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sneak 65d4dd8e0f docs: name every approval-screen amount string, fix stale zero claim (closes #369)
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The README's amount-display section claimed a genuine zero always renders
`0.0000`. That is corrected and scoped: it holds for the ERC-20 amount and for
the swap's `Amount` line on a literal-zero `amountIn` in a V2/V3 exact-in swap
or a zero `WRAP_ETH`. Only two zeros are stated in words before the floor — the
swap's `Min. received` (any zero minimum) and its V4 exact-in `Amount` (an
`amountIn` of zero, V4's open delta).

A new list names every string an amount slot can show: a formatted quantity,
`Unlimited`, `All available (V4 open delta)`, `None (no minimum guaranteed)`,
base units with decimals unknown, and `Unknown (not named in the calldata)`. It
also records that a zero `minBalance` on a `BALANCE_CHECK_ERC20` step now reads
the no-minimum wording where it once read `0.0000`. Each claim checked against
the tree. Docs only.

Model: opus-4-8
2026-09-21 23:30:10 +00:00
6 changed files with 74 additions and 185 deletions
+19 -30
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@@ -884,16 +884,16 @@ instead: `0.000000000000000001 DAI`, not `0.0000 DAI`. The test is on the whole
truncated string, integer part included, so `1.00005` still shows as `1.0000` —
the exception only fires where the entire displayed figure would read as zero.
Truncation stays truncation: `0.99999` shows as `0.9999`, never rounded up. A
genuine zero reaching this rule renders `0.0000`. The swap screen states a zero
in words before it gets here in only two places. Its `Min. received` line reads
`None (no minimum guaranteed)` for any zero minimum. Its `Amount` line reads
`All available (V4 open delta)` for a V4 exact-in `amountIn` of zero, which V4
treats as the whole open credit rather than a quantity — but only when that V4
step is the one that sets the `Amount` line. A Permit2 permit sets it whenever
one is among the steps, so a swap carrying a permit shows the permit's amount
there and never the open-delta wording. Every other zero amount with a known
scale renders `0.0000`, the swap's `Amount` line included; the list of
amount-slot strings below says where.
genuine zero reaching this rule renders `0.0000`. The ERC-20
`approve`/`transfer` amount does exactly that, and so does the swap's `Amount`
line for a literal-zero `amountIn` on a V2 or V3 exact-in swap, or a zero
`WRAP_ETH` (`0.0000 ETH`). Only two zeros are stated in words before the floor:
the swap's `Min. received` line reads `None (no minimum guaranteed)` for any
zero minimum, and its `Amount` line reads `All available (V4 open delta)` for a
V4 exact-in `amountIn` of zero, which V4 treats as the whole open credit rather
than a quantity. So the guarantee that a zero is never shown as `0.0000` covers
the `Min. received` line and the V4 exact-in `Amount`; a V2/V3 or `WRAP_ETH`
`Amount` still renders it (see the list of amount-slot strings below).
The rule and its exception live in `src/shared/amountDisplay.js` as
`truncateAmount()` and `truncateAmountNeverZero()`. Everything the approval and
@@ -950,29 +950,18 @@ mean an amount line on the dApp approval screen (and the wait/success/error
screens that carry a figure forward) shows one of a fixed set of strings, not
always a number:
- A formatted quantity, e.g. `17.1900 USDT`: the token's scale is known. A
figure at or above the floor is truncated to four decimals, one below it is
extended to its first significant digit, and a genuine zero renders `0.0000`,
e.g. `0.0000 USDT`. That zero reaches the ERC-20 `approve`/`transfer` line for
an amount of zero, and the swap's `Amount` line when the step that sets it
states zero: a Permit2 permit, a V2 or V3 exact-in `amountIn`, or a `WRAP_ETH`
(`0.0000 ETH`). This is `truncateAmountNeverZero()`
- A formatted quantity, e.g. `17.1900 USDT`: the token's scale is known and the
figure is at or above the floor, or below it and extended to its first
significant digit. This is `truncateAmountNeverZero()`
(`src/shared/amountDisplay.js`).
