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clawbot
61e0cad31f fix: let a user who lost the password delete the wallet, and warn before they can (closes #312)
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Deleting a wallet was password-gated and importing its recovery phrase
again was refused as a duplicate xpub by findWalletByXpub(), so a user who
held the phrase but had forgotten the password could neither leave the
wallet nor come back to it. The only escape was clearing extension storage
through browser internals, which takes every other wallet with it, and
nothing in the product ever warned that this was possible.

DeleteWallet now offers "I have lost my password", a screen that destroys
the wallet after the user types its name back. No password: requiring one
to discard a secret protects nobody, because an attacker at the popup who
wants the wallet gone can uninstall the extension, so the only person such
a gate stops is the owner who forgot it. The typed name is a check that
the user knows which wallet they are on, so it is matched with letter
case, surrounding spaces and repeated inner spaces ignored. The last of
those is not a nicety: HTML collapses a doubled inner space when it
renders the name, so comparing raw would leave a wallet named "My  Wallet"
with a confirmation no typing could ever satisfy.

This is the deletion route rather than the re-import route, and only one
of the two. Re-import would have had to be built three times over (hd and
xprv by xpub, key by address), would make the user retype the recovery
phrase into a live popup in order to change a password, and reaches no end
state that delete-then-import does not already reach through the existing
import path and scanForAddresses().

Both routes share one finishDelete(), so the selection repair, the site
permission cleanup and the AUTISTMASK_ACTIVE_CHANGED broadcast cannot
diverge between them. The new screen is not in RESTORABLE_VIEWS, alongside
delete-wallet-confirm: a popup reopened by accident must not land on a
button that erases key material. It registers an onViewLeave() cleanup as
well, not because a wallet name is a secret but because a typed
confirmation left standing in a hidden view leaves a wallet one click from
deletion. The two delete screens are siblings, so nothing is pushed on the
way in and Back re-enters DeleteWallet through show(), which hands it back
its wallet selection.

AddWallet's password hint now states, per import mode, that the password
cannot be recovered or reset and names what the only backup is. The hint
line reserves the 48px all three wordings measure in the popup, so
switching tabs cannot move the password fields under the pointer and the
reserve costs no height the screen needs elsewhere.

The test drives the real view against a chrome.storage.local stub that
structured-clones on both set and get, and asserts against what comes back
out of storage rather than against the live state object, so it fails on
the deletion of saveState() and not only on an in-memory splice.
2026-08-20 13:01:34 +00:00
33 changed files with 264 additions and 4071 deletions

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@@ -4,4 +4,3 @@
node_modules
.DS_Store
dist
release

3
.gitignore vendored
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@@ -23,9 +23,6 @@ node_modules/
# Build output
dist/
# Release artifacts (make package). Derived from dist/, never committed.
release/
# Yarn
.yarn-integrity
package-lock.json

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@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
node_modules/
yarn.lock
dist/
release/
.claude/

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@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
.PHONY: bootstrap setup install test test-e2e test-e2e-firefox lint fmt fmt-check check check-censored docker hooks build build-debug package vendor-blocklist clean dev
.PHONY: bootstrap setup install test test-e2e test-e2e-firefox lint fmt fmt-check check check-censored docker hooks build build-debug vendor-blocklist clean dev
# Standard targets are thin shims; the implementations live in script/
# per the scripts-to-rule-them-all pattern (see the Entrypoints section
@@ -41,9 +41,6 @@ check:
check-censored:
@script/check-censored
package:
@script/package
docker:
@script/docker
@@ -63,31 +60,19 @@ hooks:
# scrubbed from the build itself: with AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1 exported, this target
# compiles a debug bundle and then fails on it, loudly, rather than quietly
# handing back something other than the release build that was asked for.
#
# Every step of this target is wrapped in script/discard-dist-on-failure, so a
# release build that fails removes dist/ instead of leaving a complete, loadable
# debug bundle there for whoever runs the build, sees it fail, and loads
# dist/chrome/ anyway. A step that succeeds removes nothing, and build-debug is
# deliberately not wrapped.
build:
@echo "Building extension..."
@set -eu; \
receipt="$$(mktemp "$${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/autistmask-build-receipt.XXXXXX")"; \
trap 'rm -f "$$receipt"' EXIT INT TERM; \
script/discard-dist-on-failure \
env AUTISTMASK_BUILD_RECEIPT="$$receipt" yarn run build 2>&1; \
script/discard-dist-on-failure \
env -u AUTISTMASK_DEBUG script/verify-build --expect release \
AUTISTMASK_BUILD_RECEIPT="$$receipt" yarn run build 2>&1; \
env -u AUTISTMASK_DEBUG script/verify-build --expect release \
--receipt "$$receipt"
@script/discard-dist-on-failure script/check-censored --require-dist
@script/check-censored --require-dist
# Development-only build: enables the red DEBUG / INSECURE banner and makes
# the hardcoded test recovery phrase the output of wallet creation. Never
# distribute the artifacts this produces.
#
# No discard-dist-on-failure here, on purpose: a debug build that fails is not
# producing an artifact anyone could mistake for a release one, and its dist/ is
# the evidence of what went wrong.
build-debug:
@echo "Building extension (DEBUG)..."
@set -eu; \
@@ -105,7 +90,7 @@ vendor-blocklist:
@script/vendor-blocklist
clean:
@rm -rf dist/ release/
@rm -rf dist/
dev:
@echo "Building in watch mode..."

267
README.md
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@@ -44,107 +44,7 @@ Load the extension:
- **Chrome**: Navigate to `chrome://extensions/`, enable "Developer mode", click
"Load unpacked", and select the `dist/chrome/` directory.
- **Firefox**: Navigate to `about:debugging#/runtime/this-firefox`, click "Load
Temporary Add-on", and select `dist/firefox/manifest.json`. Read
[Installing on Firefox](#installing-on-firefox) before relying on this: a
temporary add-on does not survive closing the browser.
### Release Artifacts
`make package` runs `make build` and then writes one self-contained, versioned
archive per browser into `release/`, plus a `SHA256SUMS` for them:
```bash
make package
```
```
release/autistmask-chrome-<version>.zip
release/autistmask-firefox-<version>.xpi
release/SHA256SUMS
```
Nothing is published by this. Tagging, CRX packing and any upload are
outward-facing acts and are the owner's alone.
The archives are deterministic — entries sorted, timestamps fixed, compression
level fixed — so two builds of one commit produce byte-identical files and the
recorded digest is a property of the input rather than of the clock.
**Self-containment is checked, not assumed.** `build.js` writes the compiled
Tailwind output to `dist/styles.css` at the `dist/` ROOT, outside both browser
directories, and copies it into each of them as `src/popup/styles.css`; a naive
`zip -r dist/chrome` is therefore correct only by accident. So the packager
resolves every path referenced by the manifest and by every HTML document in the
archive, requires each to be inside the archive, and fails on any reference that
climbs out of the extension root. Files left at the `dist/` root are printed as
deliberately not shipped rather than dropped by a glob. The archive is then read
back off disk and compared member by member against the directory it was built
from: an archive nobody opened is a claim, not an artifact.
There is one version, and the build enforces it. `package.json`,
`manifest/chrome.json` and `manifest/firefox.json` each declare one and none is
derived from another — the manifests are copied to `dist/` verbatim, which is
what `tests/manifest.test.js` asserts — so `script/lib/version.js` requires all
three to agree and **fails the build when they do not**, naming each file and
what it said. `tests/version.test.js` covers that rule in `make check`.
### Installing on Chrome
`manifest/chrome.json` carries a fixed `key`: the public half of an RSA keypair,
base64-encoded DER. It exists for one reason. An unpacked Chrome extension with
no `key` gets an extension id derived from the **absolute path it was loaded
from**, and `chrome.storage.local` — which is where the wallet lives — is
partitioned by that id. Move the checkout, re-clone it, or load a second copy
from anywhere else, and the extension comes up on a fresh, empty storage
partition: the wallet is simply gone, with no error and nothing in the UI to say
so. With the `key` in place the id is derived from the key instead, and follows
the extension wherever it is loaded from. That id is
`gipbhkogfopeahplcjhipkgpcimdpkip`, pinned in `tests/extensionId.test.js` and
observed against a real Chrome in `tests/e2e/storagePartition.js`.
**Changing `key` changes the extension id, and orphans every wallet stored under
the old one.** It is a migration, not an edit.
The **private** half is a credential. It is not in this repository, no target
generates one into the working tree, `*.pem` and `*.key` are gitignored, and
`tests/extensionId.test.js` fails if such a file is ever committed. It is not
needed to build, load or test anything here — it signs a CRX, and this repo does
not pack one. A packer would take it from outside the repo, e.g.
`chrome --pack-extension=dist/chrome --pack-extension-key=<path to the .pem>`.
### Installing on Firefox
**The XPI this repo produces is UNSIGNED, and release Firefox and Firefox ESR
will refuse to install it.** Those builds enforce add-on signing with no working
override — `xpinstall.signatures.required` does nothing on them — so a permanent
install needs Firefox Developer Edition, Nightly, or an Unbranded build, with
`xpinstall.signatures.required` set to `false` in `about:config`.
Signing means submitting to AMO (self-distribution is enough, and does not
require listing), which needs credentials this repository does not have and is
the owner's decision.
The other route is `about:debugging#/runtime/this-firefox` -> "Load Temporary
Add-on", which works on every Firefox including release. **A temporary add-on is
unloaded when Firefox exits**, so daily use means re-adding it by hand on every
browser start.
**The wallet survives the restart.** `manifest/firefox.json` declares a fixed
`browser_specific_settings.gecko.id`, and Firefox keys the extension's storage
area on that id rather than on the install, so adding the temporary add-on again
in the same profile finds the vault where it left it. That is asserted, not
assumed: `tests/e2e/firefox/reinstall.js` installs the packaged XPI in a real
Firefox, creates a wallet through the UI, quits the browser, starts it again on
the same profile, adds the add-on again, and decrypts the vault with the
original password back to the original recovery phrase. The `moz-extension://`
origin the popup is served from is _not_ stable across installs and does not
need to be — nothing durable is keyed on it.
**Removing the add-on does not.** An explicit uninstall — about:addons "Remove"
— destroys the extension's storage, and the vault with it. That is ordinary,
correct browser behaviour and it is observed in the same suite, but for a wallet
it is worth saying out loud: **on Firefox, Remove is irreversible, and the
recovery phrase is the only way back.**
Temporary Add-on", and select `dist/firefox/manifest.json`.
### Debug Builds
@@ -163,12 +63,8 @@ that runs `make build`, that target compiles a debug bundle and then **fails**,
because it tells `script/verify-build` in so many words that it was supposed to
produce a release build. It used to be that the verifier read the same variable
out of its own environment, agreed with itself, and reported a debug artifact as
verified. The build prints which mode it used. A release build that fails also
**removes `dist/`**, and says so: the bundle it had already written is loadable,
and a loud failure is no protection against someone loading `dist/chrome/`
anyway. `make build-debug` keeps its `dist/` on failure — that output is not
mistakable for a release build, and it is the evidence of what went wrong. See
the [DEBUG Mode Policy](#debug-mode-policy) for what the flag changes. **Never
verified. The build prints which mode it used. See the
[DEBUG Mode Policy](#debug-mode-policy) for what the flag changes. **Never
distribute a debug build** — every wallet it creates gets the same publicly
known test recovery phrase.
@@ -185,21 +81,17 @@ lives.
one of the bundles containing `src/shared/constants.js` — into a build receipt,
and `script/verify-build` checks `dist/` against that receipt: every recorded
file present with exactly the recorded bytes, every audited bundle carrying the
requested `DEBUG` marker, and no regular file or symlink under `dist/` that the
build did not write. The `Makefile` creates the receipt path with `mktemp` per
invocation, outside the repo, and deletes it afterwards.
requested `DEBUG` marker, and nothing under `dist/` that the build did not
write. The `Makefile` creates the receipt path with `mktemp` per invocation,
outside the repo, and deletes it afterwards.
That is what ties the check to a build rather than to a directory. What it
establishes is narrow and worth stating exactly: `dist/` is byte for byte the
output of the `build.js` run that just finished, with no regular file or symlink
added, removed or altered in between. Regular files and symlinks are the whole
of what the tree walk covers; fifos, sockets, device nodes and empty directories
under `dist/` are not checked, because a build emits none of them, none can
carry a shippable payload, and `grep` on a fifo would hang rather than fail. It
establishes nothing about whether the source tree or `build.js` were honest, and
it offers nothing to someone handed a `dist/` from elsewhere — without the
receipt from its own build there is no input to the check. Verifiable provenance
for a third party is signing, which this is not.
output of the `build.js` run that just finished, with nothing added, removed or
altered in between. It establishes nothing about whether the source tree or
`build.js` were honest, and it offers nothing to someone handed a `dist/` from
elsewhere — without the receipt from its own build there is no input to the
check. Verifiable provenance for a third party is signing, which this is not.
There is deliberately no target that re-verifies an existing `dist/` on its own.
The list of files to check has to come from the build that produced them; read
@@ -246,45 +138,31 @@ provide:
fails anywhere else. Part of `make check`, which inspects `dist/` when there
is one and says loudly when there is not; `make build` re-runs it with
`--require-dist`, so a build artifact is always covered
- `script/package` — produce the release artifacts: `make build` first, so the
archives can only ever be made from a `dist/` that has been verified against
that build's own receipt as a RELEASE build, then one self-contained,
versioned archive per browser into `release/` (see
[Release Artifacts](#release-artifacts)). It packages and does not publish
- `script/vendor-blocklist` — refresh `src/shared/phishingBlocklist.json` from
its upstream, pinned to a commit and to the sha256 of the bytes that commit
serves. Run deliberately, never as part of a build: the output is committed
and there is no runtime fetch, so the shipped list is as fresh as the last
vendoring run that was released
- `script/verify-build --expect release|debug --receipt PATH` — assert that the
regular files and symlinks under `dist/` are exactly what the build that just
ran emitted (other file types are out of scope), and that the compiled `DEBUG`
state of the bundles in it is the one that was asked for. Both arguments are
required and neither has a default: the expected mode is stated by the caller
rather than read from `AUTISTMASK_DEBUG`, and the file list comes from the
build's receipt rather than from `dist/` (see
- `script/verify-build --expect release|debug --receipt PATH` — assert that
`dist/` is exactly what the build that just ran emitted, and that the compiled
`DEBUG` state of the bundles in it is the one that was asked for. Both
arguments are required and neither has a default: the expected mode is stated
by the caller rather than read from `AUTISTMASK_DEBUG`, and the file list
comes from the build's receipt rather than from `dist/` (see
[Build Receipts](#build-receipts)). Run automatically at the end of
`make build` and `make build-debug`; fails loudly rather than passing whenever
it cannot determine something. Not part of `make check`, which does not depend
on build artifacts existing.
- `script/discard-dist-on-failure COMMAND [ARG...]` — run one step of the
**release** build and, if it fails, remove `dist/` before returning that
step's exit status, saying on stderr that it did and why. Every step of
`make build` runs through it; `make build-debug` runs none of them through it.
A step that succeeds removes nothing, and a removal that cannot be completed
is reported as loudly as one that was
- `script/test-verify-build` — exercise every failure mode of
`script/verify-build` against a fixture tree in a temp dir, asserting the exit
status and the message of each, assert the state of `dist/` on disk after a
failing and a succeeding release build step, and read the `make build` and
status and the message of each, and read the `make build` and
`make build-debug` recipes back out of `make -n` to check that they pass the
mode as an argument on a scrubbed environment and wrap only the release path.
Part of `make check`; it reads no build artifacts and writes nothing under
`dist/`. The cases that depend on file permissions cannot mean anything for a
process that is not subject to them, so the harness proves its runner against
a mode-000 file before counting them, dropping to an unprivileged user when
run as root; if it cannot, it skips those cases and says so in a banner rather
than passing them.
mode as an argument on a scrubbed environment. Part of `make check`; it reads
no build artifacts and writes nothing under `dist/`. The cases that depend on
file permissions cannot mean anything for a process that is not subject to
them, so the harness proves its runner against a mode-000 file before counting
them, dropping to an unprivileged user when run as root; if it cannot, it
skips those cases and says so in a banner rather than passing them.
- `script/docker` — build the Docker image tagged via `script/projectname`
- `script/cibuild` — CI entrypoint: plain `docker build .`
- `script/precommit` — run by the git pre-commit hook; runs `script/check`
@@ -298,12 +176,10 @@ The Makefile shims to those. It also carries a few targets that have no
silently rewritten. Use `make setup` for a fresh clone.
- `make hooks` — shims to `script/install-precommit`
- `make build` — build the extension into `dist/chrome/` and `dist/firefox/`,
then verify the result against the build's receipt as a release build. A
failure at any step removes `dist/`
then verify the result against the build's receipt as a release build
- `make build-debug` — the same build with `AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1`, verified as a
debug build, and keeping its `dist/` on failure (see
[Debug Builds](#debug-builds))
- `make clean` — remove `dist/` and `release/`
debug build (see [Debug Builds](#debug-builds))
- `make clean` — remove `dist/`
- `make dev` — build in watch mode
## End-to-End Tests
@@ -439,23 +315,6 @@ class before a browser is involved, so this suite is no longer the only thing
standing between it and a release — but a static rule only sees identifiers, and
the runtime errors this suite catches are broader than one rule.
`make test-e2e` then runs a second program in the same image,
`tests/e2e/storagePartition.js`, which answers where `chrome.storage.local`
lives. It loads the built extension from one temporary directory in a fresh
profile, writes a sentinel key the extension itself never touches, closes the
browser, and loads a **copy at a different path into the same profile** — then
does it again with `key` stripped out of the manifest, and reports what each
pair actually did rather than what it expected. It needs its own browser
sessions, four of them, because the whole subject is what happens ACROSS loads.
The observed behaviour, on the pinned Chromium: **with `key`, both paths get the
same extension id and the second load reads the first load's storage. Without
`key`, the two paths get different ids and the second load sees an empty
partition** — the wallet, silently gone. Loading both keyed copies at once in
one profile yields a single extension id, not two: Chrome does not load a second
copy of an id it already has. The assertions are annotated as observations, so a
Chrome that ever changes this fails the run instead of passing it.
### Firefox (`make test-e2e-firefox`)
`make test-e2e-firefox` builds `dist/firefox/` and drives the **real popup in a
@@ -473,33 +332,6 @@ runner rather than believed from the extension, and the stub node has to answer
`eth_sendRawTransaction` with the hash `ethers` computes for the artifact it
sent, or `provider.broadcastTransaction()` refuses the answer.
`make test-e2e-firefox` then runs a second program in the same image,
`tests/e2e/firefox/reinstall.js`, and it installs the **packaged XPI** rather
than the unpacked directory — the only place a real Firefox is asked to load the
artifact that would actually be handed to someone. It runs two browsers over one
profile, because it asks two questions that have different answers:
- **Restart.** Install, create a wallet through the UI, record the vault, quit
the browser, start it again on the same profile, add the add-on again. The
extension must not come up as a fresh install; the vault, xpub and first
address must be unchanged; and the vault must still **decrypt** with the
original password to the original recovery phrase, through the real Show
Recovery Phrase screen. "The ciphertext is still in storage" and "the wallet
still works" are different claims and only the second one is worth anything.
This is what a user does every day, because a temporary add-on is unloaded
when Firefox exits.
- **Removal.** Then, in the same browser, an explicit uninstall and a fresh
install. Observed: **Firefox destroys the extension's storage on uninstall**,
so the vault is gone. Recorded as an assertion, so a Firefox that ever changes
it fails the run, and stated in
[Installing on Firefox](#installing-on-firefox) because for a wallet it means
Remove is irreversible except from the recovery phrase.
It also pins down something worth knowing about the harness: the
`moz-extension://` uuid the popup is served from is not stable across installs,
and navigating to a stale one does not fail — it hangs. The program reads the
live uuid out of `extensions.webextensions.uuids` after every install.
Both suites build their own image, each with the repo and a fresh extension
build baked in; what differs is the base. The Chrome image layers those on top
of a published Playwright image, whereas this one is assembled from a `node`
@@ -857,51 +689,6 @@ Both are click-copyable. Truncating to 4 decimals in summary views is acceptable
for scannability, but the detail view must never discard precision — it is the
one place the user can always use to verify exact details.
**Specific Exception — nonzero floor on the approval screens:** A nonzero amount
must never render as zero. Truncating to 4 decimals does exactly that to an
amount below 0.0001 — 1 base unit of an 18-decimal token, 500 base units of an
8-decimal one — and on the dApp approval screen and the wait/success/error
screens that carry its amount forward, a real transfer or allowance then reads
as "nothing is being moved". A swap's `Min. received` is the sharper case: a
slippage floor shown as `0.0000` states that the swap may return nothing.
On those screens, when the truncated string would contain no digit from 1 to 9
and the value does, the amount is extended to its first significant digit
instead: `0.000000000000000001 DAI`, not `0.0000 DAI`. The test is on the whole
truncated string, integer part included, so `1.00005` still shows as `1.0000`
the exception only fires where the entire displayed figure would read as zero. A
genuine zero still renders `0.0000`, and truncation stays truncation: `0.99999`
shows as `0.9999`, never rounded up.
The rule and its exception live in `src/shared/amountDisplay.js` as
`truncateAmount()` and `truncateAmountNeverZero()`. Everything the approval and
confirmation screens display goes through the floored one — the ERC-20 amount,
the ETH value and max fee (`src/popup/views/approval.js`), and the swap's
`Amount` and `Min. received` lines (`src/shared/uniswap.js`). The history and
balance lists (`src/shared/transactions.js`) use the unfloored one: the
transaction detail view is the authoritative record and already shows exact
precision. The 4-decimal rule is unchanged everywhere else, including for
amounts at or above the floor on the approval screens.
The floor applies only where the token's scale is known. Where it is not, the
approval screen states base units instead of a quantity — see Unknown token
scale below — and no truncation happens at all.
**Specific Exception — unknown token scale:** Calldata carries base units and no
scale, so every amount on the dApp approval screen needs the token's `decimals`.
It is resolved from the bundled token list, then from the tokens the user
tracks, then from what the block explorer reported for the contract
(`resolveTokenDecimals()` in `src/shared/approvalAmount.js`). Where none of them
answers, the amount is not formatted: the line reads
`5000000000 base units (decimals unknown)`. A guessed scale is not an
approximation but a different number — 1,000 units of a 6-decimal token
formatted at 18 decimals reads `0.000000001` — on the screen whose only job is
to state what is being authorized. Both amount paths of that screen take this
rule: the ERC-20 `transfer`/`approve` line (`src/popup/views/approval.js`) and
the swap's `Amount` and `Min. received` lines (`src/shared/uniswap.js`). An
unbounded allowance or permit needs no scale to describe and is still shown as
`Unlimited`.
#### Partial USD totals
Prices are fetched for the top 25 tokens only, so an address can hold assets the

