  `unknownDecimalsAmount()` — base units with the scale stated — instead of a
+  number. No new data source and no network call: the scale comes only from what
+  the wallet already holds. An unbounded permit is still shown as `Unlimited`.
+  `README.md` records the rule as a Display Consistency exception.
+- 2026-08-23: A failed release build no longer leaves a loadable debug bundle in
+  `dist/` ([#333](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/333)). With
+  `AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1` exported, `make build` compiled a debug bundle and failed
+  on it in `script/verify-build` — but the bundle stayed on disk, loadable, with
+  every wallet it creates using the publicly committed test recovery phrase.
+  Every step of `make build` now runs through `script/discard-dist-on-failure`,
+  which removes `dist/` when a step fails and says on stderr that it did and
+  why; a removal it cannot complete is reported just as loudly.
+  `make build-debug` is deliberately not wrapped: its output is not mistakable
+  for a release build and is the evidence of the failure.
+  `script/test-verify-build` asserts the state of `dist/` on disk after a
+  failing and a succeeding step, not just the exit status, and reads `make -n`
+  to check the wrapper is on the release path and only there.
+- 2026-08-23: `README.md` and `script/verify-build`'s own comments now state the
+  emitted-tree guarantee at the width the code actually enforces
+  ([#331](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/331)). The tree walk is
+  `-type f -o -type l`, so the guarantee covers regular files and symlinks under
+  `dist/`; fifos, sockets, device nodes and empty directories are not checked,
+  because a build emits none of them, none can carry a shippable payload, and
+  `grep` on a fifo would hang rather than fail. The exclusion is deliberate and
+  unchanged — the README said "nothing under `dist/` that the build did not
+  write", which was broader than that. Documentation only; no executable line
+  changed.
+- 2026-08-23: An amount below the 4-decimal display floor no longer reads as
+  zero on the approval screens
+  ([#322](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/322)). With the token's
+  true scale resolved, the 4-decimal truncation still printed a small amount as
+  `0.0000` — 1 base unit of an 18-decimal token, 500 of an 8-decimal one — so a
+  real transfer, allowance or swap was stated as nothing on the one screen whose
+  job is to say what is being authorized, and a swap's `Min. received` claimed
+  the user might receive nothing. Three copies of that truncation existed; they
+  now share `src/shared/amountDisplay.js`. Everything the approval and
+  confirmation screens render (`src/popup/views/approval.js`,
+  `src/shared/uniswap.js`) extends to the first significant digit when the
+  truncated figure would otherwise read as zero, keeping the amount in token
+  units rather than switching to base units mid-line. The history and balance
+  lists (`src/shared/transactions.js`) keep the unfloored rule, which is out of
+  scope by the issue's definition of done. `README.md`'s Display Consistency
+  section records the exception.
+- 2026-08-23: The extension can be installed once and kept
+  ([#310](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/310)). There was no
+  packaging target anywhere, no artifact, and `manifest/chrome.json` carried no
+  `key` — so an unpacked Chrome load derived its extension id, and therefore its
+  `chrome.storage.local` partition, from the absolute checkout path: moving or
+  re-cloning the checkout presented an empty wallet with no error. The manifest
+  now carries a fixed `key` (public half only; the private half is a credential
+  and is not in this repo, and no target generates one into the tree), pinning
+  the id to `gipbhkogfopeahplcjhipkgpcimdpkip`. `make package` produces
+  `release/autistmask-chrome-<version>.zip` and
+  `release/autistmask-firefox-<version>.xpi` plus `SHA256SUMS`,
+  deterministically and via `make build` so the archives can only be made from a
+  `dist/` already verified against that build's receipt as a release build;
+  every path the manifests and the popup HTML reference is resolved and required
+  to be inside the archive, and the archive is read back off disk and compared
+  member by member — `dist/styles.css` sits at the `dist/` root outside both
+  browser directories and is reported as deliberately not shipped rather than
+  dropped by a glob. One version: `script/lib/version.js` fails the build when
+  `package.json` and the two manifests disagree, instead of reading from one of
+  them. `BUILD_COMMIT` now carries `-dirty` when the working tree does not match
+  `HEAD` (and `-unknown` when git cannot say), while the full hash behind the
+  About screen's commit link stays clean so the link still resolves. Two real
+  browser observations back it: `tests/e2e/storagePartition.js` loads the
+  extension from two different paths in one Chrome profile with and without
+  `key` and records what each does, and `tests/e2e/firefox/reinstall.js`
+  installs the packaged XPI in a real Firefox, creates a wallet, restarts the
+  browser on the same profile, adds the add-on again and decrypts the vault back
+  to the original recovery phrase — and then observes that an explicit uninstall
+  DESTROYS that storage, which is correct browser behaviour but means Remove is
+  irreversible for a wallet, now stated in README.md. Deliberately not done: AMO
+  signing, CRX packing, tagging and any upload — the Firefox artifact is
+  UNSIGNED and README.md now states that release Firefox and ESR refuse it, that
+  Developer Edition or an Unbranded build is required, and that a temporary
+  add-on does not survive a browser restart.
+- 2026-08-20: A second extension page can no longer silently delete a wallet
+  ([#304](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/304)). `saveState()` wrote
+  the entire state blob, and every extension page — the toolbar popup, a dApp
+  approval window, `backgroundRefresh()` — holds its own in-memory `state`,
+  loaded once, with `showView()` saving on every navigation; a second page that
+  saved after a first had written something new overwrote it, no attacker or
+  unusual input required. `saveState()` is now a read-modify-write: it re-reads
+  storage, diffs the persisted fields against a deep-cloned `baseline` snapshot
+  taken at the last `loadState()`/`saveState()` on that page, and writes only
+  the fields that actually changed — everything else is carried forward from
+  storage in its loaded-and-normalized shape (`normalizePersisted()`, shared
+  with `loadState()`), so a legacy or malformed record a load has always
+  self-healed in memory keeps getting written back even on a save that touched
+  something else entirely. `showView()` fires `saveState()` on every navigation
+  without awaiting it, so two saves from the same page can be in flight at once;
+  a FIFO queue serializes them rather than letting a slow one finish after a
+  later one and re-derive a stale answer. Deliberately not done: the live
+  `state` of a field this page does not own is not rehydrated from what another
+  page wrote, only the persisted record is — adopting a concurrently-written
+  value into `state` reintroduced the same clobber one page later, caught by
+  `tests/txStatus.test.js` red. Two writers of the same field still resolve
+  last-writer-wins, documented at the merge point. `tests/stateMerge.test.js`
+  covers the two-page save and the approval-window reproduction from the issue —
+  add a wallet in one page, force a save from a second page loaded before it,
+  both wallets survive — each demonstrated failing against the unfixed full-blob
+  write.
+- 2026-08-20: A forgotten password no longer wedges the wallet
+  ([#312](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/312)). Deleting a wallet
+  was password-gated and importing its recovery phrase again was refused as a
+  duplicate xpub, so a user who had the phrase but not the password could
+  neither leave nor come back: the only way out was clearing extension storage
+  through browser internals, which takes every other wallet with it.
+  DeleteWallet now offers "I have lost my password", a screen that destroys the
+  wallet after the user types its name back — no password, because requiring one
+  to _discard_ a secret protects nobody. An attacker at the popup who wants the
+  wallet gone can uninstall the extension; the only person such a gate stopped
+  was the owner who forgot it. That was chosen over allowing a duplicate xpub to
+  re-encrypt in place: re-import would have had to be built three times over
+  (`hd` and `xprv` by xpub, `key` by address), would make the user retype the
+  recovery phrase into a live popup to change a password, and reaches no state
+  that delete-then-import does not already reach through `scanForAddresses()`.
+  Both routes share one `finishDelete()`, so the selection repair, the
+  site-permission cleanup and the `AUTISTMASK_ACTIVE_CHANGED` broadcast cannot
+  diverge between them, and the new screen is excluded from `RESTORABLE_VIEWS` —
+  a popup reopened by accident must not land on a button that erases key
+  material. AddWallet's password hint now says, per import mode, that the
+  password cannot be recovered or reset and what the only backup is; the hint
+  line reserves its height so switching tabs cannot move the password fields.
+  The test drives the real view against a `chrome.storage.local` stub that
+  structured-clones on both `set` and `get` and asserts against the read-back,
+  so it fails on the deletion of `saveState()` and not only on an in-memory
+  splice.
 - 2026-08-20: `make build` can no longer hand back a debug build, and
   `script/verify-build` can no longer be satisfied by bytes the build did not
   produce ([#309](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/309)). The

build.js

@@ -3,6 +3,12 @@ const path = require("path");
 const crypto = require("crypto");
 const { execSync } = require("child_process");
 const esbuild = require("esbuild");
+const { resolveVersion } = require("./script/lib/version");
+const {
+    BACKGROUND_ENTRY_PREFIX,
+    FORBIDDEN_INPUTS,
+    assertTableWellFormed,
+} = require("./script/lib/forbiddenBundleInputs");
 
 const DIST = path.join(__dirname, "dist");
 const DIST_CHROME = path.join(DIST, "chrome");
@@ -15,6 +21,18 @@ const SRC = path.join(__dirname, "src");
 // rotting with it.
 const AUDITED_MODULE = "src/shared/constants.js";
 
+// FORBIDDEN_INPUTS — what each entry point's bundle may not contain, and what
+// that covers — lives in script/lib/forbiddenBundleInputs.js, because the
+// ESLint rule reads the same table and two literal copies of a path drift.
+//
+// This is the authoritative check, and it is here rather than in the linter
+// because it consults the resolution esbuild actually performed. Any specifier
+// syntax, any hop, any resolution rule that puts the module in the bundle fails
+// the build, whether or not a text matcher would have recognized it. A
+// background entry point the table does not name fails as well, so a second
+// worker is protected by default rather than by someone remembering this file.
+// Dockerfile:42 runs `make build`, so it is enforced in CI.
+
 // The build receipt: every file this build emits, with its sha256 and whether
 // it is one of the audited bundles. script/verify-build is handed this and
 // checks dist/ against it, so the file list comes from the build that just ran
@@ -64,6 +82,164 @@ function outputsContainingAuditedModule(metafile) {
         .map(([outFile]) => repoRelative(outFile));
 }
 
+// Shortest import chain from `entryInput` to `target` through the metafile's
+// own input graph, or null when there is none. The message this feeds is the
+// point of the check: "state.js is in the worker bundle" is not actionable on
+// its own, "index.js -> chainSwitchFields.js -> state.js" is.
+function importChain(metafile, entryInput, target) {
+    const graph = new Map(
+        Object.entries(metafile.inputs).map(([input, info]) => [
+            repoRelative(input),
+            (info.imports || []).map((i) => repoRelative(i.path)),
+        ]),
+    );
+    const start = repoRelative(entryInput);
+    const seen = new Set([start]);
+    const queue = [[start]];
+    while (queue.length > 0) {
+        const chain = queue.shift();
+        for (const next of graph.get(chain[chain.length - 1]) || []) {
+            if (next === target) return chain.concat([next]);
+            if (seen.has(next)) continue;
+            seen.add(next);
+            queue.push(chain.concat([next]));
+        }
+    }
+    return null;
+}
+
+// What the forbidden-input checks accumulate over a whole build: which
+// FORBIDDEN_INPUTS keys were actually bundled, and every input of every output
+// this build emitted. Both are read by assertForbiddenTableCovered() at the
+// end — a table entry naming something that is not there any more enforces
+// nothing, and must fail rather than pass quietly.
+function newForbiddenRecord() {
+    return { entriesChecked: new Set(), bundledInputs: new Set() };
+}
+
+// Note every input of every output of one esbuild run. Deliberately not
+// restricted to the entry points named in FORBIDDEN_INPUTS: it is the POPUP
+// that legitimately bundles src/shared/state.js, and that is what makes
+// "the forbidden module still exists at this path" checkable at all.
+function recordBundledInputs(metafile, record) {
+    for (const info of Object.values(metafile.outputs)) {
+        for (const input of Object.keys(info.inputs)) {
+            record.bundledInputs.add(repoRelative(input));
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+// Fail the build when an entry point's bundle contains a module it is
+// prohibited from reaching. The inputs come from esbuild's metafile, so this is
+// the resolution the shipped bundle was built from and not a guess at it.
+//
+// A background entry point with no line in the table fails here too. The five
+// defects this exists to prevent were accidents, and so is adding a second
+// worker entry point without knowing that a table somewhere needs a line: the
+// protection has to be the default for that directory rather than something
+// the next author must opt into.
+function assertNoForbiddenInputs(
+    entryPoint,
+    outfile,
+    metafile,
+    record,
+    table = FORBIDDEN_INPUTS,
+) {
+    const entry = repoRelative(entryPoint);
+    const forbidden = table[entry];
+    if (!forbidden) {
+        if (!entry.startsWith(BACKGROUND_ENTRY_PREFIX)) return;
+        throw new Error(
+            `${entry} is a background entry point with no line in ` +
+                `FORBIDDEN_INPUTS, so nothing stops its bundle from ` +
+                `containing the shared state singleton. Add it to ` +
+                `script/lib/forbiddenBundleInputs.js. The MV3 worker never ` +
+                `populates that singleton, so reading it serves ` +
+                `DEFAULT_STATE; use getState()/updateState() from ` +
+                `src/background/state.js instead.`,
+        );
+    }
+
+    const out = repoRelative(outfile);
+    const entryOutput = Object.entries(metafile.outputs).find(
+        ([outFile]) => repoRelative(outFile) === out,
+    );
+    if (!entryOutput) {
+        throw new Error(`esbuild reported no metafile output for ${out}`);
+    }
+    const inputs = new Set(
+        Object.keys(entryOutput[1].inputs).map(repoRelative),
+    );
+
+    // Recorded only once the bundle's inputs are actually in hand. Marking the
+    // entry checked any earlier — as this did — means an early return above
+    // satisfies assertForbiddenTableCovered() with a bundle nobody examined,
+    // and the coverage half cannot tell that from a real check. The lookup
+    // above is the fragile step: repoRelative() resolves against process.cwd()
+    // while esbuild's output keys are cwd-relative, so a change to where the
+    // build runs from could miss.
+    record.entriesChecked.add(entry);
+
+    for (const module of forbidden) {
+        if (!inputs.has(module)) continue;
+        const chain = importChain(metafile, entryPoint, module);
+        throw new Error(
+            `${out} bundles ${module}, which ${entry} must not reach` +
+                `${chain ? `: ${chain.join(" -> ")}` : ""}. The MV3 worker ` +
+                `never populates the shared state singleton, so reading it ` +
+                `serves DEFAULT_STATE. Use getState()/updateState() from ` +
+                `src/background/state.js instead.`,
+        );
+    }
+}
+
+// Fail the build when the table has rotted away from the tree it describes.
+// Both halves of an entry rot independently, and either one turns the whole
+// prohibition into a pass that checks nothing:
+//
+//   - the KEY, when no bundled entry point matches it: the entry point was
+//     renamed or is no longer built, and no bundle was ever tested against the
+//     list;
+//   - the MODULE, when this build bundled it nowhere: the module was renamed,
+//     moved or deleted, so "is it an input of the background bundle" is asked
+//     about a path nothing resolves to and is answered no forever. The popup
+//     legitimately bundles src/shared/state.js, which is what makes this
+//     checkable — and it is stronger than an existsSync(), because it also
+//     fails when the file is still there but has dropped out of every bundle.
+//
+// This matters concretely: https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/311
+// rewrites this persistence layer, and a rename that quietly disarmed the
+// guarantee would put the singleton back within reach of the worker with every
+// check in the repo still green.
+//
+// The third way — an entry that lists no modules at all — is refused where the
+// table is defined, at require time, because that one also empties the ESLint
+// rule's forbidden set and so has to fail before either layer runs. It is
+// re-checked here so the build's own half does not depend on the table having
+// been loaded from that file.
+function assertForbiddenTableCovered(record, table = FORBIDDEN_INPUTS) {
+    assertTableWellFormed(table);
+    for (const [entry, modules] of Object.entries(table)) {
+        if (!record.entriesChecked.has(entry)) {
+            throw new Error(
+                `${entry} is listed in FORBIDDEN_INPUTS but was not bundled, ` +
+                    `so nothing checked it`,
+            );
+        }
+        for (const module of modules) {
+            if (record.bundledInputs.has(module)) continue;
+            throw new Error(
+                `${module} is listed in FORBIDDEN_INPUTS for ${entry}, but ` +
+                    `this build bundled it nowhere, so the prohibition names ` +
+                    `a module that is not in this tree at that path and ` +
+                    `nothing enforces it. If the module moved, move it in ` +
+                    `script/lib/forbiddenBundleInputs.js too, which both ` +
+                    `this check and the ESLint rule read.`,
+            );
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 // Every file this build writes under dist/, recorded as it is written. This is
 // the build's own account of what it emitted; it is never recovered by
 // listing dist/, because a file that is in dist/ without this build having put
@@ -160,28 +336,53 @@ function isDebugBuild() {
     return process.env.AUTISTMASK_DEBUG === "1";
 }
 
+// A short git output, or null when git cannot answer. Distinguishing "git said
+// nothing" from "git could not be asked" matters below: a working tree whose
+// state is unknown must not be stamped as clean.
+function git(args) {
+    try {
+        return execSync(`git ${args}`, {
+            encoding: "utf8",
+            stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "ignore"],
+        }).trim();
+    } catch {
+        // not a git repo, or git not available
+        return null;
+    }
+}
+
+// The working-tree state, as a suffix for the displayed commit: "" when the
+// tree matches HEAD, "-dirty" when it does not, "-unknown" when git answered
+// the hash but not the status. Without this a build from a modified tree
+// stamped a clean hash, so the About screen named a commit whose contents were
+// not what was running — the one thing that stamp exists to establish.
+//
+// git status --porcelain honours .gitignore, so dist/ and node_modules/ do not
+// make every build dirty; an untracked file that is NOT ignored does, and
+// correctly: it may well be in the bundle.
+function worktreeSuffix() {
+    const status = git("status --porcelain");
+    if (status === null) return "-unknown";
+    return status === "" ? "" : "-dirty";
+}
+
 function getBuildInfo() {
     const pkg = JSON.parse(
         fs.readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, "package.json"), "utf8"),
     );
-    let commitHash = "unknown";
+    const commitHashFull = git("rev-parse HEAD") || "unknown";
-    try {
+    const shortHash = git("rev-parse --short HEAD") || "unknown";
-        commitHash = execSync("git rev-parse --short HEAD", {
+    // The full hash is left clean because it is the href of the commit link in
-            encoding: "utf8",
+    // the About screen, and "abc123-dirty" is not a commit anyone can fetch.
-        }).trim();
+    // The displayed short hash carries the marker, so the screen says the tree
-    } catch {
+    // was modified while still linking somewhere real.
-        // not a git repo or git not available
+    const commitHash =
-    }
+        shortHash === "unknown" ? shortHash : shortHash + worktreeSuffix();
-    let commitHashFull = "unknown";
-    try {
-        commitHashFull = execSync("git rev-parse HEAD", {
-            encoding: "utf8",
-        }).trim();
-    } catch {
-        // not a git repo or git not available
-    }
     return {
-        version: pkg.version,
+        // Fails the build when package.json and the two manifests disagree;
+        // see script/lib/version.js. Called before anything is emitted, so a
+        // tree with no single version never reaches dist/.
+        version: resolveVersion(__dirname),
         license: pkg.license,
         author: pkg.author,
         commitHash,
@@ -226,6 +427,9 @@ async function build() {
     // esbuild run below and recorded in the receipt for script/verify-build.
     const auditedBundles = [];
 
+    // What the forbidden-input checks accumulate across those same runs.
+    const forbiddenRecord = newForbiddenRecord();
+
     // compile tailwind CSS
     console.log("Compiling Tailwind CSS...");
     const tailwindInput = path.join(SRC, "popup", "styles", "main.css");
@@ -267,6 +471,15 @@ async function build() {
             metafile: true,
             define,
         });
+        // Before the output is recorded as emitted: a bundle that violates a
+        // prohibition must abort the build, not be written into a receipt.
+        recordBundledInputs(result.metafile, forbiddenRecord);
+        assertNoForbiddenInputs(
+            entryPoint,
+            outfile,
+            result.metafile,
+            forbiddenRecord,
+        );
         recordEmitted(outfile);
         auditedBundles.push(...outputsContainingAuditedModule(result.metafile));
     }
@@ -323,6 +536,8 @@ async function build() {
         path.join(DIST_FIREFOX, "manifest.json"),
     );
 
+    assertForbiddenTableCovered(forbiddenRecord);
+
     // Written last so a build that died partway through leaves no receipt at
     // all, which script/verify-build treats as a hard failure rather than as
     // "nothing to check".
@@ -333,7 +548,27 @@ async function build() {
     console.log("Build complete: dist/chrome/ and dist/firefox/");
 }
 
-build().catch((err) => {
+// Run only as a program. Required as a module — which is how
-    console.error(`Build failed: ${err && err.message ? err.message : err}`);
+// tests/buildForbiddenInputs.test.js reaches the checks below — this file
-    process.exit(1);
+// builds nothing and writes nothing.
-});
+if (require.main === module) {
+    build().catch((err) => {
+        console.error(
+            `Build failed: ${err && err.message ? err.message : err}`,
+        );
+        process.exit(1);
+    });
+}
+
+// Exported for tests/buildForbiddenInputs.test.js only. The prohibition these
+// three functions enforce is the guarantee behind
+// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324, and `make check` does not
+// run `make build` — so they are unit tested against synthetic metafiles
+// rather than being exercised only by CI, where "it ran" is not "it works".
+module.exports = {
+    importChain,
+    newForbiddenRecord,
+    recordBundledInputs,
+    assertNoForbiddenInputs,
+    assertForbiddenTableCovered,
+};

eslint.config.js

@@ -8,6 +8,10 @@
 
 const js = require("@eslint/js");
 const globals = require("globals");
+const backgroundState = require("./script/lib/eslint/noStateSingletonInBackground");
+const {
+    BACKGROUND_ENTRY_PREFIX,
+} = require("./script/lib/forbiddenBundleInputs");
 
 // The extension APIs. MV3 Chrome exposes `chrome`; Firefox exposes both, and
 // the code feature-detects between them.
@@ -78,12 +82,36 @@ module.exports = [
     },
 
     // MV3 background: a service worker, with no window and no document.
+    //
+    // It also may not reach src/shared/state.js. That module's `state` export
+    // is a per-bundle singleton loaded once and mutated in place, which is the
+    // popup's lifetime and not the worker's: the worker is killed when idle,
+    // nothing loads state at module scope, and an unpopulated read used to be
+    // served DEFAULT_STATE silently. Five defects came from background code
+    // reading or writing it (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324),
+    // and each point fix added a loadState() that created the next one. The
+    // rule below checks reachability through the whole require graph, not just
+    // the direct require, because a re-export from any shared module the
+    // background already pulls in would put the singleton back in the bundle
+    // with no background file naming it.
+    //
+    // It is not the guarantee: build.js asserts the same prohibition against
+    // esbuild's own metafile, from the shared table in
+    // script/lib/forbiddenBundleInputs.js. This is the early report.
+    //
+    // The glob comes from that same file, because build.js uses the prefix to
+    // decide which entry points must be listed in the table at all: the two
+    // layers must not disagree about which files are "the background".
     {
-        files: ["src/background/**/*.js"],
+        files: [`${BACKGROUND_ENTRY_PREFIX}**/*.js`],
+        plugins: { background: backgroundState },
         languageOptions: {
             ...commonjs,
             globals: { ...globals.serviceworker, ...extensionGlobals },
         },
+        rules: {
+            "background/no-state-singleton-in-background": "error",
+        },
     },
 
     // src/shared is bundled into both, so it may only use what both provide:
@@ -107,9 +135,9 @@ module.exports = [
         },
     },
 
-    // Unit tests: jest on node.
+    // Unit tests, and the helpers they require: jest on node.
     {
-        files: ["tests/**/*.test.js"],
+        files: ["tests/**/*.test.js", "tests/support/**/*.js"],
         languageOptions: {
             ...commonjs,
             globals: { ...globals.node, ...globals.jest },

manifest/chrome.json

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
     "name": "AutistMask",
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "description": "Minimal Ethereum wallet for Chrome",
+    "key": "MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAzy/G9gT4Z3Ci0HCmthUPEiCjENg+5meZpjdogyT7SiMfxENtHdrpDL6wGhAg1Dk0f1C67Ft8OYpMrMH3kiP2Wnt0UpHo45PY0YUUYzdJgbsp8u0kaykd5FFiY6FycIIFaTniMuh7wRKuNNdJWly+H3aG7qZ6nGu5PIMdb1GXUk35hY+yl7dz5dqFFYUCyxvWCT9XGBSYiI+XRBB/rVZjMWfWpaTmRPdOZ4+GO/Lx0OdMxKlPA/kLWoPot5vMlLn2FDPu6sASphiu7dKZnrINW+h/27jlHMJQS0jncB1EgqOHW0vbXrZnTveFX6UW+Qp86FfSkikhKtQgTW2A4mtWawIDAQAB",
     "permissions": ["storage", "activeTab", "alarms"],
     "host_permissions": ["<all_urls>"],
     "content_security_policy": {

script/discard-dist-on-failure

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# script/discard-dist-on-failure: run one step of the RELEASE build, and if that
+# step fails, remove dist/ before returning its exit status. Our own extension
+# to scripts-to-rule-them-all, wrapped around every step of make build.
+#
+# Why: with AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1 exported in the calling shell, make build
+# compiles a debug bundle and then fails on it in script/verify-build — but the
+# bundle is already written. It is loadable, and every wallet it creates gets
+# the publicly committed test recovery phrase from src/shared/constants.js. A
+# failed release build that leaves that behind is a smaller version of the trap
+# the verifier exists to close, and "the failure was loud" only works on an
+# operator who does not load dist/chrome/ anyway. Removing the artifact does not
+# depend on that.
+#
+# Two things this deliberately does not do. It does not wrap make build-debug: a
+# debug build that failed is not a mistakable artifact, and its output is the
+# evidence of what went wrong. And it never removes anything on a step that
+# SUCCEEDS, including the final check-censored --require-dist pass.
+#
+# The removal is never silent: it says dist/ is gone and why, on stderr, above
+# the build's own failure.
+set -eu
+
+ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
+DIST="$ROOT/dist"
+
+usage() {
+    echo "usage: discard-dist-on-failure COMMAND [ARG...]" >&2
+}
+
+# Remove dist/, and say so. A removal that could not be completed is reported as
+# loudly as one that was: the artifact is still on disk, and reporting nothing
+# would leave the operator believing it is not.
+discard_dist() {
+    if [ ! -e "$DIST" ] && [ ! -h "$DIST" ]; then
+        echo "discard-dist-on-failure: the release build failed. There was no" \
+            "dist/ to remove." >&2
+        return 0
+    fi
+
+    rm -rf "$DIST" || true
+
+    if [ -e "$DIST" ] || [ -h "$DIST" ]; then
+        echo "discard-dist-on-failure: the release build failed and dist/" \
+            "COULD NOT BE REMOVED, so it is still on disk. Do not load it:" \
+            "a release build that failed may hold a complete debug bundle," \
+            "whose wallets all use the publicly committed test recovery" \
+            "phrase. Remove it by hand (make clean)." >&2
+        return 0
+    fi
+
+    echo "discard-dist-on-failure: the release build failed, so dist/ WAS" \
+        "REMOVED and no longer exists. A release build that fails has often" \
+        "already emitted a complete, loadable debug bundle — every wallet it" \
+        "creates gets the publicly committed test recovery phrase — so the" \
+        "failed build is not left behind to be loaded. Fix the failure and" \
+        "re-run make build, or run make build-debug if a debug build is what" \
+        "was wanted; that target keeps its output." >&2
+}
+
+main() {
+    [ "$#" -ge 1 ] || {
+        usage
+        echo "discard-dist-on-failure: no command given, so no build step ran" \
+            "and nothing was removed." >&2
+        exit 1
+    }
+
+    _status=0
+    "$@" || _status=$?
+
+    [ "$_status" -ne 0 ] || return 0
+
+    discard_dist
+    exit "$_status"
+}
+
+main "$@"

script/lib/eslint/noStateSingletonInBackground.js

@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
+// ESLint rule: the background bundle may not reach the shared state singleton.
+//
+// src/shared/state.js holds a module-level `state` object, loaded once by
+// loadState() and mutated in place from then on. That is the popup's model. In
+// the MV3 service worker there is no "once": the worker is terminated when
+// idle and revived by the next message, nothing loads state at module scope,
+// and an unpopulated read used to be served DEFAULT_STATE without complaint —
+// five defects, one cause
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324). The background has its
+// own per-call storage layer in src/background/state.js instead.
+//
+// THIS RULE IS NOT THE GUARANTEE, and must not be described as one. The
+// guarantee is in build.js: FORBIDDEN_INPUTS / assertNoForbiddenInputs() fails
+// the build when esbuild's own metafile reports src/shared/state.js as an input
+// of a background bundle. That consults the resolution esbuild actually
+// performed, so no specifier syntax and no resolution rule can slip past it,
+// and Dockerfile:42 runs `make build` in CI.
+//
+// What this rule is: fast local feedback, in the editor and in `make lint`,
+// before a full bundle. It reads sources from disk and matches import
+// specifiers TEXTUALLY, so it is a best-effort approximation of module
+// resolution — a hand-rolled matcher will diverge from a real bundler, and two
+// earlier revisions of this file proved it by shipping holes (a template
+// literal, a dynamic `import()`, a comment inside the call, a directory
+// resolved through `package.json` `main`). Those are all covered now, and the
+// next divergence is caught by the build rather than by widening this again.
+//
+// It checks REACHABILITY, not just the direct require: the singleton is one
+// `require()` away from any shared module the background pulls in, and a
+// re-export would put it back in the bundle without any background file naming
+// it. So each background file is the root of a walk over the CommonJS require
+// graph, and the error names the whole chain that brought the singleton in.
+//
+// Matching textually over-approximates — a specifier inside a comment or a
+// string counts — which is the safe direction here: the failure mode is a
+// spurious error naming an exact file and line, not a silent hole.
+//
+// Two shapes this rule does NOT report, both of which the build does fail on
+// (each measured with `make lint` and `make build` on the branch that added
+// this note):
+//
+//   - a computed specifier, `require("../shared/" + "state")` — esbuild
+//     constant-folds it, so it is in the bundle and `make build` is exit 2
+//     naming src/shared/state.js, while `make lint` is exit 0. Same for
+//     `import("../shared/" + variable)`, which esbuild resolves as a glob.
+//   - a symlink to the module — esbuild reports the real path and fails the
+//     build; this rule resolves the link's own path and sees a different file.
+//
+// Both are pinned as non-reports in tests/backgroundStateLintRule.test.js, so
+// this list is a measured description of the rule rather than a claim about
+// it. They are known divergences, not things that cannot happen. A
+// matcher will keep diverging from a bundler; that is why the guarantee is the
+// build's and this rule is not widened again to chase them.
+
+const fs = require("fs");
+const path = require("path");
+
+const { FORBIDDEN_INPUTS } = require("../forbiddenBundleInputs");
+
+// The modules to keep out, repo-relative, taken from the same table build.js
+// asserts against so that the two layers cannot name different paths. A second
+// literal copy here is how a rename disarms one of them while the other still
+// looks enforced.
+const FORBIDDEN = [...new Set(Object.values(FORBIDDEN_INPUTS).flat())];
+
+// Whatever may sit between a keyword, a paren and a specifier: whitespace and
+// comments. `import(/* webpackChunkName: "x" */ "./x")` is a standard bundler
+// idiom, and an inline `/* eslint-… */` is just as ordinary, so a matcher that
+// allows only \s there is not strict, it is broken. Each alternative starts
+// with a distinct character, so this cannot backtrack quadratically.
+const GAP = "(?:\\s|/\\*[^]*?\\*/|//[^\\n]*)";
+const SPECIFIER = "[\"'`]([^\"'`]+)[\"'`]";
+
+// Both alternatives capture the specifier: call form first
+// (`require(...)`/`import(...)`), then clause form (`from "x"`, and the bare
+// side-effect `import "x"`). Nothing after the specifier is matched, so a
+// trailing comment or a trailing comma cannot break the match either.
+const SPECIFIER_RE = new RegExp(
+    `\\b(?:require|import)${GAP}*\\(${GAP}*${SPECIFIER}` +
+        `|\\b(?:from|import)${GAP}+${SPECIFIER}`,
+    "g",
+);
+
+// The `main` of a directory's package.json, as a specifier relative to that
+// directory, or null. esbuild resolves a directory through it, so a walk that
+// stops at `<dir>/index.js` reports a specifier it matched perfectly well as
+// unresolvable.
+function packageMain(dir) {
+    try {
+        const pkg = JSON.parse(
+            fs.readFileSync(path.join(dir, "package.json"), "utf8"),
+        );
+        return typeof pkg.main === "string" && pkg.main ? pkg.main : null;
+    } catch {
+        return null;
+    }
+}
+
+// Resolve a relative require to a file path, trying what node and esbuild would
+// in the order they would: the path itself, then extensions, then the directory
+// (its package.json `main`, then its index.js).
+function resolveRelative(fromFile, spec) {
+    if (!spec.startsWith(".")) return null; // a package, not our tree
+    const base = path.resolve(path.dirname(fromFile), spec);
+    const main = packageMain(base);
+    for (const candidate of [
+        base,
+        base + ".js",
+        base + ".json",
+        ...(main
+            ? [path.resolve(base, main), path.resolve(base, main) + ".js"]
+            : []),
+        path.join(base, "index.js"),
+    ]) {
+        try {
+            if (fs.statSync(candidate).isFile()) return candidate;
+        } catch {
+            // Not this candidate.
+        }
+    }
+    return null;
+}
+
+function requiresOf(file) {
+    let source;
+    try {
+        source = fs.readFileSync(file, "utf8");
+    } catch {
+        return [];
+    }
+    const out = [];
+    for (const match of source.matchAll(SPECIFIER_RE)) {
+        const resolved = resolveRelative(file, match[1] ?? match[2]);
+        if (resolved) out.push(resolved);
+    }
+    return out;
+}
+
+// Breadth-first from `entry`, returning the shortest chain of files that ends
+// at one of the forbidden modules, or null when none is reachable.
+function chainToForbidden(entry, forbidden) {
+    const seen = new Set([entry]);
+    const queue = [[entry]];
+    while (queue.length > 0) {
+        const chain = queue.shift();
+        for (const next of requiresOf(chain[chain.length - 1])) {
+            if (forbidden.has(next)) return chain.concat([next]);
+            if (seen.has(next)) continue;
+            seen.add(next);
+            queue.push(chain.concat([next]));
+        }
+    }
+    return null;
+}
+
+const rule = {
+    meta: {
+        type: "problem",
+        docs: {
+            description:
+                "the background bundle must not be able to reach the" +
+                " module-level state singleton in src/shared/state.js",
+        },
+        schema: [],
+        messages: {
+            reachable:
+                "The background must not reach the shared state singleton:" +
+                " {{chain}}. The MV3 worker never populates it, so reading it" +
+                " serves DEFAULT_STATE. Use getState()/updateState() from" +
+                " src/background/state.js instead.",
+        },
+    },
+
+    create(context) {
+        return {
+            "Program:exit"(node) {
+                const filename = context.filename;
+                // ESLint lints from the repo root, which is also where the
+                // forbidden paths are anchored.
+                const forbidden = new Set(
+                    FORBIDDEN.map((module) =>
+                        path.resolve(context.cwd, module),
+                    ),
+                );
+                const chain = chainToForbidden(
+                    path.resolve(filename),
+                    forbidden,
+                );
+                if (!chain) return;
+                context.report({
+                    node,
+                    messageId: "reachable",
+                    data: {
+                        chain: chain
+                            .map((file) => path.relative(context.cwd, file))
+                            .join(" -> "),
+                    },
+                });
+            },
+        };
+    },
+};
+
+module.exports = {
+    rules: { "no-state-singleton-in-background": rule },
+};

script/lib/forbiddenBundleInputs.js

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+// The modules a given entry point's bundle may not contain, keyed by the
+// repo-relative entry point.
+//
+// ONE table, read by both layers that act on it: build.js asserts it against
+// esbuild's own metafile (the guarantee), and
+// script/lib/eslint/noStateSingletonInBackground.js reports the same
+// prohibition in the editor (fast feedback). It lives here because a second
+// literal copy of the path is exactly how a rename disarms one layer while the
+// other still looks enforced.
+//
+// src/shared/state.js holds a module-level `state` object, loaded once by
+// loadState() and mutated in place from then on. That is the popup's model:
+// one page, one load at boot, one lifetime. The MV3 service worker has no
+// "once" — it is killed when idle and revived by the next message, nothing
+// loads state at module scope, and an unpopulated read was answered out of
+// DEFAULT_STATE in silence. Five defects came from that, one of which
+// destroyed a wallet (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324). The
+// background has its own per-call storage layer in src/background/state.js
+// instead.
+//
+// What build.js's assertion covers, measured rather than assumed:
+//
+//   - Any import of a listed module, at any hop, in any specifier syntax,
+//     however esbuild resolved it. The check reads the input list esbuild
+//     reported for the emitted bundle, so it is the resolution the shipped
+//     file was built from and not a model of it. Measured on a computed
+//     specifier that esbuild constant-folds (`require("../shared/" +
+//     "state")`), on a computed specifier it resolves as a glob
+//     (`import("../shared/" + variable)`), and on a symlink to the module
+//     (esbuild reports the real path): each is `make build` exit 2.
+//
+//   - Every background entry point, whether or not anyone remembered to list
+//     it. A bundled entry point under BACKGROUND_ENTRY_PREFIX with no line in
+//     this table fails the build (assertNoForbiddenInputs()), so adding a
+//     second worker entry point is protected by default rather than protected
+//     only if the person adding it knew about this file. Measured: bundling
+//     src/background/worker2.js with no line here is `make build` exit 2.
+//
+//   - NOT covered: a COPY of a listed module at another path. The table is
+//     keyed by path, so `cp src/shared/state.js src/shared/stateCopy.js` plus
+//     a background require of the copy is `make build` exit 0 and `make lint`
+//     exit 0 (measured). The copy carries the singleton's own guard, so
+//     defects 1-3 of https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324 — a read
+//     of a field nothing loaded — become a loud StateNotLoadedError instead of
+//     a silent DEFAULT_STATE. Defects 4 and 5 do NOT: a copy also carries
+//     loadState(), and a stale read several awaits after a load, or a load
+//     detaching the objects an in-flight handler is mutating, are silent over
+//     a LOADED singleton whether it is the original or a copy. So the residual
+//     is wider than "it fails loudly". A newly WRITTEN singleton has no
+//     backstop at all.
+//
+//   - NOT covered: a background-behaving entry point outside
+//     BACKGROUND_ENTRY_PREFIX. The default protection above is keyed on that
+//     directory, which is also what eslint.config.js scopes the rule to, so a
+//     worker entry point placed somewhere else is covered by neither layer and
+//     needs its own line here.
+//
+// The ESLint rule's bounds are its own and are narrower: it matches specifiers
+// textually, so a computed specifier and a symlink to a listed module are
+// reported by the build and not by the rule. Both are pinned as non-reports in
+// tests/backgroundStateLintRule.test.js and are `make build` exit 2 (measured).
+// A second background entry point reached by one of those two shapes is
+// therefore caught by the build and not by the rule — which is the same
+// division of labour as everywhere else here, not an extra hole.
+//
+// Every way the table itself can rot is a failure rather than a quiet pass:
+//
+//   - a KEY no bundled entry point matched, and a listed MODULE this build
+//     bundled nowhere: assertForbiddenTableCovered(), at the end of a build;
+//   - an entry that lists NO modules, and a table with no entries at all:
+//     assertTableWellFormed() below, at require time — so it fails the build
+//     and the lint run alike, because the rule reads the same values and an
+//     empty list leaves it with nothing to look for.
+//
+// All of it is pinned by tests/buildForbiddenInputs.test.js.
+
+// What counts as a background entry point, and therefore must be listed above.
+// The build has no other notion of one: entry points are the paths handed to
+// bundle(), and this prefix is the narrowest rule that names the worker's
+// directory. eslint.config.js scopes the lint rule with the same prefix, from
+// this constant, so the two layers cannot disagree about what "background"
+// means.
+const BACKGROUND_ENTRY_PREFIX = "src/background/";
+
+const FORBIDDEN_INPUTS = {
+    "src/background/index.js": ["src/shared/state.js"],
+};
+
+// Refuse a table that cannot prohibit anything. An entry whose module list is
+// empty passes every check in both layers while enforcing nothing: the build
+// finds no module to look for and records the entry as checked, and the rule's
+// forbidden set — Object.values(...).flat() — comes back empty, so a plain
+// `require("../shared/state")` in the worker is green everywhere. That is a
+// one-character edit, so it fails here, where the table is defined and both
+// layers must load it, rather than in either layer's own checks.
+function assertTableWellFormed(table) {
+    const entries = Object.entries(table);
+    if (entries.length === 0) {
+        throw new Error(
+            "FORBIDDEN_INPUTS is empty, so nothing is prohibited anywhere. " +
+                "Removing the last entry disables the guarantee behind " +
+                "https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324.",
+        );
+    }
+    for (const [entry, modules] of entries) {
+        if (!Array.isArray(modules) || modules.length === 0) {
+            throw new Error(
+                `FORBIDDEN_INPUTS["${entry}"] lists no modules, so it ` +
+                    `prohibits nothing while still looking enforced. Give it ` +
+                    `the modules that entry point may not reach, or remove ` +
+                    `the entry.`,
+            );
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+assertTableWellFormed(FORBIDDEN_INPUTS);
+
+module.exports = {
+    BACKGROUND_ENTRY_PREFIX,
+    FORBIDDEN_INPUTS,
+    assertTableWellFormed,
+};

script/lib/package.js

@@ -0,0 +1,294 @@
+// Turn a verified dist/ into the two distributable archives.
+//
+// Invoked by script/package, which runs `make build` first so that dist/ has
+// already been checked against the build's own receipt (see the Build Receipts
+// section of README.md). This program does not build anything and does not
+// write into dist/: it reads the emitted tree and writes release/.
+//
+//   release/autistmask-chrome-<version>.zip   loaded via chrome://extensions
+//   release/autistmask-firefox-<version>.xpi  an UNSIGNED add-on, see README
+//   release/SHA256SUMS
+//
+// Self-containment is checked rather than assumed, because the layout invites
+// exactly one mistake: build.js emits dist/styles.css at the dist/ ROOT,
+// outside both browser directories, and copies it into each of them as
+// src/popup/styles.css. A naive `zip -r dist/chrome` is therefore correct only
+// by accident, and would stop being correct the moment a reference pointed up
+// and out. So every path the manifest and the popup HTML reference is resolved
+// and required to be inside the archive, a reference that escapes the browser
+// directory is a hard failure, and anything sitting at the dist/ root is
+// listed as deliberately not shipped rather than silently dropped.
+//
+// The archive is then read back and compared byte for byte against the
+// directory it was built from. An archive nobody opened is a claim, not an
+// artifact.
+
+"use strict";
+
+const crypto = require("crypto");
+const fs = require("fs");
+const path = require("path");
+
+const { readZip, writeZip } = require("./zip");
+const { resolveVersion } = require("./version");
+
+const ROOT = path.resolve(__dirname, "..", "..");
+const DIST = path.join(ROOT, "dist");
+const RELEASE = path.join(ROOT, "release");
+
+const TARGETS = [
+    { dir: "chrome", ext: "zip" },
+    // .xpi rather than .zip: it is the same container, but Firefox's install
+    // flow keys off the extension.
+    { dir: "firefox", ext: "xpi" },
+];
+
+// Strings in a manifest that name a file the extension loads. Matched by
+// shape, not by a list of manifest keys, so a key added in a later manifest
+// version is covered the day it appears rather than the day someone remembers
+// to extend a list here. Nothing else in either manifest looks like this: the
+// CSP strings, "<all_urls>", the version and the base64 key all fail it.
+const MANIFEST_PATH_RE =
+    /^[A-Za-z0-9._][A-Za-z0-9._/-]*\.(?:js|css|html|json|png|svg|woff2?)$/;
+
+// Local references out of an HTML document. Enough for what this repo emits —
+// one stylesheet link and one script tag — and anything it does not understand
+// is reported rather than passed over, see htmlReferences().
+const HTML_REF_RE = /(?:src|href)\s*=\s*["']([^"']+)["']/gi;
+
+function fail(message) {
+    throw new Error(message);
+}
+
+function sha256(buf) {
+    return crypto.createHash("sha256").update(buf).digest("hex");
+}
+
+// Every regular file under dir, as archive-root-relative forward-slashed
+// paths. A symlink is refused rather than followed: build.js emits regular
+// files only, so a link under dist/ is not something the build produced, and
+// dereferencing one would put bytes from outside dist/ into the artifact.
+function listFiles(dir, prefix = "") {
+    const out = [];
+    for (const entry of fs.readdirSync(dir, { withFileTypes: true })) {
+        const rel = prefix ? `${prefix}/${entry.name}` : entry.name;
+        if (entry.isSymbolicLink()) {
+            fail(
+                `${dir}/${entry.name} is a symlink. The build emits regular ` +
+                    `files only, so this is not something it produced and it ` +
+                    `will not be archived.`,
+            );
+        } else if (entry.isDirectory()) {
+            out.push(...listFiles(path.join(dir, entry.name), rel));
+        } else if (entry.isFile()) {
+            out.push(rel);
+        } else {
+            fail(
+                `${dir}/${entry.name} is neither a regular file nor a ` +
+                    `directory, so it is not something the build emitted`,
+            );
+        }
+    }
+    return out.sort();
+}
+
+// Collect every string anywhere in the manifest that looks like a file it
+// loads, plus every string that tries to reach outside the extension root.
+// The second half is the point: "../styles.css" never matches
+// MANIFEST_PATH_RE, so without an explicit check an escaping reference would
+// read as "not a path" and the missing file would be found only by a user
+// whose popup rendered unstyled.
+function manifestReferences(value, found = new Set()) {
+    if (typeof value === "string") {
+        if (value.split("/").includes("..")) {
+            fail(
+                `the manifest references ${JSON.stringify(value)}, which ` +
+                    `points outside the extension root. Everything the ` +
+                    `browser loads has to be inside the archive; nothing ` +
+                    `above it is shipped.`,
+            );
+        }
+        if (MANIFEST_PATH_RE.test(value)) found.add(value);
+    } else if (Array.isArray(value)) {
+        for (const v of value) manifestReferences(v, found);
+    } else if (value && typeof value === "object") {
+        for (const v of Object.values(value)) manifestReferences(v, found);
+    }
+    return found;
+}
+
+// Local references out of one HTML member, resolved against that member's own
+// directory and returned archive-relative. Absolute URLs, data: URIs and
+// in-page anchors are not files and are skipped; a relative reference that
+// climbs out of the archive root is a failure for the same reason as above.
+function htmlReferences(member, text) {
+    const base = path.posix.dirname(member);
+    const out = new Set();
+    for (const match of text.matchAll(HTML_REF_RE)) {
+        const ref = match[1].trim();
+        if (ref === "" || ref.startsWith("#") || ref.startsWith("//")) continue;
+        if (/^[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:/i.test(ref)) continue;
+        if (ref.startsWith("/")) {
+            fail(
+                `${member} references ${JSON.stringify(ref)} from the ` +
+                    `extension root. Nothing here emits root-absolute ` +
+                    `references and this packager does not resolve them.`,
+            );
+        }
+        const resolved = path.posix.normalize(path.posix.join(base, ref));
+        if (resolved.startsWith("..")) {
+            fail(
+                `${member} references ${JSON.stringify(ref)}, which resolves ` +
+                    `outside the extension root. build.js copies the ` +
+                    `compiled stylesheet into each browser directory for ` +
+                    `exactly this reason: dist/styles.css lives at the dist/ ` +
+                    `root and is not part of either archive.`,
+            );
+        }
+        out.add(resolved);
+    }
+    return out;
+}
+
+// Everything the browser is told to load, and the assertion that all of it is
+// in the archive.
+function checkSelfContained(target, members, read) {
+    if (!members.includes("manifest.json")) {
+        fail(`dist/${target} has no manifest.json at its root`);
+    }
+
+    const manifest = JSON.parse(read("manifest.json").toString("utf8"));
+    const referenced = new Set(manifestReferences(manifest));
+
+    for (const member of members) {
+        if (!member.endsWith(".html")) continue;
+        for (const ref of htmlReferences(
+            member,
+            read(member).toString("utf8"),
+        )) {
+            referenced.add(ref);
+        }
+    }
+
+    const missing = [...referenced].filter((r) => !members.includes(r));
+    if (missing.length > 0) {
+        fail(
+            `the ${target} archive would not be self-contained: it is told ` +
+                `to load ${missing.join(", ")}, which ${
+                    missing.length === 1 ? "is" : "are"
+                } not in it`,
+        );
+    }
+    return { manifest, referenced };
+}
+
+function main() {
+    const version = resolveVersion(ROOT);
+
+    if (!fs.existsSync(DIST)) {
+        fail(
+            "there is no dist/ to package. script/package runs make build " +
+                "first; run it rather than this program.",
+        );
+    }
+
+    fs.rmSync(RELEASE, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    fs.mkdirSync(RELEASE, { recursive: true });
+
+    // Files the build emits at the dist/ root, outside both browser
+    // directories. Printed rather than ignored: dist/styles.css is the
+    // Tailwind output that build.js then copies into each browser directory,
+    // so leaving it out is correct — but "correct and stated" and "dropped by
+    // a glob" are different things, and only one of them survives the next
+    // change to the build.
+    const rootOnly = fs
+        .readdirSync(DIST, { withFileTypes: true })
+        .filter((e) => !e.isDirectory())
+        .map((e) => e.name)
+        .sort();
+    if (rootOnly.length > 0) {
+        console.log(
+            `Not shipped (dist/ root, outside every browser directory, and ` +
+                `referenced by nothing inside one): ${rootOnly.join(", ")}`,
+        );
+    }
+
+    const sums = [];
+    for (const { dir, ext } of TARGETS) {
+        const targetDir = path.join(DIST, dir);
+        if (!fs.existsSync(targetDir)) {
+            fail(`dist/${dir} does not exist; run make build`);
+        }
+
+        const members = listFiles(targetDir);
+        const readFromDir = (member) =>
+            fs.readFileSync(path.join(targetDir, member));
+
+        const { manifest } = checkSelfContained(dir, members, readFromDir);
+        if (manifest.version !== version) {
+            fail(
+                `dist/${dir}/manifest.json says version ${manifest.version} ` +
+                    `but this tree is ${version}. dist/ is stale: run make ` +
+                    `build.`,
+            );
+        }
+
+        const archive = writeZip(
+            members.map((name) => ({ name, data: readFromDir(name) })),
+        );
+        const name = `autistmask-${dir}-${version}.${ext}`;
+        const outPath = path.join(RELEASE, name);
+        fs.writeFileSync(outPath, archive);
+
+        // Read the artifact back off disk, not the buffer that was just
+        // written: what ships is the file.
+        const written = fs.readFileSync(outPath);
+        const entries = readZip(written);
+        const inArchive = entries.map((e) => e.name).sort();
+        if (inArchive.join("\n") !== members.join("\n")) {
+            fail(
+                `${name} does not hold the same members as dist/${dir}: ` +
+                    `archive has ${inArchive.length}, directory has ` +
+                    `${members.length}`,
+            );
+        }
+        for (const entry of entries) {
+            const onDisk = readFromDir(entry.name);
+            if (sha256(entry.data) !== sha256(onDisk)) {
+                fail(`${name} member ${entry.name} differs from dist/${dir}`);
+            }
+        }
+        // Re-run the self-containment check against the ARCHIVE's own
+        // contents. The directory passing it is not the claim being made.
+        const byName = new Map(entries.map((e) => [e.name, e.data]));
+        checkSelfContained(dir, inArchive, (m) => byName.get(m));
+
+        const digest = sha256(written);
+        sums.push(`${digest}  ${name}`);
+        console.log(
+            `${name}: ${entries.length} member(s), ${written.length} bytes, ` +
+                `sha256 ${digest}`,
+        );
+    }
+
+    fs.writeFileSync(
+        path.join(RELEASE, "SHA256SUMS"),
+        sums.map((l) => `${l}\n`).join(""),
+    );
+    console.log(`Wrote release/ for version ${version}`);
+}
+
+// Only when run as a program. The reference-resolving helpers are what decide
+// whether an archive is self-contained, so tests/packaging.test.js exercises
+// them directly and must be able to require this file without packaging
+// anything.
+if (require.main === module) {
+    try {
+        main();
+    } catch (err) {
+        console.error(`package: ${err && err.message ? err.message : err}`);
+        process.exit(1);
+    }
+}
+
+module.exports = { checkSelfContained, htmlReferences, manifestReferences };

