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329f3e1558 build: run the browser e2e suites in CI (closes #259)
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e2e / e2e-chrome (push) Successful in 51s
e2e / e2e-firefox (push) Successful in 20s
Nothing automatic ran either e2e suite, so every browser-level guarantee in this
wallet -- WebAssembly under the shipped CSP, the recovery-phrase and private-key
DOM wipes, the ConfirmTx spend gate, the dApp approval round trips -- held only
when a human or an agent remembered to run it by hand.

.gitea/workflows/e2e.yml adds two jobs, e2e-chrome and e2e-firefox, one per
browser so a Chrome failure cannot hide the Firefox result. They are separate
from the check workflow: REPO_POLICIES.md caps make test at 20 seconds and
script/cibuild is a docker build whose Dockerfile runs make check, so neither the
cap nor the local fast path is touched. make check is byte-for-byte unchanged.

Neither suite could run on the runner as it stood, and the reason is not
docker-in-docker. The runner executes a job inside a container against the HOST's
docker daemon, and the job's checkout lives on a docker volume rather than a host
path, so `docker run -v "$PWD:/work"` is resolved by the host, silently succeeds
and mounts an empty directory -- measured on this runner. The runner image's node
is also too old to install this repo's dependencies. Both suites therefore ship
the repo to the daemon as a build context and build the extension inside the
pinned image, which leaves docker as the only prerequisite on a runner or a
laptop. The suites themselves are unchanged; only how the repo reaches the
container is.

Both scripts now build with --iidfile and run the image by ID rather than by tag,
so two clones running a suite at once on the same host cannot swap it under each
other.

The jobs report, they do not gate. Whether a check blocks a merge is Gitea branch
protection, which this repo does not configure, so a failure is a red mark a
reviewer must account for. Nothing can pass vacuously: no continue-on-error, no
`|| true`, and both scripts exit non-zero when docker is missing, when the image
build fails and when the browser fails to start.

Wiring this up measured something that has to be said rather than absorbed: the
Chrome suite is flaky under load. Two of six runs of unmutated code on a loaded
machine lost the approval popup out from under the dApp signing wait. It is
filed as #287 and not papered over here -- no retry wrapper, no longer timeout,
no weakened assertion -- and it is the reason e2e-chrome cannot become a
required check yet. README and the workflow say so where a reader meets them.
2026-08-14 04:23:39 +00:00
0be20d7270 fix: render the view "Back" lands on after the popup is reopened (closes #268)
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2026-08-14 06:14:09 +02:00
9dcd875dd4 fix: carry EIP-1193 error codes through to the page (closes #274)
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The provider rebuilt every rejection as a bare Error carrying only a message,
so a dApp checking err.code === 4001 saw undefined and could not tell a user's
deliberate refusal from a failure. Well-behaved sites therefore showed an error
or retried instead of accepting the refusal. The code was produced correctly
and did cross the extension boundary; it was lost in the last hop.

Rejections now reach the page as a ProviderRpcError carrying code, and data
where present. The code is passed through verbatim rather than matched against
a whitelist, so a code added upstream later needs no change here. An error that
genuinely has no code stays a plain Error with no code property at all, rather
than advertising code: undefined -- 'code' in err is what a careful dApp asks.

Messages are unchanged for every path, verified byte-for-byte against the
previous provider across every background error shape.

The end-to-end assertion that printed the observed code now requires it.
2026-08-12 13:47:33 +02:00
c755a5e944 fix: a shared ticker no longer hides one of its two real tokens (closes #276)
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check / check (push) Successful in 33s
Seven bundled tokens were filtered as spoofs at their own address, so a user
holding FRAX, TON, REUSD, EURE, MSUSD, MUSD or JPYC could not see or spend the
one the wallet happened not to pick.

The known-symbol table is derived from the bundled token list, first-wins in
market-cap order, so a symbol that appears twice silently condemned its second
contract. Both are real tokens from the same fetch and neither is stale --
three pairs are one issuer's old and new contract, four are unrelated issuers
sharing a ticker. Picking a winner would have been guessing, and dropping the
ambiguous symbols would have ended spoof filtering for those tickers entirely.

The table now maps a symbol to the set of addresses that legitimately bear it.
A contract outside the set is still a spoof, so the check is not weakened: a
third contract bearing any of the seven shared tickers is refused, and that is
tested. The filter decides what is fake, not what is worth holding, so a legacy
contract stays in the set -- it still holds real balances.

A test walks the whole bundled list asserting no token is filtered at its own
address, which is the guard whose absence let this ship.
2026-08-12 13:31:55 +02:00
d5595c0151 test: drive the EIP-1193 dApp approval round trips in the browser (closes #183)
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The dApp signing path was the largest unverified surface in the milestone: the
only place where the content script, the inpage provider, the background worker
and the popup all have to work together, with unit tests covering each side in
isolation and none covering the seam.

A page served by the harness speaks EIP-1193 to the real provider -- asserted by
EIP-6963 object identity, not by shape -- and eth_requestAccounts, personal_sign,
eth_signTypedData_v4 and eth_sendTransaction are each driven through to approval
and to rejection.

Every signature is recovered and compared to the approved address; the broadcast
transaction is parsed from the bytes captured at eth_sendRawTransaction and
checked for signer, recipient, value, calldata and chain. A signature that
merely came back would pass against a wrong key, a wrong message or a wrong
chain, so each assertion was demonstrated failing against a variant that is
wrong in exactly one of those ways.

The password is asserted absent from every message crossing the extension
boundary, which gives #157's fix a permanent floor rather than a one-time
review.

Two defects this surfaced are tracked separately: EIP-1193 error codes never
reach the page (#274), and approving a site connection races the popup teardown
(#275). Neither is asserted as correct here. A real dApp with real funds against
mainnet remains an uncovered human pass and is documented as such.
2026-08-12 13:23:57 +02:00
19 changed files with 2694 additions and 168 deletions

49
.gitea/workflows/e2e.yml Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
name: e2e
on: [push]
# The browser end-to-end suites, one job per browser, deliberately kept out
# of the check workflow: REPO_POLICIES.md caps make test at 20 seconds and
# script/cibuild is a plain `docker build .` whose Dockerfile runs
# make check, so folding a browser suite into either would blow that cap
# and slow the local fast path. Before this workflow every browser-level
# guarantee in this repo held only when a human remembered to run it.
#
# One job per browser rather than two steps in one job, so a Chrome failure
# does not hide the Firefox result.
#
# Each job is one script and nothing else. Both scripts need docker and
# nothing else — they deliver the repo to the daemon as a build context and
# build the extension inside the pinned image — which is what makes them
# runnable here at all: the runner executes the job in a container against
# the host's docker socket, so a `-v "$PWD:/work"` source path is resolved
# by the host daemon and mounts an empty directory, and the runner image's
# node is too old to install this repo's dependencies.
#
# These jobs REPORT, they do not gate. Whether a check blocks a merge is
# Gitea branch protection, which this repo does not configure, so a failure
# here is a red mark a reviewer has to account for rather than a hard
# block. Making e2e-chrome a required check is blocked on the measured
# flake in the dApp signing wait -- two of six runs of unmutated code on a
# loaded machine -- tracked as
# https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/287. A gate that fails at
# random teaches people to merge past red.
#
# Nothing here may pass vacuously. There is no continue-on-error and no
# `|| true`. Both scripts exit non-zero when docker is missing, when the
# image build fails, and when the browser fails to start; the Chrome
# harness aborts the suite outright if its network interception is not in
# effect.
jobs:
e2e-chrome:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
# actions/checkout v4.2.2, 2026-02-22
- uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683
- run: script/test-e2e
e2e-firefox:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
# actions/checkout v4.2.2, 2026-02-22
- uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683
- run: script/test-e2e-firefox