116
TODO.md
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@@ -26,8 +26,7 @@ milestone is in flight on `next`; its `next` -> `main` PR is
[#190](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/pulls/190). `make check` verified
green on `next` at `e9fa8be` on 2026-08-10, and `make build` produces
`dist/chrome/` and `dist/firefox/`, verified against the build's own receipt to
hold exactly the regular files and symlinks that build emitted, with `DEBUG`
compiled off.
be exactly what that build emitted with `DEBUG` compiled off.
The backlog lives on the
[Gitea tracker](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues), which is
@@ -45,119 +44,6 @@ but the review is broader than any of them.
# Completed Steps
- 2026-08-23: The swap approval screen no longer guesses 18 decimals for a token
outside the bundled list
([#340](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/340)). `tokenInfo()` in
`src/shared/uniswap.js` returned `decimals: 18` for any such token — the same
assumption [#306](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/306) removed
from the ERC-20 amount line — so a 1,000-unit swap of a 6-decimal token was
stated as `0.000000001`, and every newly listed token reached it. The swap's
`Amount` and `Min. received` lines now resolve the scale through
`resolveTokenDecimals()`, the same bundled-list-then-tracked-then-explorer
order the ERC-20 line uses, and where nothing knows it they render
`unknownDecimalsAmount()` — base units with the scale stated — instead of a
number. No new data source and no network call: the scale comes only from what
the wallet already holds. An unbounded permit is still shown as `Unlimited`.
`README.md` records the rule as a Display Consistency exception.
- 2026-08-23: A failed release build no longer leaves a loadable debug bundle in
`dist/` ([#333](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/333)). With
`AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1` exported, `make build` compiled a debug bundle and failed
on it in `script/verify-build` — but the bundle stayed on disk, loadable, with
every wallet it creates using the publicly committed test recovery phrase.
Every step of `make build` now runs through `script/discard-dist-on-failure`,
which removes `dist/` when a step fails and says on stderr that it did and
why; a removal it cannot complete is reported just as loudly.
`make build-debug` is deliberately not wrapped: its output is not mistakable
for a release build and is the evidence of the failure.
`script/test-verify-build` asserts the state of `dist/` on disk after a
failing and a succeeding step, not just the exit status, and reads `make -n`
to check the wrapper is on the release path and only there.
- 2026-08-23: `README.md` and `script/verify-build`'s own comments now state the
emitted-tree guarantee at the width the code actually enforces
([#331](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/331)). The tree walk is
`-type f -o -type l`, so the guarantee covers regular files and symlinks under
`dist/`; fifos, sockets, device nodes and empty directories are not checked,
because a build emits none of them, none can carry a shippable payload, and
`grep` on a fifo would hang rather than fail. The exclusion is deliberate and
unchanged — the README said "nothing under `dist/` that the build did not
write", which was broader than that. Documentation only; no executable line
changed.
- 2026-08-23: An amount below the 4-decimal display floor no longer reads as
zero on the approval screens
([#322](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/322)). With the token's
true scale resolved, the 4-decimal truncation still printed a small amount as
`0.0000` — 1 base unit of an 18-decimal token, 500 of an 8-decimal one — so a
real transfer, allowance or swap was stated as nothing on the one screen whose
job is to say what is being authorized, and a swap's `Min. received` claimed
the user might receive nothing. Three copies of that truncation existed; they
now share `src/shared/amountDisplay.js`. Everything the approval and
confirmation screens render (`src/popup/views/approval.js`,
`src/shared/uniswap.js`) extends to the first significant digit when the
truncated figure would otherwise read as zero, keeping the amount in token
units rather than switching to base units mid-line. The history and balance
lists (`src/shared/transactions.js`) keep the unfloored rule, which is out of
scope by the issue's definition of done. `README.md`'s Display Consistency
section records the exception.
- 2026-08-23: The extension can be installed once and kept
([#310](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/310)). There was no
packaging target anywhere, no artifact, and `manifest/chrome.json` carried no
`key` — so an unpacked Chrome load derived its extension id, and therefore its
`chrome.storage.local` partition, from the absolute checkout path: moving or
re-cloning the checkout presented an empty wallet with no error. The manifest
now carries a fixed `key` (public half only; the private half is a credential
and is not in this repo, and no target generates one into the tree), pinning
the id to `gipbhkogfopeahplcjhipkgpcimdpkip`. `make package` produces
`release/autistmask-chrome-<version>.zip` and
`release/autistmask-firefox-<version>.xpi` plus `SHA256SUMS`,
deterministically and via `make build` so the archives can only be made from a
`dist/` already verified against that build's receipt as a release build;
every path the manifests and the popup HTML reference is resolved and required
to be inside the archive, and the archive is read back off disk and compared
member by member — `dist/styles.css` sits at the `dist/` root outside both
browser directories and is reported as deliberately not shipped rather than
dropped by a glob. One version: `script/lib/version.js` fails the build when
`package.json` and the two manifests disagree, instead of reading from one of
them. `BUILD_COMMIT` now carries `-dirty` when the working tree does not match
`HEAD` (and `-unknown` when git cannot say), while the full hash behind the
About screen's commit link stays clean so the link still resolves. Two real
browser observations back it: `tests/e2e/storagePartition.js` loads the
extension from two different paths in one Chrome profile with and without
`key` and records what each does, and `tests/e2e/firefox/reinstall.js`
installs the packaged XPI in a real Firefox, creates a wallet, restarts the
browser on the same profile, adds the add-on again and decrypts the vault back
to the original recovery phrase — and then observes that an explicit uninstall
DESTROYS that storage, which is correct browser behaviour but means Remove is
irreversible for a wallet, now stated in README.md. Deliberately not done: AMO
signing, CRX packing, tagging and any upload — the Firefox artifact is
UNSIGNED and README.md now states that release Firefox and ESR refuse it, that
Developer Edition or an Unbranded build is required, and that a temporary
add-on does not survive a browser restart.
- 2026-08-20: A second extension page can no longer silently delete a wallet
([#304](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/304)). `saveState()` wrote
the entire state blob, and every extension page — the toolbar popup, a dApp
approval window, `backgroundRefresh()` — holds its own in-memory `state`,
loaded once, with `showView()` saving on every navigation; a second page that
saved after a first had written something new overwrote it, no attacker or
unusual input required. `saveState()` is now a read-modify-write: it re-reads
storage, diffs the persisted fields against a deep-cloned `baseline` snapshot
taken at the last `loadState()`/`saveState()` on that page, and writes only
the fields that actually changed — everything else is carried forward from
storage in its loaded-and-normalized shape (`normalizePersisted()`, shared
with `loadState()`), so a legacy or malformed record a load has always
self-healed in memory keeps getting written back even on a save that touched
something else entirely. `showView()` fires `saveState()` on every navigation
without awaiting it, so two saves from the same page can be in flight at once;
a FIFO queue serializes them rather than letting a slow one finish after a
later one and re-derive a stale answer. Deliberately not done: the live
`state` of a field this page does not own is not rehydrated from what another
page wrote, only the persisted record is — adopting a concurrently-written
value into `state` reintroduced the same clobber one page later, caught by
`tests/txStatus.test.js` red. Two writers of the same field still resolve
last-writer-wins, documented at the merge point. `tests/stateMerge.test.js`
covers the two-page save and the approval-window reproduction from the issue —
add a wallet in one page, force a save from a second page loaded before it,
both wallets survive — each demonstrated failing against the unfixed full-blob
write.
- 2026-08-20: A forgotten password no longer wedges the wallet
([#312](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/312)). Deleting a wallet
was password-gated and importing its recovery phrase again was refused as a

View File

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ const path = require("path");
const crypto = require("crypto");
const { execSync } = require("child_process");
const esbuild = require("esbuild");
const { resolveVersion } = require("./script/lib/version");
const DIST = path.join(__dirname, "dist");
const DIST_CHROME = path.join(DIST, "chrome");
@@ -161,53 +160,28 @@ function isDebugBuild() {
return process.env.AUTISTMASK_DEBUG === "1";
}
// A short git output, or null when git cannot answer. Distinguishing "git said
// nothing" from "git could not be asked" matters below: a working tree whose
// state is unknown must not be stamped as clean.
function git(args) {
try {
return execSync(`git ${args}`, {
encoding: "utf8",
stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "ignore"],
}).trim();
} catch {
// not a git repo, or git not available
return null;
}
}
// The working-tree state, as a suffix for the displayed commit: "" when the
// tree matches HEAD, "-dirty" when it does not, "-unknown" when git answered
// the hash but not the status. Without this a build from a modified tree
// stamped a clean hash, so the About screen named a commit whose contents were
// not what was running — the one thing that stamp exists to establish.
//
// git status --porcelain honours .gitignore, so dist/ and node_modules/ do not
// make every build dirty; an untracked file that is NOT ignored does, and
// correctly: it may well be in the bundle.
function worktreeSuffix() {
const status = git("status --porcelain");
if (status === null) return "-unknown";
return status === "" ? "" : "-dirty";
}
function getBuildInfo() {
const pkg = JSON.parse(
fs.readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, "package.json"), "utf8"),
);
const commitHashFull = git("rev-parse HEAD") || "unknown";
const shortHash = git("rev-parse --short HEAD") || "unknown";
// The full hash is left clean because it is the href of the commit link in
// the About screen, and "abc123-dirty" is not a commit anyone can fetch.
// The displayed short hash carries the marker, so the screen says the tree
// was modified while still linking somewhere real.
const commitHash =
shortHash === "unknown" ? shortHash : shortHash + worktreeSuffix();
let commitHash = "unknown";
try {
commitHash = execSync("git rev-parse --short HEAD", {
encoding: "utf8",
}).trim();
} catch {
// not a git repo or git not available
}
let commitHashFull = "unknown";
try {
commitHashFull = execSync("git rev-parse HEAD", {
encoding: "utf8",
}).trim();
} catch {
// not a git repo or git not available
}
return {
// Fails the build when package.json and the two manifests disagree;
// see script/lib/version.js. Called before anything is emitted, so a
// tree with no single version never reaches dist/.
version: resolveVersion(__dirname),
version: pkg.version,
license: pkg.license,
author: pkg.author,
commitHash,

View File

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@
"name": "AutistMask",
"version": "0.1.0",
"description": "Minimal Ethereum wallet for Chrome",
"key": "MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAzy/G9gT4Z3Ci0HCmthUPEiCjENg+5meZpjdogyT7SiMfxENtHdrpDL6wGhAg1Dk0f1C67Ft8OYpMrMH3kiP2Wnt0UpHo45PY0YUUYzdJgbsp8u0kaykd5FFiY6FycIIFaTniMuh7wRKuNNdJWly+H3aG7qZ6nGu5PIMdb1GXUk35hY+yl7dz5dqFFYUCyxvWCT9XGBSYiI+XRBB/rVZjMWfWpaTmRPdOZ4+GO/Lx0OdMxKlPA/kLWoPot5vMlLn2FDPu6sASphiu7dKZnrINW+h/27jlHMJQS0jncB1EgqOHW0vbXrZnTveFX6UW+Qp86FfSkikhKtQgTW2A4mtWawIDAQAB",
"permissions": ["storage", "activeTab", "alarms"],
"host_permissions": ["<all_urls>"],
"content_security_policy": {

View File

@@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
# script/discard-dist-on-failure: run one step of the RELEASE build, and if that
# step fails, remove dist/ before returning its exit status. Our own extension
# to scripts-to-rule-them-all, wrapped around every step of make build.
#
# Why: with AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1 exported in the calling shell, make build
# compiles a debug bundle and then fails on it in script/verify-build — but the
# bundle is already written. It is loadable, and every wallet it creates gets
# the publicly committed test recovery phrase from src/shared/constants.js. A
# failed release build that leaves that behind is a smaller version of the trap
# the verifier exists to close, and "the failure was loud" only works on an
# operator who does not load dist/chrome/ anyway. Removing the artifact does not
# depend on that.
#
# Two things this deliberately does not do. It does not wrap make build-debug: a
# debug build that failed is not a mistakable artifact, and its output is the
# evidence of what went wrong. And it never removes anything on a step that
# SUCCEEDS, including the final check-censored --require-dist pass.
#
# The removal is never silent: it says dist/ is gone and why, on stderr, above
# the build's own failure.
set -eu
ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
DIST="$ROOT/dist"
usage() {
echo "usage: discard-dist-on-failure COMMAND [ARG...]" >&2
}
# Remove dist/, and say so. A removal that could not be completed is reported as
# loudly as one that was: the artifact is still on disk, and reporting nothing
# would leave the operator believing it is not.
discard_dist() {
if [ ! -e "$DIST" ] && [ ! -h "$DIST" ]; then
echo "discard-dist-on-failure: the release build failed. There was no" \
"dist/ to remove." >&2
return 0
fi
rm -rf "$DIST" || true
if [ -e "$DIST" ] || [ -h "$DIST" ]; then
echo "discard-dist-on-failure: the release build failed and dist/" \
"COULD NOT BE REMOVED, so it is still on disk. Do not load it:" \
"a release build that failed may hold a complete debug bundle," \
"whose wallets all use the publicly committed test recovery" \
"phrase. Remove it by hand (make clean)." >&2
return 0
fi
echo "discard-dist-on-failure: the release build failed, so dist/ WAS" \
"REMOVED and no longer exists. A release build that fails has often" \
"already emitted a complete, loadable debug bundle — every wallet it" \
"creates gets the publicly committed test recovery phrase — so the" \
"failed build is not left behind to be loaded. Fix the failure and" \
"re-run make build, or run make build-debug if a debug build is what" \
"was wanted; that target keeps its output." >&2
}
main() {
[ "$#" -ge 1 ] || {
usage
echo "discard-dist-on-failure: no command given, so no build step ran" \
"and nothing was removed." >&2
exit 1
}
_status=0
"$@" || _status=$?
[ "$_status" -ne 0 ] || return 0
discard_dist
exit "$_status"
}
main "$@"

View File

@@ -1,294 +0,0 @@
// Turn a verified dist/ into the two distributable archives.
//
// Invoked by script/package, which runs `make build` first so that dist/ has
// already been checked against the build's own receipt (see the Build Receipts
// section of README.md). This program does not build anything and does not
// write into dist/: it reads the emitted tree and writes release/.
//
// release/autistmask-chrome-<version>.zip loaded via chrome://extensions
// release/autistmask-firefox-<version>.xpi an UNSIGNED add-on, see README
// release/SHA256SUMS
//
// Self-containment is checked rather than assumed, because the layout invites
// exactly one mistake: build.js emits dist/styles.css at the dist/ ROOT,
// outside both browser directories, and copies it into each of them as
// src/popup/styles.css. A naive `zip -r dist/chrome` is therefore correct only
// by accident, and would stop being correct the moment a reference pointed up
// and out. So every path the manifest and the popup HTML reference is resolved
// and required to be inside the archive, a reference that escapes the browser
// directory is a hard failure, and anything sitting at the dist/ root is
// listed as deliberately not shipped rather than silently dropped.
//
// The archive is then read back and compared byte for byte against the
// directory it was built from. An archive nobody opened is a claim, not an
// artifact.
"use strict";
const crypto = require("crypto");
const fs = require("fs");
const path = require("path");
const { readZip, writeZip } = require("./zip");
const { resolveVersion } = require("./version");
const ROOT = path.resolve(__dirname, "..", "..");
const DIST = path.join(ROOT, "dist");
const RELEASE = path.join(ROOT, "release");
const TARGETS = [
{ dir: "chrome", ext: "zip" },
// .xpi rather than .zip: it is the same container, but Firefox's install
// flow keys off the extension.
{ dir: "firefox", ext: "xpi" },
];
// Strings in a manifest that name a file the extension loads. Matched by
// shape, not by a list of manifest keys, so a key added in a later manifest
// version is covered the day it appears rather than the day someone remembers
// to extend a list here. Nothing else in either manifest looks like this: the
// CSP strings, "<all_urls>", the version and the base64 key all fail it.
const MANIFEST_PATH_RE =
/^[A-Za-z0-9._][A-Za-z0-9._/-]*\.(?:js|css|html|json|png|svg|woff2?)$/;
// Local references out of an HTML document. Enough for what this repo emits —
// one stylesheet link and one script tag — and anything it does not understand
// is reported rather than passed over, see htmlReferences().
const HTML_REF_RE = /(?:src|href)\s*=\s*["']([^"']+)["']/gi;
function fail(message) {
throw new Error(message);
}
function sha256(buf) {
return crypto.createHash("sha256").update(buf).digest("hex");
}
// Every regular file under dir, as archive-root-relative forward-slashed
// paths. A symlink is refused rather than followed: build.js emits regular
// files only, so a link under dist/ is not something the build produced, and
// dereferencing one would put bytes from outside dist/ into the artifact.
function listFiles(dir, prefix = "") {
const out = [];
for (const entry of fs.readdirSync(dir, { withFileTypes: true })) {
const rel = prefix ? `${prefix}/${entry.name}` : entry.name;
if (entry.isSymbolicLink()) {
fail(
`${dir}/${entry.name} is a symlink. The build emits regular ` +
`files only, so this is not something it produced and it ` +
`will not be archived.`,
);
} else if (entry.isDirectory()) {
out.push(...listFiles(path.join(dir, entry.name), rel));
} else if (entry.isFile()) {
out.push(rel);
} else {
fail(
`${dir}/${entry.name} is neither a regular file nor a ` +
`directory, so it is not something the build emitted`,
);
}
}
return out.sort();
}
// Collect every string anywhere in the manifest that looks like a file it
// loads, plus every string that tries to reach outside the extension root.
// The second half is the point: "../styles.css" never matches
// MANIFEST_PATH_RE, so without an explicit check an escaping reference would
// read as "not a path" and the missing file would be found only by a user
// whose popup rendered unstyled.
function manifestReferences(value, found = new Set()) {
if (typeof value === "string") {
if (value.split("/").includes("..")) {
fail(
`the manifest references ${JSON.stringify(value)}, which ` +
`points outside the extension root. Everything the ` +
`browser loads has to be inside the archive; nothing ` +
`above it is shipped.`,
);
}
if (MANIFEST_PATH_RE.test(value)) found.add(value);
} else if (Array.isArray(value)) {
for (const v of value) manifestReferences(v, found);
} else if (value && typeof value === "object") {
for (const v of Object.values(value)) manifestReferences(v, found);
}
return found;
}
// Local references out of one HTML member, resolved against that member's own
// directory and returned archive-relative. Absolute URLs, data: URIs and
// in-page anchors are not files and are skipped; a relative reference that
// climbs out of the archive root is a failure for the same reason as above.
function htmlReferences(member, text) {
const base = path.posix.dirname(member);
const out = new Set();
for (const match of text.matchAll(HTML_REF_RE)) {
const ref = match[1].trim();
if (ref === "" || ref.startsWith("#") || ref.startsWith("//")) continue;
if (/^[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:/i.test(ref)) continue;
if (ref.startsWith("/")) {
fail(
`${member} references ${JSON.stringify(ref)} from the ` +
`extension root. Nothing here emits root-absolute ` +
`references and this packager does not resolve them.`,
);
}
const resolved = path.posix.normalize(path.posix.join(base, ref));
if (resolved.startsWith("..")) {
fail(
`${member} references ${JSON.stringify(ref)}, which resolves ` +
`outside the extension root. build.js copies the ` +
`compiled stylesheet into each browser directory for ` +
`exactly this reason: dist/styles.css lives at the dist/ ` +
`root and is not part of either archive.`,
);
}
out.add(resolved);
}
return out;
}
// Everything the browser is told to load, and the assertion that all of it is
// in the archive.
function checkSelfContained(target, members, read) {
if (!members.includes("manifest.json")) {
fail(`dist/${target} has no manifest.json at its root`);
}
const manifest = JSON.parse(read("manifest.json").toString("utf8"));
const referenced = new Set(manifestReferences(manifest));
for (const member of members) {
if (!member.endsWith(".html")) continue;
for (const ref of htmlReferences(
member,
read(member).toString("utf8"),
)) {
referenced.add(ref);
}
}
const missing = [...referenced].filter((r) => !members.includes(r));
if (missing.length > 0) {
fail(
`the ${target} archive would not be self-contained: it is told ` +
`to load ${missing.join(", ")}, which ${
missing.length === 1 ? "is" : "are"
} not in it`,
);
}
return { manifest, referenced };
}
function main() {
const version = resolveVersion(ROOT);
if (!fs.existsSync(DIST)) {
fail(
"there is no dist/ to package. script/package runs make build " +
"first; run it rather than this program.",
);
}
fs.rmSync(RELEASE, { recursive: true, force: true });
fs.mkdirSync(RELEASE, { recursive: true });
// Files the build emits at the dist/ root, outside both browser
// directories. Printed rather than ignored: dist/styles.css is the
// Tailwind output that build.js then copies into each browser directory,
// so leaving it out is correct — but "correct and stated" and "dropped by
// a glob" are different things, and only one of them survives the next
// change to the build.
const rootOnly = fs
.readdirSync(DIST, { withFileTypes: true })
.filter((e) => !e.isDirectory())
.map((e) => e.name)
.sort();
if (rootOnly.length > 0) {
console.log(
`Not shipped (dist/ root, outside every browser directory, and ` +
`referenced by nothing inside one): ${rootOnly.join(", ")}`,
);
}
const sums = [];
for (const { dir, ext } of TARGETS) {
const targetDir = path.join(DIST, dir);
if (!fs.existsSync(targetDir)) {
fail(`dist/${dir} does not exist; run make build`);
}
const members = listFiles(targetDir);
const readFromDir = (member) =>
fs.readFileSync(path.join(targetDir, member));
const { manifest } = checkSelfContained(dir, members, readFromDir);
if (manifest.version !== version) {
fail(
`dist/${dir}/manifest.json says version ${manifest.version} ` +
`but this tree is ${version}. dist/ is stale: run make ` +
`build.`,
);
}
const archive = writeZip(
members.map((name) => ({ name, data: readFromDir(name) })),
);
const name = `autistmask-${dir}-${version}.${ext}`;
const outPath = path.join(RELEASE, name);
fs.writeFileSync(outPath, archive);
// Read the artifact back off disk, not the buffer that was just
// written: what ships is the file.
const written = fs.readFileSync(outPath);
const entries = readZip(written);
const inArchive = entries.map((e) => e.name).sort();
if (inArchive.join("\n") !== members.join("\n")) {
fail(
`${name} does not hold the same members as dist/${dir}: ` +
`archive has ${inArchive.length}, directory has ` +
`${members.length}`,
);
}
for (const entry of entries) {
const onDisk = readFromDir(entry.name);
if (sha256(entry.data) !== sha256(onDisk)) {
fail(`${name} member ${entry.name} differs from dist/${dir}`);
}
}
// Re-run the self-containment check against the ARCHIVE's own
// contents. The directory passing it is not the claim being made.
const byName = new Map(entries.map((e) => [e.name, e.data]));
checkSelfContained(dir, inArchive, (m) => byName.get(m));
const digest = sha256(written);
sums.push(`${digest} ${name}`);
console.log(
`${name}: ${entries.length} member(s), ${written.length} bytes, ` +
`sha256 ${digest}`,
);
}
fs.writeFileSync(
path.join(RELEASE, "SHA256SUMS"),
sums.map((l) => `${l}\n`).join(""),
);
console.log(`Wrote release/ for version ${version}`);
}
// Only when run as a program. The reference-resolving helpers are what decide
// whether an archive is self-contained, so tests/packaging.test.js exercises
// them directly and must be able to require this file without packaging
// anything.
if (require.main === module) {
try {
main();
} catch (err) {
console.error(`package: ${err && err.message ? err.message : err}`);
process.exit(1);
}
}
module.exports = { checkSelfContained, htmlReferences, manifestReferences };

