Compare commits
1
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
|
87071bf6ff |
@@ -22,10 +22,11 @@ on: [push]
|
||||
# These jobs REPORT, they do not gate. Whether a check blocks a merge is
|
||||
# Gitea branch protection, which this repo does not configure, so a failure
|
||||
# here is a red mark a reviewer has to account for rather than a hard
|
||||
# block. Making e2e-chrome a required check is blocked while reports of the
|
||||
# Chrome suite failing under load are still open; the "In CI" section of
|
||||
# README.md names them. A gate that fails at random teaches people to merge
|
||||
# past red.
|
||||
# block. Making e2e-chrome a required check is blocked on the measured
|
||||
# flake in the dApp signing wait -- two of six runs of unmutated code on a
|
||||
# loaded machine -- tracked as
|
||||
# https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/287. A gate that fails at
|
||||
# random teaches people to merge past red.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Nothing here may pass vacuously. There is no continue-on-error and no
|
||||
# `|| true`. Both scripts exit non-zero when docker is missing, when the
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -381,13 +381,11 @@ handler on a reserved-TLD origin, gets `window.ethereum` from the shipped
|
||||
the runner and compared against the active address, the transaction assertions
|
||||
run against the raw signed transaction captured at `eth_sendRawTransaction`
|
||||
rather than against anything the extension reported, rejecting each prompt is
|
||||
required to return a rejection to the page rather than hang or resolve, a prompt
|
||||
raised while another approval window has focus is required to open a window of
|
||||
its own, and the password is required to be absent from every message the
|
||||
approval window sends to the background — with the message that would carry it
|
||||
required to be present, so that check cannot pass by observing nothing. That
|
||||
last one is the standing floor under
|
||||
[#157](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/157).
|
||||
required to return a rejection to the page rather than hang or resolve, and the
|
||||
password is required to be absent from every message the approval window sends
|
||||
to the background — with the message that would carry it required to be present,
|
||||
so that check cannot pass by observing nothing. That last one is the standing
|
||||
floor under [#157](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/157).
|
||||
|
||||
Two limits of that coverage, neither of them papered over. The RPC is stubbed
|
||||
throughout, so this is **not** a real dApp against a real network with real
|
||||
@@ -621,10 +619,14 @@ The jobs **report, they do not gate.** A failure is a red mark against the
|
||||
commit that a reviewer has to account for, not a hard block: whether a check
|
||||
blocks a merge is Gitea branch protection, which this repo does not configure.
|
||||
|
||||
That is not only a statement about configuration. No report of the Chrome suite
|
||||
**failing under load** is open now, but it has failed that way before, so a red
|
||||
`e2e-chrome` is read before it is believed. Do not answer one with a retry
|
||||
wrapper: a suite that reruns until it is green stops being evidence.
|
||||
That is not only a statement about configuration. The Chrome suite is
|
||||
**measurably flaky under load** — two of six runs of unmutated code on a busy
|
||||
machine lost the approval popup out from under the dApp signing wait, always in
|
||||
the `#183` section, tracked as
|
||||
[#287](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/287). So a red `e2e-chrome`
|
||||
has to be read before it is believed, and that flake is the blocker to ever
|
||||
making this a required check. Do not answer it with a retry wrapper: a suite
|
||||
that reruns until it is green stops being evidence.
|
||||
|
||||
Nothing in either job can pass vacuously. There is no `continue-on-error` and no
|
||||
`|| true`; both scripts exit non-zero when docker is missing, when the image
|
||||
@@ -693,7 +695,6 @@ src/
|
||||
balances.js — ETH + ERC-20 balance fetching via RPC + Blockscout
|
||||
constants.js — chain IDs, default RPC endpoint, ERC-20 ABI
|
||||
ens.js — ENS forward/reverse resolution (popup only)
|
||||
holders.js — holder-count parsing and the low-holder rule
|
||||
prices.js — ETH/USD and token/USD via CoinDesk API
|
||||
scamlist.js — known fraud contract addresses
|
||||
state.js — persisted state (extension storage)
|
||||
@@ -845,20 +846,6 @@ wherever shown. If a formatting rule applies in one place, it applies in every
|
||||
place. Users should never see the same value rendered differently on two
|
||||
screens.
|
||||
|
||||
The native token's label is a network's `nativeCurrency` in
|
||||
`src/shared/networks.js`: `ETH` on mainnet, `SepoliaETH` on Sepolia. The
|
||||
wallet's balances and the Send and confirmation screens, which send on the
|
||||
active network, use the active network's. A transaction's figures use the one of
|
||||
the network its chain id names, whichever network is active: the value and fee
|
||||
on the approval screen, the amount on the wait, success and error screens, the
|
||||
transaction history and the transaction detail screen, and the refusal of a fee
|
||||
above 1 ETH. A chain id that names no network reads `ETH`. Wherever this
|
||||
document shows ETH as the label of a native balance, value or fee, in a "Native
|
||||
ETH transfer" type line, in the contract-recipient warning or in that refusal,
|
||||
Sepolia shows `SepoliaETH`. The swap lines keep `ETH`, the router's own name for
|
||||
the native currency, and the ETH/USD price line, shown on mainnet only, keeps
|
||||
its fixed wording.
|
||||
|
||||
**Specific Exception — Truncation:** On some non-critical display locations, we
|
||||
may truncate _a small number_ of characters from the middle of an address solely
|
||||
due to display size constraints. Wherever possible, and, notably, **in all
|
||||
@@ -1035,12 +1022,6 @@ unwraps the WETH it did not spend shows USDC. The token permission warning on
|
||||
the signature screen has its own amount wording, including `Unknown`; the
|
||||
SignApproval section below describes it.
|
||||
|
||||
The swap's `Deadline` line is the router's deadline as a UTC date and time, e.g.
|
||||
`2026-02-27 08:25:51`. A JavaScript date reaches only to 275760-09-13 00:00:00
|
||||
UTC, so a later deadline, such as the `uint256` maximum, reads
|
||||
`After 275760-09-13 00:00:00 (no deadline in practice)` rather than leaving the
|
||||
whole swap undecoded.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Partial USD totals
|
||||
|
||||
Prices are fetched for the top 25 tokens only, so an address can hold assets the
|
||||
@@ -1119,21 +1100,15 @@ balance is nonzero and it is in the bundled known-token list, is tracked by the
|
||||
user, or has 1,000 or more holders; a token claiming a symbol from the bundled
|
||||
list from any other contract address is always dropped, and so is any token
|
||||
claiming a symbol that belongs to the native asset and therefore has no
|
||||
legitimate contract at all (`"ETH"`, and every network's `nativeCurrency`, such
|
||||
as `"SepoliaETH"`, on every network). That filter is unconditional — the "Hide
|
||||
legitimate contract at all (`"ETH"`). That filter is unconditional — the "Hide
|
||||
tokens with fewer than 1,000 holders" setting governs the transaction history
|
||||
and the send-screen token selector, not this list. A token's holder count is
|
||||
unknown when the explorer reports none, or reports anything other than a whole
|
||||
number written in digits alone, such as `1,000` or `1e3` (`parseHoldersCount()`
|
||||
in `src/shared/holders.js`). This list does not take an unknown count as 1,000
|
||||
or more, so such a token is shown only when it is on the bundled list or
|
||||
tracked. `fetchTokenBalances()` stores every nonzero holding of a token it
|
||||
admits, however small, but a holding below 0.000001 is left out of the balance
|
||||
lists, the send-screen token selector, the address total and the remove-address
|
||||
warning (`isBelowOneMillionth()` in `src/shared/amountDisplay.js`). The Send and
|
||||
confirmation screens show it when its token is the one being sent. Tracked
|
||||
tokens with a zero balance are listed as well while "Show tracked tokens with
|
||||
zero balance" is on.
|
||||
and the send-screen token selector, not this list. `fetchTokenBalances()` stores
|
||||
every nonzero holding of a token it admits, however small, but a holding below
|
||||
0.000001 is left out of the balance lists, the send-screen token selector, the
|
||||
address total and the remove-address warning (`isBelowOneMillionth()` in
|
||||
`src/shared/amountDisplay.js`). The Send and confirmation screens show it when
|
||||
its token is the one being sent. Tracked tokens with a zero balance are listed
|
||||
as well while "Show tracked tokens with zero balance" is on.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Stored state and its version
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1153,18 +1128,16 @@ because bumping for one would send every older install to StateRecovery for
|
||||
nothing.
|
||||
|
||||
Every read of the record goes through `assertStateUsable()` first, on the raw
|
||||
bytes, before normalization: `loadState()` and every `saveState()` for the
|
||||
popup, and `getState()` for the background. It refuses a record that is not an
|
||||
object, a `schemaVersion` this build does not understand (a newer one included),
|
||||
a `wallets` that is not a list of wallet records with address records in them,
|
||||
and a `networkId` that is not a network in `src/shared/networks.js`. Refusing is
|
||||
the whole point — a record the wallet cannot vouch for is never normalized,
|
||||
never written back, and never half-loaded. The popup shows StateRecovery,
|
||||
whether it finds the record unreadable when it opens or at a save while it is
|
||||
open; a dApp gets a specific error (`-32007`, an EIP-1474 server-error code the
|
||||
spec leaves unassigned) saying the saved data cannot be read and that nothing
|
||||
was signed or sent, rather than the generic `-32603` every request used to
|
||||
answer.
|
||||
bytes, before normalization: `loadState()` for the popup and `getState()` for
|
||||
the background. It refuses a record that is not an object, a `schemaVersion`
|
||||
this build does not understand (a newer one included), a `wallets` that is not a
|
||||
list of wallet records with address records in them, and a `networkId` that is
|
||||
not a network in `src/shared/networks.js`. Refusing is the whole point — a
|
||||
record the wallet cannot vouch for is never normalized, never written back, and
|
||||
never half-loaded. The popup shows StateRecovery; a dApp gets a specific error
|
||||
(`-32007`, an EIP-1474 server-error code the spec leaves unassigned) saying the
|
||||
saved data cannot be read and that nothing was signed or sent, rather than the
|
||||
generic `-32603` every request used to answer.
|
||||
|
||||
Every other field of the record is floored in `normalizePersisted()` rather than
|
||||
gated, and the floor is not the same for every field. Some are type-checked as a
|
||||
@@ -1208,9 +1181,8 @@ now also reported rather than swallowed: `onSaveFailure()` in
|
||||
`src/shared/state.js` is called for every failed save, awaited or not, and the
|
||||
popup puts up a persistent "NOT SAVED" banner (`showSaveFailureBanner()` in
|
||||
`src/popup/views/helpers.js`). Storage can still fail for reasons no floor
|
||||
covers — a quota, a revoked permission — and the wallet must never look healthy
|
||||
while that is true. A save that fails because the stored record fails the gate,
|
||||
such as one a newer build wrote, gets StateRecovery instead of the banner.
|
||||
covers — a quota, a revoked permission, a record a newer build wrote — and the
|
||||
wallet must never look healthy while that is true.
|
||||
|
||||
The `networkId` check is not cosmetic: that value is an object KEY into
|
||||
`state.networkEndpoints`, so an unvalidated `"__proto__"` would set the map's
|
||||
@@ -1442,9 +1414,7 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
|
||||
- Send / Receive buttons
|
||||
- Token contract well (ERC-20 only): full contract address (tap to copy,
|
||||
etherscan link) plus name, symbol, decimals, holder count and project
|
||||
website where known. The "Holders:" row is left out, not shown as 0, when
|
||||
the token's balance-list entry has no holder count: the explorer did not
|
||||
report a readable one, or the token is not in the balance list
|
||||
website where known
|
||||
- Token-filtered transaction list (only this token's transfers)
|
||||
- **Transitions**:
|
||||
- "Send" → **Send** (token locked: the dropdown is replaced by a static
|
||||
@@ -1610,9 +1580,7 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
|
||||
- "Transaction" heading, "Back" button
|
||||
- Transaction hash: full hash (tap to copy) + etherscan link
|
||||
- Type: transaction classification — one of: Native ETH Transfer, ERC-20
|
||||
Token Transfer, Swap, Token Approval, Contract Call, Contract Creation. A
|
||||
transfer with a token contract is an ERC-20 Token Transfer whatever symbol
|
||||
the token reports.
|
||||
Token Transfer, Swap, Token Approval, Contract Call, Contract Creation
|
||||
- Status: "Success" or "Failed"
|
||||
- From: blockie + color dot + full address (tap to copy) + etherscan link;
|
||||
ENS name if available
|
||||
@@ -1786,10 +1754,7 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
|
||||
new password — and, in bold, that without that phrase written down the
|
||||
deletion loses everything the wallet holds, forever
|
||||
- That the other wallets are not touched
|
||||
- The wallet's name, and a text input asking for it to be typed back. A name
|
||||
that shows nothing at all (only spaces, or only characters that paint
|
||||
nothing) is shown as "Wallet N", its position in the list, and that is
|
||||
what is typed back.
|
||||
- The wallet's name, and a text input asking for it to be typed back
|
||||
- Error line
|
||||
- "Delete This Wallet Forever" button
|
||||
- **Transitions**:
|
||||
@@ -1797,9 +1762,9 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
|
||||
outcomes as "Confirm Delete" above, through the same `finishDelete()`, so
|
||||
the selection repair, permission cleanup and `AUTISTMASK_ACTIVE_CHANGED`
|
||||
broadcast are identical on both routes
|
||||
- "Delete This Wallet Forever" (name does not match, or the field is empty)
|
||||
→ "That is not the name of this wallet. Type <name> to confirm." on
|
||||
the error line, nothing deleted
|
||||
- "Delete This Wallet Forever" (name does not match) → "That is not the name
|
||||
of this wallet. Type <name> to confirm." on the error line, nothing
|
||||
deleted
|
||||
- "Back" → **DeleteWallet**, re-entered through its `show()` so the wallet
|
||||
selection comes back with it. The two delete screens are siblings rather
|
||||
than parent and child: nothing is pushed on the way here, so both have
|
||||
@@ -1808,13 +1773,8 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
|
||||
secret protects nobody: an attacker at the popup who wants the wallet gone can
|
||||
uninstall the extension, so the only person such a gate stops is the owner who
|
||||
forgot it. The typed name is a check that the user knows which wallet they are
|
||||
on, not a secret, so it is matched as the user can see it: letter case,
|
||||
surrounding spaces and repeated inner spaces are ignored, and characters that
|
||||
paint nothing (format characters such as the zero-width space,
|
||||
default-ignorable characters, and DELETE — the same set
|
||||
`src/shared/symbolSpoof.js` strips) are removed from both sides before
|
||||
comparing. An empty field, or one holding only spaces or such characters, is
|
||||
refused whatever the wallet is called.
|
||||
on, not a secret, so it is matched with surrounding spaces and letter case
|
||||
ignored.
|
||||
- Not in `RESTORABLE_VIEWS`, alongside `delete-wallet-confirm`: a popup reopened
|
||||
by accident must not land on a screen whose button erases key material.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1939,8 +1899,7 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
|
||||
`eth_sendTransaction` arriving while one is unanswered is refused with
|
||||
EIP-1193 code `-32002` rather than being populated at the same nonce. It opens
|
||||
no window and takes no nonce, and the site can send it again once the pending
|
||||
one is answered. The window is centred on the browser window the user was last
|
||||
in; if that was another approval window, the browser picks the position.
|
||||
one is answered.
|
||||
- **Elements**:
|
||||
- "Transaction Request" heading
|
||||
- Phishing warning banner (shown when the hostname is on the phishing
|
||||
@@ -2033,19 +1992,9 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
|
||||
|
||||
#### StateRecovery (`state-recovery`)
|
||||
|
||||
- **When**: the stored profile fails `assertStateUsable()`. At open, that is
|
||||
`loadState()` refusing it, so the popup has no profile at all. While the popup
|
||||
is open, on any screen, it is a save refusing it: every `saveState()` reads
|
||||
the stored record and runs the same check before writing, so the popup finds
|
||||
it at the next navigation or ten-second refresh, whether or not the network
|
||||
answers ([#373](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/373)). A save that
|
||||
fails for any other reason, such as a storage read or write that errors, gets
|
||||
the "NOT SAVED" banner instead and leaves the screen as it is. The screen it
|
||||
replaces is left as any navigation leaves it, so a revealed phrase or key, or
|
||||
a typed password, is wiped. Once up, the screen stays until the popup closes
|
||||
or reloads: work still running in the popup, such as a transaction wait,
|
||||
cannot replace it, even after the record is erased in another window. It is
|
||||
the only screen that never appears during ordinary use.
|
||||
- **When**: `loadState()` refused the stored profile, so the popup has no
|
||||
profile at all. It is the only screen reached without one, and the only one
|
||||
that never appears during ordinary use.
|
||||
- **Why it exists**: a record the wallet cannot read used to render nothing — no
|
||||
view, no message, no control — while every dApp call answered a generic
|
||||
internal error, and no reset or wipe control existed anywhere in the product.
|
||||
@@ -2072,20 +2021,16 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
|
||||
Nothing was erased." on the error line
|
||||
- **No other control is reachable.** The Settings gear is hidden while this
|
||||
screen is up, because every screen behind it renders from the profile that
|
||||
could not be read. `showView()` is not used to raise it, for the same reason:
|
||||
it reads and writes the state singleton. Under an open popup the screen is
|
||||
passed to `showView()` only to run the replaced screen's cleanup; from then on
|
||||
`showView()` shows nothing else in that popup.
|
||||
could not be read, and `showView()` is not used to raise it for the same
|
||||
reason — it reads and writes the state singleton.
|
||||
- **Both controls are required.** An export with no reset leaves the user
|
||||
looking at a broken profile with no way to use the wallet again; a reset with
|
||||
no export destroys the only copy of a record that may hold recoverable key
|
||||
material. The typed phrase is the same barrier DeleteWalletLostPassword uses,
|
||||
and for the same reason: there is no password to gate this with, since there
|
||||
is no profile to check one against.
|
||||
- Not in `RESTORABLE_VIEWS`, and never recorded as the current view: the record
|
||||
can become readable again under an open popup, erased in another window, and
|
||||
the next save from that popup then succeeds. A popup opened after that opens
|
||||
normally.
|
||||
- Not in `RESTORABLE_VIEWS`: it is never persisted as the current view, because
|
||||
nothing on this path writes state at all.
|
||||
|
||||
### External Services
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2394,8 +2339,7 @@ indexes it as a real token transfer.