106
README.md
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@@ -83,10 +83,11 @@ provide:
git pre-commit hook
- `script/projectname` — print the project name (used for the Docker image tag)
- `script/test` — run the test suite (jest)
- `script/test-e2e` — run the Chrome browser end-to-end suite (docker required;
see [End-to-End Tests](#end-to-end-tests))
- `script/test-e2e-firefox` — run the Firefox browser end-to-end suite (docker
required; builds its own pinned image, see
- `script/test-e2e` — run the Chrome browser end-to-end suite (docker is the
only prerequisite: it builds a pinned image that carries the repo and a fresh
extension build, see [End-to-End Tests](#end-to-end-tests))
- `script/test-e2e-firefox` — run the Firefox browser end-to-end suite (same,
against an image with a pinned Firefox and geckodriver, see
[End-to-End Tests](#end-to-end-tests))
- `script/lint` — run the linter
- `script/fmt` — format all files (writes)
@@ -136,11 +137,12 @@ are outside `make check`.
`make test-e2e` builds `dist/chrome/` and drives the **real popup in a real
Chrome**, loaded as an unpacked MV3 extension inside a pinned
`mcr.microsoft.com/playwright` container (pinned by digest in `script/test-e2e`;
docker is required and the suite fails loudly rather than skipping if it is
unavailable). The suite lives in `tests/e2e/` and is driven by
`playwright-core`, whose version must stay matched to the container's Playwright
version — the browsers ship inside the image.
`mcr.microsoft.com/playwright` container (pinned by digest in
`tests/e2e/Dockerfile`, which is also where the extension is built; docker is
required and the suite fails loudly rather than skipping if it is unavailable).
The suite lives in `tests/e2e/` and is driven by `playwright-core`, whose
version must stay matched to the container's Playwright version — the browsers
ship inside the image.
It covers popup load, WebAssembly compilation under the shipped CSP (see
[Content Security Policy](#content-security-policy)), wallet creation through
@@ -169,6 +171,34 @@ reserve while sitting on the same side of the estimate, so swapping the two in
what [#154](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/154) was, and it was
previously correct by reading only.
It also covers the **dApp approval round trips** — the one place where the
content script, the inpage provider, the background worker and the approval
popup all have to work together. A local test page is served by the route
handler on a reserved-TLD origin, gets `window.ethereum` from the shipped
`MAIN`-world content script like any other page, and drives
`eth_requestAccounts`, `personal_sign`, `eth_signTypedData_v4` and
`eth_sendTransaction` through the real prompts. Every signature is recovered in
the runner and compared against the active address, the transaction assertions
run against the raw signed transaction captured at `eth_sendRawTransaction`
rather than against anything the extension reported, rejecting each prompt is
required to return a rejection to the page rather than hang or resolve, and the
password is required to be absent from every message the approval window sends
to the background — with the message that would carry it required to be present,
so that check cannot pass by observing nothing. That last one is the standing
floor under [#157](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/157).
Three limits of that coverage, none of them papered over. The RPC is stubbed
throughout, so this is **not** a real dApp against a real network with real
funds; that remains a human pass before 1.0.0. The site-connection prompt is
raised through `chrome.action.openPopup()`, and headless Chromium's
browser-action popup is not a page Playwright can see or click, so that one
prompt is driven at the URL the extension itself puts on the action — the same
page and the same approval id, but whether a real toolbar click shows it is not
observable here. And the EIP-1193 error code does not survive the last hop: the
rejection that crosses the boundary carries code 4001 and is asserted to, but
`src/content/inpage.js` rebuilds it as `new Error(message)`, so the calling page
catches an error with no `code` property.
Any test that drives a failure path on purpose declares the `console.error` it
is about to provoke, via `errors.expect()`. That is not a mute: the declaration
consumes exactly one matching record, and a declaration nothing matched fails
@@ -292,9 +322,46 @@ Two limits are worth knowing, both real differences from the Chrome suite:
Neither `make test-e2e` nor `make test-e2e-firefox` is part of `make check` or
`make test`. `REPO_POLICIES.md` caps `make test` at 20 seconds and a browser
suite does not fit; nothing in `tests/e2e/` is named `*.test.js`, so jest cannot
pick it up either. Neither is wired into the Gitea workflow yet —
docker-in-docker in CI is a separate question. Run them locally before changing
anything under `src/popup/views/`.
pick it up either. Run them locally before changing anything under
`src/popup/views/`.
### In CI
`.gitea/workflows/e2e.yml` runs both suites on every push, as two jobs —
`e2e-chrome` and `e2e-firefox` — separate from the `check` workflow, so the
20-second `make test` cap and the local fast path are untouched. Each job is a
checkout and the matching `script/` entrypoint, nothing else.
Docker is the only thing either job needs from the runner, and that is not an
accident. The runner executes a job inside a container against the **host's**
docker daemon, so a `docker run -v "$PWD:/work"` source path is resolved by the
host and mounts an empty directory, and the runner image's node is too old to
install this repo's dependencies. Both suites therefore ship the repo to the
daemon as a build context and build the extension inside the image, which works
identically on a laptop.
The jobs **report, they do not gate.** A failure is a red mark against the
commit that a reviewer has to account for, not a hard block: whether a check
blocks a merge is Gitea branch protection, which this repo does not configure.
That is not only a statement about configuration. The Chrome suite is
**measurably flaky under load** — two of six runs of unmutated code on a busy
machine lost the approval popup out from under the dApp signing wait, always in
the `#183` section, tracked as
[#287](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/287). So a red `e2e-chrome`
has to be read before it is believed, and that flake is the blocker to ever
making this a required check. Do not answer it with a retry wrapper: a suite
that reruns until it is green stops being evidence.
Nothing in either job can pass vacuously. There is no `continue-on-error` and no
`|| true`; both scripts exit non-zero when docker is missing, when the image
build fails, and when the browser fails to start; the Chrome harness aborts the
suite outright if its network interception is not in effect.
Measured on this repo's runner: `e2e-chrome` about 1m55s cold, almost all of it
the one-time pull of the pinned ~800MB Playwright layer, and well under a minute
once that layer is cached. `e2e-firefox` about 1m05s cold, and it caches its
Firefox and geckodriver downloads the same way.
## Rationale
@@ -610,6 +677,21 @@ ExportPrivKey and ShowRecoveryPhrase — are deliberately absent from that list,
so the popup can never reopen onto one of them with no password prompt in front
of it.
A reopened popup renders the wallet list and the one screen it restores onto,
and nothing else, so every screen on the stack behind that one is still the
blank template from `index.html`. "Back" therefore renders its target rather
than only unhiding it, through the same dispatch and data guards as the restore
(`src/popup/viewRouter.js`), and falls back to Home when the state the target
would render is gone.
It renders only a screen this page load has not rendered yet. Forward navigation
renders as it goes, and `viewRouter.js` records every screen that reaches
`showView()`, so "Back" onto a screen already on the page unhides it and nothing
more — rendering it a second time would re-fetch and overwrite what it holds,
such as an edit typed into Settings and not yet saved. Home is the one screen
"Back" always re-renders, so the wallet list reflects anything that changed
while the user was away from it.
Every screen that holds secret material in the page registers a cleanup with
`onViewLeave()` (`src/popup/views/helpers.js`), which `showView()` runs on every
exit from that screen rather than only on its "Back" button, so nothing secret

81
TODO.md
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@@ -33,7 +33,8 @@ The backlog lives on the
authoritative; this file does not duplicate it. Full policy file set present.
Real-browser end-to-end suites (`make test-e2e` for Chrome,
`make test-e2e-firefox` for Firefox) now sit alongside `make check`, which
cannot see a runtime `ReferenceError` in a popup view.
cannot see a runtime `ReferenceError` in a popup view, and
`.gitea/workflows/e2e.yml` runs both of them on every push.
# Next Step
@@ -45,6 +46,80 @@ undefined identifiers, which is how
# Completed Steps
- 2026-08-14: CI runs the browser end-to-end suites. `.gitea/workflows/e2e.yml`
runs `script/test-e2e` and `script/test-e2e-firefox` as two jobs on every
push, separate from `check`, so `make check` and its 20-second `make test` cap
are untouched. Every browser-level guarantee in this repo — the WASM-under-CSP
check, the recovery-phrase and private-key DOM wipes, the ConfirmTx spend
gate, the dApp approval round trips — was enforced only when a human
remembered to run it by hand. The suites could not run on the runner as they
stood: the runner executes a job in a container against the host's docker
daemon, so `docker run -v "$PWD:/work"` mounts an empty directory (measured),
and the runner image's node cannot install this repo's dependencies. Both
suites now ship the repo to the daemon as a build context and build the
extension inside the pinned image, so docker is the only prerequisite on a
runner or a laptop, and both run the image by ID rather than by tag so
concurrent clones cannot swap it. The jobs report rather than gate — this repo
configures no branch protection, and the Chrome suite is measurably flaky
under load, filed as [#287](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/287)
rather than papered over
([#259](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/259)).
- 2026-08-12: EIP-1193 error codes now reach the page. `src/content/inpage.js`
rebuilt every failure as `new Error(error.message)`, so the code the
background produced and the content script relayed intact was dropped in the
last hop and a dApp checking `err.code === 4001` saw `undefined` — a wallet
the user deliberately declined was indistinguishable from one that broke. The
provider now rejects with a `ProviderRpcError` carrying `code` and, where the
boundary sent one, `data`, passed through verbatim rather than matched against
a list, so 4001, 4100 and 4902 all arrive and a future code needs no edit
here. An error the background sent with no code stays a plain `Error` with no
`code` property, and `message` is unchanged in every case. All four request
entry points (`request`, `enable`, `send`, `sendAsync`) are covered by
`tests/inpageErrors.test.js`, and the e2e probe that printed the missing code
now requires it on the page's Error as well as on the wire, for all four
rejected flows ([#274](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/274)).
- 2026-08-12: "Back" now renders the screen it lands on instead of only unhiding
it. A reopened popup renders the wallet list and the one screen it restores
onto, so every screen further down the stack was still the blank template from
`index.html`, and Back walked straight onto it — an empty address, no
balances, no QR code. The Back path now goes through the same per-view
dispatch and data guards as the restore (`src/popup/viewRouter.js`, shared
with `restoreView()`), falling back to Home when the state the target would
render is gone. It renders only a view this page load has not rendered yet:
`viewRouter.js` records every view that reaches `showView()`, which is where
forward navigation and the restore both end, so Back onto a view already on
the page unhides it and nothing more. That is what keeps a second render from
re-fetching and overwriting what the view holds — an unsaved edit in Settings,
a transaction list already loaded. Home is the exception and is always
re-rendered, as it was before. Covered by unit tests on the real `goBack()`
and by three end-to-end cases against the real popup, each demonstrated
failing on the unfixed build
([#268](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/268)).
- 2026-08-12: `KNOWN_SYMBOLS` now maps a symbol to the set of contract addresses
that bear it, not to one of them. A ticker is not unique: seven of the 512
bundled tokens — `FRAX`, `REUSD`, `TON`, `EURE`, `MSUSD`, `MUSD` and `JPYC`
share a symbol with another bundled entry at a different real contract, and
the table, built from the list first-wins, kept only the earlier one. The
other seven were judged spoofs of their own symbol at their own address and
hidden from the balance list, the history and the send selector, so a holder
could not spend them. Both contracts of each pair come from the same CoinGecko
fetch of 2026-02-27, so neither was stale and neither was dropped.
`isSpoofedSymbol()` asks set membership instead of equality, which does not
loosen the rule — a contract outside the set is still a spoof — and a test now
walks `TOKENS` asserting no bundled token is filtered at its own address,
which is the walk the suite lacked
([#276](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/276)).
- 2026-08-12: The dApp approval round trips are driven end to end in the
browser. A test page served by the harness speaks EIP-1193 to the real inpage
provider through the real content script, background worker and approval popup
for `eth_requestAccounts`, `personal_sign`, `eth_signTypedData_v4` and
`eth_sendTransaction`. Every signature is recovered and compared against the
active address, the transaction is checked against the bytes handed to the
stubbed RPC, each rejection must reach the page as a rejection, and the
password must appear in no message the approval window sends — the assertion
that gives [#157](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/157) a permanent
floor. This does not discharge a real dApp with real funds against mainnet
([#183](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/183)).
- 2026-08-12: The known-symbol spoof rule now judges the symbol a user actually
sees. `isSpoofedSymbol()` normalizes before the lookup — NFKC, then every
character that paints nothing removed (the format and default-ignorable
@@ -312,9 +387,5 @@ tracker.
- Pre-1.0 security review of the extension (key handling, DEBUG mode policy, RPC
input validation) before any 1.0rc tag. Individual filed issues are parts of
it, but the review is broader than any of them.
- Decide whether docker-in-docker makes `make test-e2e` and
`make test-e2e-firefox` runnable in the Gitea workflow. Extending the Chrome
suite itself is tracked as
[#183](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/183).
- Cut 1.0.0 once the milestone is empty, then continue tagging as milestones
land.