script/lib/version.js

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+// The version, and the rule that there is only one of it.
+//
+// Three files declare a version and none of them can be derived from another:
+// Chrome and Firefox each need their own manifest, both are copied to dist/
+// verbatim (tests/manifest.test.js asserts that what is in manifest/ is what
+// ships), and package.json's copy is what build.js compiles into the About
+// screen. So the single source of truth is enforced rather than generated —
+// they must all agree or there is no version and no build.
+//
+// Reading one of the three and ignoring the rest is what this replaces. That
+// shape cannot fail: it silently ships an extension whose About screen and
+// whose browser-reported version disagree, and whose release artifact is named
+// after whichever file the packager happened to read.
+//
+// Required by build.js, script/lib/package.js and tests/version.test.js, so
+// the build, the release artifacts and make check all apply the same rule to
+// the same files.
+
+"use strict";
+
+const fs = require("fs");
+const path = require("path");
+
+const VERSION_SOURCES = [
+    "package.json",
+    "manifest/chrome.json",
+    "manifest/firefox.json",
+];
+
+// Every declared version, in VERSION_SOURCES order, as { source, version }.
+// A file that declares nothing usable fails here rather than being skipped:
+// a missing version is not agreement.
+function declaredVersions(root) {
+    return VERSION_SOURCES.map((source) => {
+        const file = path.join(root, source);
+        let parsed;
+        try {
+            parsed = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(file, "utf8"));
+        } catch (e) {
+            throw new Error(
+                `${source} could not be read as JSON: ${e.message}`,
+            );
+        }
+        const version = parsed.version;
+        if (typeof version !== "string" || version.trim() === "") {
+            throw new Error(
+                `${source} declares no usable "version" (found ` +
+                    `${JSON.stringify(version)}). Every artifact is named and ` +
+                    `stamped with it, so there is nothing to build without it.`,
+            );
+        }
+        return { source, version };
+    });
+}
+
+// The one version all three declare, or a failure naming every disagreeing
+// file and what it said.
+function resolveVersion(root) {
+    const declared = declaredVersions(root);
+    const distinct = [...new Set(declared.map((d) => d.version))];
+    if (distinct.length !== 1) {
+        throw new Error(
+            "the declared versions disagree, so this tree has no version: " +
+                declared.map((d) => `${d.source}=${d.version}`).join(", ") +
+                ". Set all of them to the same value: the manifests are what " +
+                "the browser reports and package.json is what the About " +
+                "screen shows, and a build that picked one of them would " +
+                "ship the disagreement.",
+        );
+    }
+    return distinct[0];
+}
+
+module.exports = { VERSION_SOURCES, declaredVersions, resolveVersion };

script/lib/zip.js

@@ -0,0 +1,274 @@
+// A minimal, deterministic ZIP writer and reader.
+//
+// Used by script/lib/package.js to build the distributable archives: a Chrome
+// zip and a Firefox XPI are both ordinary zip files with manifest.json at the
+// root, so one implementation covers both.
+//
+// Why this rather than a package or the zip(1) binary. A dependency would have
+// to be hash-pinned like everything else in REPO_POLICIES.md, and this is
+// about a hundred lines of stdlib zlib for a format the archives use two
+// features of. The binary is worse: the release artifact would then depend on
+// whichever Info-ZIP the machine happens to have, which is the same objection
+// that keeps linting inside a container.
+//
+// Deterministic on purpose. Entries are sorted by name, every timestamp is the
+// same fixed 1980-01-01 the format's epoch starts at, and the compression
+// level is fixed, so building the same dist/ twice produces byte-identical
+// archives and the sha256 in SHA256SUMS is a property of the input rather than
+// of the clock. Two builds of the same commit that disagree are then visible
+// instead of expected.
+//
+// Deliberately NOT implemented: zip64, encryption, data descriptors,
+// directory entries (browsers infer directories from member paths), and
+// anything to do with symlinks. writeZip refuses input it cannot represent
+// rather than emitting an archive that is quietly wrong.
+
+"use strict";
+
+const zlib = require("zlib");
+
+const LOCAL_SIG = 0x04034b50;
+const CENTRAL_SIG = 0x02014b50;
+const EOCD_SIG = 0x06054b50;
+
+const METHOD_STORE = 0;
+const METHOD_DEFLATE = 8;
+
+// 1980-01-01 00:00:00, the earliest the MS-DOS timestamp fields can express.
+const DOS_DATE = (0 << 9) | (1 << 5) | 1;
+const DOS_TIME = 0;
+
+// Unix regular file, mode 0644, in the high 16 bits, which is where the "made
+// by unix" convention puts it.
+// >>> 0 because JS shifts are signed 32-bit and this one sets the top bit.
+const EXTERNAL_ATTRS = (0o100644 << 16) >>> 0;
+const VERSION_MADE_BY = (3 << 8) | 20; // unix, needs zip 2.0
+const VERSION_NEEDED = 20;
+
+// Without zip64 every size and offset is a u32.
+const MAX_U32 = 0xffffffff;
+
+const CRC_TABLE = (() => {
+    const table = new Int32Array(256);
+    for (let i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
+        let c = i;
+        for (let k = 0; k < 8; k++) {
+            c = c & 1 ? 0xedb88320 ^ (c >>> 1) : c >>> 1;
+        }
+        table[i] = c;
+    }
+    return table;
+})();
+
+// Written out rather than taken from zlib.crc32, which only exists from node
+// 22.2: this runs from script/ on whatever node the host has as well as inside
+// the pinned image, and a checksum that silently is not there is worse than
+// twelve lines.
+function crc32(buf) {
+    let c = -1;
+    for (let i = 0; i < buf.length; i++) {
+        c = CRC_TABLE[(c ^ buf[i]) & 0xff] ^ (c >>> 8);
+    }
+    return (c ^ -1) >>> 0;
+}
+
+// Member names are stored as raw bytes. Anything outside ASCII would need the
+// UTF-8 flag and interoperability care that nothing this repo emits requires,
+// so it is refused instead of guessed at.
+function encodeName(name) {
+    if (typeof name !== "string" || name === "") {
+        throw new Error(`zip: unusable member name ${JSON.stringify(name)}`);
+    }
+    const segments = name.split("/");
+    if (
+        name.startsWith("/") ||
+        name.includes("\\") ||
+        segments.some((s) => s === "" || s === "." || s === "..")
+    ) {
+        throw new Error(
+            `zip: refusing member name ${JSON.stringify(name)}: archive ` +
+                `members must be relative paths under the archive root`,
+        );
+    }
+    if (/[^\x20-\x7e]/.test(name)) {
+        throw new Error(
+            `zip: refusing non-ASCII member name ${JSON.stringify(name)}`,
+        );
+    }
+    return Buffer.from(name, "ascii");
+}
+
+function compress(data) {
+    if (data.length === 0) {
+        return { method: METHOD_STORE, body: data };
+    }
+    const deflated = zlib.deflateRawSync(data, { level: 9 });
+    if (deflated.length >= data.length) {
+        return { method: METHOD_STORE, body: data };
+    }
+    return { method: METHOD_DEFLATE, body: deflated };
+}
+
+// entries: [{ name, data }]. Returns the archive as a Buffer.
+function writeZip(entries) {
+    if (!Array.isArray(entries) || entries.length === 0) {
+        throw new Error("zip: refusing to write an archive with no members");
+    }
+
+    const sorted = [...entries].sort((a, b) => (a.name < b.name ? -1 : 1));
+    const seen = new Set();
+    const locals = [];
+    const centrals = [];
+    let offset = 0;
+
+    for (const entry of sorted) {
+        const name = encodeName(entry.name);
+        if (seen.has(entry.name)) {
+            throw new Error(`zip: duplicate member ${entry.name}`);
+        }
+        seen.add(entry.name);
+
+        const data = Buffer.from(entry.data);
+        const { method, body } = compress(data);
+        if (data.length > MAX_U32 || body.length > MAX_U32) {
+            throw new Error(
+                `zip: ${entry.name} is too large for a non-zip64 archive`,
+            );
+        }
+        const crc = crc32(data);
+
+        const local = Buffer.alloc(30 + name.length);
+        local.writeUInt32LE(LOCAL_SIG, 0);
+        local.writeUInt16LE(VERSION_NEEDED, 4);
+        local.writeUInt16LE(0, 6);
+        local.writeUInt16LE(method, 8);
+        local.writeUInt16LE(DOS_TIME, 10);
+        local.writeUInt16LE(DOS_DATE, 12);
+        local.writeUInt32LE(crc, 14);
+        local.writeUInt32LE(body.length, 18);
+        local.writeUInt32LE(data.length, 22);
+        local.writeUInt16LE(name.length, 26);
+        local.writeUInt16LE(0, 28);
+        name.copy(local, 30);
+
+        const central = Buffer.alloc(46 + name.length);
+        central.writeUInt32LE(CENTRAL_SIG, 0);
+        central.writeUInt16LE(VERSION_MADE_BY, 4);
+        central.writeUInt16LE(VERSION_NEEDED, 6);
+        central.writeUInt16LE(0, 8);
+        central.writeUInt16LE(method, 10);
+        central.writeUInt16LE(DOS_TIME, 12);
+        central.writeUInt16LE(DOS_DATE, 14);
+        central.writeUInt32LE(crc, 16);
+        central.writeUInt32LE(body.length, 20);
+        central.writeUInt32LE(data.length, 24);
+        central.writeUInt16LE(name.length, 28);
+        central.writeUInt16LE(0, 30);
+        central.writeUInt16LE(0, 32);
+        central.writeUInt16LE(0, 34);
+        central.writeUInt16LE(0, 36);
+        central.writeUInt32LE(EXTERNAL_ATTRS, 38);
+        if (offset > MAX_U32) {
+            throw new Error("zip: archive too large for a non-zip64 archive");
+        }
+        central.writeUInt32LE(offset, 42);
+        name.copy(central, 46);
+
+        locals.push(local, body);
+        centrals.push(central);
+        offset += local.length + body.length;
+    }
+
+    const centralBuf = Buffer.concat(centrals);
+    const eocd = Buffer.alloc(22);
+    eocd.writeUInt32LE(EOCD_SIG, 0);
+    eocd.writeUInt16LE(0, 4);
+    eocd.writeUInt16LE(0, 6);
+    eocd.writeUInt16LE(sorted.length, 8);
+    eocd.writeUInt16LE(sorted.length, 10);
+    eocd.writeUInt32LE(centralBuf.length, 12);
+    eocd.writeUInt32LE(offset, 16);
+    eocd.writeUInt16LE(0, 20);
+
+    return Buffer.concat([...locals, centralBuf, eocd]);
+}
+
+// Read an archive back into [{ name, data }], from the central directory
+// rather than by scanning for local headers: the central directory is the
+// authoritative index, and a member reachable only by scanning is one a real
+// unzipper would not extract.
+//
+// Every member's CRC is checked. The point of reading an archive back is to
+// establish that it holds what it was meant to hold, so a member that does not
+// decompress to its recorded checksum is a failure and never a warning.
+function readZip(buf) {
+    if (buf.length < 22) {
+        throw new Error("zip: too short to be an archive");
+    }
+    // No archive this writes has a trailing comment, so the EOCD is the last
+    // 22 bytes. Anything else is not an archive this produced.
+    const eocdAt = buf.length - 22;
+    if (buf.readUInt32LE(eocdAt) !== EOCD_SIG) {
+        throw new Error(
+            "zip: no end-of-central-directory record at the end of the " +
+                "archive (a trailing comment, or not a zip at all)",
+        );
+    }
+    const count = buf.readUInt16LE(eocdAt + 10);
+    const centralSize = buf.readUInt32LE(eocdAt + 12);
+    let at = buf.readUInt32LE(eocdAt + 16);
+    if (at + centralSize > eocdAt) {
+        throw new Error("zip: central directory runs past the archive");
+    }
+
+    const out = [];
+    for (let i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+        if (buf.readUInt32LE(at) !== CENTRAL_SIG) {
+            throw new Error(`zip: bad central directory entry ${i}`);
+        }
+        const method = buf.readUInt16LE(at + 10);
+        const crc = buf.readUInt32LE(at + 16);
+        const compSize = buf.readUInt32LE(at + 20);
+        const rawSize = buf.readUInt32LE(at + 24);
+        const nameLen = buf.readUInt16LE(at + 28);
+        const extraLen = buf.readUInt16LE(at + 30);
+        const commentLen = buf.readUInt16LE(at + 32);
+        const localAt = buf.readUInt32LE(at + 42);
+        const name = buf.toString("ascii", at + 46, at + 46 + nameLen);
+        at += 46 + nameLen + extraLen + commentLen;
+
+        if (buf.readUInt32LE(localAt) !== LOCAL_SIG) {
+            throw new Error(`zip: ${name} has no local header`);
+        }
+        // The local header's own name and extra lengths, not the central
+        // directory's: the two are allowed to differ and the data starts after
+        // the local ones.
+        const localNameLen = buf.readUInt16LE(localAt + 26);
+        const localExtraLen = buf.readUInt16LE(localAt + 28);
+        const dataAt = localAt + 30 + localNameLen + localExtraLen;
+        const body = buf.subarray(dataAt, dataAt + compSize);
+
+        let data;
+        if (method === METHOD_STORE) {
+            data = Buffer.from(body);
+        } else if (method === METHOD_DEFLATE) {
+            data = zlib.inflateRawSync(body);
+        } else {
+            throw new Error(`zip: ${name} uses compression method ${method}`);
+        }
+
+        if (data.length !== rawSize) {
+            throw new Error(
+                `zip: ${name} decompressed to ${data.length} bytes, not the ` +
+                    `recorded ${rawSize}`,
+            );
+        }
+        if (crc32(data) !== crc) {
+            throw new Error(`zip: ${name} fails its recorded CRC32`);
+        }
+        out.push({ name, data });
+    }
+    return out;
+}
+
+module.exports = { crc32, readZip, writeZip };

script/package

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# script/package: produce the release artifacts — one self-contained,
+# versioned archive per browser — into release/. Our own extension to
+# scripts-to-rule-them-all.
+#
+# It builds first, through `make build` rather than by calling build.js
+# itself. That target is the only audited path to a release build: it creates
+# the build receipt outside the repo, scrubs AUTISTMASK_DEBUG from the
+# verifier's environment, tells script/verify-build in so many words to expect
+# a RELEASE build, and re-runs script/check-censored against dist/.
+# script/test-verify-build asserts that wiring by reading the recipe back out
+# of `make -n`. Re-implementing that sequence here would give the release
+# artifacts a second, unaudited path to dist/ — and it is the release
+# artifacts, above everything else, that must never be built from a debug
+# compile.
+#
+# This packages, it does not publish. Tagging, CRX packing and any upload are
+# outward-facing acts and are nobody's job but the owner's.
+set -eu
+
+ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
+
+main() {
+    cd "$ROOT"
+
+    if ! command -v make >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        echo "package: make is required (the release build runs through" \
+            "make build)" >&2
+        exit 1
+    fi
+
+    make build
+
+    echo "Packaging release artifacts..."
+    node script/lib/package.js
+}
+
+main "$@"

script/test-e2e

@@ -78,6 +78,22 @@ main() {
         -e "E2E_TRACE_NETWORK=${E2E_TRACE_NETWORK:-0}" \
         "$(cat "$IIDFILE")" \
         node tests/e2e/run.js
+
+    # Where chrome.storage.local lives, and what moves it: two unpacked loads
+    # from two different paths in one profile, with the shipped manifest and
+    # again with `key` stripped out. Its own browser sessions — four of them —
+    # because the whole subject is what happens ACROSS loads, which the suite
+    # above cannot express with one.
+    #
+    # No PW_EXPERIMENTAL_SERVICE_WORKER_NETWORK_EVENTS here: this drives no
+    # RPC and installs no route handlers, and the browser is started with
+    # --host-resolver-rules=MAP * ~NOTFOUND so nothing it does can leave.
+    echo "Running the extension-id and storage-partition observations..."
+    docker run --rm \
+        --ipc=host \
+        -e HOME=/tmp \
+        "$(cat "$IIDFILE")" \
+        node tests/e2e/storagePartition.js
 }
 
 main "$@"

script/test-e2e-firefox

@@ -72,6 +72,19 @@ main() {
         -e HOME=/tmp \
         "$(cat "$IIDFILE")" \
         node tests/e2e/firefox/run.js dist/firefox
+
+    # The install/uninstall/re-install property, against the packaged XPI
+    # rather than the unpacked directory: it is the artifact a user would be
+    # handed, and this is the only place a real Firefox is asked to load it.
+    # Its own browser session, because it takes the add-on away in the middle
+    # and the suite above shares one session throughout.
+    echo "Running the Firefox re-install suite against the packaged XPI..."
+    docker run --rm \
+        --shm-size=1g \
+        --network none \
+        -e HOME=/tmp \
+        "$(cat "$IIDFILE")" \
+        node tests/e2e/firefox/reinstall.js
 }
 
 main "$@"

script/test-verify-build

@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 # script/test-verify-build: exercise every failure mode of
-# script/verify-build. Our own extension to scripts-to-rule-them-all, run
+# script/verify-build, and what make build does with dist/ after one of them
-# from script/check so make check covers it.
+# (script/discard-dist-on-failure). Our own extension to
+# scripts-to-rule-them-all, run from script/check so make check covers it.
 #
 # Why this exists: verify-build is the build-integrity guard, and four separate
 # reviews of it each found a fresh vacuous pass — the grep exit-2 conflation,
@@ -31,6 +32,7 @@ set -eu
 
 ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
 VERIFY_BUILD="$ROOT/script/verify-build"
+DISCARD_DIST="$ROOT/script/discard-dist-on-failure"
 
 MARKER_ON="autistmask-build-debug=on"
 MARKER_OFF="autistmask-build-debug=off"
@@ -150,6 +152,7 @@ build_fixture() {
 
     mkdir -p "$FIXTURE/script"
     ln -s "$VERIFY_BUILD" "$FIXTURE/script/verify-build"
+    ln -s "$DISCARD_DIST" "$FIXTURE/script/discard-dist-on-failure"
 
     mkdir -p "$FIXTURE/dist/chrome/src/popup" \
         "$FIXTURE/dist/chrome/src/content" \
@@ -513,12 +516,125 @@ c_debug_build() {
     write_receipt
 }
 
+c_no_dist() { rm -rf dist; }
+
+# --- dist discard -----------------------------------------------------------
+#
+# make build wraps every step of the release path in
+# script/discard-dist-on-failure, so a release build that fails removes dist/:
+# with AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1 exported it has already emitted a complete, loadable
+# debug bundle whose every wallet uses the publicly committed test recovery
+# phrase, and a loud failure alone does not stop someone loading dist/chrome/
+# anyway. make build-debug is deliberately not wrapped.
+#
+# Both directions are asserted against the state of dist/ ON DISK after the run,
+# not against the exit status: a case reading only the status would keep passing
+# if the removal quietly stopped happening, which is the flip this exists to
+# catch. The wrapper runs against the fixture — its ROOT is the fixture, via the
+# symlink in the fixture's script/ — with trivial commands standing in for the
+# build steps, because what is under test is what happens after a step says no,
+# not the step.
+
+# discard_case <name> <setup> <status> <gone|kept> <want> <unwanted> [cmd...]
+discard_case() {
+    _dc_name="$1"
+    _dc_setup="$2"
+    _dc_want_status="$3"
+    _dc_want_dist="$4"
+    _dc_want="$5"
+    _dc_unwanted="$6"
+    shift 6
+
+    build_fixture
+    if ! (cd "$FIXTURE" && "$_dc_setup") >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        FAILED=$((FAILED + 1))
+        echo "  FAIL: $_dc_name"
+        echo "    the case's own setup failed, so nothing was tested."
+        return 0
+    fi
+
+    _dc_status=0
+    _dc_out="$(cd "$FIXTURE" &&
+        "$FIXTURE/script/discard-dist-on-failure" "$@" 2>&1)" || _dc_status=$?
+
+    _ok=yes
+    _why=""
+
+    if [ "$_dc_status" -ne "$_dc_want_status" ]; then
+        _ok=no
+        _why="exit status $_dc_status, wanted $_dc_want_status"
+    fi
+
+    # The assertion this case exists for: what is on disk now.
+    if [ -e "$FIXTURE/dist" ] || [ -h "$FIXTURE/dist" ]; then
+        _dc_dist=kept
+    else
+        _dc_dist=gone
+    fi
+    if [ "$_dc_dist" != "$_dc_want_dist" ]; then
+        _ok=no
+        _why="${_why:+$_why; }dist/ is $_dc_dist after the run, wanted"
+        _why="$_why $_dc_want_dist"
+    elif [ "$_dc_want_dist" = kept ] &&
+        [ ! -f "$FIXTURE/dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js" ]; then
+        # Kept has to mean intact: a dist/ emptied out is not one left alone.
+        _ok=no
+        _why="${_why:+$_why; }dist/ survived but its emitted bundle did not"
+    fi
+
+    _dc_check_message "$_dc_want" want
+    _dc_check_message "$_dc_unwanted" unwanted
+
+    if [ "$_ok" = yes ]; then
+        PASSED=$((PASSED + 1))
+        echo "  ok: $_dc_name"
+        return 0
+    fi
+
+    FAILED=$((FAILED + 1))
+    echo "  FAIL: $_dc_name"
+    echo "    $_why"
+    echo "    --- discard-dist-on-failure output ---"
+    printf '%s\n' "$_dc_out" | sed 's/^/    /'
+    echo "    --- end output ---"
+}
+
+# Require ($2 = want) or forbid ($2 = unwanted) a substring in the wrapper's
+# output, updating _ok and _why. An empty substring asserts nothing. Same grep
+# discipline as everywhere else here: 0 and 1 are answers, anything else means
+# the message was never checked.
+_dc_check_message() {
+    [ -n "$1" ] || return 0
+
+    _dcm_g=0
+    printf '%s\n' "$_dc_out" | grep -q -F -e "$1" || _dcm_g=$?
+    case "$_dcm_g" in
+    0)
+        [ "$2" = unwanted ] || return 0
+        _ok=no
+        _why="${_why:+$_why; }message contained: $1"
+        ;;
+    1)
+        [ "$2" = want ] || return 0
+        _ok=no
+        _why="${_why:+$_why; }message did not contain: $1"
+        ;;
+    *)
+        _ok=no
+        _why="${_why:+$_why; }grep exited $_dcm_g matching the message, so the
+      message was never checked"
+        ;;
+    esac
+}
+
 # --- Makefile wiring --------------------------------------------------------
 
 # The verifier cases above prove what verify-build does when it is told what to
-# expect. This proves the Makefile tells it — with the mode as an argument, on
+# expect, and the discard cases prove what the wrapper does with dist/. This
-# a scrubbed environment, and identically whether or not AUTISTMASK_DEBUG is
+# proves the Makefile wires both up — the mode as an argument, on a scrubbed
-# exported in the shell that ran make. Read off `make -n`, so no build runs.
+# environment, identically whether or not AUTISTMASK_DEBUG is exported in the
+# shell that ran make, and the wrapper on the release path only. Read off
+# `make -n`, so no build runs.
 check_makefile_wiring() {
     if ! command -v make >/dev/null 2>&1; then
         SKIPPED=$((SKIPPED + 1))
@@ -537,6 +653,34 @@ check_makefile_wiring() {
         build-debug "verify-build --expect debug"
     _wiring_case "make build-debug scrubs AUTISTMASK_DEBUG for the verifier" \
         build-debug "env -u AUTISTMASK_DEBUG"
+
+    # The release path runs its steps through the wrapper, including the final
+    # check-censored pass; the debug path runs none of them through it, which is
+    # what keeps a failed debug build's dist/ on disk.
+    _wiring_case "make build wraps its steps in discard-dist-on-failure" \
+        build "script/discard-dist-on-failure"
+    _wiring_case "make build wraps check-censored --require-dist too" \
+        build "script/discard-dist-on-failure script/check-censored"
+    _wiring_case_absent "make build-debug never discards its dist/" \
+        build-debug "discard-dist-on-failure"
+}
+
+# Run `make -n TARGET` with AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1 exported, into _wc_out. Returns
+# non-zero, having already reported the failure, when make itself failed: a
+# recipe that could not be printed was never checked.
+_wiring_make_n() {
+    AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1
+    export AUTISTMASK_DEBUG
+    _wc_status=0
+    _wc_out="$(cd "$ROOT" && make -n "$_wc_target" 2>&1)" || _wc_status=$?
+    unset AUTISTMASK_DEBUG
+
+    [ "$_wc_status" -ne 0 ] || return 0
+
+    FAILED=$((FAILED + 1))
+    echo "  FAIL: $_wc_name"
+    echo "    make -n $_wc_target exited $_wc_status"
+    return 1
 }
 
 _wiring_case() {
@@ -544,18 +688,7 @@ _wiring_case() {
     _wc_target="$2"
     _wc_want="$3"
 
-    AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1
+    _wiring_make_n || return 0
-    export AUTISTMASK_DEBUG
-    _wc_status=0
-    _wc_out="$(cd "$ROOT" && make -n "$_wc_target" 2>&1)" || _wc_status=$?
-    unset AUTISTMASK_DEBUG
-
-    if [ "$_wc_status" -ne 0 ]; then
-        FAILED=$((FAILED + 1))
-        echo "  FAIL: $_wc_name"
-        echo "    make -n $_wc_target exited $_wc_status"
-        return 0
-    fi
 
     _wc_g=0
     printf '%s\n' "$_wc_out" | grep -q -F -e "$_wc_want" || _wc_g=$?
@@ -577,6 +710,34 @@ _wiring_case() {
     esac
 }
 
+# The inverse: the recipe must NOT run something.
+_wiring_case_absent() {
+    _wc_name="$1"
+    _wc_target="$2"
+    _wc_want="$3"
+
+    _wiring_make_n || return 0
+
+    _wc_g=0
+    printf '%s\n' "$_wc_out" | grep -q -F -e "$_wc_want" || _wc_g=$?
+    case "$_wc_g" in
+    1)
+        PASSED=$((PASSED + 1))
+        echo "  ok: $_wc_name"
+        ;;
+    0)
+        FAILED=$((FAILED + 1))
+        echo "  FAIL: $_wc_name"
+        echo "    make -n $_wc_target runs: $_wc_want"
+        ;;
+    *)
+        FAILED=$((FAILED + 1))
+        echo "  FAIL: $_wc_name"
+        echo "    grep exited $_wc_g, so the recipe was never checked"
+        ;;
+    esac
+}
+
 run_cases() {
     check_case "control: untouched dist passes" \
         no release 0 "2 bundle(s) $MARKER_OFF" c_control
@@ -712,6 +873,18 @@ run_cases() {
         no release 1 "carries a debug marker but the build did not" \
         c_marker_on_plain_file
 
+    discard_case "a failed release build step removes dist/" \
+        c_control 3 gone "dist/ WAS REMOVED" "" sh -c 'exit 3'
+
+    discard_case "a successful release build step leaves dist/ alone" \
+        c_control 0 kept "" "REMOVED" true
+
+    discard_case "a failed release build step with no dist/ says there was none" \
+        c_no_dist 3 gone "There was no dist/ to remove" "" sh -c 'exit 3'
+
+    discard_case "the wrapper given no command removes nothing" \
+        c_control 1 kept "no command given" ""
+
     check_makefile_wiring
 }
 
@@ -740,6 +913,10 @@ main() {
         echo "test-verify-build: $VERIFY_BUILD is missing or not executable" >&2
         exit 1
     }
+    [ -x "$DISCARD_DIST" ] || {
+        echo "test-verify-build: $DISCARD_DIST is missing or not executable" >&2
+        exit 1
+    }
 
     echo "Testing script/verify-build failure modes..."
     pick_sha256_tool

script/verify-build

@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
 #!/bin/sh
-# script/verify-build: assert that dist/ holds exactly what the build that just
+# script/verify-build: assert that the regular files and symlinks under dist/
-# ran emitted, and that the compiled DEBUG state of that output is the one the
+# are exactly what the build that just ran emitted (other file types are out of
-# caller asked for. Our own extension to scripts-to-rule-them-all, run at the
+# scope; see "What that does and does not establish" below), and that the
-# end of make build / make build-debug.
+# compiled DEBUG state of that output is the one the caller asked for. Our own
+# extension to scripts-to-rule-them-all, run at the end of make build /
+# make build-debug.
 #
 # Why the DEBUG half exists: DEBUG makes the publicly committed test recovery
 # phrase the output of wallet creation, so a release artifact built with it live
@@ -29,12 +31,16 @@
 # path fresh per invocation, outside the repo, and deletes it afterwards.
 #
 # What that does and does not establish. It establishes that dist/ is byte for
-# byte the output of the build.js run that just finished, with nothing added,
+# byte the output of the build.js run that just finished, with no regular file
-# nothing missing and nothing altered in between, and that the audited bundles
+# or symlink added, missing or altered in between, and that the audited bundles
-# in it compiled to the requested mode. It does NOT establish that the source
+# in it compiled to the requested mode. Regular files and symlinks are the whole
-# tree or build.js were honest, and it says nothing at all to someone handed a
+# of what the tree walk covers; fifos, sockets, device nodes and empty
-# dist/ from elsewhere: without the receipt from its own build they have no
+# directories under dist/ are not checked, because a build emits none of them,
-# input to this check. That is signing, and it is not this control.
+# none can carry a shippable payload, and grep on a fifo would hang rather than
+# fail. It does NOT establish that the source tree or build.js were honest, and
+# it says nothing at all to someone handed a dist/ from elsewhere: without the
+# receipt from its own build they have no input to this check. That is signing,
+# and it is not this control.
 #
 # It fails rather than passes whenever it cannot determine something. Minified
 # output is not a stable contract, so "matched neither marker" is not evidence
@@ -392,8 +398,10 @@ check_receipt_entries() {
 #     its own command line, so a linked dist/ collapses this walk to one entry
 #     and cross-checks nothing.
 #
-# Types other than regular files and symlinks are left out on purpose: a build
+# Types other than regular files and symlinks — fifos, sockets, device nodes and
-# emits none of them, and grep on a fifo would hang rather than fail.
+# empty directories — are left out on purpose, and the guarantee is bounded to
+# what is walked: a build emits none of them, none can carry a shippable
+# payload, and grep on a fifo would hang rather than fail.
 check_dist_tree() {
     LISTING="$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/verify-build-dist.XXXXXX")" ||
         fail "could not create a temporary file for the dist/ listing, so the

src/background/index.js

@@ -2,19 +2,21 @@
 // Handles EIP-1193 RPC requests from content scripts and proxies
 // non-sensitive calls to the configured Ethereum JSON-RPC endpoint.
 
-const { DEFAULT_RPC_URL } = require("../shared/constants");
 const {
     SUPPORTED_CHAIN_IDS,
     networkById,
     networkByChainId,
 } = require("../shared/networks");
-const { onChainSwitch } = require("../shared/chainSwitch");
+const { applyChainSwitchFields } = require("../shared/chainSwitchFields");
-const {
+// The background's own storage layer. src/shared/state.js — the module-level
-    state,
+// `state` singleton, loadState() and saveState() — is deliberately NOT
-    loadState,
+// imported here and must never be: see the header of src/background/state.js.
-    saveState,
+// The build enforces it, not review: build.js fails when esbuild's metafile
-    currentNetwork,
+// reports that module as an input of this bundle (FORBIDDEN_INPUTS in
-} = require("../shared/state");
+// script/lib/forbiddenBundleInputs.js). The ESLint rule of the same name is
+// the same prohibition reported early, not the guarantee.
+const { getState, updateState } = require("./state");
+const { StateUnusableError } = require("../shared/stateSchema");
 const { refreshBalances, getProvider } = require("../shared/balances");
 const { debugFetch, log } = require("../shared/log");
 const {
@@ -42,7 +44,6 @@ const {
 const {
     actionApi,
     runtimeApi,
-    storageGet,
     tabsQuery,
     tabsSendMessage,
     windowsApi,
@@ -179,21 +180,42 @@ const INTERNAL_ERROR_CODE = -32603;
 const INTERNAL_ERROR_MESSAGE =
     "AutistMask could not complete this request because of an internal error.";
 
-async function getState() {
+// What the page is told when the wallet's own stored profile cannot be read.
-    const result = await storageGet("autistmask");
+//
-    return (
+// This used to be the generic answer above: getActiveAddress() dereferenced
-        result.autistmask || {
+// the stored wallet list on nearly every method, so a corrupt or
-            wallets: [],
+// newer-than-this-build record turned EVERY request from EVERY page into
-            rpcUrl: DEFAULT_RPC_URL,
+// "internal error", which is also what a failed signing attempt answers. The
-            activeAddress: null,
+// page cannot tell those apart, and the user is told nothing about the one
-            allowedSites: {},
+// thing that is actually wrong or where to fix it
-            deniedSites: {},
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/311).
-        }
+//
-    );
+// -32001 rather than -32603: EIP-1474 reserves -32000..-32099 for
+// implementation-defined server errors, this wallet uses no other code in that
+// range except -32002 for a pending approval, and the condition is specific,
+// diagnosable and has a user action attached — none of which -32603 conveys.
+const STATE_UNUSABLE_CODE = -32001;
+const STATE_UNUSABLE_MESSAGE =
+    "AutistMask cannot read its saved data, so nothing was signed or sent." +
+    " Open the AutistMask extension to export or reset it.";
+
+// The EIP-1193 error for a handler that threw, by cause. Everything that
+// consults the profile goes through getState(), so this one mapping covers
+// every method rather than each one having to know about the condition.
+function failureError(err) {
+    if (err instanceof StateUnusableError) {
+        log.errorf("state is unusable:", err.problem);
+        return { code: STATE_UNUSABLE_CODE, message: STATE_UNUSABLE_MESSAGE };
+    }
+    return { code: INTERNAL_ERROR_CODE, message: INTERNAL_ERROR_MESSAGE };
 }
 
-async function getActiveAddress() {
+// The active address of a profile snapshot. Pure, and taking the snapshot as
-    const s = await getState();
+// an argument rather than reading storage itself: a handler that has already
+// read state must not answer "which account is this" from a SECOND, later read
+// — the two can disagree, and the checks that compare them would then be
+// comparing two different moments.
+function activeAddressOf(s) {
     if (s.activeAddress) return s.activeAddress;
     // Fall back to first address
     if (s.wallets.length > 0 && s.wallets[0].addresses.length > 0) {
@@ -202,6 +224,11 @@ async function getActiveAddress() {
     return null;
 }
 
+// For the few call sites that need only the address and hold no snapshot.
+async function getActiveAddress() {
+    return activeAddressOf(await getState());
+}
+
 // Whether a request names a signing address other than the active one. Such a
 // request is refused rather than quietly signed as whichever address happens
 // to be active: the page asked for account A and would otherwise be handed
@@ -210,9 +237,14 @@ function namesAnotherAddress(requested, activeAddress) {
     return !!requested && !sameAddress(requested, activeAddress);
 }
 
+// The endpoint alone, for the one caller that needs nothing else. Anything
+// that also needs the network the endpoint belongs to must take both from ONE
+// snapshot — see handleSendTransaction() — because a chain switch moves them
+// together and a provider built from two different reads can end up pointed at
+// one chain and told it is on another
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/320).
 async function getRpcUrl() {
-    const s = await getState();
+    return (await getState()).rpcUrl;
-    return s.rpcUrl || DEFAULT_RPC_URL;
 }
 
 function extractHostname(origin) {
@@ -553,10 +585,26 @@ runtime.onConnect.addListener((port) => {
     }
 });
 
+// Record a remembered site decision under one address.
+//
+// A read-modify-write against storage, not a load-mutate-save of a shared
+// singleton: the user takes seconds to answer the prompt, and everything else
+// in the worker — a balance refresh in flight, another site's approval — has
+// gone on running the whole time. Loading here used to replace the very
+// objects that work was holding.
+async function rememberSiteChoice(field, address, hostname) {
+    await updateState((s) => {
+        if (!s[field][address]) s[field][address] = [];
+        if (!s[field][address].includes(hostname)) {
+            s[field][address].push(hostname);
+        }
+    });
+}
+
 // Handle connection requests (eth_requestAccounts, wallet_requestPermissions)
 async function handleConnectionRequest(origin) {
     const s = await getState();
-    const activeAddress = await getActiveAddress();
+    const activeAddress = activeAddressOf(s);
     if (!activeAddress) {
         return { error: { message: "No accounts available" } };
     }
@@ -588,29 +636,14 @@ async function handleConnectionRequest(origin) {
 
     if (decision.approved) {
         if (decision.remember) {
-            // Reload state to get latest, add to allowed, persist
+            await rememberSiteChoice("allowedSites", activeAddress, hostname);
-            await loadState();
-            if (!state.allowedSites[activeAddress]) {
-                state.allowedSites[activeAddress] = [];
-            }
-            if (!state.allowedSites[activeAddress].includes(hostname)) {
-                state.allowedSites[activeAddress].push(hostname);
-            }
-            await saveState();
         } else {
             connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress] = true;
         }
         return { result: [activeAddress] };
     } else {
         if (decision.remember) {
-            await loadState();
+            await rememberSiteChoice("deniedSites", activeAddress, hostname);
-            if (!state.deniedSites[activeAddress]) {
-                state.deniedSites[activeAddress] = [];
-            }
-            if (!state.deniedSites[activeAddress].includes(hostname)) {
-                state.deniedSites[activeAddress].push(hostname);
-            }
-            await saveState();
         }
         return {
             error: {
@@ -654,7 +687,7 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
 
     if (method === "eth_accounts") {
         const s = await getState();
-        const activeAddress = await getActiveAddress();
+        const activeAddress = activeAddressOf(s);
         if (!activeAddress) return { result: [] };
         const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
         const allowed = s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [];
@@ -667,22 +700,11 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
         return { result: [] };
     }
 
-    // Both answered from currentNetwork(), which reads the module-level state
+    // Both used to be answered from currentNetwork(), which reads the
-    // singleton, and nothing populates that at module scope. A worker revived
+    // module-level state singleton, and nothing populates that at module
-    // by the page's own message therefore held DEFAULT_STATE and told a page
+    // scope. A worker revived by the page's own message therefore held
-    // it was on mainnet while the user was on Sepolia
+    // DEFAULT_STATE and told a page it was on mainnet while the user was on
-    // (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/317).
+    // Sepolia (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/317).
-    //
-    // Answered from getState() rather than by loading the singleton. Any page
-    // reaches these two — neither is gated on a connection, and the injected
-    // provider sends eth_chainId on every page load — and loadState() replaces
-    // state.wallets wholesale, which would detach the address objects an
-    // in-flight backgroundRefresh() is mutating across its network round trip,
-    // so its saveState() would persist the pre-refresh balances while still
-    // stamping lastBalanceRefresh. getState() is the detached per-call storage
-    // read the other read handlers here already use.
-    // networkById(undefined) falls back to mainnet, matching the default for a
-    // profile with no stored networkId.
     if (method === "eth_chainId" || method === "net_version") {
         const s = await getState();
         const net = networkById(s.networkId);
@@ -699,7 +721,7 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
         // not be able to do it. Ungated, any page could clear the
         // [TESTNET] banner under a user who believed they were on Sepolia.
         const s = await getState();
-        const activeAddress = await getActiveAddress();
+        const activeAddress = activeAddressOf(s);
         const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
         const allowed = s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [];
         if (
@@ -709,24 +731,25 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
             return { error: { code: 4100, message: "Unauthorized" } };
         }
 
-        // onChainSwitch() mutates the module-level state singleton and then
+        // The chain in force is read from the snapshot above, not from the
-        // saves every field of it, and currentNetwork() reads the same
+        // singleton: this worker may have been started by this very message,
-        // singleton. This worker may have been started by this very message:
+        // and the singleton would then be DEFAULT_STATE, so the same-chain
-        // nothing loads state at module scope, so without this the singleton
+        // check compared against mainnet whatever the user was on
-        // is DEFAULT_STATE, the same-chain check compares against the wrong
+        // (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/316).
-        // network, and the save writes empty wallets, empty allowedSites and
-        // the default endpoints over the user's stored profile
-        // (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/316). Same precedent
-        // as the transaction path below.
-        await loadState();
-
         const chainId = params?.[0]?.chainId;
-        if (chainId === currentNetwork().chainId) {
+        if (chainId === networkById(s.networkId).chainId) {
             return { result: null };
         }
         if (SUPPORTED_CHAIN_IDS.has(chainId)) {
             const target = networkByChainId(chainId);
-            await onChainSwitch(target.id);
+            // Read-modify-write against storage. The old path went through
+            // onChainSwitch(), which mutates the singleton and then persists
+            // every field of it — on an unloaded worker that wrote empty
+            // wallets, empty allowedSites and the default endpoints over the
+            // user's stored profile, encrypted secrets included.
+            await updateState((fresh) =>
+                applyChainSwitchFields(fresh, target.id),
+            );
             broadcastChainChanged(target.chainId);
             return { result: null };
         }
@@ -773,7 +796,7 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
 
     if (method === "wallet_getPermissions") {
         const s = await getState();
-        const activeAddress = await getActiveAddress();
+        const activeAddress = activeAddressOf(s);
         const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
         const allowed = s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [];
         const isConnected =
@@ -799,7 +822,7 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
 
     if (method === "personal_sign" || method === "eth_sign") {
         const s = await getState();
-        const activeAddress = await getActiveAddress();
+        const activeAddress = activeAddressOf(s);
         if (!activeAddress)
             return { error: { message: "No accounts available" } };
 
@@ -848,7 +871,7 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
 
     if (method === "eth_signTypedData_v4" || method === "eth_signTypedData") {
         const s = await getState();
-        const activeAddress = await getActiveAddress();
+        const activeAddress = activeAddressOf(s);
         if (!activeAddress)
             return { error: { message: "No accounts available" } };
 
@@ -891,6 +914,11 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
             const result = await proxyRpc(method, params);
             return { result };
         } catch (e) {
+            // A node that answered with an error is reported as itself. The
+            // wallet being unable to read its own profile is not that, and it
+            // must not be flattened into a message with no code: it goes back
+            // to the dispatcher, which has the one answer for it.
+            if (e instanceof StateUnusableError) throw e;
             return { error: { message: e.message } };
         }
     }
@@ -904,7 +932,7 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
 // page has its answer.
 async function handleSendTransaction(params, origin) {
     const s = await getState();
-    const activeAddress = await getActiveAddress();
+    const activeAddress = activeAddressOf(s);
     if (!activeAddress) return { error: { message: "No accounts available" } };
 
     const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
@@ -948,10 +976,19 @@ async function handleSendTransaction(params, origin) {
         // user is shown is a complete one and is the same object the signed
         // artifact is checked against. A failure raises no approval at all and
         // is reported to the requesting page; see approvalTx.js.
+        //
+        // The provider is built from ONE snapshot — the endpoint and the
+        // network name both come from `s`. It used to be
+        // getProvider(await getRpcUrl()) with no network name at all, so
+        // getProvider fell back to the unpopulated singleton's mainnet: the
+        // endpoint was the user's chain and the static hint was 0x1, ethers
+        // fixed chainId at 0x1, and the wallet's own verifySignedTx then
+        // refused every non-mainnet dApp send
+        // (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/320).
         let approvedTx;
         try {
             approvedTx = await prepareApprovalTx(
-                getProvider(await getRpcUrl()),
+                getProvider(s.rpcUrl, s.networkId),
                 activeAddress,
                 txParams,
             );
@@ -1039,7 +1076,7 @@ async function broadcastAccountsChanged() {
     }
     resetPopupUrl();
     const s = await getState();
-    const activeAddress = await getActiveAddress();
+    const activeAddress = activeAddressOf(s);
     const allowed = activeAddress ? s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [] : [];
     let tabs;
     try {
@@ -1079,20 +1116,60 @@ async function broadcastAccountsChanged() {
 const BALANCE_REFRESH_PERIOD_MS = BALANCE_REFRESH_PERIOD_MINUTES * 60 * 1000;
 const RECENT_BALANCE_REFRESH_MS = Math.floor(BALANCE_REFRESH_PERIOD_MS / 2);
 
+// The wallets this refresh works on are its OWN, and nothing else in the
+// worker can reach them.
+//
+// refreshBalances() mutates address objects in place across a multi-second
+// network round trip. It used to be handed the module-level singleton's
+// wallets, which meant any concurrent handler that called loadState() replaced
+// state.wallets underneath it: the refreshed balances landed on detached
+// objects, and the save that followed persisted the PRE-refresh values while
+// still stamping lastBalanceRefresh, suppressing the redo. Every point fix for
+// the singleton added such a loadState(), so the next one would have done it
+// again (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324).
+//
+// So: read a snapshot, refresh a private copy of its wallets, then apply the
+// balances that came back — by address, onto whatever storage holds NOW.
+// Applying by address rather than writing the array back is what keeps a
+// wallet or address added, renamed or deleted during the round trip.
 async function backgroundRefresh() {
-    await loadState();
+    const s = await getState();
     const now = Date.now();
-    if (now - (state.lastBalanceRefresh || 0) < RECENT_BALANCE_REFRESH_MS)
+    if (now - (s.lastBalanceRefresh || 0) < RECENT_BALANCE_REFRESH_MS) return;
-        return;
+    if (s.wallets.length === 0) return;
-    if (state.wallets.length === 0) return;
+
+    const wallets = s.wallets;
     await refreshBalances(
-        state.wallets,
+        wallets,
-        state.rpcUrl,
+        s.rpcUrl,
-        state.blockscoutUrl,
+        s.blockscoutUrl,
-        state.trackedTokens,
+        s.trackedTokens,
+        s.networkId,
     );
-    state.lastBalanceRefresh = now;
+
-    await saveState();
+    const refreshed = new Map();
+    for (const wallet of wallets) {
+        for (const addr of wallet.addresses || []) {
+            refreshed.set(String(addr.address).toLowerCase(), addr);
+        }
+    }
+
+    await updateState((fresh) => {
+        for (const wallet of fresh.wallets) {
+            for (const addr of wallet.addresses || []) {
+                const got = refreshed.get(String(addr.address).toLowerCase());
+                if (!got) continue;
+                // Only fields the refresh actually produced. refreshBalances()
+                // leaves a field untouched when its lookup failed, so an
+                // undefined here means "no answer", not "the answer is empty",
+                // and must not overwrite what is stored.
+                for (const key of ["balance", "ensName", "tokenBalances"]) {
+                    if (got[key] !== undefined) addr[key] = got[key];
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        fresh.lastBalanceRefresh = now;
+    });
 }
 
 // The recurring job runs off an alarm, not a timer. On Chrome MV3 this file is
@@ -1101,7 +1178,14 @@ async function backgroundRefresh() {
 // module-level state does not outlive it. Alarms are held by the browser and
 // wake the worker to deliver them.
 registerAlarmHandlers({
-    [BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM]: backgroundRefresh,
+    // Caught here rather than left to the alarm dispatcher, which does not
+    // await what it calls: a profile this build cannot read makes every
+    // refresh throw, and an unhandled rejection per alarm tick says less than
+    // one logged line per tick does.
+    [BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM]: () =>
+        backgroundRefresh().catch((e) => {
+            log.errorf("background balance refresh failed:", e);
+        }),
 });
 
 // Everything the background context needs re-established on start. This runs
@@ -1200,12 +1284,7 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
                 // "it does not throw today" is not a property anyone is
                 // maintaining.
                 log.errorf("RPC request failed:", msg.method, err);
-                sendResponse({
+                sendResponse({ error: failureError(err) });
-                    error: {
-                        code: INTERNAL_ERROR_CODE,
-                        message: INTERNAL_ERROR_MESSAGE,
-                    },
-                });
             });
         return true;
     }
@@ -1307,16 +1386,29 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
         // so an escape from there must not tell the user it might have.
         let lastResortStage = TX_STAGE_VERIFY;
         (async () => {
-            // The chain this attempt is on, read once. Verification below
+            // The chain this attempt is on, read once — and the endpoint it
-            // refuses an artifact signed for any other chain, and the nonce
+            // will be broadcast to comes from the SAME read.
-            // record is both consulted and written under this one, so a
+            //
-            // network switch part-way through cannot make the check and the
+            // Verification below refuses an artifact signed for any other
-            // record disagree about which chain the nonce was spent on.
+            // chain, and the nonce record is both consulted and written under
+            // this one, so a network switch part-way through cannot make the
+            // check and the record disagree about which chain the nonce was
+            // spent on. The endpoint used to be read separately, several
+            // awaits later (`state.rpcUrl` off the singleton), so a chain
+            // switch committed in that window moved the endpoint out from
+            // under a transaction already verified against the old chain: the
+            // artifact would be sent to the new chain's node, which is
+            // precisely the "signed for a different network" case the
+            // verification exists to prevent.
             let chainId;
+            let rpcUrl;
+            let networkId;
             try {
-                await loadState();
+                const s = await getState();
-                chainId = currentNetwork().chainId;
+                networkId = s.networkId;
-                const activeAddress = await getActiveAddress();
+                chainId = networkById(networkId).chainId;
+                rpcUrl = s.rpcUrl;
+                const activeAddress = activeAddressOf(s);
                 // An address switch between approval and signing refuses. The
                 // approval named one account; signing from whichever account
                 // is active now would send funds from an account this screen
@@ -1388,7 +1480,7 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
             }
 
             try {
-                const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl);
+                const provider = getProvider(rpcUrl, networkId);
                 lastResortStage = TX_STAGE_BROADCAST;
                 const tx = await provider.broadcastTransaction(msg.rawSignedTx);
                 if (nonce !== null) spent.add(nonce);
@@ -1427,18 +1519,10 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
             // the popup nor the page is ever answered. Settle both, through
             // the same chokepoint as every other retirement.
             log.errorf("transaction approval response failed:", e);
-            settleApproval(
+            const failure = failureError(e);
-                msg.id,
+            settleApproval(msg.id, { error: failure }, { holdsClaim: true });
-                {
-                    error: {
-                        code: INTERNAL_ERROR_CODE,
-                        message: INTERNAL_ERROR_MESSAGE,
-                    },
-                },
-                { holdsClaim: true },
-            );
             sendResponse({
-                error: INTERNAL_ERROR_MESSAGE,
+                error: failure.message,
                 retryable: false,
                 stage: lastResortStage,
             });
@@ -1530,18 +1614,10 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
             // Same shape as the transaction path: a throw out of the catch
             // block above would leave the popup and the page both waiting.
             log.errorf("sign approval response failed:", e);
-            settleApproval(
+            const failure = failureError(e);
-                msg.id,
+            settleApproval(msg.id, { error: failure }, { holdsClaim: true });
-                {
-                    error: {
-                        code: INTERNAL_ERROR_CODE,
-                        message: INTERNAL_ERROR_MESSAGE,
-                    },
-                },
-                { holdsClaim: true },
-            );
             sendResponse({
-                error: INTERNAL_ERROR_MESSAGE,
+                error: failure.message,
                 retryable: false,
             });
         });

src/background/state.js

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+// The background's access to the persisted profile.
+//
+// There is no in-memory copy here, and that is the whole design. The MV3
+// service worker is terminated when idle and revived by the next message, so
+// anything held at module scope is either absent or arbitrarily stale, and
+// src/shared/state.js's module-level `state` singleton — which nothing in the
+// worker ever populates — silently served DEFAULT_STATE to whoever read it.
+// Five defects came out of that (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324),
+// and every point fix for one of them added a loadState() that created the
+// next: loading detaches the objects an in-flight handler is holding.
+//
+// So the background reads per call and writes read-modify-write:
+//
+//   getState()        one storage read, normalized, detached. Nothing else
+//                     holds the object it returns, so a handler may keep it
+//                     across any number of awaits and no concurrent work can
+//                     move it.
+//   updateState(fn)   read fresh, apply fn to that fresh record, write it
+//                     back — all inside a queue, so two background writes
+//                     never interleave, and the read is one storage round trip
+//                     ahead of the write rather than a page lifetime ahead of
+//                     it (which is what made the popup's saveState() need a
+//                     per-field merge against a baseline at all).
+//
+// A handler that must both read and write therefore does its network work
+// against a snapshot it owns, and applies the RESULT inside updateState().
+// It never publishes an object other in-flight work is holding.
+
+const { storageGet, storageSet } = require("../shared/browserApi");
+const { normalizePersisted } = require("../shared/persistedState");
+const {
+    STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION,
+    assertStateUsable,
+} = require("../shared/stateSchema");
+
+// A fresh, fully-normalized, detached copy of the persisted profile.
+//
+// Normalized rather than raw: a legacy or malformed record is self-healed the
+// same way loadState() heals it for the popup, so the background is never the
+// one context reasoning about a shape the rest of the extension repairs.
+//
+// Throws StateUnusableError for a record this build cannot make sense of,
+// before normalization gets a chance to paper over it — the same gate, in the
+// same place, as the popup's loadState(). Every handler that consults the
+// profile comes through here, so a dApp call against such a record is answered
+// with the specific error the dispatcher maps that to (src/background/index.js)
+// rather than dereferencing its way into a generic -32603.
+async function getState() {
+    const result = await storageGet("autistmask");
+    assertStateUsable(result.autistmask);
+    return normalizePersisted(result.autistmask);
+}
+
+// Serializes the read-modify-write turns below. Two of them interleaved would
+// each read before the other wrote, and the second write would carry the first
+// one's fields back to their pre-turn values.
+let updateQueue = Promise.resolve();
+
+async function updateStateOnce(mutate) {
+    const s = await getState();
+    await mutate(s);
+    s.hasWallet = Boolean(s.wallets && s.wallets.length > 0);
+    // Stamped on every write, exactly as the popup's saveState() stamps it:
+    // whichever context writes last, the record in storage is in this build's
+    // shape and says so.
+    s.schemaVersion = STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION;
+    await storageSet({ autistmask: s });
+    return s;
+}
+
+// Apply `mutate` to a record read fresh from storage and write the result
+// back. `mutate` receives a detached, normalized profile and mutates it in
+// place; it may be async, but it must not do anything slow — the window
+// between the read and the write is the window in which another context's
+// write is lost, and keeping it to one storage round trip is what makes a
+// whole-record write safe here. Concretely: the write is the WHOLE record, so
+// a popup write that lands inside that window is reverted, in every field, by
+// the record this turn read before it. That is accepted because the window is
+// one round trip long and the popup is not writing while the worker is;
+// widening it is what would make it a real hazard.
+//
+// `mutate` must also not call updateState() itself, directly or through
+// anything it awaits: the queue is strictly serial, so the inner turn waits on
+// the outer one, which is waiting on the inner one. That deadlocks the whole
+// background, not just the caller. Mutate the record you were handed.
+//
+// Resolves with the record that was written.
+function updateState(mutate) {
+    const turn = updateQueue.then(() => updateStateOnce(mutate));
+    // The queue must advance even when a turn rejects, or every update after
+    // it queues behind a promise that never settles.
+    updateQueue = turn.catch(() => {});
+    return turn;
+}
+
+module.exports = { getState, updateState };

src/popup/index.html

@@ -153,12 +153,28 @@
                 <!-- Shared password fields -->
                 <div class="mb-2" id="add-wallet-password-section">
                     <label class="block mb-1">Choose a password</label>
+                    <!-- The hint is swapped in place when the import tab
+                         changes, and it sits directly above the password
+                         fields, so a wording that wraps to a different
+                         number of lines would move them under the pointer.
+                         Two things stop that: the three wordings in
+                         PASSWORD_HINTS are kept within a couple of
+                         characters of each other in length, and this floor
+                         matches what each of them needs. All three measure
+                         48px -- 3 lines at the 16px line height, at the
+                         368px width this box has in the 396px popup body.
+                         Do not raise it: the reserve is unused height on
+                         every tab, and at 6rem it pushed
+                         #btn-add-wallet-confirm to bottom=628px in a 600px
+                         viewport, below the fold. -->
                     <p
-                        class="text-xs text-muted mb-1"
+                        class="text-xs text-muted mb-1 min-h-[3rem]"
                         id="add-wallet-password-hint"
                     >
                         This password encrypts your recovery phrase on this
-                        device. You will need it to send funds.
+                        device. You will need it to send funds. It cannot be
+                        recovered or reset, so keep your recovery phrase written
+                        down: it is the only backup of this wallet.
                     </p>
                     <input
                         type="password"
@@ -1140,6 +1156,71 @@
                 >
                     Confirm Delete
                 </button>
+                <p class="text-xs mt-3">
+                    <span
+                        id="btn-delete-wallet-lost-password"
+                        class="underline decoration-dashed cursor-pointer"
+                        >I have lost my password</span
+                    >
+                </p>
+            </div>
+
+            <!-- ============ DELETE WALLET WITHOUT THE PASSWORD ============ -->
+            <div id="view-delete-wallet-lost-password" class="view hidden">
+                <button
+                    id="btn-delete-wallet-lost-back"
+                    class="border border-border px-2 py-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer mb-2"
+                >
+                    &lt; Back
+                </button>
+                <h2 class="font-bold mb-3">Delete Wallet Without a Password</h2>
+                <p class="text-xs mb-2">
+                    Your password cannot be recovered or reset, so there is no
+                    way to unlock
+                    <strong id="delete-wallet-lost-name"></strong> again. You
+                    can still delete it, and no password is needed to do that.
+                </p>
+                <p class="text-xs mb-2">
+                    Deleting it erases the copy of its key that is stored on
+                    this device. Nothing on the blockchain changes, and the
+                    money at its addresses is not moved or destroyed.
+                </p>
+                <p class="text-xs mb-2">
+                    If you have the recovery phrase for this wallet written
+                    down, add the wallet again afterwards with a new password
+                    and you will have it back.
+                    <strong
+                        >If you do not have it written down, deleting this
+                        wallet means losing everything it holds,
+                        forever.</strong
+                    >
+                </p>
+                <p class="text-xs mb-3">Your other wallets are not touched.</p>
+                <p class="text-xs mb-1">
+                    To confirm, type the name of the wallet (<strong
+                        id="delete-wallet-lost-name-echo"
+                    ></strong
+                    >) below.
+                </p>
+                <div class="mb-2">
+                    <input
+                        type="text"
+                        id="delete-wallet-lost-name-input"
+                        class="border border-border p-1 w-full font-mono text-sm bg-bg text-fg"
+                        placeholder="Type the wallet name"
+                    />
+                </div>
+                <div
+                    id="delete-wallet-lost-flash"
+                    class="text-xs text-red-500 mb-2 min-h-[1.25rem]"
+                    style="visibility: hidden"
+                ></div>
+                <button
+                    id="btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm"
+                    class="border border-border text-red-500 px-2 py-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer"
+                >
+                    Delete This Wallet Forever
+                </button>
             </div>
 