|
||||
act on and what the user believes they own rather than what the history
|
||||
displays. All three surfaces read the rule from `src/shared/symbolSpoof.js`,
|
||||
so they cannot answer the question differently. A symbol the list maps to no
|
||||
contract at all — the native asset's labels: `"ETH"` and every network's
|
||||
`nativeCurrency`, such as `"SepoliaETH"`, on every network — may be borne by
|
||||
contract at all — `"ETH"`, the native asset, is the only one — may be borne by
|
||||
no contract, so every ERC-20 claiming it is a spoof on all three. The user's
|
||||
real ETH balance is not an ERC-20 and is read over RPC, so the rule never sees
|
||||
it.
|
||||
@@ -2404,8 +2348,7 @@ indexes it as a real token transfer.
|
||||
fewer than 1,000 holders are hidden from transaction history by default.
|
||||
Legitimate tokens have substantial holder counts; poisoning tokens typically
|
||||
have zero. This catches new poisoning contracts that use novel symbols not in
|
||||
the known token list. A transfer whose token's holder count is unknown (see
|
||||
Data Model) is kept: only a reported count below 1,000 hides it.
|
||||
the known token list.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Fraud contract blocklist**: AutistMask maintains a local list of known fraud
|
||||
contract addresses. Token transfers involving these contracts are filtered
|
||||
@@ -2415,9 +2358,7 @@ indexes it as a real token transfer.
|
||||
- **Send-side token filtering**: Tokens with fewer than 1,000 holders are
|
||||
excluded from the token selector on the send screen. This prevents users from
|
||||
accidentally interacting with a spoofed token that appeared in their balance
|
||||
via a fake Transfer event. A token whose holder count is unknown is kept in
|
||||
the selector. The selector offers only tokens in the balance list, so such a
|
||||
token is one on the bundled list or one the user tracks.
|
||||
via a fake Transfer event.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Dust transaction filtering**: A second wave of the same attack used real
|
||||
native ETH transfers instead of fake tokens. Transaction
|
||||
@@ -2441,9 +2382,8 @@ indexes it as a real token transfer.
|
||||
both cases identically to the history. The fraud contract blocklist is applied
|
||||
unconditionally on that selector and is not consulted by the balance list at
|
||||
all. The low-holder setting also gates the send selector, while the balance
|
||||
list's own 1,000-holder floor is unconditional (see Data Model). An unknown
|
||||
holder count passes the history and send-selector filters but not that floor.
|
||||
The dust threshold applies to the transaction history alone.
|
||||
list's own 1,000-holder floor is unconditional (see Data Model). The dust
|
||||
threshold applies to the transaction history alone.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Phishing Domain Protection
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -45,127 +45,6 @@ but the review is broader than any of them.
|
||||
|
||||
# Completed Steps
|
||||
|
||||
- 2026-10-05: A prompt raised while another approval window has focus opens a
|
||||
window of its own ([#290](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/290)).
|
||||
The background centred each approval window on the last focused window, which
|
||||
could be an earlier approval window still open; headless Chrome reports one as
|
||||
1280x720, so the new window came out where the browser refused to create it,
|
||||
and the request failed with no window at all. It now centres only on a browser
|
||||
window and otherwise lets the browser place it. In the Chrome end-to-end suite
|
||||
a test could raise its prompt while the previous test's window was still
|
||||
closing, and then either hit that refusal or take the closing window for its
|
||||
own; the runner now closes every approval window between tests.
|
||||
|
||||
- 2026-10-05: A token scale of zero decimals is tested
|
||||
([#325](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/325)).
|
||||
`resolveTokenDecimals()` already used a scale of 0 from the bundled list or
|
||||
from a tracked token, but no test said so: turning either of its `d !== null`
|
||||
checks into a plain truthiness check left every test green while a
|
||||
zero-decimal token fell through to the next source, or to "decimals unknown".
|
||||
The approval tests now assert a scale of 0 from each of those two sources,
|
||||
both where it is resolved and on the approval screen's Amount line. The second
|
||||
half of the issue, one shared `toDecimals()`, had already landed with
|
||||
[#349](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/349).
|
||||
|
||||
- 2026-10-05: The e2e suite waits for a save to land before it closes the popup
|
||||
([#446](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/446)). The Settings round
|
||||
trip switched the theme and the network and closed the popup at once, and a
|
||||
close before the save lands loses the switch; with the network left on
|
||||
Sepolia, a dozen later tests failed too. Each Settings switch and spam-filter
|
||||
toggle is now waited for in storage before the close, and `reopenPopup()`
|
||||
waits until the view it expects to reopen on is the saved one. The restore
|
||||
half of the round trip and the second filter toggle change a setting right
|
||||
after a reopen, while the reopened popup's own saves may still be running;
|
||||
they rely on the fix for
|
||||
[#448](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/448).
|
||||
|
||||
- 2026-10-05: A change made while an earlier save from the same page is still
|
||||
running is stored ([#448](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/448)).
|
||||
`saveStateOnce()` took its baseline from the page's state after the write, so
|
||||
a change made while the save waited on storage counted as already stored and
|
||||
the save queued after it wrote nothing. A setting changed during the read was
|
||||
lost; so was a wallet added, a site revoked or an endpoint changed during the
|
||||
write, and a wallet deleted then stayed in storage. The save now copies the
|
||||
page's fields when it starts, writes from that copy, and keeps the copy as the
|
||||
baseline.
|
||||
|
||||
- 2026-10-05: The extension no longer opens a window for a site-connection
|
||||
prompt already answered
|
||||
([#287](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/287)). When the prompt was
|
||||
decided before the toolbar popup raised for it had loaded, that popup was torn
|
||||
down, `chrome.action.openPopup()` rejected, and the background opened its
|
||||
fallback window for the answered approval and then removed it. In the Chrome
|
||||
end-to-end suite the next test could take that window for its own prompt and
|
||||
lose it under its wait. `openApprovalWindow()` now opens nothing for an
|
||||
approval that is no longer pending. The blocklist test's Reject, whose window
|
||||
closes itself, is clicked as the other site Reject is, with the click
|
||||
witnessed. Making `e2e-chrome` a required check is still blocked: other
|
||||
reports of the Chrome suite failing under load are open, among them
|
||||
[#290](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/290) and
|
||||
[#446](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/446), as `README.md` says.
|
||||
|
||||
- 2026-10-05: The lost-password delete confirmation refuses an empty field and
|
||||
ignores characters that paint nothing
|
||||
([#336](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/336)). A wallet named only
|
||||
with spaces compared equal to an empty field, so typing nothing would have
|
||||
deleted it, and a zero-width space in a name made the name impossible to type
|
||||
back. An empty field is now refused whatever the name is, the same invisible
|
||||
characters `src/shared/symbolSpoof.js` strips are removed from both sides, and
|
||||
a name that shows nothing is shown and typed back as "Wallet N".
|
||||
|
||||
- 2026-10-05: A `holders_count` that is not a whole number in plain digits is
|
||||
unknown, not read in part
|
||||
([#251](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/251)). `parseInt` read
|
||||
`1,000` as 1, `0x10` as 0 and `1e3` as 1, a reported low count that hides the
|
||||
token in the transaction history and the send-screen token selector. A count
|
||||
above `Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER` is unknown too, not rounded or `Infinity`. The
|
||||
balance list's `holders !== null` check, which did nothing, is dropped.
|
||||
`README.md` and `docs/README.md` now say how each filter treats an unknown
|
||||
count and that the token screen leaves out its "Holders:" row then, and
|
||||
`README.md` lists `src/shared/holders.js`.
|
||||
|
||||
- 2026-10-04: A popup boot in the tests loads transactions without failing
|
||||
([#429](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/429)). The stand-in for
|
||||
`filterTransactions` in `tests/support/popupBoot.js` returned a bare list,
|
||||
while the real one returns `{ transactions, newFraudContracts }`, so every
|
||||
boot onto Home, AddressDetail or AddressToken failed inside its transaction
|
||||
loading and logged `loadHomeTxs failed` or `loadTransactions failed`; the rest
|
||||
of that code never ran. The stand-in now returns the real shape, and
|
||||
`tests/persistedFieldContract.test.js` boots onto each of the three and
|
||||
asserts neither message is logged. `make test` time did not change measurably.
|
||||
|
||||
- 2026-10-04: The native token's label follows the network
|
||||
([#372](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/372)). `networks.js` gives
|
||||
each network a `nativeCurrency` and nothing read it: every screen wrote `ETH`,
|
||||
so on Sepolia the balance, the value and the fee all read `ETH`. Every native
|
||||
figure now reads `nativeCurrency`, which is `ETH` on mainnet and `SepoliaETH`
|
||||
on Sepolia: the balance lists, Send and confirmation screens and the
|
||||
contract-recipient warning the active network's; the approval, wait, success,
|
||||
error and transaction detail screens, the transaction history and the refusal
|
||||
of a fee above the limit that of the network the transaction's chain id names.
|
||||
A token claiming any network's `nativeCurrency` is dropped as a fake, as one
|
||||
claiming `ETH` already was, and the transaction detail screen calls an entry a
|
||||
token transfer when it has a token contract, not by its symbol.
|
||||
- 2026-10-04: A popup that is already open when the stored profile becomes
|
||||
unreadable moves to the recovery screen
|
||||
([#373](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/373)). It used to stay on
|
||||
the last good profile, with the "NOT SAVED" banner at most, until reopened.
|
||||
Every save already ran the check the popup runs at open, so the popup finds
|
||||
the record at the next navigation or ten-second refresh, whether or not the
|
||||
network answers; a save that fails that check now raises the recovery screen
|
||||
and stops the refresh. The screen it replaces is left as any navigation leaves
|
||||
it, so a revealed phrase or key or a typed password is wiped. Once up, nothing
|
||||
else in that popup can replace it, and a later save or a transaction wait that
|
||||
ends does not clear an export or a typed confirmation. It is never saved as
|
||||
the current view, so a popup opened after the record is erased in another
|
||||
window opens normally. Any other failed save still gets the banner and leaves
|
||||
the screen alone.
|
||||
- 2026-10-04: A swap whose deadline is later than a JavaScript date can hold is
|
||||
decoded ([#437](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/437)). A date
|
||||
reaches only to 275760-09-13, so a later deadline, such as the `uint256`
|
||||
maximum, made the `Deadline` line throw, and the approval screen showed the
|
||||
swap as an undecoded contract call with nothing saying why. That line now
|
||||
reads `After 275760-09-13 00:00:00 (no deadline in practice)`.
|
||||
- 2026-10-04: The swap decoder reads two router zeros the way the router does
|
||||
([#415](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/415)). A V2 exact-in
|
||||
`amountIn` of zero means an earlier step already sent the tokens to the pair;
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-7
@@ -333,13 +333,7 @@ it is hidden from your transaction history and from the send token list.
|
||||
from transaction history and the send token list, and are left out of your
|
||||
balances unless they are on the bundled known-token list or you added them
|
||||
yourself. Legitimate tokens have substantial holder counts; scam tokens deployed
|
||||
for address poisoning typically have zero. When the explorer reports no holder
|
||||
count for a token, or reports something other than a whole number in plain
|
||||
digits (such as "1,000"), the count is unknown. An unknown count does not hide a
|
||||
token from your transaction history or the send token list, and it does not get
|
||||
a token into your balances either: such a token is listed only if it is on the
|
||||
bundled known-token list or you added it yourself. The screen you reach by
|
||||
clicking a token balance shows a "Holders:" line only when the count is known.
|
||||
for address poisoning typically have zero.
|
||||
|
||||
**Fraud contract blocklist.** When AutistMask detects a fraudulent transfer, it
|
||||
adds the contract address to a local blocklist. Future transactions from that
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-12
@@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ function releaseApproval(approval) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Open approval in a separate popup window, unless it is no longer pending.
|
||||
// Open approval in a separate popup window.
|
||||
// This is the primary mechanism for tx/sign approvals (triggered programmatically,
|
||||
// not from a user gesture) and the fallback for site-connection approvals.
|
||||
// Never rejects. Its callers raise it from inside a Promise executor and drop
|
||||
@@ -437,13 +437,7 @@ async function openApprovalWindow(id) {
|
||||
width: popupWidth,
|
||||
height: popupHeight,
|
||||
};
|
||||
// Centred on a browser window only. The last focused window can be
|
||||
// another approval window still open, and centring on one can give a
|
||||
// position the browser refuses ("Bounds must be at least 50% within
|
||||
// visible screen space"): headless Chrome reports this 360x600 popup as
|
||||
// 1280x720. The request then failed with no window at all. Over a popup,
|
||||
// the browser picks the position.
|
||||
if (currentWin && currentWin.type === "normal") {
|
||||
if (currentWin) {
|
||||
opts.left = Math.round(
|
||||
currentWin.left + (currentWin.width - popupWidth) / 2,
|
||||
);
|
||||
@@ -452,10 +446,6 @@ async function openApprovalWindow(id) {
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Already answered: a site-connection prompt decided before the toolbar
|
||||
// popup raised for it had loaded, whose openPopup() rejects only now.
|
||||
if (!pendingApprovals[id]) return;
|
||||
|
||||
let win = null;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
win = await windowsCreate(opts);
|
||||
|
||||
+14
-7
@@ -640,13 +640,19 @@
|
||||
Double-check the address before sending.
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<!-- Its sentence names the network's native token, so show()
|
||||
in confirmTx.js sets it. -->
|
||||
<div
|
||||
id="confirm-contract-warning"
|
||||
class="mb-2 border border-red-500 border-dashed p-2 text-xs font-bold text-red-500"
|
||||
class="mb-2"
|
||||
style="visibility: hidden"
|
||||
></div>
|
||||
>
|
||||
<div
|
||||
class="border border-red-500 border-dashed p-2 text-xs font-bold text-red-500"
|
||||
>
|
||||
WARNING: The recipient is a smart contract. Sending ETH
|
||||
or tokens directly to a contract may result in permanent
|
||||
loss of funds.
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<div
|
||||
id="confirm-burn-warning"
|
||||
class="mb-2"
|
||||
@@ -684,13 +690,14 @@
|
||||
Your balance does not cover this amount plus the network
|
||||
fee. Please go back and send a smaller amount.
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<!-- Its sentence names the network's native token, so show()
|
||||
in confirmTx.js sets it. -->
|
||||
<div
|
||||
id="confirm-gas-error"
|
||||
class="mb-2 border border-border border-dashed p-2 text-xs"
|
||||
style="visibility: hidden"
|
||||
></div>
|
||||
>
|
||||
You do not have enough ETH to pay the network fee for this
|
||||
transfer. Please add ETH to this address and try again.
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<!-- Its sentence names why the fee could not be estimated,
|
||||
so show() in confirmTx.js sets it. -->
|
||||
<div
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-27
@@ -50,10 +50,6 @@ function renderWalletList() {
|
||||
|
||||
let refreshInFlight = false;
|
||||
|
||||
// The ten-second refresh init() starts, stopped when the popup moves to the
|
||||
// recovery screen: there is no profile left to refresh.
|
||||
let refreshTimer = null;
|
||||
|
||||
async function doRefreshAndRender() {
|
||||
if (refreshInFlight) return;
|
||||
refreshInFlight = true;
|
||||
@@ -159,28 +155,7 @@ async function init() {
|
||||
// reported rather than being swallowed by the save queue
|
||||
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/362). Registered ahead of
|
||||
// the approval-window branch below too, since that window saves as well.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Every save first reads the stored record and refuses it with the same
|
||||
// check loadState() runs below. So a record that becomes unreadable while
|
||||
// the popup is open is found by the next save, a navigation or the
|
||||
// ten-second refresh, and gets the screen it would get at open
|
||||
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/373). Passing the recovery
|
||||
// screen to showView() first leaves the current screen as any navigation
|
||||
// does, so a phrase, key or password on it is wiped, and from then on
|
||||
// showView() shows nothing else. A later save that fails the same way,
|
||||
// such as a refresh already in flight, comes back here, where both calls
|
||||
// see the screen already up and do nothing. Any other failed save is a
|
||||
// read or write that failed, and gets the banner without changing the
|
||||
// screen.
|
||||
onSaveFailure((e) => {
|
||||
if (e instanceof StateUnusableError) {
|
||||
clearInterval(refreshTimer);
|
||||
showView("state-recovery");
|
||||
stateRecovery.show(e);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
showSaveFailureBanner(e);
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
onSaveFailure(showSaveFailureBanner);
|
||||
try {
|
||||
await loadState();
|
||||
} catch (e) {
|
||||
@@ -269,7 +244,7 @@ async function init() {
|
||||
renderWalletList();
|
||||
restoreView();
|
||||
doRefreshAndRender();
|
||||
refreshTimer = setInterval(doRefreshAndRender, 10000);
|
||||
setInterval(doRefreshAndRender, 10000);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ const {
|
||||
goBack,
|
||||
pushCurrentView,
|
||||
} = require("./helpers");
|
||||
const { state, saveState, currentNetwork } = require("../../shared/state");
|
||||
const { state, saveState } = require("../../shared/state");
|
||||
const { formatAddressTotal, getAddressValue } = require("../../shared/prices");
|
||||
const {
|
||||
fetchRecentTransactions,
|
||||
@@ -153,7 +153,6 @@ async function loadTransactions(address) {
|
||||
const rawTxs = await fetchRecentTransactions(
|
||||
address,
|
||||
state.blockscoutUrl,
|
||||
currentNetwork().chainId,
|
||||
);
|
||||
const result = filterTransactions(rawTxs, {
|
||||
hideSpoofedSymbols: state.hideSpoofedSymbols,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ const {
|
||||
addressTitle,
|
||||
escapeHtml,
|
||||
displaySymbol,
|
||||
nativeCurrency,
|
||||
balanceLine,
|
||||
unknownableAmount,
|
||||
renderAddressHtml,
|
||||
@@ -18,7 +17,7 @@ const {
|
||||
goBack,
|
||||
pushCurrentView,
|
||||
} = require("./helpers");
|
||||
const { state, saveState, currentNetwork } = require("../../shared/state");
|
||||
const { state, saveState } = require("../../shared/state");
|
||||
const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS, resolveSymbol } = require("../../shared/tokenList");
|
||||
const { formatUsd, getPrice } = require("../../shared/prices");
|
||||
const {
|
||||
@@ -107,7 +106,7 @@ function show() {
|
||||
let symbol, amount, price;
|
||||
const knownToken = TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.get(tokenId.toLowerCase());
|
||||
if (tokenId === "ETH") {
|
||||
symbol = nativeCurrency();
|
||||
symbol = "ETH";
|
||||
amount = parseFloat(addr.balance || "0");
|
||||
price = getPrice("ETH");
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
@@ -227,7 +226,6 @@ async function loadTransactions(address, tokenId) {
|
||||
const rawTxs = await fetchRecentTransactions(
|
||||
address,
|
||||
state.blockscoutUrl,
|
||||
currentNetwork().chainId,
|
||||
);
|
||||
const result = filterTransactions(rawTxs, {
|
||||
hideSpoofedSymbols: state.hideSpoofedSymbols,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -12,10 +12,7 @@ const {
|
||||
formatFee,
|
||||
} = require("./helpers");
|
||||
const { state, saveState } = require("../../shared/state");
|
||||
const {
|
||||
networkByChainId,
|
||||
nativeCurrencyByChainId,
|
||||
} = require("../../shared/networks");
|
||||
const { networkByChainId } = require("../../shared/networks");
|
||||
const {
|
||||
formatEther,
|
||||
formatUnits,
|
||||
@@ -222,12 +219,8 @@ function showTxFee(approvedTx) {
|
||||
const gasLimit = BigInt(approvedTx.gasLimit);
|
||||
const feePerGas = BigInt(approvedTx.maxFeePerGas || approvedTx.gasPrice);
|
||||
// Through formatFee(), as the confirmation screen's fee is, so the same
|
||||
// fee reads the same on both. In the native currency of the network shown
|
||||
// above, as the value is.