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@@ -7,17 +7,29 @@
# caps make test at 20 seconds and a browser suite does not fit. Run it
# yourself before touching popup views; it is the only check that can see
# a used-but-not-imported identifier blow up at runtime.
# .gitea/workflows/e2e.yml also runs it on every push, in a job separate
# from check so that cap and the local fast path both stay intact.
#
# Docker is the only prerequisite. The repo reaches the container as a
# build context and the extension is built inside it (see
# tests/e2e/Dockerfile), so nothing here depends on the node, yarn or make
# on the machine that starts the run. That is not a convenience: a bind
# mount cannot work under Gitea Actions, and the runner image's node is too
# old to install this repo's dependencies.
set -eu
ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd -P)"
ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/.." && pwd -P)"
# mcr.microsoft.com/playwright:v1.56.0-noble, 2026-08-09
#
# The playwright-core devDependency is pinned to the matching Playwright
# version (1.56.0) and the two must be bumped together: the browsers ship
# inside this image, and playwright-core looks for the exact browser
# revision its own version expects. A mismatch fails at launch.
IMAGE="mcr.microsoft.com/playwright@sha256:35246d87a7c88ea9b771c65d33171b2611b02a8253b4b12ce6f94376c55f99f2"
IMAGE="$("$SCRIPT_DIR/projectname")-e2e-chrome"
IIDFILE=""
cleanup() {
if [ -n "$IIDFILE" ]; then
rm -f "$IIDFILE"
fi
}
main() {
cd "$ROOT"
@@ -27,14 +39,23 @@ main() {
exit 1
fi
echo "Building extension for e2e..."
yarn run build 2>&1
IIDFILE="$(mktemp)"
trap cleanup EXIT
trap 'cleanup; exit 130' INT TERM
echo "Building the Chrome e2e image (extension included)..."
docker build --iidfile "$IIDFILE" -t "$IMAGE" -f tests/e2e/Dockerfile .
echo "Running e2e suite in the pinned Playwright container..."
# The image is run by ID, not by tag: where two clones of this repo run
# the suite at once, the other build can move the tag between this
# build and this run, and the suite would then silently test the other
# checkout.
#
# --ipc=host: Chromium's shared-memory needs more than the default
# 64MB /dev/shm or renderers crash.
# --user: keep files the suite touches owned by the caller, not root.
# HOME=/tmp: the mapped uid has no home directory in the image.
# HOME=/tmp: the image's root home is not a reliable place for the
# browser profile.
# PW_EXPERIMENTAL_SERVICE_WORKER_NETWORK_EVENTS=1: without it,
# ctx.route() intercepts page requests only, and every fetch made by
# the MV3 background service worker — including the phishing
@@ -51,13 +72,10 @@ main() {
# on a deliberate bump.
docker run --rm \
--ipc=host \
--user "$(id -u):$(id -g)" \
-e HOME=/tmp \
-e PW_EXPERIMENTAL_SERVICE_WORKER_NETWORK_EVENTS=1 \
-e "E2E_TRACE_NETWORK=${E2E_TRACE_NETWORK:-0}" \
-v "$ROOT:/work" \
-w /work \
"$IMAGE" \
"$(cat "$IIDFILE")" \
node tests/e2e/run.js
}

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@@ -5,12 +5,17 @@
#
# Deliberately NOT called by script/check or script/test, for the same
# reason as the Chrome suite: REPO_POLICIES.md caps make test at 20 seconds
# and a browser suite does not fit.
# and a browser suite does not fit. .gitea/workflows/e2e.yml also runs it
# on every push, in a job separate from check.
#
# Unlike script/test-e2e this builds its image locally, because no
# Unlike script/test-e2e this builds its base image locally, because no
# published image carries both a pinned Firefox and a matching geckodriver.
# All three external artifacts are pinned by digest inside the Dockerfile;
# see tests/e2e/firefox/Dockerfile.
# see tests/e2e/firefox/Dockerfile, which also explains why the repo and
# the extension build are baked into the image rather than mounted.
#
# Docker is the only prerequisite: nothing here depends on the node, yarn
# or make on the machine that starts the run.
set -eu
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd -P)"
@@ -18,6 +23,14 @@ ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/.." && pwd -P)"
IMAGE="$("$SCRIPT_DIR/projectname")-e2e-firefox"
IIDFILE=""
cleanup() {
if [ -n "$IIDFILE" ]; then
rm -f "$IIDFILE"
fi
}
main() {
cd "$ROOT"
@@ -26,16 +39,20 @@ main() {
exit 1
fi
echo "Building extension for e2e..."
yarn run build 2>&1
IIDFILE="$(mktemp)"
trap cleanup EXIT
trap 'cleanup; exit 130' INT TERM
# The build context is tests/e2e/firefox/ and holds nothing but the
# Dockerfile: the harness itself arrives over the bind mount below, so
# editing it never invalidates an image layer.
echo "Building the pinned Firefox e2e image..."
docker build -t "$IMAGE" "$ROOT/tests/e2e/firefox"
echo "Building the pinned Firefox e2e image (extension included)..."
docker build --iidfile "$IIDFILE" -t "$IMAGE" \
-f tests/e2e/firefox/Dockerfile .
echo "Running the Firefox e2e suite..."
# The image is run by ID, not by tag: where two clones of this repo run
# the suite at once, the other build can move the tag between this
# build and this run, and the suite would then silently test the other
# checkout.
#
# --shm-size=1g: Firefox needs more than the default 64MB /dev/shm.
# --network none: the suite stubs nothing, so this is what keeps the
# run offline and deterministic. The extension swallows its own
@@ -43,8 +60,8 @@ main() {
# network note in README.md. Weaker than the Chrome suite's
# fixture interception, and honestly so — it proves no request
# escaped, but it cannot report which ones were attempted.
# --user: keep files the suite touches owned by the caller, not root.
# HOME=/tmp: the mapped uid has no home directory in the image.
# HOME=/tmp: the image's root home is not a reliable place for the
# browser profile.
#
# No --privileged. Firefox's sandbox logs
# "CanCreateUserNamespace() clone() failure: EPERM" on startup here;
@@ -52,11 +69,8 @@ main() {
docker run --rm \
--shm-size=1g \
--network none \
--user "$(id -u):$(id -g)" \
-e HOME=/tmp \
-v "$ROOT:/work" \
-w /work \
"$IMAGE" \
"$(cat "$IIDFILE")" \
node tests/e2e/firefox/run.js dist/firefox
}

View File

@@ -11,6 +11,39 @@
let nextId = 1;
const pending = {};
// EIP-1193 ProviderRpcError: `code`, `message`, optional `data`. A class
// rather than properties bolted onto an Error because this object crosses
// no boundary after construction — it is built in the page's own realm and
// handed straight to the caller's catch — so the prototype survives and
// `error.name` is a stable thing for a dApp to see.
class ProviderRpcError extends Error {
constructor(code, message, data) {
super(message);
this.name = "ProviderRpcError";
this.code = code;
if (data !== undefined) this.data = data;
}
}
// Rebuild a boundary error as the error the page catches, carrying the
// code (and data) the extension reported. Without this a dApp cannot tell
// a user's refusal (4001) from a wallet that broke, and retries or shows
// an error instead of accepting the refusal.
//
// Whatever code arrived is passed through verbatim rather than being
// matched against a list: the extension emits 4001, 4100 and 4902 today,
// and a code this file has never heard of is still the truth about what
// happened. An error reported with no code at all stays a plain Error —
// a ProviderRpcError whose `code` is undefined would advertise a
// conformance it does not have. `message` is untouched in every case.
function toPageError(error) {
const message = (error && error.message) || "Request failed";
if (error && error.code !== undefined && error.code !== null) {
return new ProviderRpcError(error.code, message, error.data);
}
return new Error(message);
}
// Listen for responses from the content script
window.addEventListener("message", function onUuid(event) {
if (event.source !== window) return;
@@ -20,7 +53,7 @@
if (!p) return;
delete pending[id];
if (error) {
p.reject(new Error(error.message || "Request failed"));
p.reject(toPageError(error));
} else {
p.resolve(result);
}