View File

@@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
// The version, and the rule that there is only one of it.
//
// Three files declare a version and none of them can be derived from another:
// Chrome and Firefox each need their own manifest, both are copied to dist/
// verbatim (tests/manifest.test.js asserts that what is in manifest/ is what
// ships), and package.json's copy is what build.js compiles into the About
// screen. So the single source of truth is enforced rather than generated —
// they must all agree or there is no version and no build.
//
// Reading one of the three and ignoring the rest is what this replaces. That
// shape cannot fail: it silently ships an extension whose About screen and
// whose browser-reported version disagree, and whose release artifact is named
// after whichever file the packager happened to read.
//
// Required by build.js, script/lib/package.js and tests/version.test.js, so
// the build, the release artifacts and make check all apply the same rule to
// the same files.
"use strict";
const fs = require("fs");
const path = require("path");
const VERSION_SOURCES = [
"package.json",
"manifest/chrome.json",
"manifest/firefox.json",
];
// Every declared version, in VERSION_SOURCES order, as { source, version }.
// A file that declares nothing usable fails here rather than being skipped:
// a missing version is not agreement.
function declaredVersions(root) {
return VERSION_SOURCES.map((source) => {
const file = path.join(root, source);
let parsed;
try {
parsed = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(file, "utf8"));
} catch (e) {
throw new Error(
`${source} could not be read as JSON: ${e.message}`,
);
}
const version = parsed.version;
if (typeof version !== "string" || version.trim() === "") {
throw new Error(
`${source} declares no usable "version" (found ` +
`${JSON.stringify(version)}). Every artifact is named and ` +
`stamped with it, so there is nothing to build without it.`,
);
}
return { source, version };
});
}
// The one version all three declare, or a failure naming every disagreeing
// file and what it said.
function resolveVersion(root) {
const declared = declaredVersions(root);
const distinct = [...new Set(declared.map((d) => d.version))];
if (distinct.length !== 1) {
throw new Error(
"the declared versions disagree, so this tree has no version: " +
declared.map((d) => `${d.source}=${d.version}`).join(", ") +
". Set all of them to the same value: the manifests are what " +
"the browser reports and package.json is what the About " +
"screen shows, and a build that picked one of them would " +
"ship the disagreement.",
);
}
return distinct[0];
}
module.exports = { VERSION_SOURCES, declaredVersions, resolveVersion };

View File

@@ -1,274 +0,0 @@
// A minimal, deterministic ZIP writer and reader.
//
// Used by script/lib/package.js to build the distributable archives: a Chrome
// zip and a Firefox XPI are both ordinary zip files with manifest.json at the
// root, so one implementation covers both.
//
// Why this rather than a package or the zip(1) binary. A dependency would have
// to be hash-pinned like everything else in REPO_POLICIES.md, and this is
// about a hundred lines of stdlib zlib for a format the archives use two
// features of. The binary is worse: the release artifact would then depend on
// whichever Info-ZIP the machine happens to have, which is the same objection
// that keeps linting inside a container.
//
// Deterministic on purpose. Entries are sorted by name, every timestamp is the
// same fixed 1980-01-01 the format's epoch starts at, and the compression
// level is fixed, so building the same dist/ twice produces byte-identical
// archives and the sha256 in SHA256SUMS is a property of the input rather than
// of the clock. Two builds of the same commit that disagree are then visible
// instead of expected.
//
// Deliberately NOT implemented: zip64, encryption, data descriptors,
// directory entries (browsers infer directories from member paths), and
// anything to do with symlinks. writeZip refuses input it cannot represent
// rather than emitting an archive that is quietly wrong.
"use strict";
const zlib = require("zlib");
const LOCAL_SIG = 0x04034b50;
const CENTRAL_SIG = 0x02014b50;
const EOCD_SIG = 0x06054b50;
const METHOD_STORE = 0;
const METHOD_DEFLATE = 8;
// 1980-01-01 00:00:00, the earliest the MS-DOS timestamp fields can express.
const DOS_DATE = (0 << 9) | (1 << 5) | 1;
const DOS_TIME = 0;
// Unix regular file, mode 0644, in the high 16 bits, which is where the "made
// by unix" convention puts it.
// >>> 0 because JS shifts are signed 32-bit and this one sets the top bit.
const EXTERNAL_ATTRS = (0o100644 << 16) >>> 0;
const VERSION_MADE_BY = (3 << 8) | 20; // unix, needs zip 2.0
const VERSION_NEEDED = 20;
// Without zip64 every size and offset is a u32.
const MAX_U32 = 0xffffffff;
const CRC_TABLE = (() => {
const table = new Int32Array(256);
for (let i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
let c = i;
for (let k = 0; k < 8; k++) {
c = c & 1 ? 0xedb88320 ^ (c >>> 1) : c >>> 1;
}
table[i] = c;
}
return table;
})();
// Written out rather than taken from zlib.crc32, which only exists from node
// 22.2: this runs from script/ on whatever node the host has as well as inside
// the pinned image, and a checksum that silently is not there is worse than
// twelve lines.
function crc32(buf) {
let c = -1;
for (let i = 0; i < buf.length; i++) {
c = CRC_TABLE[(c ^ buf[i]) & 0xff] ^ (c >>> 8);
}
return (c ^ -1) >>> 0;
}
// Member names are stored as raw bytes. Anything outside ASCII would need the
// UTF-8 flag and interoperability care that nothing this repo emits requires,
// so it is refused instead of guessed at.
function encodeName(name) {
if (typeof name !== "string" || name === "") {
throw new Error(`zip: unusable member name ${JSON.stringify(name)}`);
}
const segments = name.split("/");
if (
name.startsWith("/") ||
name.includes("\\") ||
segments.some((s) => s === "" || s === "." || s === "..")
) {
throw new Error(
`zip: refusing member name ${JSON.stringify(name)}: archive ` +
`members must be relative paths under the archive root`,
);
}
if (/[^\x20-\x7e]/.test(name)) {
throw new Error(
`zip: refusing non-ASCII member name ${JSON.stringify(name)}`,
);
}
return Buffer.from(name, "ascii");
}
function compress(data) {
if (data.length === 0) {
return { method: METHOD_STORE, body: data };
}
const deflated = zlib.deflateRawSync(data, { level: 9 });
if (deflated.length >= data.length) {
return { method: METHOD_STORE, body: data };
}
return { method: METHOD_DEFLATE, body: deflated };
}
// entries: [{ name, data }]. Returns the archive as a Buffer.
function writeZip(entries) {
if (!Array.isArray(entries) || entries.length === 0) {
throw new Error("zip: refusing to write an archive with no members");
}
const sorted = [...entries].sort((a, b) => (a.name < b.name ? -1 : 1));
const seen = new Set();
const locals = [];
const centrals = [];
let offset = 0;
for (const entry of sorted) {
const name = encodeName(entry.name);
if (seen.has(entry.name)) {
throw new Error(`zip: duplicate member ${entry.name}`);
}
seen.add(entry.name);
const data = Buffer.from(entry.data);
const { method, body } = compress(data);
if (data.length > MAX_U32 || body.length > MAX_U32) {
throw new Error(
`zip: ${entry.name} is too large for a non-zip64 archive`,
);
}
const crc = crc32(data);
const local = Buffer.alloc(30 + name.length);
local.writeUInt32LE(LOCAL_SIG, 0);
local.writeUInt16LE(VERSION_NEEDED, 4);
local.writeUInt16LE(0, 6);
local.writeUInt16LE(method, 8);
local.writeUInt16LE(DOS_TIME, 10);
local.writeUInt16LE(DOS_DATE, 12);
local.writeUInt32LE(crc, 14);
local.writeUInt32LE(body.length, 18);
local.writeUInt32LE(data.length, 22);
local.writeUInt16LE(name.length, 26);
local.writeUInt16LE(0, 28);
name.copy(local, 30);
const central = Buffer.alloc(46 + name.length);
central.writeUInt32LE(CENTRAL_SIG, 0);
central.writeUInt16LE(VERSION_MADE_BY, 4);
central.writeUInt16LE(VERSION_NEEDED, 6);
central.writeUInt16LE(0, 8);
central.writeUInt16LE(method, 10);
central.writeUInt16LE(DOS_TIME, 12);
central.writeUInt16LE(DOS_DATE, 14);
central.writeUInt32LE(crc, 16);
central.writeUInt32LE(body.length, 20);
central.writeUInt32LE(data.length, 24);
central.writeUInt16LE(name.length, 28);
central.writeUInt16LE(0, 30);
central.writeUInt16LE(0, 32);
central.writeUInt16LE(0, 34);
central.writeUInt16LE(0, 36);
central.writeUInt32LE(EXTERNAL_ATTRS, 38);
if (offset > MAX_U32) {
throw new Error("zip: archive too large for a non-zip64 archive");
}
central.writeUInt32LE(offset, 42);
name.copy(central, 46);
locals.push(local, body);
centrals.push(central);
offset += local.length + body.length;
}
const centralBuf = Buffer.concat(centrals);
const eocd = Buffer.alloc(22);
eocd.writeUInt32LE(EOCD_SIG, 0);
eocd.writeUInt16LE(0, 4);
eocd.writeUInt16LE(0, 6);
eocd.writeUInt16LE(sorted.length, 8);
eocd.writeUInt16LE(sorted.length, 10);
eocd.writeUInt32LE(centralBuf.length, 12);
eocd.writeUInt32LE(offset, 16);
eocd.writeUInt16LE(0, 20);
return Buffer.concat([...locals, centralBuf, eocd]);
}
// Read an archive back into [{ name, data }], from the central directory
// rather than by scanning for local headers: the central directory is the
// authoritative index, and a member reachable only by scanning is one a real
// unzipper would not extract.
//
// Every member's CRC is checked. The point of reading an archive back is to
// establish that it holds what it was meant to hold, so a member that does not
// decompress to its recorded checksum is a failure and never a warning.
function readZip(buf) {
if (buf.length < 22) {
throw new Error("zip: too short to be an archive");
}
// No archive this writes has a trailing comment, so the EOCD is the last
// 22 bytes. Anything else is not an archive this produced.
const eocdAt = buf.length - 22;
if (buf.readUInt32LE(eocdAt) !== EOCD_SIG) {
throw new Error(
"zip: no end-of-central-directory record at the end of the " +
"archive (a trailing comment, or not a zip at all)",
);
}
const count = buf.readUInt16LE(eocdAt + 10);
const centralSize = buf.readUInt32LE(eocdAt + 12);
let at = buf.readUInt32LE(eocdAt + 16);
if (at + centralSize > eocdAt) {
throw new Error("zip: central directory runs past the archive");
}
const out = [];
for (let i = 0; i < count; i++) {
if (buf.readUInt32LE(at) !== CENTRAL_SIG) {
throw new Error(`zip: bad central directory entry ${i}`);
}
const method = buf.readUInt16LE(at + 10);
const crc = buf.readUInt32LE(at + 16);
const compSize = buf.readUInt32LE(at + 20);
const rawSize = buf.readUInt32LE(at + 24);
const nameLen = buf.readUInt16LE(at + 28);
const extraLen = buf.readUInt16LE(at + 30);
const commentLen = buf.readUInt16LE(at + 32);
const localAt = buf.readUInt32LE(at + 42);
const name = buf.toString("ascii", at + 46, at + 46 + nameLen);
at += 46 + nameLen + extraLen + commentLen;
if (buf.readUInt32LE(localAt) !== LOCAL_SIG) {
throw new Error(`zip: ${name} has no local header`);
}
// The local header's own name and extra lengths, not the central
// directory's: the two are allowed to differ and the data starts after
// the local ones.
const localNameLen = buf.readUInt16LE(localAt + 26);
const localExtraLen = buf.readUInt16LE(localAt + 28);
const dataAt = localAt + 30 + localNameLen + localExtraLen;
const body = buf.subarray(dataAt, dataAt + compSize);
let data;
if (method === METHOD_STORE) {
data = Buffer.from(body);
} else if (method === METHOD_DEFLATE) {
data = zlib.inflateRawSync(body);
} else {
throw new Error(`zip: ${name} uses compression method ${method}`);
}
if (data.length !== rawSize) {
throw new Error(
`zip: ${name} decompressed to ${data.length} bytes, not the ` +
`recorded ${rawSize}`,
);
}
if (crc32(data) !== crc) {
throw new Error(`zip: ${name} fails its recorded CRC32`);
}
out.push({ name, data });
}
return out;
}
module.exports = { crc32, readZip, writeZip };

View File

@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
# script/package: produce the release artifacts — one self-contained,
# versioned archive per browser — into release/. Our own extension to
# scripts-to-rule-them-all.
#
# It builds first, through `make build` rather than by calling build.js
# itself. That target is the only audited path to a release build: it creates
# the build receipt outside the repo, scrubs AUTISTMASK_DEBUG from the
# verifier's environment, tells script/verify-build in so many words to expect
# a RELEASE build, and re-runs script/check-censored against dist/.
# script/test-verify-build asserts that wiring by reading the recipe back out
# of `make -n`. Re-implementing that sequence here would give the release
# artifacts a second, unaudited path to dist/ — and it is the release
# artifacts, above everything else, that must never be built from a debug
# compile.
#
# This packages, it does not publish. Tagging, CRX packing and any upload are
# outward-facing acts and are nobody's job but the owner's.
set -eu
ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
main() {
cd "$ROOT"
if ! command -v make >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "package: make is required (the release build runs through" \
"make build)" >&2
exit 1
fi
make build
echo "Packaging release artifacts..."
node script/lib/package.js
}
main "$@"

View File

@@ -78,22 +78,6 @@ main() {
-e "E2E_TRACE_NETWORK=${E2E_TRACE_NETWORK:-0}" \
"$(cat "$IIDFILE")" \
node tests/e2e/run.js
# Where chrome.storage.local lives, and what moves it: two unpacked loads
# from two different paths in one profile, with the shipped manifest and
# again with `key` stripped out. Its own browser sessions — four of them —
# because the whole subject is what happens ACROSS loads, which the suite
# above cannot express with one.
#
# No PW_EXPERIMENTAL_SERVICE_WORKER_NETWORK_EVENTS here: this drives no
# RPC and installs no route handlers, and the browser is started with
# --host-resolver-rules=MAP * ~NOTFOUND so nothing it does can leave.
echo "Running the extension-id and storage-partition observations..."
docker run --rm \
--ipc=host \
-e HOME=/tmp \
"$(cat "$IIDFILE")" \
node tests/e2e/storagePartition.js
}
main "$@"

View File

@@ -72,19 +72,6 @@ main() {
-e HOME=/tmp \
"$(cat "$IIDFILE")" \
node tests/e2e/firefox/run.js dist/firefox
# The install/uninstall/re-install property, against the packaged XPI
# rather than the unpacked directory: it is the artifact a user would be
# handed, and this is the only place a real Firefox is asked to load it.
# Its own browser session, because it takes the add-on away in the middle
# and the suite above shares one session throughout.
echo "Running the Firefox re-install suite against the packaged XPI..."
docker run --rm \
--shm-size=1g \
--network none \
-e HOME=/tmp \
"$(cat "$IIDFILE")" \
node tests/e2e/firefox/reinstall.js
}
main "$@"

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
#!/bin/sh
# script/test-verify-build: exercise every failure mode of
# script/verify-build, and what make build does with dist/ after one of them
# (script/discard-dist-on-failure). Our own extension to
# scripts-to-rule-them-all, run from script/check so make check covers it.
# script/verify-build. Our own extension to scripts-to-rule-them-all, run
# from script/check so make check covers it.
#
# Why this exists: verify-build is the build-integrity guard, and four separate
# reviews of it each found a fresh vacuous pass — the grep exit-2 conflation,
@@ -32,7 +31,6 @@ set -eu
ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
VERIFY_BUILD="$ROOT/script/verify-build"
DISCARD_DIST="$ROOT/script/discard-dist-on-failure"
MARKER_ON="autistmask-build-debug=on"
MARKER_OFF="autistmask-build-debug=off"
@@ -152,7 +150,6 @@ build_fixture() {
mkdir -p "$FIXTURE/script"
ln -s "$VERIFY_BUILD" "$FIXTURE/script/verify-build"
ln -s "$DISCARD_DIST" "$FIXTURE/script/discard-dist-on-failure"
mkdir -p "$FIXTURE/dist/chrome/src/popup" \
"$FIXTURE/dist/chrome/src/content" \
@@ -516,125 +513,12 @@ c_debug_build() {
write_receipt
}
c_no_dist() { rm -rf dist; }
# --- dist discard -----------------------------------------------------------
#
# make build wraps every step of the release path in
# script/discard-dist-on-failure, so a release build that fails removes dist/:
# with AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1 exported it has already emitted a complete, loadable
# debug bundle whose every wallet uses the publicly committed test recovery
# phrase, and a loud failure alone does not stop someone loading dist/chrome/
# anyway. make build-debug is deliberately not wrapped.
#
# Both directions are asserted against the state of dist/ ON DISK after the run,
# not against the exit status: a case reading only the status would keep passing
# if the removal quietly stopped happening, which is the flip this exists to
# catch. The wrapper runs against the fixture — its ROOT is the fixture, via the
# symlink in the fixture's script/ — with trivial commands standing in for the
# build steps, because what is under test is what happens after a step says no,
# not the step.
# discard_case <name> <setup> <status> <gone|kept> <want> <unwanted> [cmd...]
discard_case() {
_dc_name="$1"
_dc_setup="$2"
_dc_want_status="$3"
_dc_want_dist="$4"
_dc_want="$5"
_dc_unwanted="$6"
shift 6
build_fixture
if ! (cd "$FIXTURE" && "$_dc_setup") >/dev/null 2>&1; then
FAILED=$((FAILED + 1))
echo " FAIL: $_dc_name"
echo " the case's own setup failed, so nothing was tested."
return 0
fi
_dc_status=0
_dc_out="$(cd "$FIXTURE" &&
"$FIXTURE/script/discard-dist-on-failure" "$@" 2>&1)" || _dc_status=$?
_ok=yes
_why=""
if [ "$_dc_status" -ne "$_dc_want_status" ]; then
_ok=no
_why="exit status $_dc_status, wanted $_dc_want_status"
fi
# The assertion this case exists for: what is on disk now.
if [ -e "$FIXTURE/dist" ] || [ -h "$FIXTURE/dist" ]; then
_dc_dist=kept
else
_dc_dist=gone
fi
if [ "$_dc_dist" != "$_dc_want_dist" ]; then
_ok=no
_why="${_why:+$_why; }dist/ is $_dc_dist after the run, wanted"
_why="$_why $_dc_want_dist"
elif [ "$_dc_want_dist" = kept ] &&
[ ! -f "$FIXTURE/dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js" ]; then
# Kept has to mean intact: a dist/ emptied out is not one left alone.
_ok=no
_why="${_why:+$_why; }dist/ survived but its emitted bundle did not"
fi
_dc_check_message "$_dc_want" want
_dc_check_message "$_dc_unwanted" unwanted
if [ "$_ok" = yes ]; then
PASSED=$((PASSED + 1))
echo " ok: $_dc_name"
return 0
fi
FAILED=$((FAILED + 1))
echo " FAIL: $_dc_name"
echo " $_why"
echo " --- discard-dist-on-failure output ---"
printf '%s\n' "$_dc_out" | sed 's/^/ /'
echo " --- end output ---"
}
# Require ($2 = want) or forbid ($2 = unwanted) a substring in the wrapper's
# output, updating _ok and _why. An empty substring asserts nothing. Same grep
# discipline as everywhere else here: 0 and 1 are answers, anything else means
# the message was never checked.
_dc_check_message() {
[ -n "$1" ] || return 0
_dcm_g=0
printf '%s\n' "$_dc_out" | grep -q -F -e "$1" || _dcm_g=$?
case "$_dcm_g" in
0)
[ "$2" = unwanted ] || return 0
_ok=no
_why="${_why:+$_why; }message contained: $1"
;;
1)
[ "$2" = want ] || return 0
_ok=no
_why="${_why:+$_why; }message did not contain: $1"
;;
*)
_ok=no
_why="${_why:+$_why; }grep exited $_dcm_g matching the message, so the
message was never checked"
;;
esac
}
# --- Makefile wiring --------------------------------------------------------
# The verifier cases above prove what verify-build does when it is told what to
# expect, and the discard cases prove what the wrapper does with dist/. This
# proves the Makefile wires both up — the mode as an argument, on a scrubbed
# environment, identically whether or not AUTISTMASK_DEBUG is exported in the
# shell that ran make, and the wrapper on the release path only. Read off
# `make -n`, so no build runs.
# expect. This proves the Makefile tells it — with the mode as an argument, on
# a scrubbed environment, and identically whether or not AUTISTMASK_DEBUG is
# exported in the shell that ran make. Read off `make -n`, so no build runs.
check_makefile_wiring() {
if ! command -v make >/dev/null 2>&1; then
SKIPPED=$((SKIPPED + 1))
@@ -653,34 +537,6 @@ check_makefile_wiring() {
build-debug "verify-build --expect debug"
_wiring_case "make build-debug scrubs AUTISTMASK_DEBUG for the verifier" \
build-debug "env -u AUTISTMASK_DEBUG"
# The release path runs its steps through the wrapper, including the final
# check-censored pass; the debug path runs none of them through it, which is
# what keeps a failed debug build's dist/ on disk.
_wiring_case "make build wraps its steps in discard-dist-on-failure" \
build "script/discard-dist-on-failure"
_wiring_case "make build wraps check-censored --require-dist too" \
build "script/discard-dist-on-failure script/check-censored"
_wiring_case_absent "make build-debug never discards its dist/" \
build-debug "discard-dist-on-failure"
}
# Run `make -n TARGET` with AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1 exported, into _wc_out. Returns
# non-zero, having already reported the failure, when make itself failed: a
# recipe that could not be printed was never checked.
_wiring_make_n() {
AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1
export AUTISTMASK_DEBUG
_wc_status=0
_wc_out="$(cd "$ROOT" && make -n "$_wc_target" 2>&1)" || _wc_status=$?
unset AUTISTMASK_DEBUG
[ "$_wc_status" -ne 0 ] || return 0
FAILED=$((FAILED + 1))
echo " FAIL: $_wc_name"
echo " make -n $_wc_target exited $_wc_status"
return 1
}
_wiring_case() {
@@ -688,7 +544,18 @@ _wiring_case() {
_wc_target="$2"
_wc_want="$3"
_wiring_make_n || return 0
AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1
export AUTISTMASK_DEBUG
_wc_status=0
_wc_out="$(cd "$ROOT" && make -n "$_wc_target" 2>&1)" || _wc_status=$?
unset AUTISTMASK_DEBUG
if [ "$_wc_status" -ne 0 ]; then
FAILED=$((FAILED + 1))
echo " FAIL: $_wc_name"
echo " make -n $_wc_target exited $_wc_status"
return 0
fi
_wc_g=0
printf '%s\n' "$_wc_out" | grep -q -F -e "$_wc_want" || _wc_g=$?
@@ -710,34 +577,6 @@ _wiring_case() {
esac
}
# The inverse: the recipe must NOT run something.
_wiring_case_absent() {
_wc_name="$1"
_wc_target="$2"
_wc_want="$3"
_wiring_make_n || return 0
_wc_g=0
printf '%s\n' "$_wc_out" | grep -q -F -e "$_wc_want" || _wc_g=$?
case "$_wc_g" in
1)
PASSED=$((PASSED + 1))
echo " ok: $_wc_name"
;;
0)
FAILED=$((FAILED + 1))
echo " FAIL: $_wc_name"
echo " make -n $_wc_target runs: $_wc_want"
;;
*)
FAILED=$((FAILED + 1))
echo " FAIL: $_wc_name"
echo " grep exited $_wc_g, so the recipe was never checked"
;;
esac
}
run_cases() {
check_case "control: untouched dist passes" \
no release 0 "2 bundle(s) $MARKER_OFF" c_control
@@ -873,18 +712,6 @@ run_cases() {
no release 1 "carries a debug marker but the build did not" \
c_marker_on_plain_file
discard_case "a failed release build step removes dist/" \
c_control 3 gone "dist/ WAS REMOVED" "" sh -c 'exit 3'
discard_case "a successful release build step leaves dist/ alone" \
c_control 0 kept "" "REMOVED" true
discard_case "a failed release build step with no dist/ says there was none" \
c_no_dist 3 gone "There was no dist/ to remove" "" sh -c 'exit 3'
discard_case "the wrapper given no command removes nothing" \
c_control 1 kept "no command given" ""
check_makefile_wiring
}
@@ -913,10 +740,6 @@ main() {
echo "test-verify-build: $VERIFY_BUILD is missing or not executable" >&2
exit 1
}
[ -x "$DISCARD_DIST" ] || {
echo "test-verify-build: $DISCARD_DIST is missing or not executable" >&2
exit 1
}
echo "Testing script/verify-build failure modes..."
pick_sha256_tool