|
||||
$("approve-tx-fee").textContent = formatFee(
|
||||
gasLimit * feePerGas,
|
||||
nativeCurrencyByChainId(approvedTx.chainId),
|
||||
);
|
||||
// fee reads the same on both.
|
||||
$("approve-tx-fee").textContent = formatFee(gasLimit * feePerGas);
|
||||
|
||||
let detail =
|
||||
gasLimit.toString() +
|
||||
@@ -271,7 +264,6 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
|
||||
amount: formatTxValue(ethValue),
|
||||
token: "ETH",
|
||||
tokenSymbol: null,
|
||||
chainId: approvedTx.chainId,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// If this is an ERC-20 call, try to extract the real recipient and amount
|
||||
@@ -337,15 +329,8 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
|
||||
const ethPrice = getPrice("ETH");
|
||||
const ethUsd = ethPrice ? parseFloat(ethValueFormatted) * ethPrice : null;
|
||||
const usdStr = formatUsd(ethUsd);
|
||||
// In the native currency of the network the transaction is for, which the
|
||||
// Network line names, not the active network's: a site can switch the
|
||||
// active network after this transaction is prepared and back before it is
|
||||
// signed.
|
||||
$("approve-tx-value").textContent =
|
||||
ethValueFormatted +
|
||||
" " +
|
||||
nativeCurrencyByChainId(approvedTx.chainId) +
|
||||
(usdStr ? " (" + usdStr + ")" : "");
|
||||
ethValueFormatted + " ETH" + (usdStr ? " (" + usdStr + ")" : "");
|
||||
|
||||
showTxFee(approvedTx);
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -11,14 +11,13 @@ const {
|
||||
addressTitle,
|
||||
escapeHtml,
|
||||
displaySymbol,
|
||||
nativeCurrency,
|
||||
renderAddressHtml,
|
||||
attachCopyHandlers,
|
||||
goBack,
|
||||
onViewLeave,
|
||||
formatFee,
|
||||
} = require("./helpers");
|
||||
const { state, currentNetwork } = require("../../shared/state");
|
||||
const { state } = require("../../shared/state");
|
||||
const { getSignerForAddress } = require("../../shared/wallet");
|
||||
const { decryptWithPassword } = require("../../shared/vault");
|
||||
const { formatUsd, getPrice } = require("../../shared/prices");
|
||||
@@ -91,7 +90,7 @@ function show(txInfo) {
|
||||
// The raw symbol is the price-table key; the capped one is what the
|
||||
// screen says. Truncating before the lookup would silently drop the
|
||||
// price of any token whose symbol is long enough to be capped.
|
||||
const rawSymbol = isErc20 ? txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?" : nativeCurrency();
|
||||
const rawSymbol = isErc20 ? txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?" : "ETH";
|
||||
const symbol = displaySymbol(rawSymbol);
|
||||
|
||||
// Transaction type
|
||||
@@ -99,7 +98,7 @@ function show(txInfo) {
|
||||
$("confirm-type").textContent =
|
||||
"ERC-20 token transfer (" + symbol + ")";
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
$("confirm-type").textContent = "Native " + symbol + " transfer";
|
||||
$("confirm-type").textContent = "Native ETH transfer";
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Token contract section (ERC-20 only)
|
||||
@@ -163,7 +162,7 @@ function show(txInfo) {
|
||||
const bal = txInfo.balance || "0";
|
||||
const balUsd = ethPrice ? parseFloat(bal) * ethPrice : null;
|
||||
$("confirm-balance").textContent = valueWithUsd(
|
||||
truncateAmountNeverZero(bal) + " " + symbol,
|
||||
truncateAmountNeverZero(bal) + " ETH",
|
||||
balUsd,
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -198,19 +197,6 @@ function show(txInfo) {
|
||||
// estimate landing later never moves anything.
|
||||
$("confirm-amount-fee-error").classList.toggle("hidden", isErc20);
|
||||
$("confirm-gas-error").classList.toggle("hidden", !isErc20);
|
||||
$("confirm-gas-error").textContent =
|
||||
"You do not have enough " +
|
||||
nativeCurrency() +
|
||||
" to pay the network fee for this transfer. Please add " +
|
||||
nativeCurrency() +
|
||||
" to this address and try again.";
|
||||
|
||||
// Shown later, once checkRecipientHistory() finds a contract.
|
||||
$("confirm-contract-warning").textContent =
|
||||
"WARNING: The recipient is a smart contract. Sending " +
|
||||
nativeCurrency() +
|
||||
" or tokens directly to a contract may result in permanent loss of" +
|
||||
" funds.";
|
||||
|
||||
// The fee-unknown message names its cause, which is also known here.
|
||||
// Without the token's scale estimateGas() cannot encode the transfer, so
|
||||
@@ -259,9 +245,7 @@ function show(txInfo) {
|
||||
// touches already occupies its space, so re-running it never moves anything.
|
||||
function renderValidation(txInfo) {
|
||||
const isErc20 = txInfo.token !== "ETH";
|
||||
const symbol = isErc20
|
||||
? displaySymbol(txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?")
|
||||
: nativeCurrency();
|
||||
const symbol = isErc20 ? displaySymbol(txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?") : "ETH";
|
||||
|
||||
const { canSend, codes } = validateTransfer({
|
||||
isErc20,
|
||||
@@ -274,7 +258,7 @@ function renderValidation(txInfo) {
|
||||
|
||||
// Messages carrying the user's own numbers are built here; the fixed
|
||||
// sentences live in the reserved elements in index.html, except the
|
||||
// gas and fee-unknown ones, which show() sets.
|
||||
// fee-unknown one, which show() sets.
|
||||
const messages = [];
|
||||
if (codes.includes(CODES.AMOUNT_INVALID)) {
|
||||
messages.push("Please enter a valid amount to send.");
|
||||
@@ -303,13 +287,9 @@ function renderValidation(txInfo) {
|
||||
messages.push(
|
||||
"Insufficient balance. You have " +
|
||||
truncateAmountNeverZero(txInfo.balance || "0") +
|
||||
" " +
|
||||
symbol +
|
||||
" but are trying to send " +
|
||||
" ETH but are trying to send " +
|
||||
txInfo.amount +
|
||||
" " +
|
||||
symbol +
|
||||
".",
|
||||
" ETH.",
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -398,23 +378,17 @@ async function estimateGas(txInfo) {
|
||||
// The fee line goes through formatFee(), as the approval screen's
|
||||
// does, so the same fee reads the same on both.
|
||||
if (estimateWei !== null && estimateWei < gasCostWei) {
|
||||
$("confirm-fee-amount").textContent =
|
||||
"~" + formatFee(estimateWei, nativeCurrency());
|
||||
$("confirm-fee-amount").textContent = "~" + formatFee(estimateWei);
|
||||
$("confirm-fee-reserve").textContent =
|
||||
"up to " +
|
||||
truncateAmountNeverZero(formatEther(gasCostWei)) +
|
||||
" " +
|
||||
nativeCurrency() +
|
||||
" reserved";
|
||||
" ETH reserved";
|
||||
setVisible("confirm-fee-reserve", true);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
// No spread to report: either there is no estimate, or the node
|
||||
// quotes a gas price at or above maxFeePerGas, so the expected
|
||||
// cost is not below the reserve. Show the reserve alone.
|
||||
$("confirm-fee-amount").textContent = formatFee(
|
||||
gasCostWei,
|
||||
nativeCurrency(),
|
||||
);
|
||||
$("confirm-fee-amount").textContent = formatFee(gasCostWei);
|
||||
setVisible("confirm-fee-reserve", false);
|
||||
}
|
||||
feeStatus = FEE_KNOWN;
|
||||
@@ -534,10 +508,6 @@ function init(_ctx) {
|
||||
$("btn-confirm-send").disabled = true;
|
||||
$("btn-confirm-send").classList.add("text-muted");
|
||||
|
||||
// The network it is sent on. The wait, success and error screens
|
||||
// label its amount by this, not by the network active when they draw.
|
||||
pendingTx.chainId = currentNetwork().chainId;
|
||||
|
||||
let tx;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const signer = getSignerForAddress(
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ const {
|
||||
removeWalletFromState,
|
||||
broadcastActiveChanged,
|
||||
} = require("../../shared/walletDelete");
|
||||
const { INVISIBLE_CHARACTERS } = require("../../shared/symbolSpoof");
|
||||
|
||||
let deleteWalletIndex = null;
|
||||
let lostPasswordIndex = null;
|
||||
@@ -21,31 +20,21 @@ let ctx = null;
|
||||
// The name shown for a wallet, and on the lost-password screen the string
|
||||
// the user has to type back. One function so the two cannot disagree: a
|
||||
// confirmation that asks for a name other than the one on screen is
|
||||
// unusable. A name that shows nothing at all (only spaces, or only
|
||||
// zero-width characters) is replaced by "Wallet N" for the same reason:
|
||||
// there would be nothing on screen to type back.
|
||||
// unusable.
|
||||
function displayName(walletIdx) {
|
||||
const wallet = state.wallets[walletIdx];
|
||||
const name = wallet && wallet.name;
|
||||
if (name && confirmKey(name)) return name;
|
||||
return "Wallet " + (walletIdx + 1);
|
||||
return (wallet && wallet.name) || "Wallet " + (walletIdx + 1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// What the typed confirmation and the wallet name are compared as. HTML
|
||||
// collapses runs of whitespace when it renders the name, so a wallet named
|
||||
// "My Wallet" with two spaces DISPLAYS as "My Wallet": the user cannot
|
||||
// see the second space and cannot type a string that matches the stored
|
||||
// name. Characters that paint nothing, such as a zero-width space, are
|
||||
// invisible the same way and are removed first. Comparing this form on
|
||||
// both sides is what keeps the confirmation satisfiable, on the one screen
|
||||
// whose whole purpose is unwedging a user who is already stuck. Case and
|
||||
// surrounding space go the same way.
|
||||
// name. Comparing collapsed on both sides is what keeps the confirmation
|
||||
// satisfiable, on the one screen whose whole purpose is unwedging a user
|
||||
// who is already stuck. Case and surrounding space go the same way.
|
||||
function confirmKey(name) {
|
||||
return name
|
||||
.replace(INVISIBLE_CHARACTERS, "")
|
||||
.trim()
|
||||
.replace(/\s+/g, " ")
|
||||
.toLowerCase();
|
||||
return name.trim().replace(/\s+/g, " ").toLowerCase();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Drop the password from the DOM and the wallet selection from the
|
||||
@@ -185,16 +174,14 @@ function init(_ctx) {
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Case, surrounding spaces, repeated inner spaces and invisible
|
||||
// characters are not part of the confirmation; see confirmKey().
|
||||
// This asks whether the user knows which wallet they are on; it is
|
||||
// not a secret, and refusing "wallet 2" for "Wallet 2" would only
|
||||
// teach the user to distrust the control. An empty field is
|
||||
// refused whatever the wallet is called, so no stored name can
|
||||
// ever be confirmed by typing nothing.
|
||||
const typed = confirmKey($("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value);
|
||||
// Case, surrounding spaces and repeated inner spaces are not part
|
||||
// of the confirmation; see confirmKey(). This asks whether the
|
||||
// user knows which wallet they are on; it is not a secret, and
|
||||
// refusing "wallet 2" for "Wallet 2" would only teach the user to
|
||||
// distrust the control.
|
||||
const typed = $("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value;
|
||||
const expected = displayName(lostPasswordIndex);
|
||||
if (typed === "" || typed !== confirmKey(expected)) {
|
||||
if (confirmKey(typed) !== confirmKey(expected)) {
|
||||
$("delete-wallet-lost-flash").textContent =
|
||||
"That is not the name of this wallet. Type " +
|
||||
expected +
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -52,8 +52,9 @@ const VIEWS = [
|
||||
"export-privkey",
|
||||
"show-phrase",
|
||||
// Shown by src/popup/views/stateRecovery.js when the stored profile
|
||||
// cannot be read, never by showView() (see there), but listed so that
|
||||
// every view-hiding loop covers it.
|
||||
// cannot be read. It is never reached through showView() — by then the
|
||||
// state singleton this file writes on every navigation refuses to be read
|
||||
// — but it is listed so that every view-hiding loop covers it.
|
||||
"state-recovery",
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -84,28 +85,12 @@ function hideError(id) {
|
||||
el.style.visibility = "hidden";
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Set when src/popup/index.js passes the recovery screen to showView(), and
|
||||
// never cleared. Kept in memory for this popup's life, never in
|
||||
// state.currentView, which is saved: a popup opened later must not inherit it.
|
||||
let stateRecoveryShown = false;
|
||||
|
||||
function showView(name) {
|
||||
// The recovery screen, once up, is never replaced: work still running
|
||||
// when it went up, such as a transaction wait, must not take the user off
|
||||
// it or clear what they exported or typed there
|
||||
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/373).
|
||||
if (stateRecoveryShown) return;
|
||||
const leaving = state.currentView;
|
||||
if (leaving && leaving !== name) {
|
||||
const onLeave = viewLeaveHandlers.get(leaving);
|
||||
if (onLeave) onLeave();
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Passed here only so the screen it replaces is left like any other;
|
||||
// stateRecovery.show() raises it, and it is never the current view.
|
||||
if (name === "state-recovery") {
|
||||
stateRecoveryShown = true;
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
for (const v of VIEWS) {
|
||||
const el = document.getElementById(`view-${v}`);
|
||||
if (el) {
|
||||
@@ -267,31 +252,16 @@ function unknownableAmount(balance) {
|
||||
return Number.isFinite(n) ? n : null;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The active network's native token symbol, `ETH` on mainnet and `SepoliaETH`
|
||||
// on Sepolia, as src/shared/networks.js names it. The wallet's balances and
|
||||
// the Send and confirmation screens, which send on the active network, label a
|
||||
// native amount with this; a transaction already made or requested is labelled
|
||||
// by its own chain id, through nativeCurrencyByChainId() in networks.js. The
|
||||
// "ETH" that state.selectedToken and txInfo.token hold is the native token's
|
||||
// id, not its label, and stays "ETH" on every network.
|
||||
function nativeCurrency() {
|
||||
return currentNetwork().nativeCurrency;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// A network fee in wei as the confirmation and approval screens both show it:
|
||||
// the ETH figure through truncateAmountNeverZero() and labelled `symbol`, the
|
||||
// native currency of the network the fee is paid on, then its USD value when
|
||||
// the ETH price is known. The USD value is of the exact fee, not of the
|
||||
// truncated figure.
|
||||
function formatFee(wei, symbol) {
|
||||
// the ETH figure through truncateAmountNeverZero(), then its USD value when the
|
||||
// ETH price is known. The USD value is of the exact fee, not of the truncated
|
||||
// figure.
|
||||
function formatFee(wei) {
|
||||
const eth = formatEther(wei);
|
||||
const ethPrice = getPrice("ETH");
|
||||
const usd = ethPrice ? formatUsd(parseFloat(eth) * ethPrice) : "";
|
||||
return (
|
||||
truncateAmountNeverZero(eth) +
|
||||
" " +
|
||||
symbol +
|
||||
(usd ? " (" + usd + ")" : "")
|
||||
truncateAmountNeverZero(eth) + " ETH" + (usd ? " (" + usd + ")" : "")
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -333,7 +303,7 @@ function balanceLine(symbol, amount, price, tokenId) {
|
||||
|
||||
function balanceLinesForAddress(addr, trackedTokens, showZero) {
|
||||
let html = balanceLine(
|
||||
nativeCurrency(),
|
||||
"ETH",
|
||||
parseFloat(addr.balance || "0"),
|
||||
getPrice("ETH"),
|
||||
"ETH",
|
||||
@@ -690,7 +660,6 @@ module.exports = {
|
||||
balanceLinesForAddress,
|
||||
addressHoldsFunds,
|
||||
unknownableAmount,
|
||||
nativeCurrency,
|
||||
formatFee,
|
||||
addressColor,
|
||||
addressDotHtml,
|
||||
|
||||
+3
-13
@@ -10,17 +10,11 @@ const {
|
||||
addressTitle,
|
||||
escapeHtml,
|
||||
displaySymbol,
|
||||
nativeCurrency,
|
||||
renderAddressHtml,
|
||||
attachCopyHandlers,
|
||||
pushCurrentView,
|
||||
} = require("./helpers");
|
||||
const {
|
||||
state,
|
||||
saveState,
|
||||
currentAddress,
|
||||
currentNetwork,
|
||||
} = require("../../shared/state");
|
||||
const { state, saveState, currentAddress } = require("../../shared/state");
|
||||
const { notify } = require("../../shared/browserApi");
|
||||
const {
|
||||
updateSendBalance,
|
||||
@@ -74,7 +68,7 @@ function renderTotalValue() {
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
const ethBal = parseFloat(addr.balance || "0");
|
||||
const ethStr = ethBal.toFixed(4) + " " + nativeCurrency();
|
||||
const ethStr = ethBal.toFixed(4) + " ETH";
|
||||
const ethUsd = ethPrice ? " (" + formatUsd(ethBal * ethPrice) + ")" : "";
|
||||
el.textContent = ethStr + ethUsd;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -188,11 +182,7 @@ async function loadHomeTxs(ctx) {
|
||||
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const fetches = allAddresses.map((addr) =>
|
||||
fetchRecentTransactions(
|
||||
addr,
|
||||
state.blockscoutUrl,
|
||||
currentNetwork().chainId,
|
||||
),
|
||||
fetchRecentTransactions(addr, state.blockscoutUrl),
|
||||
);
|
||||
const results = await Promise.all(fetches);
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -5,8 +5,6 @@ const {
|
||||
showFlash,
|
||||
addressTitle,
|
||||
displaySymbol,
|
||||
escapeHtml,
|
||||
nativeCurrency,
|
||||
renderAddressHtml,
|
||||
attachCopyHandlers,
|
||||
goBack,
|
||||
@@ -126,7 +124,7 @@ function updateToValidation() {
|
||||
|
||||
function renderSendTokenSelect(addr) {
|
||||
const sel = $("send-token");
|
||||
sel.innerHTML = `<option value="ETH">${escapeHtml(nativeCurrency())}</option>`;
|
||||
sel.innerHTML = '<option value="ETH">ETH</option>';
|
||||
const fraudSet = new Set(
|
||||
(state.fraudContracts || []).map((a) => a.toLowerCase()),
|
||||
);
|
||||
@@ -206,8 +204,7 @@ function updateSendBalance() {
|
||||
$("send-balance").textContent =
|
||||
"Current balance: " +
|
||||
truncateAmountNeverZero(addr.balance || "0") +
|
||||
" " +
|
||||
nativeCurrency();
|
||||
" ETH";
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
const symbol = resolveSymbol(
|
||||
token,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -3,10 +3,8 @@
|
||||
// Everything else in the popup assumes a loaded profile: showView() reads and
|
||||
// writes the state singleton, every view renders from it, and the Settings
|
||||
// gear leads to a screen that does both. None of that is available here — by
|
||||
// the time this runs, the stored record has been REFUSED, deliberately: at
|
||||
// open loadState() refused it and reading the singleton throws
|
||||
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/311), and under an open popup
|
||||
// a save refused it (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/373).