- `Unlimited`: named rather than formatted, since it needs no scale to describe.
On the ERC-20 line it is an `approve` of the `uint256` maximum, an unbounded
allowance (`src/popup/views/approval.js`); `transfer` has no such case. On a
swap's `Amount` line it is any input amount at or above the `uint160` maximum,
whichever step set the line (`src/shared/uniswap.js`): a Permit2 permit at
that maximum, which is an unbounded permit, or a V2 or V3 exact-in `amountIn`
or `WRAP_ETH` amount that large. That includes the router's whole-balance
value (`2^255`), which tells the router to use all it holds of the token — a
quantity decided at execution, not an allowance.
- `Unlimited`: an unbounded allowance or permit, which needs no scale to
describe — a `uint256`-max ERC-20 `approve` (`src/popup/views/approval.js`) or
a Permit2 amount at the `uint160` max on a swap's `Amount`
(`src/shared/uniswap.js`).
- `All available (V4 open delta)`: a V4 exact-in swap whose `amountIn` is zero.
V4 reads that zero as "use the whole open delta", not as a literal zero, so
the calldata states no quantity at all. Swap `Amount` line only, and only when
that V4 step is the one that sets the line. A Permit2 permit sets it instead
whenever one is among the steps, and so does any earlier swap or `WRAP_ETH`
step; the line then shows what that step stated (`src/shared/uniswap.js`).
the calldata states no quantity at all. Swap `Amount` line only
(`src/shared/uniswap.js`).
- `None (no minimum guaranteed)`: a zero minimum — the swap guarantees nothing
back. It is a literal zero slippage floor on a V2/V3/V4 swap, and it also
reaches a `BALANCE_CHECK_ERC20` step: a zero `minBalance`, which once rendered
+11 -23
View File
@@ -143,32 +143,20 @@ but the review is broader than any of them.
both routes take, so they behave the same and the button is live for the next
delete.
- 2026-09-21: The EIP-6963 provider UUID is generated fresh on each page load
and never persisted ([#398](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/398)).
It was created once and stored, then announced verbatim to every page on every
load and across restarts, so any site — connected or not — could read it as a
stable cross-site, cross-session identifier for the install, contradicting the
"no tracking" promise. inpage.js now announces a per-load
`crypto.randomUUID()` and the `eip6963Uuid` storage key and the
`AUTISTMASK_PROVIDER_UUID` content-script message are gone. That key was a
standalone storage entry, never part of the versioned `autistmask` profile, so
the state schema is untouched and no existing profile is affected.
- 2026-09-21: `README.md` now documents the approval screen's amount-slot
vocabulary and no longer contradicts itself
([#369](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/369)). The stale claim
that a genuine zero always renders `0.0000` is corrected: a zero with a known
scale does, except where the swap screen states it in words first —
`Min. received` always, and the `Amount` line only when a V4 exact-in of zero
is the step that sets it. A Permit2 permit sets that line whenever one is
present, so a zero permit, a zero V2/V3 exact-in `amountIn` or a zero
`WRAP_ETH` still reads `0.0000`. The amount-display section now names every
string a slot can show and when — a formatted quantity (a known-scale zero
included), `Unlimited` (on a swap also the router's whole-balance value),
`All available (V4 open delta)`, `None (no minimum guaranteed)`, base units
with decimals unknown, and `Unknown (not named in the calldata)` — and records
that a zero `minBalance` on a `BALANCE_CHECK_ERC20` step now reads
`None (no minimum guaranteed)` where it once read `0.0000`. Docs only.
that a genuine zero still renders `0.0000` is corrected: it holds for the
ERC-20 amount, and also for the swap's `Amount` line on a literal-zero
`amountIn` in a V2/V3 exact-in swap or a zero `WRAP_ETH`. Only two zeros are
stated in words upstream — the swap's `Min. received` (any zero minimum) and
its V4 exact-in `Amount` (an `amountIn` of zero, V4's open delta). The
amount-display section now names every string a slot can show — a formatted
quantity, `Unlimited`, `All available (V4 open delta)`,
`None (no minimum guaranteed)`, base units with decimals unknown, and
`Unknown (not named in the calldata)` — and records that a zero `minBalance`
on a `BALANCE_CHECK_ERC20` step now reads `None (no minimum guaranteed)` where
it once read `0.0000`. Docs only; each claim checked against the tree.