View File

@@ -9,16 +9,17 @@ const {
$,
showView,
updateDebugBanner,
setRenderMain,
setBackRenderer,
pushCurrentView,
goBack,
clearViewStack,
} = require("./views/helpers");
const { applyTheme } = require("./theme");
// Views that can be fully re-rendered from persisted state. All others fall
// back to the nearest restorable parent; see the module for why the
// secret-bearing views are absent.
const { RESTORABLE_VIEWS } = require("./restorableViews");
// Renders a view the popup lands on without having navigated to it forward:
// on restore here, and on Back. Only the views that can be fully re-rendered
// from persisted state (RESTORABLE_VIEWS, src/popup/restorableViews.js) go
// through it; anything else falls back to the nearest restorable parent.
const { renderView, makeBackRenderer } = require("./viewRouter");
const home = require("./views/home");
const welcome = require("./views/welcome");
@@ -108,91 +109,22 @@ const ctx = {
},
};
function needsAddress(view) {
return (
view === "address" ||
view === "address-token" ||
view === "receive" ||
view === "transaction"
);
}
function hasValidAddress() {
return (
state.selectedWallet !== null &&
state.selectedAddress !== null &&
state.wallets[state.selectedWallet] &&
state.wallets[state.selectedWallet].addresses[state.selectedAddress]
);
}
// The view modules the router renders through, keyed as it expects them.
const viewModules = {
main: { show: () => fallbackView() },
addressDetail,
addressToken,
receive,
settings,
settingsAddToken,
confirmTx,
transactionDetail,
txStatus,
};
function restoreView() {
const view = state.currentView;
if (!view || !RESTORABLE_VIEWS.has(view)) {
return fallbackView();
}
if (needsAddress(view) && !hasValidAddress()) {
return fallbackView();
}
if (view === "address-token" && !state.selectedToken) {
return fallbackView();
}
switch (view) {
case "address":
addressDetail.show();
break;
case "address-token":
addressToken.show();
break;
case "receive":
receive.show();
break;
case "settings":
settings.show();
break;
case "settings-addtoken":
settingsAddToken.show();
break;
case "confirm-tx":
if (state.viewData && state.viewData.pendingTx) {
confirmTx.restore();
} else {
fallbackView();
}
break;
case "transaction":
if (state.viewData && state.viewData.tx) {
transactionDetail.render();
} else {
fallbackView();
}
break;
case "wait-tx":
// Resumes the receipt poll from the persisted broadcast time.
if (!txStatus.restoreWait()) {
fallbackView();
}
break;
case "success-tx":
if (state.viewData && state.viewData.hash) {
txStatus.renderSuccess();
} else {
fallbackView();
}
break;
case "error-tx":
if (state.viewData && state.viewData.message) {
txStatus.renderError();
} else {
fallbackView();
}
break;
default:
fallbackView();
break;
if (!renderView(state.currentView, state, viewModules)) {
fallbackView();
}
}
@@ -247,7 +179,7 @@ async function init() {
settings.show();
});
setRenderMain(renderWalletList);
setBackRenderer(makeBackRenderer(state, viewModules));
welcome.init(ctx);
addWallet.init(ctx);

167
src/popup/viewRouter.js Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
// Rendering a view the popup lands on without having navigated to it
// forward: on restore, and on Back. In both cases the view may never have
// been rendered in this page load — a reopened popup renders only the
// wallet list and the view it restores onto, so every other view is still
// the blank static template from index.html — so unhiding it is not enough.
//
// Forward navigation renders as it goes and must NOT come through here:
// rendering a second time would re-fetch and clobber whatever the view has
// in flight.
//
// The view modules are injected and nothing here touches the DOM, so the
// dispatch and its data guards can be tested directly; src/popup/index.js
// cannot be required outside a browser.
const { RESTORABLE_VIEWS } = require("./restorableViews");
// The views this page load has rendered.
//
// The Back path cannot otherwise tell its two cases apart. A view the popup
// never rendered is still the blank template from index.html and has to be
// rendered; a view already on the page must NOT be rendered again, because
// a second render re-fetches and overwrites whatever the user has typed
// into it and not yet saved.
//
// Registration is showView() in views/helpers.js, which is the last thing
// every render path runs — restoreView()'s, the Back path's, and every
// forward show(). That is the point of putting it there rather than in the
// individual views: a view added later registers itself with no one having
// to remember it, so this cannot decay.
//
// Module scope is page-load scope: the popup loads this module once per
// page load, and a reopened popup gets a fresh, empty set — which is
// exactly the state that makes the Back path render.
const renderedViews = new Set();
function markViewRendered(view) {
if (view) renderedViews.add(view);
}
// Begin a fresh page-load scope. The popup gets one by being loaded; the
// unit tests, which simulate several page loads against one module
// instance, ask for one.
function resetRenderedViews() {
renderedViews.clear();
}
// Home is the exception: Back re-renders it every time, which is what the
// popup did before this router existed (index.js registered
// renderWalletList() as setRenderMain(), and goBack() called it on every
// Back onto "main"). It must stay that way — the wallet list has to reflect
// what changed while the user was away from it, such as a wallet renamed or
// an address removed in Settings — and Home holds no unsaved input to lose.
const ALWAYS_RENDER_ON_BACK = new Set(["main"]);
// Views that render an address the user picked and cannot be rendered
// without one.
const ADDRESS_VIEWS = new Set([
"address",
"address-token",
"receive",
"transaction",
]);
function needsAddress(view) {
return ADDRESS_VIEWS.has(view);
}
function hasValidAddress(state) {
return Boolean(
state.selectedWallet !== null &&
state.selectedAddress !== null &&
state.wallets[state.selectedWallet] &&
state.wallets[state.selectedWallet].addresses[state.selectedAddress],
);
}
// Render `view` from persisted state. Each view module shows itself, so a
// true return means the view is both rendered and on screen.
//
// Returns false when the view is not one the popup renders from state, or
// when the state it would render is gone — a token no longer selected, a
// transaction no longer persisted. The caller falls back rather than
// putting an empty template on screen.
function renderView(view, state, views) {
if (!view || !RESTORABLE_VIEWS.has(view)) return false;
if (needsAddress(view) && !hasValidAddress(state)) return false;
if (view === "address-token" && !state.selectedToken) return false;
const data = state.viewData || {};
switch (view) {
case "main":
views.main.show();
return true;
case "address":
views.addressDetail.show();
return true;
case "address-token":
views.addressToken.show();
return true;
case "receive":
views.receive.show();
return true;
case "settings":
views.settings.show();
return true;
case "settings-addtoken":
views.settingsAddToken.show();
return true;
case "confirm-tx":
if (!data.pendingTx) return false;
views.confirmTx.restore();
return true;
case "transaction":
if (!data.tx) return false;
views.transactionDetail.render();
return true;
case "wait-tx":
// Resumes the receipt poll from the persisted broadcast time,
// and answers false when there is nothing resumable left.
return Boolean(views.txStatus.restoreWait());
case "success-tx":
if (!data.hash) return false;
views.txStatus.renderSuccess();
return true;
case "error-tx":
if (!data.message) return false;
views.txStatus.renderError();
return true;
default:
return false;
}
}
// The Back-path renderer, registered with setBackRenderer() in
// views/helpers.js.
//
// Returns false — leaving goBack() to unhide the view, as it always did —
// in the two cases where the view is known to be on the page already:
//
// - It is not one the popup renders from persisted state. The restored
// stack is filtered against RESTORABLE_VIEWS, so such a view can only
// be on the stack from this page load, where forward navigation
// rendered it on the way in.
// - This page load has rendered it. Re-rendering would re-fetch and
// clobber what it holds; Home is rendered anyway, see above.
//
// What is left is the case the router exists for: a view on the stack that
// this page load has never rendered, whose template is still blank.
function makeBackRenderer(state, views) {
return function renderBack(view) {
if (!RESTORABLE_VIEWS.has(view)) return false;
if (renderedViews.has(view) && !ALWAYS_RENDER_ON_BACK.has(view)) {
return false;
}
if (!renderView(view, state, views)) {
views.main.show();
}
return true;
};
}
module.exports = {
renderView,
makeBackRenderer,
markViewRendered,
resetRenderedViews,
};

View File

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ const {
getAddressValueUsd,
} = require("../../shared/prices");
const { state, saveState, currentNetwork } = require("../../shared/state");
const { markViewRendered } = require("../viewRouter");
// When views are added, removed, or transitions between them change,
// update the view-navigation documentation in README.md to match.
@@ -76,6 +77,10 @@ function showView(name) {
}
clearFlash();
state.currentView = name;
// A view's show() ends here, so this is where the Back path learns the
// view is no longer the blank template from index.html and must not be
// rendered a second time. See viewRouter.js.
markViewRendered(name);
saveState();
updateDebugBanner(name);
}
@@ -111,12 +116,19 @@ function updateDebugBanner(viewName) {
}
}
// Callback to re-render the main/home view when navigating back to it.
// Set once by index.js via setRenderMain().
let _renderMain = null;
// Callback that renders a view being navigated BACK onto. Set once by
// index.js via setBackRenderer(), which routes the view through the same
// per-view render and data guards restoreView() uses.
//
// It answers true when it took the navigation — the view is rendered and
// shown, or its backing data was gone and it fell back — and false for a
// view the popup does not render from persisted state. Those can only be
// on the stack from this page load, because the stack is filtered on load,
// so they have already been rendered and only need unhiding.
let _renderBack = null;
function setRenderMain(fn) {
_renderMain = fn;
function setBackRenderer(fn) {
_renderBack = fn;
}
// Push the current view onto the navigation stack so goBack() can
@@ -136,9 +148,11 @@ function goBack() {
} else {
target = "main";
}
if (target === "main" && _renderMain) {
_renderMain();
}
// A popped view is landed on, not navigated to. If the popup has been
// closed and reopened since the view was pushed, nothing has ever
// rendered it in this page load and its template is still blank, so it
// has to be rendered here rather than merely unhidden.
if (_renderBack && _renderBack(target)) return;
showView(target);
}
@@ -470,7 +484,7 @@ module.exports = {
showView,
onViewLeave,
updateDebugBanner,
setRenderMain,
setBackRenderer,
pushCurrentView,
goBack,
clearViewStack,