|
||||
// the time this runs, loadState() has REFUSED, deliberately, and reading the
|
||||
// singleton throws (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/311).
|
||||
//
|
||||
// So this module talks to the DOM directly and touches no state at all. It is
|
||||
// the one screen that must work when nothing else can, which is also why it
|
||||
@@ -172,11 +170,6 @@ function wire() {
|
||||
* refused, or its sentence.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
function show(problem) {
|
||||
// Already up: a later save that trips over the same record, such as a
|
||||
// refresh that was in flight when the screen went up, must not clear what
|
||||
// the user has exported or typed here.
|
||||
if (!$("view-state-recovery").classList.contains("hidden")) return;
|
||||
|
||||
const sentence =
|
||||
(problem && (problem.problem || problem.message)) || String(problem);
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ const {
|
||||
goBack,
|
||||
} = require("./helpers");
|
||||
const { state } = require("../../shared/state");
|
||||
const { nativeCurrencyByChainId } = require("../../shared/networks");
|
||||
const { formatEther, formatUnits } = require("ethers");
|
||||
const makeBlockie = require("ethereum-blockies-base64");
|
||||
const { log, debugFetch } = require("../../shared/log");
|
||||
@@ -42,10 +41,8 @@ function getTransactionType(tx) {
|
||||
return "Token Approval";
|
||||
return "Contract Call";
|
||||
}
|
||||
// By the token contract, not the symbol: a token chooses its own symbol
|
||||
// and can report the native token's, but only a token transfer has one.
|
||||
if (tx.contractAddress) return "ERC-20 Token Transfer";
|
||||
return "Native " + nativeCurrencyByChainId(tx.chainId) + " Transfer";
|
||||
if (tx.symbol && tx.symbol !== "ETH") return "ERC-20 Token Transfer";
|
||||
return "Native ETH Transfer";
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function blockieHtml(address) {
|
||||
@@ -87,11 +84,6 @@ function show(tx) {
|
||||
isContractCall: tx.isContractCall || false,
|
||||
method: tx.method || null,
|
||||
contractAddress: tx.contractAddress || null,
|
||||
// The network the history entry was read from. The type line and
|
||||
// the fee are in its native currency, not the active network's:
|
||||
// a site can switch the active network before a later popup
|
||||
// shows this screen again.
|
||||
chainId: tx.chainId,
|
||||
},
|
||||
};
|
||||
render();
|
||||
@@ -187,7 +179,7 @@ function render() {
|
||||
if (el) el.classList.add("hidden");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
loadFullTxDetails(tx.hash, tx.to, tx.chainId);
|
||||
loadFullTxDetails(tx.hash, tx.to);
|
||||
|
||||
const isoStr = isoDate(tx.timestamp);
|
||||
$("tx-detail-time").innerHTML =
|
||||
@@ -205,7 +197,7 @@ function showDetailField(sectionId, contentId, value) {
|
||||
section.classList.remove("hidden");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function populateOnChainDetails(txData, chainId) {
|
||||
function populateOnChainDetails(txData) {
|
||||
// Block number
|
||||
if (txData.block_number != null) {
|
||||
const blockLink = explorerUrl("block", String(txData.block_number));
|
||||
@@ -235,7 +227,7 @@ function populateOnChainDetails(txData, chainId) {
|
||||
showDetailField(
|
||||
"tx-detail-fee-section",
|
||||
"tx-detail-fee",
|
||||
feeEth + " " + nativeCurrencyByChainId(chainId),
|
||||
feeEth + " ETH",
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -295,7 +287,7 @@ function populateOnChainDetails(txData, chainId) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async function loadFullTxDetails(txHash, toAddress, chainId) {
|
||||
async function loadFullTxDetails(txHash, toAddress) {
|
||||
const section = $("tx-detail-calldata-section");
|
||||
const actionEl = $("tx-detail-calldata-action");
|
||||
const detailsEl = $("tx-detail-calldata-details");
|
||||
@@ -312,7 +304,7 @@ async function loadFullTxDetails(txHash, toAddress, chainId) {
|
||||
const txData = await resp.json();
|
||||
|
||||
// Populate on-chain detail fields (block, nonce, gas, fee)
|
||||
populateOnChainDetails(txData, chainId);
|
||||
populateOnChainDetails(txData);
|
||||
|
||||
const inputData = txData.raw_input || txData.input || null;
|
||||
if (!inputData || inputData === "0x") return;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ const {
|
||||
} = require("./helpers");
|
||||
const { resolveTokenSymbol } = require("../../shared/approvalAmount");
|
||||
const { state } = require("../../shared/state");
|
||||
const { nativeCurrencyByChainId } = require("../../shared/networks");
|
||||
const { getProvider } = require("../../shared/balances");
|
||||
const { log } = require("../../shared/log");
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -87,13 +86,9 @@ function startWait(txInfo, txHash, broadcastTime, pollNow) {
|
||||
endWait();
|
||||
const id = waitId;
|
||||
|
||||
// A native amount, here and on the success and error screens, is in the
|
||||
// native currency of txInfo.chainId, the network the transaction was sent
|
||||
// on, not the active network's: a site can switch the active network
|
||||
// while this screen is open or before a later popup resumes it.
|
||||
const symbol =
|
||||
txInfo.token === "ETH"
|
||||
? nativeCurrencyByChainId(txInfo.chainId)
|
||||
? "ETH"
|
||||
: displaySymbol(txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?");
|
||||
$("wait-tx-summary").textContent = txInfo.amount + " " + symbol;
|
||||
$("wait-tx-to").innerHTML = toAddressHtml(txInfo.to);
|
||||
@@ -198,10 +193,9 @@ function showWait(txInfo, txHash) {
|
||||
// an object merely missing one of them throws a TypeError out of
|
||||
// restoreView() — which init() does not guard, skipping the rest of popup
|
||||
// init and leaving wait-tx on screen with no back control. A non-numeric
|
||||
// broadcastTime leaves an unexitable wait counting "NaNs". txInfo.token,
|
||||
// txInfo.tokenSymbol and txInfo.chainId are deliberately unchecked: they are
|
||||
// compared and coalesced rather than dereferenced, and tokenSymbol is null for
|
||||
// ETH.
|
||||
// broadcastTime leaves an unexitable wait counting "NaNs". txInfo.token and
|
||||
// txInfo.tokenSymbol are deliberately unchecked: they are compared and
|
||||
// coalesced rather than dereferenced, and tokenSymbol is null for ETH.
|
||||
function restoreWait() {
|
||||
const d = state.viewData;
|
||||
if (!d || !d.pendingWait) return false;
|
||||
@@ -229,7 +223,7 @@ function showSuccess(txInfo, txHash, blockNumber) {
|
||||
|
||||
const symbol =
|
||||
txInfo.token === "ETH"
|
||||
? nativeCurrencyByChainId(txInfo.chainId)
|
||||
? "ETH"
|
||||
: displaySymbol(txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?");
|
||||
state.viewData = {
|
||||
amount: txInfo.amount,
|
||||
@@ -326,7 +320,7 @@ function showError(txInfo, txHash, message) {
|
||||
|
||||
const symbol =
|
||||
txInfo.token === "ETH"
|
||||
? nativeCurrencyByChainId(txInfo.chainId)
|
||||
? "ETH"
|
||||
: displaySymbol(txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?");
|
||||
state.viewData = {
|
||||
amount: txInfo.amount,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -54,11 +54,9 @@ const {
|
||||
formatEther,
|
||||
getAddress,
|
||||
getBytes,
|
||||
toQuantity,
|
||||
verifyMessage,
|
||||
verifyTypedData,
|
||||
} = require("ethers");
|
||||
const { nativeCurrencyByChainId } = require("./networks");
|
||||
|
||||
// The only transaction types this wallet signs: legacy, EIP-2930 and
|
||||
// EIP-1559. populateTransaction() produces nothing else, so nothing else can
|
||||
@@ -409,21 +407,12 @@ function assertWithinCeilings(tx) {
|
||||
price = normalizeQuantity(tx.gasPrice, "gas price");
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (price !== null && gasLimit * price > MAX_TOTAL_FEE) {
|
||||
// The fee is paid in the native currency of the network the
|
||||
// transaction is for. Every caller's transaction names it.
|
||||
const nativeCurrency = nativeCurrencyByChainId(
|
||||
present(tx.chainId) ? toQuantity(tx.chainId) : null,
|
||||
);
|
||||
throw refuse(
|
||||
"This transaction would allow a network fee of up to " +
|
||||
formatEther(gasLimit * price) +
|
||||
" " +
|
||||
nativeCurrency +
|
||||
", which is more than the " +
|
||||
" ETH, which is more than the " +
|
||||
formatEther(MAX_TOTAL_FEE) +
|
||||
" " +
|
||||
nativeCurrency +
|
||||
" this wallet will sign for.",
|
||||
" ETH this wallet will sign for.",
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -147,20 +147,20 @@ async function fetchTokenBalances(address, blockscoutUrl, trackedTokens) {
|
||||
// null is a holding of an amount that cannot be stated, which is
|
||||
// not the same as a holding of zero, and must never render as one.
|
||||
const bal = scale === null ? null : formatTokenBalance(raw, scale);
|
||||
// null means the explorer reported no readable count, which is
|
||||
// not the same as a count of zero. This gate is not the
|
||||
// low-holder display filter: it has no user-facing off switch and
|
||||
// governs the whole balance list, so it stays strict and admits a
|
||||
// token only on a reported count — an unreported one is no
|
||||
// evidence, and `null >= LOW_HOLDER_THRESHOLD` is false. A
|
||||
// legitimate token still reaches the list through the known
|
||||
// null means the explorer reported no count, which is not the
|
||||
// same as a count of zero. This gate is not the low-holder
|
||||
// display filter: it has no user-facing off switch and governs
|
||||
// the whole balance list, so it stays strict and admits a token
|
||||
// only on a reported count — an unreported one is no evidence.
|
||||
// A legitimate token still reaches the list through the known
|
||||
// token list or by the user tracking it, and the null is carried
|
||||
// through to the views, where the two low-holder filters treat
|
||||
// an unknown count as "do not judge" rather than as zero.
|
||||
const holders = parseHoldersCount(item.token.holders_count);
|
||||
const isKnown = TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.has(tokenAddr);
|
||||
const isTracked = trackedSet.has(tokenAddr);
|
||||
const hasEnoughHolders = holders >= LOW_HOLDER_THRESHOLD;
|
||||
const hasEnoughHolders =
|
||||
holders !== null && holders >= LOW_HOLDER_THRESHOLD;
|
||||
|
||||
// Skip spam tokens the user never asked to see
|
||||
if (!isKnown && !isTracked && !hasEnoughHolders) continue;
|
||||
|
||||
+6
-15
@@ -9,22 +9,13 @@
|
||||
|
||||
const LOW_HOLDER_THRESHOLD = 1000;
|
||||
|
||||
// Parse an explorer-supplied holders_count into a number, or null when it is
|
||||
// not one. Only a whole number of zero or more, or a string made of nothing
|
||||
// but the digits 0-9, is a count. Anything else is null, never read in part:
|
||||
// "1,000", "0x10" and "1e3" are unknown, not 1, 0 and 1, because a count we
|
||||
// cannot read is not a low count. A count above Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER is
|
||||
// null too: a number cannot hold it exactly, so it would come back rounded,
|
||||
// or as Infinity.
|
||||
// Parse an explorer-supplied holders_count into a number, or null when the
|
||||
// explorer did not report one. Anything unparseable is unknown too: a count
|
||||
// we cannot read is not a count of zero.
|
||||
function parseHoldersCount(raw) {
|
||||
if (typeof raw === "number") {
|
||||
return Number.isSafeInteger(raw) && raw >= 0 ? raw : null;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (typeof raw === "string" && /^[0-9]+$/.test(raw)) {
|
||||
const count = Number(raw);
|
||||
return Number.isSafeInteger(count) ? count : null;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return null;
|
||||
if (raw === null || raw === undefined || raw === "") return null;
|
||||
const n = parseInt(raw, 10);
|
||||
return Number.isFinite(n) ? n : null;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// True only for a token the explorer reported as having fewer holders than
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -76,15 +76,6 @@ function networkByChainId(chainId) {
|
||||
return null;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The native currency of the network with this chain id. A transaction's
|
||||
// value and fee are labelled with the one of the chain the transaction is on,
|
||||
// which need not be the active network. `ETH` when the chain id is missing or
|
||||
// no network here has it.
|
||||
function nativeCurrencyByChainId(chainId) {
|
||||
const network = networkByChainId(chainId);
|
||||
return network ? network.nativeCurrency : "ETH";
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Build a block explorer link for the given path type and value.
|
||||
// type: "address" | "tx" | "token" | "block"
|
||||
function explorerLink(network, type, value) {
|
||||
@@ -98,6 +89,5 @@ module.exports = {
|
||||
isKnownNetworkId,
|
||||
networkById,
|
||||
networkByChainId,
|
||||
nativeCurrencyByChainId,
|
||||
explorerLink,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
+5
-12
@@ -122,9 +122,9 @@ function currentNetwork() {
|
||||
return networkById(state.networkId);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The persisted fields as this page held them when its last loadState()
|
||||
// finished, or when its last successful saveState() began. saveState() diffs
|
||||
// the live state against this to find only the fields THIS page changed since.
|
||||
// The persisted fields as they stood at the end of this page's last
|
||||
// loadState() or saveState(). saveState() diffs the live state against this
|
||||
// to find only the fields THIS page actually changed.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Deep-cloned, not a reference: callers mutate persisted objects and arrays
|
||||
// in place (state.wallets.push(...)), and a reference baseline would mutate
|
||||
@@ -464,10 +464,7 @@ function mergeNetworkEndpoints(base, ours, theirs) {
|
||||
// does not own goes on being whatever its last loadState() saw, same as
|
||||
// before this fix; only the persisted record is guaranteed current.
|
||||
async function saveStateOnce() {
|
||||
// A copy, so what this save compares and writes is the page's state as it
|
||||
// stood when the save began. A change made while it waits on storage is
|
||||
// left for the next save, which compares against this copy.
|
||||
const current = structuredClone(snapshotPersisted());
|
||||
const current = snapshotPersisted();
|
||||
const result = await storageGet("autistmask");
|
||||
// The record in storage right now is about to be merged into and written
|
||||
// back, so it is validated exactly like a load validates it. Without this,
|
||||
@@ -524,11 +521,7 @@ async function saveStateOnce() {
|
||||
// exactly as it stood; see the note above.
|
||||
rawState.hasWallet = rawState.wallets.length > 0;
|
||||
|
||||
// What this save compared and wrote, not the page's state now: a change
|
||||
// made during the save must still differ from the baseline, or the save
|
||||
// queued after it finds nothing to store
|
||||
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/448).
|
||||
baseline = current;
|
||||
baseline = structuredClone(snapshotPersisted());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// showView() calls saveState() on every navigation without awaiting it, so
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -11,8 +11,8 @@
|
||||
// KNOWN_SYMBOLS maps a symbol to the set of lowercased contract addresses
|
||||
// that may bear it, or to null. Null means the symbol belongs to the native
|
||||
// asset, which has no contract at all, so no contract may bear it and every
|
||||
// one that does is a spoof. "ETH" is one such entry, and every network's
|
||||
// `nativeCurrency` in networks.js (`SepoliaETH`) is another, on every network.
|
||||
// one that does is a spoof. "ETH" is the only such entry today; the rule is
|
||||
// written so that a second one needs no change here or at any call site.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The value is a set because a ticker is not unique: seven symbols in the
|
||||
// bundled list belong to two real contracts each, and answering with one of
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@
|
||||
// 511 tokens.
|
||||
|
||||
const { debugFetch } = require("./log");
|
||||
const { NETWORKS } = require("./networks");
|
||||
|
||||
const COINDESK_API = "https://data-api.coindesk.com/index/cc/v1/latest/tick";
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -3611,9 +3610,7 @@ for (const t of TOKENS) {
|
||||
// Build a map of symbol (uppercased) -> the set of contract addresses
|
||||
// (lowercased) that legitimately bear it. Used for spoofed-symbol detection.
|
||||
// "ETH" maps to null: the native asset has no contract, so no contract may
|
||||
// bear its symbol. So does every network's `nativeCurrency` in networks.js
|
||||
// (`SepoliaETH`), on every network, since that is the label the wallet shows
|
||||
// its native asset under on that network.