- 2026-08-30: An address no longer wraps, or is shortened to fit, in any of the
common views ([#380](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/380)). The
+26
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@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ const {
hasBrowserNamespace,
runtimeApi,
sendMessage,
storageGet,
storageSet,
} = require("../shared/browserApi");
// In Chrome (MV3), inpage.js runs as a MAIN-world content script declared
@@ -19,6 +21,30 @@ if (hasBrowserNamespace()) {
(document.head || document.documentElement).appendChild(script);
}
// Send the persisted EIP-6963 provider UUID to the inpage script.
// Generated once at install time and stored in extension storage.
(async function sendProviderUuid() {
let uuid = null;
try {
const items = await storageGet("eip6963Uuid");
uuid = items?.eip6963Uuid;
if (!uuid) {
uuid = crypto.randomUUID();
await storageSet({ eip6963Uuid: uuid });
}
} catch {
// Storage was unavailable or refused the write. The announcement
// still has to go out — a provider that never announces is invisible
// to every EIP-6963 dApp — so it goes under a fresh uuid that this
// page load will not outlive.
if (!uuid) uuid = crypto.randomUUID();
}
window.postMessage(
{ type: "AUTISTMASK_PROVIDER_UUID", uuid },
location.origin,
);
})();
// Relay requests from the page to the background script
window.addEventListener("message", (event) => {
if (event.source !== window) return;
+13 -9
View File
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@
}
// Listen for responses from the content script
window.addEventListener("message", (event) => {
window.addEventListener("message", function onUuid(event) {
if (event.source !== window) return;
if (event.data?.type !== "AUTISTMASK_RESPONSE") return;
const { id, result, error } = event.data;
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@
});
// Listen for events pushed from the extension
window.addEventListener("message", (event) => {
window.addEventListener("message", function onUuid(event) {
if (event.source !== window) return;
if (event.data?.type !== "AUTISTMASK_EVENT") return;
const { eventName, data } = event.data;
@@ -204,13 +204,7 @@
"</svg>",
);
// EIP-6963 asks for one UUIDv4 per provider for the life of the page: one
// per page load, shared by every announcement in that load. It is
// generated here and never stored: announcing one persisted value to every
// site, on every load and across restarts, turned it into a stable
// cross-site, cross-session tracking identifier any page could read
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/398).
const providerUuid = crypto.randomUUID();
let providerUuid = crypto.randomUUID(); // fallback until real UUID arrives
function buildProviderInfo() {
return {
@@ -232,6 +226,16 @@
);
}
// Listen for the persisted UUID from the content script
function onProviderUuid(event) {
if (event.source !== window) return;
if (event.data?.type !== "AUTISTMASK_PROVIDER_UUID") return;
window.removeEventListener("message", onProviderUuid);
providerUuid = event.data.uuid;
announceProvider();
}
window.addEventListener("message", onProviderUuid);
window.addEventListener("eip6963:requestProvider", announceProvider);
announceProvider();
+5 -5
View File
@@ -372,10 +372,10 @@ step("the loopback dApp page gets the real inpage provider", async (env) => {
STEP_TIMEOUT_MS,
);
// EIP-6963, asked of the provider itself. The announcement carries a
// UUIDv4 inpage.js generates fresh for this page load (nothing persists
// it — see issue #398) and has to name this extension and hand back the
// very object on window.ethereum.