View File

@@ -1,10 +1,8 @@
#!/bin/sh
# script/verify-build: assert that the regular files and symlinks under dist/
# are exactly what the build that just ran emitted (other file types are out of
# scope; see "What that does and does not establish" below), and that the
# compiled DEBUG state of that output is the one the caller asked for. Our own
# extension to scripts-to-rule-them-all, run at the end of make build /
# make build-debug.
# script/verify-build: assert that dist/ holds exactly what the build that just
# ran emitted, and that the compiled DEBUG state of that output is the one the
# caller asked for. Our own extension to scripts-to-rule-them-all, run at the
# end of make build / make build-debug.
#
# Why the DEBUG half exists: DEBUG makes the publicly committed test recovery
# phrase the output of wallet creation, so a release artifact built with it live
@@ -31,16 +29,12 @@
# path fresh per invocation, outside the repo, and deletes it afterwards.
#
# What that does and does not establish. It establishes that dist/ is byte for
# byte the output of the build.js run that just finished, with no regular file
# or symlink added, missing or altered in between, and that the audited bundles
# in it compiled to the requested mode. Regular files and symlinks are the whole
# of what the tree walk covers; fifos, sockets, device nodes and empty
# directories under dist/ are not checked, because a build emits none of them,
# none can carry a shippable payload, and grep on a fifo would hang rather than
# fail. It does NOT establish that the source tree or build.js were honest, and
# it says nothing at all to someone handed a dist/ from elsewhere: without the
# receipt from its own build they have no input to this check. That is signing,
# and it is not this control.
# byte the output of the build.js run that just finished, with nothing added,
# nothing missing and nothing altered in between, and that the audited bundles
# in it compiled to the requested mode. It does NOT establish that the source
# tree or build.js were honest, and it says nothing at all to someone handed a
# dist/ from elsewhere: without the receipt from its own build they have no
# input to this check. That is signing, and it is not this control.
#
# It fails rather than passes whenever it cannot determine something. Minified
# output is not a stable contract, so "matched neither marker" is not evidence
@@ -398,10 +392,8 @@ check_receipt_entries() {
# its own command line, so a linked dist/ collapses this walk to one entry
# and cross-checks nothing.
#
# Types other than regular files and symlinks — fifos, sockets, device nodes and
# empty directories — are left out on purpose, and the guarantee is bounded to
# what is walked: a build emits none of them, none can carry a shippable
# payload, and grep on a fifo would hang rather than fail.
# Types other than regular files and symlinks are left out on purpose: a build
# emits none of them, and grep on a fifo would hang rather than fail.
check_dist_tree() {
LISTING="$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/verify-build-dist.XXXXXX")" ||
fail "could not create a temporary file for the dist/ listing, so the

View File

@@ -25,12 +25,6 @@ const {
resolveTokenDecimals,
unknownDecimalsAmount,
} = require("../../shared/approvalAmount");
// Four decimals, with the nonzero floor these screens hold: every amount this
// view renders — the ERC-20 line, the ETH value, the max fee — and every one
// it carries forward to the wait/success/error screens goes through it.
const {
truncateAmountNeverZero: formatTxValue,
} = require("../../shared/amountDisplay");
const { decryptWithPassword } = require("../../shared/vault");
const { getSignerForAddress } = require("../../shared/wallet");
const { walletDefect } = require("../../shared/walletDefects");
@@ -46,6 +40,13 @@ function approvalAddressHtml(address) {
return renderAddressHtml(address, { title });
}
function formatTxValue(val) {
const parts = val.split(".");
if (parts.length === 1) return val + ".0000";
const dec = (parts[1] + "0000").slice(0, 4);
return parts[0] + "." + dec;
}
// The amount line for a decoded ERC-20 call. With a known scale it is the
// token quantity; with `decimals` null it is the base-unit integer with the
// unknown scale stated, because formatting it with an assumed scale is what
@@ -73,14 +74,6 @@ function tokenLabel(address) {
function decodeCalldata(data, toAddress) {
if (!data || data === "0x" || data.length < 10) return null;
// Where a token's scale is looked for, for every decoder below: the ERC-20
// amount line and the swap's Amount and Min. received lines resolve it the
// same way, and refuse to format the same way when it is nowhere.
const decimalsSources = {
trackedTokens: state.trackedTokens,
wallets: state.wallets,
};
// Try ERC-20 (approve / transfer)
try {
const parsed = erc20Iface.parseTransaction({ data });
@@ -92,10 +85,10 @@ function decodeCalldata(data, toAddress) {
// the wrong number, and for a token with fewer decimals than the
// guess it is the wrong number in the direction that reads as
// zero. See tokenAmountText().
const tokenDecimals = resolveTokenDecimals(
toAddress,
decimalsSources,
);
const tokenDecimals = resolveTokenDecimals(toAddress, {
trackedTokens: state.trackedTokens,
wallets: state.wallets,
});
const contractLabel = tokenSymbol
? tokenSymbol + " (" + toAddress + ")"
: toAddress;
@@ -175,7 +168,7 @@ function decodeCalldata(data, toAddress) {
}
// Try Uniswap Universal Router
const routerResult = uniswap.decode(data, toAddress, decimalsSources);
const routerResult = uniswap.decode(data, toAddress);
if (routerResult) return routerResult;
return null;

View File

@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
// The 4-decimal amount rule from README.md's Display Consistency section, and
// the one exception to it, in one place. Three call sites had grown their own
// copy of the truncation — the history and balance lists
// (`src/shared/transactions.js`), the approval screen's ERC-20 amount line
// (`src/popup/views/approval.js`) and its Uniswap swap detail lines
// (`src/shared/uniswap.js`) — and a fix applied to one of them left the other
// two showing a different number for the same value.
//
// The two functions below are the two policies, not two implementations of
// one: summary lists truncate, and the screens that state what is being
// authorized truncate with a floor. Keeping them adjacent is the point, so a
// change to the rule cannot reach one screen and miss another.
// Truncate to exactly four decimal places. Truncation, never rounding: an
// amount must never be displayed as larger than it is, so 0.99999 stays
// 0.9999.
function truncateAmount(val) {
const parts = val.split(".");
if (parts.length === 1) return val + ".0000";
return parts[0] + "." + (parts[1] + "0000").slice(0, 4);
}
// The same rule, plus the invariant the approval and confirmation screens
// hold: a nonzero amount never renders as zero. Truncating to four decimals
// does exactly that to an amount below 0.0001 — one base unit of an 18-decimal
// token, 500 of an 8-decimal one — and a real transfer or allowance then reads
// as "nothing is being moved" on the screen whose whole job is to say what is
// being authorized.
//
// When the truncated string carries no significant digit and the value does,
// the amount is extended to its first significant digit instead. It stays in
// token units, the same unit as the symbol printed beside it. A genuine zero
// still renders 0.0000, and anything at or above the floor is untouched.
function truncateAmountNeverZero(val) {
const truncated = truncateAmount(val);
// Tests the whole truncated string, integer part included: 1.00005 has a
// significant digit already and stays 1.0000.
if (/[1-9]/.test(truncated)) return truncated;
const parts = val.split(".");
if (parts.length === 1) return truncated;
const sig = parts[1].search(/[1-9]/);
if (sig === -1) return truncated;
return parts[0] + "." + parts[1].slice(0, sig + 1);
}
module.exports = { truncateAmount, truncateAmountNeverZero };

View File

@@ -14,10 +14,6 @@
// them answers, unknownDecimalsAmount() renders the base-unit integer with the
// unknown scale stated, and no formatUnits() call is reached at all.
//
// The Uniswap decoder's Amount and Min. received lines land on this same
// screen and use these same two functions, so there is one way of resolving a
// scale and one way of saying there is none.
//
// This is the display counterpart to transferAmount.js, which takes the same
// stance on the wallet's own send path: an amount whose scale is unknown or
// disputed is refused rather than guessed at.