|
||||
// bear its symbol.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The value is a set and not a single address because tickers are not unique
|
||||
// and the list above proves it: seven of these 512 tokens share a symbol with
|
||||
@@ -3627,9 +3624,6 @@ for (const t of TOKENS) {
|
||||
// loosen the rule, because a contract outside the set is still a spoof.
|
||||
const KNOWN_SYMBOLS = new Map();
|
||||
KNOWN_SYMBOLS.set("ETH", null);
|
||||
for (const network of Object.values(NETWORKS)) {
|
||||
KNOWN_SYMBOLS.set(network.nativeCurrency.toUpperCase(), null);
|
||||
}
|
||||
for (const t of TOKENS) {
|
||||
const upper = t.symbol.toUpperCase();
|
||||
if (!KNOWN_SYMBOLS.has(upper)) {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ const { log, debugFetch } = require("./log");
|
||||
const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("./tokenList");
|
||||
const { parseHoldersCount, isLowHolderCount } = require("./holders");
|
||||
const { isSpoofedSymbol } = require("./symbolSpoof");
|
||||
const { nativeCurrencyByChainId } = require("./networks");
|
||||
// The uint8 test every scale in this wallet goes through. Shared, not copied:
|
||||
// a scale is either reported or it is unknown, and "unknown" must mean the
|
||||
// same thing here as it does on the screens that refuse to format one.
|
||||
@@ -29,7 +28,7 @@ function normalizeAddress(addr) {
|
||||
return (addr || "").toLowerCase();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function parseTx(tx, addrLower, chainId) {
|
||||
function parseTx(tx, addrLower) {
|
||||
const from = tx.from?.hash || "";
|
||||
const to = tx.to?.hash || "";
|
||||
const rawWei = tx.value || "0";
|
||||
@@ -37,7 +36,7 @@ function parseTx(tx, addrLower, chainId) {
|
||||
const method = tx.method || null;
|
||||
|
||||
// For contract calls, produce a meaningful label instead of "0.0000 ETH"
|
||||
let symbol = nativeCurrencyByChainId(chainId);
|
||||
let symbol = "ETH";
|
||||
let value = formatTxValue(formatEther(rawWei));
|
||||
let exactValue = formatEther(rawWei);
|
||||
let rawAmount = rawWei;
|
||||
@@ -91,11 +90,10 @@ function parseTx(tx, addrLower, chainId) {
|
||||
holders: null,
|
||||
isContractCall: toIsContract,
|
||||
method: method,
|
||||
chainId: chainId,
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function parseTokenTransfer(tt, addrLower, chainId) {
|
||||
function parseTokenTransfer(tt, addrLower) {
|
||||
const from = tt.from?.hash || "";
|
||||
const to = tt.to?.hash || "";
|
||||
// The explorer's own answer, or null. Never a default: a transfer of
|
||||
@@ -137,12 +135,10 @@ function parseTokenTransfer(tt, addrLower, chainId) {
|
||||
contractAddress: normalizeAddress(
|
||||
tt.token?.address_hash || tt.token?.address || "",
|
||||
),
|
||||
// null when the explorer reported no readable count: unknown, not
|
||||
// zero. The low-holder filter declines to judge a null, so a
|
||||
// legitimate token is not hidden because a field went missing
|
||||
// upstream.
|
||||
// null when the explorer reported no count: unknown, not zero. The
|
||||
// low-holder filter declines to judge a null, so a legitimate token
|
||||
// is not hidden because a field went missing upstream.
|
||||
holders: parseHoldersCount(tt.token?.holders_count),
|
||||
chainId: chainId,
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -225,15 +221,7 @@ function mergeTransactions(txs, tokenTransfers) {
|
||||
return merged;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// `chainId` is the chain id of the network `blockscoutUrl` serves. Every entry
|
||||
// carries it, and a native entry is labelled with that network's
|
||||
// `nativeCurrency` from networks.js (`ETH`, `SepoliaETH`).
|
||||
async function fetchRecentTransactions(
|
||||
address,
|
||||
blockscoutUrl,
|
||||
chainId,
|
||||
count = 25,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
async function fetchRecentTransactions(address, blockscoutUrl, count = 25) {
|
||||
log.debugf("fetchRecentTransactions", address);
|
||||
const addrLower = normalizeAddress(address);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -266,10 +254,8 @@ async function fetchRecentTransactions(
|
||||
const ttJson = ttResp.ok ? await ttResp.json() : {};
|
||||
|
||||
const txs = mergeTransactions(
|
||||
(txJson.items || []).map((tx) => parseTx(tx, addrLower, chainId)),
|
||||
(ttJson.items || []).map((tt) =>
|
||||
parseTokenTransfer(tt, addrLower, chainId),
|
||||
),
|
||||
(txJson.items || []).map((tx) => parseTx(tx, addrLower)),
|
||||
(ttJson.items || []).map((tt) => parseTokenTransfer(tt, addrLower)),
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
const result = txs.slice(0, count);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -724,15 +724,10 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, sources) {
|
||||
|
||||
details.push({ label: "Steps", value: commandNames.join(" \u2192 ") });
|
||||
|
||||
// A JavaScript date reaches only to 275760-09-13 00:00:00 UTC. A
|
||||
// later deadline, such as the uint256 maximum, makes an invalid date,
|
||||
// and toISOString() throws on one, so that deadline is said in words.
|
||||
const deadlineDate = new Date(Number(deadline) * 1000);
|
||||
details.push({
|
||||
label: "Deadline",
|
||||
value: isNaN(deadlineDate.getTime())
|
||||
? "After 275760-09-13 00:00:00 (no deadline in practice)"
|
||||
: deadlineDate.toISOString().replace("T", " ").slice(0, 19),
|
||||
value: deadlineDate.toISOString().replace("T", " ").slice(0, 19),
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -31,15 +31,11 @@ const iface = new Interface(ERC20_ABI);
|
||||
const NOVEL_TOKEN = "0xE2E0000000000000000000000000000000000E2e";
|
||||
// In the bundled list, at 6 decimals.
|
||||
const USDC = "0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48";
|
||||
// In the bundled list, at 0 decimals.
|
||||
const SLP = "0xCC8Fa225D80b9c7D42F96e9570156c65D6cAAa25";
|
||||
const RECIPIENT = "0xC0FfEE0000000000000000000000000000c0fFEe";
|
||||
const SPENDER = "0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111";
|
||||
|
||||
// 5,000 units of a 6-decimal token, the amount from the issue.
|
||||
const FIVE_THOUSAND_AT_SIX = 5000000000n;
|
||||
// 5,000 units of a 0-decimal token, which are 5,000 tokens.
|
||||
const FIVE_THOUSAND_AT_ZERO = 5000n;
|
||||
const MAX_UINT256 = (1n << 256n) - 1n;
|
||||
|
||||
function transferData(amount) {
|
||||
@@ -117,21 +113,6 @@ describe("resolveTokenDecimals", () => {
|
||||
expect(resolveTokenDecimals(NOVEL_TOKEN, state)).toBe(6);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// Zero decimals is a real scale, not a missing one, so a source that
|
||||
// answers 0 is used rather than fallen past like the unusable entry above.
|
||||
test("uses a bundled scale of zero", () => {
|
||||
state.trackedTokens = [{ address: SLP, symbol: "SLP", decimals: 18 }];
|
||||
expect(resolveTokenDecimals(SLP, state)).toBe(0);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("uses a tracked scale of zero", () => {
|
||||
state.trackedTokens = [
|
||||
{ address: NOVEL_TOKEN, symbol: "NOVEL", decimals: 0 },
|
||||
];
|
||||
state.wallets = walletsHolding(NOVEL_TOKEN, 18);
|
||||
expect(resolveTokenDecimals(NOVEL_TOKEN, state)).toBe(0);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("refuses a scale the explorer's own entries disagree about", () => {
|
||||
const wallets = walletsHolding(NOVEL_TOKEN, 6);
|
||||
wallets[0].addresses.push({
|
||||
@@ -232,21 +213,6 @@ describe("decodeCalldata amount", () => {
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a bundled token with zero decimals shows the true quantity", () => {
|
||||
expect(amountLine(transferData(FIVE_THOUSAND_AT_ZERO), SLP)).toBe(
|
||||
"5000.0000 SLP",
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a tracked token with zero decimals shows the true quantity", () => {
|
||||
state.trackedTokens = [
|
||||
{ address: NOVEL_TOKEN, symbol: "NOVEL", decimals: 0 },
|
||||
];
|
||||
expect(
|
||||
amountLine(transferData(FIVE_THOUSAND_AT_ZERO), NOVEL_TOKEN),
|
||||
).toBe("5000.0000 NOVEL");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("the amount carried to the status screens is the same string", () => {
|
||||
const decoded = decodeCalldata(
|
||||
transferData(FIVE_THOUSAND_AT_SIX),
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -599,24 +599,6 @@ describe("verifySignedTx field comparison", () => {
|
||||
expect(e.message).toContain("1.0 ETH");
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// The fee is in the native currency of the network the transaction is
|
||||
// for, whether its chain id is the hex string the background prepares
|
||||
// or the number ethers parses from a signed transaction.
|
||||
test.each([
|
||||
["0x1", "ETH"],
|
||||
[1n, "ETH"],
|
||||
["0xaa36a7", "SepoliaETH"],
|
||||
[11155111n, "SepoliaETH"],
|
||||
])("the refusal on chain %p names %s", (chainId, nativeCurrency) => {
|
||||
expect(() => assertWithinCeilings({ ...OVER, chainId })).toThrow(
|
||||
"up to 3000.0 " +
|
||||
nativeCurrency +
|
||||
", which is more than the 1.0 " +
|
||||
nativeCurrency +
|
||||
" this wallet",
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("every field mismatch is a refusal, not a warning", async () => {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
|
||||
lastError: null,
|
||||
},
|
||||
windows: {
|
||||
getLastFocused: (cb) => cb(opts.lastFocused || null),
|
||||
getLastFocused: (cb) => cb(null),
|
||||
create: (options2, cb) => {
|
||||
created.push(options2);
|
||||
// A browser that answers with no window at all. The approval
|
||||
@@ -2235,27 +2235,6 @@ describe("a site connection decided as the popup closes", () => {
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// The prompt is decided before the toolbar popup raised for it has
|
||||
// loaded; that popup is torn down and openPopup() rejects only after.
|
||||
test("a toolbar prompt already decided opens no window when openPopup() rejects", async () => {
|
||||
const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
|
||||
const opening = deferred();
|
||||
bg.openPopup.mockImplementation(() => opening.promise);
|
||||
const pending = bg.requestSite();
|
||||
await settle();
|
||||
|
||||
const port = bg.connectApproval(pending.id());
|
||||
port.decide(true, false);
|
||||
port.disconnect();
|
||||
await settle();
|
||||
expect(pending.result()).toEqual({ result: [signer.address] });
|
||||
|
||||
opening.reject(new Error("the toolbar popup closed before it loaded"));
|
||||
await settle();
|
||||
|
||||
expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(0);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// The port carries a decision now, so it carries the sender check the
|
||||
// one-off message used to carry. A content script that guessed an
|
||||
// approval id must not be able to connect the site it is running on.
|
||||
@@ -2716,47 +2695,3 @@ describe("removing a site in Settings disconnects it", () => {
|
||||
expect(await siteAccounts(bg)).toEqual({ result: [signer.address] });
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// An approval window still open is often the last focused window, and headless
|
||||
// Chrome reports one as 1280x720. Centred on that, the next approval window
|
||||
// lands where the browser refuses to create it, and its request failed with no
|
||||
// window at all (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/290).
|
||||
describe("where an approval window opens", () => {
|
||||
test("centred on the browser window the user was last in", async () => {
|
||||
const bg = loadBackground({
|
||||
lastFocused: {
|
||||
type: "normal",
|
||||
left: 0,
|
||||
top: 0,
|
||||
width: 1280,
|
||||
height: 720,
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
bg.requestSign();
|
||||
await settle();
|
||||
|
||||
expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(1);
|
||||
expect(bg.created[0]).toMatchObject({ left: 460, top: 60 });
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("not centred on an approval window the user was last in", async () => {
|
||||
const bg = loadBackground({
|
||||
lastFocused: {
|
||||
type: "popup",
|
||||
left: 440,
|
||||
top: 0,
|
||||
width: 1280,
|
||||
height: 720,
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
bg.requestSign();
|
||||
await settle();
|
||||
|
||||
// Centred, it would be at left 900, the position the browser refused.
|
||||
expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(1);
|
||||
expect(bg.created[0].left).toBeUndefined();
|
||||
expect(bg.created[0].top).toBeUndefined();
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -46,9 +46,6 @@ const A1 = "0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7";
|
||||
const B0 = "0x2260FAC5E5542a773Aa44fBCfeDf7C193bc2C599";
|
||||
const C0 = "0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48";
|
||||
|
||||
// U+200B, built from its code point so that it can be seen in this file.
|
||||
const ZERO_WIDTH_SPACE = String.fromCodePoint(0x200b);
|
||||
|
||||
// ------------------------------------------------------------ DOM stub
|
||||
|
||||
function makeElement(id) {
|
||||
@@ -345,72 +342,6 @@ describe("the typed confirmation", () => {
|
||||
"secret-three",
|
||||
]);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// A name of only spaces compares as nothing, and so does an empty
|
||||
// field. Typing nothing must still delete nothing.
|
||||
test.each(["", " "])(
|
||||
"typing %j deletes nothing when the name is only spaces",
|
||||
async (typedValue) => {
|
||||
const { deleteWallet, state, storage } = load();
|
||||
state.wallets[1].name = " ";
|
||||
await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
|
||||
|
||||
node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = typedValue;
|
||||
await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
|
||||
|
||||
expect(node("delete-wallet-lost-flash").style.visibility).toBe(
|
||||
"visible",
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(state.wallets).toHaveLength(3);
|
||||
expect(await persistedWallets(storage)).toHaveLength(3);
|
||||
},
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
// A name that shows nothing would leave nothing on screen to type
|
||||
// back, so the screen names the wallet by its position instead, and
|
||||
// that is what the user types.
|
||||
test.each([
|
||||
["spaces", " "],
|
||||
["a zero-width space", ZERO_WIDTH_SPACE],
|
||||
])(
|
||||
"a name of only %s is shown and typed back as Wallet 2",
|
||||
async (_label, storedName) => {
|
||||
const { deleteWallet, state, storage } = load();
|
||||
state.wallets[1].name = storedName;
|
||||
await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
|
||||
|
||||
expect(node("delete-wallet-lost-name").textContent).toBe(
|
||||
"Wallet 2",
|
||||
);
|
||||
node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "Wallet 2";
|
||||
await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
|
||||
|
||||
const persisted = await persistedWallets(storage);
|
||||
expect(persisted.map((w) => w.encryptedSecret)).toEqual([
|
||||
"secret-one",
|
||||
"secret-three",
|
||||
]);
|
||||
},
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
// A zero-width space paints nothing, so "My", a zero-width space and
|
||||
// "Wallet" reads as "MyWallet", and that is all the user can type. HTML
|
||||
// does not collapse it the way it collapses spaces, so it has to be
|
||||
// removed explicitly.
|
||||
test("a zero-width space inside the name is not part of it", async () => {
|
||||
const { deleteWallet, state, storage } = load();
|
||||
state.wallets[1].name = "My" + ZERO_WIDTH_SPACE + "Wallet";
|
||||
await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
|
||||
|
||||
node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "MyWallet";
|
||||
await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
|
||||
|
||||
const persisted = await persistedWallets(storage);
|
||||
expect(persisted.map((w) => w.encryptedSecret)).toEqual([
|
||||
"secret-one",
|
||||
"secret-three",
|
||||
]);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe("deleting without the password", () => {
|
||||
|
||||
+35
-169
@@ -204,51 +204,40 @@ async function goHome(page) {
|
||||
await visible(page, "#view-main");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// One field of the popup's state as it was actually persisted, read out of
|
||||
// extension storage rather than inferred from what is on screen.
|
||||
function persistedField(page, field) {
|
||||
// The navigation stack as it was actually persisted, read out of extension
|
||||
// storage rather than inferred from which screen is showing. A stale entry
|
||||
// left behind by a forward navigation that threw is invisible on screen
|
||||
// until the user presses Back one time too many — which is exactly the
|
||||
// second-order damage #150 did — so the stack itself is what gets asserted.
|
||||
function persistedViewStack(page) {
|
||||
return page.evaluate(
|
||||
(key) =>
|
||||
() =>
|
||||
new Promise((resolve) => {
|
||||
chrome.storage.local.get("autistmask", (r) => {
|
||||
resolve(r.autistmask ? r.autistmask[key] : undefined);
|
||||
resolve((r.autistmask && r.autistmask.viewStack) || []);
|
||||
});
|
||||
}),
|
||||
field,
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The navigation stack as it was actually persisted. A stale entry left
|
||||
// behind by a forward navigation that threw is invisible on screen until
|
||||
// the user presses Back one time too many — which is exactly the
|
||||
// second-order damage #150 did — so the stack itself is what gets asserted.
|
||||
async function persistedViewStack(page) {
|
||||
return (await persistedField(page, "viewStack")) || [];
|
||||
}
|
||||
// saveState() is fired from showView() without being awaited, so the write
|
||||
// lands shortly after the screen does. Polling for the expected stack keeps
|
||||
// that race out of the assertion; a stack that never becomes the expected
|
||||
// one fails with what it actually was.
|
||||
const VIEW_STACK_SETTLE_MS = 5000;
|
||||
|
||||
// Nothing here can await the popup's saves. showView() fires saveState()
|
||||
// without awaiting it, and a Settings control's "change" handler awaits its
|
||||
// save only after click() or selectOption() has already returned. So the
|
||||
// write lands shortly after the screen or the control changes, and a popup
|
||||
// closed before then loses it. Polling for the expected value keeps that
|
||||
// race out of the assertion and out of the close; a value that never
|
||||
// arrives fails with what it actually was.