             <!-- ============ DELETE ADDRESS CONFIRM ============ -->
@@ -1680,6 +1761,75 @@
                     </button>
                 </div>
             </div>
+
+            <!-- ============ STATE RECOVERY ============ -->
+            <!--
+                Shown when the stored profile cannot be read at all. Every
+                other screen renders from that profile, so this one is reached
+                without one and is the only way out of a wallet that would
+                otherwise be a blank popup.
+            -->
+            <div id="view-state-recovery" class="view hidden">
+                <h2 class="font-bold mb-2">Saved Data Cannot Be Read</h2>
+                <p class="text-xs mb-2">
+                    AutistMask stopped rather than guessing. Nothing has been
+                    changed or erased, and nothing can be signed or sent until
+                    this is resolved.
+                </p>
+                <div
+                    id="state-recovery-problem"
+                    class="text-xs font-bold mb-3 break-words"
+                ></div>
+                <p class="text-xs mb-2">
+                    Export the saved data first and keep it. It may hold the
+                    encrypted keys for your wallets, and it is the only copy.
+                </p>
+                <button
+                    id="btn-state-recovery-export"
+                    class="border border-border px-2 py-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer"
+                >
+                    Export Saved Data
+                </button>
+                <textarea
+                    id="state-recovery-blob"
+                    readonly
+                    class="hidden border border-border p-1 w-full h-32 font-mono text-xs bg-bg text-fg mt-2"
+                ></textarea>
+                <p class="text-xs mt-3 mb-2">
+                    <strong
+                        >Erasing the saved data deletes every wallet stored in
+                        this browser.</strong
+                    >
+                    Nothing on the blockchain changes and no money is moved, but
+                    without the exported copy above, or the recovery phrase for
+                    each wallet written down, everything they hold is gone
+                    forever.
+                </p>
+                <p class="text-xs mb-1">
+                    To confirm, type
+                    <strong>ERASE MY WALLET</strong>
+                    below.
+                </p>
+                <div class="mb-2">
+                    <input
+                        type="text"
+                        id="state-recovery-reset-input"
+                        class="border border-border p-1 w-full font-mono text-sm bg-bg text-fg"
+                        placeholder="Type ERASE MY WALLET"
+                    />
+                </div>
+                <div
+                    id="state-recovery-flash"
+                    class="text-xs text-red-500 mb-2 min-h-[1.25rem]"
+                    style="visibility: hidden"
+                ></div>
+                <button
+                    id="btn-state-recovery-reset"
+                    class="border border-border text-red-500 px-2 py-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer"
+                >
+                    Erase Saved Data
+                </button>
+            </div>
         </div>
 
         <script src="index.js"></script>

src/popup/index.js

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 // Loads state, initializes views, triggers first render.
 
 const { state, saveState, loadState } = require("../shared/state");
+const { StateUnusableError } = require("../shared/stateSchema");
 const { setRuntimeDebug } = require("../shared/log");
 const { refreshPrices } = require("../shared/prices");
 const { refreshBalances } = require("../shared/balances");
@@ -16,7 +17,7 @@ const {
 const { applyTheme } = require("./theme");
 // Renders a view the popup lands on without having navigated to it forward:
 // on restore here, and on Back. Only the views that can be fully re-rendered
-// from persisted state (RESTORABLE_VIEWS, src/popup/restorableViews.js) go
+// from persisted state (RESTORABLE_VIEWS, src/shared/restorableViews.js) go
 // through it; anything else falls back to the nearest restorable parent.
 const { renderView, makeBackRenderer } = require("./viewRouter");
 
@@ -35,6 +36,7 @@ const settings = require("./views/settings");
 const settingsAddToken = require("./views/settingsAddToken");
 const deleteAddress = require("./views/deleteAddress");
 const approval = require("./views/approval");
+const stateRecovery = require("./views/stateRecovery");
 
 function renderWalletList() {
     home.render(ctx);
@@ -53,6 +55,7 @@ async function doRefreshAndRender() {
                 state.rpcUrl,
                 state.blockscoutUrl,
                 state.trackedTokens,
+                state.networkId,
             ),
         ]);
         state.lastBalanceRefresh = Date.now();
@@ -133,7 +136,22 @@ function fallbackView() {
 }
 
 async function init() {
-    await loadState();
+    try {
+        await loadState();
+    } catch (e) {
+        // A profile this build cannot read is the one failure that must not
+        // fall through to the rest of init(). It used to: the load "succeeded"
+        // on a record nothing had validated, and the first dereference below
+        // threw, leaving a popup with no view, no message and no control on
+        // it, and no way out of the wallet from inside the product
+        // (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/311). Now the load
+        // refuses, and this is the screen that says so.
+        if (e instanceof StateUnusableError) {
+            stateRecovery.show(e);
+            return;
+        }
+        throw e;
+    }
     applyTheme(state.theme);
 
     // Sync runtime debug flag from persisted state before first render

src/popup/viewRouter.js

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
 // dispatch and its data guards can be tested directly; src/popup/index.js
 // cannot be required outside a browser.
 
-const { RESTORABLE_VIEWS } = require("./restorableViews");
+const { RESTORABLE_VIEWS } = require("../shared/restorableViews");
 
 // The views this page load has rendered.
 //

src/popup/views/addToken.js

@@ -49,7 +49,11 @@ function init(ctx) {
         infoEl.style.visibility = "visible";
         log.debugf("Looking up token contract", contractAddr);
         try {
-            const info = await lookupTokenInfo(contractAddr, state.rpcUrl);
+            const info = await lookupTokenInfo(
+                contractAddr,
+                state.rpcUrl,
+                state.networkId,
+            );
             log.infof("Adding token", info.symbol, contractAddr);
             state.trackedTokens.push({
                 address: contractAddr,

src/popup/views/addWallet.js

@@ -42,12 +42,24 @@ let currentMode = "mnemonic";
 
 const MODES = ["mnemonic", "privkey", "xprv"];
 
+// Each hint names what this import mode's own backup is, because a key
+// wallet and an xprv wallet have no recovery phrase to point the user at.
+// All three say the same thing about the password: it is gone for good if
+// it is forgotten. That sentence is the only warning the user gets before
+// the wallet exists, and without it the lost-password route in
+// views/deleteWallet.js is the first they hear of it.
+//
+// Keep the three within a couple of characters of each other in length.
+// The hint sits directly above the password fields and the tabs swap it in
+// place, so a wording that wraps to a different number of lines would move
+// those fields under the pointer; the reserved height on
+// #add-wallet-password-hint is the other half of that guarantee.
 const PASSWORD_HINTS = {
     mnemonic:
-        "This password encrypts your recovery phrase on this device. You will need it to send funds.",
+        "This password encrypts your recovery phrase on this device. You will need it to send funds. It cannot be recovered or reset, so keep your recovery phrase written down: it is the only backup of this wallet.",
     privkey:
-        "This password encrypts your private key on this device. You will need it to send funds.",
+        "This password encrypts your private key on this device. You will need it to send funds. It cannot be recovered or reset, so keep your private key saved somewhere safe: it is the only backup of this wallet.",
-    xprv: "This password encrypts your key on this device. You will need it to send funds.",
+    xprv: "This password encrypts your key on this device. You will need it to send funds. It cannot be recovered or reset, so keep your extended private key saved somewhere safe: it is the only backup of this wallet.",
 };
 
 function switchMode(mode) {
@@ -167,7 +179,7 @@ async function importMnemonic(ctx) {
 
     // Scan for used HD addresses beyond index 0.
     showFlash("Scanning for addresses...", 30000);
-    const scan = await scanForAddresses(xpub, state.rpcUrl);
+    const scan = await scanForAddresses(xpub, state.rpcUrl, state.networkId);
     if (scan.addresses.length > 1) {
         wallet.addresses = scan.addresses.map((a) => ({
             address: a.address,
@@ -286,7 +298,7 @@ async function importXprvKey(ctx) {
 
     // Scan for used HD addresses beyond index 0.
     showFlash("Scanning for addresses...", 30000);
-    const scan = await scanForAddresses(xpub, state.rpcUrl);
+    const scan = await scanForAddresses(xpub, state.rpcUrl, state.networkId);
     if (scan.addresses.length > 1) {
         wallet.addresses = scan.addresses.map((a) => ({
             address: a.address,

src/popup/views/addressDetail.js

@@ -188,6 +188,7 @@ async function loadTransactions(address) {
                 ensNameMap = await resolveEnsNames(
                     counterparties,
                     state.rpcUrl,
+                    state.networkId,
                 );
             } catch {
                 ensNameMap = new Map();

src/popup/views/addressToken.js

@@ -268,6 +268,7 @@ async function loadTransactions(address, tokenId) {
                 ensNameMap = await resolveEnsNames(
                     counterparties,
                     state.rpcUrl,
+                    state.networkId,
                 );
             } catch {
                 ensNameMap = new Map();

src/popup/views/approval.js

@@ -25,6 +25,12 @@ const {
     resolveTokenDecimals,
     unknownDecimalsAmount,
 } = require("../../shared/approvalAmount");
+// Four decimals, with the nonzero floor these screens hold: every amount this
+// view renders — the ERC-20 line, the ETH value, the max fee — and every one
+// it carries forward to the wait/success/error screens goes through it.
+const {
+    truncateAmountNeverZero: formatTxValue,
+} = require("../../shared/amountDisplay");
 const { decryptWithPassword } = require("../../shared/vault");
 const { getSignerForAddress } = require("../../shared/wallet");
 const { walletDefect } = require("../../shared/walletDefects");
@@ -40,13 +46,6 @@ function approvalAddressHtml(address) {
     return renderAddressHtml(address, { title });
 }
 
-function formatTxValue(val) {
-    const parts = val.split(".");
-    if (parts.length === 1) return val + ".0000";
-    const dec = (parts[1] + "0000").slice(0, 4);
-    return parts[0] + "." + dec;
-}
-
 // The amount line for a decoded ERC-20 call. With a known scale it is the
 // token quantity; with `decimals` null it is the base-unit integer with the
 // unknown scale stated, because formatting it with an assumed scale is what
@@ -74,6 +73,14 @@ function tokenLabel(address) {
 function decodeCalldata(data, toAddress) {
     if (!data || data === "0x" || data.length < 10) return null;
 
+    // Where a token's scale is looked for, for every decoder below: the ERC-20
+    // amount line and the swap's Amount and Min. received lines resolve it the
+    // same way, and refuse to format the same way when it is nowhere.
+    const decimalsSources = {
+        trackedTokens: state.trackedTokens,
+        wallets: state.wallets,
+    };
+
     // Try ERC-20 (approve / transfer)
     try {
         const parsed = erc20Iface.parseTransaction({ data });
@@ -85,10 +92,10 @@ function decodeCalldata(data, toAddress) {
             // the wrong number, and for a token with fewer decimals than the
             // guess it is the wrong number in the direction that reads as
             // zero. See tokenAmountText().
-            const tokenDecimals = resolveTokenDecimals(toAddress, {
+            const tokenDecimals = resolveTokenDecimals(
-                trackedTokens: state.trackedTokens,
+                toAddress,
-                wallets: state.wallets,
+                decimalsSources,
-            });
+            );
             const contractLabel = tokenSymbol
                 ? tokenSymbol + " (" + toAddress + ")"
                 : toAddress;
@@ -168,7 +175,7 @@ function decodeCalldata(data, toAddress) {
     }
 
     // Try Uniswap Universal Router
-    const routerResult = uniswap.decode(data, toAddress);
+    const routerResult = uniswap.decode(data, toAddress, decimalsSources);
     if (routerResult) return routerResult;
 
     return null;

src/popup/views/confirmTx.js

@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ function formatFeeEth(wei) {
 
 async function estimateGas(txInfo) {
     try {
-        const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl);
+        const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl, state.networkId);
         const feeData = await provider.getFeeData();
         let gasLimit;
 
@@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ async function estimateGas(txInfo) {
 
 async function checkRecipientHistory(txInfo) {
     try {
-        const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl);
+        const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl, state.networkId);
         const asyncWarnings = await getFullWarnings(txInfo.to, provider, {
             fromAddress: txInfo.from,
         });
@@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ function init(_ctx) {
                 state.selectedAddress,
                 decryptedSecret,
             );
-            const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl);
+            const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl, state.networkId);
             const connectedSigner = signer.connect(provider);
 
             if (pendingTx.token === "ETH") {

src/popup/views/deleteAddress.js

@@ -45,8 +45,8 @@ function setFlash(msg) {
 // wallet.nextIndex is a high-water mark and is deliberately not rewound; and
 // re-importing this wallet's key material is refused as a duplicate by
 // findWalletByXpub() for as long as the wallet is here. What remains is to
-// delete the whole wallet in Settings — which asks for the password and
+// delete the whole wallet in Settings — which destroys the stored secret,
-// destroys the stored secret — and import again, after which
+// with or without the password — and import again, after which
 // scanForAddresses() rediscovers the address only if it has on-chain
 // activity. An address that was never used is not found by that scan, and
 // the copy must not imply otherwise.
@@ -63,8 +63,7 @@ function recoveryPathText(wallet) {
         "importing this " +
         secret +
         " again is refused while this wallet is still here. The way back is " +
-        "to delete the whole wallet in Settings, which asks for your " +
+        "to delete the whole wallet in Settings, which destroys the stored " +
-        "password and destroys the stored " +
         secret +
         ", and then import that " +
         secret +

src/popup/views/deleteWallet.js

@@ -14,8 +14,29 @@ const {
 } = require("../../shared/walletDelete");
 
 let deleteWalletIndex = null;
+let lostPasswordIndex = null;
 let ctx = null;
 
+// The name shown for a wallet, and on the lost-password screen the string
+// the user has to type back. One function so the two cannot disagree: a
+// confirmation that asks for a name other than the one on screen is
+// unusable.
+function displayName(walletIdx) {
+    const wallet = state.wallets[walletIdx];
+    return (wallet && wallet.name) || "Wallet " + (walletIdx + 1);
+}
+
+// What the typed confirmation and the wallet name are compared as. HTML
+// collapses runs of whitespace when it renders the name, so a wallet named
+// "My  Wallet" with two spaces DISPLAYS as "My Wallet": the user cannot
+// see the second space and cannot type a string that matches the stored
+// name. Comparing collapsed on both sides is what keeps the confirmation
+// satisfiable, on the one screen whose whole purpose is unwedging a user
+// who is already stuck. Case and surrounding space go the same way.
+function confirmKey(name) {
+    return name.trim().replace(/\s+/g, " ").toLowerCase();
+}
+
 // Drop the password from the DOM and the wallet selection from the
 // closure. Registered as the view-leave handler as well as run on entry,
 // so the typed password does not sit in the hidden view after the user
@@ -27,19 +48,89 @@ function clear() {
     $("delete-wallet-flash").style.visibility = "hidden";
 }
 
+// The lost-password screen holds no secret — a wallet name is not one —
+// but it is wiped on leave for the neighbouring reason: a typed
+// confirmation left standing in a hidden view is one click away from
+// destroying a wallet the user has since navigated off. The button is
+// re-enabled here too, so a screen left mid-delete is usable on re-entry.
+function clearLostPassword() {
+    lostPasswordIndex = null;
+    $("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "";
+    $("delete-wallet-lost-flash").textContent = "";
+    $("delete-wallet-lost-flash").style.visibility = "hidden";
+    const btn = $("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
+    btn.disabled = false;
+    btn.classList.remove("text-muted");
+}
+
 function show(walletIdx) {
     clear();
     deleteWalletIndex = walletIdx;
-    const wallet = state.wallets[walletIdx];
+    $("delete-wallet-name").textContent = displayName(walletIdx);
-    $("delete-wallet-name").textContent =
-        wallet.name || "Wallet " + (walletIdx + 1);
     showView("delete-wallet-confirm");
 }
 
+// The two delete screens are siblings, not parent and child: nothing is
+// pushed on the way here, and Back goes to show() rather than goBack().
+// Both then have the same Back target — Settings, the screen that pushed
+// delete-wallet-confirm — and re-entering through show() hands the confirm
+// screen its wallet selection back, which a bare goBack() onto a view
+// whose leave hook has already nulled that selection would not.
+function showLostPassword() {
+    const walletIdx = deleteWalletIndex;
+    if (walletIdx === null) {
+        goBack();
+        return;
+    }
+    const name = displayName(walletIdx);
+    clearLostPassword();
+    $("delete-wallet-lost-name").textContent = name;
+    $("delete-wallet-lost-name-echo").textContent = name;
+    // showView() runs the leave hook of delete-wallet-confirm, which nulls
+    // deleteWalletIndex, so this screen's own selection is recorded after
+    // it and not before.
+    showView("delete-wallet-lost-password");
+    lostPasswordIndex = walletIdx;
+}
+
+// Remove the wallet and put the user somewhere sensible. Shared by both
+// routes onto this screen, so the selection repair, the site-permission
+// cleanup and the accountsChanged broadcast cannot drift apart between
+// them.
+async function finishDelete(walletIdx) {
+    const { activeAddressChanged } = removeWalletFromState(state, walletIdx);
+
+    deleteWalletIndex = null;
+    lostPasswordIndex = null;
+
+    if (!state.hasWallet) {
+        clearViewStack();
+        await saveState();
+        // Save before broadcasting: the background reads the active
+        // address back out of storage to build accountsChanged.
+        if (activeAddressChanged) broadcastActiveChanged();
+        showView("welcome");
+        return;
+    }
+
+    await saveState();
+    if (activeAddressChanged) broadcastActiveChanged();
+    // Reset stack to [main] so Settings back goes home.
+    // Use require() lazily to avoid circular dependency
+    // (settings.js requires deleteWallet.js).
+    clearViewStack();
+    state.viewStack.push("main");
+    ctx.renderWalletList();
+    const settings = require("./settings");
+    settings.show();
+    showFlash("Wallet deleted.");
+}
+
 function init(_ctx) {
     ctx = _ctx;
 
     onViewLeave("delete-wallet-confirm", clear);
+    onViewLeave("delete-wallet-lost-password", clearLostPassword);
 
     // No wipe here: goBack() routes through showView(), which runs the
     // leave hook.
@@ -47,6 +138,60 @@ function init(_ctx) {
         goBack();
     });
 
+    // The escape hatch, and deliberately not gated on anything a user who
+    // has lost the password cannot produce. A password in front of
+    // DISCARDING a secret protects nobody: an attacker at the popup who
+    // wants the wallet gone can uninstall the extension, so the only
+    // person such a gate stops is the owner who forgot it — and before
+    // this route existed that owner could neither delete the wallet nor
+    // import its recovery phrase again, because AddWallet refuses the xpub
+    // as a duplicate while the wallet is still stored.
+    $("btn-delete-wallet-lost-password").addEventListener("click", () => {
+        showLostPassword();
+    });
+
+    $("btn-delete-wallet-lost-back").addEventListener("click", () => {
+        const walletIdx = lostPasswordIndex;
+        if (walletIdx === null) {
+            goBack();
+            return;
+        }
+        show(walletIdx);
+    });
+
+    $("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm").addEventListener("click", async () => {
+        if (lostPasswordIndex === null) {
+            $("delete-wallet-lost-flash").textContent =
+                "No wallet selected for deletion.";
+            $("delete-wallet-lost-flash").style.visibility = "visible";
+            return;
+        }
+
+        // Case, surrounding spaces and repeated inner spaces are not part
+        // of the confirmation; see confirmKey(). This asks whether the
+        // user knows which wallet they are on; it is not a secret, and
+        // refusing "wallet 2" for "Wallet 2" would only teach the user to
+        // distrust the control.
+        const typed = $("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value;
+        const expected = displayName(lostPasswordIndex);
+        if (confirmKey(typed) !== confirmKey(expected)) {
+            $("delete-wallet-lost-flash").textContent =
+                "That is not the name of this wallet. Type " +
+                expected +
+                " to confirm.";
+            $("delete-wallet-lost-flash").style.visibility = "visible";
+            return;
+        }
+
+        const btn = $("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
+        btn.disabled = true;
+        btn.classList.add("text-muted");
+
+        // finishDelete() navigates, and the leave hook re-enables the
+        // button and wipes the typed name on the way out.
+        await finishDelete(lostPasswordIndex);
+    });
+
     $("btn-delete-wallet-confirm").addEventListener("click", async () => {
         const pw = $("delete-wallet-password").value;
         if (!pw) {
@@ -82,34 +227,7 @@ function init(_ctx) {
             return;
         }
 
-        // Remove the wallet and repair selection, permissions and hasWallet
+        await finishDelete(walletIdx);
-        const { activeAddressChanged } = removeWalletFromState(
-            state,
-            walletIdx,
-        );
-
-        deleteWalletIndex = null;
-
-        if (!state.hasWallet) {
-            clearViewStack();
-            await saveState();
-            // Save before broadcasting: the background reads the active
-            // address back out of storage to build accountsChanged.
-            if (activeAddressChanged) broadcastActiveChanged();
-            showView("welcome");
-        } else {
-            await saveState();
-            if (activeAddressChanged) broadcastActiveChanged();
-            // Reset stack to [main] so Settings back goes home.
-            // Use require() lazily to avoid circular dependency
-            // (settings.js requires deleteWallet.js).
-            clearViewStack();
-            state.viewStack.push("main");
-            ctx.renderWalletList();
-            const settings = require("./settings");
-            settings.show();
-            showFlash("Wallet deleted.");
-        }
     });
 }
 

src/popup/views/helpers.js

@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ const VIEWS = [
     "add-token",
     "settings",
     "delete-wallet-confirm",
+    "delete-wallet-lost-password",
     "delete-address-confirm",
     "settings-addtoken",
     "transaction",
@@ -44,6 +45,11 @@ const VIEWS = [
     "approve-sign",
     "export-privkey",
     "show-phrase",
+    // Shown by src/popup/views/stateRecovery.js when the stored profile
+    // cannot be read. It is never reached through showView() — by then the
+    // state singleton this file writes on every navigation refuses to be read
+    // — but it is listed so that every view-hiding loop covers it.
+    "state-recovery",
 ];
 
 // Cleanup callbacks for views that hold a secret in the DOM. The view

src/popup/views/send.js

@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ function init(_ctx) {
         let ensName = null;
         if (to.includes(".") && !to.startsWith("0x")) {
             try {
-                const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl);
+                const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl, state.networkId);
                 const resolved = await provider.resolveName(to);
                 if (!resolved) {
                     showFlash("Could not resolve " + to);

src/popup/views/settingsAddToken.js

@@ -133,7 +133,11 @@ function init(_ctx) {
         infoEl.style.visibility = "visible";
         log.debugf("Looking up token contract", addr);
         try {
-            const info = await lookupTokenInfo(addr, state.rpcUrl);
+            const info = await lookupTokenInfo(
+                addr,
+                state.rpcUrl,
+                state.networkId,
+            );
             log.infof("Adding token", info.symbol, addr);
             state.trackedTokens.push({
                 address: addr,

src/popup/views/stateRecovery.js

@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+// The screen the popup shows when it cannot read the stored profile.
+//
+// Everything else in the popup assumes a loaded profile: showView() reads and
+// writes the state singleton, every view renders from it, and the Settings
+// gear leads to a screen that does both. None of that is available here — by
+// the time this runs, loadState() has REFUSED, deliberately, and reading the
+// singleton throws (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/311).
+//
+// So this module talks to the DOM directly and touches no state at all. It is
+// the one screen that must work when nothing else can, which is also why it
+// takes no ctx and needs no init(): whatever the rest of the popup did or did
+// not manage to wire up, this shows.
+//
+// Two controls, and both are required. An export with no reset leaves the user
+// looking at their broken profile with no way to use the wallet again; a reset
+// with no export destroys the only copy of a record that may hold key material
+// a later build could read. So the export is offered first, in the page where
+// it cannot fail, and the reset is behind a typed confirmation.
+
+// $ and VIEWS only: nothing else in helpers is safe here, since showView() and
+// everything under it read the state singleton. $ is taken from there rather
+// than written again locally so that tests/popupElementIds.test.js sees these
+// lookups and holds every id below against the markup.
+const { $, VIEWS } = require("./helpers");
+const { storageGet, storageRemove } = require("../../shared/browserApi");
+const { log } = require("../../shared/log");
+
+// Typed in full before anything is erased, in the same spirit as the wallet
+// name on DeleteWalletLostPassword: this button destroys key material and
+// there is no password in front of it, because there is no profile to check a
+// password against. Compared case-insensitively — the phrase is the barrier,
+// not the shift key.
+const RESET_PHRASE = "ERASE MY WALLET";
+
+let wired = false;
+
+function setFlash(message) {
+    const node = $("state-recovery-flash");
+    node.textContent = message;
+    node.style.visibility = message ? "visible" : "hidden";
+}
+
+// The raw record, as bytes, however malformed. Never normalized and never
+// re-serialized from a parsed copy of itself: this is evidence, and the point
+// of the export is that a later build (or a human) sees exactly what is there.
+async function rawRecord() {
+    const result = await storageGet("autistmask");
+    return result.autistmask;
+}
+
+// Best effort, and never the only route. A download from an extension popup
+// depends on the browser, the popup staying open long enough, and the
+// extension's content security policy; the textarea below depends on none of
+// those, and is filled first.
+function offerDownload(text) {
+    try {
+        if (
+            typeof Blob !== "function" ||
+            typeof URL === "undefined" ||
+            typeof URL.createObjectURL !== "function"
+        ) {
+            return false;
+        }
+        const url = URL.createObjectURL(
+            new Blob([text], { type: "application/json" }),
+        );
+        const link = document.createElement("a");
+        link.href = url;
+        link.download = "autistmask-saved-data.json";
+        link.click();
+        // Revoked in a later task, not in this one: the download is started
+        // from the click and revoking the URL in the same turn can cancel it
+        // before it has been read. If the popup closes first the URL dies with
+        // the document anyway.
+        if (typeof URL.revokeObjectURL === "function") {
+            setTimeout(() => URL.revokeObjectURL(url), 0);
+        }
+        return true;
+    } catch (e) {
+        log.errorf("state recovery: download failed:", e);
+        return false;
+    }
+}
+
+async function exportRecord() {
+    let text;
+    try {
+        const record = await rawRecord();
+        text = JSON.stringify(record === undefined ? null : record, null, 2);
+    } catch (e) {
+        log.errorf("state recovery: export failed:", e);
+        setFlash(
+            "The saved data could not be read out of storage. Nothing has" +
+                " been changed.",
+        );
+        return;
+    }
+    // JSON.stringify answers undefined for a value it cannot represent, and
+    // an empty box would read as "there was nothing there".
+    if (typeof text !== "string") text = String(text);
+
+    const box = $("state-recovery-blob");
+    box.value = text;
+    box.classList.remove("hidden");
+    const downloaded = offerDownload(text);
+    setFlash(
+        downloaded
+            ? "Saved data downloaded, and shown below. Keep a copy before" +
+                  " erasing anything."
+            : "Saved data shown below. Copy it and keep it before erasing" +
+                  " anything.",
+    );
+}
+
+async function resetProfile() {
+    const typed = $("state-recovery-reset-input").value || "";
+    if (typed.trim().toUpperCase() !== RESET_PHRASE) {
+        setFlash("Type " + RESET_PHRASE + " to confirm. Nothing was erased.");
+        return;
+    }
+    try {
+        await storageRemove("autistmask");
+    } catch (e) {
+        log.errorf("state recovery: reset failed:", e);
+        setFlash("The saved data could not be erased. Nothing was changed.");
+        return;
+    }
+    setFlash("Saved data erased. AutistMask is starting fresh.");
+    // Back to a first run, which is what the wallet now is. A popup that
+    // cannot reload says so rather than sitting on a screen describing a
+    // profile that no longer exists.
+    if (
+        typeof window !== "undefined" &&
+        window.location &&
+        typeof window.location.reload === "function"
+    ) {
+        window.location.reload();
+        return;
+    }
+    setFlash("Saved data erased. Close and reopen AutistMask.");
+}
+
+function wire() {
+    if (wired) return;
+    wired = true;
+    $("btn-state-recovery-export").addEventListener("click", exportRecord);
+    $("btn-state-recovery-reset").addEventListener("click", resetProfile);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Show the recovery screen, naming `problem`.
+ *
+ * @param {Error|string} problem the StateUnusableError from the read that
+ *     refused, or its sentence.
+ */
+function show(problem) {
+    const sentence =
+        (problem && (problem.problem || problem.message)) || String(problem);
+
+    // Not showView(): that reads and writes the singleton this screen exists
+    // because nothing could load.
+    for (const view of VIEWS) {
+        const node = document.getElementById("view-" + view);
+        if (node) node.classList.add("hidden");
+    }
+    // The one global control, and it leads to a screen that renders from the
+    // profile. There is nowhere to go from here but out.
+    const gear = $("btn-settings");
+    if (gear) gear.classList.add("hidden");
+
+    $("state-recovery-problem").textContent = sentence;
+    $("state-recovery-blob").value = "";
+    $("state-recovery-blob").classList.add("hidden");
+    $("state-recovery-reset-input").value = "";
+    setFlash("");
+    wire();
+    $("view-state-recovery").classList.remove("hidden");
+    log.errorf("state is unusable, showing the recovery screen:", sentence);
+}
+
+module.exports = { show, RESET_PHRASE };

src/popup/views/txStatus.js

@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ function startWait(txInfo, txHash, broadcastTime, pollNow) {
         renderElapsed();
     }, 1000);
 
-    const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl);
+    const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl, state.networkId);
     let consecutiveFailures = 0;
 
     async function poll() {

src/shared/amountDisplay.js

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+// The 4-decimal amount rule from README.md's Display Consistency section, and
+// the one exception to it, in one place. Three call sites had grown their own
+// copy of the truncation — the history and balance lists
+// (`src/shared/transactions.js`), the approval screen's ERC-20 amount line
+// (`src/popup/views/approval.js`) and its Uniswap swap detail lines
+// (`src/shared/uniswap.js`) — and a fix applied to one of them left the other
+// two showing a different number for the same value.
+//
+// The two functions below are the two policies, not two implementations of
+// one: summary lists truncate, and the screens that state what is being
+// authorized truncate with a floor. Keeping them adjacent is the point, so a
+// change to the rule cannot reach one screen and miss another.
+
+// Truncate to exactly four decimal places. Truncation, never rounding: an
+// amount must never be displayed as larger than it is, so 0.99999 stays
+// 0.9999.
+function truncateAmount(val) {
+    const parts = val.split(".");
+    if (parts.length === 1) return val + ".0000";
+    return parts[0] + "." + (parts[1] + "0000").slice(0, 4);
+}
+
+// The same rule, plus the invariant the approval and confirmation screens
+// hold: a nonzero amount never renders as zero. Truncating to four decimals
+// does exactly that to an amount below 0.0001 — one base unit of an 18-decimal
+// token, 500 of an 8-decimal one — and a real transfer or allowance then reads
+// as "nothing is being moved" on the screen whose whole job is to say what is
+// being authorized.
+//
+// When the truncated string carries no significant digit and the value does,
+// the amount is extended to its first significant digit instead. It stays in
+// token units, the same unit as the symbol printed beside it. A genuine zero
+// still renders 0.0000, and anything at or above the floor is untouched.
+function truncateAmountNeverZero(val) {
+    const truncated = truncateAmount(val);
+    // Tests the whole truncated string, integer part included: 1.00005 has a
+    // significant digit already and stays 1.0000.
+    if (/[1-9]/.test(truncated)) return truncated;
+    const parts = val.split(".");
+    if (parts.length === 1) return truncated;
+    const sig = parts[1].search(/[1-9]/);
+    if (sig === -1) return truncated;
+    return parts[0] + "." + parts[1].slice(0, sig + 1);
+}
+
+module.exports = { truncateAmount, truncateAmountNeverZero };

src/shared/approvalAmount.js

@@ -14,6 +14,10 @@
 // them answers, unknownDecimalsAmount() renders the base-unit integer with the
 // unknown scale stated, and no formatUnits() call is reached at all.
 //
+// The Uniswap decoder's Amount and Min. received lines land on this same
+// screen and use these same two functions, so there is one way of resolving a
+// scale and one way of saying there is none.
+//
 // This is the display counterpart to transferAmount.js, which takes the same
 // stance on the wallet's own send path: an amount whose scale is unknown or
 // disputed is refused rather than guessed at.

src/shared/balances.js

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ const {
     formatUnits,
 } = require("ethers");
 const { ERC20_ABI } = require("./constants");
+const { NETWORKS } = require("./networks");
 const { log, debugFetch } = require("./log");
 const { deriveAddressFromXpub } = require("./wallet");
 const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("./tokenList");
@@ -17,17 +18,38 @@ const { isSpoofedSymbol } = require("./symbolSpoof");
 
 // Use a static network to skip auto-detection (which can fail and cause
 // "could not coalesce error" on some RPC endpoints like Cloudflare).
-// Accepts an optional networkName ("mainnet" or "sepolia") for the static
+//
-// network hint so ethers picks the right chain parameters.  When omitted,
+// `networkId` is REQUIRED, and is one of the ids in networks.js. It used to be
-// reads the currently selected network from extension state.
+// optional, falling back to currentNetwork() — the module-level `state`
-function getProvider(rpcUrl, networkName) {
+// singleton, which the MV3 service worker never populates. The endpoint then
-    // Lazy require to avoid circular dependency issues at module scope.
+// came out right and the static hint came out mainnet, so ethers fixed
-    const { currentNetwork } = require("./state");
+// `chainId` at 0x1 and every non-mainnet dApp send was prepared for the wrong
-    const name = networkName || currentNetwork().id;
+// chain and then refused by the wallet's own verifier
-    const net = Network.from(name);
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/320). Requiring it is what
+// stops that from coming back: a caller that has no network to name has no
+// business constructing a provider, and there is no longer a default for it
+// to get silently wrong.
+//
+// Validated against NETWORKS rather than passed straight to Network.from():
+// ethers knows chains this wallet does not, so an id that is not one of ours
+// is a caller bug and must not resolve to a working provider for some other
+// chain.
+function getProvider(rpcUrl, networkId) {
+    const net = Network.from(requireNetworkId(networkId).id);
     return new JsonRpcProvider(rpcUrl, net, { staticNetwork: net });
 }
 
+function requireNetworkId(networkId) {
+    const net = NETWORKS[networkId];
+    if (!net) {
+        throw new Error(
+            "getProvider requires the id of a supported network; got " +
+                JSON.stringify(networkId),
+        );
+    }
+    return net;
+}
+
 function formatBalance(wei) {
     const eth = formatEther(wei);
     const parts = eth.split(".");
@@ -118,9 +140,15 @@ async function fetchTokenBalances(address, blockscoutUrl, trackedTokens) {
 }
 
 // Fetch ETH balances, ENS names, and ERC-20 token balances for all addresses.
-async function refreshBalances(wallets, rpcUrl, blockscoutUrl, trackedTokens) {
+async function refreshBalances(
+    wallets,
+    rpcUrl,
+    blockscoutUrl,
+    trackedTokens,
+    networkId,
+) {
     log.debugf("refreshBalances start, rpc:", rpcUrl);
-    const provider = getProvider(rpcUrl);
+    const provider = getProvider(rpcUrl, networkId);
     const updates = [];
 
     for (const wallet of wallets) {
@@ -193,9 +221,9 @@ async function refreshBalances(wallets, rpcUrl, blockscoutUrl, trackedTokens) {
 
 // Look up token metadata from its contract.
 // Calls symbol() and decimals() to verify it implements ERC-20.
-async function lookupTokenInfo(contractAddress, rpcUrl) {
+async function lookupTokenInfo(contractAddress, rpcUrl, networkId) {
     log.debugf("lookupTokenInfo", contractAddress, "rpc:", rpcUrl);
-    const provider = getProvider(rpcUrl);
+    const provider = getProvider(rpcUrl, networkId);
     const contract = new Contract(contractAddress, ERC20_ABI, provider);
 
     let name, symbol, decimals;
@@ -235,9 +263,9 @@ async function lookupTokenInfo(contractAddress, rpcUrl) {
 // Checks gapLimit addresses in parallel per batch.  Stops when an entire
 // batch has no used addresses (i.e. gapLimit consecutive empty addresses).
 // Returns { addresses: [{ address, index }], nextIndex }.
-async function scanForAddresses(xpub, rpcUrl, gapLimit = 5) {
+async function scanForAddresses(xpub, rpcUrl, networkId, gapLimit = 5) {
     log.debugf("scanForAddresses start, gapLimit:", gapLimit);
-    const provider = getProvider(rpcUrl);
+    const provider = getProvider(rpcUrl, networkId);
     const used = [];
     let checked = 0;
     let checkUpTo = gapLimit;

src/shared/browserApi.js

@@ -194,6 +194,23 @@ function storageSet(items) {
     return Promise.resolve(storage.set(items));
 }
 
+/**
+ * Erase stored keys. The one caller is the destructive reset on the recovery
+ * screen (src/popup/views/stateRecovery.js), which is the only way out of a
+ * profile no build can read; it rejects rather than defaulting for the same
+ * reason the two above do — a reset that silently did nothing would leave the
+ * user in the dead end they were promised an exit from.
+ *
+ * @param {string|string[]} keys
+ * @returns {Promise<void>}
+ * @throws rejects where `storage.local` is absent.
+ */
+function storageRemove(keys) {
+    const storage = storageLocal();
+    if (!storage) return storageUnavailable("remove");
+    return Promise.resolve(storage.remove(keys));
+}
+
 /**
  * @param {Object} queryInfo
  * @returns {Promise<Array>} the matching tabs.
@@ -251,6 +268,7 @@ module.exports = {
     sendMessage,
     storageGet,
     storageLocal,
+    storageRemove,
     storageSet,
     tabsApi,
     tabsQuery,

src/shared/chainSwitch.js

@@ -1,14 +1,23 @@
-// Consolidated chain-switch handler.
+// Consolidated chain-switch handler for the popup.
 //
 // Every state change required when the active network changes is
-// performed here so that callers (settings UI, background
+// performed here so that callers (settings UI, future chain additions) all go
-// wallet_switchEthereumChain, future chain additions) all go
 // through a single code path.
 //
 // Adding a new chain (e.g. ETC) requires only a new entry in
 // networks.js — no per-caller wiring is needed.
+//
+// The background does NOT come through here: this function mutates the
+// module-level `state` singleton, which the MV3 service worker never
+// populates, and a background switch performed on it wrote DEFAULT_STATE over
+// the user's whole profile
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/316). The field mutations
+// themselves live in chainSwitchFields.js, which takes the record to mutate as
+// an argument; src/background/state.js applies them inside a read-modify-write
+// against storage, and the singleton is not reachable from the background
+// bundle at all (enforced by the ESLint rule in eslint.config.js).
 
-const { networkById } = require("./networks");
+const { applyChainSwitchFields } = require("./chainSwitchFields");
 const { clearPrices } = require("./prices");
 
 // Switch the active chain and reset all chain-specific cached state.
@@ -16,56 +25,14 @@ const { clearPrices } = require("./prices");
 async function onChainSwitch(newNetworkId) {
     const { state, saveState } = require("./state");
 
-    const net = networkById(newNetworkId);
+    const net = applyChainSwitchFields(state, newNetworkId);
-
-    // --- core identity ---
-    // Endpoints are remembered per network rather than reset to the
-    // defaults, because a user who points the wallet at their own node has
-    // no way to get that URL back once it is gone: overwriting it moved
-    // every address and every transaction onto a third-party endpoint
-    // silently and permanently.
-    //
-    // state.rpcUrl / state.blockscoutUrl stay the live endpoints of the
-    // active network, so nothing that reads them changes. The invariant is
-    // that for the ACTIVE network those two fields are authoritative and
-    // the map entry may be stale (Settings writes the fields directly);
-    // for every other network the map is authoritative. Snapshotting the
-    // outgoing network here, before the switch, is what reconciles them.
-    state.networkEndpoints[state.networkId] = {
-        rpcUrl: state.rpcUrl,
-        blockscoutUrl: state.blockscoutUrl,
-    };
-    const remembered = state.networkEndpoints[net.id] || {};
-    state.networkId = net.id;
-    state.rpcUrl = remembered.rpcUrl || net.defaultRpcUrl;
-    state.blockscoutUrl = remembered.blockscoutUrl || net.defaultBlockscoutUrl;
 
     // --- price cache ---
     // Prices are chain-specific (testnet tokens are worthless,
-    // ETC has different pricing, etc.).
+    // ETC has different pricing, etc.). In-memory and per bundle, so this is
+    // the popup's own cache — the only context that ever fills it.
     clearPrices();
 
-    // --- balance / refresh state ---
-    // Reset last-refresh timestamp so the next polling cycle
-    // triggers an immediate balance refresh on the new chain.
-    state.lastBalanceRefresh = 0;
-
-    // Clear per-address balances and token balances so stale data
-    // from the previous chain is never displayed while the first
-    // refresh on the new chain is in flight.
-    for (const wallet of state.wallets) {
-        for (const addr of wallet.addresses) {
-            addr.balance = "0";
-            addr.tokenBalances = [];
-        }
-    }
-
-    // --- chain-specific caches ---
-    // Token holder counts and fraud contract lists are
-    // chain-specific and must not carry over.
-    state.tokenHolderCache = {};
-    state.fraudContracts = [];
-
     await saveState();
 
     return net;

src/shared/chainSwitchFields.js

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+// The field mutations a chain switch performs, applied to a state record
+// handed in rather than to the module-level `state` singleton.
+//
+// Split out of chainSwitch.js so the background can perform a chain switch
+// without the singleton being reachable from its bundle at all. The popup
+// still goes through onChainSwitch() (chainSwitch.js), which applies this to
+// the singleton and saves; the background applies it to the detached record of
+// its own read-modify-write (src/background/state.js).
+//
+// Everything here is synchronous and touches nothing but the object it is
+// given: no storage, no caches, no imports beyond the network table. That is
+// what makes it usable on a record that has been read fresh from storage
+// microseconds earlier and is about to be written back.
+
+const { networkById } = require("./networks");
+
+// Switch `s` to `newNetworkId` and reset every piece of chain-specific state
+// it carries. Returns the network configuration object for the new chain.
+function applyChainSwitchFields(s, newNetworkId) {
+    const net = networkById(newNetworkId);
+
+    // --- core identity ---
+    // Endpoints are remembered per network rather than reset to the
+    // defaults, because a user who points the wallet at their own node has
+    // no way to get that URL back once it is gone: overwriting it moved
+    // every address and every transaction onto a third-party endpoint
+    // silently and permanently.
+    //
+    // s.rpcUrl / s.blockscoutUrl stay the live endpoints of the active
+    // network, so nothing that reads them changes. The invariant is that for
+    // the ACTIVE network those two fields are authoritative and the map entry
+    // may be stale (Settings writes the fields directly); for every other
+    // network the map is authoritative. Snapshotting the outgoing network
+    // here, before the switch, is what reconciles them.
+    if (!s.networkEndpoints) s.networkEndpoints = {};
+    s.networkEndpoints[s.networkId] = {
+        rpcUrl: s.rpcUrl,
+        blockscoutUrl: s.blockscoutUrl,
+    };
+    const remembered = s.networkEndpoints[net.id] || {};
+    s.networkId = net.id;
+    s.rpcUrl = remembered.rpcUrl || net.defaultRpcUrl;
+    s.blockscoutUrl = remembered.blockscoutUrl || net.defaultBlockscoutUrl;
+
+    // --- balance / refresh state ---
+    // Reset last-refresh timestamp so the next polling cycle
+    // triggers an immediate balance refresh on the new chain.
+    s.lastBalanceRefresh = 0;
+
+    // Clear per-address balances and token balances so stale data
+    // from the previous chain is never displayed while the first
+    // refresh on the new chain is in flight.
+    for (const wallet of s.wallets || []) {
+        for (const addr of wallet.addresses || []) {
+            addr.balance = "0";
+            addr.tokenBalances = [];
+        }
+    }
+
+    // --- chain-specific caches ---
+    // Token holder counts and fraud contract lists are
+    // chain-specific and must not carry over.
+    s.tokenHolderCache = {};
+    s.fraudContracts = [];
+
+    return net;
+}
+
+module.exports = { applyChainSwitchFields };

src/shared/ens.js

@@ -32,11 +32,11 @@ function setCache(address, name) {
     localStorage.setItem(key, JSON.stringify({ name, ts: Date.now() }));
 }
 
-async function resolveEnsName(address, rpcUrl) {
+async function resolveEnsName(address, rpcUrl, networkId) {
     const cached = getCached(address);
     if (cached !== undefined) return cached;
 
-    const provider = getProvider(rpcUrl);
+    const provider = getProvider(rpcUrl, networkId);
     try {
         const name = (await provider.lookupAddress(address)) || null;
         setCache(address, name);
@@ -48,11 +48,11 @@ async function resolveEnsName(address, rpcUrl) {
     }
 }
 
-async function resolveEnsNames(addresses, rpcUrl) {
+async function resolveEnsNames(addresses, rpcUrl, networkId) {
     const results = new Map();
     await Promise.all(
         addresses.map(async (addr) => {
-            results.set(addr, await resolveEnsName(addr, rpcUrl));
+            results.set(addr, await resolveEnsName(addr, rpcUrl, networkId));
         }),
     );
     return results;

src/shared/networks.js

@@ -31,8 +31,42 @@ const SUPPORTED_CHAIN_IDS = new Set(
     Object.values(NETWORKS).map((n) => n.chainId),
 );
 