View File

@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ const { networkById } = require("./networks");
const { RESTORABLE_VIEWS } = require("../popup/restorableViews");
const { storageGet, storageSet } = require("./browserApi");
const { log } = require("./log");
const DEFAULT_STATE = {
hasWallet: false,
@@ -89,529 +88,135 @@ function currentNetwork() {
return networkById(state.networkId);
}
// Every field written to and read from the single "autistmask" storage key.
// hasWallet is deliberately excluded from the diffing/merge logic below —
// like loadState() does, it is always derived from `wallets`, never carried
// as an independent value.
const PERSISTED_FIELDS = Object.keys(DEFAULT_STATE)
.filter((key) => key !== "hasWallet")
.concat([
"currentView",
"selectedWallet",
"selectedAddress",
"selectedToken",
"viewData",
"viewStack",
]);
// Turn a raw stored (or missing) record into the full, defaulted shape
// loadState() used to assign directly onto `state`. Pulled out as a pure
// function so saveState() can apply it too: the fields THIS page did not
// change still have to come from storage in their loaded-and-normalized
// form, not as the raw bytes another page (or an old release) left there —
// otherwise a legacy shape a load has always self-healed in memory (a
// missing networkEndpoints map, an out-of-range flag) is dropped right back
// into storage unfixed every time the page that DID normalize it saves
// something unrelated, because that field's value never "changed" for that
// page to notice.
function normalizePersisted(saved) {
saved = saved || {};
const out = {};
out.wallets = saved.wallets || [];
// Derived, never trusted verbatim off storage — see loadState().
out.hasWallet = out.wallets.length > 0;
out.trackedTokens = saved.trackedTokens || [];
out.networkId = saved.networkId || DEFAULT_STATE.networkId;
out.rpcUrl = saved.rpcUrl || DEFAULT_STATE.rpcUrl;
out.blockscoutUrl = saved.blockscoutUrl || DEFAULT_STATE.blockscoutUrl;
// An actual object is required, not merely a truthy non-array: the code
// below and onChainSwitch() index and ASSIGN INTO this value, and
// assigning a property to a string or a number is a silent no-op in
// sloppy mode. Copied rather than referenced, nested pairs included, so
// normalizing never mutates the object a caller handed in.
const rawEndpoints =
typeof saved.networkEndpoints === "object" &&
saved.networkEndpoints !== null &&
!Array.isArray(saved.networkEndpoints)
? saved.networkEndpoints
: {};
out.networkEndpoints = {};
for (const netId of Object.keys(rawEndpoints)) {
out.networkEndpoints[netId] = { ...rawEndpoints[netId] };
}
// A profile written before this map existed carries exactly one pair of
// endpoints, belonging to whatever network it was last on. Adopt it as
// that network's remembered pair, so a custom endpoint set on the old
// build is not lost by the first switch away and back.
if (!out.networkEndpoints[out.networkId]) {
out.networkEndpoints[out.networkId] = {
rpcUrl: out.rpcUrl,
blockscoutUrl: out.blockscoutUrl,
};
}
out.lastBalanceRefresh = saved.lastBalanceRefresh || 0;
out.activeAddress = saved.activeAddress || null;
out.allowedSites =
saved.allowedSites && !Array.isArray(saved.allowedSites)
? saved.allowedSites
: {};
out.deniedSites =
saved.deniedSites && !Array.isArray(saved.deniedSites)
? saved.deniedSites
: {};
out.rememberSiteChoice =
saved.rememberSiteChoice !== undefined
? saved.rememberSiteChoice
: true;
out.showZeroBalanceTokens =
saved.showZeroBalanceTokens !== undefined
? saved.showZeroBalanceTokens
: true;
// A profile written before this setting existed has no key for it. It
// is a safety filter, so absent must load as on, not as undefined.
out.hideSpoofedSymbols =
saved.hideSpoofedSymbols !== undefined
? saved.hideSpoofedSymbols
: true;
out.hideLowHolderTokens =
saved.hideLowHolderTokens !== undefined
? saved.hideLowHolderTokens
: true;
out.hideFraudContracts =
saved.hideFraudContracts !== undefined
? saved.hideFraudContracts
: true;
out.hideDustTransactions =
saved.hideDustTransactions !== undefined
? saved.hideDustTransactions
: true;
out.dustThresholdGwei =
saved.dustThresholdGwei !== undefined
? saved.dustThresholdGwei
: 100000;
out.utcTimestamps =
saved.utcTimestamps !== undefined ? saved.utcTimestamps : false;
out.fraudContracts = saved.fraudContracts || [];
out.tokenHolderCache = saved.tokenHolderCache || {};
out.theme = saved.theme || "system";
out.debugMode = saved.debugMode !== undefined ? saved.debugMode : false;
out.currentView = saved.currentView || null;
out.selectedWallet =
saved.selectedWallet !== undefined ? saved.selectedWallet : null;
out.selectedAddress =
saved.selectedAddress !== undefined ? saved.selectedAddress : null;
out.selectedToken = saved.selectedToken || null;
out.viewData = saved.viewData || {};
out.viewStack = restorableStack(saved.viewStack, out.currentView);
return out;
}
// The persisted fields as they stood at the end of this page's last
// loadState() or saveState(). saveState() diffs the live state against this
// to find only the fields THIS page actually changed.
//
// Deep-cloned, not a reference: callers mutate persisted objects and arrays
// in place (state.wallets.push(...)), and a reference baseline would mutate
// right along with `state`, so the diff would always come out empty.
let baseline = null;
function snapshotPersisted() {
const out = {};
for (const key of PERSISTED_FIELDS) out[key] = state[key];
return out;
}
function deepEqual(a, b) {
if (a === b) return true;
if (typeof a !== "object" || typeof b !== "object") return false;
if (a === null || b === null) return false;
if (Array.isArray(a) !== Array.isArray(b)) return false;
const aKeys = Object.keys(a);
const bKeys = Object.keys(b);
if (aKeys.length !== bKeys.length) return false;
for (const key of aKeys) {
if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(b, key)) return false;
if (!deepEqual(a[key], b[key])) return false;
}
return true;
}
// Stable identity for a wallet, independent of its position in the array
// (which shifts under a concurrent add/delete elsewhere) and independent of
// its mutable fields (name is user-editable; addresses gains/loses entries
// via scanning and deleteAddress.js). An "hd"/"xprv" wallet's xpub never
// changes for its lifetime and is already enforced unique
// (findWalletByXpub() in addWallet.js). A "key" wallet has no xpub, exactly
// one address for its whole lifetime (nothing ever adds to or removes from
// a key wallet's address list), and that address is already enforced
// unique (findWalletByAddress()) — so it stands in for identity there.
// Neither invariant is enforced by this function or by
// mergeListByIdentity() below — they hold only because every wallet-
// creation path in addWallet.js happens to populate one or the other before
// the wallet ever reaches state.wallets, and because canRemoveAddress() in
// walletDelete.js never lets a wallet's address list go to zero. A wallet
// with neither (an empty/legacy/corrupt record) falls back to the same
// "addr:" identity as every other such record, which is a genuine
// collision, not a proxy for one — see the collision handling in
// mergeListByIdentity().
function walletIdentity(wallet) {
if (wallet.xpub) return "xpub:" + wallet.xpub;
const first = wallet.addresses && wallet.addresses[0];
return "addr:" + (first ? String(first.address).toLowerCase() : "");
}
// Stable identity for an address within one wallet's address list. An
// address is unique within its wallet and, once derived or imported, never
// changes — only whether it is present.
function addressIdentity(addr) {
return String(addr.address).toLowerCase();
}
// Merge one array of identity-bearing objects (wallets, or the addresses
// inside one wallet) by identity rather than by array index — an index
// shifts under a concurrent insert/delete elsewhere, which would merge the
// wrong pair of objects entirely.
//
// `theirs` (fresh storage) sets the membership baseline and the order:
// - An item this page never had baseline knowledge of, but that is in
// `theirs`, was added by someone else — kept as-is.
// - An item `base` had and `ours` no longer has was deleted by THIS page
// — dropped even though `theirs` still has it (this page's own delete
// must win over a background save that only touched leaf fields).
// - An item present in both `ours` and `theirs` is merged leaf-by-leaf via
// `mergeItem`, so a leaf this page changed (e.g. a renamed wallet) lands
// on top of `theirs`' otherwise-current copy (e.g. a refreshed balance).
// Anything left in `ours` that `base` never had and `theirs` does not have
// yet is this page's own new addition — appended.
//
// `identityOf` is not guaranteed collision-free (walletIdentity() falls
// back to one shared "addr:" value for any wallet with neither an xpub nor
// a populated first address). Two records that collide under it must never
// silently collapse into one — that is exactly how this function used to
// drop a wallet, encryptedSecret included, with no error and no log. Two
// defenses:
// - `ours` is indexed into GROUPS, not a single item per identity, so two
// colliding live items on this page can't overwrite each other in the
// index before the merge below even runs.
// - A matched pair with no shared `base` entry (neither page ever agreed
// on this identity) is only merged leaf-by-leaf when the two sides are
// already equal. If they differ, that is not "the same record edited
// twice", it is two different records that happen to share an identity
// — both are kept, unmerged, rather than guessing which one is real.
function mergeListByIdentity(base, ours, theirs, identityOf, mergeItem) {
base = base || [];
ours = ours || [];
theirs = theirs || [];
const baseIndex = new Map(base.map((item) => [identityOf(item), item]));
const oursIndex = new Map();
for (const item of ours) {
const id = identityOf(item);
if (!oursIndex.has(id)) oursIndex.set(id, []);
oursIndex.get(id).push(item);
}
const result = [];
const seen = new Set();
for (const theirItem of theirs) {
const id = identityOf(theirItem);
seen.add(id);
const oursGroup = oursIndex.get(id);
if (baseIndex.has(id) && !oursGroup) continue;
if (oursGroup) {
const baseItem = baseIndex.get(id);
if (!baseItem && !deepEqual(oursGroup[0], theirItem)) {
log.errorf(
"state: identity collision merging",
JSON.stringify(id),
"- keeping both records instead of dropping one",
);
result.push(theirItem, ...oursGroup);
} else {
result.push(mergeItem(baseItem, oursGroup[0], theirItem));
for (let i = 1; i < oursGroup.length; i++) {
result.push(oursGroup[i]);
}
}
} else {
result.push(theirItem);
}
}
for (const item of ours) {
const id = identityOf(item);
if (seen.has(id)) continue;
if (!baseIndex.has(id)) result.push(item);
}
return result;
}
// Merge one wallet's scalar/leaf fields (name, encryptedSecret, nextIndex,
// ...) against base, then recurse into its address list by identity. `base`
// is null when this page created the wallet itself and no other page has
// (yet) produced a same-identity record — nothing to merge in that case,
// this page's own copy wins outright. mergeListByIdentity() only ever calls
// this with `!base` when `ours` and `theirs` are already equal (a genuine
// collision between two DIFFERENT same-identity records is caught and kept
// as two separate entries before this function is reached), so returning
// `ours` here can't discard a different wallet's data.
function mergeWallet(base, ours, theirs) {
if (!base) return ours;
const merged = { ...theirs };
for (const key of Object.keys(ours)) {
if (key === "addresses") continue;
if (!deepEqual(ours[key], base[key])) merged[key] = ours[key];
}
merged.addresses = mergeListByIdentity(
base.addresses,
ours.addresses,
theirs.addresses,
addressIdentity,
mergeAddress,
);
return merged;
}
// Merge one address's leaf fields (balance, ensName, tokenBalances, ...).
// tokenBalances is itself an array, but only backgroundRefresh() ever
// writes it and always wholesale (refreshBalances() in
// src/shared/balances.js), so there is no membership to reconcile within
// it — it is a leaf like balance or ensName, not a list with its own
// identity.
function mergeAddress(base, ours, theirs) {
if (!base) return ours;
const merged = { ...theirs };
for (const key of Object.keys(ours)) {
if (!deepEqual(ours[key], base[key])) merged[key] = ours[key];
}
return merged;
}
// Merge a plain object keyed by string (allowedSites/deniedSites: address ->
// hostname list; networkEndpoints: networkId -> {rpcUrl, blockscoutUrl}) the
// same way mergeListByIdentity() merges an array — by key, not by whole-
// object diff — so a key one page added or removed applies independently of
// a key another page edited. Unlike an array's identity function, an object
// key can't collide with a different logical entry (Object.keys() is
// already deduplicated), so this needs no collision floor of its own.
function mergeMapByKey(base, ours, theirs, mergeLeaf) {
base = base || {};
ours = ours || {};
theirs = theirs || {};
const result = {};
const seen = new Set();
for (const key of Object.keys(theirs)) {
seen.add(key);
const inBase = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(base, key);
const inOurs = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(ours, key);
if (inBase && !inOurs) continue; // this page deleted the whole entry
if (inOurs) {
result[key] = mergeLeaf(base[key], ours[key], theirs[key]);
} else {
result[key] = theirs[key];
}
}
for (const key of Object.keys(ours)) {
if (seen.has(key)) continue;
if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(base, key)) {
result[key] = ours[key];
}
}
return result;
}
// allowedSites/deniedSites: { [address]: [hostname, ...] }. The hostname
// list is itself membership, not a leaf — src/background/index.js pushes a
// newly approved/denied hostname onto it in place, and the Settings "revoke"
// button (src/popup/views/settings.js) filters a hostname out of it in
// place, from a different page. Merge it the same way wallets are merged:
// identity is the hostname itself, so a merged pair is always equal and
// mergeItem is a no-op pick.
function mergeHostnameList(base, ours, theirs) {
return mergeListByIdentity(
base,
ours,
theirs,
(hostname) => hostname,
(b, o, t) => t,
);
}
function mergeSiteMap(base, ours, theirs) {
return mergeMapByKey(base, ours, theirs, mergeHostnameList);
}
// networkEndpoints: { [networkId]: {rpcUrl, blockscoutUrl} }. onChainSwitch()
// (src/shared/chainSwitch.js) writes state.networkEndpoints[networkId] in
// place before saving. No code path ever removes a key from this map, so the
// membership collision that matters for allowedSites/wallets (an add on one
// page racing a delete on another) can't happen here — but two pages
// switching to two different networks concurrently still race a whole-field
// diff the same way, so it gets the same per-key merge for the leaf edit
// case (e.g. Settings saving a custom RPC URL for the active network).
function mergeEndpointEntry(base, ours, theirs) {
if (!base) return ours;
const merged = { ...theirs };
for (const key of Object.keys(ours)) {
if (!deepEqual(ours[key], base[key])) merged[key] = ours[key];
}
return merged;
}
function mergeNetworkEndpoints(base, ours, theirs) {
return mergeMapByKey(base, ours, theirs, mergeEndpointEntry);
}
// Read-modify-write, merged per field, rather than one full-blob write.
//
// Every extension page (the toolbar popup, a dApp approval window, the
// background's backgroundRefresh()) holds its own in-memory `state`, loaded
// once, and showView() saves on every navigation. A full-blob write here
// clobbers whatever a second page had written since — including, in the
// worst case, an entire wallet and its encrypted secret with no attacker
// and no unusual input (see the issue this fixes).
//
// Only the fields this page actually changed — those that differ from
// `baseline`, captured at the last loadState()/saveState() on this page —
// are written; every other field is carried forward from whatever is in
// storage right now, which may already be a value another page wrote.
//
// `wallets` is merged structurally (mergeListByIdentity(), by wallet
// identity and then by address identity within each wallet), not as one
// whole field: backgroundRefresh() mutates wallets IN PLACE (addr.balance /
// ensName / tokenBalances, via refreshBalances()), so a whole-field diff
// would mark all of `wallets` "changed" the moment any balance moved and
// write back background's own copy — loaded before its multi-second network
// round trip — clobbering a wallet another page added, or resurrecting one
// another page deleted, in that window. Merging by identity lets
// background's leaf changes and another page's membership changes
// (add/delete a wallet or an address) apply independently instead of
// colliding as the same field.
//
// `allowedSites` and `deniedSites` get the same treatment (mergeSiteMap(),
// by address key and then by hostname within each address's list), for the
// identical reason: src/background/index.js pushes a newly
// approved/denied hostname onto them in place, and the Settings "revoke"
// button (src/popup/views/settings.js) filters one out in place, from a
// different page. A whole-field diff here doesn't just lose data, it is a
// security defect — a stale page's save can resurrect a just-revoked site
// permission, or silently wipe a permission just granted elsewhere.
//
// `networkEndpoints` gets the same treatment too (mergeNetworkEndpoints(),
// by network id), since onChainSwitch() writes into it in place; the value
// per key is a small leaf object with no membership of its own; see the
// comment at mergeEndpointEntry() for why the collision this closes is
// milder than the other two.
//
// Every other persisted field stays a whole-field diff:
// `trackedTokens`/`fraudContracts`/`viewStack` are arrays of scalars with no
// per-element identity to merge by; `tokenHolderCache` is a map shaped like
// the ones above, but nothing in src/ ever writes an entry into it — it is
// only ever reset wholesale to `{}` (onChainSwitch()) — so there is no
// in-place mutation for a whole-field diff to collide with; `viewData` is
// this page's own UI scratch space, not data another page has any reason to
// share membership of.
//
// This does not make two pages that both change the SAME leaf concurrently
// safe: last write wins on that one leaf, same as before. What it removes
// is the cross-field (and now cross-membership-vs-leaf) clobber — a page
// that only navigated, or only refreshed a balance, overwriting a wallet or
// address list it never touched the membership of.
//
// This page's own live `state` is deliberately NOT rehydrated from a field
// another page changed — only the record written to storage is merged.
// showView() fires saveState() on every navigation without awaiting it,
// which is what makes the queue above necessary in the first place, and a
// save that is slow to come back has no way to tell whether the field it
// is about to hand back is still the current answer or has since been
// overtaken by something this very page did in the meantime; writing it
// into `state` regardless reintroduced exactly the clobber this function
// exists to remove, just delayed and confined to one page instead of two
// (caught by tests/txStatus.test.js). A page's live picture of a field it
// does not own goes on being whatever its last loadState() saw, same as
// before this fix; only the persisted record is guaranteed current.
async function saveStateOnce() {
const current = snapshotPersisted();
const result = await storageGet("autistmask");
// Normalized, not raw: a field this page did not change still has to
// come from storage in its loaded (self-healed) shape. See
// normalizePersisted() above.
const fresh = normalizePersisted(result.autistmask);
const merged = { ...fresh };
for (const key of PERSISTED_FIELDS) {
if (key === "wallets") {
merged.wallets = mergeListByIdentity(
baseline ? baseline.wallets : [],
current.wallets,
fresh.wallets,
walletIdentity,
mergeWallet,
);
} else if (key === "allowedSites" || key === "deniedSites") {
merged[key] = mergeSiteMap(
baseline ? baseline[key] : {},
current[key],
fresh[key],
);
} else if (key === "networkEndpoints") {
merged.networkEndpoints = mergeNetworkEndpoints(
baseline ? baseline.networkEndpoints : {},
current.networkEndpoints,
fresh.networkEndpoints,
);
} else if (
baseline === null ||
!deepEqual(current[key], baseline[key])
) {
merged[key] = current[key];
}
}
merged.hasWallet = Boolean(merged.wallets && merged.wallets.length > 0);
await storageSet({ autistmask: merged });
// Derived from this page's own wallets, never adopted off the wire —
// see loadState(). Everything else this page did not change is left
// exactly as it stood; see the note above.
state.hasWallet = state.wallets.length > 0;
baseline = structuredClone(snapshotPersisted());
}
// showView() calls saveState() on every navigation without awaiting it, so
// two saves from the SAME page can be in flight at once — e.g. a screen
// shown, then immediately replaced before the first save's storageGet()
// round trip has come back. Left concurrent, the first save's turn would
// finish after the second's live-state mutation and then re-hydrate `state`
// from what IT read, stomping the second, later change back to a stale
// value — the same clobber this function exists to prevent, just between
// two saves on one page instead of two pages. Queuing makes every save's
// snapshot-diff-write-rehydrate run start to finish before the next one
// begins, so each one only ever sees the true live state at its turn.
let saveQueue = Promise.resolve();
function saveState() {
const turn = saveQueue.then(saveStateOnce);
// The queue must advance even when a save rejects, or every save after
// it queues behind a promise that never settles.
saveQueue = turn.catch(() => {});
return turn;
async function saveState() {
const persisted = {
hasWallet: state.hasWallet,
wallets: state.wallets,
trackedTokens: state.trackedTokens,
networkId: state.networkId,
rpcUrl: state.rpcUrl,
blockscoutUrl: state.blockscoutUrl,
networkEndpoints: state.networkEndpoints,
lastBalanceRefresh: state.lastBalanceRefresh,
activeAddress: state.activeAddress,
allowedSites: state.allowedSites,
deniedSites: state.deniedSites,
rememberSiteChoice: state.rememberSiteChoice,
showZeroBalanceTokens: state.showZeroBalanceTokens,
hideSpoofedSymbols: state.hideSpoofedSymbols,
hideLowHolderTokens: state.hideLowHolderTokens,
hideFraudContracts: state.hideFraudContracts,
hideDustTransactions: state.hideDustTransactions,
dustThresholdGwei: state.dustThresholdGwei,
utcTimestamps: state.utcTimestamps,
fraudContracts: state.fraudContracts,
tokenHolderCache: state.tokenHolderCache,
theme: state.theme,
debugMode: state.debugMode,
currentView: state.currentView,
selectedWallet: state.selectedWallet,
selectedAddress: state.selectedAddress,
selectedToken: state.selectedToken,
viewData: state.viewData,
viewStack: state.viewStack,
};
await storageSet({ autistmask: persisted });
}
async function loadState() {
const result = await storageGet("autistmask");
if (result.autistmask) {
Object.assign(state, normalizePersisted(result.autistmask));
const saved = result.autistmask;
state.wallets = saved.wallets || [];
// Derived, never read from storage: a profile persisted with the flag
// out of step with the wallet list would otherwise stay broken on
// every load. Nothing depends on the two disagreeing.
state.hasWallet = state.wallets.length > 0;
state.trackedTokens = saved.trackedTokens || [];
state.networkId = saved.networkId || DEFAULT_STATE.networkId;
state.rpcUrl = saved.rpcUrl || DEFAULT_STATE.rpcUrl;
state.blockscoutUrl =
saved.blockscoutUrl || DEFAULT_STATE.blockscoutUrl;
// An actual object is required, not merely a truthy non-array: the
// code below and onChainSwitch() index and ASSIGN INTO this value,
// and assigning a property to a string or a number is a silent no-op
// in sloppy mode. A stored primitive would therefore be re-persisted
// unchanged forever, and every switch would fall back to the network
// default — the endpoint loss this map exists to prevent, with no
// self-healing. The allowedSites/deniedSites guards below are only
// read from, which is why they can be looser.
state.networkEndpoints =
typeof saved.networkEndpoints === "object" &&
saved.networkEndpoints !== null &&
!Array.isArray(saved.networkEndpoints)
? saved.networkEndpoints
: {};
// A profile written before this map existed carries exactly one pair
// of endpoints, belonging to whatever network it was last on. Adopt
// it as that network's remembered pair, so a custom endpoint set on
// the old build is not lost by the first switch away and back.
if (!state.networkEndpoints[state.networkId]) {
state.networkEndpoints[state.networkId] = {
rpcUrl: state.rpcUrl,
blockscoutUrl: state.blockscoutUrl,
};
}
state.lastBalanceRefresh = saved.lastBalanceRefresh || 0;
state.activeAddress = saved.activeAddress || null;
state.allowedSites =
saved.allowedSites && !Array.isArray(saved.allowedSites)
? saved.allowedSites
: {};
state.deniedSites =
saved.deniedSites && !Array.isArray(saved.deniedSites)
? saved.deniedSites
: {};
state.rememberSiteChoice =
saved.rememberSiteChoice !== undefined
? saved.rememberSiteChoice
: true;
state.showZeroBalanceTokens =
saved.showZeroBalanceTokens !== undefined
? saved.showZeroBalanceTokens
: true;
// A profile written before this setting existed has no key for it.
// It is a safety filter, so absent must load as on, not as undefined.
state.hideSpoofedSymbols =
saved.hideSpoofedSymbols !== undefined
? saved.hideSpoofedSymbols
: true;
state.hideLowHolderTokens =
saved.hideLowHolderTokens !== undefined
? saved.hideLowHolderTokens
: true;
state.hideFraudContracts =
saved.hideFraudContracts !== undefined
? saved.hideFraudContracts
: true;
state.hideDustTransactions =
saved.hideDustTransactions !== undefined
? saved.hideDustTransactions
: true;
state.dustThresholdGwei =
saved.dustThresholdGwei !== undefined
? saved.dustThresholdGwei
: 100000;
state.utcTimestamps =
saved.utcTimestamps !== undefined ? saved.utcTimestamps : false;
state.fraudContracts = saved.fraudContracts || [];
state.tokenHolderCache = saved.tokenHolderCache || {};
state.theme = saved.theme || "system";
state.debugMode =
saved.debugMode !== undefined ? saved.debugMode : false;
state.currentView = saved.currentView || null;
state.selectedWallet =
saved.selectedWallet !== undefined ? saved.selectedWallet : null;
state.selectedAddress =
saved.selectedAddress !== undefined ? saved.selectedAddress : null;
state.selectedToken = saved.selectedToken || null;
state.viewData = saved.viewData || {};
state.viewStack = restorableStack(saved.viewStack, state.currentView);
}
// The point of comparison every saveState() on this page diffs against,
// whether storage had a profile or was empty. See PERSISTED_FIELDS above
// saveState() for why a reference here would be wrong.
baseline = structuredClone(snapshotPersisted());
}
function currentAddress() {

View File

@@ -11,10 +11,6 @@ const { log, debugFetch } = require("./log");
const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("./tokenList");
const { parseHoldersCount, isLowHolderCount } = require("./holders");
const { isSpoofedSymbol } = require("./symbolSpoof");
// The plain 4-decimal rule. The history and balance lists deliberately keep
// truncation without the approval screens' nonzero floor: the transaction
// detail view is the authoritative record and already shows exact precision.
const { truncateAmount: formatTxValue } = require("./amountDisplay");
// Ethereum addresses are case-insensitive: EIP-55 mixed case is a checksum
// over the address, not part of its identity. Every address comparison in
@@ -24,6 +20,13 @@ function normalizeAddress(addr) {
return (addr || "").toLowerCase();
}
function formatTxValue(val) {
const parts = val.split(".");
if (parts.length === 1) return val + ".0000";
const dec = (parts[1] + "0000").slice(0, 4);
return parts[0] + "." + dec;
}
function parseTx(tx, addrLower) {
const from = tx.from?.hash || "";
const to = tx.to?.hash || "";

View File

@@ -3,11 +3,6 @@
const { Interface, AbiCoder, getBytes, formatUnits } = require("ethers");
const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("./tokenList");
const { truncateAmountNeverZero } = require("./amountDisplay");
const {
resolveTokenDecimals,
unknownDecimalsAmount,
} = require("./approvalAmount");
const coder = AbiCoder.defaultAbiCoder();
@@ -39,46 +34,20 @@ const COMMAND_NAMES = {
0x21: "Execute Sub-Plan",
};
// The swap's Amount and Min. received lines land on the same approval screen,
// and Amount is carried to the wait/success/error screens as the ERC-20 line
// is, so they take the same nonzero floor: a swap of an amount below 0.0001 is
// not "0.0000", and a slippage floor of one base unit does not read as "you may
// receive nothing".
function formatAmount(raw, decimals) {
return truncateAmountNeverZero(formatUnits(raw, decimals));
const parts = formatUnits(raw, decimals).split(".");
if (parts.length === 1) return parts[0] + ".0000";
const dec = (parts[1] + "0000").slice(0, 4);
return parts[0] + "." + dec;
}
// `decimals` is null when nothing knows this token's scale. It is not
// defaulted to 18: the swap lines land on the same approval screen as the
// ERC-20 line, and a scale guessed there is what showed a 1,000 USDT swap as
// 0.000000000001. `sources` is { trackedTokens, wallets }, shaped as they are
// on `state`; resolveTokenDecimals() reads the bundled list, then those.
function tokenInfo(address, sources) {
function tokenInfo(address) {
if (!address || address === "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000") {
return { symbol: "ETH", decimals: 18, address: null };
}
const t = TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.get(address.toLowerCase());
return {
symbol: t ? t.symbol : null,
decimals: resolveTokenDecimals(address, sources),
address,
};
}
// A swap amount line. With a scale it is the token quantity; with none it is
// the base-unit integer with the unknown scale stated, the same refusal the
// ERC-20 amount line makes, so the screen has one way of saying it. `display`
// is the line on the screen, `raw` is what the status screens carry.
function amountText(raw, info) {
if (info.decimals === null) {
const unknown = unknownDecimalsAmount(raw);
return { raw: unknown, display: unknown };
}
const formatted = formatAmount(raw, info.decimals);
return {
raw: formatted,
display: formatted + (info.symbol ? " " + info.symbol : ""),
};
if (t) return { symbol: t.symbol, decimals: t.decimals, address };
return { symbol: null, decimals: 18, address };
}
// Decode PERMIT2_PERMIT (command 0x0a) input bytes.
@@ -351,7 +320,7 @@ function decodeV4Swap(input) {
// Try to decode a Universal Router execute() call.
// Returns { name, description, details } matching the format used by
// the approval UI, or null if the calldata is not a recognised execute().
function decode(data, toAddress, sources) {
function decode(data, toAddress) {
try {
const parsed = ROUTER_IFACE.parseTransaction({ data });
if (!parsed) return null;
@@ -444,10 +413,10 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, sources) {
}
// Resolve token info
const inInfo = tokenInfo(inputToken, sources);
const inInfo = tokenInfo(inputToken);
const outInfo = hasUnwrapWeth
? { symbol: "ETH", decimals: 18, address: null }
: tokenInfo(outputToken, sources);
: tokenInfo(outputToken);
const inSymbol = inInfo.symbol;
const outSymbol = outInfo.symbol;
@@ -484,15 +453,16 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, sources) {
"0xffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff",
);
const isUnlimited = inputAmount >= maxUint160;
// An unbounded permit needs no scale to describe, so it is still
// named rather than refused.
const amount = isUnlimited
? { raw: "Unlimited", display: "Unlimited" }
: amountText(inputAmount, inInfo);
const amountRaw = isUnlimited
? "Unlimited"
: formatAmount(inputAmount, inInfo.decimals);
const amountStr = isUnlimited
? "Unlimited"
: amountRaw + (inSymbol ? " " + inSymbol : "");
details.push({
label: "Amount",
value: amount.display,
rawValue: amount.raw,
value: amountStr,
rawValue: amountRaw,
});
}
@@ -513,10 +483,10 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, sources) {
}
if (minOutput !== null && minOutput !== undefined) {
details.push({
label: "Min. received",
value: amountText(minOutput, outInfo).display,
});
const minStr =
formatAmount(minOutput, outInfo.decimals) +
(outSymbol ? " " + outSymbol : "");
details.push({ label: "Min. received", value: minStr });
}
details.push({ label: "Steps", value: commandNames.join(" \u2192 ") });