|
||||
const SAVE_SETTLE_MS = 5000;
|
||||
|
||||
async function waitForPersisted(page, field, expected, where) {
|
||||
async function waitForViewStack(page, expected, where) {
|
||||
const want = JSON.stringify(expected);
|
||||
const deadline = Date.now() + SAVE_SETTLE_MS;
|
||||
const deadline = Date.now() + VIEW_STACK_SETTLE_MS;
|
||||
let seen;
|
||||
for (;;) {
|
||||
seen = await persistedField(page, field);
|
||||
seen = await persistedViewStack(page);
|
||||
if (JSON.stringify(seen) === want) return;
|
||||
if (Date.now() >= deadline) break;
|
||||
await sleep(50);
|
||||
}
|
||||
throw new Error(
|
||||
"the persisted " +
|
||||
field +
|
||||
" " +
|
||||
"navigation stack " +
|
||||
where +
|
||||
" is " +
|
||||
JSON.stringify(seen) +
|
||||
@@ -268,18 +257,12 @@ test("Back from Add Token unwinds the stack exactly once (#150)", async (env) =>
|
||||
|
||||
await env.page.locator("#wallet-list .btn-addr-info").first().click();
|
||||
await visible(env.page, "#view-address");
|
||||
await waitForPersisted(
|
||||
env.page,
|
||||
"viewStack",
|
||||
base.concat("main"),
|
||||
"on address detail",
|
||||
);
|
||||
await waitForViewStack(env.page, base.concat("main"), "on address detail");
|
||||
|
||||
await env.page.click("#btn-add-token");
|
||||
await visible(env.page, "#view-add-token");
|
||||
await waitForPersisted(
|
||||
await waitForViewStack(
|
||||
env.page,
|
||||
"viewStack",
|
||||
base.concat("main", "address"),
|
||||
"on the add token screen",
|
||||
);
|
||||
@@ -290,16 +273,15 @@ test("Back from Add Token unwinds the stack exactly once (#150)", async (env) =>
|
||||
!(await env.page.isVisible("#view-add-token")),
|
||||
"the add token screen is still showing after Back",
|
||||
);
|
||||
await waitForPersisted(
|
||||
await waitForViewStack(
|
||||
env.page,
|
||||
"viewStack",
|
||||
base.concat("main"),
|
||||
"after Back from add token",
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
await env.page.click("#btn-address-back");
|
||||
await visible(env.page, "#view-main");
|
||||
await waitForPersisted(env.page, "viewStack", base, "after a second Back");
|
||||
await waitForViewStack(env.page, base, "after a second Back");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a common-token quick-pick fills in the contract address (#150)", async (env) => {
|
||||
@@ -697,12 +679,6 @@ test("reopening the popup never lands on the phrase screen (#161)", async (env)
|
||||
await openPhraseScreen(env.page);
|
||||
await revealPhrase(env.page);
|
||||
|
||||
await waitForPersisted(
|
||||
env.page,
|
||||
"currentView",
|
||||
"show-phrase",
|
||||
"before closing the popup",
|
||||
);
|
||||
await env.page.close();
|
||||
env.page = await openPopup(env.ctx, env.popupUrl);
|
||||
await visible(env.page, "#view-main");
|
||||
@@ -738,20 +714,10 @@ function addressScreenState(page) {
|
||||
|
||||
// Close and reopen the page rather than reload it: that is what the toolbar
|
||||
// popup does, and it is the only thing that produces the unrendered views.
|
||||
// The popup reopens on the view it last saved, so the close waits until
|
||||
// `view` is the one saved. That wait cannot see a save that leaves the value
|
||||
// as it was: a caller whose popup already had `view` saved waits for a
|
||||
// screen in between first.
|
||||
async function reopenPopup(env, view) {
|
||||
await waitForPersisted(
|
||||
env.page,
|
||||
"currentView",
|
||||
view,
|
||||
"before closing the popup",
|
||||
);
|
||||
async function reopenPopup(env, restoredView) {
|
||||
await env.page.close();
|
||||
env.page = await openPopup(env.ctx, env.popupUrl);
|
||||
await visible(env.page, "#view-" + view);
|
||||
await visible(env.page, restoredView);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The reproduction from the issue, step for step.
|
||||
@@ -766,7 +732,7 @@ test("Back after reopening the popup renders the address screen (#268)", async (
|
||||
await env.page.click("#btn-settings");
|
||||
await visible(env.page, "#view-settings");
|
||||
|
||||
await reopenPopup(env, "settings");
|
||||
await reopenPopup(env, "#view-settings");
|
||||
|
||||
await env.page.click("#btn-settings-back");
|
||||
await visible(env.page, "#view-address");
|
||||
@@ -823,18 +789,10 @@ test("Back after reopening the popup renders the Receive screen (#268)", async (
|
||||
JSON.stringify(before.address),
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
// The test above left `settings` saved too, so reopenPopup() could not
|
||||
// tell this page's save of it from that one without a save in between.
|
||||
await waitForPersisted(
|
||||
env.page,
|
||||
"currentView",
|
||||
"receive",
|
||||
"on the Receive screen",
|
||||
);
|
||||
await env.page.click("#btn-settings");
|
||||
await visible(env.page, "#view-settings");
|
||||
|
||||
await reopenPopup(env, "settings");
|
||||
await reopenPopup(env, "#view-settings");
|
||||
|
||||
await env.page.click("#btn-settings-back");
|
||||
await visible(env.page, "#view-receive");
|
||||
@@ -1217,24 +1175,11 @@ const NONDEFAULT_NETWORK = "sepolia";
|
||||
test("the theme and network selectors carry a non-default persisted value (#229)", async (env) => {
|
||||
await openSettings(env.page);
|
||||
|
||||
// selectOption() fires "change", which is what the handlers bind. It
|
||||
// returns before the handler's save lands, hence each wait.
|
||||
// selectOption() fires "change", which is what the handlers bind.
|
||||
await env.page.selectOption("#settings-theme", NONDEFAULT_THEME);
|
||||
await waitForPersisted(
|
||||
env.page,
|
||||
"theme",
|
||||
NONDEFAULT_THEME,
|
||||
"after the switch",
|
||||
);
|
||||
await env.page.selectOption("#settings-network", NONDEFAULT_NETWORK);
|
||||
await waitForPersisted(
|
||||
env.page,
|
||||
"networkId",
|
||||
NONDEFAULT_NETWORK,
|
||||
"after the switch",
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
await reopenPopup(env, "settings");
|
||||
await reopenPopup(env, "#view-settings");
|
||||
|
||||
assertSelectors(
|
||||
await selectorValues(env.page),
|
||||
@@ -1253,16 +1198,9 @@ test("the theme and network selectors carry a non-default persisted value (#229)
|
||||
// fixture never customised and so are the mainnet defaults
|
||||
// src/shared/state.js starts with.
|
||||
await env.page.selectOption("#settings-theme", "system");
|
||||
await waitForPersisted(env.page, "theme", "system", "after the restore");
|
||||
await env.page.selectOption("#settings-network", "mainnet");
|
||||
await waitForPersisted(
|
||||
env.page,
|
||||
"networkId",
|
||||
"mainnet",
|
||||
"after the restore",
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
await reopenPopup(env, "settings");
|
||||
await reopenPopup(env, "#view-settings");
|
||||
|
||||
assertSelectors(
|
||||
await selectorValues(env.page),
|
||||
@@ -1287,14 +1225,8 @@ test("a spam filter toggled in Settings survives a popup reopen (#229)", async (
|
||||
immediately.checked === false,
|
||||
"clicking #" + TOGGLED_FILTER + " did not clear it",
|
||||
);
|
||||
await waitForPersisted(
|
||||
env.page,
|
||||
"hideDustTransactions",
|
||||
false,
|
||||
"after clearing #" + TOGGLED_FILTER,
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
await reopenPopup(env, "settings");
|
||||
await reopenPopup(env, "#view-settings");
|
||||
|
||||
const after = await checkboxStates(env.page);
|
||||
for (const { id } of SPAM_FILTER_CHECKBOXES) {
|
||||
@@ -1311,14 +1243,8 @@ test("a spam filter toggled in Settings survives a popup reopen (#229)", async (
|
||||
test("turning the same filter back on survives a reopen too (#229)", async (env) => {
|
||||
await openSettings(env.page);
|
||||
await env.page.click("#" + TOGGLED_FILTER);
|
||||
await waitForPersisted(
|
||||
env.page,
|
||||
"hideDustTransactions",
|
||||
true,
|
||||
"after setting #" + TOGGLED_FILTER + " again",
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
await reopenPopup(env, "settings");
|
||||
await reopenPopup(env, "#view-settings");
|
||||
|
||||
// Restores the fixture the later sections inherit, and rules out a
|
||||
// checkbox that persists "off" only because it is stuck there.
|
||||
@@ -2439,7 +2365,7 @@ test("a token whose symbol() returns markup renders as text (#307)", async (env)
|
||||
|
||||
// Close and reopen so the refresh that runs on open fetches balances
|
||||
// with the hostile symbol in them.
|
||||
await reopenPopup(env, "address");
|
||||
await reopenPopup(env, "#view-address");
|
||||
await env.page.waitForFunction(
|
||||
(addr) =>
|
||||
!!document.querySelector(
|
||||
@@ -2505,7 +2431,7 @@ test("a token whose symbol() returns markup renders as text (#307)", async (env)
|
||||
// Put the fixture back before the next test reads it, and let the
|
||||
// stored balances be rewritten with the honest symbol.
|
||||
env.routeOpts.tokenSymbolOverride = null;
|
||||
await reopenPopup(env, "main");
|
||||
await reopenPopup(env, "#view-main");
|
||||
await env.page.waitForFunction(
|
||||
(addr) => {
|
||||
const row = document.querySelector(
|
||||
@@ -2676,9 +2602,7 @@ function dappMessages(page, type) {
|
||||
|
||||
// The approval window the background opened. Approvals are raised from an
|
||||
// RPC call rather than from a user gesture, so the extension opens a real
|
||||
// popup window for them; it is an ordinary page in this context. It is the
|
||||
// first one found: the runner closes every approval window between tests, so
|
||||
// within a test it can only be this test's.
|
||||
// popup window for them; it is an ordinary page in this context.
|
||||
async function waitForApprovalWindow(ctx, timeout = 30000) {
|
||||
const deadline = Date.now() + timeout;
|
||||
for (;;) {
|
||||
@@ -2814,7 +2738,7 @@ async function closeApprovalPages(ctx) {
|
||||
// #btn-reject on the site prompt — NOT self-proving. A page that went away
|
||||
// without the click landing disconnects the approval port, the background
|
||||
// settles that as 4001, and 4001 is exactly what assertUserRejection
|
||||
// accepts. Both call sites arm the click trace below and assert it.
|
||||
// accepts. That call site arms the click trace below and asserts it.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// A button that is missing or unclickable raises a different error, which is
|
||||
// rethrown.
|
||||
@@ -3200,9 +3124,7 @@ test("a connect request from a blocklisted site is flagged (#219)", async (env)
|
||||
// Not remembered: a remembered decision for this origin would
|
||||
// outlive the test.
|
||||
await popup.uncheck("#approve-remember");
|
||||
await armClickTrace(env, popup, "#btn-reject");
|
||||
await clickAndClose(popup, "#btn-reject");
|
||||
await assertClickLanded(env, "#btn-reject");
|
||||
await popup.click("#btn-reject");
|
||||
|
||||
await assertUserRejection(
|
||||
phishingDapp,
|
||||
@@ -3635,55 +3557,6 @@ test("eth_sendTransaction rejected broadcasts nothing (#183)", async (env) => {
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// The extension used to centre every approval window on the last focused
|
||||
// window. Centred on another approval window, the new one landed where the
|
||||
// browser refused to create it, and the request failed with no window at all
|
||||
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/290).
|
||||
test("a prompt raised while another approval window has focus opens its own (#290)", async (env) => {
|
||||
await startRequest(env.dapp, "focus-sign", "personal_sign", [
|
||||
SIGN_HEX,
|
||||
env.expectedAddress,
|
||||
]);
|
||||
const signWindow = await waitForApprovalWindow(env.ctx);
|
||||
await visible(signWindow, "#view-approve-sign");
|
||||
await signWindow.bringToFront();
|
||||
const focused = await env.page.evaluate(
|
||||
() =>
|
||||
new Promise((resolve) => {
|
||||
chrome.windows.getLastFocused((w) => resolve(w.type));
|
||||
}),
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert(
|
||||
focused === "popup",
|
||||
"the sign window does not have focus, so this proves nothing: the " +
|
||||
"last focused window is a " +
|
||||
focused,
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
const opened = env.ctx.waitForEvent("page");
|
||||
await startRequest(env.dapp, "focus-tx", "eth_sendTransaction", [
|
||||
{
|
||||
from: env.expectedAddress,
|
||||
to: STUB_COUNTERPARTY,
|
||||
value: toQuantity(TX_VALUE_WEI),
|
||||
data: TX_DATA,
|
||||
},
|
||||
]);
|
||||
const txWindow = await opened.catch(async () => {
|
||||
const outcome = await settleRequest(env.dapp, "focus-tx", 1000);
|
||||
throw new Error(
|
||||
"the extension opened no window for the transaction: " +
|
||||
JSON.stringify(outcome),
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
await visible(txWindow, "#view-approve-tx");
|
||||
|
||||
// Closing a window is refusing its prompt, so both answer 4001.
|
||||
await closeApprovalPages(env.ctx);
|
||||
await assertUserRejection(env.dapp, "focus-tx", "the transaction prompt");
|
||||
await assertUserRejection(env.dapp, "focus-sign", "the sign prompt");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// The closing pass over both boundaries at once. Every message the section
|
||||
// put on either channel is re-read here and required to be free of the
|
||||
// password — and required to be there at all, method by method, so the
|
||||
@@ -4053,13 +3926,6 @@ async function main() {
|
||||
failure = e.message;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// No test starts with an approval window open. One that closes itself,
|
||||
// after a signature or on Reject, can still be closing when the next
|
||||
// test raises its prompt, and waitForApprovalWindow() would take it
|
||||
// for the new one; one a failed test left unanswered would refuse the
|
||||
// next prompt from its site.
|
||||
await closeApprovalPages(env.ctx);
|
||||
|
||||
// Any uncaught page error, console.error or unstubbed request
|
||||
// fails the test that provoked it, whether or not its assertions
|
||||
// passed. This is the mechanism that caught #150.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -57,39 +57,6 @@ describe("parseHoldersCount", () => {
|
||||
expect(parseHoldersCount("many")).toBeNull();
|
||||
expect(parseHoldersCount(NaN)).toBeNull();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// Each of these starts with a digit, so reading only the leading digits
|
||||
// would turn it into a small reported count, and a small count is
|
||||
// exactly what hides a token as spam (issue #251).
|
||||
test.each(["1,000", "0x10", "1e3", "12 holders"])(
|
||||
"%p is not read in part: it is unknown",
|
||||
(raw) => {
|
||||
expect(parseHoldersCount(raw)).toBeNull();
|
||||
},
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
test("a negative count is unknown", () => {
|
||||
expect(parseHoldersCount("-5")).toBeNull();
|
||||
expect(parseHoldersCount(-5)).toBeNull();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// A number holds a whole number exactly only up to 2^53 - 1. Past that a
|
||||
// string of digits would come back rounded, and a long enough one as
|
||||
// Infinity, which would pass every holder-count floor.
|
||||
test("a count too large for a number to hold exactly is unknown", () => {
|
||||
expect(parseHoldersCount("9007199254740993")).toBeNull();
|
||||
expect(parseHoldersCount("9".repeat(400))).toBeNull();
|
||||
expect(parseHoldersCount(2 ** 53)).toBeNull();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("the largest count a number holds exactly still parses", () => {
|
||||
expect(parseHoldersCount("9007199254740991")).toBe(
|
||||
Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER,
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(parseHoldersCount(Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER)).toBe(
|
||||
Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER,
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe("isLowHolderCount", () => {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,461 +0,0 @@
|
||||
// The native token's label on the screens that show a native amount.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// src/shared/networks.js gives each network a nativeCurrency, `ETH` on mainnet
|
||||
// and `SepoliaETH` on Sepolia, and nothing read it: every screen wrote a
|
||||
// hardcoded "ETH", so on Sepolia the balance, the value and the fee all read
|
||||
// ETH (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/372). Each line is asserted
|
||||
// on both networks, through the real Send, confirmation and approval screens,
|
||||
// with only the node and the DOM stubbed. So is that a token cannot pass for
|
||||
// the native token by reporting its label, and that a transaction's figures
|
||||
// carry its own network's label when another network is active.
|
||||
|
||||
"use strict";
|
||||
|
||||
jest.mock("ethers", () => {
|
||||
const actual = jest.requireActual("ethers");
|
||||
class StubProvider {
|
||||
async lookupAddress() {
|
||||
return null;
|
||||
}
|
||||
// 10 gwei expected, 20 gwei reserved per gas.
|
||||
async getFeeData() {
|
||||
return { maxFeePerGas: 20000000000n, gasPrice: 10000000000n };
|
||||
}
|
||||
async estimateGas() {
|
||||
return 21000n;
|
||||
}
|
||||
async getCode() {
|
||||
return "0x";
|
||||
}
|
||||
async getTransactionCount() {
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
async getTransactionReceipt() {
|
||||
return { blockNumber: 21000000 };
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return {
|
||||
...actual,
|
||||
JsonRpcProvider: StubProvider,
|
||||
Network: { from: () => ({}) },
|
||||
};
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
jest.mock("../src/shared/log", () => ({
|
||||
log: {
|
||||
debugf: () => {},
|
||||
infof: () => {},
|
||||
warnf: () => {},
|
||||
errorf: () => {},
|
||||
},
|
||||
debugFetch: jest.fn(async () => ({
|
||||
ok: true,
|
||||
status: 200,
|
||||
json: async () => ({ items: [] }),
|
||||
})),
|
||||
urlOrigin: () => "",
|
||||
setRuntimeDebug: () => {},
|
||||
isDebug: () => false,
|
||||
}));
|
||||
|
||||
// Signing a send succeeds without a key, and sending answers with a hash.
|
||||
jest.mock("../src/shared/vault", () => ({
|
||||
...jest.requireActual("../src/shared/vault"),
|
||||
decryptWithPassword: async () => "secret",
|
||||
}));
|
||||
jest.mock("../src/shared/wallet", () => ({
|
||||
...jest.requireActual("../src/shared/wallet"),
|
||||
getSignerForAddress: () => ({
|
||||
connect: () => ({
|
||||
populateTransaction: async (request) => request,
|
||||
sendTransaction: async () => ({ hash: "0x" + "3".repeat(64) }),
|
||||
}),
|
||||
}),
|
||||
}));
|
||||
|
||||
global.fetch = jest.fn(() => {
|
||||
throw new Error("tests must not perform network requests");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// The approval the background hands the approval screen. Set per test.