+// Thrown rather than defaulted. An id this build does not know used to answer
+// with MAINNET, so a stored `{networkId:"base"}` rendered the selector as
+// Ethereum Mainnet with no banner and answered eth_chainId 0x1, while rpcUrl
+// still pointed at Base — the wallet telling the user and the page one chain
+// while transacting on another. Nothing in this codebase has an unknown id to
+// offer: stored state is validated against this table before it is loaded
+// (src/shared/stateSchema.js), and every other caller passes an id it took
+// from here. So an unknown id is a defect, and it says so, the same way
+// getProvider() (src/shared/balances.js) already refuses one.
+class UnknownNetworkError extends Error {
+    constructor(id) {
+        super(
+            "AutistMask does not know the network " +
+                JSON.stringify(id) +
+                "; it supports " +
+                Object.keys(NETWORKS).join(", "),
+        );
+        this.name = "UnknownNetworkError";
+        this.networkId = id;
+    }
+}
+
+// Own properties only: NETWORKS inherits from Object.prototype, so
+// NETWORKS["constructor"] and NETWORKS["__proto__"] both answer with something
+// truthy that is not a network. A stored id is untrusted input, and this is
+// the test the validator uses to decide whether it may be adopted at all.
+function isKnownNetworkId(id) {
+    return (
+        typeof id === "string" &&
+        Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(NETWORKS, id)
+    );
+}
+
 function networkById(id) {
-    return NETWORKS[id] || NETWORKS.mainnet;
+    if (!isKnownNetworkId(id)) throw new UnknownNetworkError(id);
+    return NETWORKS[id];
 }
 
 function networkByChainId(chainId) {
@@ -51,6 +85,8 @@ function explorerLink(network, type, value) {
 module.exports = {
     NETWORKS,
     SUPPORTED_CHAIN_IDS,
+    UnknownNetworkError,
+    isKnownNetworkId,
     networkById,
     networkByChainId,
     explorerLink,

src/shared/persistedState.js

@@ -0,0 +1,239 @@
+// The shape of the persisted profile, and the normalization every read of it
+// goes through. No singleton, no storage access, no browser API: just the
+// record definition and pure functions over it.
+//
+// Split out of state.js so that a context which must never touch the
+// module-level `state` singleton can still speak the same record format.
+// src/background/state.js is that context — the MV3 service worker never
+// populates the singleton, and every defect in
+// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324 came from background code
+// reaching it anyway and being served DEFAULT_STATE.
+
+const { DEFAULT_RPC_URL, DEFAULT_BLOCKSCOUT_URL } = require("./constants");
+const { isKnownNetworkId } = require("./networks");
+const { STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION } = require("./stateSchema");
+// Dependency-free constant module. It lives under src/shared/ rather than
+// src/popup/ precisely because this module is in the background bundle: a
+// popup-path module reached from the worker is the shape the prohibition in
+// script/lib/forbiddenBundleInputs.js exists to keep out, even when the
+// particular module is harmless.
+const { RESTORABLE_VIEWS } = require("./restorableViews");
+
+const DEFAULT_STATE = {
+    hasWallet: false,
+    wallets: [],
+    trackedTokens: [],
+    networkId: "mainnet",
+    rpcUrl: DEFAULT_RPC_URL,
+    blockscoutUrl: DEFAULT_BLOCKSCOUT_URL,
+    // Endpoints remembered per network: { [networkId]: { rpcUrl,
+    // blockscoutUrl } }. rpcUrl/blockscoutUrl above are the live endpoints
+    // of the active network; this is what the others are restored from
+    // when the active network changes. See applyChainSwitchFields().
+    networkEndpoints: {},
+    lastBalanceRefresh: 0,
+    activeAddress: null,
+    allowedSites: {},
+    deniedSites: {},
+    rememberSiteChoice: true,
+    showZeroBalanceTokens: true,
+    hideSpoofedSymbols: true,
+    hideLowHolderTokens: true,
+    hideFraudContracts: true,
+    hideDustTransactions: true,
+    dustThresholdGwei: 100000,
+    utcTimestamps: false,
+    fraudContracts: [],
+    tokenHolderCache: {},
+    theme: "system",
+    debugMode: false,
+};
+
+// Every field written to and read from the single "autistmask" storage key.
+// hasWallet is deliberately excluded from the diffing/merge logic in
+// state.js — like loadState() does, it is always derived from `wallets`,
+// never carried as an independent value. schemaVersion is excluded for the
+// same reason and is absent from DEFAULT_STATE for it: it describes the
+// record rather than being part of it, and every write stamps the current
+// value rather than diffing whatever was read.
+const PERSISTED_FIELDS = Object.keys(DEFAULT_STATE)
+    .filter((key) => key !== "hasWallet")
+    .concat([
+        "currentView",
+        "selectedWallet",
+        "selectedAddress",
+        "selectedToken",
+        "viewData",
+        "viewStack",
+    ]);
+
+// Keep only the leading run of stored views the popup is willing to render.
+//
+// restoreView() refuses to reopen ONTO a non-restorable view, but the stack
+// behind it used to be restored verbatim, so Back could walk onto a screen
+// whose content is deliberately never re-rendered — and "show-phrase" has no
+// Back control to leave by. Truncating at the first such entry instead of
+// splicing it out keeps the result a prefix of the stored stack, so every
+// surviving entry's Back target is exactly the one it had; splicing would
+// silently re-point the entry above the hole at a different screen.
+//
+// Filtering happens here on load rather than in saveState(): the live
+// in-session stack is legitimate (the screen really is rendered while the
+// popup is open), and only a load-side filter also repairs the stacks
+// already in storage, including ones written before a view left the set.
+function restorableStack(stored, currentView) {
+    // A stored stack that is missing or not an array keeps nothing, but it
+    // still goes through the never-empty rule below rather than returning
+    // early: otherwise a corrupt stack would depend on exactly the goBack()
+    // fallback that the explicit ["main"] exists in order not to depend on.
+    const source = Array.isArray(stored) ? stored : [];
+    const cut = source.findIndex((view) => !RESTORABLE_VIEWS.has(view));
+    const kept = cut === -1 ? source.slice() : source.slice(0, cut);
+    // A view restored below the root still needs somewhere for Back to go.
+    if (
+        kept.length === 0 &&
+        currentView !== "main" &&
+        RESTORABLE_VIEWS.has(currentView)
+    ) {
+        return ["main"];
+    }
+    return kept;
+}
+
+// Turn a raw stored (or missing) record into the full, defaulted shape
+// loadState() used to assign directly onto `state`. A pure function so that
+// saveState() can apply it too: the fields THIS page did not change still have
+// to come from storage in their loaded-and-normalized form, not as the raw
+// bytes another page (or an old release) left there — otherwise a legacy shape
+// a load has always self-healed in memory (a missing networkEndpoints map, an
+// out-of-range flag) is dropped right back into storage unfixed every time the
+// page that DID normalize it saves something unrelated, because that field's
+// value never "changed" for that page to notice.
+//
+// The result never shares structure with `saved`, so a caller may mutate it
+// freely: it is the detached record every per-call read in the background is
+// built on.
+function normalizePersisted(saved) {
+    saved = saved || {};
+    const out = {};
+    // Every write goes out at the current version. That IS the migration for
+    // the unversioned records every install in the field holds: version 1 is
+    // the shape that shipped unversioned, so a record that validated is
+    // carried forward simply by being stamped. A record this build does NOT
+    // understand never reaches here — assertStateUsable() refuses it on the
+    // read path first (src/shared/stateSchema.js).
+    out.schemaVersion = STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION;
+    out.wallets = structuredClone(saved.wallets || []);
+    // Derived, never trusted verbatim off storage — see loadState().
+    out.hasWallet = out.wallets.length > 0;
+    out.trackedTokens = structuredClone(saved.trackedTokens || []);
+    // The loud refusal for an unknown id is assertStateUsable(); this is the
+    // floor under it. networkId is an object KEY into networkEndpoints below,
+    // so a value that is not a network in networks.js must never get that far
+    // — "__proto__" would set the map's prototype instead of an own key, and
+    // the user's endpoint would silently not be recorded.
+    out.networkId = isKnownNetworkId(saved.networkId)
+        ? saved.networkId
+        : DEFAULT_STATE.networkId;
+    out.rpcUrl = saved.rpcUrl || DEFAULT_STATE.rpcUrl;
+    out.blockscoutUrl = saved.blockscoutUrl || DEFAULT_STATE.blockscoutUrl;
+    // An actual object is required, not merely a truthy non-array: the code
+    // below and applyChainSwitchFields() index and ASSIGN INTO this value, and
+    // assigning a property to a string or a number is a silent no-op in
+    // sloppy mode. Copied rather than referenced, nested pairs included, so
+    // normalizing never mutates the object a caller handed in.
+    const rawEndpoints =
+        typeof saved.networkEndpoints === "object" &&
+        saved.networkEndpoints !== null &&
+        !Array.isArray(saved.networkEndpoints)
+            ? saved.networkEndpoints
+            : {};
+    out.networkEndpoints = {};
+    for (const netId of Object.keys(rawEndpoints)) {
+        // defineProperty, not assignment: a stored map with an own
+        // "__proto__" key — which JSON can carry and assignment treats as the
+        // prototype setter — would otherwise replace this object's prototype
+        // and record no entry at all. Keys other than the known network ids
+        // are kept rather than dropped, so a profile that has been on a build
+        // with more networks does not lose their endpoints by passing through
+        // this one.
+        Object.defineProperty(out.networkEndpoints, netId, {
+            value: { ...rawEndpoints[netId] },
+            writable: true,
+            enumerable: true,
+            configurable: true,
+        });
+    }
+    // A profile written before this map existed carries exactly one pair of
+    // endpoints, belonging to whatever network it was last on. Adopt it as
+    // that network's remembered pair, so a custom endpoint set on the old
+    // build is not lost by the first switch away and back.
+    if (!out.networkEndpoints[out.networkId]) {
+        out.networkEndpoints[out.networkId] = {
+            rpcUrl: out.rpcUrl,
+            blockscoutUrl: out.blockscoutUrl,
+        };
+    }
+    out.lastBalanceRefresh = saved.lastBalanceRefresh || 0;
+    out.activeAddress = saved.activeAddress || null;
+    out.allowedSites =
+        saved.allowedSites && !Array.isArray(saved.allowedSites)
+            ? structuredClone(saved.allowedSites)
+            : {};
+    out.deniedSites =
+        saved.deniedSites && !Array.isArray(saved.deniedSites)
+            ? structuredClone(saved.deniedSites)
+            : {};
+    out.rememberSiteChoice =
+        saved.rememberSiteChoice !== undefined
+            ? saved.rememberSiteChoice
+            : true;
+    out.showZeroBalanceTokens =
+        saved.showZeroBalanceTokens !== undefined
+            ? saved.showZeroBalanceTokens
+            : true;
+    // A profile written before this setting existed has no key for it. It
+    // is a safety filter, so absent must load as on, not as undefined.
+    out.hideSpoofedSymbols =
+        saved.hideSpoofedSymbols !== undefined
+            ? saved.hideSpoofedSymbols
+            : true;
+    out.hideLowHolderTokens =
+        saved.hideLowHolderTokens !== undefined
+            ? saved.hideLowHolderTokens
+            : true;
+    out.hideFraudContracts =
+        saved.hideFraudContracts !== undefined
+            ? saved.hideFraudContracts
+            : true;
+    out.hideDustTransactions =
+        saved.hideDustTransactions !== undefined
+            ? saved.hideDustTransactions
+            : true;
+    out.dustThresholdGwei =
+        saved.dustThresholdGwei !== undefined
+            ? saved.dustThresholdGwei
+            : 100000;
+    out.utcTimestamps =
+        saved.utcTimestamps !== undefined ? saved.utcTimestamps : false;
+    out.fraudContracts = structuredClone(saved.fraudContracts || []);
+    out.tokenHolderCache = structuredClone(saved.tokenHolderCache || {});
+    out.theme = saved.theme || "system";
+    out.debugMode = saved.debugMode !== undefined ? saved.debugMode : false;
+    out.currentView = saved.currentView || null;
+    out.selectedWallet =
+        saved.selectedWallet !== undefined ? saved.selectedWallet : null;
+    out.selectedAddress =
+        saved.selectedAddress !== undefined ? saved.selectedAddress : null;
+    out.selectedToken = saved.selectedToken || null;
+    out.viewData = structuredClone(saved.viewData || {});
+    out.viewStack = restorableStack(saved.viewStack, out.currentView);
+    return out;
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+    DEFAULT_STATE,
+    PERSISTED_FIELDS,
+    normalizePersisted,
+    restorableStack,
+};

src/shared/restorableViews.js

@@ -10,9 +10,20 @@
 // prompt in front of it, on a popup the user may have reopened by accident.
 // That is why "export-privkey" and "show-phrase" are absent.
 //
+// Nor may a view whose button destroys a wallet be listed, for the mirror
+// reason: a popup reopened by accident must not land on the screen that
+// erases key material. That is why "delete-wallet-confirm" and
+// "delete-wallet-lost-password" are absent.
+//
 // Kept in its own module, with no dependencies, so tests can assert the
 // exclusion directly rather than trusting a reading of the popup entry
-// point, which cannot be required outside a browser.
+// point.
+//
+// It sits under src/shared/ rather than src/popup/ because
+// src/shared/persistedState.js needs it and that module is in the BACKGROUND
+// bundle: a popup-path module reached from the worker is the shape
+// script/lib/forbiddenBundleInputs.js exists to keep out, whether or not the
+// particular module is harmless.
 const RESTORABLE_VIEWS = new Set([
     "main",
     "address",

src/shared/state.js

@@ -1,45 +1,48 @@
 // State management and extension storage persistence.
+//
+// The `state` export is a module-level singleton: ONE in-memory copy of the
+// profile per bundle, loaded once by loadState() and mutated in place from
+// then on. That is the popup's model — one page, one load at boot, one
+// lifetime.
+//
+// It is NOT the background's model, and the background must not reach it. The
+// MV3 service worker is torn down when idle and revived by the next message,
+// nothing loads state at module scope, and an unpopulated read used to hand
+// back DEFAULT_STATE with no complaint — five defects came out of that one
+// fact (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324). Two things close it:
+// this module is unreachable from the background bundle, and reading a
+// persisted field of the singleton before a load now THROWS instead of quietly
+// serving a default.
+//
+// The unreachability is enforced by the BUILD. build.js fails when esbuild's
+// own metafile reports this module as an input of a background bundle — the
+// resolution the shipped file was built from, so no specifier syntax gets past
+// it — from the table in script/lib/forbiddenBundleInputs.js, which also
+// records what that does and does not cover. The ESLint rule that reports the
+// same thing in the editor is fast feedback in front of the build, not the
+// guarantee.
 
-const { DEFAULT_RPC_URL, DEFAULT_BLOCKSCOUT_URL } = require("./constants");
 const { networkById } = require("./networks");
-// Dependency-free constant module; safe to pull into a background bundle.
+const {
-const { RESTORABLE_VIEWS } = require("../popup/restorableViews");
+    DEFAULT_STATE,
+    PERSISTED_FIELDS,
+    normalizePersisted,
+} = require("./persistedState");
+
+const {
+    STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION,
+    assertStateUsable,
+    migrationNeeded,
+} = require("./stateSchema");
 
 const { storageGet, storageSet } = require("./browserApi");
+const { log } = require("./log");
 
-const DEFAULT_STATE = {
+// The live record the proxy below guards. Everything inside this module reads
-    hasWallet: false,
+// and writes THIS object, never the proxy: the guard is for callers.
-    wallets: [],
+const rawState = {
-    trackedTokens: [],
-    networkId: "mainnet",
-    rpcUrl: DEFAULT_RPC_URL,
-    blockscoutUrl: DEFAULT_BLOCKSCOUT_URL,
-    // Endpoints remembered per network: { [networkId]: { rpcUrl,
-    // blockscoutUrl } }. rpcUrl/blockscoutUrl above are the live endpoints
-    // of the active network; this is what the others are restored from
-    // when the active network changes. See onChainSwitch().
-    networkEndpoints: {},
-    lastBalanceRefresh: 0,
-    activeAddress: null,
-    allowedSites: {},
-    deniedSites: {},
-    rememberSiteChoice: true,
-    showZeroBalanceTokens: true,
-    hideSpoofedSymbols: true,
-    hideLowHolderTokens: true,
-    hideFraudContracts: true,
-    hideDustTransactions: true,
-    dustThresholdGwei: 100000,
-    utcTimestamps: false,
-    fraudContracts: [],
-    tokenHolderCache: {},
-    theme: "system",
-    debugMode: false,
-};
-
-const state = {
     ...DEFAULT_STATE,
-    // Its own object, not the one DEFAULT_STATE holds: onChainSwitch()
+    // Its own object, not the one DEFAULT_STATE holds: applyChainSwitchFields()
     // mutates this map in place, and a spread copies the reference.
     networkEndpoints: {},
     currentView: null,
@@ -50,175 +53,517 @@ const state = {
     viewStack: [],
 };
 
-// Keep only the leading run of stored views the popup is willing to render.
+// False until loadState() has completed in this bundle. Until then, a
+// persisted field that has not been assigned in this context cannot be READ:
+// see StateNotLoadedError.
+let loaded = false;
+
+// True once this context has assigned anything into the singleton.
 //
-// restoreView() refuses to reopen ONTO a non-restorable view, but the stack
+// What the guard is for is a context that READS a profile nobody put there —
-// behind it used to be restored verbatim, so Back could walk onto a screen
+// every one of the five defects was a pure read of an untouched singleton,
-// whose content is deliberately never re-rendered — and "show-phrase" has no
+// answered out of DEFAULT_STATE. A context that has written into it is
-// Back control to leave by. Truncating at the first such entry instead of
+// managing it deliberately (the popup does, via loadState() at boot and by
-// splicing it out keeps the result a prefix of the stored stack, so every
+// hand thereafter), and reading back what you yourself put there is not the
-// surviving entry's Back target is exactly the one it had; splicing would
+// mistake being caught.
-// silently re-point the entry above the hole at a different screen.
 //
-// Filtering happens here on load rather than in saveState(): the live
+// The cost of that is honest and worth naming: a context that writes one field
-// in-session stack is legitimate (the screen really is rendered while the
+// and then reads a different, untouched one is still served that field's
-// popup is open), and only a load-side filter also repairs the stacks
+// default. Nothing closes that here — what closes it for the background is
-// already in storage, including ones written before a view left the set.
+// that the background cannot reach this module at all, which build.js asserts
-function restorableStack(stored, currentView) {
+// against esbuild's metafile on every build (FORBIDDEN_INPUTS in
-    // A stored stack that is missing or not an array keeps nothing, but it
+// script/lib/forbiddenBundleInputs.js, pinned by
-    // still goes through the never-empty rule below rather than returning
+// tests/buildForbiddenInputs.test.js).
-    // early: otherwise a corrupt stack would depend on exactly the goBack()
+let adopted = false;
-    // fallback that the explicit ["main"] exists in order not to depend on.
+
-    const source = Array.isArray(stored) ? stored : [];
+// Every field whose pre-load value would be a plausible-looking default rather
-    const cut = source.findIndex((view) => !RESTORABLE_VIEWS.has(view));
+// than the user's data. The view scratch fields are guarded too: currentView
-    const kept = cut === -1 ? source.slice() : source.slice(0, cut);
+// and viewStack are persisted, and a save that carried their pre-load values
-    // A view restored below the root still needs somewhere for Back to go.
+// would overwrite a real stored stack with an empty one.
-    if (
+const GUARDED_FIELDS = new Set(PERSISTED_FIELDS.concat(["hasWallet"]));
-        kept.length === 0 &&
+
-        currentView !== "main" &&
+class StateNotLoadedError extends Error {
-        RESTORABLE_VIEWS.has(currentView)
+    constructor(field) {
-    ) {
+        super(
-        return ["main"];
+            "state." +
+                field +
+                " was read before loadState(); this context has no profile" +
+                " loaded and must not be served DEFAULT_STATE",
+        );
+        this.name = "StateNotLoadedError";
     }
-    return kept;
 }
 
+// Loud, not defaulted. The whole defect class this guard closes looks exactly
+// like working code at the call site: the read succeeds, the value is
+// well-formed, and it describes a wallet that is not the user's.
+const state = new Proxy(rawState, {
+    get(target, prop, receiver) {
+        if (
+            !loaded &&
+            !adopted &&
+            typeof prop === "string" &&
+            GUARDED_FIELDS.has(prop)
+        ) {
+            throw new StateNotLoadedError(prop);
+        }
+        return Reflect.get(target, prop, receiver);
+    },
+    set(target, prop, value, receiver) {
+        if (typeof prop === "string" && GUARDED_FIELDS.has(prop)) {
+            adopted = true;
+        }
+        return Reflect.set(target, prop, value, receiver);
+    },
+});
+
 // Return the network configuration for the currently selected network.
 function currentNetwork() {
     return networkById(state.networkId);
 }
 
-async function saveState() {
+// The persisted fields as they stood at the end of this page's last
-    const persisted = {
+// loadState() or saveState(). saveState() diffs the live state against this
-        hasWallet: state.hasWallet,
+// to find only the fields THIS page actually changed.
-        wallets: state.wallets,
+//
-        trackedTokens: state.trackedTokens,
+// Deep-cloned, not a reference: callers mutate persisted objects and arrays
-        networkId: state.networkId,
+// in place (state.wallets.push(...)), and a reference baseline would mutate
-        rpcUrl: state.rpcUrl,
+// right along with `state`, so the diff would always come out empty.
-        blockscoutUrl: state.blockscoutUrl,
+let baseline = null;
-        networkEndpoints: state.networkEndpoints,
+
-        lastBalanceRefresh: state.lastBalanceRefresh,
+function snapshotPersisted() {
-        activeAddress: state.activeAddress,
+    const out = {};
-        allowedSites: state.allowedSites,
+    for (const key of PERSISTED_FIELDS) out[key] = rawState[key];
-        deniedSites: state.deniedSites,
+    return out;
-        rememberSiteChoice: state.rememberSiteChoice,
-        showZeroBalanceTokens: state.showZeroBalanceTokens,
-        hideSpoofedSymbols: state.hideSpoofedSymbols,
-        hideLowHolderTokens: state.hideLowHolderTokens,
-        hideFraudContracts: state.hideFraudContracts,
-        hideDustTransactions: state.hideDustTransactions,
-        dustThresholdGwei: state.dustThresholdGwei,
-        utcTimestamps: state.utcTimestamps,
-        fraudContracts: state.fraudContracts,
-        tokenHolderCache: state.tokenHolderCache,
-        theme: state.theme,
-        debugMode: state.debugMode,
-        currentView: state.currentView,
-        selectedWallet: state.selectedWallet,
-        selectedAddress: state.selectedAddress,
-        selectedToken: state.selectedToken,
-        viewData: state.viewData,
-        viewStack: state.viewStack,
-    };
-    await storageSet({ autistmask: persisted });
 }
 
+function deepEqual(a, b) {
+    if (a === b) return true;
+    if (typeof a !== "object" || typeof b !== "object") return false;
+    if (a === null || b === null) return false;
+    if (Array.isArray(a) !== Array.isArray(b)) return false;
+    const aKeys = Object.keys(a);
+    const bKeys = Object.keys(b);
+    if (aKeys.length !== bKeys.length) return false;
+    for (const key of aKeys) {
+        if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(b, key)) return false;
+        if (!deepEqual(a[key], b[key])) return false;
+    }
+    return true;
+}
+
+// Stable identity for a wallet, independent of its position in the array
+// (which shifts under a concurrent add/delete elsewhere) and independent of
+// its mutable fields (name is user-editable; addresses gains/loses entries
+// via scanning and deleteAddress.js). An "hd"/"xprv" wallet's xpub never
+// changes for its lifetime and is already enforced unique
+// (findWalletByXpub() in addWallet.js). A "key" wallet has no xpub, exactly
+// one address for its whole lifetime (nothing ever adds to or removes from
+// a key wallet's address list), and that address is already enforced
+// unique (findWalletByAddress()) — so it stands in for identity there.
+// Neither invariant is enforced by this function or by
+// mergeListByIdentity() below — they hold only because every wallet-
+// creation path in addWallet.js happens to populate one or the other before
+// the wallet ever reaches state.wallets, and because canRemoveAddress() in
+// walletDelete.js never lets a wallet's address list go to zero. A wallet
+// with neither (an empty/legacy/corrupt record) falls back to the same
+// "addr:" identity as every other such record, which is a genuine
+// collision, not a proxy for one — see the collision handling in
+// mergeListByIdentity().
+function walletIdentity(wallet) {
+    if (wallet.xpub) return "xpub:" + wallet.xpub;
+    const first = wallet.addresses && wallet.addresses[0];
+    return "addr:" + (first ? String(first.address).toLowerCase() : "");
+}
+
+// Stable identity for an address within one wallet's address list. An
+// address is unique within its wallet and, once derived or imported, never
+// changes — only whether it is present.
+function addressIdentity(addr) {
+    return String(addr.address).toLowerCase();
+}
+
+// Merge one array of identity-bearing objects (wallets, or the addresses
+// inside one wallet) by identity rather than by array index — an index
+// shifts under a concurrent insert/delete elsewhere, which would merge the
+// wrong pair of objects entirely.
+//
+// `theirs` (fresh storage) sets the membership baseline and the order:
+//   - An item this page never had baseline knowledge of, but that is in
+//     `theirs`, was added by someone else — kept as-is.
+//   - An item `base` had and `ours` no longer has was deleted by THIS page
+//     — dropped even though `theirs` still has it (this page's own delete
+//     must win over a background save that only touched leaf fields).
+//   - An item present in both `ours` and `theirs` is merged leaf-by-leaf via
+//     `mergeItem`, so a leaf this page changed (e.g. a renamed wallet) lands
+//     on top of `theirs`' otherwise-current copy (e.g. a refreshed balance).
+// Anything left in `ours` that `base` never had and `theirs` does not have
+// yet is this page's own new addition — appended.
+//
+// `identityOf` is not guaranteed collision-free (walletIdentity() falls
+// back to one shared "addr:" value for any wallet with neither an xpub nor
+// a populated first address). Two records that collide under it must never
+// silently collapse into one — that is exactly how this function used to
+// drop a wallet, encryptedSecret included, with no error and no log. Two
+// defenses:
+//   - `ours` is indexed into GROUPS, not a single item per identity, so two
+//     colliding live items on this page can't overwrite each other in the
+//     index before the merge below even runs.
+//   - A matched pair with no shared `base` entry (neither page ever agreed
+//     on this identity) is only merged leaf-by-leaf when the two sides are
+//     already equal. If they differ, that is not "the same record edited
+//     twice", it is two different records that happen to share an identity
+//     — both are kept, unmerged, rather than guessing which one is real.
+function mergeListByIdentity(base, ours, theirs, identityOf, mergeItem) {
+    base = base || [];
+    ours = ours || [];
+    theirs = theirs || [];
+    const baseIndex = new Map(base.map((item) => [identityOf(item), item]));
+    const oursIndex = new Map();
+    for (const item of ours) {
+        const id = identityOf(item);
+        if (!oursIndex.has(id)) oursIndex.set(id, []);
+        oursIndex.get(id).push(item);
+    }
+
+    const result = [];
+    const seen = new Set();
+
+    for (const theirItem of theirs) {
+        const id = identityOf(theirItem);
+        seen.add(id);
+        const oursGroup = oursIndex.get(id);
+        if (baseIndex.has(id) && !oursGroup) continue;
+        if (oursGroup) {
+            const baseItem = baseIndex.get(id);
+            if (!baseItem && !deepEqual(oursGroup[0], theirItem)) {
+                log.errorf(
+                    "state: identity collision merging",
+                    JSON.stringify(id),
+                    "- keeping both records instead of dropping one",
+                );
+                result.push(theirItem, ...oursGroup);
+            } else {
+                result.push(mergeItem(baseItem, oursGroup[0], theirItem));
+                for (let i = 1; i < oursGroup.length; i++) {
+                    result.push(oursGroup[i]);
+                }
+            }
+        } else {
+            result.push(theirItem);
+        }
+    }
+
+    for (const item of ours) {
+        const id = identityOf(item);
+        if (seen.has(id)) continue;
+        if (!baseIndex.has(id)) result.push(item);
+    }
+
+    return result;
+}
+
+// Merge one wallet's scalar/leaf fields (name, encryptedSecret, nextIndex,
+// ...) against base, then recurse into its address list by identity. `base`
+// is null when this page created the wallet itself and no other page has
+// (yet) produced a same-identity record — nothing to merge in that case,
+// this page's own copy wins outright. mergeListByIdentity() only ever calls
+// this with `!base` when `ours` and `theirs` are already equal (a genuine
+// collision between two DIFFERENT same-identity records is caught and kept
+// as two separate entries before this function is reached), so returning
+// `ours` here can't discard a different wallet's data.
+function mergeWallet(base, ours, theirs) {
+    if (!base) return ours;
+    const merged = { ...theirs };
+    for (const key of Object.keys(ours)) {
+        if (key === "addresses") continue;
+        if (!deepEqual(ours[key], base[key])) merged[key] = ours[key];
+    }
+    merged.addresses = mergeListByIdentity(
+        base.addresses,
+        ours.addresses,
+        theirs.addresses,
+        addressIdentity,
+        mergeAddress,
+    );
+    return merged;
+}
+
+// Merge one address's leaf fields (balance, ensName, tokenBalances, ...).
+// tokenBalances is itself an array, but only a balance refresh ever writes
+// it and always wholesale (refreshBalances() in src/shared/balances.js), so
+// there is no membership to reconcile within it — it is a leaf like balance
+// or ensName, not a list with its own identity.
+function mergeAddress(base, ours, theirs) {
+    if (!base) return ours;
+    const merged = { ...theirs };
+    for (const key of Object.keys(ours)) {
+        if (!deepEqual(ours[key], base[key])) merged[key] = ours[key];
+    }
+    return merged;
+}
+
+// Merge a plain object keyed by string (allowedSites/deniedSites: address ->
+// hostname list; networkEndpoints: networkId -> {rpcUrl, blockscoutUrl}) the
+// same way mergeListByIdentity() merges an array — by key, not by whole-
+// object diff — so a key one page added or removed applies independently of
+// a key another page edited. Unlike an array's identity function, an object
+// key can't collide with a different logical entry (Object.keys() is
+// already deduplicated), so this needs no collision floor of its own.
+function mergeMapByKey(base, ours, theirs, mergeLeaf) {
+    base = base || {};
+    ours = ours || {};
+    theirs = theirs || {};
+    const result = {};
+    const seen = new Set();
+
+    for (const key of Object.keys(theirs)) {
+        seen.add(key);
+        const inBase = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(base, key);
+        const inOurs = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(ours, key);
+        if (inBase && !inOurs) continue; // this page deleted the whole entry
+        if (inOurs) {
+            result[key] = mergeLeaf(base[key], ours[key], theirs[key]);
+        } else {
+            result[key] = theirs[key];
+        }
+    }
+
+    for (const key of Object.keys(ours)) {
+        if (seen.has(key)) continue;
+        if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(base, key)) {
+            result[key] = ours[key];
+        }
+    }
+
+    return result;
+}
+
+// allowedSites/deniedSites: { [address]: [hostname, ...] }. The hostname
+// list is itself membership, not a leaf — the background appends a newly
+// approved/denied hostname to it, and the Settings "revoke" button
+// (src/popup/views/settings.js) filters a hostname out of it in place, from a
+// different page. Merge it the same way wallets are merged: identity is the
+// hostname itself, so a merged pair is always equal and mergeItem is a no-op
+// pick.
+function mergeHostnameList(base, ours, theirs) {
+    return mergeListByIdentity(
+        base,
+        ours,
+        theirs,
+        (hostname) => hostname,
+        (b, o, t) => t,
+    );
+}
+
+function mergeSiteMap(base, ours, theirs) {
+    return mergeMapByKey(base, ours, theirs, mergeHostnameList);
+}
+
+// networkEndpoints: { [networkId]: {rpcUrl, blockscoutUrl} }.
+// applyChainSwitchFields() (src/shared/chainSwitchFields.js) writes
+// networkEndpoints[networkId] in place before saving. No code path ever
+// removes a key from this map, so the membership collision that matters for
+// allowedSites/wallets (an add on one page racing a delete on another) can't
+// happen here — but two pages switching to two different networks
+// concurrently still race a whole-field diff the same way, so it gets the same
+// per-key merge for the leaf edit case (e.g. Settings saving a custom RPC URL
+// for the active network).
+function mergeEndpointEntry(base, ours, theirs) {
+    if (!base) return ours;
+    const merged = { ...theirs };
+    for (const key of Object.keys(ours)) {
+        if (!deepEqual(ours[key], base[key])) merged[key] = ours[key];
+    }
+    return merged;
+}
+
+function mergeNetworkEndpoints(base, ours, theirs) {
+    return mergeMapByKey(base, ours, theirs, mergeEndpointEntry);
+}
+
+// Read-modify-write, merged per field, rather than one full-blob write.
+//
+// Every extension page (the toolbar popup, a dApp approval window) holds its
+// own in-memory `state`, loaded once, and showView() saves on every
+// navigation. A full-blob write here clobbers whatever a second page had
+// written since — including, in the worst case, an entire wallet and its
+// encrypted secret with no attacker and no unusual input (see the issue this
+// fixes).
+//
+// Only the fields this page actually changed — those that differ from
+// `baseline`, captured at the last loadState()/saveState() on this page —
+// are written; every other field is carried forward from whatever is in
+// storage right now, which may already be a value another page wrote.
+//
+// `wallets` is merged structurally (mergeListByIdentity(), by wallet
+// identity and then by address identity within each wallet), not as one
+// whole field: a balance refresh mutates wallets IN PLACE (addr.balance /
+// ensName / tokenBalances, via refreshBalances()), so a whole-field diff
+// would mark all of `wallets` "changed" the moment any balance moved and
+// write back that page's own copy — loaded before its multi-second network
+// round trip — clobbering a wallet another page added, or resurrecting one
+// another page deleted, in that window. Merging by identity lets the leaf
+// changes and another page's membership changes (add/delete a wallet or an
+// address) apply independently instead of colliding as the same field.
+//
+// `allowedSites` and `deniedSites` get the same treatment (mergeSiteMap(),
+// by address key and then by hostname within each address's list), for the
+// identical reason: the background appends a newly approved/denied hostname
+// to them, and the Settings "revoke" button (src/popup/views/settings.js)
+// filters one out in place, from a different page. A whole-field diff here
+// doesn't just lose data, it is a security defect — a stale page's save can
+// resurrect a just-revoked site permission, or silently wipe a permission just
+// granted elsewhere.
+//
+// `networkEndpoints` gets the same treatment too (mergeNetworkEndpoints(),
+// by network id), since applyChainSwitchFields() writes into it in place; the
+// value per key is a small leaf object with no membership of its own; see the
+// comment at mergeEndpointEntry() for why the collision this closes is
+// milder than the other two.
+//
+// Every other persisted field stays a whole-field diff:
+// `trackedTokens`/`fraudContracts`/`viewStack` are arrays of scalars with no
+// per-element identity to merge by; `tokenHolderCache` is a map shaped like
+// the ones above, but nothing in src/ ever writes an entry into it — it is
+// only ever reset wholesale to `{}` (applyChainSwitchFields()) — so there is
+// no in-place mutation for a whole-field diff to collide with; `viewData` is
+// this page's own UI scratch space, not data another page has any reason to
+// share membership of.
+//
+// This does not make two pages that both change the SAME leaf concurrently
+// safe: last write wins on that one leaf, same as before. What it removes
+// is the cross-field (and now cross-membership-vs-leaf) clobber — a page
+// that only navigated, or only refreshed a balance, overwriting a wallet or
+// address list it never touched the membership of.
+//
+// This page's own live `state` is deliberately NOT rehydrated from a field
+// another page changed — only the record written to storage is merged.
+// showView() fires saveState() on every navigation without awaiting it,
+// which is what makes the queue above necessary in the first place, and a
+// save that is slow to come back has no way to tell whether the field it
+// is about to hand back is still the current answer or has since been
+// overtaken by something this very page did in the meantime; writing it
+// into `state` regardless reintroduced exactly the clobber this function
+// exists to remove, just delayed and confined to one page instead of two
+// (caught by tests/txStatus.test.js). A page's live picture of a field it
+// does not own goes on being whatever its last loadState() saw, same as
+// before this fix; only the persisted record is guaranteed current.
+async function saveStateOnce() {
+    const current = snapshotPersisted();
+    const result = await storageGet("autistmask");
+    // The record in storage right now is about to be merged into and written
+    // back, so it is validated exactly like a load validates it. Without this,
+    // a page whose own load succeeded would normalize a record it does not
+    // understand — one a NEWER build wrote in the meantime, say — and write
+    // the result back over it, destroying the only copy of whatever that
+    // record held. Refusing is louder than that and loses nothing: the live
+    // state is untouched and the next save retries.
+    assertStateUsable(result.autistmask);
+    // Normalized, not raw: a field this page did not change still has to
+    // come from storage in its loaded (self-healed) shape. See
+    // normalizePersisted() in persistedState.js.
+    const fresh = normalizePersisted(result.autistmask);
+
+    const merged = { ...fresh };
+    for (const key of PERSISTED_FIELDS) {
+        if (key === "wallets") {
+            merged.wallets = mergeListByIdentity(
+                baseline ? baseline.wallets : [],
+                current.wallets,
+                fresh.wallets,
+                walletIdentity,
+                mergeWallet,
+            );
+        } else if (key === "allowedSites" || key === "deniedSites") {
+            merged[key] = mergeSiteMap(
+                baseline ? baseline[key] : {},
+                current[key],
+                fresh[key],
+            );
+        } else if (key === "networkEndpoints") {
+            merged.networkEndpoints = mergeNetworkEndpoints(
+                baseline ? baseline.networkEndpoints : {},
+                current.networkEndpoints,
+                fresh.networkEndpoints,
+            );
+        } else if (
+            baseline === null ||
+            !deepEqual(current[key], baseline[key])
+        ) {
+            merged[key] = current[key];
+        }
+    }
+    merged.hasWallet = Boolean(merged.wallets && merged.wallets.length > 0);
+    // Stamped on every write, never merged or diffed: the record that goes to
+    // storage is in THIS build's shape whatever shape it was read in, which is
+    // what migrates the unversioned records every install in the field holds.
+    merged.schemaVersion = STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION;
+
+    await storageSet({ autistmask: merged });
+
+    // Derived from this page's own wallets, never adopted off the wire —
+    // see loadState(). Everything else this page did not change is left
+    // exactly as it stood; see the note above.
+    rawState.hasWallet = rawState.wallets.length > 0;
+
+    baseline = structuredClone(snapshotPersisted());
+}
+
+// showView() calls saveState() on every navigation without awaiting it, so
+// two saves from the SAME page can be in flight at once — e.g. a screen
+// shown, then immediately replaced before the first save's storageGet()
+// round trip has come back. Left concurrent, the first save's turn would
+// finish after the second's live-state mutation and then re-hydrate `state`
+// from what IT read, stomping the second, later change back to a stale
+// value — the same clobber this function exists to prevent, just between
+// two saves on one page instead of two pages. Queuing makes every save's
+// snapshot-diff-write-rehydrate run start to finish before the next one
+// begins, so each one only ever sees the true live state at its turn.
+let saveQueue = Promise.resolve();
+
+function saveState() {
+    const turn = saveQueue.then(saveStateOnce);
+    // The queue must advance even when a save rejects, or every save after
+    // it queues behind a promise that never settles.
+    saveQueue = turn.catch(() => {});
+    return turn;
+}
+
+// Rejects with StateUnusableError for a stored record this build cannot make
+// sense of. Nothing is assigned and `loaded` stays false in that case, so a
+// caller that ignores the rejection gets StateNotLoadedError on the first
+// read rather than a half-populated profile. The caller that does NOT ignore
+// it is the popup entry point, which shows the recovery screen
+// (src/popup/views/stateRecovery.js) instead of proceeding.
 async function loadState() {
     const result = await storageGet("autistmask");
-    if (result.autistmask) {
+    // Before normalization, on the raw bytes: normalizing first would paper
-        const saved = result.autistmask;
+    // over the very shapes this refuses, which is how a corrupt record used to
-        state.wallets = saved.wallets || [];
+    // reach the popup and blank it (issue #311).
-        // Derived, never read from storage: a profile persisted with the flag
+    assertStateUsable(result.autistmask);
-        // out of step with the wallet list would otherwise stay broken on
+    if (migrationNeeded(result.autistmask)) {
-        // every load. Nothing depends on the two disagreeing.
+        log.infof(
-        state.hasWallet = state.wallets.length > 0;
+            "state: migrating an unversioned profile to schema version",
-        state.trackedTokens = saved.trackedTokens || [];
+            STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION,
-        state.networkId = saved.networkId || DEFAULT_STATE.networkId;
+        );
-        state.rpcUrl = saved.rpcUrl || DEFAULT_STATE.rpcUrl;
-        state.blockscoutUrl =
-            saved.blockscoutUrl || DEFAULT_STATE.blockscoutUrl;
-        // An actual object is required, not merely a truthy non-array: the
-        // code below and onChainSwitch() index and ASSIGN INTO this value,
-        // and assigning a property to a string or a number is a silent no-op
-        // in sloppy mode. A stored primitive would therefore be re-persisted
-        // unchanged forever, and every switch would fall back to the network
-        // default — the endpoint loss this map exists to prevent, with no
-        // self-healing. The allowedSites/deniedSites guards below are only
-        // read from, which is why they can be looser.
-        state.networkEndpoints =
-            typeof saved.networkEndpoints === "object" &&
-            saved.networkEndpoints !== null &&
-            !Array.isArray(saved.networkEndpoints)
-                ? saved.networkEndpoints
-                : {};
-        // A profile written before this map existed carries exactly one pair
-        // of endpoints, belonging to whatever network it was last on. Adopt
-        // it as that network's remembered pair, so a custom endpoint set on
-        // the old build is not lost by the first switch away and back.
-        if (!state.networkEndpoints[state.networkId]) {
-            state.networkEndpoints[state.networkId] = {
-                rpcUrl: state.rpcUrl,
-                blockscoutUrl: state.blockscoutUrl,
-            };
-        }
-        state.lastBalanceRefresh = saved.lastBalanceRefresh || 0;
-        state.activeAddress = saved.activeAddress || null;
-        state.allowedSites =
-            saved.allowedSites && !Array.isArray(saved.allowedSites)
-                ? saved.allowedSites
-                : {};
-        state.deniedSites =
-            saved.deniedSites && !Array.isArray(saved.deniedSites)
-                ? saved.deniedSites
-                : {};
-        state.rememberSiteChoice =
-            saved.rememberSiteChoice !== undefined
-                ? saved.rememberSiteChoice
-                : true;
-        state.showZeroBalanceTokens =
-            saved.showZeroBalanceTokens !== undefined
-                ? saved.showZeroBalanceTokens
-                : true;
-        // A profile written before this setting existed has no key for it.
-        // It is a safety filter, so absent must load as on, not as undefined.
-        state.hideSpoofedSymbols =
-            saved.hideSpoofedSymbols !== undefined
-                ? saved.hideSpoofedSymbols
-                : true;
-        state.hideLowHolderTokens =
-            saved.hideLowHolderTokens !== undefined
-                ? saved.hideLowHolderTokens
-                : true;
-        state.hideFraudContracts =
-            saved.hideFraudContracts !== undefined
-                ? saved.hideFraudContracts
-                : true;
-        state.hideDustTransactions =
-            saved.hideDustTransactions !== undefined
-                ? saved.hideDustTransactions
-                : true;
-        state.dustThresholdGwei =
-            saved.dustThresholdGwei !== undefined
-                ? saved.dustThresholdGwei
-                : 100000;
-        state.utcTimestamps =
-            saved.utcTimestamps !== undefined ? saved.utcTimestamps : false;
-        state.fraudContracts = saved.fraudContracts || [];
-        state.tokenHolderCache = saved.tokenHolderCache || {};
-        state.theme = saved.theme || "system";
-        state.debugMode =
-            saved.debugMode !== undefined ? saved.debugMode : false;
-        state.currentView = saved.currentView || null;
-        state.selectedWallet =
-            saved.selectedWallet !== undefined ? saved.selectedWallet : null;
-        state.selectedAddress =
-            saved.selectedAddress !== undefined ? saved.selectedAddress : null;
-        state.selectedToken = saved.selectedToken || null;
-        state.viewData = saved.viewData || {};
-        state.viewStack = restorableStack(saved.viewStack, state.currentView);
     }
+    if (result.autistmask) {
+        Object.assign(rawState, normalizePersisted(result.autistmask));
+    }
+    // Whether storage had a profile or was empty, this context has now read
+    // it, and the defaults standing in for an empty profile are the right
+    // answer rather than a stand-in for one nobody looked for.
+    loaded = true;
+    // The point of comparison every saveState() on this page diffs against.
+    // See PERSISTED_FIELDS in persistedState.js for why a reference here
+    // would be wrong.
+    baseline = structuredClone(snapshotPersisted());
 }
 
+// Through the guarded proxy, not rawState: a caller asking which address is
+// selected before anything was loaded gets the same loud failure it would get
+// reading the fields itself.
 function currentAddress() {
     if (state.selectedWallet === null || state.selectedAddress === null) {
         return null;
@@ -232,4 +577,5 @@ module.exports = {
     loadState,
     currentAddress,
     currentNetwork,
+    StateNotLoadedError,
 };

src/shared/stateSchema.js

@@ -0,0 +1,239 @@
+// The version stamped on the stored profile, and the shape check every read
+// of one goes through.
+//
+// Storage is the one input to this extension that nobody validated. A profile
+// carried no version at all, so there was no way to tell a record this build
+// understands from one a later build wrote, and loadState() coerced scalars
+// while trusting the structure — so a `wallets` that was a string, or an array
+// of nulls, or a later schema's wallet records, reached the popup and threw on
+// the first dereference. The popup rendered NOTHING: no view, no message, no
+// control, and no way out from inside the product
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/311).
+//
+// Two separate jobs, deliberately not merged:
+//
+//   stateProblem() / assertStateUsable()  refuse a record this build cannot
+//                     safely reason about, loudly, naming the problem in a
+//                     sentence that goes on screen. This is the gate.
+//   normalizePersisted() (persistedState.js)  self-heal a record that IS
+//                     usable: absent fields, legacy shapes, out-of-range flags.
+//
+// The gate runs FIRST, on the raw stored bytes, before normalization has a
+// chance to paper over a record whose meaning nobody can vouch for. A blob
+// that fails it is left in storage untouched — it is the user's only copy of
+// whatever it holds, and the recovery screen exports it before offering to
+// erase it.
+//
+// What is checked here is what the rest of the code dereferences without a
+// floor of its own. Everything else has one in normalizePersisted() and does
+// not need a second.
+
+const { isKnownNetworkId } = require("./networks");
+
+// Bump this when the MEANING of a stored field changes, and add the migration
+// that carries the older version forward. Adding a field with a defaulted
+// absent value is not a bump: normalizePersisted() already handles that, and
+// bumping for it would send every older install to the recovery screen for no
+// reason.
+//
+// Version 1 is the shape that shipped unversioned. An unversioned record is
+// therefore version 1, not a defect — see migrationNeeded() below.
+const STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION = 1;
+
+// Thrown by every read path that finds a record it cannot use. `problem` is
+// the sentence shown to the user; `message` carries the same text so a log
+// line or a rethrow is not empty.
+class StateUnusableError extends Error {
+    constructor(problem) {
+        super(problem);
+        this.name = "StateUnusableError";
+        this.problem = problem;
+    }
+}
+
+function isPlainObject(value) {
+    return typeof value === "object" && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value);
+}
+
+// Own properties only, everywhere in this file. `saved` comes from storage as
+// parsed JSON, so `saved.constructor` and `saved.__proto__` answer from the
+// prototype chain for a record that carries neither — a check written as a
+// plain truthiness test can be satisfied by Object.prototype rather than by
+// anything the user's profile actually contains.
+function has(obj, key) {
+    return Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(obj, key);
+}
+
+function ordinal(index) {
+    return String(index + 1);
+}
+
+function describeType(value) {
+    if (value === null) return "null";
+    if (Array.isArray(value)) return "a list";
+    return "a " + typeof value;
+}
+
+// One address record, as every screen dereferences it.
+function addressProblem(addr, walletIndex, addrIndex) {
+    const where =
+        "address " +
+        ordinal(addrIndex) +
+        " of wallet " +
+        ordinal(walletIndex) +
+        " in the saved data";
+    if (!isPlainObject(addr)) {
+        return "The " + where + " is " + describeType(addr) + ", not a record.";
+    }
+    if (typeof addr.address !== "string" || addr.address === "") {
+        return "The " + where + " has no address.";
+    }
+    return null;
+}
+
+function walletProblem(wallet, index) {
+    const where = "Wallet " + ordinal(index) + " in the saved data";
+    if (!isPlainObject(wallet)) {
+        return where + " is " + describeType(wallet) + ", not a wallet record.";
+    }
+    if (!Array.isArray(wallet.addresses)) {
+        return where + " has no list of addresses.";
+    }
+    if (has(wallet, "name") && typeof wallet.name !== "string") {
+        return where + " has a name that is not text.";
+    }
+    for (let i = 0; i < wallet.addresses.length; i++) {
+        const problem = addressProblem(wallet.addresses[i], index, i);
+        if (problem) return problem;
+    }
+    return null;
+}
+
+function versionProblem(saved) {
+    // No version field at all is the shape every install in the field has:
+    // no build ever wrote one. It is version 1, and it is migrated in place.
+    if (!has(saved, "schemaVersion")) return null;
+    const version = saved.schemaVersion;
+    if (
+        typeof version !== "number" ||
+        !Number.isInteger(version) ||
+        version < 1
+    ) {
+        return (
+            "The saved data carries a schema version AutistMask does not" +
+            " recognize (" +
+            JSON.stringify(version) +
+            ")."
+        );
+    }
+    if (version > STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION) {
+        return (
+            "The saved data was written by a newer version of AutistMask" +
+            " (schema version " +
+            version +
+            "; this build understands version " +
+            STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION +
+            ")."
+        );
+    }
+    return null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The reason this build cannot use `saved`, as a sentence for the user, or
+ * null when it can.
+ *
+ * @param {*} saved the raw record from storage, or undefined for a fresh
+ *     install.
+ * @returns {string|null}
+ */
+function stateProblem(saved) {
+    // Nothing stored is a first run, not a defect.
+    if (saved === undefined || saved === null) return null;
+    if (!isPlainObject(saved)) {
+        return (
+            "The saved data is " +
+            describeType(saved) +
+            ", not the record AutistMask stores."
+        );
+    }
+
+    const version = versionProblem(saved);
+    if (version) return version;
+
+    // Read once, from an OWN property or not at all. Reading `saved.wallets`
+    // again below would consult the prototype chain for a record that carries
+    // no wallets of its own, so what gets validated would not be what gets
+    // loaded.
+    const wallets =
+        has(saved, "wallets") && saved.wallets !== undefined
+            ? saved.wallets
+            : [];
+    if (!Array.isArray(wallets)) {
+        return (
+            "The list of wallets in the saved data is " +
+            describeType(wallets) +
+            ", not a list."
+        );
+    }
+    for (let i = 0; i < wallets.length; i++) {
+        const problem = walletProblem(wallets[i], i);
+        if (problem) return problem;
+    }
+
+    // networkId is not merely displayed: it is an object KEY into
+    // state.networkEndpoints. A corrupt "__proto__" would set that map's
+    // prototype instead of an own key, so the user's endpoint would silently
+    // not be recorded and a switch away and back would return the public
+    // default. isKnownNetworkId() is an own-property test against the network
+    // table for exactly that reason.
+    if (
+        has(saved, "networkId") &&
+        saved.networkId !== undefined &&
+        !isKnownNetworkId(saved.networkId)
+    ) {
+        return (
+            "The saved data selects a network AutistMask does not know (" +
+            JSON.stringify(saved.networkId) +
+            ")."
+        );
+    }
+
+    return null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Refuse a record this build cannot use.
+ *
+ * @param {*} saved the raw record from storage.
+ * @throws {StateUnusableError}
+ */
+function assertStateUsable(saved) {
+    const problem = stateProblem(saved);
+    if (problem) throw new StateUnusableError(problem);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Whether `saved` is a usable record written before versions existed, and so
+ * gets the current version stamped on it the next time anything writes. Purely
+ * informational — the migration itself is that stamp, since version 1 IS the
+ * unversioned shape.
+ *
+ * @param {*} saved
+ * @returns {boolean}
+ */
+function migrationNeeded(saved) {
+    return (
+        isPlainObject(saved) &&
+        !has(saved, "schemaVersion") &&
+        stateProblem(saved) === null
+    );
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+    STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION,
+    StateUnusableError,
+    assertStateUsable,
+    migrationNeeded,
+    stateProblem,
+};

src/shared/transactions.js

@@ -11,6 +11,10 @@ const { log, debugFetch } = require("./log");
 const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("./tokenList");
 const { parseHoldersCount, isLowHolderCount } = require("./holders");
 const { isSpoofedSymbol } = require("./symbolSpoof");
+// The plain 4-decimal rule. The history and balance lists deliberately keep
+// truncation without the approval screens' nonzero floor: the transaction
+// detail view is the authoritative record and already shows exact precision.
+const { truncateAmount: formatTxValue } = require("./amountDisplay");
 
 // Ethereum addresses are case-insensitive: EIP-55 mixed case is a checksum
 // over the address, not part of its identity.  Every address comparison in
@@ -20,13 +24,6 @@ function normalizeAddress(addr) {
     return (addr || "").toLowerCase();
 }
 
-function formatTxValue(val) {
-    const parts = val.split(".");
-    if (parts.length === 1) return val + ".0000";
-    const dec = (parts[1] + "0000").slice(0, 4);
-    return parts[0] + "." + dec;
-}
-
 function parseTx(tx, addrLower) {
     const from = tx.from?.hash || "";
     const to = tx.to?.hash || "";

src/shared/uniswap.js

@@ -3,6 +3,11 @@
 
 const { Interface, AbiCoder, getBytes, formatUnits } = require("ethers");
 const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("./tokenList");
+const { truncateAmountNeverZero } = require("./amountDisplay");
+const {
+    resolveTokenDecimals,
+    unknownDecimalsAmount,
+} = require("./approvalAmount");
 
 const coder = AbiCoder.defaultAbiCoder();
 
@@ -34,20 +39,46 @@ const COMMAND_NAMES = {
     0x21: "Execute Sub-Plan",
 };
 
+// The swap's Amount and Min. received lines land on the same approval screen,
+// and Amount is carried to the wait/success/error screens as the ERC-20 line
+// is, so they take the same nonzero floor: a swap of an amount below 0.0001 is
+// not "0.0000", and a slippage floor of one base unit does not read as "you may
+// receive nothing".
 function formatAmount(raw, decimals) {
-    const parts = formatUnits(raw, decimals).split(".");
+    return truncateAmountNeverZero(formatUnits(raw, decimals));
-    if (parts.length === 1) return parts[0] + ".0000";
-    const dec = (parts[1] + "0000").slice(0, 4);
-    return parts[0] + "." + dec;
 }
 
-function tokenInfo(address) {
+// `decimals` is null when nothing knows this token's scale. It is not
+// defaulted to 18: the swap lines land on the same approval screen as the
+// ERC-20 line, and a scale guessed there is what showed a 1,000 USDT swap as
+// 0.000000000001. `sources` is { trackedTokens, wallets }, shaped as they are
+// on `state`; resolveTokenDecimals() reads the bundled list, then those.
+function tokenInfo(address, sources) {
     if (!address || address === "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000") {
         return { symbol: "ETH", decimals: 18, address: null };
     }
     const t = TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.get(address.toLowerCase());
-    if (t) return { symbol: t.symbol, decimals: t.decimals, address };
+    return {
-    return { symbol: null, decimals: 18, address };
+        symbol: t ? t.symbol : null,
+        decimals: resolveTokenDecimals(address, sources),
+        address,
+    };
+}
+
+// A swap amount line. With a scale it is the token quantity; with none it is
+// the base-unit integer with the unknown scale stated, the same refusal the
+// ERC-20 amount line makes, so the screen has one way of saying it. `display`
+// is the line on the screen, `raw` is what the status screens carry.
+function amountText(raw, info) {
+    if (info.decimals === null) {
+        const unknown = unknownDecimalsAmount(raw);
+        return { raw: unknown, display: unknown };
+    }
+    const formatted = formatAmount(raw, info.decimals);
+    return {
+        raw: formatted,
+        display: formatted + (info.symbol ? " " + info.symbol : ""),
+    };
 }
 
 // Decode PERMIT2_PERMIT (command 0x0a) input bytes.
@@ -320,7 +351,7 @@ function decodeV4Swap(input) {
 // Try to decode a Universal Router execute() call.
 // Returns { name, description, details } matching the format used by
 // the approval UI, or null if the calldata is not a recognised execute().
-function decode(data, toAddress) {
+function decode(data, toAddress, sources) {
     try {
         const parsed = ROUTER_IFACE.parseTransaction({ data });
         if (!parsed) return null;
@@ -398,8 +429,16 @@ function decode(data, toAddress) {
                         if (!inputToken && v4.tokenIn) inputToken = v4.tokenIn;
                         if (!inputAmount && v4.amountIn)
                             inputAmount = v4.amountIn;
-                        // Always update output: last swap step wins
+                        // Always update output: last swap step wins. A step
-                        if (v4.tokenOut) outputToken = v4.tokenOut;
+                        // that carries the Min. received figure but decoded no
+                        // output currency makes the output *undetermined* — it
+                        // is neither ETH nor whatever an earlier step named,
+                        // and that figure is no longer counted in that token.
+                        if (v4.tokenOut) {
+                            outputToken = v4.tokenOut;
+                        } else if (v4.amountOutMin) {
+                            outputToken = null;
+                        }
                         if (v4.amountOutMin) minOutput = v4.amountOutMin;
                     }
                 }
@@ -412,11 +451,26 @@ function decode(data, toAddress) {
             }
         }
 