// EIP-6963, asked of the provider itself. The announcement carries the
// uuid src/content/index.js reads out of extension storage — call site 1
// in the issue — and it has to name this extension and hand back the very
// object on window.ethereum.
const announced = await d.executeAsync(
`const done = arguments[arguments.length - 1];
const onAnnounce = (e) => {
@@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ step("the loopback dApp page gets the real inpage provider", async (env) => {
);
assert(
typeof announced.uuid === "string" && announced.uuid.length === 36,
"the announcement carries no provider uuid: " +
"the announcement carries no stored provider uuid: " +
JSON.stringify(announced.uuid),
);
-118
View File
@@ -1,118 +0,0 @@
// The EIP-6963 provider UUID inpage.js announces (src/content/inpage.js).
//
// The bug this pins down (issue #398): the UUID used to be generated once,
// persisted in extension storage, and announced verbatim to every page on
// every load and across browser restarts, so any site — connected or not —
// could read a stable cross-site, cross-session identifier for the install.
// EIP-6963 asks for one UUIDv4 per page load, shared by every announcement in
// that load. The fix generates it per page load and stores nothing.
//
// The stored UUID reached inpage.js as an AUTISTMASK_PROVIDER_UUID page
// message from the content script, and inpage.js then announced it. Each load
// below is posted the same stored UUID that way, so on the old code both loads
// announce it and the last two tests fail.
//
// inpage.js is a bare IIFE injected into the page's JS context, not a module;
// see tests/inpageErrors.test.js for why it is evaluated against a stub window
// rather than imported. Here the stub captures the CustomEvent that carries
// the announcement, so the UUID this file reads is the one a real dApp's
// eip6963:announceProvider listener would see.
const fs = require("fs");
const path = require("path");
const { webcrypto } = require("crypto");
const SOURCE = fs.readFileSync(
path.join(__dirname, "..", "src", "content", "inpage.js"),
"utf8",
);
const loadInto = new Function(
"window",
"self",
"crypto",
"Event",
"CustomEvent",
SOURCE,
);
class StubEvent {
constructor(type) {
this.type = type;
}
}
class StubCustomEvent extends StubEvent {
constructor(type, init) {
super(type);
this.detail = init && init.detail;
}
}
// What the old content script read out of extension storage and posted to
// every page load.
const STORED_UUID = "11111111-2222-4333-8444-555555555555";
// Evaluate inpage.js once against a fresh stub window, post it STORED_UUID the
// way the old content script did, then dispatch a `requestProvider` event so a
// re-announcement is observed as well as the announcement at load. Returns
// every UUID the load announced, in order.
function announcedUuids() {
const listeners = {};
const uuids = [];
const win = {
addEventListener(type, fn) {
(listeners[type] || (listeners[type] = [])).push(fn);
},
removeEventListener(type, fn) {
const fns = listeners[type];
if (!fns) return;
const i = fns.indexOf(fn);
if (i !== -1) fns.splice(i, 1);
},
postMessage() {},
dispatchEvent(event) {
if (event.type === "eip6963:announceProvider") {
uuids.push(event.detail.info.uuid);
}
for (const fn of (listeners[event.type] || []).slice()) fn(event);
return true;
},
};
win.window = win;
loadInto(win, win, webcrypto, StubEvent, StubCustomEvent);
win.dispatchEvent({
type: "message",
source: win,
data: { type: "AUTISTMASK_PROVIDER_UUID", uuid: STORED_UUID },
});
win.dispatchEvent(new StubEvent("eip6963:requestProvider"));
return uuids;
}
const UUID_V4 =
/^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-4[0-9a-f]{3}-[89ab][0-9a-f]{3}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/;
describe("the EIP-6963 provider UUID is fresh per page load", () => {
test("a load announces a UUIDv4", () => {
const uuids = announcedUuids();
expect(uuids.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
expect(uuids[0]).toMatch(UUID_V4);
});
test("every announcement within one load carries the same UUID", () => {
const uuids = announcedUuids();
expect(uuids.length).toBeGreaterThan(1);
expect(new Set(uuids).size).toBe(1);
});
test("two page loads announce different UUIDs, neither the stored one", () => {
const first = announcedUuids();
const second = announcedUuids();
expect(first).not.toContain(STORED_UUID);
expect(second).not.toContain(STORED_UUID);
expect(second[0]).not.toBe(first[0]);
});
});