|
||||
let approvalDetails = null;
|
||||
|
||||
const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
|
||||
global.chrome = {
|
||||
storage: makeStorageStub(),
|
||||
runtime: {
|
||||
connect: () => ({
|
||||
postMessage() {},
|
||||
disconnect() {},
|
||||
onDisconnect: { addListener() {} },
|
||||
}),
|
||||
sendMessage(message, callback) {
|
||||
callback(
|
||||
message.type === "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL"
|
||||
? approvalDetails
|
||||
: undefined,
|
||||
);
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// A stub DOM: every id resolves to a recording element.
|
||||
const elements = new Map();
|
||||
|
||||
function makeEl(id) {
|
||||
const handlers = new Map();
|
||||
return {
|
||||
id,
|
||||
textContent: "",
|
||||
innerHTML: "",
|
||||
value: "",
|
||||
disabled: false,
|
||||
style: {},
|
||||
dataset: {},
|
||||
classList: {
|
||||
add() {},
|
||||
remove() {},
|
||||
toggle() {},
|
||||
contains: () => false,
|
||||
},
|
||||
handlers,
|
||||
children: [],
|
||||
addEventListener(name, fn) {
|
||||
handlers.set(name, fn);
|
||||
},
|
||||
appendChild(child) {
|
||||
this.children.push(child);
|
||||
return child;
|
||||
},
|
||||
querySelectorAll: () => [],
|
||||
querySelector: () => null,
|
||||
remove() {},
|
||||
focus() {},
|
||||
// Views reach for .parentElement to hide whole sections.
|
||||
get parentElement() {
|
||||
return global.document.getElementById(id + "-parent");
|
||||
},
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
global.document = {
|
||||
getElementById(id) {
|
||||
if (!elements.has(id)) elements.set(id, makeEl(id));
|
||||
return elements.get(id);
|
||||
},
|
||||
createElement: (tag) => makeEl(tag),
|
||||
body: { prepend() {}, appendChild() {} },
|
||||
addEventListener() {},
|
||||
};
|
||||
global.navigator = { clipboard: { writeText() {} } };
|
||||
|
||||
const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
|
||||
const { NETWORKS } = require("../src/shared/networks");
|
||||
const { clearPrices } = require("../src/shared/prices");
|
||||
const send = require("../src/popup/views/send");
|
||||
const confirmTx = require("../src/popup/views/confirmTx");
|
||||
const approval = require("../src/popup/views/approval");
|
||||
const transactionDetail = require("../src/popup/views/transactionDetail");
|
||||
const txStatus = require("../src/popup/views/txStatus");
|
||||
const { balanceLinesForAddress } = require("../src/popup/views/helpers");
|
||||
const { filterTransactions } = require("../src/shared/transactions");
|
||||
const { debugFetch } = require("../src/shared/log");
|
||||
|
||||
const HOLDER = "0x" + "a".repeat(40);
|
||||
const RECIPIENT = "0xC0FfEE0000000000000000000000000000c0fFEe";
|
||||
// A token contract that is not in the bundled token list.
|
||||
const TOKEN_CONTRACT = "0xd05339f9ea5ab9d9f03b9d57f671d2abd1f55c82";
|
||||
|
||||
function text(id) {
|
||||
return global.document.getElementById(id).textContent;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Press Review on the Send screen for a native send of `amount`, and show the
|
||||
// confirmation screen it leads to with its fee estimate settled.
|
||||
async function confirmSend(amount) {
|
||||
let txInfo = null;
|
||||
send.init({ showConfirmTx: (info) => (txInfo = info) });
|
||||
state.selectedToken = "ETH";
|
||||
global.document.getElementById("send-to").value = RECIPIENT;
|
||||
global.document.getElementById("send-amount").value = amount;
|
||||
await global.document
|
||||
.getElementById("btn-send-review")
|
||||
.handlers.get("click")();
|
||||
confirmTx.show(txInfo);
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 0));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The approval screen for a dApp transaction sending 0.01 of the native token
|
||||
// with 21000 gas at up to 20 gwei, on the network with `chainId`.
|
||||
async function approveTx(chainId) {
|
||||
approvalDetails = {
|
||||
type: "tx",
|
||||
origin: "https://dapp.example",
|
||||
approvedFrom: HOLDER,
|
||||
approvedTx: {
|
||||
to: RECIPIENT,
|
||||
value: "10000000000000000",
|
||||
data: "0x",
|
||||
chainId,
|
||||
gasLimit: "21000",
|
||||
maxFeePerGas: "20000000000",
|
||||
nonce: 0,
|
||||
},
|
||||
};
|
||||
await approval.show("1");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
describe.each([
|
||||
["mainnet", "ETH"],
|
||||
["sepolia", "SepoliaETH"],
|
||||
])("on %s the native token reads %s", (networkId, symbol) => {
|
||||
beforeEach(() => {
|
||||
elements.clear();
|
||||
clearPrices();
|
||||
state.networkId = networkId;
|
||||
state.wallets = [
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: "Wallet 1",
|
||||
addresses: [{ address: HOLDER, balance: "1.5" }],
|
||||
},
|
||||
];
|
||||
state.selectedWallet = 0;
|
||||
state.selectedAddress = 0;
|
||||
state.trackedTokens = [];
|
||||
state.fraudContracts = [];
|
||||
state.currentView = null;
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("the balance", async () => {
|
||||
const addr = state.wallets[0].addresses[0];
|
||||
expect(balanceLinesForAddress(addr, [], false)).toContain(
|
||||
`<span>${symbol}</span><span>1.5000</span>`,
|
||||
);
|
||||
state.selectedToken = "ETH";
|
||||
send.updateSendBalance();
|
||||
expect(text("send-balance")).toBe("Current balance: 1.5000 " + symbol);
|
||||
await confirmSend("0.1");
|
||||
expect(text("confirm-balance")).toBe("1.5000 " + symbol);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("the value", async () => {
|
||||
await confirmSend("0.1");
|
||||
expect(text("confirm-type")).toBe("Native " + symbol + " transfer");
|
||||
expect(text("confirm-amount")).toBe("0.1 " + symbol);
|
||||
await approveTx(NETWORKS[networkId].chainId);
|
||||
expect(text("approve-tx-value")).toBe("0.0100 " + symbol);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("the fee", async () => {
|
||||
await confirmSend("0.1");
|
||||
// 21000 gas at 10 gwei expected, at 20 gwei reserved.
|
||||
expect(text("confirm-fee-amount")).toBe("~0.0002 " + symbol);
|
||||
expect(text("confirm-fee-reserve")).toBe(
|
||||
"up to 0.0004 " + symbol + " reserved",
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(text("confirm-gas-error")).toContain(
|
||||
"You do not have enough " + symbol + " to pay the network fee",
|
||||
);
|
||||
await approveTx(NETWORKS[networkId].chainId);
|
||||
expect(text("approve-tx-fee")).toBe("0.0004 " + symbol);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("the contract-recipient warning", async () => {
|
||||
await confirmSend("0.1");
|
||||
expect(text("confirm-contract-warning")).toContain(
|
||||
"Sending " + symbol + " or tokens directly to a contract",
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// A token reports whatever symbol it likes. One reporting the label the
|
||||
// wallet shows its native token under, on this network or any other, is
|
||||
// a fake, exactly as one reporting `ETH` always was.
|
||||
test.each(["ETH", symbol])(
|
||||
"a token claiming %s is dropped from the history and the Send selector",
|
||||
(claim) => {
|
||||
const result = filterTransactions(
|
||||
[
|
||||
{
|
||||
hash: "0x" + "1".repeat(64),
|
||||
symbol: claim,
|
||||
contractAddress: TOKEN_CONTRACT,
|
||||
holders: 900000,
|
||||
valueGwei: null,
|
||||
isContractCall: false,
|
||||
},
|
||||
],
|
||||
{ hideSpoofedSymbols: true },
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(result.transactions).toEqual([]);
|
||||
expect(result.newFraudContracts).toEqual([TOKEN_CONTRACT]);
|
||||
|
||||
send.renderSendTokenSelect({
|
||||
address: HOLDER,
|
||||
tokenBalances: [
|
||||
{
|
||||
address: TOKEN_CONTRACT,
|
||||
symbol: claim,
|
||||
decimals: 18,
|
||||
balance: "5",
|
||||
holders: 900000,
|
||||
},
|
||||
],
|
||||
});
|
||||
expect(
|
||||
global.document.getElementById("send-token").children,
|
||||
).toEqual([]);
|
||||
},
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
// The detail screen tells the two apart by the token contract, which only
|
||||
// a token transfer has, so a token reporting the native label still reads
|
||||
// as a token transfer.
|
||||
test("the transaction detail screen's type line", () => {
|
||||
const entry = {
|
||||
hash: "0x" + "2".repeat(64),
|
||||
from: RECIPIENT,
|
||||
to: HOLDER,
|
||||
value: "1.0000",
|
||||
exactValue: "1.0",
|
||||
symbol,
|
||||
timestamp: 1790000000,
|
||||
isError: false,
|
||||
direction: "received",
|
||||
directionLabel: "Received",
|
||||
chainId: NETWORKS[networkId].chainId,
|
||||
};
|
||||
transactionDetail.show({ ...entry, contractAddress: null });
|
||||
expect(text("tx-detail-type")).toBe("Native " + symbol + " Transfer");
|
||||
transactionDetail.show({ ...entry, contractAddress: TOKEN_CONTRACT });
|
||||
expect(text("tx-detail-type")).toBe("ERC-20 Token Transfer");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("the insufficient-balance error", async () => {
|
||||
await confirmSend("2");
|
||||
expect(
|
||||
global.document.getElementById("confirm-errors").innerHTML,
|
||||
).toContain(
|
||||
"You have 1.5000 " +
|
||||
symbol +
|
||||
" but are trying to send 2 " +
|
||||
symbol +
|
||||
".",
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// A transaction's value and fee are in the native currency of the network the
|
||||
// transaction is on, which need not be the active one. A site can switch the
|
||||
// active network after its transaction is prepared and back before it is
|
||||
// signed, and a popup opened after a switch shows a sent or listed transaction
|
||||
// again. The wallet's balances follow the active network; these do not.
|
||||
describe.each([
|
||||
["mainnet", "sepolia", "ETH"],
|
||||
["sepolia", "mainnet", "SepoliaETH"],
|
||||
])(
|
||||
"a %s transaction shown with %s active reads %s",
|
||||
(txNetworkId, activeNetworkId, symbol) => {
|
||||
const chainId = NETWORKS[txNetworkId].chainId;
|
||||
const hash = "0x" + "3".repeat(64);
|
||||
|
||||
beforeEach(() => {
|
||||
elements.clear();
|
||||
clearPrices();
|
||||
state.networkId = activeNetworkId;
|
||||
state.wallets = [
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: "Wallet 1",
|
||||
addresses: [{ address: HOLDER, balance: "1.5" }],
|
||||
},
|
||||
];
|
||||
state.selectedWallet = 0;
|
||||
state.selectedAddress = 0;
|
||||
state.trackedTokens = [];
|
||||
state.fraudContracts = [];
|
||||
state.currentView = null;
|
||||
txStatus.init({ doRefreshAndRender() {} });
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
afterEach(() => {
|
||||
txStatus.endWait();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("the approval screen's value and fee", async () => {
|
||||
await approveTx(chainId);
|
||||
expect(text("approve-tx-network")).toBe(NETWORKS[txNetworkId].name);
|
||||
expect(text("approve-tx-value")).toBe("0.0100 " + symbol);
|
||||
expect(text("approve-tx-fee")).toBe("0.0004 " + symbol);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("the wait, success and error screens", async () => {
|
||||
const txInfo = {
|
||||
from: HOLDER,
|
||||
to: RECIPIENT,
|
||||
amount: "0.0100",
|
||||
token: "ETH",
|
||||
tokenSymbol: null,
|
||||
chainId,
|
||||
};
|
||||
txStatus.showWait(txInfo, hash);
|
||||
expect(text("wait-tx-summary")).toBe("0.0100 " + symbol);
|
||||
txStatus.showError(txInfo, hash, "Failed.");
|
||||
expect(text("error-tx-summary")).toBe("0.0100 " + symbol);
|
||||
// A later popup resumes the wait, and the receipt is there.
|
||||
state.viewData = {
|
||||
pendingWait: { txInfo, hash, broadcastTime: Date.now() },
|
||||
};
|
||||
txStatus.restoreWait();
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
|
||||
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 0));
|
||||
}
|
||||
expect(text("success-tx-summary")).toBe("0.0100 " + symbol);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// Sent from the Send screen on the transaction's network, then
|
||||
// resumed by a popup that opens after the active network changed.
|
||||
test("the wait screen after a send", async () => {
|
||||
state.networkId = txNetworkId;
|
||||
await confirmSend("0.1");
|
||||
confirmTx.init({});
|
||||
global.document.getElementById("confirm-tx-password").value = "pw";
|
||||
await global.document
|
||||
.getElementById("btn-confirm-send")
|
||||
.handlers.get("click")();
|
||||
expect(text("wait-tx-summary")).toBe("0.1 " + symbol);
|
||||
state.networkId = activeNetworkId;
|
||||
txStatus.restoreWait();
|
||||
expect(text("wait-tx-summary")).toBe("0.1 " + symbol);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("the transaction detail screen's type line and fee", async () => {
|
||||
debugFetch.mockImplementationOnce(async () => ({
|
||||
ok: true,
|
||||
status: 200,
|
||||
json: async () => ({ fee: { value: "21000000000000" } }),
|
||||
}));
|
||||
transactionDetail.show({
|
||||
hash,
|
||||
from: RECIPIENT,
|
||||
to: HOLDER,
|
||||
value: "1.0000",
|
||||
exactValue: "1.0",
|
||||
symbol,
|
||||
timestamp: 1790000000,
|
||||
isError: false,
|
||||
direction: "received",
|
||||
directionLabel: "Received",
|
||||
contractAddress: null,
|
||||
chainId,
|
||||
});
|
||||
expect(text("tx-detail-type")).toBe(
|
||||
"Native " + symbol + " Transfer",
|
||||
);
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
|
||||
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 0));
|
||||
}
|
||||
expect(
|
||||
global.document.getElementById("tx-detail-fee").innerHTML,
|
||||
).toContain("0.000021 " + symbol);
|
||||
});
|
||||
},
|
||||
);
|
||||
@@ -722,28 +722,6 @@ describe("the base profile the sweep corrupts", () => {
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// Home, AddressDetail and AddressToken load their transactions inside a catch
|
||||
// that only logs, so a boot that fails there still renders the view and passes
|
||||
// the tests above while none of that code runs.
|
||||
describe("the base profile loads transactions", () => {
|
||||
for (const view of ["main", "address", "address-token"]) {
|
||||
test(`on ${view} without logging a failure`, async () => {
|
||||
const consoleError = jest.spyOn(console, "error");
|
||||
try {
|
||||
await bootPopup(restoringOnto(view));
|
||||
const failures = consoleError.mock.calls
|
||||
.map((args) => args.join(" "))
|
||||
.filter((line) =>
|
||||
/loadHomeTxs failed|loadTransactions failed/.test(line),
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(failures).toEqual([]);
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
consoleError.mockRestore();
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// A field the ROUTER itself reads — the two it gates on and the two
|
||||
// hasValidAddress() indexes with. A hostile value in one of these legitimately
|
||||
// changes which view renders, so each gets its own boot per view and is held
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -423,80 +423,3 @@ describe("two wallets independently created with a colliding identity", () => {
|
||||
expect(secrets).toContain("secret-b");
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// showView() saves on every navigation without waiting, so the user can change
|
||||
// something while that save is still waiting on storage. The change is followed
|
||||
// by its own saveState(), which runs after the first save; it must be stored
|
||||
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/448).
|
||||
describe("a change made while an earlier save from the same page is running", () => {
|
||||
// Runs `change` inside the next call to `op` (the stub's get or set),
|
||||
// before that call does its work.
|
||||
function runInside(op, change) {
|
||||
const real = op.getMockImplementation();
|
||||
op.mockImplementationOnce(async (arg) => {
|
||||
change();
|
||||
return real(arg);
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
test("a network switched during the earlier save's read is stored", async () => {
|
||||
const storage = makeStorageStub({
|
||||
autistmask: { wallets: [W1], networkId: "sepolia" },
|
||||
});
|
||||
const { state, saveState, loadState } = loadPage(storage).state;
|
||||
await loadState();
|
||||
|
||||
let queued;
|
||||
runInside(storage.get, () => {
|
||||
state.networkId = "mainnet";
|
||||
queued = saveState();
|
||||
});
|
||||
state.theme = "dark";
|
||||
await saveState();
|
||||
await queued;
|
||||
|
||||
const stored = storage.read("autistmask");
|
||||
expect(stored.theme).toBe("dark");
|
||||
expect(stored.networkId).toBe("mainnet");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a wallet added during the earlier save's read is stored", async () => {
|
||||
const storage = makeStorageStub({ autistmask: { wallets: [W1] } });
|
||||
const { state, saveState, loadState } = loadPage(storage).state;
|
||||
await loadState();
|
||||
|
||||
let queued;
|
||||
runInside(storage.get, () => {
|
||||
state.wallets.push(W2);
|
||||
queued = saveState();
|
||||
});
|
||||
await saveState();
|
||||
await queued;
|
||||
|
||||
const stored = storage.read("autistmask");
|
||||
expect(stored.wallets.map((w) => w.encryptedSecret)).toEqual([
|
||||
"secret-one",
|
||||
"secret-two",
|
||||
]);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a wallet added during the earlier save's write is stored", async () => {
|
||||
const storage = makeStorageStub({ autistmask: { wallets: [W1] } });
|
||||
const { state, saveState, loadState } = loadPage(storage).state;
|
||||
await loadState();
|
||||
|
||||
let queued;
|
||||
runInside(storage.set, () => {
|
||||
state.wallets.push(W2);
|
||||
queued = saveState();
|
||||
});
|
||||
await saveState();
|
||||
await queued;
|
||||
|
||||
const stored = storage.read("autistmask");
|
||||
expect(stored.wallets.map((w) => w.encryptedSecret)).toEqual([
|
||||
"secret-one",
|
||||
"secret-two",
|
||||
]);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -148,173 +148,6 @@ describe("the destructive reset on the recovery screen", () => {
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe("a popup already open when the stored profile becomes unreadable", () => {
|
||||
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/373. The popup used to stay
|
||||
// on the wallet list with the last good balances, and only a reopen
|
||||
// reached the recovery screen.