View File

@@ -8,12 +8,19 @@
// either verdict alone, because the balance list is where the user forms
// their belief about what they own (issue #235).
//
// KNOWN_SYMBOLS maps a symbol to the lowercased contract address that may
// bear it, or to null. Null means the symbol belongs to the native asset,
// which has no contract at all, so no contract may bear it and every one
// that does is a spoof. "ETH" is the only such entry today; the rule is
// KNOWN_SYMBOLS maps a symbol to the set of lowercased contract addresses
// that may bear it, or to null. Null means the symbol belongs to the native
// asset, which has no contract at all, so no contract may bear it and every
// one that does is a spoof. "ETH" is the only such entry today; the rule is
// written so that a second one needs no change here or at any call site.
//
// The value is a set because a ticker is not unique: seven symbols in the
// bundled list belong to two real contracts each, and answering with one of
// them hid the other one's holders' money (issue #276). Membership, not
// equality, is therefore the question — but it is the same question, asked of
// a table that can now state the truth. Every address in a set is one the
// wallet ships as a real token; a contract outside the set is still a spoof.
//
// The symbol is attacker-controlled — it is whatever the ERC-20 contract
// returns — so the lookup is done on a normalized form (issue #260): the
// question is whether the symbol reaches the user's eye as a known one,
@@ -93,7 +100,7 @@ function isSpoofedSymbol(symbol, contractAddress) {
if (!KNOWN_SYMBOLS.has(sym)) return false;
const legit = KNOWN_SYMBOLS.get(sym);
if (legit === null) return true;
return contract !== normalizeAddress(legit);
return !legit.has(contract);
}
module.exports = {

View File

@@ -3607,14 +3607,33 @@ for (const t of TOKENS) {
TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.set(t.address.toLowerCase(), t);
}
// Build a map of symbol (uppercased) -> legitimate contract address (lowercased).
// Used for spoofed-symbol detection. "ETH" maps to null (native token).
// Build a map of symbol (uppercased) -> the set of contract addresses
// (lowercased) that legitimately bear it. Used for spoofed-symbol detection.
// "ETH" maps to null: the native asset has no contract, so no contract may
// bear its symbol.
//
// The value is a set and not a single address because tickers are not unique
// and the list above proves it: seven of these 512 tokens share a symbol with
// another entry — FRAX, REUSD, TON, EURE, MSUSD, MUSD and JPYC — at two
// different real contracts each, all of them from the same source fetch. A
// one-address-per-symbol table can only answer that by picking a winner, and
// the loser is then a token in our own bundled list that the spoof filter
// hides from the balance list, the history and the send selector at its own
// address, so the user cannot spend it (issue #276). Naming every address
// that bears the symbol is the only shape that says what is true; it does not
// loosen the rule, because a contract outside the set is still a spoof.
const KNOWN_SYMBOLS = new Map();
KNOWN_SYMBOLS.set("ETH", null);
for (const t of TOKENS) {
const upper = t.symbol.toUpperCase();
if (!KNOWN_SYMBOLS.has(upper)) {
KNOWN_SYMBOLS.set(upper, t.address.toLowerCase());
KNOWN_SYMBOLS.set(upper, new Set());
}
const addresses = KNOWN_SYMBOLS.get(upper);
// A null entry is the native asset and stays null: an ERC-20 that reports
// the native symbol does not thereby become entitled to it.
if (addresses !== null) {
addresses.add(t.address.toLowerCase());
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,329 @@
// Back after reopening the popup (#268).
//
// A reopened popup renders the wallet list and the one view it restores
// onto; every other view is still the blank static template from
// index.html. goBack() used to only unhide its target, so Back landed on
// that blank template for any view the popup had not rendered in this page
// load. These tests drive the real goBack() with the real router wired to
// recording view modules, so what is asserted is which view render ran —
// the thing that was missing.
//
// The rendering itself is asserted against the real popup in a real
// browser by tests/e2e/run.js; here the DOM is a stub, because goBack()
// only needs showView() to work.
const els = new Map();
function fakeEl() {
return {
textContent: "",
innerHTML: "",
classList: {
toggle() {},
add() {},
remove() {},
contains: () => false,
},
remove() {},
};
}
globalThis.document = {
getElementById(id) {
if (!els.has(id)) els.set(id, fakeEl());
return els.get(id);
},
};
// helpers.js pulls in state.js, which reads chrome.storage.local at load.
globalThis.chrome = {
storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
};
const {
showView,
goBack,
setBackRenderer,
pushCurrentView,
} = require("../src/popup/views/helpers");
const {
makeBackRenderer,
markViewRendered,
resetRenderedViews,
} = require("../src/popup/viewRouter");
const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
const ADDRESS = "0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111";
const TOKEN = "0xa0b86991c6218b36c1d19d4a2e9eb0ce3606eb48";
let calls;
// Stand-ins for the view modules. Each records itself and then shows its
// view, which is what every real view render ends with — so the assertions
// can tell "rendered and shown" apart from "merely unhidden".
function recorder(name, view) {
return () => {
calls.push(name);
showView(view);
};
}
function makeViews() {
return {
main: { show: recorder("main", "main") },
addressDetail: { show: recorder("addressDetail", "address") },
addressToken: { show: recorder("addressToken", "address-token") },
receive: { show: recorder("receive", "receive") },
settings: { show: recorder("settings", "settings") },
settingsAddToken: {
show: recorder("settingsAddToken", "settings-addtoken"),
},
confirmTx: { restore: recorder("confirmTx", "confirm-tx") },
transactionDetail: {
render: recorder("transactionDetail", "transaction"),
},
txStatus: {
restoreWait: () => {
calls.push("waitTx");
showView("wait-tx");
return true;
},
renderSuccess: recorder("successTx", "success-tx"),
renderError: recorder("errorTx", "error-tx"),
},
};
}
// The popup as it stands just after a reopen: one wallet with one address,
// the view the popup restored onto, and the stack behind it.
//
// A reopen is a fresh page load, so the record of what has been rendered
// starts empty — that emptiness is what makes the Back path render at all.
// Returns the view modules so a test can drive forward navigation through
// the same recorders the router renders through.
function reopenedOn(view, stack, extra) {
calls = [];
resetRenderedViews();
state.wallets = [
{
name: "Wallet 1",
addresses: [{ address: ADDRESS, balance: "0", tokenBalances: [] }],
},
];
state.selectedWallet = 0;
state.selectedAddress = 0;
state.selectedToken = null;
state.viewData = null;
state.currentView = view;
state.viewStack = stack.slice();
Object.assign(state, extra || {});
// Restoring onto a view renders it, so the reopened popup has that one
// view on the page and nothing else.
markViewRendered(view);
const views = makeViews();
setBackRenderer(makeBackRenderer(state, views));
return views;
}
// The reproduction from the issue, step for step.
describe("Back onto a view the reopened popup never rendered", () => {
test("Back from settings renders the address detail underneath", () => {
reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "address"]);
goBack();
expect(calls).toEqual(["addressDetail"]);
expect(state.currentView).toBe("address");
expect(state.viewStack).toEqual(["main"]);
});
test("Back onto the token detail renders it", () => {
reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "address", "address-token"], {
selectedToken: TOKEN,
});
goBack();
expect(calls).toEqual(["addressToken"]);
expect(state.currentView).toBe("address-token");
});
test("Back onto Receive renders it", () => {
reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "address", "receive"]);
goBack();
expect(calls).toEqual(["receive"]);
expect(state.currentView).toBe("receive");
});
test("Back onto the transaction detail renders it", () => {
reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "transaction"], {
viewData: { tx: { hash: "0xdead" } },
});
goBack();
expect(calls).toEqual(["transactionDetail"]);
expect(state.currentView).toBe("transaction");
});
test("Back onto the transaction confirmation restores it", () => {
reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "confirm-tx"], {
viewData: { pendingTx: { to: ADDRESS, amount: "1" } },
});
goBack();
expect(calls).toEqual(["confirmTx"]);
expect(state.currentView).toBe("confirm-tx");
});
test("Back onto the success screen renders it", () => {
reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "success-tx"], {
viewData: { hash: "0xdead" },
});
goBack();
expect(calls).toEqual(["successTx"]);
expect(state.currentView).toBe("success-tx");
});
test("Back onto the failure screen renders it", () => {
reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "error-tx"], {
viewData: { message: "execution reverted" },
});
goBack();
expect(calls).toEqual(["errorTx"]);
expect(state.currentView).toBe("error-tx");
});
test("Back onto Home renders the wallet list", () => {
reopenedOn("settings", ["main"]);
goBack();
expect(calls).toEqual(["main"]);
expect(state.currentView).toBe("main");
});
test("Back with an empty stack renders Home", () => {
reopenedOn("settings", []);
goBack();
expect(calls).toEqual(["main"]);
expect(state.currentView).toBe("main");
});
});
// The guards are restoreView()'s, so a popped view whose backing data is
// gone lands on Home rather than on an empty template.
describe("Back onto a view whose backing data is gone", () => {
test("the token detail with no token selected falls back to Home", () => {
reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "address-token"]);
goBack();
expect(calls).toEqual(["main"]);
expect(state.currentView).toBe("main");
});
test("the transaction detail with no transaction falls back to Home", () => {
reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "transaction"]);
goBack();
expect(calls).toEqual(["main"]);
expect(state.currentView).toBe("main");
});
test("the confirmation with no pending transaction falls back to Home", () => {
reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "confirm-tx"]);
goBack();
expect(calls).toEqual(["main"]);
expect(state.currentView).toBe("main");
});
test("an address view with no address selected falls back to Home", () => {
reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "receive"], {
selectedAddress: null,
});
goBack();
expect(calls).toEqual(["main"]);
expect(state.currentView).toBe("main");
});
test("the success screen with no transaction hash falls back to Home", () => {
reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "success-tx"]);
goBack();
expect(calls).toEqual(["main"]);
expect(state.currentView).toBe("main");
});
test("the failure screen with no message falls back to Home", () => {
reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "error-tx"]);
goBack();
expect(calls).toEqual(["main"]);
expect(state.currentView).toBe("main");
});
test("a wait that can no longer be resumed falls back to Home", () => {
reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "wait-tx"]);
const views = makeViews();
views.txStatus.restoreWait = () => false;
setBackRenderer(makeBackRenderer(state, views));
goBack();
expect(calls).toEqual(["main"]);
expect(state.currentView).toBe("main");
});
});
// Forward navigation renders as it goes, and a second render would re-fetch
// and clobber whatever the view holds — an unsaved edit, a request in
// flight. So the Back path renders only a view this page load has never
// rendered, and merely unhides every other one: the views it does not
// render from persisted state, and the views already on the page.
describe("what the Back path leaves alone", () => {
test("forward navigation renders nothing by itself", () => {
reopenedOn("address", ["main"]);
pushCurrentView();
showView("send");
expect(calls).toEqual([]);
expect(state.viewStack).toEqual(["main", "address"]);
});
test("Back onto a live-session view only unhides it", () => {
reopenedOn("confirm-tx", ["main", "address", "send"]);
goBack();
expect(calls).toEqual([]);
expect(state.currentView).toBe("send");
});
test("Back renders its target exactly once", () => {
reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "address"]);
goBack();
expect(calls.filter((c) => c === "addressDetail")).toHaveLength(1);
});
test("Back onto a view this page load already rendered only unhides it", () => {
const views = reopenedOn("main", []);
pushCurrentView();
views.addressDetail.show();
pushCurrentView();
views.settings.show();
calls = [];
goBack();
expect(calls).toEqual([]);
expect(state.currentView).toBe("address");
});
// The unit mirror of the regression the browser suite pins: Settings
// reassigns its fields from persisted state on every render, so a
// re-render on the way back discards an edit the user has not saved.
test("Back onto Settings visited earlier in this page load does not re-render it", () => {
const views = reopenedOn("main", []);
pushCurrentView();
views.settings.show();
pushCurrentView();
views.settingsAddToken.show();
calls = [];
goBack();
expect(calls).toEqual([]);
expect(state.currentView).toBe("settings");
});
// Home is the deliberate exception, unchanged from the popup's
// behaviour before the router existed: it re-renders on every Back so
// the wallet list reflects what changed while the user was away.
test("Back onto Home renders it again even when it is already on the page", () => {
const views = reopenedOn("main", []);
pushCurrentView();
views.addressDetail.show();
calls = [];
goBack();
expect(calls).toEqual(["main"]);
expect(state.currentView).toBe("main");
});
});