-        // Resolve token info
+        // Resolve token info.
-        const inInfo = tokenInfo(inputToken);
+        //
+        // A null `outputToken` means undetermined, not native ETH, so it is
+        // not handed to tokenInfo() — which maps null to ETH at 18 decimals
+        // for the input side's benefit. Uniswap V4 spells native ETH as
+        // `Currency.wrap(address(0))` (v4-core `type Currency is address`),
+        // and a Currency is ABI-encoded as a plain address word, so every
+        // decode site here gets back the truthy string
+        // "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" for it — never null.
+        // tokenInfo() already names that ETH, and an UNWRAP_WETH output is
+        // caught above, so nothing that genuinely outputs ETH arrives null.
+        // Only a step whose output currency did not decode does, and naming
+        // that ETH states the wrong asset and formats Min. received at the
+        // wrong scale.
+        const inInfo = tokenInfo(inputToken, sources);
         const outInfo = hasUnwrapWeth
             ? { symbol: "ETH", decimals: 18, address: null }
-            : tokenInfo(outputToken);
+            : outputToken
+              ? tokenInfo(outputToken, sources)
+              : { symbol: null, decimals: null, address: null };
 
         const inSymbol = inInfo.symbol;
         const outSymbol = outInfo.symbol;
@@ -453,40 +507,52 @@ function decode(data, toAddress) {
                 "0xffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff",
             );
             const isUnlimited = inputAmount >= maxUint160;
-            const amountRaw = isUnlimited
+            // An unbounded permit needs no scale to describe, so it is still
-                ? "Unlimited"
+            // named rather than refused.
-                : formatAmount(inputAmount, inInfo.decimals);
+            const amount = isUnlimited
-            const amountStr = isUnlimited
+                ? { raw: "Unlimited", display: "Unlimited" }
-                ? "Unlimited"
+                : amountText(inputAmount, inInfo);
-                : amountRaw + (inSymbol ? " " + inSymbol : "");
             details.push({
                 label: "Amount",
-                value: amountStr,
+                value: amount.display,
-                rawValue: amountRaw,
+                rawValue: amount.raw,
             });
         }
 
-        if (outSymbol) {
+        // Keyed on the address, not the symbol: a token absent from the
-            if (outInfo.address) {
+        // bundled list has no symbol, and gating the line on one dropped it
-                const label = outSymbol
+        // entirely, leaving a Min. received figure with nothing saying what is
-                    ? outSymbol + " (" + outputToken + ")"
+        // being received. The Token In line above already falls back to the
-                    : outputToken;
+        // address; this does the same.
-                details.push({
+        if (outInfo.address) {
-                    label: "Token Out",
+            const label = outSymbol
-                    value: label,
+                ? outSymbol + " (" + outInfo.address + ")"
-                    address: outputToken,
+                : outInfo.address;
-                    isToken: true,
+            details.push({
-                });
+                label: "Token Out",
-            } else {
+                value: label,
-                details.push({ label: "Token Out", value: outSymbol });
+                address: outInfo.address,
-            }
+                isToken: true,
+            });
+        } else if (outSymbol) {
+            details.push({ label: "Token Out", value: outSymbol });
+        } else {
+            // Nothing established the output token, so the line says that
+            // rather than going missing or naming a token by default. It reads
+            // as a refusal, the same stance unknownDecimalsAmount() takes on a
+            // scale, so a Min. received figure below it is never attached to a
+            // token the calldata did not state.
+            details.push({
+                label: "Token Out",
+                value: "Unknown (not named in the calldata)",
+            });
         }
 
         if (minOutput !== null && minOutput !== undefined) {
-            const minStr =
+            details.push({
-                formatAmount(minOutput, outInfo.decimals) +
+                label: "Min. received",
-                (outSymbol ? " " + outSymbol : "");
+                value: amountText(minOutput, outInfo).display,
-            details.push({ label: "Min. received", value: minStr });
+            });
         }
 
         details.push({ label: "Steps", value: commandNames.join(" \u2192 ") });

tests/alarms.test.js

@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@
 // A controllable clock plus a stubbed balance refresh, so a cadence test can
 // measure the interval between refreshes that actually happened rather than
 // asserting the interval someone intended.
+const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
+
 let mockNow = 0;
 const mockBalanceRefreshAt = [];
 
@@ -247,32 +249,17 @@ describe("alarms module", () => {
 // Loads the background worker against stubbed browser APIs. The returned
 // store is the extension storage the worker sees, so a test can seed wallet
 // state and read back what the worker persisted.
+// The stub clones in both directions, as the real chrome.storage.local does,
+// and carries the latency simulation above on every operation. It used to
+// alias, which for this file meant the worker's in-memory wallets and the
+// "stored" ones were one object — see tests/support/storageStub.js.
 function loadBackground(initialStore = {}) {
-    const storageStore = initialStore;
+    const storage = makeStorageStub(initialStore, mockStorageTick);
     const alarmsStub = makeAlarmsStub();
     const listeners = { onInstalled: [], onStartup: [] };
     global.chrome = {
         alarms: alarmsStub,
-        storage: {
+        storage,
-            local: {
-                get: async (key) => {
-                    mockStorageTick();
-                    return Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(
-                        storageStore,
-                        key,
-                    )
-                        ? { [key]: storageStore[key] }
-                        : {};
-                },
-                set: async (items) => {
-                    mockStorageTick();
-                    Object.assign(storageStore, items);
-                },
-                remove: async (key) => {
-                    delete storageStore[key];
-                },
-            },
-        },
         runtime: {
             onMessage: { addListener: jest.fn() },
             onConnect: { addListener: jest.fn() },
@@ -301,7 +288,7 @@ function loadBackground(initialStore = {}) {
     }));
     jest.resetModules();
     require("../src/background/index");
-    return { alarmsStub, listeners, store: storageStore };
+    return { alarmsStub, listeners, storage };
 }
 
 // Flush the promise chains the startup path and the alarm handlers run on.
@@ -410,8 +397,23 @@ describe("balance refresh steady-state cadence", () => {
         return {
             autistmask: {
                 hasWallet: true,
+                // A whole wallet record, not a bare address: a stored profile
+                // is validated against the schema on every read now
+                // (src/shared/stateSchema.js), and a wallet with no address
+                // list is one of the shapes that refuses to load.
                 wallets: [
-                    { address: "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000001" },
+                    {
+                        name: "Wallet 1",
+                        type: "hd",
+                        addresses: [
+                            {
+                                address:
+                                    "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000001",
+                                balance: "0",
+                                tokenBalances: [],
+                            },
+                        ],
+                    },
                 ],
                 lastBalanceRefresh: 0,
             },
@@ -476,12 +478,16 @@ describe("balance refresh steady-state cadence", () => {
         // The guard's actual job, and the reason it is shortened rather than
         // removed: while the popup is open it refreshes every 10 seconds and
         // stamps the same field, and the background job has nothing to add.
-        const store = seededStore();
+        const { alarmsStub, storage } = loadBackground(seededStore());
-        const { alarmsStub } = loadBackground(store);
         await settle();
 
         mockNow += PERIOD_MS;
-        store.autistmask.lastBalanceRefresh = mockNow - 10 * 1000;
+        // As the open popup's own refresh would leave it: written to storage,
+        // not poked into an object the worker happens to share.
+        storage.write("autistmask", {
+            ...storage.read("autistmask"),
+            lastBalanceRefresh: mockNow - 10 * 1000,
+        });
         alarmsStub.fire(BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM);
         await settle();
 

tests/approvalDisplayFloor.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+// The floor of the approval screen's amount line.
+//
+// Amounts are truncated to four decimal places for scannability (README.md,
+// Display Consistency). With the token's true scale resolved, that truncation
+// can still take a real amount below the floor and print it as `0.0000`: one
+// base unit of an 18-decimal token, or a few hundred of an 8-decimal one. On
+// the one screen whose job is to state what is being authorized, a nonzero
+// transfer or allowance then reads as nothing.
+//
+// The invariant asserted here is narrow: a nonzero amount never renders as
+// zero. The four-decimal rule itself is unchanged, and the string the
+// confirmation screens carry as `txInfo.amount` is the same one, so it is
+// asserted on `rawValue` alongside the displayed line.
+//
+// Both amount paths of that screen are covered: the ERC-20 line decoded by
+// `src/popup/views/approval.js`, and the swap's `Amount` and `Min. received`
+// lines decoded by `src/shared/uniswap.js`.
+
+globalThis.chrome = {
+    storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
+};
+
+const { AbiCoder, Interface } = require("ethers");
+const { ERC20_ABI } = require("../src/shared/constants");
+const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
+const { decodeCalldata } = require("../src/popup/views/approval");
+const uniswap = require("../src/shared/uniswap");
+const {
+    truncateAmount,
+    truncateAmountNeverZero,
+} = require("../src/shared/amountDisplay");
+
+const iface = new Interface(ERC20_ABI);
+
+// Bundled tokens, so the scale and the symbol both come from the list.
+const USDC = "0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48"; // 6 decimals
+const WBT = "0x925206b8a707096Ed26ae47C84747fE0bb734F59"; // 8 decimals
+const DAI = "0x6B175474E89094C44Da98b954EedeAC495271d0F"; // 18 decimals
+// Outside the list, so the scale comes from what the user tracks and the line
+// carries no symbol.
+const NOVEL = "0xE2E0000000000000000000000000000000000E2e";
+
+const RECIPIENT = "0xC0FfEE0000000000000000000000000000c0fFEe";
+const SPENDER = "0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111";
+
+// The Uniswap swap lines land on this same approval screen.
+const ROUTER = "0x66a9893cc07d91d95644aedd05d03f95e1dba8af";
+const USDT = "0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7"; // 6 decimals
+const WETH = "0xC02aaA39b223FE8D0A0e5C4F27eAD9083C756Cc2"; // 18 decimals
+
+const coder = AbiCoder.defaultAbiCoder();
+const routerIface = new Interface([
+    "function execute(bytes commands, bytes[] inputs, uint256 deadline)",
+]);
+
+// A V2_SWAP_EXACT_IN (command 0x08) execute() call: `amountIn` of USDT for at
+// least `amountOutMin` of WETH.
+function swapData(amountIn, amountOutMin) {
+    const input = coder.encode(
+        ["address", "uint256", "uint256", "address[]", "bool"],
+        [RECIPIENT, amountIn, amountOutMin, [USDT, WETH], true],
+    );
+    return routerIface.encodeFunctionData("execute", [
+        "0x08",
+        [input],
+        9999999999n,
+    ]);
+}
+
+function swapDetail(amountIn, amountOutMin, label) {
+    const decoded = uniswap.decode(swapData(amountIn, amountOutMin), ROUTER);
+    return decoded.details.find((d) => d.label === label);
+}
+
+function transferData(amount) {
+    return iface.encodeFunctionData("transfer", [RECIPIENT, amount]);
+}
+
+function approveData(amount) {
+    return iface.encodeFunctionData("approve", [SPENDER, amount]);
+}
+
+// The Amount detail as the approval screen renders it: `value` is the line on
+// the screen, `rawValue` is what is carried to the wait/success/error screens.
+function amount(data, token) {
+    const decoded = decodeCalldata(data, token);
+    return decoded.details.find((d) => d.label === "Amount");
+}
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+    state.trackedTokens = [];
+    state.wallets = [];
+});
+
+describe("a nonzero amount never renders as zero", () => {
+    test("500 base units of a 6-decimal token", () => {
+        const detail = amount(transferData(500n), USDC);
+        expect(detail.value).toBe("0.0005 USDC");
+        expect(detail.rawValue).toBe("0.0005");
+    });
+
+    test("1 base unit of an 18-decimal token", () => {
+        const detail = amount(transferData(1n), DAI);
+        expect(detail.value).toBe("0.000000000000000001 DAI");
+        expect(detail.rawValue).toBe("0.000000000000000001");
+    });
+
+    test("500 base units of an 8-decimal token", () => {
+        expect(amount(transferData(500n), WBT).rawValue).toBe("0.000005");
+    });
+
+    test("an allowance below the floor is not rendered as zero either", () => {
+        expect(amount(approveData(1n), DAI).value).toBe(
+            "0.000000000000000001 DAI",
+        );
+    });
+
+    // The floor holds at any scale, not only the three above: for every
+    // decimals a token can declare, one base unit has to show a digit.
+    test("one base unit shows a significant digit at every scale", () => {
+        for (let decimals = 0; decimals <= 30; decimals++) {
+            state.trackedTokens = [{ address: NOVEL, decimals }];
+            expect(amount(transferData(1n), NOVEL).rawValue).toMatch(/[1-9]/);
+        }
+    });
+});
+
+// The swap decoder formats its own amounts, so the same floor has to hold on
+// the swap lines of the same screen. `Min. received` is the sharper of the
+// two: the slippage floor rendered as `0.0000` states that the swap may return
+// nothing.
+describe("a swap's amounts never render as zero either", () => {
+    test("a swap input below the floor keeps a significant digit", () => {
+        // 50 base units of a 6-decimal token is 0.00005.
+        const detail = swapDetail(50n, 10n ** 15n, "Amount");
+        expect(detail.value).toBe("0.00005 USDT");
+        expect(detail.rawValue).toBe("0.00005");
+    });
+
+    test("a min-received below the floor keeps a significant digit", () => {
+        // 1 wei of an 18-decimal token.
+        expect(swapDetail(10n ** 6n, 1n, "Min. received").value).toBe(
+            "0.000000000000000001 WETH",
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("swap amounts at or above the floor are still truncated", () => {
+        expect(swapDetail(1000000n, 10n ** 15n, "Amount").rawValue).toBe(
+            "1.0000",
+        );
+        expect(
+            swapDetail(1000000n, 999999999999999999n, "Min. received").value,
+        ).toBe("0.9999 WETH");
+    });
+});
+
+describe("the four-decimal rule is otherwise unchanged", () => {
+    test("a whole amount keeps exactly four decimals", () => {
+        expect(amount(transferData(5000000000n), USDC).rawValue).toBe(
+            "5000.0000",
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("precision beyond four decimals is still truncated", () => {
+        expect(amount(transferData(1234567890123456789n), DAI).rawValue).toBe(
+            "1.2345",
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("an amount at the floor is not extended", () => {
+        expect(amount(transferData(100000000000000n), DAI).rawValue).toBe(
+            "0.0001",
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("a genuine zero still renders as zero", () => {
+        expect(amount(transferData(0n), DAI).rawValue).toBe("0.0000");
+    });
+
+    // The three truncators now share one module. The floor is a policy of the
+    // approval and confirmation screens only: the history and balance lists
+    // keep plain truncation, because the transaction detail view is the
+    // authoritative record and already shows exact precision.
+    test("the list rule stays unfloored", () => {
+        expect(truncateAmount("0.000000000000000001")).toBe("0.0000");
+        expect(truncateAmountNeverZero("0.000000000000000001")).toBe(
+            "0.000000000000000001",
+        );
+    });
+});

tests/backgroundApproval.test.js

@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ const { Network, Wallet } = require("ethers");
 // before any jest.doMock() of the module, so the copy assertions below check
 // what the user is actually shown.
 const { describeSigningFailure } = require("../src/shared/approvalVerify");
+const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
 
 const SIGNER_KEY =
     "0x59c6995e998f97a5a0044966f0945389dc9e86dae88c7a8412f4603b6b78690d";
@@ -137,22 +138,22 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
     jest.resetModules();
 
     const broadcastTransaction = jest.fn();
-    const loadState = jest.fn(opts.loadState || (async () => {}));
 
-    // The network the wallet is on, which the tests switch under a pending
+    // The node the transaction is populated against is on whatever chain the
-    // approval. The node the transaction is populated against is on the same
+    // stored profile says, as it would be: switching networks switches the RPC
-    // one, as it would be: switching networks switches the RPC endpoint too.
+    // endpoint too. The background takes the network from storage per call —
-    let chain = MAINNET;
+    // it holds no in-memory copy — so this reads the record rather than a
+    // variable the test keeps alongside it.
+    const chainOf = (networkId) =>
+        networkId === "sepolia" ? SEPOLIA : MAINNET;
 
-    jest.doMock("../src/shared/state", () => ({
-        state: { rpcUrl: "https://rpc.invalid", wallets: [] },
-        loadState,
-        saveState: jest.fn(async () => {}),
-        currentNetwork: () => ({ chainId: chain.hex }),
-    }));
     jest.doMock("../src/shared/balances", () => ({
-        getProvider: () =>
+        getProvider: (rpcUrl, networkId) =>
-            fakeProvider(broadcastTransaction, opts.provider, chain.num),
+            fakeProvider(
+                broadcastTransaction,
+                opts.provider,
+                chainOf(networkId).num,
+            ),
         refreshBalances: jest.fn(async () => {}),
     }));
     jest.doMock("../src/shared/phishingDomains", () => ({
@@ -174,15 +175,48 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
     }
 
     const persisted = {
+        // Address RECORDS, not bare address strings: a stored profile is
+        // validated against the schema on every read now
+        // (src/shared/stateSchema.js), and a bare string where a record
+        // belongs is one of the shapes that refuses to load.
         wallets: [
-            { name: "Wallet 1", type: "hd", addresses: [signer.address] },
+            {
+                name: "Wallet 1",
+                type: "hd",
+                addresses: [
+                    {
+                        address: signer.address,
+                        balance: "0",
+                        tokenBalances: [],
+                    },
+                ],
+            },
         ],
+        networkId: "mainnet",
         rpcUrl: "https://rpc.invalid",
         activeAddress: signer.address,
         allowedSites: { [signer.address]: [HOSTNAME] },
         deniedSites: {},
     };
 
+    // The one wallet state there is. The background reads it per call and
+    // writes it read-modify-write; it holds no in-memory copy and cannot reach
+    // the shared singleton. Clones in both directions, as the real API does —
+    // the stub here used to hand back the live record and drop every write on
+    // the floor, so a test could neither see what was persisted nor be sure
+    // what it read had crossed the boundary
+    // (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324).
+    const storage = makeStorageStub({ autistmask: persisted });
+
+    // A test that needs the state read itself to misbehave installs a hook —
+    // a stall, a throw — in place of the next reads. Armed after setup so
+    // that raising the approval is not what fails.
+    let storageGetHook = opts.storageGet || null;
+    const realGet = storage.local.get;
+    storage.local.get = jest.fn(async (key) =>
+        storageGetHook ? storageGetHook(key) : realGet(key),
+    );
+
     let messageListener = null;
     let windowRemovedListener = null;
     let connectListener = null;
@@ -194,15 +228,7 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
     const actionPopups = [];
 
     global.chrome = {
-        storage: {
+        storage,
-            local: {
-                get: jest.fn(
-                    opts.storageGet ||
-                        (async () => ({ autistmask: persisted })),
-                ),
-                set: jest.fn(async () => {}),
-            },
-        },
         runtime: {
             getURL: (path) => EXT_URL + path,
             onMessage: {
@@ -401,18 +427,32 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
         connectApproval,
         closeWindow,
         broadcastTransaction,
-        loadState,
         created,
         removed,
+        storage,
         // The user switching account in the toolbar popup, as the background
         // sees it: the persisted active address changes underneath a pending
         // approval.
         setActiveAddress: (address) => {
-            persisted.activeAddress = address;
+            storage.write("autistmask", {
+                ...storage.read("autistmask"),
+                activeAddress: address,
+            });
         },
-        // The user switching network in the toolbar popup.
+        // The user switching network in the toolbar popup. It moves the stored
+        // network and the endpoint together, as a real switch does.
         setNetwork: (network) => {
-            chain = network;
+            const networkId = network === SEPOLIA ? "sepolia" : "mainnet";
+            storage.write("autistmask", {
+                ...storage.read("autistmask"),
+                networkId,
+                rpcUrl: "https://rpc-" + networkId + ".invalid",
+            });
+        },
+        // Make the next state reads misbehave — stall, throw — without
+        // touching the reads that raised the approval. Pass null to restore.
+        setStateReadHook: (hook) => {
+            storageGetHook = hook;
         },
         fromPopup: { url: EXT_URL + "src/popup/index.html" },
     };
@@ -677,15 +717,16 @@ describe("one transaction approval at a time", () => {
     // page never — and holds the slot for the life of the worker with it.
     test("an approval whose window closed under a failed attempt is answered, and frees the next request", async () => {
         const stalled = deferred();
-        const bg = loadBackground({
+        const bg = loadBackground();
-            loadState: async () => {
-                await stalled.promise;
-                throw new Error("The wallet data could not be read.");
-            },
-        });
 
         const first = bg.requestTx();
         await settle();
+        // Armed only now: the approval was raised against a working state
+        // read, and it is the ATTEMPT's read that hangs and then fails.
+        bg.setStateReadHook(async () => {
+            await stalled.promise;
+            throw new Error("The wallet data could not be read.");
+        });
         bg.send(
             {
                 type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
@@ -709,6 +750,7 @@ describe("one transaction approval at a time", () => {
             error: { code: 4001, message: "User rejected the request." },
         });
 
+        bg.setStateReadHook(null);
         const second = bg.requestTx();
         await settle();
         expect(second.result()).toBeNull();
@@ -1226,19 +1268,18 @@ describe("what the approval is verified against", () => {
 // The interlock must not cost the retry the approval exists to allow.
 describe("the interlock releases a failed attempt", () => {
     test("a retryable failure before the broadcast leaves the approval usable", async () => {
-        let failNext = true;
+        const bg = loadBackground();
-        const bg = loadBackground({
-            loadState: async () => {
-                if (failNext) {
-                    failNext = false;
-                    throw new Error("storage unavailable");
-                }
-            },
-        });
         const pending = bg.requestTx();
         await settle();
         const id = pending.id();
 
+        // The attempt's state read fails once, then works: nothing was
+        // broadcast, so the approval must survive for the retry.
+        bg.setStateReadHook(() => {
+            bg.setStateReadHook(null);
+            throw new Error("storage unavailable");
+        });
+
         const first = bg.send(
             {
                 type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",

tests/backgroundStateIsolation.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,398 @@
+// What one background handler's state can do to another's while both are in
+// flight.
+//
+// The background used to read and write the module-level `state` singleton in
+// src/shared/state.js — one object, shared by every handler in the worker,
+// replaced wholesale by any loadState(). Two consequences, both covered here
+// and both from https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324:
+//
+//   - A transaction attempt captured the chain id at its loadState() and then
+//     read the ENDPOINT off the singleton several awaits later. A chain switch
+//     committed in that window moved the endpoint under an artifact already
+//     verified against the old chain, so it would have gone to the new chain's
+//     node — the very thing the verification exists to prevent.
+//
+//   - backgroundRefresh() handed the singleton's wallets to refreshBalances(),
+//     which mutates address objects in place across a multi-second network
+//     round trip. Any concurrent handler that loaded state replaced those
+//     objects, so the refreshed balances landed on detached ones and the save
+//     that followed persisted the pre-refresh values — while still stamping
+//     lastBalanceRefresh, suppressing the redo.
+//
+// Both use the real persistence path over a cloning storage stub. Nothing here
+// asserts the absence of a loadState() call; each asserts the OUTCOME, so it
+// holds against any implementation that gets the outcome right.
+
+const { Wallet } = require("ethers");
+const { networkById } = require("../src/shared/networks");
+const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
+
+const SIGNER_KEY =
+    "0x59c6995e998f97a5a0044966f0945389dc9e86dae88c7a8412f4603b6b78690d";
+const signer = new Wallet(SIGNER_KEY);
+const RECIPIENT = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
+
+const CONNECTED_ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
+const CONNECTED_HOSTNAME = "dapp.example";
+const EXT_URL = "chrome-extension://autistmask/";
+
+const MAINNET = networkById("mainnet");
+const SEPOLIA = networkById("sepolia");
+
+const NONCE = 7;
+const REFRESHED_BALANCE = "1.5";
+
+// The transaction the background populates, and the artifact signed from it.
+// Its chain is a parameter because the whole subject here is a chain moving
+// under work already committed to one.
+function populated(chainId) {
+    return {
+        type: 2,
+        chainId,
+        nonce: NONCE,
+        gasLimit: 100000n,
+        maxFeePerGas: 2000000000n,
+        maxPriorityFeePerGas: 1000000000n,
+        to: RECIPIENT,
+        value: 10000000000000000n,
+        data: "0x",
+    };
+}
+
+function storedProfile(networkId) {
+    const net = networkById(networkId);
+    return {
+        hasWallet: true,
+        wallets: [
+            {
+                name: "Wallet 1",
+                type: "hd",
+                xpub: "xpub-1",
+                addresses: [
+                    {
+                        address: signer.address,
+                        balance: "0.0",
+                        tokenBalances: [],
+                    },
+                ],
+            },
+        ],
+        activeAddress: signer.address,
+        networkId,
+        rpcUrl: net.defaultRpcUrl,
+        blockscoutUrl: net.defaultBlockscoutUrl,
+        allowedSites: { [signer.address]: [CONNECTED_HOSTNAME] },
+        deniedSites: {},
+        trackedTokens: [],
+        lastBalanceRefresh: 0,
+    };
+}
+
+async function settle() {
+    for (let i = 0; i < 60; i++) await Promise.resolve();
+}
+
+function deferred() {
+    let resolve;
+    const promise = new Promise((res) => {
+        resolve = res;
+    });
+    return { promise, resolve };
+}
+
+afterEach(() => {
+    delete global.chrome;
+});
+
+// The background worker over a cloning storage stub, with the network and the
+// clock stubbed out. `opts.refreshBalances` replaces the balance refresh so a
+// test can hold one open across another handler's whole turn.
+function loadWorker(networkId, opts) {
+    const options = opts || {};
+    jest.resetModules();
+
+    // Every provider this worker constructs, in order, with the endpoint and
+    // the network id it was given. The subject of the first test is which pair
+    // reaches the broadcast.
+    const providers = [];
+    const broadcastTransaction = jest.fn(async () => ({ hash: "0xfeed" }));
+
+    jest.doMock("../src/shared/balances", () => ({
+        getProvider: (rpcUrl, networkId2) => {
+            const provider = {
+                rpcUrl,
+                networkId: networkId2,
+                broadcastTransaction,
+                getNetwork: async () => ({
+                    chainId: BigInt(networkById(networkId2).networkVersion),
+                }),
+                getTransactionCount: async () => NONCE,
+                estimateGas: async () => 100000n,
+                getFeeData: async () => ({
+                    gasPrice: 2000000000n,
+                    maxFeePerGas: 2000000000n,
+                    maxPriorityFeePerGas: 1000000000n,
+                }),
+            };
+            providers.push(provider);
+            return provider;
+        },
+        refreshBalances:
+            options.refreshBalances || jest.fn(async () => undefined),
+    }));
+    jest.doMock("../src/shared/phishingDomains", () => ({
+        isPhishingDomain: () => false,
+    }));
+    let alarmHandlers = {};
+    jest.doMock("../src/shared/alarms", () => ({
+        BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM: "balance",
+        BALANCE_REFRESH_PERIOD_MINUTES: 1,
+        ensureRecurringAlarms: jest.fn(async () => {}),
+        registerAlarmHandlers: jest.fn((handlers) => {
+            alarmHandlers = handlers;
+        }),
+    }));
+
+    const storage = makeStorageStub({ autistmask: storedProfile(networkId) });
+    // A hook the tests use to suspend one handler mid-flight, so the other one
+    // runs entirely inside its window.
+    let getHook = null;
+    const realGet = storage.local.get;
+    storage.local.get = jest.fn(async (key) => {
+        if (getHook) await getHook();
+        return realGet(key);
+    });
+
+    let messageListener = null;
+    // Every popup URL the background opened. The approval id is in it, and
+    // that is how the popup learns which approval it is answering.
+    const createdUrls = [];
+    global.chrome = {
+        storage,
+        runtime: {
+            getURL: (path) => EXT_URL + path,
+            onMessage: {
+                addListener: (fn) => {
+                    messageListener = fn;
+                },
+            },
+            onConnect: { addListener: () => {} },
+            lastError: null,
+        },
+        windows: {
+            getLastFocused: (cb) => cb(null),
+            create: (createOpts, cb) => {
+                createdUrls.push(createOpts.url);
+                cb({ id: createdUrls.length });
+            },
+            remove: (id, cb) => {
+                if (cb) cb();
+            },
+            onRemoved: { addListener: () => {} },
+        },
+        tabs: {
+            query: (queryInfo, cb) => cb([{ id: 1 }]),
+            sendMessage: (tabId, message, cb) => {
+                if (cb) cb();
+            },
+        },
+        action: { setPopup: () => {} },
+    };
+
+    require("../src/background/index");
+
+    function send(msg, sender) {
+        let result = null;
+        const kept = messageListener(msg, sender, (r) => {
+            result = r;
+        });
+        return { kept, result: () => result };
+    }
+
+    function rpc(method, params, origin) {
+        return send(
+            { type: "AUTISTMASK_RPC", method, params },
+            { origin: origin || CONNECTED_ORIGIN },
+        );
+    }
+
+    return {
+        rpc,
+        send,
+        providers,
+        broadcastTransaction,
+        persisted: () => storage.read("autistmask"),
+        setGetHook: (hook) => {
+            getHook = hook;
+        },
+        fromPopup: { url: EXT_URL + "src/popup/index.html" },
+        fireBalanceAlarm: () => alarmHandlers.balance(),
+        lastApprovalId: () => {
+            const url = createdUrls[createdUrls.length - 1];
+            if (!url) return null;
+            return new URL(url, EXT_URL).searchParams.get("approval");
+        },
+    };
+}
+
+describe("a chain switch under a transaction already committed to a chain", () => {
+    // Item 4 of https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324.
+    //
+    // The artifact is verified against the chain read at the top of the
+    // attempt. Whatever endpoint it is then broadcast to has to be that same
+    // chain's — otherwise the wallet checks a transaction against Sepolia and
+    // sends it to a mainnet node. A connected site can switch the chain at any
+    // moment, including this one.
+    test("the artifact is broadcast to the endpoint of the chain it was verified against", async () => {
+        const bg = loadWorker("sepolia");
+
+        // Raise the approval, then find its id from the popup's own fetch.
+        bg.rpc("eth_sendTransaction", [
+            {
+                from: signer.address,
+                to: RECIPIENT,
+                value: "0x2386f26fc10000",
+                data: "0x",
+            },
+        ]);
+        await settle();
+
+        const id = bg.lastApprovalId();
+        expect(id).toBeTruthy();
+
+        // The popup signs what it was shown: Sepolia.
+        const rawSignedTx = await signer.signTransaction(
+            populated(Number(SEPOLIA.networkVersion)),
+        );
+
+        // A connected site switches the chain while the attempt is running,
+        // and the switch is committed to storage in full before the attempt
+        // goes any further.
+        //
+        // It is fired from inside the attempt's SECOND state read, because
+        // that is where the window used to be: the chain id was captured at
+        // the first read and the endpoint was taken off the singleton several
+        // awaits later, so a switch landing between them moved the endpoint
+        // under an artifact already verified against the old chain. An
+        // implementation that takes both from one read has no second read for
+        // this to fire on, and the switch below runs after the attempt is
+        // done instead — which is the point.
+        let reads = 0;
+        let switched = null;
+        const doSwitch = async () => {
+            switched = bg.rpc("wallet_switchEthereumChain", [
+                { chainId: MAINNET.chainId },
+            ]);
+            await settle();
+        };
+        bg.setGetHook(async () => {
+            reads++;
+            if (reads !== 2) return;
+            bg.setGetHook(null);
+            await doSwitch();
+        });
+
+        const attempt = bg.send(
+            {
+                type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
+                id,
+                approved: true,
+                rawSignedTx,
+            },
+            { url: bg.fromPopup.url },
+        );
+        await settle();
+
+        bg.setGetHook(null);
+        if (!switched) await doSwitch();
+        expect(switched.result()).toEqual({ result: null });
+        expect(bg.persisted().networkId).toBe("mainnet");
+        await settle();
+
+        // It went out, and it went out to Sepolia's node — the chain the
+        // artifact was verified against. Reading the endpoint separately from
+        // the chain id put mainnet's here.
+        expect(attempt.result()).toEqual({ txHash: "0xfeed" });
+        expect(bg.broadcastTransaction).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+        const used = bg.providers[bg.providers.length - 1];
+        expect(used.rpcUrl).toBe(SEPOLIA.defaultRpcUrl);
+        expect(used.networkId).toBe("sepolia");
+    });
+});
+
+describe("a balance refresh under another handler's state read", () => {
+    // Item 5 of https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324.
+    //
+    // The trigger is a same-chain wallet_switchEthereumChain from a connected
+    // site: it answers { result: null } and changes nothing, so the ONLY thing
+    // it can do to the refresh is what its state read does. On the singleton
+    // that read replaced state.wallets, detaching the objects the refresh was
+    // mutating.
+    test("a chain read arriving mid-refresh does not discard the refresh", async () => {
+        const roundTrip = deferred();
+        const reachedNetwork = deferred();
+
+        const bg = loadWorker("sepolia", {
+            refreshBalances: async (wallets) => {
+                reachedNetwork.resolve();
+                await roundTrip.promise;
+                // In place, on the objects handed in — as balances.js does.
+                wallets[0].addresses[0].balance = REFRESHED_BALANCE;
+            },
+        });
+
+        const refresh = bg.fireBalanceAlarm();
+        await reachedNetwork.promise;
+
+        const answered = bg.rpc("wallet_switchEthereumChain", [
+            { chainId: SEPOLIA.chainId },
+        ]);
+        await settle();
+        expect(answered.result()).toEqual({ result: null });
+
+        roundTrip.resolve();
+        await refresh;
+
+        expect(bg.persisted().wallets[0].addresses[0].balance).toBe(
+            REFRESHED_BALANCE,
+        );
+        expect(bg.persisted().lastBalanceRefresh).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+    });
+
+    // The other half of "does not publish a shared object": a wallet added
+    // while the refresh was in flight must survive the refresh's own write.
+    test("a wallet added mid-refresh survives the refresh's write", async () => {
+        const roundTrip = deferred();
+        const reachedNetwork = deferred();
+
+        const bg = loadWorker("sepolia", {
+            refreshBalances: async (wallets) => {
+                reachedNetwork.resolve();
+                await roundTrip.promise;
+                wallets[0].addresses[0].balance = REFRESHED_BALANCE;
+            },
+        });
+
+        const refresh = bg.fireBalanceAlarm();
+        await reachedNetwork.promise;
+
+        // Another extension page adds a wallet while the round trip is out.
+        const during = bg.persisted();
+        during.wallets.push({
+            name: "Wallet 2",
+            type: "hd",
+            xpub: "xpub-2",
+            addresses: [
+                { address: RECIPIENT, balance: "0.0", tokenBalances: [] },
+            ],
+        });
+        global.chrome.storage.write("autistmask", during);
+
+        roundTrip.resolve();
+        await refresh;
+
+        const after = bg.persisted();
+        expect(after.wallets).toHaveLength(2);
+        expect(after.wallets[0].addresses[0].balance).toBe(REFRESHED_BALANCE);
+    });
+});

tests/backgroundStateLintRule.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,270 @@
+// The lint rule that keeps src/shared/state.js out of the background bundle
+// (script/lib/eslint/noStateSingletonInBackground.js).
+//
+// Five defects, one of which destroyed a wallet, came from background code
+// reaching that singleton, and each point fix created the next site
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324).
+//
+// What this file does NOT do is establish that the singleton cannot reach the
+// background bundle. That is build.js's FORBIDDEN_INPUTS assertion, which reads
+// esbuild's metafile and so cannot be evaded by a syntax a matcher does not
+// know; it is pinned by tests/buildForbiddenInputs.test.js. The rule under test
+// here is fast local feedback in front of that, and these cases pin the shapes
+// it is known to catch, so a regression in the matcher is a failing test rather
+// than a quietly narrower rule.
+//
+// Every shape below was measured against a real `make build`: each one puts
+// state.js in the shipped background bundles, and each one was invisible to
+// some earlier revision of the matcher — the quoted-only regex missed the
+// backtick, the dynamic import and the `from` clause; its successor missed a
+// comment inside the call and a directory resolved through package.json `main`.
+//
+// Two shapes the rule does NOT report are pinned below as non-reports, in
+// "the divergences from the build's answer": a computed specifier such as
+// `require("../shared/" + "state")`, which esbuild constant-folds, and a
+// symlink to the module, whose real path esbuild reports. Both put state.js in
+// the shipped background bundle and both are `make build` exit 2 with
+// `make lint` exit 0 (measured). Pinning them as non-reports is what makes the
+// rule's stated bounds a measured description rather than a claim: if either
+// starts being reported, or the matcher is widened until one is, a test says
+// so. Their catch is the build's, and is pinned in
+// tests/buildForbiddenInputs.test.js against the metafile that catches it.
+
+const fs = require("fs");
+const os = require("os");
+const path = require("path");
+const { Linter } = require("eslint");
+
+const plugin = require("../script/lib/eslint/noStateSingletonInBackground");
+
+const RULE = "background/no-state-singleton-in-background";
+
+// The three files a fixture tree always has. `src/background/index.js` is
+// supplied per case; the other two stand in for the real modules.
+const SHARED_STATE = "const state = {};\nmodule.exports = { state };\n";
+const SHARED_HOP =
+    "// A shared module the background legitimately imports.\n" +
+    "module.exports = { applyChainSwitchFields() {} };\n";
+
+let roots = [];
+
+function fixture(files) {
+    const root = fs.realpathSync(
+        fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "autistmask-state-rule-")),
+    );
+    roots.push(root);
+    const tree = {
+        "src/shared/state.js": SHARED_STATE,
+        "src/shared/chainSwitchFields.js": SHARED_HOP,
+        ...files,
+    };
+    for (const [rel, source] of Object.entries(tree)) {
+        const abs = path.join(root, rel);
+        fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(abs), { recursive: true });
+        fs.writeFileSync(abs, source);
+    }
+    return root;
+}
+
+// Run the rule exactly as eslint.config.js runs it, over a real tree: the walk
+// reads its sources from disk, so a virtual RuleTester would not exercise it.
+// `sourceType` is the fixture's own, not the rule's business: the walk is
+// textual and never parses the files it follows. The two ESM cases below pass
+// "module" only so espree can parse the fixture at all — in this repo those
+// shapes are also a parse error under the commonjs config, but the rule must
+// not be left depending on that.
+function lintBackground(root, { sourceType = "commonjs" } = {}) {
+    const file = path.join(root, "src/background/index.js");
+    const linter = new Linter({ cwd: root });
+    return linter.verify(
+        fs.readFileSync(file, "utf8"),
+        {
+            plugins: { background: plugin },
+            languageOptions: { ecmaVersion: 2024, sourceType },
+            rules: { [RULE]: "error" },
+        },
+        file,
+    );
+}
+
+function chainOf(messages) {
+    expect(messages).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(messages[0].ruleId).toBe(RULE);
+    // "...singleton: <chain>. The MV3 worker..." — the chain is what the
+    // message exists to hand the reader, so assert on it rather than on the
+    // fact that something was reported.
+    return messages[0].message.split("singleton: ")[1].split(". The MV3")[0];
+}
+
+afterEach(() => {
+    for (const root of roots) fs.rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    roots = [];
+});
+
+describe("the specifier syntaxes the matcher is known to catch", () => {
+    test("a quoted require", () => {
+        const root = fixture({
+            "src/background/index.js":
+                'const { state } = require("../shared/state");\n' +
+                "module.exports = { state };\n",
+        });
+        expect(chainOf(lintBackground(root))).toBe(
+            "src/background/index.js -> src/shared/state.js",
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("a backtick require", () => {
+        const root = fixture({
+            "src/background/index.js":
+                "const { state } = require(`../shared/state`);\n" +
+                "module.exports = { state };\n",
+        });
+        expect(chainOf(lintBackground(root))).toBe(
+            "src/background/index.js -> src/shared/state.js",
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("a dynamic import inside an async function", () => {
+        const root = fixture({
+            "src/background/index.js":
+                "async function readState() {\n" +
+                '    const m = await import("../shared/state");\n' +
+                "    return m.state;\n" +
+                "}\n" +
+                "module.exports = { readState };\n",
+        });
+        expect(chainOf(lintBackground(root))).toBe(
+            "src/background/index.js -> src/shared/state.js",
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("a static import from-clause", () => {
+        const root = fixture({
+            "src/background/index.js":
+                'import { state } from "../shared/state";\n' +
+                "export { state };\n",
+        });
+        expect(chainOf(lintBackground(root, { sourceType: "module" }))).toBe(
+            "src/background/index.js -> src/shared/state.js",
+        );
+    });
+
+    // `import(/* webpackChunkName: "x" */ "./x")` is the standard bundler
+    // annotation idiom, and prettier leaves both of these exactly as written,
+    // so nothing else in the repo would object to them either.
+    test("a comment between the paren and the specifier", () => {
+        const root = fixture({
+            "src/background/index.js":
+                'globalThis.__probe = require(/* probe */ "../shared/state").state;\n',
+        });
+        expect(chainOf(lintBackground(root))).toBe(
+            "src/background/index.js -> src/shared/state.js",
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("a comment between the specifier and the closing paren", () => {
+        const root = fixture({
+            "src/background/index.js":
+                'globalThis.__probe = require("../shared/state" /* probe */).state;\n',
+        });
+        expect(chainOf(lintBackground(root))).toBe(
+            "src/background/index.js -> src/shared/state.js",
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("a bare side-effect import", () => {
+        const root = fixture({
+            "src/background/index.js": 'import "../shared/state";\n',
+        });
+        expect(chainOf(lintBackground(root, { sourceType: "module" }))).toBe(
+            "src/background/index.js -> src/shared/state.js",
+        );
+    });
+});
+
+describe("reachability, not just the direct specifier", () => {
+    // The shape a no-restricted-imports could never see: no background file
+    // names state.js, and the singleton is in the bundle anyway. In a backtick
+    // require, so this fails on the specifier widening as well as on the walk.
+    test("a two-hop re-export through a shared module", () => {
+        const root = fixture({
+            "src/background/index.js":
+                'const { applyChainSwitchFields } = require("../shared/chainSwitchFields");\n' +
+                "module.exports = { applyChainSwitchFields };\n",
+            "src/shared/chainSwitchFields.js":
+                SHARED_HOP +
+                "module.exports.state = require(`./state`).state;\n",
+        });
+        expect(chainOf(lintBackground(root))).toBe(
+            "src/background/index.js -> src/shared/chainSwitchFields.js" +
+                " -> src/shared/state.js",
+        );
+    });
+
+    // Resolution, not syntax: the specifier names a directory, and the file it
+    // resolves to is chosen by that directory's package.json `main`. A walk
+    // that only tries `<dir>/index.js` stops on a specifier it matched.
+    test("a directory resolved through its package.json main", () => {
+        const root = fixture({
+            "src/background/index.js":
+                'globalThis.__probe = require("../shared/probepkg").state;\n',
+            "src/shared/probepkg/package.json": '{"main": "./bridge.js"}\n',
+            "src/shared/probepkg/bridge.js":
+                'const { state } = require("../state");\n' +
+                "module.exports = { state };\n",
+        });
+        expect(chainOf(lintBackground(root))).toBe(
+            "src/background/index.js -> src/shared/probepkg/bridge.js" +
+                " -> src/shared/state.js",
+        );
+    });
+});
+
+// These two are holes in the rule, and they are pinned as holes on purpose:
+// the build catches both, the rule is fast feedback in front of it, and a
+// written-down bound that nothing measures is how the previous three rounds of
+// this change ended up with claims that were false.
+describe("the divergences from the build's answer", () => {
+    test("a computed specifier is not reported (esbuild folds it; the build fails)", () => {
+        const root = fixture({
+            "src/background/index.js":
+                'globalThis.__probe = require("../shared/" + "state").state;\n',
+        });
+        expect(lintBackground(root)).toEqual([]);
+    });
+
+    test("a symlink to the module is not reported (esbuild reports the real path)", () => {
+        const root = fixture({
+            "src/background/index.js":
+                'const { state } = require("../shared/stateLink");\n' +
+                "module.exports = { state };\n",
+        });
+        fs.symlinkSync(
+            path.join(root, "src/shared/state.js"),
+            path.join(root, "src/shared/stateLink.js"),
+        );
+        expect(lintBackground(root)).toEqual([]);
+    });
+});
+
+describe("what the rule must not report", () => {
+    test("a background file that reaches only its own state layer", () => {
+        const root = fixture({
+            "src/background/index.js":
+                'const { getState } = require("./state");\n' +
+                'const { applyChainSwitchFields } = require("../shared/chainSwitchFields");\n' +
+                "module.exports = { getState, applyChainSwitchFields };\n",
+            "src/background/state.js":
+                "async function getState() {}\nmodule.exports = { getState };\n",
+        });
+        expect(lintBackground(root)).toEqual([]);
+    });
+
+    // The tree as it actually stands. This is the assertion that would catch a
+    // widened matcher that resolves something it should not: it runs the rule
+    // over the real background entrypoint, from the real repo root.
+    test("the repository's own background entrypoint", () => {
+        const root = path.resolve(__dirname, "..");
+        expect(lintBackground(root)).toEqual([]);
+    });
+});

tests/buildForbiddenInputs.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,366 @@
+// build.js's FORBIDDEN_INPUTS assertion — the mechanical guarantee that the
+// MV3 background bundle cannot contain src/shared/state.js
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324).
+//
+// Why this file exists: `make check` does not run `make build`. CI executes
+// the assertion (Dockerfile runs `make build`), but executing is not testing —
+// invert its condition, or make the table lookup always come back undefined,
+// and every check in this repo stays green while the singleton walks back into
+// the worker. Five defects, one destroyed wallet, and the whole argument for
+// the scoped loud-read guard rest on this assertion, so it is pinned here.
+//
+// The subject is build.js's exported helpers plus the table's own
+// well-formedness check, driven against SYNTHETIC metafiles in esbuild's
+// shape. Nothing here shells out to a build or writes dist/: the assertion's
+// job is to read a metafile correctly, and a metafile is data. That the real
+// shapes reach it is the build's own business and is measured in the PR that
+// introduced it.
+//
+// Every vacuous pass this guarantee has been found to have is pinned below,
+// because each one was a way for `make check`, `make lint` and `make build` to
+// be green over a background bundle containing the singleton: a stale key, a
+// stale module, an entry that lists no modules, an entry recorded as checked
+// before its bundle was in hand, and a background entry point nobody added to
+// the table.
+//
+// Paths are absolute on the way in, because the helpers normalize whatever
+// esbuild gave them to repo-relative and this file should not depend on the
+// working directory jest was started from.
+
+const path = require("path");
+
+const {
+    importChain,
+    newForbiddenRecord,
+    recordBundledInputs,
+    assertNoForbiddenInputs,
+    assertForbiddenTableCovered,
+} = require("../build");
+const {
+    BACKGROUND_ENTRY_PREFIX,
+    FORBIDDEN_INPUTS,
+    assertTableWellFormed,
+} = require("../script/lib/forbiddenBundleInputs");
+
+const ROOT = path.resolve(__dirname, "..");
+const abs = (p) => path.join(ROOT, p);
+
+const ENTRY = "src/background/index.js";
+const OUT = "dist/chrome/src/background/index.js";
+const STATE = "src/shared/state.js";
+const HOP = "src/shared/chainSwitchFields.js";
+const SECOND = "src/background/worker2.js";
+const SECOND_OUT = "dist/chrome/src/background/worker2.js";
+const POPUP = "src/popup/index.js";
+const POPUP_OUT = "dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js";
+
+// The real table's shape: entry point -> modules its bundle may not contain.
+const TABLE = { [ENTRY]: [STATE] };
+
+// A metafile as esbuild emits one: `outputs[out].inputs` is the flat list of
+// every input that contributed to that output, and `inputs[file].imports` is
+// the edge list, which is what the chain walk follows.
+function metafile({ outputs = {}, imports = {} } = {}) {
+    return {
+        outputs: Object.fromEntries(
+            Object.entries(outputs).map(([out, inputs]) => [
+                abs(out),
+                {
+                    inputs: Object.fromEntries(
+                        inputs.map((input) => [
+                            abs(input),
+                            { bytesInOutput: 1 },
+                        ]),
+                    ),
+                },
+            ]),
+        ),
+        inputs: Object.fromEntries(
+            Object.entries(imports).map(([file, targets]) => [
+                abs(file),
+                { imports: targets.map((target) => ({ path: abs(target) })) },
+            ]),
+        ),
+    };
+}
+
+function check(mf, table = TABLE, record = newForbiddenRecord()) {
+    recordBundledInputs(mf, record);
+    assertNoForbiddenInputs(abs(ENTRY), abs(OUT), mf, record, table);
+    return record;
+}
+
+describe("assertNoForbiddenInputs()", () => {
+    test("a forbidden module in the bundle fails, naming the import chain", () => {
+        const mf = metafile({
+            outputs: { [OUT]: [ENTRY, HOP, STATE] },
+            imports: {
+                [ENTRY]: [HOP],
+                [HOP]: [STATE],
+            },
+        });
+
+        expect(() => check(mf)).toThrow(
+            `${OUT} bundles ${STATE}, which ${ENTRY} must not reach: ` +
+                `${ENTRY} -> ${HOP} -> ${STATE}.`,
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("a bundle without the forbidden module passes, and is recorded as checked", () => {
+        const mf = metafile({
+            outputs: { [OUT]: [ENTRY, HOP, "src/background/state.js"] },
+            imports: { [ENTRY]: [HOP, "src/background/state.js"] },
+        });
+
+        const record = check(mf);
+        expect([...record.entriesChecked]).toEqual([ENTRY]);
+        expect(record.bundledInputs.has(STATE)).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    test("the failure still names the bundle when no import chain can be shown", () => {
+        // esbuild resolves `import("../shared/" + variable)` as a glob: the
+        // module is an input of the output, but no single edge leads to it.
+        // The message must degrade to no chain rather than crash.
+        const mf = metafile({
+            outputs: { [OUT]: [ENTRY, STATE] },
+            imports: { [ENTRY]: [] },
+        });
+
+        expect(() => check(mf)).toThrow(
+            `${OUT} bundles ${STATE}, which ${ENTRY} must not reach.`,
+        );
+    });
+
+    // The lookup this covers is the fragile step in the whole assertion:
+    // repoRelative() resolves against process.cwd() and esbuild's output keys
+    // are cwd-relative, so a change to where the build runs from, or to
+    // outfile vs outdir, makes it miss. It must be loud, and the entry must
+    // NOT already be marked checked when it does — otherwise a later edit
+    // turning this throw into an early return leaves both halves of the
+    // guarantee satisfied by a bundle nothing looked at.
+    test("an output esbuild did not report fails, and records nothing as checked", () => {
+        const mf = metafile({
+            outputs: { "dist/chrome/src/background/renamed.js": [ENTRY] },
+            imports: { [ENTRY]: [] },
+        });
+        const record = newForbiddenRecord();
+        recordBundledInputs(mf, record);
+
+        expect(() =>
+            assertNoForbiddenInputs(abs(ENTRY), abs(OUT), mf, record, TABLE),
+        ).toThrow(`esbuild reported no metafile output for ${OUT}`);
+        expect([...record.entriesChecked]).toEqual([]);
+
+        // So even if that throw became `return`, the coverage half catches it.
+        record.bundledInputs.add(STATE);
+        expect(() => assertForbiddenTableCovered(record, TABLE)).toThrow(
+            `${ENTRY} is listed in FORBIDDEN_INPUTS but was not bundled`,
+        );
+    });
+});
+
+// Finding from the fifth review of this change: adding a second worker entry
+// point is exactly the accident this guarantee exists for, and the person
+// adding one has no reason to know a table elsewhere needs a line. So the
+// default for the background directory is protected, not unprotected.
+describe("background entry points are protected by default", () => {
+    test("a bundled background entry point with no line in the table fails", () => {
+        const mf = metafile({
+            outputs: { [SECOND_OUT]: [SECOND, STATE] },
+            imports: { [SECOND]: [STATE] },
+        });
+        const record = newForbiddenRecord();
+        recordBundledInputs(mf, record);
+
+        expect(() =>
+            assertNoForbiddenInputs(
+                abs(SECOND),
+                abs(SECOND_OUT),
+                mf,
+                record,
+                TABLE,
+            ),
+        ).toThrow(
+            `${SECOND} is a background entry point with no line in ` +
+                `FORBIDDEN_INPUTS`,
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("an entry point outside the background directory needs no line", () => {
+        // The popup legitimately bundles the singleton; that is its model.
+        const mf = metafile({
+            outputs: { [POPUP_OUT]: [POPUP, STATE] },
+            imports: { [POPUP]: [STATE] },
+        });
+        const record = newForbiddenRecord();
+        recordBundledInputs(mf, record);
+
+        expect(() =>
+            assertNoForbiddenInputs(
+                abs(POPUP),
+                abs(POPUP_OUT),
+                mf,
+                record,
+                TABLE,
+            ),
+        ).not.toThrow();
+        expect([...record.entriesChecked]).toEqual([]);
+    });
+
+    test("the prefix is the one the lint rule is scoped to", () => {
+        expect(BACKGROUND_ENTRY_PREFIX).toBe("src/background/");
+        expect(SECOND.startsWith(BACKGROUND_ENTRY_PREFIX)).toBe(true);
+        expect(POPUP.startsWith(BACKGROUND_ENTRY_PREFIX)).toBe(false);
+    });
+});
+
+describe("recordBundledInputs()", () => {
+    // The sole data source for the module half of the anti-rot check, and
+    // every other case here hand-seeds what it produces. Driven for real,
+    // across two outputs, and then handed straight to the check that reads it.
+    test("records every input of every output, satisfying the module half", () => {
+        const mf = metafile({
+            outputs: {
+                [OUT]: [ENTRY, HOP],
+                [POPUP_OUT]: [POPUP, STATE],
+            },
+            imports: { [ENTRY]: [HOP], [POPUP]: [STATE] },
+        });
+        const record = newForbiddenRecord();
+        recordBundledInputs(mf, record);
+
+        expect([...record.bundledInputs].sort()).toEqual(
+            [ENTRY, HOP, POPUP, STATE].sort(),
+        );
+
+        // Nothing hand-seeded: the covered check passes on what the recorder
+        // actually collected, so a recorder that collects nothing fails here.
+        assertNoForbiddenInputs(abs(ENTRY), abs(OUT), mf, record, TABLE);
+        expect(() => assertForbiddenTableCovered(record, TABLE)).not.toThrow();
+    });
+});
+
+describe("importChain()", () => {
+    test("terminates on a cyclic input graph, and still finds the module", () => {
+        const mf = metafile({
+            imports: {
+                [ENTRY]: [HOP],
+                [HOP]: ["src/shared/log.js"],
+                // The cycle: log <-> hop, with the target one hop past it.
+                "src/shared/log.js": [HOP, STATE],
+            },
+        });
+
+        expect(importChain(mf, abs(ENTRY), STATE)).toEqual([
+            ENTRY,
+            HOP,
+            "src/shared/log.js",
+            STATE,
+        ]);
+    });
+
+    test("terminates and returns null when a cycle cannot reach the module", () => {
+        const mf = metafile({
+            imports: {
+                [ENTRY]: [HOP],
+                [HOP]: ["src/shared/log.js"],
+                "src/shared/log.js": [HOP, ENTRY],
+            },
+        });
+
+        expect(importChain(mf, abs(ENTRY), STATE)).toBeNull();
+    });
+});
+
+describe("assertForbiddenTableCovered()", () => {
+    test("the shipped table is satisfied by a build that checked it", () => {
+        const record = newForbiddenRecord();
+        record.entriesChecked.add(ENTRY);
+        // The popup bundle is what legitimately contains the singleton.
+        record.bundledInputs.add(STATE);
+
+        expect(() => assertForbiddenTableCovered(record, TABLE)).not.toThrow();
+    });
+
+    // The build this drives bundles the popup and no background entry point,
+    // because a stale key AND a bundled background entry point is now the
+    // stronger failure above — the entry point that is there but unlisted is
+    // reported by name, before the end of the build. This case is the rot that
+    // is left after that one: a key naming something this build never bundled.
+    test("a key no bundled entry point matched fails", () => {
+        const mf = metafile({
+            outputs: { [POPUP_OUT]: [POPUP] },
+            imports: { [POPUP]: [] },
+        });
+        const stale = { "src/background/renamed.js": [STATE] };
+        const record = newForbiddenRecord();
+        recordBundledInputs(mf, record);
+        assertNoForbiddenInputs(abs(POPUP), abs(POPUP_OUT), mf, record, stale);
+        record.bundledInputs.add(STATE);
+
+        expect(() => assertForbiddenTableCovered(record, stale)).toThrow(
+            "src/background/renamed.js is listed in FORBIDDEN_INPUTS but was" +
+                " not bundled, so nothing checked it",
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("a forbidden module this build bundled nowhere fails", () => {
+        // The other half of the same rot: renaming or moving the singleton
+        // leaves a table that names a path nothing resolves to any more, and
+        // every bundle then passes it vacuously.
+        const mf = metafile({
+            outputs: { [OUT]: [ENTRY] },
+            imports: { [ENTRY]: [] },
+        });
+        const stale = { [ENTRY]: ["src/shared/stateRenamed.js"] };
+        const record = check(mf, stale);
+        record.bundledInputs.add(STATE);
+
+        expect(() => assertForbiddenTableCovered(record, stale)).toThrow(
+            "src/shared/stateRenamed.js is listed in FORBIDDEN_INPUTS for" +
+                ` ${ENTRY}, but this build bundled it nowhere`,
+        );
+    });
+
+    // The third rot, and the worst of the three: an entry with an empty list
+    // is checked, is bundled, names no module that could be missing, and
+    // prohibits nothing — in BOTH layers at once, since the rule's forbidden
+    // set is Object.values(table).flat().
+    test("an entry that lists no modules fails", () => {
+        const mf = metafile({
+            outputs: { [OUT]: [ENTRY, STATE] },
+            imports: { [ENTRY]: [STATE] },
+        });
+        const empty = { [ENTRY]: [] };
+        const record = newForbiddenRecord();
+        recordBundledInputs(mf, record);
+        assertNoForbiddenInputs(abs(ENTRY), abs(OUT), mf, record, empty);
+
+        expect(() => assertForbiddenTableCovered(record, empty)).toThrow(
+            `FORBIDDEN_INPUTS["${ENTRY}"] lists no modules`,
+        );
+    });
+});
+
+describe("assertTableWellFormed()", () => {
+    // Runs at require time on the shipped table, in script/lib/
+    // forbiddenBundleInputs.js, so an empty list fails the lint run as well as
+    // the build — the build's own re-check cannot help a layer that never
+    // reaches the build.
+    test("the shipped table is well formed", () => {
+        expect(() => assertTableWellFormed(FORBIDDEN_INPUTS)).not.toThrow();
+        expect(Object.entries(FORBIDDEN_INPUTS).length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+    });
+
+    test("an entry that lists no modules fails, naming the entry", () => {
+        expect(() => assertTableWellFormed({ [ENTRY]: [] })).toThrow(
+            `FORBIDDEN_INPUTS["${ENTRY}"] lists no modules`,
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("a table with no entries at all fails", () => {
+        expect(() => assertTableWellFormed({})).toThrow(
+            "FORBIDDEN_INPUTS is empty",
+        );
+    });
+});

tests/chainSwitchGate.test.js

@@ -8,10 +8,12 @@
 // broadcast — because an error code alone would not distinguish a gate from
 // a switch that happened and then reported a failure.
 //
-// The endpoint half of that issue lives in tests/networkEndpoints.test.js;
+// The endpoint half of that issue lives in tests/networkEndpoints.test.js,
-// this file mocks the state module, which that one exercises for real.
+// which covers the popup's chain switch; this file covers the background's,
+// which goes through storage rather than the shared state singleton.
 