View File

@@ -1,190 +0,0 @@
// The floor of the approval screen's amount line.
//
// Amounts are truncated to four decimal places for scannability (README.md,
// Display Consistency). With the token's true scale resolved, that truncation
// can still take a real amount below the floor and print it as `0.0000`: one
// base unit of an 18-decimal token, or a few hundred of an 8-decimal one. On
// the one screen whose job is to state what is being authorized, a nonzero
// transfer or allowance then reads as nothing.
//
// The invariant asserted here is narrow: a nonzero amount never renders as
// zero. The four-decimal rule itself is unchanged, and the string the
// confirmation screens carry as `txInfo.amount` is the same one, so it is
// asserted on `rawValue` alongside the displayed line.
//
// Both amount paths of that screen are covered: the ERC-20 line decoded by
// `src/popup/views/approval.js`, and the swap's `Amount` and `Min. received`
// lines decoded by `src/shared/uniswap.js`.
globalThis.chrome = {
storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
};
const { AbiCoder, Interface } = require("ethers");
const { ERC20_ABI } = require("../src/shared/constants");
const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
const { decodeCalldata } = require("../src/popup/views/approval");
const uniswap = require("../src/shared/uniswap");
const {
truncateAmount,
truncateAmountNeverZero,
} = require("../src/shared/amountDisplay");
const iface = new Interface(ERC20_ABI);
// Bundled tokens, so the scale and the symbol both come from the list.
const USDC = "0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48"; // 6 decimals
const WBT = "0x925206b8a707096Ed26ae47C84747fE0bb734F59"; // 8 decimals
const DAI = "0x6B175474E89094C44Da98b954EedeAC495271d0F"; // 18 decimals
// Outside the list, so the scale comes from what the user tracks and the line
// carries no symbol.
const NOVEL = "0xE2E0000000000000000000000000000000000E2e";
const RECIPIENT = "0xC0FfEE0000000000000000000000000000c0fFEe";
const SPENDER = "0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111";
// The Uniswap swap lines land on this same approval screen.
const ROUTER = "0x66a9893cc07d91d95644aedd05d03f95e1dba8af";
const USDT = "0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7"; // 6 decimals
const WETH = "0xC02aaA39b223FE8D0A0e5C4F27eAD9083C756Cc2"; // 18 decimals
const coder = AbiCoder.defaultAbiCoder();
const routerIface = new Interface([
"function execute(bytes commands, bytes[] inputs, uint256 deadline)",
]);
// A V2_SWAP_EXACT_IN (command 0x08) execute() call: `amountIn` of USDT for at
// least `amountOutMin` of WETH.
function swapData(amountIn, amountOutMin) {
const input = coder.encode(
["address", "uint256", "uint256", "address[]", "bool"],
[RECIPIENT, amountIn, amountOutMin, [USDT, WETH], true],
);
return routerIface.encodeFunctionData("execute", [
"0x08",
[input],
9999999999n,
]);
}
function swapDetail(amountIn, amountOutMin, label) {
const decoded = uniswap.decode(swapData(amountIn, amountOutMin), ROUTER);
return decoded.details.find((d) => d.label === label);
}
function transferData(amount) {
return iface.encodeFunctionData("transfer", [RECIPIENT, amount]);
}
function approveData(amount) {
return iface.encodeFunctionData("approve", [SPENDER, amount]);
}
// The Amount detail as the approval screen renders it: `value` is the line on
// the screen, `rawValue` is what is carried to the wait/success/error screens.
function amount(data, token) {
const decoded = decodeCalldata(data, token);
return decoded.details.find((d) => d.label === "Amount");
}
beforeEach(() => {
state.trackedTokens = [];
state.wallets = [];
});
describe("a nonzero amount never renders as zero", () => {
test("500 base units of a 6-decimal token", () => {
const detail = amount(transferData(500n), USDC);
expect(detail.value).toBe("0.0005 USDC");
expect(detail.rawValue).toBe("0.0005");
});
test("1 base unit of an 18-decimal token", () => {
const detail = amount(transferData(1n), DAI);
expect(detail.value).toBe("0.000000000000000001 DAI");
expect(detail.rawValue).toBe("0.000000000000000001");
});
test("500 base units of an 8-decimal token", () => {
expect(amount(transferData(500n), WBT).rawValue).toBe("0.000005");
});
test("an allowance below the floor is not rendered as zero either", () => {
expect(amount(approveData(1n), DAI).value).toBe(
"0.000000000000000001 DAI",
);
});
// The floor holds at any scale, not only the three above: for every
// decimals a token can declare, one base unit has to show a digit.
test("one base unit shows a significant digit at every scale", () => {
for (let decimals = 0; decimals <= 30; decimals++) {
state.trackedTokens = [{ address: NOVEL, decimals }];
expect(amount(transferData(1n), NOVEL).rawValue).toMatch(/[1-9]/);
}
});
});
// The swap decoder formats its own amounts, so the same floor has to hold on
// the swap lines of the same screen. `Min. received` is the sharper of the
// two: the slippage floor rendered as `0.0000` states that the swap may return
// nothing.
describe("a swap's amounts never render as zero either", () => {
test("a swap input below the floor keeps a significant digit", () => {
// 50 base units of a 6-decimal token is 0.00005.
const detail = swapDetail(50n, 10n ** 15n, "Amount");
expect(detail.value).toBe("0.00005 USDT");
expect(detail.rawValue).toBe("0.00005");
});
test("a min-received below the floor keeps a significant digit", () => {
// 1 wei of an 18-decimal token.
expect(swapDetail(10n ** 6n, 1n, "Min. received").value).toBe(
"0.000000000000000001 WETH",
);
});
test("swap amounts at or above the floor are still truncated", () => {
expect(swapDetail(1000000n, 10n ** 15n, "Amount").rawValue).toBe(
"1.0000",
);
expect(
swapDetail(1000000n, 999999999999999999n, "Min. received").value,
).toBe("0.9999 WETH");
});
});
describe("the four-decimal rule is otherwise unchanged", () => {
test("a whole amount keeps exactly four decimals", () => {
expect(amount(transferData(5000000000n), USDC).rawValue).toBe(
"5000.0000",
);
});
test("precision beyond four decimals is still truncated", () => {
expect(amount(transferData(1234567890123456789n), DAI).rawValue).toBe(
"1.2345",
);
});
test("an amount at the floor is not extended", () => {
expect(amount(transferData(100000000000000n), DAI).rawValue).toBe(
"0.0001",
);
});
test("a genuine zero still renders as zero", () => {
expect(amount(transferData(0n), DAI).rawValue).toBe("0.0000");
});
// The three truncators now share one module. The floor is a policy of the
// approval and confirmation screens only: the history and balance lists
// keep plain truncation, because the transaction detail view is the
// authoritative record and already shows exact precision.
test("the list rule stays unfloored", () => {
expect(truncateAmount("0.000000000000000001")).toBe("0.0000");
expect(truncateAmountNeverZero("0.000000000000000001")).toBe(
"0.000000000000000001",
);
});
});

View File

@@ -72,11 +72,6 @@ RUN script/bootstrap
COPY . .
# make package builds (and verifies) dist/ and then writes the release
# artifacts, so the image carries both: run.js installs the unpacked
# dist/firefox and reinstall.js installs the packaged .xpi, which is how the
# artifact that would actually be handed to someone gets exercised in a real
# Firefox rather than only being produced.
RUN make package
RUN make build
CMD ["node", "tests/e2e/firefox/run.js", "dist/firefox"]

View File

@@ -103,13 +103,7 @@ class Driver {
// ------------------------------------------------------------ setup
// `profileDir` reuses an existing profile directory in place instead of
// letting geckodriver make a throwaway one. That is the only way to ask
// what survives a browser RESTART, which for a Firefox add-on that can
// only be installed temporarily is the question that decides whether the
// extension is usable at all: a temporary add-on is unloaded when Firefox
// exits, so every session begins by adding it again.
async newSession(profileDir) {
async newSession() {
const prefs = {
// See EXTENSION_UUID above. The pref is a string pref whose
// value is itself JSON.
@@ -138,27 +132,26 @@ class Driver {
"extensions.openPopupWithoutUserGesture.enabled": false,
};
const args = [
"-headless",
// Mandatory on Firefox 153: without it, navigating to
// moz-extension:// and running chrome-context script both
// fail with "unsupported operation".
//
// It grants the driver FULL CHROME PRIVILEGES over this
// browser. Acceptable only because the browser is a
// throwaway in a CI container; never point a session with
// this flag at anything you care about.
"-remote-allow-system-access",
];
if (profileDir) args.push("-profile", profileDir);
const value = await this.send("POST", "/session", {
capabilities: {
alwaysMatch: {
browserName: "firefox",
"moz:firefoxOptions": {
binary: FIREFOX_BIN,
args,
args: [
"-headless",
// Mandatory on Firefox 153: without it,
// navigating to moz-extension:// and running
// chrome-context script both fail with
// "unsupported operation".
//
// It grants the driver FULL CHROME PRIVILEGES
// over this browser. Acceptable only because
// the browser is a throwaway in a CI
// container; never point a session with this
// flag at anything you care about.
"-remote-allow-system-access",
],
prefs,
},
},
@@ -169,30 +162,16 @@ class Driver {
return value;
}
// Installs the MV2 build, either from an unpacked directory or from an
// XPI file. temporary:true bypasses signature checks — which is the only
// way an UNSIGNED xpi installs at all, and the reason README.md says
// release Firefox will refuse the artifact this repo produces — and the
// add-on dies with the profile.
//
// Returns the add-on id Firefox assigned, which is
// browser_specific_settings.gecko.id from the manifest and is what
// uninstallAddon() takes.
async installAddon(pathToAddon) {
// Installs the unpacked MV2 build straight from a directory.
// temporary:true bypasses signature checks, so no XPI and no signing
// are involved, and the add-on dies with the profile.
async installAddon(dir) {
return this.session("POST", "/moz/addon/install", {
path: pathToAddon,
path: dir,
temporary: true,
});
}
// Removes an installed add-on, the way clicking Remove in about:addons
// does. tests/e2e/firefox/reinstall.js uses it to ask the one question
// that decides whether this extension can be used at all on Firefox: does
// the vault survive being removed and added again.
async uninstallAddon(id) {
return this.session("POST", "/moz/addon/uninstall", { id });
}
// Classic navigation on purpose. BiDi's browsingContext.navigate
// refuses moz-extension:// URLs outright.
async navigate(url) {

View File

@@ -1,438 +0,0 @@
// Does the wallet survive being installed again on Firefox?
//
// This is the question behind
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/310, and it is the one property
// that has to hold before real money goes into this extension. The only route
// that works on release Firefox is a TEMPORARY add-on, which is unloaded when
// the browser exits: daily use means adding it again from about:debugging on
// every browser start. If extension storage did not survive that, every start
// would present an empty wallet and the recovery phrase would be the only copy
// of the money.
//
// manifest/firefox.json declares a fixed browser_specific_settings.gecko.id,
// which is the right SHAPE for storage to survive — Firefox keys the storage
// area by add-on id — but shape is not observation, and nothing asserted it.
//
// Two different things are asked here, because they have different answers and
// conflating them would be the whole mistake:
//
// RESTART one profile, two browser runs, the add-on added temporarily
// in each. This is what a user does every day, and the vault
// has to survive it.
// REMOVAL an explicit uninstall, the way about:addons "Remove" works,
// inside one browser run. Firefox destroys an add-on's storage
// when it is uninstalled, and the observed result is recorded
// here rather than wished away — for a wallet it means Remove
// is irreversible except from the recovery phrase.
//
// The vault is not merely compared as bytes in the restart case. It is
// DECRYPTED with the original password through the real Show Recovery Phrase
// screen and the phrase is compared against the one wallet creation produced,
// because "the ciphertext is still in storage" and "the wallet still works"
// are different claims and only the second one is worth anything.
//
// Run through script/test-e2e-firefox, which builds the artifact and the
// pinned container. The one argument is what to install — an unpacked
// directory or an .xpi. With none, the packaged XPI in release/ is used, so
// this doubles as the check that the release artifact installs in a real
// Firefox.
//
// node tests/e2e/firefox/reinstall.js release/autistmask-firefox-0.1.0.xpi
//
// A separate program from run.js rather than another step in it: every step
// there shares one browser session with one installed add-on, and this needs
// two browsers and three installs.
"use strict";
const fs = require("fs");
const os = require("os");
const path = require("path");
const { EXTENSION_ID, EXTENSION_UUID, start } = require("./driver");
const REPO_ROOT = path.resolve(__dirname, "..", "..", "..");
const PASSWORD = "e2e-harness-password";
const STEP_TIMEOUT_MS = 120000;
const checks = [];
let failed = 0;
function check(name, cond, detail) {
checks.push(name);
if (cond) {
console.log("ok " + checks.length + " - " + name);
} else {
failed += 1;
console.log("not ok " + checks.length + " - " + name);
if (detail) console.log(" " + detail);
}
}
// The moz-extension:// uuid Firefox currently serves this add-on from, read
// out of the pref that holds the mapping. Privileged scope, because that pref
// is not reachable from content.
//
// It has to be read after every install and never assumed. driver.js pins a
// uuid through extensions.webextensions.uuids at each session start, but an
// uninstall inside a running session drops that mapping and the next install
// mints a fresh one — and navigating to the stale origin does not fail, it
// HANGS until the session times out, which is how this was found.
async function extensionUuid(d) {
const raw = await d.executeChrome(
`return Services.prefs.getStringPref(
"extensions.webextensions.uuids", "{}");`,
);
let map;
try {
map = JSON.parse(raw);
} catch (e) {
throw new Error(
"extensions.webextensions.uuids is not JSON (" +
e.message +
"): " +
raw,
);
}
return map[EXTENSION_ID] || null;
}
async function openPopup(d) {
const uuid = await extensionUuid(d);
if (!uuid) {
throw new Error(
"no uuid for " +
EXTENSION_ID +
" in extensions.webextensions.uuids, so the popup has no " +
"origin to be served from",
);
}
await d.navigate("moz-extension://" + uuid + "/src/popup/index.html");
// Whichever screen it lands on, wait for one of the two it can land on.
// Waiting for #view-main directly would time out rather than say what
// happened, and an empty storage partition is exactly the case where it
// lands on the other one.
await d.waitFor(
"the popup to finish restoring",
`const w = document.getElementById("view-welcome");
const m = document.getElementById("view-main");
if (!w || !m) return false;
const shown = (el) => {
const r = el.getBoundingClientRect();
return r.width > 0 && r.height > 0;
};
return shown(w) || shown(m);`,
[],
STEP_TIMEOUT_MS,
);
return uuid;
}
// The persisted record, straight out of extension storage, read from the popup
// page — the one moz-extension:// document this program opens and therefore
// the only place the storage API is reachable from.
async function readVault(d) {
const outcome = await d.executeAsync(
`const done = arguments[arguments.length - 1];
const api = typeof browser !== "undefined" ? browser : chrome;
Promise.resolve(api.storage.local.get("autistmask"))
.then((r) => {
const s = r.autistmask;
if (!s) return done({ present: false });
const w = (s.wallets || [])[0];
if (!w) return done({ present: false });
done({
present: true,
wallets: s.wallets.length,
name: w.name,
xpub: w.xpub,
address: (w.addresses || []).map((a) => a.address)[0],
vault: JSON.stringify(w.encryptedSecret),
});
})
.catch((e) => done({ error: String((e && e.message) || e) }));`,
);
if (outcome && outcome.error) {
throw new Error("could not read extension storage: " + outcome.error);
}
return outcome;
}
async function createWallet(d) {
await d.click("#btn-welcome-add");
await d.waitVisible("#view-add-wallet");
await d.click("#btn-generate-phrase");
await d.waitFor(
"a generated recovery phrase of at least 12 words",
`const el = document.getElementById("wallet-mnemonic");
return !!el && el.value.trim().split(/\\s+/).length >= 12;`,
);
const phrase = (await d.value("#wallet-mnemonic")).trim();
await d.fill("#add-wallet-password", PASSWORD);
await d.fill("#add-wallet-password-confirm", PASSWORD);
await d.click("#btn-add-wallet-confirm");
// Argon2id under libsodium, for real.
await d.waitVisible("#view-main", STEP_TIMEOUT_MS);
return phrase;
}
// The phrase the vault decrypts to, obtained the way a user would: Settings,
// Show Recovery Phrase, the original password.
async function revealPhrase(d) {
if (!(await d.isVisible("#view-settings"))) {
await d.click("#btn-settings");
}
await d.waitVisible("#view-settings");
await d.click("#settings-wallet-list .btn-show-phrase");
await d.waitVisible("#view-show-phrase");
await d.fill("#show-phrase-password", PASSWORD);
await d.click("#btn-show-phrase-reveal");
await d.waitVisible("#show-phrase-result", STEP_TIMEOUT_MS);
return (await d.text("#show-phrase-value")).trim();
}
// What to install. An explicit argument wins; with none, the packaged XPI in
// release/ is used, and there is deliberately no fallback to dist/firefox: the
// point of running this against the artifact is that the artifact is what gets
// installed, and quietly testing something else instead would leave the XPI
// unexercised while the run stayed green.
function resolveArtifact() {
if (process.argv[2]) return path.resolve(REPO_ROOT, process.argv[2]);
const releaseDir = path.join(REPO_ROOT, "release");
const xpis = fs.existsSync(releaseDir)
? fs.readdirSync(releaseDir).filter((f) => f.endsWith(".xpi"))
: [];
if (xpis.length !== 1) {
throw new Error(
"expected exactly one .xpi in release/, found " +
xpis.length +
" (" +
xpis.join(", ") +
"). Run make package, or name the artifact as the argument.",
);
}
return path.join(releaseDir, xpis[0]);
}
async function main() {
let artifact;
try {
artifact = resolveArtifact();
} catch (e) {
console.error("e2e-firefox-reinstall: " + e.message);
process.exitCode = 1;
return;
}
if (!fs.existsSync(artifact)) {
console.error(
"e2e-firefox-reinstall: nothing to install at " + artifact,
);
process.exitCode = 1;
return;
}
console.log("# installing: " + artifact);
// One profile, reused by both browser runs below. geckodriver would
// otherwise make a throwaway one per session, and "survives a restart"
// cannot be asked of a profile that does not.
const profile = fs.mkdtempSync(
path.join(os.tmpdir(), "autistmask-reinstall-profile-"),
);
let phrase = null;
let before = null;
let first;
// --- run one: install, create a wallet, close the browser --------------
try {
first = await start();
await first.newSession(profile);
} catch (e) {
// A browser we cannot start is a failure of this program, never an
// absent one.
console.error("e2e-firefox-reinstall: cannot run: " + e.message);
if (first) await first.quit().catch(() => {});
process.exitCode = 1;
return;
}
try {
const firstId = await first.installAddon(artifact);
check(
"the artifact installs and reports the manifest's gecko id",
firstId === EXTENSION_ID,
"installed add-on id is " +
JSON.stringify(firstId) +
", expected " +
JSON.stringify(EXTENSION_ID) +
". Without a stable id Firefox has no key to hang the " +
"storage area on, and nothing below can hold.",
);
const firstUuid = await openPopup(first);
await first.waitVisible("#view-welcome", STEP_TIMEOUT_MS);
phrase = await createWallet(first);
before = await readVault(first);
check(
"a wallet created through the UI is in extension storage",
before.present && before.wallets === 1 && !!before.vault,
JSON.stringify(before),
);
console.log(
"# run 1 moz-extension uuid: " +
firstUuid +
(firstUuid === EXTENSION_UUID ? " (the pinned one)" : ""),
);
} catch (e) {
failed += 1;
console.log("# ERROR in run 1: " + (e && e.stack ? e.stack : e));
} finally {
await first.quit().catch(() => {});
}
// --- run two: same profile, add-on added again -------------------------
//
// This is the restart. The temporary add-on died with the previous
// browser; the profile, and whatever Firefox kept in it, did not.
let second;
try {
second = await start();
await second.newSession(profile);
} catch (e) {
console.error(
"e2e-firefox-reinstall: cannot restart the browser: " + e.message,
);
if (second) await second.quit().catch(() => {});
process.exitCode = 1;
return;
}
try {
const secondId = await second.installAddon(artifact);
check(
"the add-on installs again after a browser restart with the " +
"same id",
secondId === EXTENSION_ID,
"re-installed id is " + JSON.stringify(secondId),
);
const secondUuid = await openPopup(second);
// The origin the popup is served from is not the thing that carries
// the wallet, and the uuid is read live for exactly that reason. In
// this run it comes back as the pinned one, because driver.js writes
// extensions.webextensions.uuids into the profile at every session
// start; an uninstall inside a running session drops the mapping and
// the next install mints a fresh uuid instead. Either way the storage
// area is keyed on the add-on id, never on this.
console.log(
"# run 2 moz-extension uuid: " +
secondUuid +
(secondUuid === EXTENSION_UUID
? " (the pinned one, re-applied at session start)"
: " (freshly minted)"),
);
const onWelcome = await second.isVisible("#view-welcome");
check(
"after a restart and re-add, the extension does not come up as " +
"a fresh install",
!onWelcome,
"the popup shows the welcome screen, which is what an empty " +
"storage partition looks like: the wallet is gone and only " +
"the recovery phrase would get it back.",
);
const after = await readVault(second);
check(
"the vault, xpub and first address survive the restart unchanged",
after.present &&
after.wallets === before.wallets &&
after.vault === before.vault &&
after.xpub === before.xpub &&
after.address === before.address,
"before: " +
JSON.stringify(before) +
" after: " +
JSON.stringify(after),
);
if (after.present) {
const revealed = await revealPhrase(second);
check(
"the vault still decrypts with the original password to the " +
"original recovery phrase",
revealed === phrase,
"the recovery phrase read back after the restart is not the " +
"one the wallet was created with",
);
} else {
check(
"the vault still decrypts with the original password to the " +
"original recovery phrase",
false,
"there was no vault left to decrypt",
);
}
// --- an explicit removal, in the same browser run ------------------
//
// Leave the popup FIRST. Removing the add-on destroys every document
// it serves, and the popup is this session's only window: uninstalling
// while it is on screen discards the browsing context, and every
// subsequent WebDriver command fails with "no such window" rather than
// with anything about the add-on. Observed, not anticipated.
await second.navigate("about:blank");
await second.uninstallAddon(EXTENSION_ID);
await second.installAddon(artifact);
await openPopup(second);
const afterRemoval = await readVault(second);
console.log(
"# after an explicit uninstall: " + JSON.stringify(afterRemoval),
);
// Recorded as observed behaviour, not as something this repo wants.
// Firefox destroys an add-on's storage when it is uninstalled, and
// that is correct of a browser — it is stated here, and in README.md,
// because for a WALLET it means about:addons "Remove" is irreversible
// except from the recovery phrase. If a Firefox ever stops doing it
// this fails and the claim gets rewritten from a new observation.
check(
"an explicit uninstall DESTROYS the vault (observed Firefox " +
"behaviour: Remove is irreversible, unlike a restart)",
afterRemoval.present === false,
"the vault survived an explicit uninstall: " +
JSON.stringify(afterRemoval),
);
} catch (e) {
failed += 1;
console.log("# ERROR in run 2: " + (e && e.stack ? e.stack : e));
} finally {
await second.quit().catch(() => {});
fs.rmSync(profile, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
console.log("1.." + checks.length);
if (checks.length === 0) {
console.log("# FAILED: this program asserted nothing");
process.exitCode = 1;
return;
}
console.log(
"# " +
(checks.length - failed) +
"/" +
checks.length +
" checks passed",
);
if (failed > 0) {
console.log("# FAILED");
process.exitCode = 1;
}
}
main().catch((e) => {
console.error("e2e-firefox-reinstall: " + (e && e.stack ? e.stack : e));
process.exitCode = 1;
});