34
tests/e2e/Dockerfile Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
# Chrome end-to-end image: the pinned Playwright image with this repo and a
# freshly built extension inside it, built by script/test-e2e. The suite is
# still started with `docker run`, so every runtime flag the harness needs
# (--ipc=host in particular) applies as before.
#
# The repo is baked in rather than bind-mounted because a bind mount does
# not resolve under Gitea Actions: the runner runs the job in a container
# against the HOST's docker socket, so the source side of a -v is resolved
# by the host daemon while the job's checkout lives on a docker volume that
# is not a host path -- the mount silently succeeds and /work is empty. A
# build context is streamed to the daemon and so works from anywhere.
# Building the extension here too means the machine starting a run needs
# docker and nothing else.
# mcr.microsoft.com/playwright:v1.56.0-noble, 2026-08-09
#
# The playwright-core devDependency is pinned to the matching Playwright
# version (1.56.0) and the two must be bumped together: the browsers ship
# inside this image, and playwright-core looks for the exact browser
# revision its own version expects. A mismatch fails at launch.
FROM mcr.microsoft.com/playwright@sha256:35246d87a7c88ea9b771c65d33171b2611b02a8253b4b12ce6f94376c55f99f2
WORKDIR /work
# Same layering as the root Dockerfile: script/bootstrap installs the
# prerequisites and the dependencies, and the manifests are copied first so
# that layer is cached until they change.
COPY script/ script/
COPY package.json yarn.lock ./
RUN script/bootstrap
COPY . .
RUN make build

View File

@@ -1,10 +1,24 @@
# Firefox end-to-end image: stock Firefox plus geckodriver on a node base,
# built by script/test-e2e-firefox. The repo is bind-mounted at /work; the
# harness itself has no dependencies, so nothing is installed for it.
# with this repo and a freshly built extension inside it, built by
# script/test-e2e-firefox. The harness itself has no dependencies, so
# nothing is installed for it.
#
# All three external artifacts are pinned by digest. The Firefox version in
# particular must not float: -remote-allow-system-access is mandatory on 153
# and was not on 142, so the flag the harness passes is version-coupled.
# The build context is the repo root. The repo is baked in rather than
# bind-mounted because a bind mount does not resolve under Gitea Actions:
# the runner runs the job in a container against the HOST's docker socket,
# so the source side of a -v is resolved by the host daemon while the job's
# checkout lives on a docker volume that is not a host path -- the mount
# silently succeeds and /work is empty. Baking the build in is also the
# only way this suite can have both a built extension and the
# `--network none` it runs under, since a container with no network cannot
# install anything.
#
# All three external artifacts are pinned by digest, and are fetched in
# layers above the repo copy, so editing the harness or any source file
# re-runs only the two cheap layers at the bottom. The Firefox version in
# particular must not float: -remote-allow-system-access is mandatory on
# 153 and was not on 142, so the flag the harness passes is
# version-coupled.
# node:22-bookworm-slim, 2026-08-12
FROM node@sha256:d649c27dae7ba0137b3cef5dd75baa422c08dc3d9e3fc0c23dfb172dc3cc6436
@@ -48,4 +62,16 @@ ENV FIREFOX_BIN=/opt/firefox/firefox
ENV GECKODRIVER=/usr/local/bin/geckodriver
WORKDIR /work
# Same layering as the root Dockerfile: script/bootstrap installs the
# prerequisites and the dependencies, and the manifests are copied first so
# that layer is cached until they change.
COPY script/ script/
COPY package.json yarn.lock ./
RUN script/bootstrap
COPY . .
RUN make build
CMD ["node", "tests/e2e/firefox/run.js", "dist/firefox"]