 const { networkById } = require("../src/shared/networks");
+const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
 
 const ADDRESS = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
 
@@ -51,29 +53,11 @@ afterEach(() => {
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
 // Load the background worker against stubbed browser APIs, with the real
-// chain-switch module behind it, and return the handles to drive it. The
+// chain-switch and persistence modules behind it, and return the handles to
-// wallet state is a plain object so that a switch that DID happen is visible
+// drive it.
-// as a mutation of it, and one that did not is visible as its absence.
 function loadBackground() {
     jest.resetModules();
 
-    const walletState = {
-        networkId: "mainnet",
-        rpcUrl: CUSTOM_RPC,
-        blockscoutUrl: MAINNET.defaultBlockscoutUrl,
-        networkEndpoints: {},
-        wallets: walletFixture(),
-        lastBalanceRefresh: 1,
-        tokenHolderCache: {},
-        fraudContracts: [],
-    };
-
-    jest.doMock("../src/shared/state", () => ({
-        state: walletState,
-        loadState: jest.fn(async () => {}),
-        saveState: jest.fn(async () => {}),
-        currentNetwork: () => networkById(walletState.networkId),
-    }));
     jest.doMock("../src/shared/balances", () => ({
         getProvider: () => ({}),
         refreshBalances: jest.fn(async () => {}),
@@ -88,12 +72,24 @@ function loadBackground() {
         registerAlarmHandlers: jest.fn(),
     }));
 
+    // Storage is the only wallet state there is. The background reads and
+    // writes it per call — it holds no in-memory copy and cannot reach the
+    // shared singleton — so a switch that happened is visible here as a
+    // written record, and one that did not is visible as its absence.
     const persisted = {
+        networkId: "mainnet",
+        rpcUrl: CUSTOM_RPC,
+        blockscoutUrl: MAINNET.defaultBlockscoutUrl,
+        networkEndpoints: {},
         wallets: walletFixture(),
+        lastBalanceRefresh: 1,
+        tokenHolderCache: {},
+        fraudContracts: [],
         activeAddress: ADDRESS,
         allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_HOSTNAME] },
         deniedSites: {},
     };
+    const storage = makeStorageStub({ autistmask: persisted });
 
     let messageListener = null;
     // Every message the background pushed at a content script. chainChanged
@@ -102,12 +98,7 @@ function loadBackground() {
     const toTabs = [];
 
     global.chrome = {
-        storage: {
+        storage,
-            local: {
-                get: jest.fn(async () => ({ autistmask: persisted })),
-                set: jest.fn(async () => {}),
-            },
-        },
         runtime: {
             getURL: (path) => "chrome-extension://autistmask/" + path,
             onMessage: {
@@ -157,7 +148,7 @@ function loadBackground() {
 
     return {
         switchChain,
-        walletState,
+        walletState: () => storage.read("autistmask"),
         chainChangedEvents: () =>
             toTabs.filter((m) => m.eventName === "chainChanged"),
     };
@@ -174,8 +165,8 @@ describe("wallet_switchEthereumChain is gated on the connection", () => {
         // The refusal has to be a refusal to ACT, not just an error string:
         // the wallet is still on mainnet, still on the user's own node, and
         // no page was told the chain moved.
-        expect(bg.walletState.networkId).toBe("mainnet");
+        expect(bg.walletState().networkId).toBe("mainnet");
-        expect(bg.walletState.rpcUrl).toBe(CUSTOM_RPC);
+        expect(bg.walletState().rpcUrl).toBe(CUSTOM_RPC);
         expect(bg.chainChangedEvents()).toEqual([]);
     });
 
@@ -201,7 +192,7 @@ describe("wallet_switchEthereumChain is gated on the connection", () => {
         const result = await bg.switchChain(SEPOLIA.chainId, CONNECTED_ORIGIN);
 
         expect(result).toEqual({ result: null });
-        expect(bg.walletState.networkId).toBe("sepolia");
+        expect(bg.walletState().networkId).toBe("sepolia");
         expect(bg.chainChangedEvents()).toEqual([
             {
                 type: "AUTISTMASK_EVENT",
@@ -217,16 +208,16 @@ describe("wallet_switchEthereumChain is gated on the connection", () => {
         const result = await bg.switchChain("0x89", CONNECTED_ORIGIN);
 
         expect(result.error.code).toBe(4902);
-        expect(bg.walletState.networkId).toBe("mainnet");
+        expect(bg.walletState().networkId).toBe("mainnet");
     });
 
     test("a switch by a connected origin keeps the user's endpoint", async () => {
         const bg = loadBackground();
 
         await bg.switchChain(SEPOLIA.chainId, CONNECTED_ORIGIN);
-        expect(bg.walletState.rpcUrl).toBe(SEPOLIA.defaultRpcUrl);
+        expect(bg.walletState().rpcUrl).toBe(SEPOLIA.defaultRpcUrl);
 
         await bg.switchChain(MAINNET.chainId, CONNECTED_ORIGIN);
-        expect(bg.walletState.rpcUrl).toBe(CUSTOM_RPC);
+        expect(bg.walletState().rpcUrl).toBe(CUSTOM_RPC);
     });
 });

tests/coldWorkerChainSwitch.test.js

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 // first, so neither can see this.
 
 const { networkById } = require("../src/shared/networks");
+const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
 
 const ADDRESS = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
 
@@ -64,9 +65,12 @@ afterEach(() => {
     delete global.chrome;
 });
 
-// Load the background worker with the real state and chain-switch modules
+// Load the background worker with the real chain-switch and persistence
-// behind it, over a storage stub that actually keeps what is written — a
+// modules behind it, over a storage stub that actually keeps what is written —
-// wipe is only observable against storage that remembers.
+// a wipe is only observable against storage that remembers — and that clones
+// in both directions, as the real API does. It used to alias, so the record
+// the worker held and the "stored" one were a single object; see
+// tests/support/storageStub.js.
 function loadColdWorker(networkId) {
     jest.resetModules();
 
@@ -84,20 +88,13 @@ function loadColdWorker(networkId) {
         registerAlarmHandlers: jest.fn(),
     }));
 
-    const store = { autistmask: storedProfile(networkId) };
+    const storage = makeStorageStub({ autistmask: storedProfile(networkId) });
 
     let messageListener = null;
     const toTabs = [];
 
     global.chrome = {
-        storage: {
+        storage,
-            local: {
-                get: jest.fn(async () => ({ autistmask: store.autistmask })),
-                set: jest.fn(async (items) => {
-                    store.autistmask = items.autistmask;
-                }),
-            },
-        },
         runtime: {
             getURL: (path) => "chrome-extension://autistmask/" + path,
             onMessage: {
@@ -147,7 +144,7 @@ function loadColdWorker(networkId) {
 
     return {
         switchChain,
-        persisted: () => store.autistmask,
+        persisted: () => storage.read("autistmask"),
         chainChangedEvents: () =>
             toTabs.filter((m) => m.eventName === "chainChanged"),
     };

tests/coldWorkerSendTransaction.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,279 @@
+// Which chain a dApp transaction is PREPARED for on a worker that has not
+// loaded state.
+//
+// The MV3 service worker is terminated when idle — roughly 30 seconds, which
+// is its normal condition — and revived by the page's own message. Nothing
+// loads state at module scope, so handleSendTransaction() used to build its
+// provider with `getProvider(await getRpcUrl())`: the endpoint came from
+// storage and was right, and the static network hint was omitted, so
+// src/shared/balances.js fell back to currentNetwork() — the unpopulated
+// singleton — and answered mainnet. ethers then fixed `chainId` at 0x1.
+//
+// The transaction was not sent on the wrong chain: verifySignedTx() compares
+// the artifact against the selected chain and refused it. So the guard held
+// and the feature did not — a user on any non-mainnet network could not send
+// from a dApp at all, and the error described the symptom
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/320).
+//
+// This drives the real balances module and the real approval preparation and
+// verification. Only ethers' JsonRpcProvider is replaced, so the static
+// network hint getProvider() computes is the hint the population sees.
+
+const { Network, Wallet, Transaction } = require("ethers");
+const { networkById } = require("../src/shared/networks");
+const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
+
+const SIGNER_KEY =
+    "0x59c6995e998f97a5a0044966f0945389dc9e86dae88c7a8412f4603b6b78690d";
+const signer = new Wallet(SIGNER_KEY);
+const RECIPIENT = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
+
+const CONNECTED_ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
+const CONNECTED_HOSTNAME = "dapp.example";
+const EXT_URL = "chrome-extension://autistmask/";
+
+const SEPOLIA = networkById("sepolia");
+const MAINNET = networkById("mainnet");
+
+const NONCE = 7;
+const TX_HASH = "0xfeed";
+
+const TX_PARAMS = {
+    from: signer.address,
+    to: RECIPIENT,
+    value: "0x2386f26fc10000",
+    data: "0x",
+};
+
+function storedProfile(networkId) {
+    const net = networkById(networkId);
+    return {
+        hasWallet: true,
+        wallets: [
+            {
+                name: "Wallet 1",
+                type: "hd",
+                xpub: "xpub-1",
+                addresses: [
+                    {
+                        address: signer.address,
+                        balance: "0.0",
+                        tokenBalances: [],
+                    },
+                ],
+            },
+        ],
+        activeAddress: signer.address,
+        networkId,
+        rpcUrl: net.defaultRpcUrl,
+        blockscoutUrl: net.defaultBlockscoutUrl,
+        allowedSites: { [signer.address]: [CONNECTED_HOSTNAME] },
+        deniedSites: {},
+        trackedTokens: [],
+    };
+}
+
+async function settle() {
+    for (let i = 0; i < 60; i++) await Promise.resolve();
+}
+
+afterEach(() => {
+    delete global.chrome;
+});
+
+// A worker whose only wallet state is what is in storage, with ethers'
+// JsonRpcProvider replaced by a stub that answers out of the static network it
+// was constructed with — which is exactly what a real staticNetwork provider
+// does, and what makes the chain id on the approval screen observable here.
+function loadColdWorker(networkId) {
+    jest.resetModules();
+
+    const constructed = [];
+    const broadcast = [];
+
+    jest.doMock("ethers", () => {
+        const actual = jest.requireActual("ethers");
+        class StubJsonRpcProvider {
+            constructor(url, network) {
+                this._network = network;
+                constructed.push({ url, network });
+            }
+            async getNetwork() {
+                return this._network;
+            }
+            async getTransactionCount() {
+                return NONCE;
+            }
+            async estimateGas() {
+                return 100000n;
+            }
+            async getFeeData() {
+                return {
+                    gasPrice: 2000000000n,
+                    maxFeePerGas: 2000000000n,
+                    maxPriorityFeePerGas: 1000000000n,
+                };
+            }
+            async broadcastTransaction(raw) {
+                broadcast.push(raw);
+                return { hash: TX_HASH };
+            }
+        }
+        return { ...actual, JsonRpcProvider: StubJsonRpcProvider };
+    });
+    jest.doMock("../src/shared/phishingDomains", () => ({
+        isPhishingDomain: () => false,
+    }));
+    jest.doMock("../src/shared/alarms", () => ({
+        BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM: "balance",
+        BALANCE_REFRESH_PERIOD_MINUTES: 1,
+        ensureRecurringAlarms: jest.fn(async () => {}),
+        registerAlarmHandlers: jest.fn(),
+    }));
+
+    const storage = makeStorageStub({ autistmask: storedProfile(networkId) });
+
+    let messageListener = null;
+    const createdUrls = [];
+
+    global.chrome = {
+        storage,
+        runtime: {
+            getURL: (path) => EXT_URL + path,
+            onMessage: {
+                addListener: (fn) => {
+                    messageListener = fn;
+                },
+            },
+            onConnect: { addListener: () => {} },
+            lastError: null,
+        },
+        windows: {
+            getLastFocused: (cb) => cb(null),
+            create: (opts, cb) => {
+                createdUrls.push(opts.url);
+                cb({ id: createdUrls.length });
+            },
+            remove: (id, cb) => {
+                if (cb) cb();
+            },
+            onRemoved: { addListener: () => {} },
+        },
+        tabs: {
+            query: (queryInfo, cb) => cb([{ id: 1 }]),
+            sendMessage: (tabId, message, cb) => {
+                if (cb) cb();
+            },
+        },
+        action: { setPopup: () => {} },
+    };
+
+    require("../src/background/index");
+
+    function send(msg, sender) {
+        let result = null;
+        messageListener(msg, sender, (r) => {
+            result = r;
+        });
+        return () => result;
+    }
+
+    return {
+        send,
+        constructed,
+        broadcast,
+        fromPopup: { url: EXT_URL + "src/popup/index.html" },
+        // The first message this worker ever sees, as the injected provider
+        // sends it.
+        sendTransaction: () =>
+            send(
+                {
+                    type: "AUTISTMASK_RPC",
+                    method: "eth_sendTransaction",
+                    params: [TX_PARAMS],
+                },
+                { origin: CONNECTED_ORIGIN },
+            ),
+        approvalId: () => {
+            const url = createdUrls[createdUrls.length - 1];
+            return url
+                ? new URL(url, EXT_URL).searchParams.get("approval")
+                : null;
+        },
+    };
+}
+
+// What the approval window does: fetch the approval and sign the transaction
+// it was handed, exactly as given.
+function signApproved(approvedTx) {
+    const tx = {};
+    for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(approvedTx)) {
+        if (key === "from") continue;
+        tx[key] = value;
+    }
+    return signer.signTransaction(tx);
+}
+
+describe("a dApp transaction prepared by a worker that never loaded state", () => {
+    test("a cold send on Sepolia reaches the approval screen and goes out", async () => {
+        const bg = loadColdWorker("sepolia");
+
+        const answer = bg.sendTransaction();
+        await settle();
+
+        // The provider was built for Sepolia, endpoint and static hint
+        // together. Omitting the hint made this mainnet.
+        expect(bg.constructed).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(bg.constructed[0].url).toBe(SEPOLIA.defaultRpcUrl);
+        expect(bg.constructed[0].network.chainId).toBe(
+            Network.from("sepolia").chainId,
+        );
+
+        // So the approval the user is shown is a Sepolia transaction.
+        const id = bg.approvalId();
+        expect(id).toBeTruthy();
+        const approval = bg.send(
+            { type: "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL", id },
+            { url: bg.fromPopup.url },
+        )();
+        expect(approval.type).toBe("tx");
+        expect(approval.approvedTx.chainId).toBe(SEPOLIA.chainId);
+
+        // And it survives the wallet's own verification, which is where a
+        // 0x1-stamped artifact was refused as "for a different network".
+        const rawSignedTx = await signApproved(approval.approvedTx);
+        const response = bg.send(
+            {
+                type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
+                id,
+                approved: true,
+                rawSignedTx,
+            },
+            { url: bg.fromPopup.url },
+        );
+        await settle();
+
+        expect(response()).toEqual({ txHash: TX_HASH });
+        expect(bg.broadcast).toEqual([rawSignedTx]);
+        expect(Number(Transaction.from(rawSignedTx).chainId)).toBe(
+            Number(SEPOLIA.networkVersion),
+        );
+        expect(answer()).toEqual({ result: TX_HASH });
+    });
+
+    test("a cold send on mainnet is prepared for mainnet", async () => {
+        // The stored value and the old fallback agree here, so this case
+        // cannot catch the defect; it is what keeps the fix from being a swap.
+        const bg = loadColdWorker("mainnet");
+
+        bg.sendTransaction();
+        await settle();
+
+        expect(bg.constructed[0].url).toBe(MAINNET.defaultRpcUrl);
+        const approval = bg.send(
+            { type: "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL", id: bg.approvalId() },
+            { url: bg.fromPopup.url },
+        )();
+        expect(approval.approvedTx.chainId).toBe(MAINNET.chainId);
+    });
+});

tests/deleteAddress.test.js

@@ -19,6 +19,14 @@ const {
     balanceWarningHtml,
 } = require("../src/popup/views/deleteAddress");
 const { prices, clearPrices } = require("../src/shared/prices");
+const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
+
+// The screen prices holdings, and pricing asks which chain it is on. Reading
+// the singleton's network before anything loaded it now throws rather than
+// answering mainnet by default
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324), so the network this
+// fixture is on is stated instead of assumed.
+state.networkId = "mainnet";
 
 const USDC = "0xa0b86991c6218b36c1d19d4a2e9eb0ce3606eb48";
 

tests/deleteWalletLostPassword.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,477 @@
+// The lost-password route off the delete-wallet screen (issue #312).
+//
+// What is pinned here is that a user who has forgotten the password can
+// still get out — no password is asked for and none is checked — and that
+// the escape hatch destroys exactly the wallet it names and nothing else.
+// The second half is the dangerous one: this is the only control in the
+// product that erases key material without the password that encrypted it,
+// so an off-by-one in the wallet it removes would take a wallet whose
+// owner never asked for it to be touched.
+//
+// The assertions are made against what came back OUT of extension storage,
+// not against the live `state` object. Deleting a wallet in memory and
+// never persisting it looks identical from `state`, and a build that never
+// wrote at all would pass a check that only reads `state` back.
+//
+// That makes the storage stub load-bearing, so it is the shared one from
+// tests/support/storageStub.js, a real store that structured-clones on both
+// `set` and `get`. A stub whose `get` hands back the same object its `set`
+// was given aliases the caller's own array: the test then reads its own
+// in-memory mutation and calls it persistence, and passes against a build
+// that persists nothing
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324). The aliasing is closed
+// off explicitly by the first test below rather than left as an assumption
+// about `structuredClone`.
+//
+// The view is driven against a minimal DOM stub, in the same shape as
+// tests/exportPrivkey.test.js: the module reads and writes named nodes and
+// needs nothing else from a document.
+
+const mockSettingsShow = jest.fn();
+jest.mock("../src/popup/views/settings", () => ({
+    show: mockSettingsShow,
+}));
+jest.mock("../src/shared/vault", () => ({
+    decryptWithPassword: jest.fn(),
+}));
+
+const { RESTORABLE_VIEWS } = require("../src/shared/restorableViews");
+const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
+
+const VIEW = "delete-wallet-lost-password";
+
+// Fixed addresses — never used for anything but these tests.
+const A0 = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
+const A1 = "0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7";
+const B0 = "0x2260FAC5E5542a773Aa44fBCfeDf7C193bc2C599";
+const C0 = "0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48";
+
+// ------------------------------------------------------------ DOM stub
+
+function makeElement(id) {
+    const classes = new Set();
+    const el = {
+        id,
+        textContent: "",
+        value: "",
+        innerHTML: "",
+        disabled: false,
+        style: {},
+        dataset: {},
+        listeners: {},
+        classList: {
+            add: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.add(n)),
+            remove: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.delete(n)),
+            contains: (n) => classes.has(n),
+            toggle: (n, force) => {
+                const on = force === undefined ? !classes.has(n) : force;
+                if (on) classes.add(n);
+                else classes.delete(n);
+                return on;
+            },
+        },
+        addEventListener: (name, fn) => {
+            el.listeners[name] = el.listeners[name] || [];
+            el.listeners[name].push(fn);
+        },
+        appendChild: () => {},
+        remove: () => {},
+        querySelectorAll: () => [],
+    };
+    return el;
+}
+
+function makeDocument() {
+    const els = new Map();
+    return {
+        getElementById(id) {
+            // The debug banner is created on demand by helpers.js; absent
+            // is the state a non-debug, non-testnet popup is in.
+            if (id === "debug-banner") return null;
+            if (!els.has(id)) els.set(id, makeElement(id));
+            return els.get(id);
+        },
+        createElement: () => makeElement("created"),
+        addEventListener: () => {},
+        body: { prepend: () => {} },
+    };
+}
+
+// ------------------------------------------------------------ harness
+
+function wallet(name, secret, addresses) {
+    return {
+        type: "hd",
+        name,
+        xpub: "xpub-" + name,
+        encryptedSecret: secret,
+        nextIndex: addresses.length,
+        addresses: addresses.map((address) => ({
+            address,
+            balance: "0.0000",
+            tokenBalances: [],
+        })),
+    };
+}
+
+function load() {
+    jest.resetModules();
+    mockSettingsShow.mockClear();
+
+    const storage = makeStorageStub();
+    const sent = [];
+    globalThis.chrome = {
+        storage: { local: storage.local },
+        runtime: { sendMessage: (msg) => sent.push(msg) },
+    };
+    globalThis.document = makeDocument();
+
+    const helpers = require("../src/popup/views/helpers");
+    const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
+    const vault = require("../src/shared/vault");
+    const deleteWallet = require("../src/popup/views/deleteWallet");
+
+    state.hasWallet = true;
+    state.wallets = [
+        wallet("Wallet 1", "secret-one", [A0, A1]),
+        wallet("Wallet 2", "secret-two", [B0]),
+        wallet("Wallet 3", "secret-three", [C0]),
+    ];
+    state.selectedWallet = 0;
+    state.selectedAddress = 0;
+    state.activeAddress = A0;
+    state.allowedSites = { [A0]: ["a.example"], [B0]: ["b.example"] };
+    state.deniedSites = { [B0]: ["c.example"], [C0]: ["d.example"] };
+    state.viewStack = ["main", "settings"];
+    state.currentView = "settings";
+
+    const renderWalletList = jest.fn();
+    deleteWallet.init({ renderWalletList });
+
+    return { helpers, state, vault, deleteWallet, storage, sent };
+}
+
+function click(id) {
+    const el = globalThis.document.getElementById(id);
+    return Promise.all((el.listeners.click || []).map((fn) => fn()));
+}
+
+function node(id) {
+    return globalThis.document.getElementById(id);
+}
+
+// The wallets as the extension would read them back on a cold start.
+async function persistedWallets(storage) {
+    const result = await storage.get("autistmask");
+    return result.autistmask.wallets;
+}
+
+// Open the lost-password screen for a wallet, the way the user does.
+async function openLostPassword(deleteWallet, walletIdx) {
+    deleteWallet.show(walletIdx);
+    await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-password");
+}
+
+// ------------------------------------------------------------ tests
+
+// The stub is what every persistence assertion below rests on, so its one
+// dangerous failure mode is closed off first. An aliasing store passes
+// every other test in this file against a build that never writes.
+describe("the storage stub", () => {
+    test("does not hand back the object it was given", async () => {
+        const storage = makeStorageStub();
+        const written = { wallets: [{ name: "Wallet 1" }] };
+
+        await storage.set({ autistmask: written });
+        written.wallets.push({ name: "Wallet 2" });
+        written.wallets[0].name = "renamed after the write";
+
+        const readBack = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
+        expect(readBack.wallets).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(readBack.wallets[0].name).toBe("Wallet 1");
+
+        // And the other direction: mutating what came out must not reach
+        // back into the store.
+        readBack.wallets[0].name = "renamed after the read";
+        const again = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
+        expect(again.wallets[0].name).toBe("Wallet 1");
+    });
+});
+
+describe("reaching the screen", () => {
+    test("the delete screen offers the route", async () => {
+        const { deleteWallet, state } = load();
+        await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
+
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe(VIEW);
+        expect(node("delete-wallet-lost-name").textContent).toBe("Wallet 2");
+        expect(node("delete-wallet-lost-name-echo").textContent).toBe(
+            "Wallet 2",
+        );
+    });
+
+    // Both delete screens hang off Settings. Pushing one onto the other
+    // would leave Back on the confirm screen popping onto itself.
+    test("it does not push the screen it came from", async () => {
+        const { deleteWallet, state } = load();
+        await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
+
+        expect(state.viewStack).toEqual(["main", "settings"]);
+    });
+
+    test("Back returns to the delete screen with its wallet still chosen", async () => {
+        const { deleteWallet, state } = load();
+        await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
+        await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-back");
+
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe("delete-wallet-confirm");
+        expect(node("delete-wallet-name").textContent).toBe("Wallet 2");
+        expect(state.viewStack).toEqual(["main", "settings"]);
+
+        // The confirm screen is usable, not merely on screen: the wallet
+        // it holds is the one that was chosen, so its own button does not
+        // answer "No wallet selected for deletion."
+        node("delete-wallet-password").value = "some password";
+        const { decryptWithPassword } = require("../src/shared/vault");
+        decryptWithPassword.mockRejectedValue(new Error("nope"));
+        await click("btn-delete-wallet-confirm");
+        expect(node("delete-wallet-flash").textContent).toBe(
+            "That password is incorrect. Please try again.",
+        );
+    });
+});
+
+describe("the typed confirmation", () => {
+    test("a name that is not the wallet's deletes nothing", async () => {
+        const { deleteWallet, state, storage } = load();
+        await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
+
+        node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "Wallet 3";
+        await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
+
+        expect(node("delete-wallet-lost-flash").textContent).toBe(
+            "That is not the name of this wallet. Type Wallet 2 to confirm.",
+        );
+        expect(node("delete-wallet-lost-flash").style.visibility).toBe(
+            "visible",
+        );
+        expect(state.wallets.map((w) => w.name)).toEqual([
+            "Wallet 1",
+            "Wallet 2",
+            "Wallet 3",
+        ]);
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe(VIEW);
+        // Nothing was destroyed on disk either. Storage is not empty —
+        // showView() persists the current screen on the way in — so what
+        // is asserted is that all three wallets are still in it.
+        const persisted = await persistedWallets(storage);
+        expect(persisted.map((w) => w.encryptedSecret)).toEqual([
+            "secret-one",
+            "secret-two",
+            "secret-three",
+        ]);
+    });
+
+    test("an empty field deletes nothing", async () => {
+        const { deleteWallet, state } = load();
+        await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
+
+        await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
+
+        expect(node("delete-wallet-lost-flash").style.visibility).toBe(
+            "visible",
+        );
+        expect(state.wallets).toHaveLength(3);
+    });
+
+    // Not a secret and not a password: it asks whether the user knows
+    // which wallet they are on. Refusing the name they can plainly read,
+    // over letter case, would only teach them to distrust the control.
+    test("case and surrounding spaces do not matter", async () => {
+        const { deleteWallet, state, storage } = load();
+        await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
+
+        node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "  wALLet 2 ";
+        await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
+
+        expect(state.wallets.map((w) => w.name)).toEqual([
+            "Wallet 1",
+            "Wallet 3",
+        ]);
+        expect(await persistedWallets(storage)).toHaveLength(2);
+    });
+
+    // A name with a doubled inner space RENDERS with one — HTML collapses
+    // runs of whitespace — so the string the user can see and type is not
+    // the string the name is stored as. Comparing the two raw would make
+    // this wallet's confirmation impossible to satisfy by any typing at
+    // all, wedging the one screen that exists to unwedge people.
+    test("a doubled space inside the name is typed back as one", async () => {
+        const { deleteWallet, state, storage } = load();
+        state.wallets[1].name = "My  Wallet";
+        await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
+
+        // What the DOM was handed still has both spaces; what the user
+        // reads off the screen, and therefore types, has one.
+        expect(node("delete-wallet-lost-name").textContent).toBe("My  Wallet");
+        node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "My Wallet";
+        await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
+
+        expect(state.wallets.map((w) => w.name)).toEqual([
+            "Wallet 1",
+            "Wallet 3",
+        ]);
+        const persisted = await persistedWallets(storage);
+        expect(persisted.map((w) => w.encryptedSecret)).toEqual([
+            "secret-one",
+            "secret-three",
+        ]);
+    });
+});
+
+describe("deleting without the password", () => {
+    test("no password is asked for and none is checked", async () => {
+        const { deleteWallet, vault, storage } = load();
+        await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
+
+        node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "Wallet 2";
+        await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
+
+        expect(vault.decryptWithPassword).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+        expect(await persistedWallets(storage)).toHaveLength(2);
+    });
+
+    // The load-bearing assertion of the whole file, and the one that says
+    // this control is safe to give a user who cannot prove anything: it
+    // removes the wallet it named, and every other wallet survives intact,
+    // key material included.
+    test("exactly the named wallet is destroyed", async () => {
+        const { deleteWallet, storage } = load();
+        await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
+
+        node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "Wallet 2";
+        await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
+
+        const wallets = await persistedWallets(storage);
+        expect(wallets.map((w) => w.name)).toEqual(["Wallet 1", "Wallet 3"]);
+        expect(wallets.map((w) => w.encryptedSecret)).toEqual([
+            "secret-one",
+            "secret-three",
+        ]);
+        expect(wallets.map((w) => w.xpub)).toEqual([
+            "xpub-Wallet 1",
+            "xpub-Wallet 3",
+        ]);
+        expect(wallets[0].addresses.map((a) => a.address)).toEqual([A0, A1]);
+        expect(wallets[1].addresses.map((a) => a.address)).toEqual([C0]);
+
+        // The deleted wallet's secret is gone from storage entirely, not
+        // merely unreferenced by the wallet list.
+        expect(JSON.stringify(storage.read())).not.toContain("secret-two");
+        expect(JSON.stringify(storage.read())).not.toContain("xpub-Wallet 2");
+    });
+
+    test("only the deleted wallet's site permissions are dropped", async () => {
+        const { deleteWallet, storage } = load();
+        await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
+
+        node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "Wallet 2";
+        await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
+
+        const saved = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
+        expect(saved.allowedSites).toEqual({ [A0]: ["a.example"] });
+        expect(saved.deniedSites).toEqual({ [C0]: ["d.example"] });
+    });
+
+    // The route shares finishDelete() with the password route, so the
+    // selection repair and the accountsChanged broadcast are the same on
+    // both. Deleting a wallet that did not own the active address must
+    // leave that address, and the selection, exactly where they were.
+    test("a selection in another wallet is left alone", async () => {
+        const { deleteWallet, storage, sent } = load();
+        await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
+
+        node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "Wallet 2";
+        await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
+
+        const saved = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
+        expect(saved.activeAddress).toBe(A0);
+        expect(saved.selectedWallet).toBe(0);
+        expect(saved.selectedAddress).toBe(0);
+        expect(sent).toEqual([]);
+        // Settings is stubbed, so this is where the route hands over, not
+        // where it renders.
+        expect(mockSettingsShow).toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+
+    test("deleting the wallet holding the active address moves it and says so", async () => {
+        const { deleteWallet, storage, sent } = load();
+        await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 0);
+
+        node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "Wallet 1";
+        await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
+
+        const saved = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
+        expect(saved.wallets.map((w) => w.name)).toEqual([
+            "Wallet 2",
+            "Wallet 3",
+        ]);
+        expect(saved.activeAddress).toBe(B0);
+        expect(sent).toEqual([{ type: "AUTISTMASK_ACTIVE_CHANGED" }]);
+    });
+
+    test("deleting the last wallet lands on Welcome with nothing left", async () => {
+        const { deleteWallet, state, storage } = load();
+        state.wallets = [wallet("Wallet 1", "secret-one", [A0])];
+        state.allowedSites = { [A0]: ["a.example"] };
+        state.deniedSites = {};
+
+        await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 0);
+        node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "Wallet 1";
+        await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
+
+        const saved = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
+        expect(saved.wallets).toEqual([]);
+        expect(saved.hasWallet).toBe(false);
+        expect(saved.activeAddress).toBeNull();
+        expect(saved.allowedSites).toEqual({});
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe("welcome");
+        expect(JSON.stringify(storage.read())).not.toContain("secret-one");
+    });
+});
+
+describe("what the screen leaves behind", () => {
+    test("the typed confirmation is wiped when the screen is left", async () => {
+        const { helpers, deleteWallet } = load();
+        await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
+
+        node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "Wallet 2";
+        // The Settings gear, which is not this screen's Back button.
+        helpers.showView("settings");
+
+        expect(node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value).toBe("");
+        expect(node("delete-wallet-lost-flash").textContent).toBe("");
+        expect(node("delete-wallet-lost-flash").style.visibility).toBe(
+            "hidden",
+        );
+    });
+
+    // Left mid-delete, the screen has to come back usable.
+    test("the confirm button is re-enabled on the way out", async () => {
+        const { helpers, deleteWallet } = load();
+        await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
+
+        node("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm").disabled = true;
+        helpers.showView("settings");
+
+        expect(node("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm").disabled).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    // A wallet name is not a secret, so the screen is excluded for the
+    // other reason: reopening the popup must not land the user on a screen
+    // whose button erases key material.
+    test("the popup may not reopen onto it", () => {
+        expect(RESTORABLE_VIEWS.has(VIEW)).toBe(false);
+        expect(RESTORABLE_VIEWS.has("delete-wallet-confirm")).toBe(false);
+    });
+});

tests/e2e/firefox/Dockerfile

@@ -72,6 +72,11 @@ RUN script/bootstrap
 
 COPY . .
 
-RUN make build
+# make package builds (and verifies) dist/ and then writes the release
+# artifacts, so the image carries both: run.js installs the unpacked
+# dist/firefox and reinstall.js installs the packaged .xpi, which is how the
+# artifact that would actually be handed to someone gets exercised in a real
+# Firefox rather than only being produced.
+RUN make package
 
 CMD ["node", "tests/e2e/firefox/run.js", "dist/firefox"]

tests/e2e/firefox/driver.js

@@ -103,7 +103,13 @@ class Driver {
 
     // ------------------------------------------------------------ setup
 
-    async newSession() {
+    // `profileDir` reuses an existing profile directory in place instead of
+    // letting geckodriver make a throwaway one. That is the only way to ask
+    // what survives a browser RESTART, which for a Firefox add-on that can
+    // only be installed temporarily is the question that decides whether the
+    // extension is usable at all: a temporary add-on is unloaded when Firefox
+    // exits, so every session begins by adding it again.
+    async newSession(profileDir) {
         const prefs = {
             // See EXTENSION_UUID above. The pref is a string pref whose
             // value is itself JSON.
@@ -132,26 +138,27 @@ class Driver {
             "extensions.openPopupWithoutUserGesture.enabled": false,
         };
 
+        const args = [
+            "-headless",
+            // Mandatory on Firefox 153: without it, navigating to
+            // moz-extension:// and running chrome-context script both
+            // fail with "unsupported operation".
+            //
+            // It grants the driver FULL CHROME PRIVILEGES over this
+            // browser. Acceptable only because the browser is a
+            // throwaway in a CI container; never point a session with
+            // this flag at anything you care about.
+            "-remote-allow-system-access",
+        ];
+        if (profileDir) args.push("-profile", profileDir);
+
         const value = await this.send("POST", "/session", {
             capabilities: {
                 alwaysMatch: {
                     browserName: "firefox",
                     "moz:firefoxOptions": {
                         binary: FIREFOX_BIN,
-                        args: [
+                        args,
-                            "-headless",
-                            // Mandatory on Firefox 153: without it,
-                            // navigating to moz-extension:// and running
-                            // chrome-context script both fail with
-                            // "unsupported operation".
-                            //
-                            // It grants the driver FULL CHROME PRIVILEGES
-                            // over this browser. Acceptable only because
-                            // the browser is a throwaway in a CI
-                            // container; never point a session with this
-                            // flag at anything you care about.
-                            "-remote-allow-system-access",
-                        ],
                         prefs,
                     },
                 },
@@ -162,16 +169,30 @@ class Driver {
         return value;
     }
 
-    // Installs the unpacked MV2 build straight from a directory.
+    // Installs the MV2 build, either from an unpacked directory or from an
-    // temporary:true bypasses signature checks, so no XPI and no signing
+    // XPI file. temporary:true bypasses signature checks — which is the only
-    // are involved, and the add-on dies with the profile.
+    // way an UNSIGNED xpi installs at all, and the reason README.md says
-    async installAddon(dir) {
+    // release Firefox will refuse the artifact this repo produces — and the
+    // add-on dies with the profile.
+    //
+    // Returns the add-on id Firefox assigned, which is
+    // browser_specific_settings.gecko.id from the manifest and is what
+    // uninstallAddon() takes.
+    async installAddon(pathToAddon) {
         return this.session("POST", "/moz/addon/install", {
-            path: dir,
+            path: pathToAddon,
             temporary: true,
         });
     }
 
+    // Removes an installed add-on, the way clicking Remove in about:addons
+    // does. tests/e2e/firefox/reinstall.js uses it to ask the one question
+    // that decides whether this extension can be used at all on Firefox: does
+    // the vault survive being removed and added again.
+    async uninstallAddon(id) {
+        return this.session("POST", "/moz/addon/uninstall", { id });
+    }
+
     // Classic navigation on purpose. BiDi's browsingContext.navigate
     // refuses moz-extension:// URLs outright.
     async navigate(url) {

tests/e2e/firefox/reinstall.js

@@ -0,0 +1,438 @@
+// Does the wallet survive being installed again on Firefox?
+//
+// This is the question behind
+// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/310, and it is the one property
+// that has to hold before real money goes into this extension. The only route
+// that works on release Firefox is a TEMPORARY add-on, which is unloaded when
+// the browser exits: daily use means adding it again from about:debugging on
+// every browser start. If extension storage did not survive that, every start
+// would present an empty wallet and the recovery phrase would be the only copy
+// of the money.
+//
+// manifest/firefox.json declares a fixed browser_specific_settings.gecko.id,
+// which is the right SHAPE for storage to survive — Firefox keys the storage
+// area by add-on id — but shape is not observation, and nothing asserted it.
+//
+// Two different things are asked here, because they have different answers and
+// conflating them would be the whole mistake:
+//
+//   RESTART      one profile, two browser runs, the add-on added temporarily
+//                in each. This is what a user does every day, and the vault
+//                has to survive it.
+//   REMOVAL      an explicit uninstall, the way about:addons "Remove" works,
+//                inside one browser run. Firefox destroys an add-on's storage
+//                when it is uninstalled, and the observed result is recorded
+//                here rather than wished away — for a wallet it means Remove
+//                is irreversible except from the recovery phrase.
+//
+// The vault is not merely compared as bytes in the restart case. It is
+// DECRYPTED with the original password through the real Show Recovery Phrase
+// screen and the phrase is compared against the one wallet creation produced,
+// because "the ciphertext is still in storage" and "the wallet still works"
+// are different claims and only the second one is worth anything.
+//
+// Run through script/test-e2e-firefox, which builds the artifact and the
+// pinned container. The one argument is what to install — an unpacked
+// directory or an .xpi. With none, the packaged XPI in release/ is used, so
+// this doubles as the check that the release artifact installs in a real
+// Firefox.
+//
+//   node tests/e2e/firefox/reinstall.js release/autistmask-firefox-0.1.0.xpi
+//
+// A separate program from run.js rather than another step in it: every step
+// there shares one browser session with one installed add-on, and this needs
+// two browsers and three installs.
+
+"use strict";
+
+const fs = require("fs");
+const os = require("os");
+const path = require("path");
+
+const { EXTENSION_ID, EXTENSION_UUID, start } = require("./driver");
+
+const REPO_ROOT = path.resolve(__dirname, "..", "..", "..");
+const PASSWORD = "e2e-harness-password";
+
+const STEP_TIMEOUT_MS = 120000;
+
+const checks = [];
+let failed = 0;
+
+function check(name, cond, detail) {
+    checks.push(name);
+    if (cond) {
+        console.log("ok " + checks.length + " - " + name);
+    } else {
+        failed += 1;
+        console.log("not ok " + checks.length + " - " + name);
+        if (detail) console.log("  " + detail);
+    }
+}
+
+// The moz-extension:// uuid Firefox currently serves this add-on from, read
+// out of the pref that holds the mapping. Privileged scope, because that pref
+// is not reachable from content.
+//
+// It has to be read after every install and never assumed. driver.js pins a
+// uuid through extensions.webextensions.uuids at each session start, but an
+// uninstall inside a running session drops that mapping and the next install
+// mints a fresh one — and navigating to the stale origin does not fail, it
+// HANGS until the session times out, which is how this was found.
+async function extensionUuid(d) {
+    const raw = await d.executeChrome(
+        `return Services.prefs.getStringPref(
+             "extensions.webextensions.uuids", "{}");`,
+    );
+    let map;
+    try {
+        map = JSON.parse(raw);
+    } catch (e) {
+        throw new Error(
+            "extensions.webextensions.uuids is not JSON (" +
+                e.message +
+                "): " +
+                raw,
+        );
+    }
+    return map[EXTENSION_ID] || null;
+}
+
+async function openPopup(d) {
+    const uuid = await extensionUuid(d);
+    if (!uuid) {
+        throw new Error(
+            "no uuid for " +
+                EXTENSION_ID +
+                " in extensions.webextensions.uuids, so the popup has no " +
+                "origin to be served from",
+        );
+    }
+    await d.navigate("moz-extension://" + uuid + "/src/popup/index.html");
+    // Whichever screen it lands on, wait for one of the two it can land on.
+    // Waiting for #view-main directly would time out rather than say what
+    // happened, and an empty storage partition is exactly the case where it
+    // lands on the other one.
+    await d.waitFor(
+        "the popup to finish restoring",
+        `const w = document.getElementById("view-welcome");
+         const m = document.getElementById("view-main");
+         if (!w || !m) return false;
+         const shown = (el) => {
+             const r = el.getBoundingClientRect();
+             return r.width > 0 && r.height > 0;
+         };
+         return shown(w) || shown(m);`,
+        [],
+        STEP_TIMEOUT_MS,
+    );
+    return uuid;
+}
+
+// The persisted record, straight out of extension storage, read from the popup
+// page — the one moz-extension:// document this program opens and therefore
+// the only place the storage API is reachable from.
+async function readVault(d) {
+    const outcome = await d.executeAsync(
+        `const done = arguments[arguments.length - 1];
+         const api = typeof browser !== "undefined" ? browser : chrome;
+         Promise.resolve(api.storage.local.get("autistmask"))
+             .then((r) => {
+                 const s = r.autistmask;
+                 if (!s) return done({ present: false });
+                 const w = (s.wallets || [])[0];
+                 if (!w) return done({ present: false });
+                 done({
+                     present: true,
+                     wallets: s.wallets.length,
+                     name: w.name,
+                     xpub: w.xpub,
+                     address: (w.addresses || []).map((a) => a.address)[0],
+                     vault: JSON.stringify(w.encryptedSecret),
+                 });
+             })
+             .catch((e) => done({ error: String((e && e.message) || e) }));`,
+    );
+    if (outcome && outcome.error) {
+        throw new Error("could not read extension storage: " + outcome.error);
+    }
+    return outcome;
+}
+
+async function createWallet(d) {
+    await d.click("#btn-welcome-add");
+    await d.waitVisible("#view-add-wallet");
+    await d.click("#btn-generate-phrase");
+    await d.waitFor(
+        "a generated recovery phrase of at least 12 words",
+        `const el = document.getElementById("wallet-mnemonic");
+         return !!el && el.value.trim().split(/\\s+/).length >= 12;`,
+    );
+    const phrase = (await d.value("#wallet-mnemonic")).trim();
+    await d.fill("#add-wallet-password", PASSWORD);
+    await d.fill("#add-wallet-password-confirm", PASSWORD);
+    await d.click("#btn-add-wallet-confirm");
+    // Argon2id under libsodium, for real.
+    await d.waitVisible("#view-main", STEP_TIMEOUT_MS);
+    return phrase;
+}
+
+// The phrase the vault decrypts to, obtained the way a user would: Settings,
+// Show Recovery Phrase, the original password.
+async function revealPhrase(d) {
+    if (!(await d.isVisible("#view-settings"))) {
+        await d.click("#btn-settings");
+    }
+    await d.waitVisible("#view-settings");
+    await d.click("#settings-wallet-list .btn-show-phrase");
+    await d.waitVisible("#view-show-phrase");
+    await d.fill("#show-phrase-password", PASSWORD);
+    await d.click("#btn-show-phrase-reveal");
+    await d.waitVisible("#show-phrase-result", STEP_TIMEOUT_MS);
+    return (await d.text("#show-phrase-value")).trim();
+}
+
+// What to install. An explicit argument wins; with none, the packaged XPI in
+// release/ is used, and there is deliberately no fallback to dist/firefox: the
+// point of running this against the artifact is that the artifact is what gets
+// installed, and quietly testing something else instead would leave the XPI
+// unexercised while the run stayed green.
+function resolveArtifact() {
+    if (process.argv[2]) return path.resolve(REPO_ROOT, process.argv[2]);
+
+    const releaseDir = path.join(REPO_ROOT, "release");
+    const xpis = fs.existsSync(releaseDir)
+        ? fs.readdirSync(releaseDir).filter((f) => f.endsWith(".xpi"))
+        : [];
+    if (xpis.length !== 1) {
+        throw new Error(
+            "expected exactly one .xpi in release/, found " +
+                xpis.length +
+                " (" +
+                xpis.join(", ") +
+                "). Run make package, or name the artifact as the argument.",
+        );
+    }
+    return path.join(releaseDir, xpis[0]);
+}
+
+async function main() {
+    let artifact;
+    try {
+        artifact = resolveArtifact();
+    } catch (e) {
+        console.error("e2e-firefox-reinstall: " + e.message);
+        process.exitCode = 1;
+        return;
+    }
+    if (!fs.existsSync(artifact)) {
+        console.error(
+            "e2e-firefox-reinstall: nothing to install at " + artifact,
+        );
+        process.exitCode = 1;
+        return;
+    }
+    console.log("# installing: " + artifact);
+
+    // One profile, reused by both browser runs below. geckodriver would
+    // otherwise make a throwaway one per session, and "survives a restart"
+    // cannot be asked of a profile that does not.
+    const profile = fs.mkdtempSync(
+        path.join(os.tmpdir(), "autistmask-reinstall-profile-"),
+    );
+
+    let phrase = null;
+    let before = null;
+    let first;
+
+    // --- run one: install, create a wallet, close the browser --------------
+    try {
+        first = await start();
+        await first.newSession(profile);
+    } catch (e) {
+        // A browser we cannot start is a failure of this program, never an
+        // absent one.
+        console.error("e2e-firefox-reinstall: cannot run: " + e.message);
+        if (first) await first.quit().catch(() => {});
+        process.exitCode = 1;
+        return;
+    }
+
+    try {
+        const firstId = await first.installAddon(artifact);
+        check(
+            "the artifact installs and reports the manifest's gecko id",
+            firstId === EXTENSION_ID,
+            "installed add-on id is " +
+                JSON.stringify(firstId) +
+                ", expected " +
+                JSON.stringify(EXTENSION_ID) +
+                ". Without a stable id Firefox has no key to hang the " +
+                "storage area on, and nothing below can hold.",
+        );
+
+        const firstUuid = await openPopup(first);
+        await first.waitVisible("#view-welcome", STEP_TIMEOUT_MS);
+        phrase = await createWallet(first);
+        before = await readVault(first);
+        check(
+            "a wallet created through the UI is in extension storage",
+            before.present && before.wallets === 1 && !!before.vault,
+            JSON.stringify(before),
+        );
+        console.log(
+            "# run 1 moz-extension uuid: " +
+                firstUuid +
+                (firstUuid === EXTENSION_UUID ? " (the pinned one)" : ""),
+        );
+    } catch (e) {
+        failed += 1;
+        console.log("# ERROR in run 1: " + (e && e.stack ? e.stack : e));
+    } finally {
+        await first.quit().catch(() => {});
+    }
+
+    // --- run two: same profile, add-on added again -------------------------
+    //
+    // This is the restart. The temporary add-on died with the previous
+    // browser; the profile, and whatever Firefox kept in it, did not.
+    let second;
+    try {
+        second = await start();
+        await second.newSession(profile);
+    } catch (e) {
+        console.error(
+            "e2e-firefox-reinstall: cannot restart the browser: " + e.message,
+        );
+        if (second) await second.quit().catch(() => {});
+        process.exitCode = 1;
+        return;
+    }
+
+    try {
+        const secondId = await second.installAddon(artifact);
+        check(
+            "the add-on installs again after a browser restart with the " +
+                "same id",
+            secondId === EXTENSION_ID,
+            "re-installed id is " + JSON.stringify(secondId),
+        );
+
+        const secondUuid = await openPopup(second);
+        // The origin the popup is served from is not the thing that carries
+        // the wallet, and the uuid is read live for exactly that reason. In
+        // this run it comes back as the pinned one, because driver.js writes
+        // extensions.webextensions.uuids into the profile at every session
+        // start; an uninstall inside a running session drops the mapping and
+        // the next install mints a fresh uuid instead. Either way the storage
+        // area is keyed on the add-on id, never on this.
+        console.log(
+            "# run 2 moz-extension uuid: " +
+                secondUuid +
+                (secondUuid === EXTENSION_UUID
+                    ? " (the pinned one, re-applied at session start)"
+                    : " (freshly minted)"),
+        );
+
+        const onWelcome = await second.isVisible("#view-welcome");
+        check(
+            "after a restart and re-add, the extension does not come up as " +
+                "a fresh install",
+            !onWelcome,
+            "the popup shows the welcome screen, which is what an empty " +
+                "storage partition looks like: the wallet is gone and only " +
+                "the recovery phrase would get it back.",
+        );
+
+        const after = await readVault(second);
+        check(
+            "the vault, xpub and first address survive the restart unchanged",
+            after.present &&
+                after.wallets === before.wallets &&
+                after.vault === before.vault &&
+                after.xpub === before.xpub &&
+                after.address === before.address,
+            "before: " +
+                JSON.stringify(before) +
+                " after: " +
+                JSON.stringify(after),
+        );
+
+        if (after.present) {
+            const revealed = await revealPhrase(second);
+            check(
+                "the vault still decrypts with the original password to the " +
+                    "original recovery phrase",
+                revealed === phrase,
+                "the recovery phrase read back after the restart is not the " +
+                    "one the wallet was created with",
+            );
+        } else {
+            check(
+                "the vault still decrypts with the original password to the " +
+                    "original recovery phrase",
+                false,
+                "there was no vault left to decrypt",
+            );
+        }
+
+        // --- an explicit removal, in the same browser run ------------------
+        //
+        // Leave the popup FIRST. Removing the add-on destroys every document
+        // it serves, and the popup is this session's only window: uninstalling
+        // while it is on screen discards the browsing context, and every
+        // subsequent WebDriver command fails with "no such window" rather than
+        // with anything about the add-on. Observed, not anticipated.
+        await second.navigate("about:blank");
+        await second.uninstallAddon(EXTENSION_ID);
+        await second.installAddon(artifact);
+        await openPopup(second);
+
+        const afterRemoval = await readVault(second);
+        console.log(
+            "# after an explicit uninstall: " + JSON.stringify(afterRemoval),
+        );
+        // Recorded as observed behaviour, not as something this repo wants.
+        // Firefox destroys an add-on's storage when it is uninstalled, and
+        // that is correct of a browser — it is stated here, and in README.md,
+        // because for a WALLET it means about:addons "Remove" is irreversible
+        // except from the recovery phrase. If a Firefox ever stops doing it
+        // this fails and the claim gets rewritten from a new observation.
+        check(
+            "an explicit uninstall DESTROYS the vault (observed Firefox " +
+                "behaviour: Remove is irreversible, unlike a restart)",
+            afterRemoval.present === false,
+            "the vault survived an explicit uninstall: " +
+                JSON.stringify(afterRemoval),
+        );
+    } catch (e) {
+        failed += 1;
+        console.log("# ERROR in run 2: " + (e && e.stack ? e.stack : e));
+    } finally {
+        await second.quit().catch(() => {});
+        fs.rmSync(profile, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    }
+
+    console.log("1.." + checks.length);
+    if (checks.length === 0) {
+        console.log("# FAILED: this program asserted nothing");
+        process.exitCode = 1;
+        return;
+    }
+    console.log(
+        "# " +
+            (checks.length - failed) +
+            "/" +
+            checks.length +
+            " checks passed",
+    );
+    if (failed > 0) {
+        console.log("# FAILED");
+        process.exitCode = 1;
+    }
+}
+
+main().catch((e) => {
+    console.error("e2e-firefox-reinstall: " + (e && e.stack ? e.stack : e));
+    process.exitCode = 1;
+});