View File

@@ -1,303 +0,0 @@
// Where does chrome.storage.local live, and what moves it?
//
// The finding behind https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/310: an
// unpacked Chrome extension with no `key` in its manifest gets an extension id
// derived from the ABSOLUTE PATH it was loaded from, and chrome.storage.local
// is partitioned by that id. README.md documents Load unpacked from
// dist/chrome/ as the install route, so moving the checkout, re-cloning it, or
// loading a second copy from anywhere else means a different id, a different
// storage partition, and a wallet that reads as empty — with no error, no
// prompt and nothing in the UI to say what happened.
//
// So this OBSERVES the behaviour rather than restating it. Two unpacked loads
// from two different directories, in one profile, with the shipped manifest
// and again with `key` stripped out, and it reports what each pair actually
// does. The assertions are on what was seen when this was written and are
// annotated as such; if Chrome's derivation ever changes, this says so instead
// of passing.
//
// Run through script/test-e2e, which builds the extension and the pinned
// container.
//
// node tests/e2e/storagePartition.js
//
// A separate program from run.js because every test there shares one browser
// and one extension load, and the whole subject here is what happens across
// two of each.
//
// The extension's own UI is deliberately not driven. What is under test is the
// storage partition, so a sentinel key the extension never reads or writes is
// written and read back directly: a wallet would prove the same thing more
// slowly, and would confuse an empty partition with a UI that failed to
// render.
"use strict";
const fs = require("fs");
const os = require("os");
const path = require("path");
const { chromium } = require("playwright-core");
const REPO_ROOT = path.resolve(__dirname, "..", "..");
const DIST_CHROME = path.join(REPO_ROOT, "dist", "chrome");
// Never touched by the extension: src/shared/state.js reads and writes the
// single key "autistmask" and nothing else.
const SENTINEL_KEY = "e2e-storage-partition-sentinel";
const SENTINEL_VALUE = "written-by-the-first-load";
const checks = [];
let failed = 0;
const scratch = [];
function check(name, cond, detail) {
checks.push(name);
if (cond) {
console.log("ok " + checks.length + " - " + name);
} else {
failed += 1;
console.log("not ok " + checks.length + " - " + name);
if (detail) console.log(" " + detail);
}
}
function tmpdir(tag) {
const dir = fs.mkdtempSync(
path.join(os.tmpdir(), "autistmask-" + tag + "-"),
);
scratch.push(dir);
return dir;
}
// A copy of the built extension at a fresh absolute path. `withKey: false`
// strips the manifest's `key`, which is the pre-fix state of this repo and the
// control the whole program is built around.
function extensionCopy(tag, withKey) {
const dir = path.join(tmpdir(tag), "chrome");
fs.cpSync(DIST_CHROME, dir, { recursive: true });
const manifestPath = path.join(dir, "manifest.json");
const manifest = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(manifestPath, "utf8"));
if (withKey) {
if (!manifest.key) {
throw new Error(
"dist/chrome/manifest.json has no `key`, so this program has " +
"nothing to observe. That field is what pins the " +
"extension id; see tests/extensionId.test.js.",
);
}
} else {
delete manifest.key;
}
fs.writeFileSync(manifestPath, JSON.stringify(manifest, null, 4));
return dir;
}
async function launch(profileDir, extensionDirs) {
const ctx = await chromium.launchPersistentContext(profileDir, {
// See the note in harness.js: the default headless shell silently
// refuses to load extensions.
channel: "chromium",
headless: true,
args: [
"--disable-extensions-except=" + extensionDirs.join(","),
"--load-extension=" + extensionDirs.join(","),
"--no-sandbox",
// Nothing here should reach the network; this makes sure it
// cannot.
"--host-resolver-rules=MAP * ~NOTFOUND",
],
});
return ctx;
}
// Every extension id Chrome ended up with in this context, from the service
// worker urls. MV3 registers one worker per loaded extension.
async function extensionIds(ctx, expected) {
const deadline = Date.now() + 30000;
for (;;) {
const ids = [
...new Set(ctx.serviceWorkers().map((w) => new URL(w.url()).host)),
].sort();
if (ids.length >= expected) return ids;
if (Date.now() > deadline) return ids;
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 200));
}
}
// Open one extension's popup and run `fn` in it. The popup page is used rather
// than the service worker because Chrome stops an idle MV3 worker, and a
// handle to a stopped worker cannot be evaluated in.
async function inExtension(ctx, id, fn, arg) {
const page = await ctx.newPage();
try {
await page.goto("chrome-extension://" + id + "/src/popup/index.html");
return await page.evaluate(fn, arg);
} finally {
await page.close();
}
}
const writeSentinel = ([key, value]) =>
new Promise((resolve) => {
chrome.storage.local.set({ [key]: value }, () => resolve(true));
});
const readSentinel = (key) =>
new Promise((resolve) => {
chrome.storage.local.get(key, (r) => resolve(r[key] ?? null));
});
// Load `firstDir` in a fresh profile, write the sentinel, close; load
// `secondDir` in the SAME profile, read it back. Returns both ids and what the
// second load saw.
async function acrossTwoPaths(tag, firstDir, secondDir) {
const profile = tmpdir(tag + "-profile");
const first = await launch(profile, [firstDir]);
let firstId;
try {
[firstId] = await extensionIds(first, 1);
if (!firstId) throw new Error("no extension loaded from " + firstDir);
await inExtension(first, firstId, writeSentinel, [
SENTINEL_KEY,
SENTINEL_VALUE,
]);
} finally {
await first.close();
}
const second = await launch(profile, [secondDir]);
let secondId;
let seen;
try {
[secondId] = await extensionIds(second, 1);
if (!secondId) throw new Error("no extension loaded from " + secondDir);
seen = await inExtension(second, secondId, readSentinel, SENTINEL_KEY);
} finally {
await second.close();
}
return { firstId, secondId, seen };
}
async function main() {
if (!fs.existsSync(path.join(DIST_CHROME, "manifest.json"))) {
console.error(
"storagePartition: no unpacked build at " +
DIST_CHROME +
" — run make build first",
);
process.exitCode = 1;
return;
}
try {
// --- the shipped manifest, which carries `key` ----------------------
const keyedA = extensionCopy("keyed-a", true);
const keyedB = extensionCopy("keyed-b", true);
const keyed = await acrossTwoPaths("keyed", keyedA, keyedB);
console.log("# with `key`: " + keyedA + " -> " + keyed.firstId);
console.log("# with `key`: " + keyedB + " -> " + keyed.secondId);
console.log("# with `key`: sentinel read back: " + keyed.seen);
check(
"with `key`, two different paths produce the SAME extension id",
keyed.firstId === keyed.secondId,
keyed.firstId + " != " + keyed.secondId,
);
check(
"with `key`, the second path reads the first path's storage",
keyed.seen === SENTINEL_VALUE,
"the second load read " +
JSON.stringify(keyed.seen) +
" instead of the value the first load wrote. The storage " +
"partition did not follow the extension across the move, " +
"which is the wallet silently reading as empty.",
);
// --- the same build with `key` removed: the control -----------------
const barePath = extensionCopy("bare-a", false);
const bareB = extensionCopy("bare-b", false);
const bare = await acrossTwoPaths("bare", barePath, bareB);
console.log("# without `key`: " + barePath + " -> " + bare.firstId);
console.log("# without `key`: " + bareB + " -> " + bare.secondId);
console.log("# without `key`: sentinel read back: " + bare.seen);
// Observed, not assumed. If Chrome ever stops deriving the id from
// the load path these two fail, and the right response is to record
// what it does now — not to delete them.
check(
"without `key`, two different paths produce DIFFERENT ids " +
"(observed Chrome behaviour, the defect this fixes)",
bare.firstId !== bare.secondId,
"both loads got " +
bare.firstId +
", so the id no longer follows the load path on this Chrome",
);
check(
"without `key`, the second path sees an EMPTY partition " +
"(observed Chrome behaviour, the defect this fixes)",
bare.seen === null,
"the second load read " +
JSON.stringify(bare.seen) +
" from a different id's partition",
);
// --- both copies loaded at once, in one profile ---------------------
// The literal shape of the question, kept because "two unpacked loads
// in one profile" is what a user does when they forget to remove the
// old one. With `key`, both copies claim the same id.
const profile = tmpdir("simultaneous-profile");
const ctx = await launch(profile, [keyedA, keyedB]);
let ids = [];
try {
ids = await extensionIds(ctx, 2);
} finally {
await ctx.close();
}
console.log(
"# both keyed copies loaded at once: " +
ids.length +
" extension id(s): " +
ids.join(", "),
);
check(
"loading both keyed copies at once yields one id, not two " +
"(observed: Chrome does not load a second copy of an id it " +
"already has)",
ids.length === 1 && ids[0] === keyed.firstId,
"saw " + JSON.stringify(ids) + ", expected exactly one id",
);
} catch (e) {
failed += 1;
console.log("# ERROR: " + (e && e.stack ? e.stack : e));
} finally {
for (const dir of scratch) {
fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
}
console.log("1.." + checks.length);
if (checks.length === 0) {
console.log("# FAILED: this program asserted nothing");
process.exitCode = 1;
return;
}
console.log(
"# " +
(checks.length - failed) +
"/" +
checks.length +
" checks passed",
);
if (failed > 0) {
console.log("# FAILED");
process.exitCode = 1;
}
}
main().catch((e) => {
console.error("storagePartition: " + (e && e.stack ? e.stack : e));
process.exitCode = 1;
});

View File

@@ -1,119 +0,0 @@
// The extension identity on both browsers, pinned.
//
// This is the anti-regression check for
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/310. An unpacked Chrome
// extension with no `key` in its manifest gets an id derived from the
// ABSOLUTE PATH it was loaded from, and chrome.storage.local is partitioned by
// that id. Move the checkout, re-clone it, or load it from a second directory,
// and the wallet is silently gone: the extension comes up on a fresh, empty
// storage partition with no error anywhere. `key` pins the id to the public
// key instead of to the path, which is what makes the storage survive.
//
// So the id is asserted as a literal. A test that merely recomputed the id
// from whatever `key` happened to be in the manifest would pass after someone
// replaced the key — and replacing the key is exactly the change that orphans
// every existing wallet. The value below is the promise; changing it is a
// migration, not an edit.
//
// Firefox needs no key: browser_specific_settings.gecko.id declares the id
// directly, and it is pinned here for the same reason. The Firefox e2e suite
// depends on it too (tests/e2e/firefox/driver.js maps it to a fixed uuid), and
// tests/e2e/firefox/reinstall.js is the empirical half — it removes the add-on
// and installs it again and reads the vault back out.
const crypto = require("crypto");
const fs = require("fs");
const path = require("path");
const MANIFEST_DIR = path.join(__dirname, "..", "manifest");
// The public half of an RSA keypair, DER-encoded SubjectPublicKeyInfo, base64.
// The PRIVATE half is not in this repo and is not needed to build, load or
// test anything here: it is only ever used to sign a CRX, which this repo does
// not do.
const CHROME_KEY =
"MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAzy/G9gT4Z3Ci0HCmthUPEiCjENg+" +
"5meZpjdogyT7SiMfxENtHdrpDL6wGhAg1Dk0f1C67Ft8OYpMrMH3kiP2Wnt0UpHo45PY0YUU" +
"YzdJgbsp8u0kaykd5FFiY6FycIIFaTniMuh7wRKuNNdJWly+H3aG7qZ6nGu5PIMdb1GXUk35" +
"hY+yl7dz5dqFFYUCyxvWCT9XGBSYiI+XRBB/rVZjMWfWpaTmRPdOZ4+GO/Lx0OdMxKlPA/kL" +
"WoPot5vMlLn2FDPu6sASphiu7dKZnrINW+h/27jlHMJQS0jncB1EgqOHW0vbXrZnTveFX6UW" +
"+Qp86FfSkikhKtQgTW2A4mtWawIDAQAB";
// chrome.storage.local for this extension lives under this id, and nowhere
// else.
const CHROME_EXTENSION_ID = "gipbhkogfopeahplcjhipkgpcimdpkip";
const FIREFOX_EXTENSION_ID = "autistmask@sneak.berlin";
// Chrome's id derivation: sha256 of the DER public key, first 16 bytes, each
// hex digit mapped 0-f onto a-p. Written out here rather than taken on trust,
// because the whole claim of this file is that the committed key produces that
// id.
function chromeExtensionId(keyBase64) {
const der = Buffer.from(keyBase64, "base64");
const digest = crypto.createHash("sha256").update(der).digest("hex");
return [...digest.slice(0, 32)]
.map((c) => String.fromCharCode(97 + parseInt(c, 16)))
.join("");
}
function readManifest(name) {
return JSON.parse(
fs.readFileSync(path.join(MANIFEST_DIR, name + ".json"), "utf8"),
);
}
describe("chrome extension identity", () => {
test("the manifest carries the pinned key", () => {
expect(readManifest("chrome").key).toBe(CHROME_KEY);
});
test("the key is a well-formed RSA public key", () => {
const der = Buffer.from(CHROME_KEY, "base64");
// Round-trips: a truncated or re-wrapped base64 blob would still
// decode to bytes, and Chrome would then derive an id from garbage.
expect(der.toString("base64")).toBe(CHROME_KEY);
const key = crypto.createPublicKey({
key: der,
format: "der",
type: "spki",
});
expect(key.asymmetricKeyType).toBe("rsa");
expect(key.asymmetricKeyDetails.modulusLength).toBe(2048);
});
test("the key derives the pinned extension id", () => {
expect(chromeExtensionId(CHROME_KEY)).toBe(CHROME_EXTENSION_ID);
expect(CHROME_EXTENSION_ID).toMatch(/^[a-p]{32}$/);
});
// The private half is a credential. It has never been in this repo and no
// target generates one into the working tree; this fails loudly if that
// ever changes, because a committed .pem is a key anyone can sign a CRX
// with under this extension's id.
test("no private key is committed anywhere in the tree", () => {
const tracked = require("child_process")
.execSync("git ls-files", {
cwd: path.join(__dirname, ".."),
encoding: "utf8",
})
.split("\n")
.filter(Boolean);
expect(tracked.filter((f) => /\.(pem|key|p12|pfx)$/i.test(f))).toEqual(
[],
);
});
});
describe("firefox extension identity", () => {
test("the manifest declares the pinned gecko id", () => {
const gecko = readManifest("firefox").browser_specific_settings.gecko;
expect(gecko.id).toBe(FIREFOX_EXTENSION_ID);
});
// Firefox derives nothing from the path, so no key field belongs here; one
// would be ignored and would only suggest the id came from somewhere else.
test("the firefox manifest carries no chrome key field", () => {
expect(readManifest("firefox").key).toBeUndefined();
});
});

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@@ -1,190 +0,0 @@
// The release archives: the zip container, and the self-containment rule.
//
// script/package produces one archive per browser and script/lib/package.js
// decides what goes in it. The trap that rule exists for is real and specific:
// build.js writes the compiled stylesheet to dist/styles.css at the dist/
// ROOT, outside both browser directories, and copies it into each of them as
// src/popup/styles.css. A `zip -r dist/chrome` is correct only because of that
// copy, and would silently start shipping a popup with no stylesheet the
// moment a reference pointed up and out of the directory.
//
// So the packager resolves every reference in the manifest and in every HTML
// document, and fails on any that leaves the extension root. These are the
// cases for that, plus the archive format itself — new code, and the thing the
// artifact is made of.
const {
checkSelfContained,
htmlReferences,
manifestReferences,
} = require("../script/lib/package");
const { readZip, writeZip } = require("../script/lib/zip");
function archiveOf(files) {
return {
members: Object.keys(files).sort(),
read: (name) => Buffer.from(files[name] ?? "", "utf8"),
};
}
const MINIMAL_MANIFEST = {
manifest_version: 3,
name: "AutistMask",
version: "0.1.0",
action: { default_popup: "src/popup/index.html" },
background: { service_worker: "src/background/index.js" },
};
describe("archive self-containment", () => {
test("a complete tree passes", () => {
const { members, read } = archiveOf({
"manifest.json": JSON.stringify(MINIMAL_MANIFEST),
"src/popup/index.html":
'<link rel="stylesheet" href="styles.css" />' +
'<script src="index.js"></script>',
"src/popup/styles.css": "body{}",
"src/popup/index.js": "//",
"src/background/index.js": "//",
});
expect(() => checkSelfContained("chrome", members, read)).not.toThrow();
});
test("a manifest naming a file that is not in the archive fails", () => {
const { members, read } = archiveOf({
"manifest.json": JSON.stringify(MINIMAL_MANIFEST),
"src/popup/index.html": "<html></html>",
"src/popup/index.js": "//",
});
expect(() => checkSelfContained("chrome", members, read)).toThrow(
/would not be self-contained.*src\/background\/index\.js/s,
);
});
// The dist/styles.css case, exactly: a popup that reached up out of its
// own browser directory for the stylesheet the build leaves at the dist/
// root. Nothing would be missing from disk, and the zip would still be
// built — the archive would just have no stylesheet in it.
test("an HTML reference that escapes the extension root fails", () => {
const { members, read } = archiveOf({
"manifest.json": JSON.stringify(MINIMAL_MANIFEST),
"src/popup/index.html":
'<link rel="stylesheet" href="../../../styles.css" />',
"src/popup/index.js": "//",
"src/background/index.js": "//",
});
expect(() => checkSelfContained("chrome", members, read)).toThrow(
/resolves outside the extension root/,
);
});
test("a manifest reference that escapes the extension root fails", () => {
const { members, read } = archiveOf({
"manifest.json": JSON.stringify({
...MINIMAL_MANIFEST,
background: { service_worker: "../shared/index.js" },
}),
"src/popup/index.html": "<html></html>",
});
expect(() => checkSelfContained("chrome", members, read)).toThrow(
/points outside the extension root/,
);
});
test("an archive with no manifest.json at its root fails", () => {
const { members, read } = archiveOf({ "src/popup/index.js": "//" });
expect(() => checkSelfContained("chrome", members, read)).toThrow(
/no manifest\.json at its root/,
);
});
test("manifest strings that are not paths are not treated as files", () => {
const found = manifestReferences({
name: "AutistMask",
version: "0.1.0",
permissions: ["storage", "<all_urls>"],
content_security_policy: {
extension_pages: "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'",
},
key: "MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAzy",
});
expect([...found]).toEqual([]);
});
test("absolute, data: and anchor HTML references are not files", () => {
const refs = htmlReferences(
"src/popup/index.html",
'<a href="https://example.com/x.js">a</a>' +
'<img src="" />' +
'<a href="#view-main">b</a>' +
'<script src="index.js"></script>',
);
expect([...refs]).toEqual(["src/popup/index.js"]);
});
});
describe("the zip container", () => {
const files = [
{ name: "manifest.json", data: Buffer.from('{"a":1}') },
// Long enough that deflate wins, so both paths through compress() are
// exercised by one archive.
{ name: "src/popup/index.js", data: Buffer.from("x".repeat(5000)) },
{ name: "empty.txt", data: Buffer.alloc(0) },
];
test("round-trips every member byte for byte", () => {
const entries = readZip(writeZip(files));
expect(entries.map((e) => e.name)).toEqual([
"empty.txt",
"manifest.json",
"src/popup/index.js",
]);
for (const original of files) {
const found = entries.find((e) => e.name === original.name);
expect(found.data.equals(original.data)).toBe(true);
}
});
// The sha256 in release/SHA256SUMS has to be a property of the input. Two
// builds of one commit that produce different archives cannot be compared
// to each other, which is most of what publishing a digest is for.
test("is byte-identical across runs and independent of input order", () => {
const a = writeZip(files);
const b = writeZip([...files].reverse());
expect(a.equals(b)).toBe(true);
});
// Reading an archive back is how script/lib/package.js establishes that
// the artifact holds what dist/ holds, so a member whose bytes changed
// after it was written has to fail rather than be handed back.
test("a corrupted member fails its CRC on read", () => {
// One member, incompressible at this size, so it is stored verbatim
// and its bytes begin at a known offset: local header (30) + name.
const name = "a.js";
const archive = writeZip([{ name, data: Buffer.from("hello") }]);
expect(readZip(archive)[0].data.toString()).toBe("hello");
archive[30 + name.length] ^= 0xff;
expect(() => readZip(archive)).toThrow(/fails its recorded CRC32/);
});
test.each([["/abs.js"], ["../up.js"], ["a/../b.js"], ["a\\b.js"], [""]])(
"refuses the member name %p",
(name) => {
expect(() => writeZip([{ name, data: Buffer.from("x") }])).toThrow(
/member name/,
);
},
);
test("refuses an archive with no members", () => {
expect(() => writeZip([])).toThrow(/no members/);
});
test("refuses duplicate members", () => {
expect(() =>
writeZip([
{ name: "a.js", data: Buffer.from("1") },
{ name: "a.js", data: Buffer.from("2") },
]),
).toThrow(/duplicate member/);
});
});