View File

@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@
"use strict";
const { Transaction } = require("ethers");
// Fictional ERC-20 used to seed the transaction-detail test. The symbol
// must not collide with any entry in src/shared/tokenList.js, or
// isSpoofedSymbol() in src/shared/transactions.js drops the transfer as a
@@ -62,6 +64,87 @@ function word(value) {
return "0x" + BigInt(value).toString(16).padStart(64, "0");
}
// -------------------------------------------------------- dApp fixture
//
// The origin the EIP-1193 test page is served from, and the page itself.
//
// It is a fixture like every other one in this file: the route handler
// fulfils the navigation from the string below, so the page never comes
// from a remote origin and nothing about the dApp round trips leaves the
// container. `.test` is reserved by RFC 6761 and has no owner to reach in
// the first place; the launch arguments map every host to NOTFOUND anyway.
//
// What the page deliberately does NOT do is load a provider. window.ethereum
// is put there by the shipped manifest's MAIN-world content script, exactly
// as it is on any http(s) page a user visits, so what these tests speak to
// is the real inpage provider and not a copy the harness wired up.
const DAPP_ORIGIN = "https://dapp.e2e.test";
const DAPP_URL = DAPP_ORIGIN + "/";
// Requests are parked rather than awaited. An approval prompt only exists
// while its call is in flight, so a test that awaited the promise could
// never drive the popup that has to settle it; start() files the promise
// under a key and settle() collects it once the prompt has been dealt with.
//
// The rejection branch records the whole observable shape of the error as it
// arrives — name, message, and whether a `code` is present at all as distinct
// from its value. EIP-1193 says a user rejection is a ProviderRpcError
// carrying code 4001; what the page can actually see is recorded here rather
// than assumed, and asserted in run.js.
//
// The message log is the page's half of the boundary observation: every
// AUTISTMASK_* message that crosses between this page and the content
// script, in both directions, verbatim.
const DAPP_HTML = [
"<!doctype html>",
'<html lang="en">',
"<head>",
'<meta charset="utf-8">',
"<title>AutistMask e2e dApp</title>",
// Inline and empty: without it Chromium asks for /favicon.ico, which
// the unstubbed-request guard would report as escaping traffic.
'<link rel="icon" href="data:,">',
"</head>",
"<body>",
"<h1>AutistMask e2e dApp</h1>",
"<script>",
"window.__dapp = {",
" messages: [],",
" calls: {},",
" start: function (key, method, params) {",
" window.__dapp.calls[key] = window.ethereum",
" .request({ method: method, params: params })",
" .then(",
" function (result) {",
" return { settled: 'resolved', result: result };",
" },",
" function (error) {",
" return {",
" settled: 'rejected',",
" message: String((error && error.message) || error),",
" name: error ? error.name : undefined,",
" hasCode: !!error && 'code' in Object(error),",
" code: error ? error.code : undefined,",
" };",
" },",
" );",
" },",
" settle: function (key) {",
" return window.__dapp.calls[key];",
" },",
"};",
"window.addEventListener('message', function (event) {",
" if (event.source !== window) return;",
" var d = event.data;",
" if (!d || typeof d.type !== 'string') return;",
" if (d.type.indexOf('AUTISTMASK') !== 0) return;",
" window.__dapp.messages.push(d);",
"});",
"</script>",
"</body>",
"</html>",
].join("\n");
// ------------------------------------------------------------ fee fixture
//
// The confirmation screen carries two different numbers for the same
@@ -101,6 +184,11 @@ const RPC_RESULTS = {
eth_estimateGas: hex(GAS_LIMIT),
eth_getTransactionCount: "0x0",
eth_maxPriorityFeePerGas: hex(PRIORITY_FEE_WEI),
// "not mined yet", which is what a node answers for a transaction it has
// only just accepted. The wait screen the dApp transaction approval hands
// off to polls this every 10 seconds; leaving it unstubbed would report
// the poll as escaping traffic the moment a test outlived one tick.
eth_getTransactionReceipt: null,
};
// The "latest" block, which ethers' getFeeData() reads baseFeePerGas from
@@ -264,6 +352,31 @@ function rpcReply(req, opts, report) {
if (req.method === "eth_getBlockByNumber") {
return Object.assign(envelope, { result: latestBlock() });
}
// The end of the dApp transaction round trip: the raw signed transaction
// the background hands to the node. It is recorded verbatim so a test can
// recover the signer from the exact bytes that were broadcast, rather than
// from anything the extension reported about them.
//
// The reply must be the transaction's real hash. ethers compares the hash
// the node returns against the one it computes itself and throws on a
// mismatch, so a constant here would fail the broadcast for a reason that
// has nothing to do with what is being tested.
if (req.method === "eth_sendRawTransaction") {
const raw = Array.isArray(req.params) ? req.params[0] : null;
let parsed;
try {
parsed = Transaction.from(raw);
} catch {
report("eth_sendRawTransaction with an undecodable transaction");
return Object.assign(envelope, {
error: { code: -32000, message: "undecodable transaction" },
});
}
if (Array.isArray(opts.broadcastTransactions)) {
opts.broadcastTransactions.push(raw);
}
return Object.assign(envelope, { result: parsed.hash });
}
if (req.method === "eth_estimateGas" && opts.failGasEstimate) {
// A refusal the node itself would produce, not a transport error:
// this is the shape the confirmation screen has to turn into
@@ -375,6 +488,8 @@ function traceEnabled(raw) {
* node-side refusal.
* @param {boolean} [opts.holdGasEstimate] hold every batch containing an
* eth_estimateGas until this is cleared again.
* @param {string[]} [opts.broadcastTransactions] every raw signed
* transaction handed to eth_sendRawTransaction, appended in order.
* @returns {Promise<{waitForServiceWorkerTraffic: (ms: number) =>
* Promise<string|null>}>}
*/
@@ -420,6 +535,18 @@ async function installNetworkStubs(ctx, opts) {
return handleRpc(route, req.postData(), opts, report);
}
// The local EIP-1193 test page. Served from here so the dApp round
// trips run against a real http(s) origin — which is what makes the
// shipped content scripts inject at all — without any remote origin
// being involved.
if (url.origin === DAPP_ORIGIN && p === "/") {
return route.fulfill({
status: 200,
contentType: "text/html; charset=utf-8",
body: DAPP_HTML,
});
}
// Blockscout v2
if (p.includes("/api/v2/")) {
if (/\/addresses\/0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40}\/transactions$/.test(p)) {
@@ -508,6 +635,8 @@ async function installNetworkStubs(ctx, opts) {
module.exports = {
installNetworkStubs,
DAPP_ORIGIN,
DAPP_URL,
FEE_ESTIMATE_WEI,
FEE_RESERVE_WEI,
STUB_COUNTERPARTY,

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

310
tests/inpageErrors.test.js Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,310 @@
// The EIP-1193 error the page actually catches (src/content/inpage.js).
//
// The bug this pins down (issue #274): the provider rebuilt every failure as
// `new Error(error.message)`, so the `code` the background produced and the
// content script relayed intact was thrown away in the last hop. A dApp
// checking `err.code === 4001` — the standard way to tell "the user said no"
// from "the wallet broke" — saw undefined, and well-behaved sites showed an
// error or retried instead of accepting the refusal.
//
// inpage.js is a bare IIFE injected into the page's JS context, not a module:
// it takes no import and exports nothing, and reaches for `window` at load.
// So it is evaluated here the way the browser evaluates it, against a stub
// window, and the provider is collected from `window.ethereum`. The globals it
// touches are passed in as function parameters rather than assigned to
// globalThis: nothing leaks between tests, and the source is compiled in this
// realm, so the errors it constructs are comparable against this file's own
// `Error` — which a second realm's intrinsics would silently defeat.
//
// There is no jsdom in this repo; see tests/txStatus.test.js.
const fs = require("fs");
const path = require("path");
const { webcrypto } = require("crypto");
const SOURCE = fs.readFileSync(
path.join(__dirname, "..", "src", "content", "inpage.js"),
"utf8",
);
const loadInto = new Function(
"window",
"self",
"crypto",
"Event",
"CustomEvent",
SOURCE,
);
class StubEvent {
constructor(type) {
this.type = type;
}
}
class StubCustomEvent extends StubEvent {
constructor(type, init) {
super(type);
this.detail = init && init.detail;
}
}
// Every code the background emits on the RPC path today, read out of
// src/background/index.js. The provider must not know this list — it passes
// through whatever arrived — but the cases below are the real ones.
const REJECTED = 4001; // user rejected the request
const UNAUTHORIZED = 4100; // site not connected / wrong address
const UNRECOGNIZED_CHAIN = 4902; // switch/add to an unsupported chain
// A stub window with the four things inpage.js touches: message listeners,
// postMessage out to the content script, window.ethereum, and dispatchEvent
// for the EIP-6963 announcement.
function loadProvider() {
const messageListeners = [];
const posted = [];
const win = {
addEventListener(type, fn) {
if (type === "message") messageListeners.push(fn);
},
removeEventListener(type, fn) {
const i = messageListeners.indexOf(fn);
if (type === "message" && i !== -1) messageListeners.splice(i, 1);
},
postMessage(data) {
posted.push(data);
},
dispatchEvent() {
return true;
},
};
win.window = win;
loadInto(win, win, webcrypto, StubEvent, StubCustomEvent);
// Deliver the content script's answer to an outstanding request. The id is
// read back off the wire rather than assumed: inpage.js issues its own
// eth_chainId at load, so the first id a test sees is not 1.
function respond(response) {
const request = posted
.filter((m) => m.type === "AUTISTMASK_REQUEST")
.pop();
expect(request).toBeDefined();
const event = {
source: win,
data: { type: "AUTISTMASK_RESPONSE", id: request.id, ...response },
};
for (const fn of messageListeners.slice()) fn(event);
}
return { provider: win.ethereum, posted, respond };
}
// Start a request, answer it with `response`, and hand back the rejection.
// Fails the test if the call resolves instead.
async function rejectionFrom(start, response) {
const { provider, respond } = loadProvider();
const settled = start(provider).then(
(result) => ({ resolved: result }),
(error) => ({ error }),
);
// The provider posts synchronously, so the request is already on the wire.
respond(response);
const outcome = await settled;
expect(outcome).not.toHaveProperty("resolved");
return outcome.error;
}
describe("an EIP-1193 code reaches the page", () => {
test("a user rejection arrives as code 4001", async () => {
const err = await rejectionFrom(
(p) => p.request({ method: "eth_requestAccounts" }),
{
error: {
code: REJECTED,
message: "User rejected the request.",
},
},
);
expect(err.code).toBe(REJECTED);
expect(err.message).toBe("User rejected the request.");
});
test("it is a ProviderRpcError, and an Error", async () => {
const err = await rejectionFrom(
(p) => p.request({ method: "eth_requestAccounts" }),
{
error: {
code: REJECTED,
message: "User rejected the request.",
},
},
);
expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(Error);
expect(err.name).toBe("ProviderRpcError");
});
test("4100 unauthorized arrives intact", async () => {
const err = await rejectionFrom(
(p) => p.request({ method: "personal_sign", params: ["0x00"] }),
{ error: { code: UNAUTHORIZED, message: "Unauthorized" } },
);
expect(err.code).toBe(UNAUTHORIZED);
expect(err.message).toBe("Unauthorized");
});
test("4902 unrecognized chain arrives intact", async () => {
const message =
"AutistMask supports Ethereum Mainnet and Sepolia Testnet only.";
const err = await rejectionFrom(
(p) => p.request({ method: "wallet_switchEthereumChain" }),
{ error: { code: UNRECOGNIZED_CHAIN, message } },
);
expect(err.code).toBe(UNRECOGNIZED_CHAIN);
expect(err.message).toBe(message);
});
// The provider is not allowed to know the list above: a code added to the
// background later must reach the page without this file being edited.
test("a code the provider has never heard of is passed through", async () => {
const err = await rejectionFrom(
(p) => p.request({ method: "eth_accounts" }),
{ error: { code: 4900, message: "Disconnected" } },
);
expect(err.code).toBe(4900);
});
test("data is carried when the boundary sent it", async () => {
const err = await rejectionFrom(
(p) => p.request({ method: "eth_call" }),
{
error: {
code: -32000,
message: "execution reverted",
data: "0x08c379a0",
},
},
);
expect(err.code).toBe(-32000);
expect(err.data).toBe("0x08c379a0");
});
test("no data property is invented when the boundary sent none", async () => {
const err = await rejectionFrom(
(p) => p.request({ method: "eth_requestAccounts" }),
{
error: {
code: REJECTED,
message: "User rejected the request.",
},
},
);
expect("data" in err).toBe(false);
});
});
describe("the message is untouched", () => {
test("a coded error keeps the message byte for byte", async () => {
const message =
"This site asked to sign as an address that is not " +
"the active one.";
const err = await rejectionFrom(
(p) => p.request({ method: "personal_sign" }),
{ error: { code: UNAUTHORIZED, message } },
);
expect(err.message).toBe(message);
});
test("an error the background sent with no code keeps its message", async () => {
const err = await rejectionFrom(
(p) => p.request({ method: "eth_sendTransaction" }),
{ error: { message: "No accounts available" } },
);
expect(err.message).toBe("No accounts available");
});
// A ProviderRpcError whose code is undefined would claim a conformance it
// does not have, and `'code' in err` is exactly what a careful dApp asks.
test("an error with no code gets no code property at all", async () => {
const err = await rejectionFrom(
(p) => p.request({ method: "eth_sendTransaction" }),
{ error: { message: "No accounts available" } },
);
expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(Error);
expect("code" in err).toBe(false);
});
test("an error with no message keeps the generic fallback", async () => {
const err = await rejectionFrom(
(p) => p.request({ method: "eth_sendTransaction" }),
{ error: { code: REJECTED } },
);
expect(err.message).toBe("Request failed");
expect(err.code).toBe(REJECTED);
});
});
// Every entry point the provider exposes, not just eth_requestAccounts. They
// all funnel through the same response listener, and this is what says so.
describe("every request path carries the code", () => {
const rejection = {
error: { code: REJECTED, message: "User rejected the request." },
};
test("request()", async () => {
const err = await rejectionFrom(
(p) => p.request({ method: "eth_requestAccounts" }),
rejection,
);
expect(err.code).toBe(REJECTED);
});
test("enable()", async () => {
const err = await rejectionFrom((p) => p.enable(), rejection);
expect(err.code).toBe(REJECTED);
});
test("send(method, params)", async () => {
const err = await rejectionFrom(
(p) => p.send("eth_requestAccounts", []),
rejection,
);
expect(err.code).toBe(REJECTED);
});
test("send({ method, params })", async () => {
const err = await rejectionFrom(
(p) => p.send({ method: "personal_sign", params: ["0x00"] }),
rejection,
);
expect(err.code).toBe(REJECTED);
});
test("sendAsync() hands the code to its callback", async () => {
const { provider, respond } = loadProvider();
const called = new Promise((resolve) => {
provider.sendAsync({ id: 1, method: "eth_requestAccounts" }, (e) =>
resolve(e),
);
});
respond(rejection);
const err = await called;
expect(err.name).toBe("ProviderRpcError");
expect(err.code).toBe(REJECTED);
expect(err.message).toBe("User rejected the request.");
});
});
describe("the success path is unchanged", () => {
test("a result still resolves", async () => {
const { provider, respond } = loadProvider();
const settled = provider.request({ method: "eth_requestAccounts" });
respond({ result: ["0xb61264DEFB0c4B8afb3D73724be15310036743a5"] });
await expect(settled).resolves.toEqual([
"0xb61264DEFB0c4B8afb3D73724be15310036743a5",
]);
expect(provider.selectedAddress).toBe(
"0xb61264DEFB0c4B8afb3D73724be15310036743a5",
);
});
});