tests/e2e/storagePartition.js

@@ -0,0 +1,303 @@
+// Where does chrome.storage.local live, and what moves it?
+//
+// The finding behind https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/310: an
+// unpacked Chrome extension with no `key` in its manifest gets an extension id
+// derived from the ABSOLUTE PATH it was loaded from, and chrome.storage.local
+// is partitioned by that id. README.md documents Load unpacked from
+// dist/chrome/ as the install route, so moving the checkout, re-cloning it, or
+// loading a second copy from anywhere else means a different id, a different
+// storage partition, and a wallet that reads as empty — with no error, no
+// prompt and nothing in the UI to say what happened.
+//
+// So this OBSERVES the behaviour rather than restating it. Two unpacked loads
+// from two different directories, in one profile, with the shipped manifest
+// and again with `key` stripped out, and it reports what each pair actually
+// does. The assertions are on what was seen when this was written and are
+// annotated as such; if Chrome's derivation ever changes, this says so instead
+// of passing.
+//
+// Run through script/test-e2e, which builds the extension and the pinned
+// container.
+//
+//   node tests/e2e/storagePartition.js
+//
+// A separate program from run.js because every test there shares one browser
+// and one extension load, and the whole subject here is what happens across
+// two of each.
+//
+// The extension's own UI is deliberately not driven. What is under test is the
+// storage partition, so a sentinel key the extension never reads or writes is
+// written and read back directly: a wallet would prove the same thing more
+// slowly, and would confuse an empty partition with a UI that failed to
+// render.
+
+"use strict";
+
+const fs = require("fs");
+const os = require("os");
+const path = require("path");
+
+const { chromium } = require("playwright-core");
+
+const REPO_ROOT = path.resolve(__dirname, "..", "..");
+const DIST_CHROME = path.join(REPO_ROOT, "dist", "chrome");
+
+// Never touched by the extension: src/shared/state.js reads and writes the
+// single key "autistmask" and nothing else.
+const SENTINEL_KEY = "e2e-storage-partition-sentinel";
+const SENTINEL_VALUE = "written-by-the-first-load";
+
+const checks = [];
+let failed = 0;
+const scratch = [];
+
+function check(name, cond, detail) {
+    checks.push(name);
+    if (cond) {
+        console.log("ok " + checks.length + " - " + name);
+    } else {
+        failed += 1;
+        console.log("not ok " + checks.length + " - " + name);
+        if (detail) console.log("  " + detail);
+    }
+}
+
+function tmpdir(tag) {
+    const dir = fs.mkdtempSync(
+        path.join(os.tmpdir(), "autistmask-" + tag + "-"),
+    );
+    scratch.push(dir);
+    return dir;
+}
+
+// A copy of the built extension at a fresh absolute path. `withKey: false`
+// strips the manifest's `key`, which is the pre-fix state of this repo and the
+// control the whole program is built around.
+function extensionCopy(tag, withKey) {
+    const dir = path.join(tmpdir(tag), "chrome");
+    fs.cpSync(DIST_CHROME, dir, { recursive: true });
+    const manifestPath = path.join(dir, "manifest.json");
+    const manifest = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(manifestPath, "utf8"));
+    if (withKey) {
+        if (!manifest.key) {
+            throw new Error(
+                "dist/chrome/manifest.json has no `key`, so this program has " +
+                    "nothing to observe. That field is what pins the " +
+                    "extension id; see tests/extensionId.test.js.",
+            );
+        }
+    } else {
+        delete manifest.key;
+    }
+    fs.writeFileSync(manifestPath, JSON.stringify(manifest, null, 4));
+    return dir;
+}
+
+async function launch(profileDir, extensionDirs) {
+    const ctx = await chromium.launchPersistentContext(profileDir, {
+        // See the note in harness.js: the default headless shell silently
+        // refuses to load extensions.
+        channel: "chromium",
+        headless: true,
+        args: [
+            "--disable-extensions-except=" + extensionDirs.join(","),
+            "--load-extension=" + extensionDirs.join(","),
+            "--no-sandbox",
+            // Nothing here should reach the network; this makes sure it
+            // cannot.
+            "--host-resolver-rules=MAP * ~NOTFOUND",
+        ],
+    });
+    return ctx;
+}
+
+// Every extension id Chrome ended up with in this context, from the service
+// worker urls. MV3 registers one worker per loaded extension.
+async function extensionIds(ctx, expected) {
+    const deadline = Date.now() + 30000;
+    for (;;) {
+        const ids = [
+            ...new Set(ctx.serviceWorkers().map((w) => new URL(w.url()).host)),
+        ].sort();
+        if (ids.length >= expected) return ids;
+        if (Date.now() > deadline) return ids;
+        await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 200));
+    }
+}
+
+// Open one extension's popup and run `fn` in it. The popup page is used rather
+// than the service worker because Chrome stops an idle MV3 worker, and a
+// handle to a stopped worker cannot be evaluated in.
+async function inExtension(ctx, id, fn, arg) {
+    const page = await ctx.newPage();
+    try {
+        await page.goto("chrome-extension://" + id + "/src/popup/index.html");
+        return await page.evaluate(fn, arg);
+    } finally {
+        await page.close();
+    }
+}
+
+const writeSentinel = ([key, value]) =>
+    new Promise((resolve) => {
+        chrome.storage.local.set({ [key]: value }, () => resolve(true));
+    });
+
+const readSentinel = (key) =>
+    new Promise((resolve) => {
+        chrome.storage.local.get(key, (r) => resolve(r[key] ?? null));
+    });
+
+// Load `firstDir` in a fresh profile, write the sentinel, close; load
+// `secondDir` in the SAME profile, read it back. Returns both ids and what the
+// second load saw.
+async function acrossTwoPaths(tag, firstDir, secondDir) {
+    const profile = tmpdir(tag + "-profile");
+
+    const first = await launch(profile, [firstDir]);
+    let firstId;
+    try {
+        [firstId] = await extensionIds(first, 1);
+        if (!firstId) throw new Error("no extension loaded from " + firstDir);
+        await inExtension(first, firstId, writeSentinel, [
+            SENTINEL_KEY,
+            SENTINEL_VALUE,
+        ]);
+    } finally {
+        await first.close();
+    }
+
+    const second = await launch(profile, [secondDir]);
+    let secondId;
+    let seen;
+    try {
+        [secondId] = await extensionIds(second, 1);
+        if (!secondId) throw new Error("no extension loaded from " + secondDir);
+        seen = await inExtension(second, secondId, readSentinel, SENTINEL_KEY);
+    } finally {
+        await second.close();
+    }
+
+    return { firstId, secondId, seen };
+}
+
+async function main() {
+    if (!fs.existsSync(path.join(DIST_CHROME, "manifest.json"))) {
+        console.error(
+            "storagePartition: no unpacked build at " +
+                DIST_CHROME +
+                " — run make build first",
+        );
+        process.exitCode = 1;
+        return;
+    }
+
+    try {
+        // --- the shipped manifest, which carries `key` ----------------------
+        const keyedA = extensionCopy("keyed-a", true);
+        const keyedB = extensionCopy("keyed-b", true);
+        const keyed = await acrossTwoPaths("keyed", keyedA, keyedB);
+        console.log("# with `key`:    " + keyedA + " -> " + keyed.firstId);
+        console.log("# with `key`:    " + keyedB + " -> " + keyed.secondId);
+        console.log("# with `key`:    sentinel read back: " + keyed.seen);
+
+        check(
+            "with `key`, two different paths produce the SAME extension id",
+            keyed.firstId === keyed.secondId,
+            keyed.firstId + " != " + keyed.secondId,
+        );
+        check(
+            "with `key`, the second path reads the first path's storage",
+            keyed.seen === SENTINEL_VALUE,
+            "the second load read " +
+                JSON.stringify(keyed.seen) +
+                " instead of the value the first load wrote. The storage " +
+                "partition did not follow the extension across the move, " +
+                "which is the wallet silently reading as empty.",
+        );
+
+        // --- the same build with `key` removed: the control -----------------
+        const barePath = extensionCopy("bare-a", false);
+        const bareB = extensionCopy("bare-b", false);
+        const bare = await acrossTwoPaths("bare", barePath, bareB);
+        console.log("# without `key`: " + barePath + " -> " + bare.firstId);
+        console.log("# without `key`: " + bareB + " -> " + bare.secondId);
+        console.log("# without `key`: sentinel read back: " + bare.seen);
+
+        // Observed, not assumed. If Chrome ever stops deriving the id from
+        // the load path these two fail, and the right response is to record
+        // what it does now — not to delete them.
+        check(
+            "without `key`, two different paths produce DIFFERENT ids " +
+                "(observed Chrome behaviour, the defect this fixes)",
+            bare.firstId !== bare.secondId,
+            "both loads got " +
+                bare.firstId +
+                ", so the id no longer follows the load path on this Chrome",
+        );
+        check(
+            "without `key`, the second path sees an EMPTY partition " +
+                "(observed Chrome behaviour, the defect this fixes)",
+            bare.seen === null,
+            "the second load read " +
+                JSON.stringify(bare.seen) +
+                " from a different id's partition",
+        );
+
+        // --- both copies loaded at once, in one profile ---------------------
+        // The literal shape of the question, kept because "two unpacked loads
+        // in one profile" is what a user does when they forget to remove the
+        // old one. With `key`, both copies claim the same id.
+        const profile = tmpdir("simultaneous-profile");
+        const ctx = await launch(profile, [keyedA, keyedB]);
+        let ids = [];
+        try {
+            ids = await extensionIds(ctx, 2);
+        } finally {
+            await ctx.close();
+        }
+        console.log(
+            "# both keyed copies loaded at once: " +
+                ids.length +
+                " extension id(s): " +
+                ids.join(", "),
+        );
+        check(
+            "loading both keyed copies at once yields one id, not two " +
+                "(observed: Chrome does not load a second copy of an id it " +
+                "already has)",
+            ids.length === 1 && ids[0] === keyed.firstId,
+            "saw " + JSON.stringify(ids) + ", expected exactly one id",
+        );
+    } catch (e) {
+        failed += 1;
+        console.log("# ERROR: " + (e && e.stack ? e.stack : e));
+    } finally {
+        for (const dir of scratch) {
+            fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+        }
+    }
+
+    console.log("1.." + checks.length);
+    if (checks.length === 0) {
+        console.log("# FAILED: this program asserted nothing");
+        process.exitCode = 1;
+        return;
+    }
+    console.log(
+        "# " +
+            (checks.length - failed) +
+            "/" +
+            checks.length +
+            " checks passed",
+    );
+    if (failed > 0) {
+        console.log("# FAILED");
+        process.exitCode = 1;
+    }
+}
+
+main().catch((e) => {
+    console.error("storagePartition: " + (e && e.stack ? e.stack : e));
+    process.exitCode = 1;
+});

tests/exportPrivkey.test.js

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ jest.mock("../src/shared/wallet", () => ({
     getSignerForAddress: jest.fn(() => ({ privateKey: mockPrivateKey })),
 }));
 
-const { RESTORABLE_VIEWS } = require("../src/popup/restorableViews");
+const { RESTORABLE_VIEWS } = require("../src/shared/restorableViews");
 
 const VIEW = "export-privkey";
 const PASSWORD = "correct horse battery";

tests/extensionId.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+// The extension identity on both browsers, pinned.
+//
+// This is the anti-regression check for
+// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/310. An unpacked Chrome
+// extension with no `key` in its manifest gets an id derived from the
+// ABSOLUTE PATH it was loaded from, and chrome.storage.local is partitioned by
+// that id. Move the checkout, re-clone it, or load it from a second directory,
+// and the wallet is silently gone: the extension comes up on a fresh, empty
+// storage partition with no error anywhere. `key` pins the id to the public
+// key instead of to the path, which is what makes the storage survive.
+//
+// So the id is asserted as a literal. A test that merely recomputed the id
+// from whatever `key` happened to be in the manifest would pass after someone
+// replaced the key — and replacing the key is exactly the change that orphans
+// every existing wallet. The value below is the promise; changing it is a
+// migration, not an edit.
+//
+// Firefox needs no key: browser_specific_settings.gecko.id declares the id
+// directly, and it is pinned here for the same reason. The Firefox e2e suite
+// depends on it too (tests/e2e/firefox/driver.js maps it to a fixed uuid), and
+// tests/e2e/firefox/reinstall.js is the empirical half — it removes the add-on
+// and installs it again and reads the vault back out.
+
+const crypto = require("crypto");
+const fs = require("fs");
+const path = require("path");
+
+const MANIFEST_DIR = path.join(__dirname, "..", "manifest");
+
+// The public half of an RSA keypair, DER-encoded SubjectPublicKeyInfo, base64.
+// The PRIVATE half is not in this repo and is not needed to build, load or
+// test anything here: it is only ever used to sign a CRX, which this repo does
+// not do.
+const CHROME_KEY =
+    "MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAzy/G9gT4Z3Ci0HCmthUPEiCjENg+" +
+    "5meZpjdogyT7SiMfxENtHdrpDL6wGhAg1Dk0f1C67Ft8OYpMrMH3kiP2Wnt0UpHo45PY0YUU" +
+    "YzdJgbsp8u0kaykd5FFiY6FycIIFaTniMuh7wRKuNNdJWly+H3aG7qZ6nGu5PIMdb1GXUk35" +
+    "hY+yl7dz5dqFFYUCyxvWCT9XGBSYiI+XRBB/rVZjMWfWpaTmRPdOZ4+GO/Lx0OdMxKlPA/kL" +
+    "WoPot5vMlLn2FDPu6sASphiu7dKZnrINW+h/27jlHMJQS0jncB1EgqOHW0vbXrZnTveFX6UW" +
+    "+Qp86FfSkikhKtQgTW2A4mtWawIDAQAB";
+
+// chrome.storage.local for this extension lives under this id, and nowhere
+// else.
+const CHROME_EXTENSION_ID = "gipbhkogfopeahplcjhipkgpcimdpkip";
+
+const FIREFOX_EXTENSION_ID = "autistmask@sneak.berlin";
+
+// Chrome's id derivation: sha256 of the DER public key, first 16 bytes, each
+// hex digit mapped 0-f onto a-p. Written out here rather than taken on trust,
+// because the whole claim of this file is that the committed key produces that
+// id.
+function chromeExtensionId(keyBase64) {
+    const der = Buffer.from(keyBase64, "base64");
+    const digest = crypto.createHash("sha256").update(der).digest("hex");
+    return [...digest.slice(0, 32)]
+        .map((c) => String.fromCharCode(97 + parseInt(c, 16)))
+        .join("");
+}
+
+function readManifest(name) {
+    return JSON.parse(
+        fs.readFileSync(path.join(MANIFEST_DIR, name + ".json"), "utf8"),
+    );
+}
+
+describe("chrome extension identity", () => {
+    test("the manifest carries the pinned key", () => {
+        expect(readManifest("chrome").key).toBe(CHROME_KEY);
+    });
+
+    test("the key is a well-formed RSA public key", () => {
+        const der = Buffer.from(CHROME_KEY, "base64");
+        // Round-trips: a truncated or re-wrapped base64 blob would still
+        // decode to bytes, and Chrome would then derive an id from garbage.
+        expect(der.toString("base64")).toBe(CHROME_KEY);
+        const key = crypto.createPublicKey({
+            key: der,
+            format: "der",
+            type: "spki",
+        });
+        expect(key.asymmetricKeyType).toBe("rsa");
+        expect(key.asymmetricKeyDetails.modulusLength).toBe(2048);
+    });
+
+    test("the key derives the pinned extension id", () => {
+        expect(chromeExtensionId(CHROME_KEY)).toBe(CHROME_EXTENSION_ID);
+        expect(CHROME_EXTENSION_ID).toMatch(/^[a-p]{32}$/);
+    });
+
+    // The private half is a credential. It has never been in this repo and no
+    // target generates one into the working tree; this fails loudly if that
+    // ever changes, because a committed .pem is a key anyone can sign a CRX
+    // with under this extension's id.
+    test("no private key is committed anywhere in the tree", () => {
+        const tracked = require("child_process")
+            .execSync("git ls-files", {
+                cwd: path.join(__dirname, ".."),
+                encoding: "utf8",
+            })
+            .split("\n")
+            .filter(Boolean);
+        expect(tracked.filter((f) => /\.(pem|key|p12|pfx)$/i.test(f))).toEqual(
+            [],
+        );
+    });
+});
+
+describe("firefox extension identity", () => {
+    test("the manifest declares the pinned gecko id", () => {
+        const gecko = readManifest("firefox").browser_specific_settings.gecko;
+        expect(gecko.id).toBe(FIREFOX_EXTENSION_ID);
+    });
+
+    // Firefox derives nothing from the path, so no key field belongs here; one
+    // would be ignored and would only suggest the id came from somewhere else.
+    test("the firefox manifest carries no chrome key field", () => {
+        expect(readManifest("firefox").key).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+});

tests/networkEndpoints.test.js

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 // happened.
 
 const { networkById } = require("../src/shared/networks");
+const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
 
 const ADDRESS = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
 
@@ -34,25 +35,19 @@ function walletFixture() {
 // saveState() wrote — so a case can reload a fresh module from the bytes an
 // earlier one persisted, which is what an extension restart does. `state` is
 // a module-level singleton, so the registry has to be reset per load.
+// The stub clones in both directions, as the real chrome.storage.local does.
+// It used to alias, and written() then handed the NEXT module load the live
+// in-memory object of the previous one as its "persisted bytes" — an extension
+// restart that never crossed a serialization boundary. See
+// tests/support/storageStub.js.
 function loadModuleWith(persisted) {
     jest.resetModules();
-    let written = null;
+    const storage = makeStorageStub(persisted ? { autistmask: persisted } : {});
-    global.chrome = {
+    global.chrome = { storage };
-        storage: {
-            local: {
-                get: jest.fn(async () =>
-                    persisted ? { autistmask: persisted } : {},
-                ),
-                set: jest.fn(async (items) => {
-                    written = items.autistmask;
-                }),
-            },
-        },
-    };
     return {
         mod: require("../src/shared/state"),
         chainSwitch: require("../src/shared/chainSwitch"),
-        written: () => written,
+        written: () => storage.read("autistmask"),
     };
 }
 

tests/packaging.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+// The release archives: the zip container, and the self-containment rule.
+//
+// script/package produces one archive per browser and script/lib/package.js
+// decides what goes in it. The trap that rule exists for is real and specific:
+// build.js writes the compiled stylesheet to dist/styles.css at the dist/
+// ROOT, outside both browser directories, and copies it into each of them as
+// src/popup/styles.css. A `zip -r dist/chrome` is correct only because of that
+// copy, and would silently start shipping a popup with no stylesheet the
+// moment a reference pointed up and out of the directory.
+//
+// So the packager resolves every reference in the manifest and in every HTML
+// document, and fails on any that leaves the extension root. These are the
+// cases for that, plus the archive format itself — new code, and the thing the
+// artifact is made of.
+
+const {
+    checkSelfContained,
+    htmlReferences,
+    manifestReferences,
+} = require("../script/lib/package");
+const { readZip, writeZip } = require("../script/lib/zip");
+
+function archiveOf(files) {
+    return {
+        members: Object.keys(files).sort(),
+        read: (name) => Buffer.from(files[name] ?? "", "utf8"),
+    };
+}
+
+const MINIMAL_MANIFEST = {
+    manifest_version: 3,
+    name: "AutistMask",
+    version: "0.1.0",
+    action: { default_popup: "src/popup/index.html" },
+    background: { service_worker: "src/background/index.js" },
+};
+
+describe("archive self-containment", () => {
+    test("a complete tree passes", () => {
+        const { members, read } = archiveOf({
+            "manifest.json": JSON.stringify(MINIMAL_MANIFEST),
+            "src/popup/index.html":
+                '<link rel="stylesheet" href="styles.css" />' +
+                '<script src="index.js"></script>',
+            "src/popup/styles.css": "body{}",
+            "src/popup/index.js": "//",
+            "src/background/index.js": "//",
+        });
+        expect(() => checkSelfContained("chrome", members, read)).not.toThrow();
+    });
+
+    test("a manifest naming a file that is not in the archive fails", () => {
+        const { members, read } = archiveOf({
+            "manifest.json": JSON.stringify(MINIMAL_MANIFEST),
+            "src/popup/index.html": "<html></html>",
+            "src/popup/index.js": "//",
+        });
+        expect(() => checkSelfContained("chrome", members, read)).toThrow(
+            /would not be self-contained.*src\/background\/index\.js/s,
+        );
+    });
+
+    // The dist/styles.css case, exactly: a popup that reached up out of its
+    // own browser directory for the stylesheet the build leaves at the dist/
+    // root. Nothing would be missing from disk, and the zip would still be
+    // built — the archive would just have no stylesheet in it.
+    test("an HTML reference that escapes the extension root fails", () => {
+        const { members, read } = archiveOf({
+            "manifest.json": JSON.stringify(MINIMAL_MANIFEST),
+            "src/popup/index.html":
+                '<link rel="stylesheet" href="../../../styles.css" />',
+            "src/popup/index.js": "//",
+            "src/background/index.js": "//",
+        });
+        expect(() => checkSelfContained("chrome", members, read)).toThrow(
+            /resolves outside the extension root/,
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("a manifest reference that escapes the extension root fails", () => {
+        const { members, read } = archiveOf({
+            "manifest.json": JSON.stringify({
+                ...MINIMAL_MANIFEST,
+                background: { service_worker: "../shared/index.js" },
+            }),
+            "src/popup/index.html": "<html></html>",
+        });
+        expect(() => checkSelfContained("chrome", members, read)).toThrow(
+            /points outside the extension root/,
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("an archive with no manifest.json at its root fails", () => {
+        const { members, read } = archiveOf({ "src/popup/index.js": "//" });
+        expect(() => checkSelfContained("chrome", members, read)).toThrow(
+            /no manifest\.json at its root/,
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("manifest strings that are not paths are not treated as files", () => {
+        const found = manifestReferences({
+            name: "AutistMask",
+            version: "0.1.0",
+            permissions: ["storage", "<all_urls>"],
+            content_security_policy: {
+                extension_pages: "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'",
+            },
+            key: "MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAzy",
+        });
+        expect([...found]).toEqual([]);
+    });
+
+    test("absolute, data: and anchor HTML references are not files", () => {
+        const refs = htmlReferences(
+            "src/popup/index.html",
+            '<a href="https://example.com/x.js">a</a>' +
+                '<img src="" />' +
+                '<a href="#view-main">b</a>' +
+                '<script src="index.js"></script>',
+        );
+        expect([...refs]).toEqual(["src/popup/index.js"]);
+    });
+});
+
+describe("the zip container", () => {
+    const files = [
+        { name: "manifest.json", data: Buffer.from('{"a":1}') },
+        // Long enough that deflate wins, so both paths through compress() are
+        // exercised by one archive.
+        { name: "src/popup/index.js", data: Buffer.from("x".repeat(5000)) },
+        { name: "empty.txt", data: Buffer.alloc(0) },
+    ];
+
+    test("round-trips every member byte for byte", () => {
+        const entries = readZip(writeZip(files));
+        expect(entries.map((e) => e.name)).toEqual([
+            "empty.txt",
+            "manifest.json",
+            "src/popup/index.js",
+        ]);
+        for (const original of files) {
+            const found = entries.find((e) => e.name === original.name);
+            expect(found.data.equals(original.data)).toBe(true);
+        }
+    });
+
+    // The sha256 in release/SHA256SUMS has to be a property of the input. Two
+    // builds of one commit that produce different archives cannot be compared
+    // to each other, which is most of what publishing a digest is for.
+    test("is byte-identical across runs and independent of input order", () => {
+        const a = writeZip(files);
+        const b = writeZip([...files].reverse());
+        expect(a.equals(b)).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    // Reading an archive back is how script/lib/package.js establishes that
+    // the artifact holds what dist/ holds, so a member whose bytes changed
+    // after it was written has to fail rather than be handed back.
+    test("a corrupted member fails its CRC on read", () => {
+        // One member, incompressible at this size, so it is stored verbatim
+        // and its bytes begin at a known offset: local header (30) + name.
+        const name = "a.js";
+        const archive = writeZip([{ name, data: Buffer.from("hello") }]);
+        expect(readZip(archive)[0].data.toString()).toBe("hello");
+        archive[30 + name.length] ^= 0xff;
+        expect(() => readZip(archive)).toThrow(/fails its recorded CRC32/);
+    });
+
+    test.each([["/abs.js"], ["../up.js"], ["a/../b.js"], ["a\\b.js"], [""]])(
+        "refuses the member name %p",
+        (name) => {
+            expect(() => writeZip([{ name, data: Buffer.from("x") }])).toThrow(
+                /member name/,
+            );
+        },
+    );
+
+    test("refuses an archive with no members", () => {
+        expect(() => writeZip([])).toThrow(/no members/);
+    });
+
+    test("refuses duplicate members", () => {
+        expect(() =>
+            writeZip([
+                { name: "a.js", data: Buffer.from("1") },
+                { name: "a.js", data: Buffer.from("2") },
+            ]),
+        ).toThrow(/duplicate member/);
+    });
+});

tests/settingsUtcTimestamps.test.js

@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@
 const fs = require("fs");
 const path = require("path");
 
+const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
+
 const POPUP_HTML = fs.readFileSync(
     path.join(__dirname, "..", "src", "popup", "index.html"),
     "utf8",
@@ -51,19 +53,17 @@ describe("the UTC Timestamps checkbox placement", () => {
 });
 
 describe("the UTC Timestamps setting round-trips through storage", () => {
-    let store;
+    let storage;
 
+    // The stub clones in both directions, as the real chrome.storage.local
+    // does. It used to alias, which is fatal to a round-trip test in
+    // particular: the object the module holds and the object "storage" holds
+    // are then the same object, so the setting appears to have been persisted
+    // and read back on a build where neither happened. See
+    // tests/support/storageStub.js.
     function loadStateModule() {
-        store = {};
+        storage = makeStorageStub();
-        global.chrome = {
+        global.chrome = { storage };
-            storage: {
-                local: {
-                    get: async (key) =>
-                        key in store ? { [key]: store[key] } : {},
-                    set: async (obj) => Object.assign(store, obj),
-                },
-            },
-        };
         jest.resetModules();
         return require("../src/shared/state");
     }
@@ -86,12 +86,18 @@ describe("the UTC Timestamps setting round-trips through storage", () => {
         // What the change handler in views/settings.js does.
         first.state.utcTimestamps = true;
         await first.saveState();
-        expect(store.autistmask.utcTimestamps).toBe(true);
+        expect(storage.read("autistmask").utcTimestamps).toBe(true);
 
-        // A fresh popup load sees it.
+        // A fresh popup load sees it — and, before that load, refuses to
+        // answer at all rather than reporting the default. That refusal is
+        // what makes the assertion below evidence of a read from storage
+        // instead of a value that was already sitting in memory
+        // (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324).
         jest.resetModules();
         const second = require("../src/shared/state");
-        expect(second.state.utcTimestamps).toBe(false);
+        expect(() => second.state.utcTimestamps).toThrow(
+            second.StateNotLoadedError,
+        );
         await second.loadState();
         expect(second.state.utcTimestamps).toBe(true);
     });

tests/showPhrase.test.js

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ const fs = require("fs");
 const path = require("path");
 
 const { walletHasRecoveryPhrase } = require("../src/shared/wallet");
-const { RESTORABLE_VIEWS } = require("../src/popup/restorableViews");
+const { RESTORABLE_VIEWS } = require("../src/shared/restorableViews");
 
 const SHOW_PHRASE_VIEW = "show-phrase";
 

tests/state.test.js

@@ -1,26 +1,37 @@
 const ADDRESS = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
 
+// Address RECORDS, not bare address strings. A stored profile is validated
+// against the schema on every read now (src/shared/stateSchema.js), and a bare
+// string where an address record belongs is one of the shapes that refuses to
+// load — as it should, since every screen dereferences addr.address.
 function oneWallet() {
-    return [{ name: "Wallet 1", type: "hd", addresses: [ADDRESS] }];
+    return [
+        {
+            name: "Wallet 1",
+            type: "hd",
+            addresses: [{ address: ADDRESS, balance: "0", tokenBalances: [] }],
+        },
+    ];
 }
 
+const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
+
 // state.js resolves the storage API at require time, so the stub has to exist
 // before the module is loaded, and the module registry has to be reset between
 // cases because `state` is a module-level singleton.
+//
+// The stub clones in both directions, as the real chrome.storage.local does —
+// see tests/support/storageStub.js for why an aliasing one made this file
+// assert less than it appears to.
 function loadModuleWith(persisted) {
     jest.resetModules();
-    const set = jest.fn(async () => {});
+    const storage = makeStorageStub(persisted ? { autistmask: persisted } : {});
-    global.chrome = {
+    global.chrome = { storage };
-        storage: {
+    return {
-            local: {
+        mod: require("../src/shared/state"),
-                get: jest.fn(async () =>
+        set: storage.set,
-                    persisted ? { autistmask: persisted } : {},
+        stored: () => storage.read("autistmask"),
-                ),
-                set,
-            },
-        },
     };
-    return { mod: require("../src/shared/state"), set };
 }
 
 afterEach(() => {

tests/stateMerge.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,423 @@
+// saveState() used to write the entire state blob every time
+// (src/shared/state.js). Every extension page — the toolbar popup, a dApp
+// approval window opened by the background, backgroundRefresh() in
+// src/background/index.js — holds its own in-memory `state`, loaded once,
+// and src/popup/views/helpers.js showView() saves on EVERY navigation. So
+// any second page that saved after a first page had written something new
+// overwrote it, with no attacker and no unusual input: a whole wallet, name,
+// addresses and encrypted secret included, silently gone
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/304).
+//
+// Both cases below drive the real state.js module through two independent
+// module registries sharing one storage backend, the way two real extension
+// pages share one chrome.storage.local. The shared stub structured-clones on
+// both get and set — a stub that hands back the object it was given aliases
+// the caller's own mutation and would make this entire defect class invisible
+// (see https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324).
+
+const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
+
+// One extension page: a fresh module registry over the shared storage.
+// state.js resolves the storage API at require time, so the stub has to be
+// installed before the module is loaded, and `state` is a module-level
+// singleton, so each page needs its own registry to hold its own copy.
+function loadPage(storage) {
+    jest.resetModules();
+    globalThis.chrome = { storage: { local: storage.local } };
+    return {
+        state: require("../src/shared/state"),
+        helpers: require("../src/popup/views/helpers"),
+    };
+}
+
+function wallet(name, secret, address) {
+    return {
+        type: "hd",
+        name,
+        xpub: "xpub-" + name,
+        encryptedSecret: secret,
+        nextIndex: 1,
+        addresses: [{ address, balance: "0", tokenBalances: [] }],
+    };
+}
+
+const W1 = wallet(
+    "Wallet 1",
+    "secret-one",
+    "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a",
+);
+const W2 = wallet(
+    "Wallet 2",
+    "secret-two",
+    "0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7",
+);
+
+// Minimal DOM: showView() toggles view elements, clears the flash line and
+// creates/removes the debug banner. Nothing here is asserted; it only has to
+// answer without throwing, the way the popup's own index.html would.
+function makeElement(id) {
+    const classes = new Set();
+    return {
+        id,
+        textContent: "",
+        style: {},
+        classList: {
+            add: (...n) => n.forEach((c) => classes.add(c)),
+            remove: (...n) => n.forEach((c) => classes.delete(c)),
+            toggle: (c, force) => {
+                const on = force === undefined ? !classes.has(c) : force;
+                if (on) classes.add(c);
+                else classes.delete(c);
+                return on;
+            },
+        },
+        remove: () => {},
+    };
+}
+
+function makeDocument() {
+    const els = new Map();
+    return {
+        getElementById(id) {
+            if (id === "debug-banner") return null;
+            if (!els.has(id)) els.set(id, makeElement(id));
+            return els.get(id);
+        },
+        createElement: () => makeElement("created"),
+        body: { prepend: () => {} },
+    };
+}
+
+afterEach(() => {
+    delete globalThis.chrome;
+    delete globalThis.document;
+});
+
+describe("a save from a page that never saw a wallet another page added", () => {
+    // The first DoD case on the issue: add a wallet in one page, then force
+    // a save from a second page loaded before that wallet existed. Both
+    // wallets must survive.
+    test("both wallets are in storage afterwards", async () => {
+        const storage = makeStorageStub();
+        await storage.set({ autistmask: { wallets: [W1] } });
+
+        // Loaded while storage held only Wallet 1, and never reloads —
+        // the approval window in the reproduction, or a second popup that
+        // has been open for a while.
+        const stale = loadPage(storage);
+        await stale.state.loadState();
+        expect(stale.state.state.wallets).toHaveLength(1);
+
+        // A second page, loaded after, adds a wallet — the exact sequence
+        // src/popup/views/addWallet.js uses.
+        const fresh = loadPage(storage);
+        await fresh.state.loadState();
+        fresh.state.state.wallets.push(W2);
+        fresh.state.state.hasWallet = true;
+        await fresh.state.saveState();
+
+        expect(
+            (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask.wallets,
+        ).toHaveLength(2);
+
+        // The stale page saves something that has nothing to do with
+        // wallets — exactly what showView() does on every navigation, and
+        // what backgroundRefresh() does after a balance poll.
+        stale.state.state.currentView = "settings";
+        await stale.state.saveState();
+
+        const persisted = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
+        expect(persisted.wallets.map((w) => w.name)).toEqual([
+            "Wallet 1",
+            "Wallet 2",
+        ]);
+        expect(persisted.wallets.map((w) => w.encryptedSecret)).toEqual([
+            "secret-one",
+            "secret-two",
+        ]);
+    });
+});
+
+describe("the approval-window reproduction", () => {
+    // approval window open, add a wallet in the popup, confirm the approval
+    // — the exact sequence from the issue. The approval window and the
+    // popup are the same popup code with a different starting view, so
+    // showView() is the real save path in both: src/popup/views/approval.js
+    // showTxApproval() calls showView("approve-tx") when the window opens,
+    // and a successful confirm calls
+    // src/popup/views/txStatus.js showWait() -> startWait(), which calls
+    // showView("wait-tx") — the save that clobbered the second wallet in
+    // the reproduction on the issue.
+    test("the wallet added in the popup survives confirming the approval", async () => {
+        globalThis.document = makeDocument();
+
+        const storage = makeStorageStub();
+        await storage.set({ autistmask: { wallets: [W1] } });
+
+        // The background opens the approval window on the approve-tx
+        // screen; nothing else has happened yet.
+        const approvalWindow = loadPage(storage);
+        await approvalWindow.state.loadState();
+        approvalWindow.helpers.showView("approve-tx");
+        // showView() does not await its own saveState(); an extra save
+        // joins the same queue and only resolves once that one has too,
+        // which is the black-box way to know it landed.
+        await approvalWindow.state.saveState();
+
+        // The user adds a wallet in the popup — a separate page, loaded
+        // after the approval window.
+        const popup = loadPage(storage);
+        await popup.state.loadState();
+        popup.state.state.wallets.push(W2);
+        popup.state.state.hasWallet = true;
+        await popup.state.saveState();
+        expect(
+            (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask.wallets,
+        ).toHaveLength(2);
+
+        // The user confirms the approval. The approval window navigates
+        // approve-tx -> wait-tx, saving again from state it loaded before
+        // Wallet 2 ever existed.
+        approvalWindow.helpers.showView("wait-tx");
+        await approvalWindow.state.saveState();
+
+        const persisted = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
+        expect(persisted.wallets.map((w) => w.name)).toEqual([
+            "Wallet 1",
+            "Wallet 2",
+        ]);
+        expect(persisted.wallets.map((w) => w.encryptedSecret)).toEqual([
+            "secret-one",
+            "secret-two",
+        ]);
+    });
+});
+
+// backgroundRefresh() (src/background/index.js) loads state, spends seconds
+// on network I/O in refreshBalances() (src/shared/balances.js) mutating
+// addr.balance/ensName/tokenBalances IN PLACE on the wallets it already
+// knew about, then saves. Precondition 2 on the issue: that refresh window
+// overlapping a membership change (add or delete) on another page must not
+// clobber or resurrect a wallet — a whole-field diff on `wallets` failed
+// this, because "background changed a balance" and "another page changed
+// membership" collided as the same field.
+describe("background refresh racing a wallet added on another page", () => {
+    test("the wallet added elsewhere survives background's stale balance save", async () => {
+        const storage = makeStorageStub();
+        await storage.set({ autistmask: { wallets: [W1] } });
+
+        // "background": loads first, and its save is the one that lands
+        // last, modeling the multi-second network round trip in between.
+        const background = loadPage(storage);
+        await background.state.loadState();
+        background.state.state.wallets[0].addresses[0].balance = "1.2345";
+
+        // A second page, loaded after, adds a wallet while background's
+        // refresh is still in flight.
+        const popup = loadPage(storage);
+        await popup.state.loadState();
+        popup.state.state.wallets.push(W2);
+        popup.state.state.hasWallet = true;
+        await popup.state.saveState();
+        expect(
+            (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask.wallets,
+        ).toHaveLength(2);
+
+        // background's save lands last, carrying only its balance update.
+        await background.state.saveState();
+
+        const persisted = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
+        expect(persisted.wallets.map((w) => w.name)).toEqual([
+            "Wallet 1",
+            "Wallet 2",
+        ]);
+        expect(persisted.wallets.map((w) => w.encryptedSecret)).toEqual([
+            "secret-one",
+            "secret-two",
+        ]);
+        // The balance update itself must not be lost either — this is a
+        // merge, not deletion-always-wins.
+        expect(persisted.wallets[0].addresses[0].balance).toBe("1.2345");
+    });
+});
+
+describe("background refresh racing a wallet deleted on another page", () => {
+    test("the wallet deleted elsewhere stays deleted after background's stale balance save", async () => {
+        const storage = makeStorageStub();
+        await storage.set({ autistmask: { wallets: [W1, W2] } });
+
+        const background = loadPage(storage);
+        await background.state.loadState();
+        background.state.state.wallets[0].addresses[0].balance = "1.2345";
+
+        // A second page deletes Wallet 2 while background's refresh is in
+        // flight — the same splice deleteWallet.js's removeWalletFromState()
+        // does.
+        const popup = loadPage(storage);
+        await popup.state.loadState();
+        popup.state.state.wallets.splice(1, 1);
+        popup.state.state.hasWallet = popup.state.state.wallets.length > 0;
+        await popup.state.saveState();
+        expect(
+            (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask.wallets,
+        ).toHaveLength(1);
+
+        await background.state.saveState();
+
+        const persisted = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
+        expect(persisted.wallets.map((w) => w.name)).toEqual(["Wallet 1"]);
+        expect(persisted.wallets[0].addresses[0].balance).toBe("1.2345");
+    });
+});
+
+// allowedSites/deniedSites: { [address]: [hostname, ...] }. Mutated in place
+// from two different contexts — src/background/index.js:592-599 pushes a
+// newly approved hostname onto state.allowedSites[activeAddress], and the
+// Settings "revoke" button (src/popup/views/settings.js:55-68) filters a
+// hostname out of state[key][addr] in place, deleting the address key
+// entirely once its list is empty — the exact membership-vs-whole-field
+// pattern that made the whole-field `wallets` diff unsafe, on a
+// security-relevant field: a stale whole-field save here can resurrect a
+// revoked permission or wipe a freshly granted one.
+const ADDR1 = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
+const ADDR2 = "0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7";
+
+function approveSite(pageState, address, hostname) {
+    if (!pageState.allowedSites[address]) {
+        pageState.allowedSites[address] = [];
+    }
+    if (!pageState.allowedSites[address].includes(hostname)) {
+        pageState.allowedSites[address].push(hostname);
+    }
+}
+
+function revokeSite(pageState, hostname) {
+    for (const addr of Object.keys(pageState.allowedSites)) {
+        pageState.allowedSites[addr] = pageState.allowedSites[addr].filter(
+            (h) => h !== hostname,
+        );
+        if (pageState.allowedSites[addr].length === 0) {
+            delete pageState.allowedSites[addr];
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+describe("a dApp approval racing a stale Settings page's later save", () => {
+    test("the fresh approval survives Settings revoking an unrelated site", async () => {
+        const storage = makeStorageStub();
+        await storage.set({
+            autistmask: {
+                wallets: [W1],
+                allowedSites: { [ADDR2]: ["other.example"] },
+            },
+        });
+
+        // Settings loads first, and its save lands last — before either has
+        // any idea a dApp approval happened elsewhere in between.
+        const settings = loadPage(storage);
+        await settings.state.loadState();
+
+        // A dApp approval window, opened later, approves a new site for a
+        // different address and saves — the real sequence at
+        // src/background/index.js:592-599.
+        const approval = loadPage(storage);
+        await approval.state.loadState();
+        approveSite(approval.state.state, ADDR1, "dapp.example");
+        await approval.state.saveState();
+        expect(
+            (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask.allowedSites[ADDR1],
+        ).toEqual(["dapp.example"]);
+
+        // Settings revokes its own, unrelated site — the real sequence at
+        // src/popup/views/settings.js:55-68 — and saves from state loaded
+        // before the dApp approval ever happened.
+        revokeSite(settings.state.state, "other.example");
+        await settings.state.saveState();
+
+        const persisted = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
+        expect(persisted.allowedSites[ADDR1]).toEqual(["dapp.example"]);
+        expect(persisted.allowedSites[ADDR2]).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+});
+
+describe("a revoked site permission against a stale page's later save", () => {
+    test("the revocation holds even when the stale page approves something else", async () => {
+        const storage = makeStorageStub();
+        await storage.set({
+            autistmask: {
+                wallets: [W1],
+                allowedSites: { [ADDR1]: ["evil.example"] },
+            },
+        });
+
+        // A stale page loads while the permission still stands.
+        const stale = loadPage(storage);
+        await stale.state.loadState();
+
+        // Settings revokes it — src/popup/views/settings.js:55-68 — from a
+        // second page.
+        const settings = loadPage(storage);
+        await settings.state.loadState();
+        revokeSite(settings.state.state, "evil.example");
+        await settings.state.saveState();
+        expect(
+            (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask.allowedSites[ADDR1],
+        ).toBeUndefined();
+
+        // The stale page, unaware of the revoke, approves an unrelated site
+        // for a different address and saves — src/background/index.js:592-599.
+        approveSite(stale.state.state, ADDR2, "good.example");
+        await stale.state.saveState();
+
+        const persisted = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
+        expect(persisted.allowedSites[ADDR2]).toEqual(["good.example"]);
+        expect(persisted.allowedSites[ADDR1]).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+});
+
+// mergeListByIdentity()'s identity function is not guaranteed collision-free
+// — walletIdentity() falls back to one shared "addr:" value for any wallet
+// with neither an xpub nor a populated first address (a legacy or corrupt
+// record). Two such records created independently on two different pages
+// must not silently collapse into one, dropping the loser's
+// encryptedSecret with no error and no log.
+function legacyWallet(name, secret) {
+    return {
+        type: "legacy",
+        name,
+        encryptedSecret: secret,
+        nextIndex: 0,
+        addresses: [],
+    };
+}
+
+describe("two wallets independently created with a colliding identity", () => {
+    test("both survive, encryptedSecret included, instead of one silently replacing the other", async () => {
+        const storage = makeStorageStub();
+        await storage.set({ autistmask: { wallets: [W1] } });
+
+        // Both pages load before either has created their malformed wallet,
+        // so neither has baseline knowledge of the other's.
+        const pageA = loadPage(storage);
+        await pageA.state.loadState();
+        const pageB = loadPage(storage);
+        await pageB.state.loadState();
+
+        pageA.state.state.wallets.push(legacyWallet("Legacy A", "secret-a"));
+        pageA.state.state.hasWallet = true;
+        await pageA.state.saveState();
+        expect(
+            (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask.wallets,
+        ).toHaveLength(2);
+
+        pageB.state.state.wallets.push(legacyWallet("Legacy B", "secret-b"));
+        pageB.state.state.hasWallet = true;
+        await pageB.state.saveState();
+
+        const persisted = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
+        const secrets = persisted.wallets.map((w) => w.encryptedSecret);
+        expect(secrets).toContain("secret-one");
+        expect(secrets).toContain("secret-a");
+        expect(secrets).toContain("secret-b");
+    });
+});