View File

@@ -1,443 +0,0 @@
// saveState() used to write the entire state blob every time
// (src/shared/state.js). Every extension page — the toolbar popup, a dApp
// approval window opened by the background, backgroundRefresh() in
// src/background/index.js — holds its own in-memory `state`, loaded once,
// and src/popup/views/helpers.js showView() saves on EVERY navigation. So
// any second page that saved after a first page had written something new
// overwrote it, with no attacker and no unusual input: a whole wallet, name,
// addresses and encrypted secret included, silently gone
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/304).
//
// Both cases below drive the real state.js module through two independent
// module registries sharing one storage backend, the way two real extension
// pages share one chrome.storage.local. The storage stub structured-clones
// on both get and set — a stub that hands back the object it was given
// aliases the caller's own mutation and would make this entire defect class
// invisible (see https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324).
function makeStorage() {
let store = {};
return {
get: async (keys) => {
const wanted =
keys === undefined || keys === null
? Object.keys(store)
: [].concat(keys);
const out = {};
for (const key of wanted) {
if (key in store) out[key] = structuredClone(store[key]);
}
return out;
},
set: async (items) => {
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(items)) {
store[key] = structuredClone(value);
}
},
};
}
// One extension page: a fresh module registry over the shared storage.
// state.js resolves the storage API at require time, so the stub has to be
// installed before the module is loaded, and `state` is a module-level
// singleton, so each page needs its own registry to hold its own copy.
function loadPage(storage) {
jest.resetModules();
globalThis.chrome = { storage: { local: storage } };
return {
state: require("../src/shared/state"),
helpers: require("../src/popup/views/helpers"),
};
}
function wallet(name, secret, address) {
return {
type: "hd",
name,
xpub: "xpub-" + name,
encryptedSecret: secret,
nextIndex: 1,
addresses: [{ address, balance: "0", tokenBalances: [] }],
};
}
const W1 = wallet(
"Wallet 1",
"secret-one",
"0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a",
);
const W2 = wallet(
"Wallet 2",
"secret-two",
"0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7",
);
// Minimal DOM: showView() toggles view elements, clears the flash line and
// creates/removes the debug banner. Nothing here is asserted; it only has to
// answer without throwing, the way the popup's own index.html would.
function makeElement(id) {
const classes = new Set();
return {
id,
textContent: "",
style: {},
classList: {
add: (...n) => n.forEach((c) => classes.add(c)),
remove: (...n) => n.forEach((c) => classes.delete(c)),
toggle: (c, force) => {
const on = force === undefined ? !classes.has(c) : force;
if (on) classes.add(c);
else classes.delete(c);
return on;
},
},
remove: () => {},
};
}
function makeDocument() {
const els = new Map();
return {
getElementById(id) {
if (id === "debug-banner") return null;
if (!els.has(id)) els.set(id, makeElement(id));
return els.get(id);
},
createElement: () => makeElement("created"),
body: { prepend: () => {} },
};
}
afterEach(() => {
delete globalThis.chrome;
delete globalThis.document;
});
describe("a save from a page that never saw a wallet another page added", () => {
// The first DoD case on the issue: add a wallet in one page, then force
// a save from a second page loaded before that wallet existed. Both
// wallets must survive.
test("both wallets are in storage afterwards", async () => {
const storage = makeStorage();
await storage.set({ autistmask: { wallets: [W1] } });
// Loaded while storage held only Wallet 1, and never reloads —
// the approval window in the reproduction, or a second popup that
// has been open for a while.
const stale = loadPage(storage);
await stale.state.loadState();
expect(stale.state.state.wallets).toHaveLength(1);
// A second page, loaded after, adds a wallet — the exact sequence
// src/popup/views/addWallet.js uses.
const fresh = loadPage(storage);
await fresh.state.loadState();
fresh.state.state.wallets.push(W2);
fresh.state.state.hasWallet = true;
await fresh.state.saveState();
expect(
(await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask.wallets,
).toHaveLength(2);
// The stale page saves something that has nothing to do with
// wallets — exactly what showView() does on every navigation, and
// what backgroundRefresh() does after a balance poll.
stale.state.state.currentView = "settings";
await stale.state.saveState();
const persisted = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
expect(persisted.wallets.map((w) => w.name)).toEqual([
"Wallet 1",
"Wallet 2",
]);
expect(persisted.wallets.map((w) => w.encryptedSecret)).toEqual([
"secret-one",
"secret-two",
]);
});
});
describe("the approval-window reproduction", () => {
// approval window open, add a wallet in the popup, confirm the approval
// — the exact sequence from the issue. The approval window and the
// popup are the same popup code with a different starting view, so
// showView() is the real save path in both: src/popup/views/approval.js
// showTxApproval() calls showView("approve-tx") when the window opens,
// and a successful confirm calls
// src/popup/views/txStatus.js showWait() -> startWait(), which calls
// showView("wait-tx") — the save that clobbered the second wallet in
// the reproduction on the issue.
test("the wallet added in the popup survives confirming the approval", async () => {
globalThis.document = makeDocument();
const storage = makeStorage();
await storage.set({ autistmask: { wallets: [W1] } });
// The background opens the approval window on the approve-tx
// screen; nothing else has happened yet.
const approvalWindow = loadPage(storage);
await approvalWindow.state.loadState();
approvalWindow.helpers.showView("approve-tx");
// showView() does not await its own saveState(); an extra save
// joins the same queue and only resolves once that one has too,
// which is the black-box way to know it landed.
await approvalWindow.state.saveState();
// The user adds a wallet in the popup — a separate page, loaded
// after the approval window.
const popup = loadPage(storage);
await popup.state.loadState();
popup.state.state.wallets.push(W2);
popup.state.state.hasWallet = true;
await popup.state.saveState();
expect(
(await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask.wallets,
).toHaveLength(2);
// The user confirms the approval. The approval window navigates
// approve-tx -> wait-tx, saving again from state it loaded before
// Wallet 2 ever existed.
approvalWindow.helpers.showView("wait-tx");
await approvalWindow.state.saveState();
const persisted = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
expect(persisted.wallets.map((w) => w.name)).toEqual([
"Wallet 1",
"Wallet 2",
]);
expect(persisted.wallets.map((w) => w.encryptedSecret)).toEqual([
"secret-one",
"secret-two",
]);
});
});
// backgroundRefresh() (src/background/index.js) loads state, spends seconds
// on network I/O in refreshBalances() (src/shared/balances.js) mutating
// addr.balance/ensName/tokenBalances IN PLACE on the wallets it already
// knew about, then saves. Precondition 2 on the issue: that refresh window
// overlapping a membership change (add or delete) on another page must not
// clobber or resurrect a wallet — a whole-field diff on `wallets` failed
// this, because "background changed a balance" and "another page changed
// membership" collided as the same field.
describe("background refresh racing a wallet added on another page", () => {
test("the wallet added elsewhere survives background's stale balance save", async () => {
const storage = makeStorage();
await storage.set({ autistmask: { wallets: [W1] } });
// "background": loads first, and its save is the one that lands
// last, modeling the multi-second network round trip in between.
const background = loadPage(storage);
await background.state.loadState();
background.state.state.wallets[0].addresses[0].balance = "1.2345";
// A second page, loaded after, adds a wallet while background's
// refresh is still in flight.
const popup = loadPage(storage);
await popup.state.loadState();
popup.state.state.wallets.push(W2);
popup.state.state.hasWallet = true;
await popup.state.saveState();
expect(
(await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask.wallets,
).toHaveLength(2);
// background's save lands last, carrying only its balance update.
await background.state.saveState();
const persisted = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
expect(persisted.wallets.map((w) => w.name)).toEqual([
"Wallet 1",
"Wallet 2",
]);
expect(persisted.wallets.map((w) => w.encryptedSecret)).toEqual([
"secret-one",
"secret-two",
]);
// The balance update itself must not be lost either — this is a
// merge, not deletion-always-wins.
expect(persisted.wallets[0].addresses[0].balance).toBe("1.2345");
});
});
describe("background refresh racing a wallet deleted on another page", () => {
test("the wallet deleted elsewhere stays deleted after background's stale balance save", async () => {
const storage = makeStorage();
await storage.set({ autistmask: { wallets: [W1, W2] } });
const background = loadPage(storage);
await background.state.loadState();
background.state.state.wallets[0].addresses[0].balance = "1.2345";
// A second page deletes Wallet 2 while background's refresh is in
// flight — the same splice deleteWallet.js's removeWalletFromState()
// does.
const popup = loadPage(storage);
await popup.state.loadState();
popup.state.state.wallets.splice(1, 1);
popup.state.state.hasWallet = popup.state.state.wallets.length > 0;
await popup.state.saveState();
expect(
(await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask.wallets,
).toHaveLength(1);
await background.state.saveState();
const persisted = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
expect(persisted.wallets.map((w) => w.name)).toEqual(["Wallet 1"]);
expect(persisted.wallets[0].addresses[0].balance).toBe("1.2345");
});
});
// allowedSites/deniedSites: { [address]: [hostname, ...] }. Mutated in place
// from two different contexts — src/background/index.js:592-599 pushes a
// newly approved hostname onto state.allowedSites[activeAddress], and the
// Settings "revoke" button (src/popup/views/settings.js:55-68) filters a
// hostname out of state[key][addr] in place, deleting the address key
// entirely once its list is empty — the exact membership-vs-whole-field
// pattern that made the whole-field `wallets` diff unsafe, on a
// security-relevant field: a stale whole-field save here can resurrect a
// revoked permission or wipe a freshly granted one.
const ADDR1 = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
const ADDR2 = "0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7";
function approveSite(pageState, address, hostname) {
if (!pageState.allowedSites[address]) {
pageState.allowedSites[address] = [];
}
if (!pageState.allowedSites[address].includes(hostname)) {
pageState.allowedSites[address].push(hostname);
}
}
function revokeSite(pageState, hostname) {
for (const addr of Object.keys(pageState.allowedSites)) {
pageState.allowedSites[addr] = pageState.allowedSites[addr].filter(
(h) => h !== hostname,
);
if (pageState.allowedSites[addr].length === 0) {
delete pageState.allowedSites[addr];
}
}
}
describe("a dApp approval racing a stale Settings page's later save", () => {
test("the fresh approval survives Settings revoking an unrelated site", async () => {
const storage = makeStorage();
await storage.set({
autistmask: {
wallets: [W1],
allowedSites: { [ADDR2]: ["other.example"] },
},
});
// Settings loads first, and its save lands last — before either has
// any idea a dApp approval happened elsewhere in between.
const settings = loadPage(storage);
await settings.state.loadState();
// A dApp approval window, opened later, approves a new site for a
// different address and saves — the real sequence at
// src/background/index.js:592-599.
const approval = loadPage(storage);
await approval.state.loadState();
approveSite(approval.state.state, ADDR1, "dapp.example");
await approval.state.saveState();
expect(
(await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask.allowedSites[ADDR1],
).toEqual(["dapp.example"]);
// Settings revokes its own, unrelated site — the real sequence at
// src/popup/views/settings.js:55-68 — and saves from state loaded
// before the dApp approval ever happened.
revokeSite(settings.state.state, "other.example");
await settings.state.saveState();
const persisted = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
expect(persisted.allowedSites[ADDR1]).toEqual(["dapp.example"]);
expect(persisted.allowedSites[ADDR2]).toBeUndefined();
});
});
describe("a revoked site permission against a stale page's later save", () => {
test("the revocation holds even when the stale page approves something else", async () => {
const storage = makeStorage();
await storage.set({
autistmask: {
wallets: [W1],
allowedSites: { [ADDR1]: ["evil.example"] },
},
});
// A stale page loads while the permission still stands.
const stale = loadPage(storage);
await stale.state.loadState();
// Settings revokes it — src/popup/views/settings.js:55-68 — from a
// second page.
const settings = loadPage(storage);
await settings.state.loadState();
revokeSite(settings.state.state, "evil.example");
await settings.state.saveState();
expect(
(await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask.allowedSites[ADDR1],
).toBeUndefined();
// The stale page, unaware of the revoke, approves an unrelated site
// for a different address and saves — src/background/index.js:592-599.
approveSite(stale.state.state, ADDR2, "good.example");
await stale.state.saveState();
const persisted = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
expect(persisted.allowedSites[ADDR2]).toEqual(["good.example"]);
expect(persisted.allowedSites[ADDR1]).toBeUndefined();
});
});
// mergeListByIdentity()'s identity function is not guaranteed collision-free
// — walletIdentity() falls back to one shared "addr:" value for any wallet
// with neither an xpub nor a populated first address (a legacy or corrupt
// record). Two such records created independently on two different pages
// must not silently collapse into one, dropping the loser's
// encryptedSecret with no error and no log.
function legacyWallet(name, secret) {
return {
type: "legacy",
name,
encryptedSecret: secret,
nextIndex: 0,
addresses: [],
};
}
describe("two wallets independently created with a colliding identity", () => {
test("both survive, encryptedSecret included, instead of one silently replacing the other", async () => {
const storage = makeStorage();
await storage.set({ autistmask: { wallets: [W1] } });
// Both pages load before either has created their malformed wallet,
// so neither has baseline knowledge of the other's.
const pageA = loadPage(storage);
await pageA.state.loadState();
const pageB = loadPage(storage);
await pageB.state.loadState();
pageA.state.state.wallets.push(legacyWallet("Legacy A", "secret-a"));
pageA.state.state.hasWallet = true;
await pageA.state.saveState();
expect(
(await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask.wallets,
).toHaveLength(2);
pageB.state.state.wallets.push(legacyWallet("Legacy B", "secret-b"));
pageB.state.state.hasWallet = true;
await pageB.state.saveState();
const persisted = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
const secrets = persisted.wallets.map((w) => w.encryptedSecret);
expect(secrets).toContain("secret-one");
expect(secrets).toContain("secret-a");
expect(secrets).toContain("secret-b");
});
});

View File

@@ -1,176 +0,0 @@
// The scale the swap lines of the dApp approval screen are displayed with.
//
// Issue #340: `tokenInfo()` in `src/shared/uniswap.js` returned `decimals: 18`
// for any token absent from the bundled list — the same guess
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/306 removed from the ERC-20
// amount line, still live on the swap path. A 1,000-token swap of a 6-decimal
// token then rendered as `0.000000001` on the one screen whose job is to state
// what is being authorized, and every newly listed token reaches it.
//
// What is asserted here is the rule #306 established: resolve the real scale
// wherever the wallet already has it, and where nothing has it refuse to
// format — base units with the scale stated, never a quantity.
globalThis.chrome = {
storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
};
const { AbiCoder, Interface } = require("ethers");
const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
const { unknownDecimalsAmount } = require("../src/shared/approvalAmount");
const { decodeCalldata } = require("../src/popup/views/approval");
const ROUTER = "0x66a9893cc07d91d95644aedd05d03f95e1dba8af";
const RECIPIENT = "0xC0FfEE0000000000000000000000000000c0fFEe";
// Outside the bundled list, as every newly listed token is.
const NOVEL = "0xE2E0000000000000000000000000000000000E2e";
// Also outside it, standing in for the swap's output side.
const NOVEL_OUT = "0xd0d0000000000000000000000000000000000d0d";
// In the bundled list, at 18 decimals.
const WETH = "0xC02aaA39b223FE8D0A0e5C4F27eAD9083C756Cc2";
// 1,000.00 of a 6-decimal token — the amount from the issue, which the 18
// guess rendered as 0.000000001.
const THOUSAND_AT_SIX = 1000000000n;
// 0.5 WETH out, so the Min. received line has a real number of its own.
const HALF_WETH = 500000000000000000n;
const coder = AbiCoder.defaultAbiCoder();
const routerIface = new Interface([
"function execute(bytes commands, bytes[] inputs, uint256 deadline)",
]);
// A V2_SWAP_EXACT_IN (command 0x08) execute() call: `amountIn` of `tokenIn`
// for at least `amountOutMin` of `tokenOut`.
function swapData(tokenIn, amountIn, tokenOut, amountOutMin) {
const input = coder.encode(
["address", "uint256", "uint256", "address[]", "bool"],
[RECIPIENT, amountIn, amountOutMin, [tokenIn, tokenOut], true],
);
return routerIface.encodeFunctionData("execute", [
"0x08",
[input],
9999999999n,
]);
}
// A wallet holding `token` with the decimals the block explorer reported,
// shaped as balances.js writes it onto state.
function walletsHolding(token, decimals) {
return [
{
name: "Wallet 1",
addresses: [
{
address: "0x" + "a".repeat(40),
balance: "1.0",
tokenBalances: [
{
address: token,
symbol: "NOVEL",
decimals,
balance: "1000.0",
},
],
},
],
},
];
}
// The swap detail line as the approval screen renders it. It goes through
// decodeCalldata() rather than uniswap.decode() directly, because the scale
// sources the screen supplies are part of what is under test.
function swapDetail(data, label) {
const decoded = decodeCalldata(data, ROUTER);
return decoded.details.find((d) => d.label === label);
}
beforeEach(() => {
state.trackedTokens = [];
state.wallets = [];
});
describe("a swap of a token outside the bundled list", () => {
const data = () => swapData(NOVEL, THOUSAND_AT_SIX, WETH, HALF_WETH);
test("shows the true quantity when the user tracks the token", () => {
state.trackedTokens = [
{ address: NOVEL, symbol: "NOVEL", decimals: 6 },
];
expect(swapDetail(data(), "Amount").value).toBe("1000.0000");
});
test("shows the true quantity from the explorer's decimals", () => {
state.wallets = walletsHolding(NOVEL, "6");
expect(swapDetail(data(), "Amount").value).toBe("1000.0000");
});
test("refuses to format when nothing knows the scale", () => {
const detail = swapDetail(data(), "Amount");
expect(detail.value).toBe("1000000000 base units (decimals unknown)");
expect(detail.value).toBe(unknownDecimalsAmount(THOUSAND_AT_SIX));
// The defect: an 18-decimal guess renders this swap as 0.000000001, a
// quantity, and a wrong one.
expect(detail.value).not.toMatch(/^0\./);
expect(detail.value).not.toMatch(/[0-9]\.[0-9]/);
});
test("the amount carried to the status screens is the same refusal", () => {
expect(swapDetail(data(), "Amount").rawValue).toBe(
"1000000000 base units (decimals unknown)",
);
});
test("a bundled token on the other side still formats", () => {
expect(swapDetail(data(), "Min. received").value).toBe("0.5000 WETH");
});
});
describe("the Min. received line takes the same rule", () => {
test("refuses to format an output token of unknown scale", () => {
const data = swapData(WETH, HALF_WETH, NOVEL_OUT, THOUSAND_AT_SIX);
const detail = swapDetail(data, "Min. received");
expect(detail.value).toBe("1000000000 base units (decimals unknown)");
expect(detail.value).not.toMatch(/[0-9]\.[0-9]/);
});
test("shows the true quantity when the user tracks the output token", () => {
state.trackedTokens = [
{ address: NOVEL_OUT, symbol: "NOVEL", decimals: 6 },
];
const data = swapData(WETH, HALF_WETH, NOVEL_OUT, THOUSAND_AT_SIX);
expect(swapDetail(data, "Min. received").value).toBe("1000.0000");
});
});
describe("the permit amount takes the same rule", () => {
// PERMIT2_PERMIT (command 0x0a): the input token and amount come from the
// permit rather than from a swap step.
function permitData(token, amount) {
const input = coder.encode(
[
"tuple(tuple(address,uint160,uint48,uint48),address,uint256)",
"bytes",
],
[[[token, amount, 0, 0], ROUTER, 9999999999], "0x1234"],
);
return routerIface.encodeFunctionData("execute", [
"0x0a",
[input],
9999999999n,
]);
}
test("refuses to format a permit on a token of unknown scale", () => {
const detail = swapDetail(permitData(NOVEL, THOUSAND_AT_SIX), "Amount");
expect(detail.value).toBe("1000000000 base units (decimals unknown)");
});
test("an unbounded permit is still named, with or without a scale", () => {
const maxUint160 = (1n << 160n) - 1n;
expect(swapDetail(permitData(NOVEL, maxUint160), "Amount").value).toBe(
"Unlimited",
);
});
});

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@@ -1,97 +0,0 @@
// One version, three files, and the rule that they agree.
//
// package.json, manifest/chrome.json and manifest/firefox.json each declare a
// version and none is derived from another. Before this, nothing compared
// them: the manifests were hardcoded at 0.1.0 and copied to dist/ verbatim
// while package.json fed the About screen separately, so the number the
// browser reported and the number the extension displayed could drift apart
// with no check anywhere failing.
//
// The build enforces the agreement (build.js calls resolveVersion before it
// emits anything) and script/lib/package.js names the artifacts from it. This
// asserts both halves: that the tree as committed agrees, and that a tree that
// does not is refused rather than resolved to one of the answers.
const fs = require("fs");
const os = require("os");
const path = require("path");
const {
VERSION_SOURCES,
declaredVersions,
resolveVersion,
} = require("../script/lib/version");
const ROOT = path.join(__dirname, "..");
// A tree containing only the three version files, with the given versions.
function fixture(versions) {
const dir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "autistmask-version-"));
fs.mkdirSync(path.join(dir, "manifest"));
VERSION_SOURCES.forEach((source, i) => {
fs.writeFileSync(
path.join(dir, source),
JSON.stringify({ version: versions[i] }),
);
});
return dir;
}
describe("the declared version", () => {
test("all three sources agree in this tree", () => {
const declared = declaredVersions(ROOT);
expect(declared.map((d) => d.source)).toEqual(VERSION_SOURCES);
expect([...new Set(declared.map((d) => d.version))]).toHaveLength(1);
expect(resolveVersion(ROOT)).toBe(declared[0].version);
});
// Semver-shaped, because it names every release artifact and is what the
// browser compares when deciding whether an install is an upgrade.
test("is semver-shaped", () => {
expect(resolveVersion(ROOT)).toMatch(/^\d+\.\d+\.\d+$/);
});
// The load-bearing case: each of the three, disagreeing on its own, has to
// fail. A check that only looked at two of them would pass one of these.
test.each([
["package.json", ["9.9.9", "0.1.0", "0.1.0"]],
["manifest/chrome.json", ["0.1.0", "9.9.9", "0.1.0"]],
["manifest/firefox.json", ["0.1.0", "0.1.0", "9.9.9"]],
])("a disagreeing %s fails rather than resolving", (source, versions) => {
const dir = fixture(versions);
try {
expect(() => resolveVersion(dir)).toThrow(
/the declared versions disagree/,
);
expect(() => resolveVersion(dir)).toThrow(new RegExp(source));
} finally {
fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
test("agreeing sources resolve", () => {
const dir = fixture(["1.2.3", "1.2.3", "1.2.3"]);
try {
expect(resolveVersion(dir)).toBe("1.2.3");
} finally {
fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
// A missing or empty version is not agreement. Left unchecked, three files
// that all declared nothing would "agree" on undefined and the artifacts
// would be named after it.
test.each([[undefined], [""], [" "], [3]])(
"a version of %p is refused",
(bad) => {
const dir = fixture([bad, bad, bad]);
try {
expect(() => resolveVersion(dir)).toThrow(
/declares no usable "version"/,
);
} finally {
fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
},
);
});