View File

@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ global.chrome = {
};
const { isSpoofedSymbol } = require("../src/shared/symbolSpoof");
const { KNOWN_SYMBOLS } = require("../src/shared/tokenList");
const { TOKENS, KNOWN_SYMBOLS } = require("../src/shared/tokenList");
const { filterTransactions } = require("../src/shared/transactions");
const {
fetchTokenBalances,
@@ -284,11 +284,137 @@ describe("the shared rule: symbols that render as a known symbol", () => {
// asserts the claim it stands for — `[ -~]` would admit an interior
// space and let a whitespace-bearing entry through the guard.
test("no bundled symbol is touched by the normalization", () => {
for (const [symbol, address] of KNOWN_SYMBOLS) {
for (const [symbol, addresses] of KNOWN_SYMBOLS) {
expect(symbol).toBe(symbol.trim());
expect(symbol).toMatch(/^[!-~]+$/);
if (address === null) continue;
expect(isSpoofedSymbol(symbol, address)).toBe(false);
if (addresses === null) continue;
for (const address of addresses) {
expect(isSpoofedSymbol(symbol, address)).toBe(false);
}
}
});
});
// Issue #276: the guard that was missing. The suite walked KNOWN_SYMBOLS,
// which is built from TOKENS, so it could only ever assert that the table
// agrees with itself. Seven symbols appear twice in the bundled list at two
// different real contracts, and the table kept whichever came first, so the
// other seven contracts — tokens in our own shipped list, at their own
// addresses — were judged spoofs and hidden from the balance list, the
// history and the send selector. That is the over-filtering direction: it
// hides a holding the user cannot then spend.
//
// This walk is over TOKENS, the data the wallet actually ships, so it fails
// whenever a bundled token would be filtered at its own address no matter
// which side of the table the mistake is on.
describe("the shipped token list", () => {
test("no bundled token is filtered at its own address", () => {
const filtered = TOKENS.filter((t) =>
isSpoofedSymbol(t.symbol, t.address),
).map((t) => t.symbol + " @ " + t.address);
expect(filtered).toEqual([]);
});
// The third failure mode the issue asks about: a symbol whose table entry
// names an address that is in neither the table nor the list would be a
// contract we vouch for and do not ship. There is none, and the table is
// built from the list, so this asserts the derivation has not acquired a
// hand-written entry.
test("every address the table vouches for is a bundled token", () => {
const bundled = new Set(TOKENS.map((t) => t.address.toLowerCase()));
for (const [symbol, addresses] of KNOWN_SYMBOLS) {
if (addresses === null) continue;
expect(addresses.size).toBeGreaterThan(0);
for (const address of addresses) {
expect(address).toBe(address.toLowerCase());
expect(bundled.has(address)).toBe(true);
// And it is the token that actually reports that symbol.
const token = TOKENS.find(
(t) => t.address.toLowerCase() === address,
);
expect(token.symbol.toUpperCase()).toBe(symbol);
}
}
});
// Both contracts behind a shared ticker must pass, from either side: a
// rule that admits only the one the table happens to visit first is the
// bug, not the fix.
test("both contracts behind a shared ticker are admitted", () => {
const bySymbol = new Map();
for (const t of TOKENS) {
const upper = t.symbol.toUpperCase();
if (!bySymbol.has(upper)) bySymbol.set(upper, []);
bySymbol.get(upper).push(t);
}
const shared = [...bySymbol].filter(([, list]) => list.length > 1);
// The shared tickers are a fact about the shipped data; if a future
// list has none, this test would silently assert nothing.
expect(shared.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
for (const [, list] of shared) {
for (const t of list) {
expect(isSpoofedSymbol(t.symbol, t.address)).toBe(false);
}
}
});
// The seven from issue #276, named so that the reconciliation is a fact
// in the suite: each is two real contracts from the same source fetch,
// and the table now holds both rather than the one that came first.
test("the seven shared tickers each name both bundled contracts", () => {
const expected = {
TON: [
"0x582d872a1b094fc48f5de31d3b73f2d9be47def1", // Toncoin
"0x2be5e8c109e2197d077d13a82daead6a9b3433c5", // Tokamak Network
],
FRAX: [
"0x853d955acef822db058eb8505911ed77f175b99e", // Legacy Frax Dollar
"0x3432b6a60d23ca0dfca7761b7ab56459d9c964d0", // Frax (prev. FXS)
],
REUSD: [
"0x5086bf358635b81d8c47c66d1c8b9e567db70c72", // Re Protocol reUSD
"0x57ab1e0003f623289cd798b1824be09a793e4bec", // Resupply USD
],
EURE: [
"0x39b8b6385416f4ca36a20319f70d28621895279d", // Monerium EUR emoney
"0x3231cb76718cdef2155fc47b5286d82e6eda273f", // Monerium EUR emoney [OLD]
],
MSUSD: [
"0x4ba01f22827018b4772cd326c7627fb4956a7c00", // Main Street USD
"0xab5eb14c09d416f0ac63661e57edb7aecdb9befa", // Metronome Synth USD
],
MUSD: [
"0xaca92e438df0b2401ff60da7e4337b687a2435da", // MetaMask USD
"0xdd468a1ddc392dcdbef6db6e34e89aa338f9f186", // Mezo USD
],
JPYC: [
"0x431d5dff03120afa4bdf332c61a6e1766ef37bdb", // JPY Coin
"0x2370f9d504c7a6e775bf6e14b3f12846b594cd53", // JPY Coin v1
],
};
for (const [symbol, addresses] of Object.entries(expected)) {
expect([...KNOWN_SYMBOLS.get(symbol)].sort()).toEqual(
[...addresses].sort(),
);
for (const address of addresses) {
expect(isSpoofedSymbol(symbol, address)).toBe(false);
}
}
});
// The other direction, on the same symbols: widening the table to hold
// every bundled address for a ticker must not turn it into a pass for
// any other contract.
test("a shared ticker from a third contract is still a spoof", () => {
const bySymbol = new Map();
for (const t of TOKENS) {
const upper = t.symbol.toUpperCase();
if (!bySymbol.has(upper)) bySymbol.set(upper, []);
bySymbol.get(upper).push(t);
}
for (const [symbol, list] of bySymbol) {
if (list.length < 2) continue;
expect(isSpoofedSymbol(symbol, FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(true);
}
});
});

View File

@@ -207,8 +207,8 @@ describe("token list assumptions the fixtures rely on", () => {
});
test("USDC and WETH map to their genuine lowercased contracts", () => {
expect(KNOWN_SYMBOLS.get("USDC")).toBe(USDC_CONTRACT);
expect(KNOWN_SYMBOLS.get("WETH")).toBe(WETH_CONTRACT);
expect([...KNOWN_SYMBOLS.get("USDC")]).toEqual([USDC_CONTRACT]);
expect([...KNOWN_SYMBOLS.get("WETH")]).toEqual([WETH_CONTRACT]);
});
test("the spam fixture symbol is not in the known token list", () => {