|
||||
test("moves to the recovery screen at its next refresh", async () => {
|
||||
const env = await bootPopup(unversionedValidProfile());
|
||||
expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["main"]);
|
||||
|
||||
env.storage.write("autistmask", CORRUPT_BLOBS[0].blob);
|
||||
await env.tick();
|
||||
|
||||
expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["state-recovery"]);
|
||||
expect(env.text("state-recovery-problem").length).toBeGreaterThan(10);
|
||||
expect(env.hidden("btn-settings")).toBe(true);
|
||||
expect(env.storage.read("autistmask")).toEqual(CORRUPT_BLOBS[0].blob);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("stops the ten-second refresh", async () => {
|
||||
const env = await bootPopup(unversionedValidProfile());
|
||||
env.storage.write("autistmask", CORRUPT_BLOBS[0].blob);
|
||||
await env.tick();
|
||||
const { refreshBalances } = require("../src/shared/balances");
|
||||
const calls = refreshBalances.mock.calls.length;
|
||||
|
||||
await env.tick();
|
||||
|
||||
expect(refreshBalances).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(calls);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a later save does not clear what the user exported or typed", async () => {
|
||||
const env = await bootPopup(unversionedValidProfile());
|
||||
env.storage.write("autistmask", CORRUPT_BLOBS[2].blob);
|
||||
await env.tick();
|
||||
|
||||
await env.click("btn-state-recovery-export");
|
||||
env.node("state-recovery-reset-input").value = "erase my";
|
||||
// Such as the save of a refresh already in flight when the screen
|
||||
// went up.
|
||||
const { saveState } = require("../src/shared/state");
|
||||
await expect(saveState()).rejects.toThrow();
|
||||
await env.settle();
|
||||
|
||||
expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["state-recovery"]);
|
||||
expect(env.hidden("state-recovery-blob")).toBe(false);
|
||||
expect(env.value("state-recovery-reset-input")).toBe("erase my");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// The record can become readable again under this popup, erased from the
|
||||
// recovery screen of another window, so a save from this one can succeed.
|
||||
test("a popup opened after the record is erased elsewhere shows a screen", async () => {
|
||||
const env = await bootPopup(unversionedValidProfile());
|
||||
env.storage.write("autistmask", CORRUPT_BLOBS[0].blob);
|
||||
await env.tick();
|
||||
expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["state-recovery"]);
|
||||
|
||||
await env.storage.remove("autistmask");
|
||||
const { saveState } = require("../src/shared/state");
|
||||
await saveState();
|
||||
|
||||
const reopened = await bootPopup(env.storage.read("autistmask"));
|
||||
expect(reopened.visibleViews()).toEqual(["welcome"]);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a stored current view of the recovery screen does not blank the popup", async () => {
|
||||
const env = await bootPopup(
|
||||
unversionedValidProfile({ currentView: "state-recovery" }),
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["main"]);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a transaction wait that ends under it does not replace it", async () => {
|
||||
const env = await bootPopup(
|
||||
unversionedValidProfile({
|
||||
currentView: "wait-tx",
|
||||
viewData: {
|
||||
pendingWait: {
|
||||
hash: "0x1",
|
||||
txInfo: { to: ADDRESS, amount: "1", token: "ETH" },
|
||||
broadcastTime: Date.now(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
}),
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["wait-tx"]);
|
||||
env.storage.write("autistmask", CORRUPT_BLOBS[2].blob);
|
||||
await env.tick();
|
||||
await env.click("btn-state-recovery-export");
|
||||
env.node("state-recovery-reset-input").value = "erase my";
|
||||
|
||||
// The test provider answers no receipt lookup, and six that fail in
|
||||
// a row end the wait with an error.
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < 6; i++) await env.tick();
|
||||
|
||||
expect(env.text("error-tx-message")).toMatch(/could not be reached/);
|
||||
expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["state-recovery"]);
|
||||
expect(env.hidden("state-recovery-blob")).toBe(false);
|
||||
expect(env.value("state-recovery-reset-input")).toBe("erase my");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a storage read that fails once leaves the wallet list up", async () => {
|
||||
const env = await bootPopup(unversionedValidProfile());
|
||||
|
||||
env.storage.local.get.mockRejectedValueOnce(
|
||||
new Error("IO error: storage busy"),
|
||||
);
|
||||
await env.tick();
|
||||
|
||||
// Reported as a failed save, not mistaken for an unreadable profile.
|
||||
expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["main"]);
|
||||
expect(env.node("save-failure-banner")).not.toBeNull();
|
||||
|
||||
await env.tick();
|
||||
expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["main"]);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// The screen it replaces is left as any navigation leaves it: the rules
|
||||
// at the top of src/popup/views/showPhrase.js and exportPrivkey.js hold
|
||||
// for this way off them too.
|
||||
describe("from a screen holding a secret", () => {
|
||||
const PHRASE =
|
||||
"abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon" +
|
||||
" abandon abandon abandon abandon about";
|
||||
|
||||
afterEach(() => jest.dontMock("../src/shared/vault"));
|
||||
|
||||
test("a recovery phrase on screen is wiped", async () => {
|
||||
jest.doMock("../src/shared/vault", () => ({
|
||||
decryptWithPassword: async () => PHRASE,
|
||||
}));
|
||||
const env = await bootPopup(unversionedValidProfile());
|
||||
require("../src/popup/views/showPhrase").show(0);
|
||||
env.node("show-phrase-password").value = "password";
|
||||
await env.click("btn-show-phrase-reveal");
|
||||
expect(env.text("show-phrase-value")).toBe(PHRASE);
|
||||
|
||||
env.storage.write("autistmask", CORRUPT_BLOBS[0].blob);
|
||||
await env.tick();
|
||||
|
||||
expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["state-recovery"]);
|
||||
expect(env.text("show-phrase-value")).toBe("");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a private key still being decrypted is never written", async () => {
|
||||
let answer;
|
||||
jest.doMock("../src/shared/vault", () => ({
|
||||
decryptWithPassword: () =>
|
||||
new Promise((resolve) => {
|
||||
answer = resolve;
|
||||
}),
|
||||
}));
|
||||
const env = await bootPopup(unversionedValidProfile());
|
||||
require("../src/popup/views/exportPrivkey").show(0, 0);
|
||||
env.node("export-privkey-password").value = "password";
|
||||
const revealing = env.click("btn-export-privkey-confirm");
|
||||
|
||||
env.storage.write("autistmask", CORRUPT_BLOBS[0].blob);
|
||||
await env.tick();
|
||||
expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["state-recovery"]);
|
||||
expect(env.value("export-privkey-password")).toBe("");
|
||||
|
||||
answer(PHRASE);
|
||||
await revealing;
|
||||
expect(env.text("export-privkey-value")).toBe("");
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe("an unversioned profile that is perfectly valid", () => {
|
||||
// The upgrade case. Every install in the field is in this state, and the
|
||||
// popup must load it, not offer to wipe it.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -40,10 +40,6 @@ jest.doMock("libsodium-wrappers-sumo", () => sodium);
|
||||
jest.doMock("qrcode", () => QRCode);
|
||||
jest.doMock("ethereum-blockies-base64", () => makeBlockie);
|
||||
|
||||
// Taken before any boot replaces them; see bootPopup().
|
||||
const realSetInterval = globalThis.setInterval;
|
||||
const realClearInterval = globalThis.clearInterval;
|
||||
|
||||
const POPUP_HTML = fs.readFileSync(
|
||||
path.join(__dirname, "..", "..", "src", "popup", "index.html"),
|
||||
"utf8",
|
||||
@@ -263,12 +259,9 @@ async function bootPopup(stored, options) {
|
||||
getProvider: () => ({}),
|
||||
scanForAddresses: jest.fn(async () => []),
|
||||
}));
|
||||
// filterTransactions() answers in the real one's shape: Home,
|
||||
// AddressDetail and AddressToken read both fields, and a bare list makes
|
||||
// their transaction loading throw into a catch that only logs.
|
||||
jest.doMock("../../src/shared/transactions", () => ({
|
||||
fetchRecentTransactions: jest.fn(async () => []),
|
||||
filterTransactions: () => ({ transactions: [], newFraudContracts: [] }),
|
||||
filterTransactions: () => [],
|
||||
}));
|
||||
|
||||
const storage =
|
||||
@@ -299,20 +292,9 @@ async function bootPopup(stored, options) {
|
||||
}),
|
||||
addEventListener: () => {},
|
||||
};
|
||||
// The ten-second refresh init() starts, and a transaction wait's timers,
|
||||
// would outlive the test. So every interval is recorded rather than
|
||||
// started, clearInterval() removes it as a browser would, and tick() below
|
||||
// runs the ones still set. Put back by cleanupPopup().
|
||||
const intervals = new Map();
|
||||
let lastId = 0;
|
||||
globalThis.setInterval = (fn) => {
|
||||
lastId += 1;
|
||||
intervals.set(lastId, fn);
|
||||
return lastId;
|
||||
};
|
||||
globalThis.clearInterval = (id) => {
|
||||
intervals.delete(id);
|
||||
};
|
||||
// The 10s refresh loop init() starts would outlive the test.
|
||||
const realSetInterval = globalThis.setInterval;
|
||||
globalThis.setInterval = () => 0;
|
||||
|
||||
require("../../src/popup/index");
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -334,6 +316,8 @@ async function bootPopup(stored, options) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
await settle();
|
||||
|
||||
globalThis.setInterval = realSetInterval;
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
storage,
|
||||
document,
|
||||
@@ -353,12 +337,6 @@ async function bootPopup(stored, options) {
|
||||
for (const fn of fns) await fn();
|
||||
await settle();
|
||||
},
|
||||
// Every interval still set runs once: the ten-second refresh, and a
|
||||
// transaction wait's receipt poll and elapsed counter while one runs.
|
||||
tick: async () => {
|
||||
for (const fn of intervals.values()) await fn();
|
||||
await settle();
|
||||
},
|
||||
settle,
|
||||
// The view ids whose section is not hidden, as the audit measured them.
|
||||
visibleViews: () => {
|
||||
@@ -376,8 +354,6 @@ function cleanupPopup() {
|
||||
delete globalThis.chrome;
|
||||
delete globalThis.document;
|
||||
delete globalThis.window;
|
||||
globalThis.setInterval = realSetInterval;
|
||||
globalThis.clearInterval = realClearInterval;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
module.exports = {
|
||||
|
||||
+13
-66
@@ -1219,7 +1219,7 @@ describe("fetchRecentTransactions merge and dedup", () => {
|
||||
|
||||
test("queries only the two Blockscout endpoints for the address", async () => {
|
||||
respondWith([], []);
|
||||
await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT, "0x1");
|
||||
await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT);
|
||||
expect(debugFetch).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
|
||||
const urls = debugFetch.mock.calls.map((c) => c[0]);
|
||||
expect(urls).toContain(
|
||||
@@ -1283,7 +1283,7 @@ describe("fetchRecentTransactions merge and dedup", () => {
|
||||
],
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT, "0x1");
|
||||
const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT);
|
||||
expect(txs).toHaveLength(1);
|
||||
const merged = txs[0];
|
||||
// The received leg (the swap output) supplies the display amount.
|
||||
@@ -1320,7 +1320,7 @@ describe("fetchRecentTransactions merge and dedup", () => {
|
||||
],
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT, "0x1");
|
||||
const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT);
|
||||
expect(txs).toHaveLength(1);
|
||||
expect(txs[0].symbol).toBe("USDC");
|
||||
expect(txs[0].value).toBe("1500.5000");
|
||||
@@ -1346,7 +1346,7 @@ describe("fetchRecentTransactions merge and dedup", () => {
|
||||
});
|
||||
respondWith([], [leg("1000000"), leg("2000000")]);
|
||||
|
||||
const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT, "0x1");
|
||||
const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT);
|
||||
expect(txs).toHaveLength(1);
|
||||
// Keyed by hash plus contract, so the later leg wins.
|
||||
expect(txs[0].exactValue).toBe("2.0");
|
||||
@@ -1386,7 +1386,7 @@ describe("fetchRecentTransactions merge and dedup", () => {
|
||||
],
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT, "0x1");
|
||||
const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT);
|
||||
expect(txs.map((t) => t.symbol).sort()).toEqual(["USDC", "WETH"]);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1427,13 +1427,12 @@ describe("fetchRecentTransactions merge and dedup", () => {
|
||||
],
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT, "0x1");
|
||||
const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT);
|
||||
expect(txs).toHaveLength(1);
|
||||
expect(txs[0].symbol).toBe("USDC");
|
||||
expect(txs[0].exactValue).toBe("1.0");
|
||||
expect(txs[0].direction).toBe("sent");
|
||||
expect(txs[0].contractAddress).toBe(USDC_CONTRACT);
|
||||
expect(txs[0].chainId).toBe("0x1");
|
||||
// The surviving row is the token row, and the filters keep it.
|
||||
const kept = filterTransactions(txs, filters()).transactions;
|
||||
expect(kept).toHaveLength(1);
|
||||
@@ -1453,46 +1452,10 @@ describe("fetchRecentTransactions merge and dedup", () => {
|
||||
});
|
||||
respondWith([item(6), item(8), item(7)], []);
|
||||
|
||||
const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT, "0x1", 2);
|
||||
const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT, 2);
|
||||
expect(txs.map((t) => t.blockNumber)).toEqual([21000008, 21000007]);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/372: the caller hands in
|
||||
// the chain id of the network the explorer serves. Every entry carries
|
||||
// it, and a native entry is labelled with that network's nativeCurrency.
|
||||
test("a native entry is labelled by the chain id handed in", async () => {
|
||||
respondWith(
|
||||
[
|
||||
{
|
||||
hash: "0x" + "a".repeat(64),
|
||||
block_number: 21000090,
|
||||
timestamp: TS,
|
||||
from: { hash: ORDINARY_PEER },
|
||||
to: { hash: VICTIM, is_contract: false },
|
||||
value: "10000000000000000",
|
||||
method: null,
|
||||
status: "ok",
|
||||
},
|
||||
],
|
||||
[],
|
||||
);
|
||||
const sepolia = await fetchRecentTransactions(
|
||||
VICTIM,
|
||||
BLOCKSCOUT,
|
||||
"0xaa36a7",
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(sepolia[0].symbol).toBe("SepoliaETH");
|
||||
expect(sepolia[0].value).toBe("0.0100");
|
||||
expect(sepolia[0].chainId).toBe("0xaa36a7");
|
||||
const mainnet = await fetchRecentTransactions(
|
||||
VICTIM,
|
||||
BLOCKSCOUT,
|
||||
"0x1",
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(mainnet[0].symbol).toBe("ETH");
|
||||
expect(mainnet[0].chainId).toBe("0x1");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("the fake token transfer survives fetching and is then filtered", async () => {
|
||||
respondWith(
|
||||
[],
|
||||
@@ -1513,7 +1476,7 @@ describe("fetchRecentTransactions merge and dedup", () => {
|
||||
],
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT, "0x1");
|
||||
const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT);
|
||||
expect(txs).toHaveLength(1);
|
||||
expect(txs[0].contractAddress).toBe(FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT);
|
||||
expect(txs[0].holders).toBe(0);
|
||||
@@ -1552,31 +1515,19 @@ describe("fetchRecentTransactions merge and dedup", () => {
|
||||
|
||||
test("an omitted holders_count parses to null", async () => {
|
||||
respondWith([], spamTransferWithToken(OMITTED));
|
||||
const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(
|
||||
VICTIM,
|
||||
BLOCKSCOUT,
|
||||
"0x1",
|
||||
);
|
||||
const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT);
|
||||
expect(txs[0].holders).toBeNull();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a null holders_count parses to null", async () => {
|
||||
respondWith([], spamTransferWithToken(NULLED));
|
||||
const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(
|
||||
VICTIM,
|
||||
BLOCKSCOUT,
|
||||
"0x1",
|
||||
);
|
||||
const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT);
|
||||
expect(txs[0].holders).toBeNull();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("the transfer survives the low-holder filter", async () => {
|
||||
respondWith([], spamTransferWithToken(OMITTED));
|
||||
const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(
|
||||
VICTIM,
|
||||
BLOCKSCOUT,
|
||||
"0x1",
|
||||
);
|
||||
const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT);
|
||||
expect(filterTransactions(txs, filters()).transactions).toEqual(
|
||||
txs,
|
||||
);
|
||||
@@ -1588,11 +1539,7 @@ describe("fetchRecentTransactions merge and dedup", () => {
|
||||
// holder count is the only rule that can catch it.
|
||||
test('a reported holders_count of "0" still parses to 0 and is filtered', async () => {
|
||||
respondWith([], spamTransferWithToken(ZERO));
|
||||
const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(
|
||||
VICTIM,
|
||||
BLOCKSCOUT,
|
||||
"0x1",
|
||||
);
|
||||
const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT);
|
||||
expect(txs[0].holders).toBe(0);
|
||||
expect(filterTransactions(txs, filters()).transactions).toEqual([]);
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -1608,7 +1555,7 @@ describe("fetchRecentTransactions merge and dedup", () => {
|
||||
},
|
||||
}));
|
||||
await expect(
|
||||
fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT, "0x1"),
|
||||
fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT),
|
||||
).resolves.toEqual([]);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -554,33 +554,6 @@ describe("uniswap decoder", () => {
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("shows the deadline as a UTC date and time", () => {
|
||||
const result = uniswap.decode(FIRST_SWAP_CALLDATA, ROUTER_ADDR);
|
||||
expect(detail(result, "Deadline").value).toBe("2026-02-27 08:25:51");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// A JavaScript date cannot hold this deadline. It used to make the whole
|
||||
// swap undecoded.
|
||||
test("a deadline of the uint256 maximum is stated in words", () => {
|
||||
const data = buildExecute(
|
||||
"0x08", // V2_SWAP_EXACT_IN
|
||||
[
|
||||
encodeV2SwapExactIn(USER_ADDR, 1000000n, 500000000000000n, [
|
||||
USDT_ADDR,
|
||||
WETH_ADDR,
|
||||
]),
|
||||
],
|
||||
2n ** 256n - 1n,
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
const result = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER_ADDR);
|
||||
expect(result).not.toBeNull();
|
||||
expect(result.name).toBe("Swap USDT \u2192 WETH");
|
||||
expect(detail(result, "Deadline").value).toBe(
|
||||
"After 275760-09-13 00:00:00 (no deadline in practice)",
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("formats permit amount when not unlimited", () => {
|
||||
const data = buildExecute(
|
||||
"0x0a",
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user