tests/stateRecovery.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,442 @@
+// A stored profile the popup cannot read must produce a SCREEN, not a blank
+// popup (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/311).
+//
+// The three corrupt blobs below are the ones the pre-1.0 audit wrote into
+// storage. Against the build this file was added to, each one rendered nothing
+// at all — no view, no message, no control — because init() dereferenced
+// `state.wallets[0].addresses` on a record nothing had validated and threw
+// before the first showView().
+//
+// So the assertions here are deliberately made through the REAL popup entry
+// point rather than against the recovery view module directly. A recovery
+// screen that renders perfectly when something calls it, and that nothing
+// calls, is exactly the defect: what has to be true is that BOOTING the popup
+// on a bad blob lands on it.
+//
+// The DOM stub is built FROM src/popup/index.html — every id in the markup,
+// with the classes the markup gives it — so "which views are visible" is
+// answered against the real element set, and a recovery screen with no markup
+// behind it cannot pass.
+//
+// The fourth case is the upgrade one, and it is the case that must NOT reach
+// the recovery screen: every install in the field has a valid profile with no
+// version field, and showing those users a wipe prompt would be a worse defect
+// than the one being fixed. It is migrated in place and keeps working.
+
+const fs = require("fs");
+const path = require("path");
+
+const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
+
+const POPUP_HTML = fs.readFileSync(
+    path.join(__dirname, "..", "src", "popup", "index.html"),
+    "utf8",
+);
+
+// Fixed address, never used for anything but these tests.
+const ADDRESS = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
+
+// ------------------------------------------------------------- fixtures
+
+// A profile in the shape every install in the field has it: complete, valid,
+// and carrying no version field, because no build ever wrote one.
+function unversionedValidProfile() {
+    return {
+        hasWallet: true,
+        wallets: [
+            {
+                type: "hd",
+                name: "Wallet 1",
+                xpub: "xpub-wallet-1",
+                encryptedSecret: "encrypted-secret-1",
+                nextIndex: 1,
+                addresses: [
+                    { address: ADDRESS, balance: "1.5", tokenBalances: [] },
+                ],
+            },
+        ],
+        activeAddress: ADDRESS,
+        networkId: "mainnet",
+        rpcUrl: "https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com",
+        blockscoutUrl: "https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2",
+        allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"] },
+        deniedSites: {},
+        trackedTokens: [],
+        theme: "system",
+    };
+}
+
+// The three blobs from the issue, each with the error it produced.
+const CORRUPT_BLOBS = [
+    {
+        name: "wallets is a string",
+        blob: { hasWallet: true, wallets: ADDRESS, activeAddress: ADDRESS },
+    },
+    {
+        name: "wallets is an array of garbage",
+        blob: {
+            hasWallet: true,
+            wallets: [null, 42, "wallet"],
+            activeAddress: ADDRESS,
+        },
+    },
+    {
+        name: "future-schema blob (unknown fields, no version)",
+        blob: {
+            hasWallet: true,
+            // A later schema that renamed the field and moved the key
+            // material, written by a build this one knows nothing about, and
+            // stamped with no version because this build never wrote one.
+            wallets: [
+                {
+                    id: "wallet-1",
+                    label: "Wallet 1",
+                    accounts: [{ addr: ADDRESS, wei: "0x0" }],
+                    keyring: { kind: "hd", vault: "…" },
+                },
+            ],
+            profileFormat: "am-2",
+            activeAccount: ADDRESS,
+        },
+    },
+];
+
+// ------------------------------------------------------------- DOM stub
+
+function makeElement(id, className) {
+    const classes = new Set(
+        (className || "").split(/\s+/).filter((name) => name !== ""),
+    );
+    const el = {
+        id,
+        tagName: "DIV",
+        textContent: "",
+        value: "",
+        innerHTML: "",
+        href: "",
+        download: "",
+        disabled: false,
+        style: {},
+        dataset: {},
+        listeners: {},
+        clicked: 0,
+        classList: {
+            add: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.add(n)),
+            remove: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.delete(n)),
+            contains: (n) => classes.has(n),
+            toggle: (n, force) => {
+                const on = force === undefined ? !classes.has(n) : force;
+                if (on) classes.add(n);
+                else classes.delete(n);
+                return on;
+            },
+        },
+        addEventListener: (name, fn) => {
+            el.listeners[name] = el.listeners[name] || [];
+            el.listeners[name].push(fn);
+        },
+        removeEventListener: () => {},
+        appendChild: () => {},
+        remove: () => {},
+        focus: () => {},
+        select: () => {},
+        setAttribute: (name, value) => {
+            el[name] = value;
+        },
+        querySelector: () => null,
+        querySelectorAll: () => [],
+        click: () => {
+            el.clicked += 1;
+        },
+    };
+    return el;
+}
+
+// Every id in the markup, with the classes the markup gives it. A view the
+// popup is supposed to reveal has to exist here, which means it has to exist
+// in src/popup/index.html.
+function idsFromHtml(html) {
+    const out = new Map();
+    const tags = html.match(/<[a-zA-Z][^>]*>/g) || [];
+    for (const tag of tags) {
+        const id = /\bid="([^"]+)"/.exec(tag);
+        if (!id) continue;
+        const cls = /\bclass="([^"]*)"/.exec(tag);
+        out.set(id[1], cls ? cls[1] : "");
+    }
+    return out;
+}
+
+function makeDocument(html) {
+    const authored = idsFromHtml(html);
+    const els = new Map();
+    for (const [id, className] of authored) {
+        els.set(id, makeElement(id, className));
+    }
+    const created = [];
+    const doc = {
+        listeners: {},
+        getElementById(id) {
+            // Created on demand by updateDebugBanner(); absent is the state a
+            // non-debug, non-testnet popup is in.
+            if (id === "debug-banner") return null;
+            if (!els.has(id)) els.set(id, makeElement(id, ""));
+            return els.get(id);
+        },
+        createElement(tag) {
+            const el = makeElement("created-" + tag, "");
+            el.tagName = String(tag).toUpperCase();
+            created.push(el);
+            return el;
+        },
+        addEventListener(name, fn) {
+            doc.listeners[name] = doc.listeners[name] || [];
+            doc.listeners[name].push(fn);
+        },
+        querySelectorAll: () => [],
+        documentElement: makeElement("html", ""),
+        body: {
+            prepend: () => {},
+            appendChild: () => {},
+            removeChild: () => {},
+        },
+        elements: els,
+        authoredIds: authored,
+        created,
+    };
+    return doc;
+}
+
+// ------------------------------------------------------------- harness
+
+// Boot the real popup entry point over `stored`, exactly as the browser does:
+// storage already holds the record, the page loads, DOMContentLoaded fires.
+async function bootPopup(stored) {
+    jest.resetModules();
+
+    // The two modules that reach the network. Neither is on the path under
+    // test; both would make this suite hit the internet.
+    jest.doMock("../src/shared/prices", () => ({
+        prices: {},
+        refreshPrices: jest.fn(async () => {}),
+        clearPrices: jest.fn(),
+        getPrice: () => null,
+        formatUsd: () => "",
+        formatAddressTotal: () => "",
+        getAddressValue: () => ({ usd: null, partial: false }),
+        getWalletValue: () => ({ usd: null, partial: false }),
+        getTotalValue: () => ({ usd: null, partial: false }),
+    }));
+    jest.doMock("../src/shared/balances", () => ({
+        fetchTokenBalances: jest.fn(async () => []),
+        refreshBalances: jest.fn(async () => {}),
+        lookupTokenInfo: jest.fn(async () => null),
+        getProvider: () => ({}),
+        scanForAddresses: jest.fn(async () => []),
+    }));
+    jest.doMock("../src/shared/transactions", () => ({
+        fetchRecentTransactions: jest.fn(async () => []),
+        filterTransactions: () => [],
+    }));
+
+    const storage = makeStorageStub(
+        stored === undefined ? {} : { autistmask: stored },
+    );
+    const document = makeDocument(POPUP_HTML);
+    const reloads = [];
+
+    globalThis.chrome = {
+        storage: { local: storage.local },
+        runtime: {
+            sendMessage: jest.fn(async () => ({})),
+            getURL: (p) => "chrome-extension://autistmask/" + p,
+            onMessage: { addListener: () => {} },
+        },
+    };
+    globalThis.document = document;
+    globalThis.window = {
+        location: {
+            search: "",
+            href: "chrome-extension://autistmask/src/popup/index.html",
+            reload: () => reloads.push(Date.now()),
+        },
+        matchMedia: () => ({
+            matches: false,
+            addEventListener: () => {},
+            removeEventListener: () => {},
+        }),
+        addEventListener: () => {},
+    };
+    // The 10s refresh loop init() starts would outlive the test.
+    const realSetInterval = globalThis.setInterval;
+    globalThis.setInterval = () => 0;
+
+    require("../src/popup/index");
+
+    const booted = [];
+    for (const fn of document.listeners.DOMContentLoaded || []) {
+        booted.push(fn());
+    }
+
+    // What the browser console would have shown. A throw out of init() is the
+    // blank popup this issue is about, so it is captured rather than thrown:
+    // the assertion that matters is what ended up on screen.
+    const pageErrors = [];
+    for (const p of booted) {
+        try {
+            await p;
+        } catch (e) {
+            pageErrors.push(String((e && e.message) || e));
+        }
+    }
+    await settle();
+
+    globalThis.setInterval = realSetInterval;
+
+    return {
+        storage,
+        document,
+        pageErrors,
+        reloaded: () => reloads.length,
+        node: (id) => document.getElementById(id),
+        text: (id) => document.getElementById(id).textContent,
+        value: (id) => document.getElementById(id).value,
+        hidden: (id) =>
+            document.getElementById(id).classList.contains("hidden"),
+        click: async (id) => {
+            const el = document.getElementById(id);
+            const fns = el.listeners.click || [];
+            for (const fn of fns) await fn();
+            await settle();
+        },
+        // The view ids whose section is not hidden, as the audit measured them.
+        visibleViews: () => {
+            const out = [];
+            for (const [id, el] of document.elements) {
+                if (!id.startsWith("view-")) continue;
+                if (!el.classList.contains("hidden")) out.push(id.slice(5));
+            }
+            return out;
+        },
+    };
+}
+
+async function settle() {
+    for (let i = 0; i < 50; i++) await Promise.resolve();
+}
+
+afterEach(() => {
+    delete globalThis.chrome;
+    delete globalThis.document;
+    delete globalThis.window;
+});
+
+// --------------------------------------------------------------- tests
+
+describe("a stored profile the popup cannot read", () => {
+    for (const { name, blob } of CORRUPT_BLOBS) {
+        test(`${name}: the recovery screen, not a blank popup`, async () => {
+            const env = await bootPopup(blob);
+
+            // Asserted together, and in the audit's own shape: a failure here
+            // prints both what was on screen and what the console said, which
+            // is the pair that identifies this defect.
+            expect({
+                visibleViews: env.visibleViews(),
+                errors: env.pageErrors,
+            }).toEqual({ visibleViews: ["state-recovery"], errors: [] });
+
+            // The screen has to NAME the problem. A blank recovery screen is
+            // the same dead end with a border around it.
+            expect(env.text("state-recovery-problem").length).toBeGreaterThan(
+                10,
+            );
+        });
+    }
+
+    test("the Settings gear is hidden, since every screen behind it reads the profile", async () => {
+        const env = await bootPopup(CORRUPT_BLOBS[0].blob);
+
+        expect(env.hidden("btn-settings")).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    test("it does not write over the record it could not read", async () => {
+        // The blob is evidence, and possibly the only copy of key material in
+        // a shape a later build could recover. A boot that normalized it back
+        // into storage would destroy exactly that.
+        const env = await bootPopup(CORRUPT_BLOBS[2].blob);
+
+        expect(env.storage.read("autistmask")).toEqual(CORRUPT_BLOBS[2].blob);
+        expect(env.storage.set).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+});
+
+describe("the export on the recovery screen", () => {
+    test("hands back the raw stored record verbatim", async () => {
+        const env = await bootPopup(CORRUPT_BLOBS[2].blob);
+
+        await env.click("btn-state-recovery-export");
+
+        // Shown in the page, which always works, whatever the browser does
+        // with a download from an extension popup.
+        expect(env.hidden("state-recovery-blob")).toBe(false);
+        expect(JSON.parse(env.value("state-recovery-blob"))).toEqual(
+            CORRUPT_BLOBS[2].blob,
+        );
+    });
+});
+
+describe("the destructive reset on the recovery screen", () => {
+    test("erases nothing without the typed confirmation", async () => {
+        const env = await bootPopup(CORRUPT_BLOBS[0].blob);
+
+        env.node("state-recovery-reset-input").value = "yes";
+        await env.click("btn-state-recovery-reset");
+
+        expect(env.storage.read("autistmask")).toEqual(CORRUPT_BLOBS[0].blob);
+        expect(env.text("state-recovery-flash").length).toBeGreaterThan(10);
+        expect(env.reloaded()).toBe(0);
+    });
+
+    test("erases the stored profile once the phrase is typed", async () => {
+        const env = await bootPopup(CORRUPT_BLOBS[0].blob);
+
+        env.node("state-recovery-reset-input").value = "erase my wallet";
+        await env.click("btn-state-recovery-reset");
+
+        expect(env.storage.read("autistmask")).toBeUndefined();
+        expect(env.reloaded()).toBe(1);
+    });
+});
+
+describe("an unversioned profile that is perfectly valid", () => {
+    // The upgrade case. Every install in the field is in this state, and the
+    // popup must load it, not offer to wipe it.
+    test("boots to the wallet list, not the recovery screen", async () => {
+        const env = await bootPopup(unversionedValidProfile());
+
+        expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["main"]);
+        expect(env.pageErrors).toEqual([]);
+    });
+
+    test("is migrated in place: the version is stamped, the wallet survives", async () => {
+        const env = await bootPopup(unversionedValidProfile());
+
+        const stored = env.storage.read("autistmask");
+        expect(stored.schemaVersion).toBe(1);
+        expect(stored.wallets).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(stored.wallets[0].encryptedSecret).toBe("encrypted-secret-1");
+        expect(stored.wallets[0].addresses[0].address).toBe(ADDRESS);
+        expect(stored.activeAddress).toBe(ADDRESS);
+        expect(stored.allowedSites).toEqual({ [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"] });
+    });
+});
+
+describe("a first run with nothing in storage", () => {
+    test("boots to Welcome", async () => {
+        const env = await bootPopup(undefined);
+
+        expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["welcome"]);
+        expect(env.pageErrors).toEqual([]);
+    });
+});

tests/stateSchema.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,313 @@
+// The stored-profile version stamp and the shape gate in front of it
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/311).
+//
+// tests/stateRecovery.test.js covers what the USER sees when a record is
+// refused. This file covers what is refused and what is not, which is the
+// half that decides whether an upgrade brick or a false alarm ever happens:
+// a gate that refuses too much sends a perfectly good wallet to a wipe prompt,
+// and one that refuses too little is the blank popup again.
+
+const fs = require("fs");
+const path = require("path");
+
+const {
+    STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION,
+    StateUnusableError,
+    assertStateUsable,
+    migrationNeeded,
+    stateProblem,
+} = require("../src/shared/stateSchema");
+const {
+    NETWORKS,
+    UnknownNetworkError,
+    isKnownNetworkId,
+    networkById,
+} = require("../src/shared/networks");
+const { normalizePersisted } = require("../src/shared/persistedState");
+const { RESET_PHRASE } = require("../src/popup/views/stateRecovery");
+const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
+
+const ADDRESS = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
+
+function validProfile(extra) {
+    return {
+        hasWallet: true,
+        wallets: [
+            {
+                type: "hd",
+                name: "Wallet 1",
+                xpub: "xpub-wallet-1",
+                encryptedSecret: "encrypted-secret-1",
+                nextIndex: 1,
+                addresses: [
+                    { address: ADDRESS, balance: "1.5", tokenBalances: [] },
+                ],
+            },
+        ],
+        activeAddress: ADDRESS,
+        networkId: "mainnet",
+        ...(extra || {}),
+    };
+}
+
+afterEach(() => {
+    delete global.chrome;
+});
+
+describe("what the gate accepts", () => {
+    test("nothing stored at all is a first run, not a defect", () => {
+        expect(stateProblem(undefined)).toBeNull();
+        expect(stateProblem(null)).toBeNull();
+        expect(stateProblem({})).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    test("a valid profile with no version field is accepted and migrated", () => {
+        const saved = validProfile();
+
+        expect(stateProblem(saved)).toBeNull();
+        expect(migrationNeeded(saved)).toBe(true);
+        // The migration IS the stamp: version 1 is the shape that shipped
+        // unversioned, so nothing about the record has to change.
+        expect(normalizePersisted(saved).schemaVersion).toBe(
+            STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION,
+        );
+        expect(normalizePersisted(saved).wallets).toEqual(saved.wallets);
+    });
+
+    test("a profile already at the current version needs no migration", () => {
+        const saved = validProfile({ schemaVersion: STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION });
+
+        expect(stateProblem(saved)).toBeNull();
+        expect(migrationNeeded(saved)).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    test("an empty wallet list is fine", () => {
+        expect(stateProblem({ hasWallet: false, wallets: [] })).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    test("unknown extra fields alone are not a defect", () => {
+        // Only a change in the MEANING of a stored field is a version bump, so
+        // a field this build does not know must not be a refusal on its own —
+        // otherwise a downgrade would wipe a working wallet.
+        expect(stateProblem(validProfile({ somethingNew: 42 }))).toBeNull();
+    });
+});
+
+describe("what the gate refuses", () => {
+    test("a record that is not the record AutistMask stores", () => {
+        expect(stateProblem("wallet")).toMatch(/not the record/);
+        expect(stateProblem([1, 2])).toMatch(/not the record/);
+    });
+
+    test("a version from a newer build, naming both versions", () => {
+        const problem = stateProblem(
+            validProfile({ schemaVersion: STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION + 1 }),
+        );
+
+        expect(problem).toMatch(/newer version/);
+        expect(problem).toContain(String(STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION + 1));
+        expect(problem).toContain(String(STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION));
+    });
+
+    test("a version that is not a version at all", () => {
+        for (const version of ["1", 1.5, 0, -1, null, {}]) {
+            expect(
+                stateProblem(validProfile({ schemaVersion: version })),
+            ).toMatch(/schema version/);
+        }
+    });
+
+    test("wallets that is not a list", () => {
+        expect(stateProblem({ wallets: ADDRESS })).toMatch(/not a list/);
+        expect(stateProblem({ wallets: { 0: {} } })).toMatch(/not a list/);
+    });
+
+    test("a wallet that is not a wallet record", () => {
+        expect(stateProblem({ wallets: [null] })).toMatch(/wallet record/);
+        expect(stateProblem({ wallets: [42] })).toMatch(/wallet record/);
+    });
+
+    test("a wallet whose addresses are missing or not records", () => {
+        expect(stateProblem({ wallets: [{ name: "Wallet 1" }] })).toMatch(
+            /no list of addresses/,
+        );
+        expect(stateProblem({ wallets: [{ addresses: [ADDRESS] }] })).toMatch(
+            /not a record/,
+        );
+        expect(stateProblem({ wallets: [{ addresses: [{}] }] })).toMatch(
+            /no address/,
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("the problem names WHICH wallet, counting from one", () => {
+        const problem = stateProblem({
+            wallets: [validProfile().wallets[0], { name: "Wallet 2" }],
+        });
+
+        expect(problem).toContain("Wallet 2");
+    });
+
+    test("assertStateUsable throws the sentence, not a generic error", () => {
+        let thrown = null;
+        try {
+            assertStateUsable({ wallets: ADDRESS });
+        } catch (e) {
+            thrown = e;
+        }
+
+        expect(thrown).toBeInstanceOf(StateUnusableError);
+        expect(thrown.problem).toMatch(/not a list/);
+        expect(thrown.message).toBe(thrown.problem);
+    });
+});
+
+describe("networkId, which is used as an object key", () => {
+    // https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/311#issuecomment-67478:
+    // state.networkId keys state.networkEndpoints, so a corrupt "__proto__"
+    // sets that map's prototype instead of an own key and the user's endpoint
+    // is silently not recorded.
+    test("a network this build does not know is refused", () => {
+        expect(stateProblem(validProfile({ networkId: "base" }))).toMatch(
+            /does not know/,
+        );
+    });
+
+    test('"__proto__" and "constructor" are refused, not resolved', () => {
+        for (const id of ["__proto__", "constructor", "toString"]) {
+            expect(stateProblem(validProfile({ networkId: id }))).toMatch(
+                /does not know/,
+            );
+            expect(isKnownNetworkId(id)).toBe(false);
+        }
+    });
+
+    test("the gate reads own properties only", () => {
+        // A record whose PROTOTYPE carries the fields must not be read as
+        // though it carried them itself: that is how a polluted prototype
+        // would decide whether a profile is refused.
+        const inherited = Object.create({
+            schemaVersion: STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION + 99,
+            networkId: "base",
+            wallets: "not a list",
+        });
+
+        expect(stateProblem(inherited)).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    test("normalizing never turns a stored key into a prototype", () => {
+        // JSON can carry an own "__proto__" key, and plain assignment would
+        // treat it as the prototype setter rather than storing an entry.
+        const saved = JSON.parse(
+            '{"networkId":"mainnet","networkEndpoints":' +
+                '{"__proto__":{"rpcUrl":"https://evil.invalid"}}}',
+        );
+
+        const out = normalizePersisted(saved);
+
+        expect(Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(out, "rpcUrl")).toBe(true);
+        expect(out.rpcUrl).not.toBe("https://evil.invalid");
+        expect(Object.getPrototypeOf(out.networkEndpoints)).toBe(
+            Object.prototype,
+        );
+        expect({}.rpcUrl).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+
+    test("an unknown stored networkId never reaches the endpoint map", () => {
+        // The floor under the gate: normalization alone must not adopt it.
+        const out = normalizePersisted({ networkId: "__proto__" });
+
+        expect(out.networkId).toBe("mainnet");
+        expect(Object.keys(out.networkEndpoints)).toEqual(["mainnet"]);
+    });
+});
+
+describe("networkById on an unknown id", () => {
+    test("throws instead of quietly answering mainnet", () => {
+        expect(() => networkById("base")).toThrow(UnknownNetworkError);
+        expect(() => networkById(undefined)).toThrow(UnknownNetworkError);
+        // Both of these used to answer with something truthy off the
+        // prototype chain rather than with a network.
+        expect(() => networkById("constructor")).toThrow(UnknownNetworkError);
+        expect(() => networkById("__proto__")).toThrow(UnknownNetworkError);
+    });
+
+    test("still answers every network it does know", () => {
+        for (const id of Object.keys(NETWORKS)) {
+            expect(networkById(id).id).toBe(id);
+        }
+    });
+});
+
+describe("the version stamp on the way out", () => {
+    function loadStateModule(persisted) {
+        jest.resetModules();
+        const storage = makeStorageStub(
+            persisted ? { autistmask: persisted } : {},
+        );
+        global.chrome = { storage };
+        return { storage, mod: require("../src/shared/state") };
+    }
+
+    test("the popup stamps it on a profile that had none", async () => {
+        const { storage, mod } = loadStateModule(validProfile());
+
+        await mod.loadState();
+        await mod.saveState();
+
+        expect(storage.read("autistmask").schemaVersion).toBe(
+            STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION,
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("the background stamps it on a profile that had none", async () => {
+        jest.resetModules();
+        const storage = makeStorageStub({ autistmask: validProfile() });
+        global.chrome = { storage };
+        const { updateState } = require("../src/background/state");
+
+        await updateState((s) => {
+            s.lastBalanceRefresh = 1;
+        });
+
+        expect(storage.read("autistmask").schemaVersion).toBe(
+            STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION,
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("a save refuses to write over a record it cannot read", async () => {
+        // Another context — a newer build, or something else entirely — wrote
+        // a record this one does not understand while this page was open. That
+        // record is the only copy of whatever it holds, and normalizing it
+        // back into storage would destroy it.
+        const { storage, mod } = loadStateModule(validProfile());
+        await mod.loadState();
+
+        const hostile = { schemaVersion: STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION + 1 };
+        storage.write("autistmask", hostile);
+
+        // By name rather than by constructor: jest.resetModules() above gives
+        // the module under test its own copy of the error class, so instanceof
+        // across that boundary would be comparing two identical classes.
+        const thrown = await mod.saveState().then(
+            () => null,
+            (e) => e,
+        );
+        expect(thrown && thrown.name).toBe("StateUnusableError");
+        expect(thrown.problem).toMatch(/newer version/);
+        expect(storage.read("autistmask")).toEqual(hostile);
+    });
+});
+
+describe("the typed confirmation phrase", () => {
+    test("the markup asks for the phrase the code checks", () => {
+        // The button is behind a phrase typed by hand. A screen that asks for
+        // one phrase while the code compares another is an exit that cannot be
+        // taken, on the one screen that exists to be an exit.
+        const html = fs.readFileSync(
+            path.join(__dirname, "..", "src", "popup", "index.html"),
+            "utf8",
+        );
+
+        expect(html).toContain(RESET_PHRASE);
+    });
+});

tests/stateUnusableRpc.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+// What a dApp is told when the wallet's stored profile cannot be read
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/311).
+//
+// The popup is not the only casualty of a bad blob. getActiveAddress()
+// dereferences the stored wallet list on nearly every method, so against the
+// build this file was added to, EVERY request from EVERY page came back as
+// -32603 "AutistMask could not complete this request because of an internal
+// error" — the code the wallet also answers when a signing attempt blows up,
+// with nothing in it to tell the page or the user what is actually wrong or
+// what to do about it.
+//
+// So what is pinned here is that the answer is SPECIFIC: its own code, and a
+// message that says the saved data cannot be read, that nothing was signed or
+// sent, and where to go to fix it.
+//
+// Same cold-worker shape as tests/coldWorkerChainId.test.js: the real state
+// modules, over a storage stub, with no loadState() of the test's own — the
+// handler has to reach storage by itself, as a worker revived by the page's
+// own message does.
+
+const CONNECTED_ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
+const ADDRESS = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
+
+// The generic answer, quoted rather than imported: this file's whole point is
+// that the state-unusable path stopped using it.
+const GENERIC_INTERNAL_ERROR_CODE = -32603;
+
+// The three blobs from the issue.
+const CORRUPT_BLOBS = [
+    {
+        name: "wallets is a string",
+        blob: { hasWallet: true, wallets: ADDRESS },
+    },
+    {
+        name: "wallets is an array of garbage",
+        blob: { hasWallet: true, wallets: [null, 42, "wallet"] },
+    },
+    {
+        name: "future-schema blob (unknown fields, no version)",
+        blob: {
+            hasWallet: true,
+            wallets: [{ id: "wallet-1", accounts: [{ addr: ADDRESS }] }],
+            profileFormat: "am-2",
+        },
+    },
+];
+
+async function settle() {
+    for (let i = 0; i < 50; i++) await Promise.resolve();
+}
+
+afterEach(() => {
+    delete global.chrome;
+});
+
+function loadColdWorker(stored) {
+    jest.resetModules();
+
+    jest.doMock("../src/shared/balances", () => ({
+        getProvider: () => ({}),
+        refreshBalances: jest.fn(async () => {}),
+    }));
+    jest.doMock("../src/shared/phishingDomains", () => ({
+        isPhishingDomain: () => false,
+    }));
+    jest.doMock("../src/shared/alarms", () => ({
+        BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM: "balance",
+        BALANCE_REFRESH_PERIOD_MINUTES: 1,
+        ensureRecurringAlarms: jest.fn(async () => {}),
+        registerAlarmHandlers: jest.fn(),
+    }));
+
+    const store = { autistmask: structuredClone(stored) };
+    let messageListener = null;
+    const set = jest.fn(async (items) => {
+        store.autistmask = structuredClone(items.autistmask);
+    });
+
+    global.chrome = {
+        storage: {
+            local: {
+                get: jest.fn(async () => structuredClone(store)),
+                set,
+            },
+        },
+        runtime: {
+            getURL: (p) => "chrome-extension://autistmask/" + p,
+            onMessage: {
+                addListener: (fn) => {
+                    messageListener = fn;
+                },
+            },
+            onConnect: { addListener: () => {} },
+            lastError: null,
+        },
+        windows: {
+            getLastFocused: (cb) => cb(null),
+            create: (options, cb) => cb({ id: 1 }),
+            remove: (id, cb) => {
+                if (cb) cb();
+            },
+            onRemoved: { addListener: () => {} },
+        },
+        tabs: {
+            query: (queryInfo, cb) => cb([{ id: 1 }]),
+            sendMessage: (tabId, message, cb) => {
+                if (cb) cb();
+            },
+        },
+        action: { setPopup: () => {} },
+    };
+
+    require("../src/background/index");
+
+    async function rpc(method, params) {
+        let result = null;
+        messageListener(
+            { type: "AUTISTMASK_RPC", method, params: params || [] },
+            { origin: CONNECTED_ORIGIN },
+            (r) => {
+                result = r;
+            },
+        );
+        await settle();
+        return result;
+    }
+
+    return { rpc, persisted: () => store.autistmask, storageSet: set };
+}
+
+// Every method a page can reach that has to consult the profile.
+const METHODS = [
+    "eth_accounts",
+    "eth_requestAccounts",
+    "eth_chainId",
+    "personal_sign",
+    "eth_sendTransaction",
+];
+
+describe("a dApp call against a profile the wallet cannot read", () => {
+    for (const { name, blob } of CORRUPT_BLOBS) {
+        test(`${name}: a specific error, not the generic internal one`, async () => {
+            const bg = loadColdWorker(blob);
+
+            const answer = await bg.rpc("eth_accounts");
+
+            expect(answer.error).toBeDefined();
+            expect(answer.error.code).not.toBe(GENERIC_INTERNAL_ERROR_CODE);
+            // The message has to say what is wrong, that nothing was sent,
+            // and where to go. "Internal error" says none of the three.
+            expect(answer.error.message).toMatch(/saved data/i);
+            expect(answer.error.message).toMatch(/nothing was/i);
+            expect(answer.error.message).toMatch(/AutistMask/);
+        });
+    }
+
+    test("every method that consults the profile answers the same way", async () => {
+        const bg = loadColdWorker(CORRUPT_BLOBS[0].blob);
+
+        const codes = new Set();
+        for (const method of METHODS) {
+            const answer = await bg.rpc(method, ["0x00", ADDRESS]);
+            expect(answer.error).toBeDefined();
+            codes.add(answer.error.code);
+        }
+
+        // One code for the condition, whatever the method was.
+        expect(codes.size).toBe(1);
+        expect(codes.has(GENERIC_INTERNAL_ERROR_CODE)).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    test("it does not write over the record it could not read", async () => {
+        const bg = loadColdWorker(CORRUPT_BLOBS[1].blob);
+
+        await bg.rpc("eth_accounts");
+        await bg.rpc("eth_chainId");
+
+        expect(bg.storageSet).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+        expect(bg.persisted()).toEqual(CORRUPT_BLOBS[1].blob);
+    });
+});

tests/support/storageStub.js

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+// A chrome.storage.local stub that behaves like the real one.
+//
+// The real extension storage API is a serialization boundary: `set` writes a
+// structured clone of what it is given, and `get` hands back a structured
+// clone of what is stored. Nothing an extension page holds is ever the object
+// storage holds.
+//
+// A stub that skips the clone aliases them together, and that hides an entire
+// class of defect rather than merely being imprecise. loadState() assigns
+// nested references straight out of the get result, so over an aliasing stub a
+// test can assert "the endpoint was persisted" and pass on a build that never
+// called saveState() at all: the in-memory mutation IS the stored record.
+// Measured, not theorised — with an aliasing `get` restored over the handler
+// fixed in https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/pulls/319, the whole suite
+// passed 794/794 (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324).
+//
+// So every test that drives real persistence uses this, and nothing rebuilds
+// a storage stub by hand.
+
+// `initial` is the starting contents, keyed as storage is: { autistmask: {...} }.
+// `onOp` runs before each operation, for a test that needs to advance a clock
+// or count round trips.
+function makeStorageStub(initial, onOp) {
+    const store = initial ? structuredClone(initial) : {};
+    const tick = onOp || (() => {});
+
+    const get = jest.fn(async (key) => {
+        tick();
+        if (key === undefined || key === null) return structuredClone(store);
+        const keys = Array.isArray(key) ? key : [key];
+        const out = {};
+        for (const k of keys) {
+            if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(store, k)) {
+                out[k] = structuredClone(store[k]);
+            }
+        }
+        return out;
+    });
+
+    const set = jest.fn(async (items) => {
+        tick();
+        for (const k of Object.keys(items)) {
+            store[k] = structuredClone(items[k]);
+        }
+    });
+
+    const remove = jest.fn(async (key) => {
+        tick();
+        for (const k of Array.isArray(key) ? key : [key]) delete store[k];
+    });
+
+    return {
+        // Drop this straight in as chrome.storage.
+        local: { get, set, remove },
+        get,
+        set,
+        remove,
+        // What is stored, cloned on the way out: a test can neither observe a
+        // later write through an object it read nor reach into the store by
+        // mutating one.
+        read: (key) =>
+            key === undefined
+                ? structuredClone(store)
+                : structuredClone(store[key]),
+        // Seed or replace a record without going through the module under
+        // test — for standing in as "another page wrote this".
+        write: (key, value) => {
+            store[key] = structuredClone(value);
+        },
+    };
+}
+
+module.exports = { makeStorageStub };

tests/symbolSpoof.test.js

@@ -682,6 +682,7 @@ describe("surface 3: the balance list", () => {
             "https://rpc.example.invalid",
             BLOCKSCOUT,
             [],
+            "mainnet",
         );
         expect(addr.balance).toBe("1.2345");
         expect(addr.tokenBalances).toEqual([]);

tests/transactions.test.js

@@ -30,8 +30,11 @@ global.fetch = jest.fn(() => {
 });
 
 // state.js reads chrome.storage.local at module load; stub it so the
-// default settings can be asserted against what the README promises.
+// default settings can be asserted against what the README promises. Empty
-global.chrome = { storage: { local: {} } };
+// storage, so a load produces exactly the defaults.
+const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
+
+global.chrome = { storage: makeStorageStub() };
 
 const {
     fetchRecentTransactions,
@@ -745,6 +748,16 @@ describe("dust threshold filtering", () => {
 });
 
 describe("filter defaults promised by the README and Settings", () => {
+    // The defaults are what a load of empty storage produces, so the load is
+    // part of the assertion rather than an incantation before it: reading the
+    // singleton before any load now throws (StateNotLoadedError), because a
+    // context served DEFAULT_STATE without asking for it is the whole subject
+    // of https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324. The stub at the top
+    // of this file has storage empty.
+    beforeAll(async () => {
+        await require("../src/shared/state").loadState();
+    });
+
     test("all four toggles default to on and the threshold to 100,000 gwei", () => {
         expect(state.hideSpoofedSymbols).toBe(true);
         expect(state.hideLowHolderTokens).toBe(true);

tests/txStatus.test.js

@@ -96,22 +96,18 @@ global.document = {
 
 global.window = { location: { search: "" } };
 
-const stored = {};
+// Clones in both directions, as the real chrome.storage.local does; the stub
-global.chrome = {
+// here used to hand back the live stored object, so an in-memory mutation
-    storage: {
+// looked like a write that had reached storage. See
-        local: {
+// tests/support/storageStub.js.
-            set: (obj) => {
+const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
-                Object.assign(stored, obj);
+
-                return Promise.resolve();
+const storage = makeStorageStub();
-            },
+global.chrome = { storage };
-            get: () => Promise.resolve(stored),
-        },
-    },
-};
 
 const txStatus = require("../src/popup/views/txStatus");
 const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
-const { RESTORABLE_VIEWS } = require("../src/popup/restorableViews");
+const { RESTORABLE_VIEWS } = require("../src/shared/restorableViews");
 
 const TX_HASH =
     "0x85215772ed26ea8b39c2b3b18779030487efbe0b5fd7e882592b2f62b837be84";

tests/uniswapTokenOut.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+// The output token of a swap, as the dApp approval screen names it.
+//
+// Issue #346: the `Token Out` detail line in `src/shared/uniswap.js` was
+// pushed only `if (outSymbol)`, and a token absent from the bundled list has
+// no symbol. The line was therefore dropped entirely for exactly that
+// population — which is every newly listed token — leaving a `Min. received`
+// figure with nothing on the screen saying what is being received. The
+// `Token In` line already falls back to the address; the rule asserted here is
+// that the output side does too, always.
+
+const { AbiCoder, Interface, getAddress } = require("ethers");
+const uniswap = require("../src/shared/uniswap");
+const { unknownDecimalsAmount } = require("../src/shared/approvalAmount");
+
+const ROUTER = "0x66a9893cc07d91d95644aedd05d03f95e1dba8af";
+const RECIPIENT = "0xC0FfEE0000000000000000000000000000c0fFEe";
+// In the bundled list, at 18 decimals.
+const WETH = "0xC02aaA39b223FE8D0A0e5C4F27eAD9083C756Cc2";
+// Outside it, as every newly listed token is. Checksummed, because that is
+// the form the decoder gets back from the ABI decode and puts on the line.
+const NOVEL_OUT = getAddress("0xd0d0000000000000000000000000000000000d0d");
+
+const HALF_WETH = 500000000000000000n;
+// 1,000.00 of a 6-decimal token.
+const THOUSAND_AT_SIX = 1000000000n;
+
+const coder = AbiCoder.defaultAbiCoder();
+const routerIface = new Interface([
+    "function execute(bytes commands, bytes[] inputs, uint256 deadline)",
+]);
+
+// A V2_SWAP_EXACT_IN (command 0x08) execute() call.
+function swapData(tokenIn, amountIn, tokenOut, amountOutMin) {
+    const input = coder.encode(
+        ["address", "uint256", "uint256", "address[]", "bool"],
+        [RECIPIENT, amountIn, amountOutMin, [tokenIn, tokenOut], true],
+    );
+    return routerIface.encodeFunctionData("execute", [
+        "0x08",
+        [input],
+        9999999999n,
+    ]);
+}
+
+// An UNWRAP_WETH (command 0x0c) execute() call: the output side is native ETH,
+// which has no contract address to name.
+function unwrapData() {
+    return routerIface.encodeFunctionData("execute", [
+        "0x0c",
+        [coder.encode(["address", "uint256"], [RECIPIENT, HALF_WETH])],
+        9999999999n,
+    ]);
+}
+
+function detail(data, label, sources) {
+    const decoded = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER, sources || {});
+    return decoded.details.find((d) => d.label === label);
+}
+
+describe("a swap to a token absent from the bundled list", () => {
+    const data = () => swapData(WETH, HALF_WETH, NOVEL_OUT, THOUSAND_AT_SIX);
+
+    test("still renders a Token Out line, naming the address", () => {
+        const out = detail(data(), "Token Out");
+        expect(out).toBeDefined();
+        expect(out.value).toBe(NOVEL_OUT);
+        expect(out.address).toBe(NOVEL_OUT);
+        expect(out.isToken).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    test("names the address alongside the unknown-scale refusal", () => {
+        // The same population hits both: no symbol, and no scale either. The
+        // address says which token, the base units say how much and admit the
+        // scale is unknown — neither line silently means something else.
+        expect(detail(data(), "Token Out").value).toBe(NOVEL_OUT);
+        expect(detail(data(), "Min. received").value).toBe(
+            unknownDecimalsAmount(THOUSAND_AT_SIX),
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("names the address when the scale is known but the symbol is not", () => {
+        const sources = {
+            trackedTokens: [
+                { address: NOVEL_OUT, symbol: "NOVEL", decimals: 6 },
+            ],
+        };
+        expect(detail(data(), "Token Out", sources).value).toBe(NOVEL_OUT);
+        expect(detail(data(), "Min. received", sources).value).toBe(
+            "1000.0000",
+        );
+    });
+});
+
+describe("the output tokens that already had a line keep it unchanged", () => {
+    test("a bundled token is named by symbol and address", () => {
+        const data = swapData(NOVEL_OUT, THOUSAND_AT_SIX, WETH, HALF_WETH);
+        const out = detail(data, "Token Out");
+        expect(out.value).toBe("WETH (" + WETH + ")");
+        expect(out.address).toBe(WETH);
+    });
+
+    test("an unwrap to native ETH is named ETH, with no address", () => {
+        const out = detail(unwrapData(), "Token Out");
+        expect(out.value).toBe("ETH");
+        expect(out.address).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+});

tests/uniswapUndeterminedTokenOut.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+// What the dApp approval screen says the output token of a V4 swap is when the
+// calldata did not name one.
+//
+// Issue #353: `src/shared/uniswap.js` took a V4 step's `amountOutMin` while
+// leaving `outputToken` null, and `tokenInfo(null)` answers
+// `{symbol: "ETH", decimals: 18}`. An undetermined output was therefore stated
+// to the user as ETH, with `Min. received` formatted at 18 decimals — the same
+// class as https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/340 and
+// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/306, but naming the wrong asset
+// rather than the wrong scale.
+//
+// The determination this file pins: null is NOT how V4 spells native ETH.
+// v4-core declares `type Currency is address` and wraps `address(0)` for
+// native ETH, and a Currency is ABI-encoded as a plain address word, so a
+// native-ETH currency reaches the decoder as the string
+// "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" — truthy, and already named
+// ETH by tokenInfo(). Both cases are asserted below: the zero address stays
+// ETH, and null refuses.
+
+const { AbiCoder, Interface, solidityPacked } = require("ethers");
+const uniswap = require("../src/shared/uniswap");
+const { unknownDecimalsAmount } = require("../src/shared/approvalAmount");
+
+const ROUTER = "0x66a9893cc07d91d95644aedd05d03f95e1dba8af";
+const USER = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
+const ZERO = "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000";
+// Both in the bundled list: USDT at 6 decimals, WETH at 18.
+const USDT = "0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7";
+const WETH = "0xC02aaA39b223FE8D0A0e5C4F27eAD9083C756Cc2";
+
+const REFUSAL = "Unknown (not named in the calldata)";
+
+// The figure whose asset is in question. At 18 decimals it renders as
+// 0.000000000001; in base units it renders as itself.
+const MIN_OUT = 1234567n;
+const HALF_ETH = 500000000000000000n;
+
+const V4_SWAP_EXACT_IN_SINGLE = 0x06;
+const V4_SWAP_EXACT_IN = 0x07;
+const V4_SETTLE = 0x0b;
+const V4_TAKE = 0x0e;
+
+const coder = AbiCoder.defaultAbiCoder();
+const routerIface = new Interface([
+    "function execute(bytes commands, bytes[] inputs, uint256 deadline)",
+]);
+
+function execute(commands, inputs) {
+    return routerIface.encodeFunctionData("execute", [
+        commands,
+        inputs,
+        9999999999n,
+    ]);
+}
+
+function v4Input(actions, params) {
+    return coder.encode(
+        ["bytes", "bytes[]"],
+        [new Uint8Array(actions), params],
+    );
+}
+
+// IV4Router.ExactInputParams as the decoder reads it:
+// (Currency currencyIn, PathKey[] path, uint128 amountIn, uint128 minOut).
+// An empty path names no output currency at all.
+function exactInParams(currencyIn, path, amountIn, amountOutMin) {
+    return coder.encode(
+        [
+            "tuple(address,tuple(address,uint24,int24,address,bytes)[],uint128,uint128)",
+        ],
+        [[currencyIn, path, amountIn, amountOutMin]],
+    );
+}
+
+// IV4Router.ExactInputSingleParams: (PoolKey, bool zeroForOne, uint128
+// amountIn, uint128 minOut, bytes hookData).
+function exactInSingleParams(currency0, currency1, zeroForOne, min) {
+    return coder.encode(
+        [
+            "tuple(tuple(address,address,uint24,int24,address),bool,uint128,uint128,bytes)",
+        ],
+        [
+            [
+                [currency0, currency1, 500, 10, ZERO],
+                zeroForOne,
+                1000000n,
+                min,
+                "0x",
+            ],
+        ],
+    );
+}
+
+// V3_SWAP_EXACT_IN (command 0x00) input: path is token(20) fee(3) token(20).
+function v3ExactIn(tokenIn, tokenOut, amountIn, amountOutMin) {
+    const path =
+        "0x" +
+        tokenIn.slice(2).toLowerCase() +
+        "000bb8" +
+        tokenOut.slice(2).toLowerCase();
+    return coder.encode(
+        ["address", "uint256", "uint256", "bytes", "bool"],
+        [USER, amountIn, amountOutMin, path, true],
+    );
+}
+
+function detail(data, label) {
+    const decoded = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER, {});
+    expect(decoded).not.toBeNull();
+    return decoded.details.find((d) => d.label === label);
+}
+
+describe("a V4 step that states a Min. received but no output currency", () => {
+    // SWAP_EXACT_IN with an empty path: amountOutMin decodes, no currency out
+    // does, and there is no TAKE to supply one.
+    const data = () =>
+        execute("0x10", [
+            v4Input(
+                [V4_SWAP_EXACT_IN],
+                [exactInParams(USDT, [], 5000000n, MIN_OUT)],
+            ),
+        ]);
+
+    test("says the output token is unknown instead of naming ETH", () => {
+        expect(detail(data(), "Token Out").value).toBe(REFUSAL);
+    });
+
+    test("keeps a Token Out line, so the figure is never unattributed", () => {
+        const out = detail(data(), "Token Out");
+        expect(out).toBeDefined();
+        // A refusal is not a token: nothing to link to an explorer.
+        expect(out.address).toBeUndefined();
+        expect(out.isToken).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+
+    test("refuses to scale Min. received rather than assuming 18", () => {
+        expect(detail(data(), "Min. received").value).toBe(
+            unknownDecimalsAmount(MIN_OUT),
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("does not name ETH in the swap title either", () => {
+        const decoded = uniswap.decode(data(), ROUTER, {});
+        expect(decoded.name).toBe("Uniswap Swap");
+    });
+});
+
+describe("a V4 step whose Min. received supersedes an earlier step's", () => {
+    // V3 USDT -> WETH, then a V4 step that carries the final Min. received but
+    // names no currency. The figure belongs to the V4 step, so it must not be
+    // read against the token the V3 step named.
+    const data = () =>
+        execute(solidityPacked(["uint8", "uint8"], [0x00, 0x10]), [
+            v3ExactIn(USDT, WETH, 5000000n, HALF_ETH),
+            v4Input(
+                [V4_SWAP_EXACT_IN],
+                [exactInParams(WETH, [], HALF_ETH, MIN_OUT)],
+            ),
+        ]);
+
+    test("does not keep naming the earlier step's output token", () => {
+        expect(detail(data(), "Token Out").value).toBe(REFUSAL);
+    });
+
+    test("refuses to scale the superseding figure", () => {
+        expect(detail(data(), "Min. received").value).toBe(
+            unknownDecimalsAmount(MIN_OUT),
+        );
+    });
+});
+
+describe("native ETH out, which V4 spells as the zero address", () => {
+    // The pin on the other half of the determination. PoolKey currencies are
+    // ordered, so native ETH is currency0; zeroForOne false swaps USDT in for
+    // ETH out. TAKE names the same zero-address currency.
+    const data = () =>
+        execute("0x10", [
+            v4Input(
+                [V4_SETTLE, V4_SWAP_EXACT_IN_SINGLE, V4_TAKE],
+                [
+                    coder.encode(
+                        ["address", "uint256", "bool"],
+                        [USDT, 5000000n, true],
+                    ),
+                    exactInSingleParams(ZERO, USDT, false, HALF_ETH),
+                    coder.encode(
+                        ["address", "address", "uint256"],
+                        [ZERO, USER, 0n],
+                    ),
+                ],
+            ),
+        ]);
+
+    test("a Currency of address(0) decodes to a truthy address string", () => {
+        // The fact the whole determination rests on: an absent output currency
+        // and a native-ETH one are distinguishable here, because the ABI
+        // decoder never yields null for an address word.
+        const [currency] = coder.decode(
+            ["address", "address", "uint256"],
+            coder.encode(["address", "address", "uint256"], [ZERO, USER, 0n]),
+        );
+        expect(currency).toBe(ZERO);
+        expect(Boolean(currency)).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    test("is still named ETH and still scaled at 18 decimals", () => {
+        expect(detail(data(), "Token Out").value).toBe("ETH");
+        expect(detail(data(), "Min. received").value).toBe("0.5000 ETH");
+        expect(uniswap.decode(data(), ROUTER, {}).name).toBe("Swap USDT → ETH");
+    });
+});

tests/uniswapUnknownDecimals.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
+// The scale the swap lines of the dApp approval screen are displayed with.
+//
+// Issue #340: `tokenInfo()` in `src/shared/uniswap.js` returned `decimals: 18`
+// for any token absent from the bundled list — the same guess
+// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/306 removed from the ERC-20
+// amount line, still live on the swap path. A 1,000-token swap of a 6-decimal
+// token then rendered as `0.000000001` on the one screen whose job is to state
+// what is being authorized, and every newly listed token reaches it.
+//
+// What is asserted here is the rule #306 established: resolve the real scale
+// wherever the wallet already has it, and where nothing has it refuse to
+// format — base units with the scale stated, never a quantity.
+
+globalThis.chrome = {
+    storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
+};
+
+const { AbiCoder, Interface } = require("ethers");
+const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
+const { unknownDecimalsAmount } = require("../src/shared/approvalAmount");
+const { decodeCalldata } = require("../src/popup/views/approval");
+
+const ROUTER = "0x66a9893cc07d91d95644aedd05d03f95e1dba8af";
+const RECIPIENT = "0xC0FfEE0000000000000000000000000000c0fFEe";
+// Outside the bundled list, as every newly listed token is.
+const NOVEL = "0xE2E0000000000000000000000000000000000E2e";
+// Also outside it, standing in for the swap's output side.
+const NOVEL_OUT = "0xd0d0000000000000000000000000000000000d0d";
+// In the bundled list, at 18 decimals.
+const WETH = "0xC02aaA39b223FE8D0A0e5C4F27eAD9083C756Cc2";
+
+// 1,000.00 of a 6-decimal token — the amount from the issue, which the 18
+// guess rendered as 0.000000001.
+const THOUSAND_AT_SIX = 1000000000n;
+// 0.5 WETH out, so the Min. received line has a real number of its own.
+const HALF_WETH = 500000000000000000n;
+
+const coder = AbiCoder.defaultAbiCoder();
+const routerIface = new Interface([
+    "function execute(bytes commands, bytes[] inputs, uint256 deadline)",
+]);
+
+// A V2_SWAP_EXACT_IN (command 0x08) execute() call: `amountIn` of `tokenIn`
+// for at least `amountOutMin` of `tokenOut`.
+function swapData(tokenIn, amountIn, tokenOut, amountOutMin) {
+    const input = coder.encode(
+        ["address", "uint256", "uint256", "address[]", "bool"],
+        [RECIPIENT, amountIn, amountOutMin, [tokenIn, tokenOut], true],
+    );
+    return routerIface.encodeFunctionData("execute", [
+        "0x08",
+        [input],
+        9999999999n,
+    ]);
+}
+
+// A wallet holding `token` with the decimals the block explorer reported,
+// shaped as balances.js writes it onto state.
+function walletsHolding(token, decimals) {
+    return [
+        {
+            name: "Wallet 1",
+            addresses: [
+                {
+                    address: "0x" + "a".repeat(40),
+                    balance: "1.0",
+                    tokenBalances: [
+                        {
+                            address: token,
+                            symbol: "NOVEL",
+                            decimals,
+                            balance: "1000.0",
+                        },
+                    ],
+                },
+            ],
+        },
+    ];
+}
+
+// The swap detail line as the approval screen renders it. It goes through
+// decodeCalldata() rather than uniswap.decode() directly, because the scale
+// sources the screen supplies are part of what is under test.
+function swapDetail(data, label) {
+    const decoded = decodeCalldata(data, ROUTER);
+    return decoded.details.find((d) => d.label === label);
+}
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+    state.trackedTokens = [];
+    state.wallets = [];
+});
+
+describe("a swap of a token outside the bundled list", () => {
+    const data = () => swapData(NOVEL, THOUSAND_AT_SIX, WETH, HALF_WETH);
+
+    test("shows the true quantity when the user tracks the token", () => {
+        state.trackedTokens = [
+            { address: NOVEL, symbol: "NOVEL", decimals: 6 },
+        ];
+        expect(swapDetail(data(), "Amount").value).toBe("1000.0000");
+    });
+
+    test("shows the true quantity from the explorer's decimals", () => {
+        state.wallets = walletsHolding(NOVEL, "6");
+        expect(swapDetail(data(), "Amount").value).toBe("1000.0000");
+    });
+
+    test("refuses to format when nothing knows the scale", () => {
+        const detail = swapDetail(data(), "Amount");
+        expect(detail.value).toBe("1000000000 base units (decimals unknown)");
+        expect(detail.value).toBe(unknownDecimalsAmount(THOUSAND_AT_SIX));
+        // The defect: an 18-decimal guess renders this swap as 0.000000001, a
+        // quantity, and a wrong one.
+        expect(detail.value).not.toMatch(/^0\./);
+        expect(detail.value).not.toMatch(/[0-9]\.[0-9]/);
+    });
+
+    test("the amount carried to the status screens is the same refusal", () => {
+        expect(swapDetail(data(), "Amount").rawValue).toBe(
+            "1000000000 base units (decimals unknown)",
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("a bundled token on the other side still formats", () => {
+        expect(swapDetail(data(), "Min. received").value).toBe("0.5000 WETH");
+    });
+});
+
+describe("the Min. received line takes the same rule", () => {
+    test("refuses to format an output token of unknown scale", () => {
+        const data = swapData(WETH, HALF_WETH, NOVEL_OUT, THOUSAND_AT_SIX);
+        const detail = swapDetail(data, "Min. received");
+        expect(detail.value).toBe("1000000000 base units (decimals unknown)");
+        expect(detail.value).not.toMatch(/[0-9]\.[0-9]/);
+    });
+
+    test("shows the true quantity when the user tracks the output token", () => {
+        state.trackedTokens = [
+            { address: NOVEL_OUT, symbol: "NOVEL", decimals: 6 },
+        ];
+        const data = swapData(WETH, HALF_WETH, NOVEL_OUT, THOUSAND_AT_SIX);
+        expect(swapDetail(data, "Min. received").value).toBe("1000.0000");
+    });
+});
+
+describe("the permit amount takes the same rule", () => {
+    // PERMIT2_PERMIT (command 0x0a): the input token and amount come from the
+    // permit rather than from a swap step.
+    function permitData(token, amount) {
+        const input = coder.encode(
+            [
+                "tuple(tuple(address,uint160,uint48,uint48),address,uint256)",
+                "bytes",
+            ],
+            [[[token, amount, 0, 0], ROUTER, 9999999999], "0x1234"],
+        );
+        return routerIface.encodeFunctionData("execute", [
+            "0x0a",
+            [input],
+            9999999999n,
+        ]);
+    }
+
+    test("refuses to format a permit on a token of unknown scale", () => {
+        const detail = swapDetail(permitData(NOVEL, THOUSAND_AT_SIX), "Amount");
+        expect(detail.value).toBe("1000000000 base units (decimals unknown)");
+    });
+
+    test("an unbounded permit is still named, with or without a scale", () => {
+        const maxUint160 = (1n << 160n) - 1n;
+        expect(swapDetail(permitData(NOVEL, maxUint160), "Amount").value).toBe(
+            "Unlimited",
+        );
+    });
+});

tests/version.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+// One version, three files, and the rule that they agree.
+//
+// package.json, manifest/chrome.json and manifest/firefox.json each declare a
+// version and none is derived from another. Before this, nothing compared
+// them: the manifests were hardcoded at 0.1.0 and copied to dist/ verbatim
+// while package.json fed the About screen separately, so the number the
+// browser reported and the number the extension displayed could drift apart
+// with no check anywhere failing.
+//
+// The build enforces the agreement (build.js calls resolveVersion before it
+// emits anything) and script/lib/package.js names the artifacts from it. This
+// asserts both halves: that the tree as committed agrees, and that a tree that
+// does not is refused rather than resolved to one of the answers.
+
+const fs = require("fs");
+const os = require("os");
+const path = require("path");
+
+const {
+    VERSION_SOURCES,
+    declaredVersions,
+    resolveVersion,
+} = require("../script/lib/version");
+
+const ROOT = path.join(__dirname, "..");
+
+// A tree containing only the three version files, with the given versions.
+function fixture(versions) {
+    const dir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "autistmask-version-"));
+    fs.mkdirSync(path.join(dir, "manifest"));
+    VERSION_SOURCES.forEach((source, i) => {
+        fs.writeFileSync(
+            path.join(dir, source),
+            JSON.stringify({ version: versions[i] }),
+        );
+    });
+    return dir;
+}
+
+describe("the declared version", () => {
+    test("all three sources agree in this tree", () => {
+        const declared = declaredVersions(ROOT);
+        expect(declared.map((d) => d.source)).toEqual(VERSION_SOURCES);
+        expect([...new Set(declared.map((d) => d.version))]).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(resolveVersion(ROOT)).toBe(declared[0].version);
+    });
+
+    // Semver-shaped, because it names every release artifact and is what the
+    // browser compares when deciding whether an install is an upgrade.
+    test("is semver-shaped", () => {
+        expect(resolveVersion(ROOT)).toMatch(/^\d+\.\d+\.\d+$/);
+    });
+
+    // The load-bearing case: each of the three, disagreeing on its own, has to
+    // fail. A check that only looked at two of them would pass one of these.
+    test.each([
+        ["package.json", ["9.9.9", "0.1.0", "0.1.0"]],
+        ["manifest/chrome.json", ["0.1.0", "9.9.9", "0.1.0"]],
+        ["manifest/firefox.json", ["0.1.0", "0.1.0", "9.9.9"]],
+    ])("a disagreeing %s fails rather than resolving", (source, versions) => {
+        const dir = fixture(versions);
+        try {
+            expect(() => resolveVersion(dir)).toThrow(
+                /the declared versions disagree/,
+            );
+            expect(() => resolveVersion(dir)).toThrow(new RegExp(source));
+        } finally {
+            fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+        }
+    });
+
+    test("agreeing sources resolve", () => {
+        const dir = fixture(["1.2.3", "1.2.3", "1.2.3"]);
+        try {
+            expect(resolveVersion(dir)).toBe("1.2.3");
+        } finally {
+            fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+        }
+    });
+
+    // A missing or empty version is not agreement. Left unchecked, three files
+    // that all declared nothing would "agree" on undefined and the artifacts
+    // would be named after it.
+    test.each([[undefined], [""], ["   "], [3]])(
+        "a version of %p is refused",
+        (bad) => {
+            const dir = fixture([bad, bad, bad]);
+            try {
+                expect(() => resolveVersion(dir)).toThrow(
+                    /declares no usable "version"/,
+                );
+            } finally {
+                fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+            }
+        },
+    );
+});