A network switch puts the outgoing network's tracked tokens away in a new
persisted field, networkTrackedTokens, and brings back the incoming network's
list, or an empty one, as endpoints are kept; the background's switch uses the
same function. The two add-token screens offer their common-token picks on
Ethereum Mainnet only. After a switch in Settings, Back renders the screen it
lands on again, and the stack is cut at the first screen that cannot be
rendered from saved state, or at AddressToken for any token but the native
one; the cut stack is saved with the switch. ConfirmTx drawn again keeps the
network it was reviewed on. A contract lookup that answers after a switch adds
nothing.
Model: opus-5-5
ConfirmTx showed and checked the balance Send handed it, so a screen the popup reopened onto stated the balance as Send knew it, not as it is on the network the screen is drawn for.
Each time it is shown, ConfirmTx now reads the From address's ETH balance, and for a token send its token balance, from the node reviewedNetworkProvider() picks for the network the transaction was reviewed for, the node the fee estimate and recipient checks ask. The fee estimate starts once the read returns. Until then the balance line says "Loading..." and Sign & Send stays disabled; a failed read is stated as unknown. Each message the read can bring has a box reserved from the first paint, so nothing moves when it returns.
Model: opus-5-5
ConfirmTx set the transaction's chain id to the active network's every
time it drew the screen, so a popup reopened onto a saved confirmation
after a network switch in Settings described the reviewed transfer as
the new network's and sent it there.
show() now sets the chain id only on a transaction Send hands over, and
the screen describes the transaction entirely on that network: native
currency, USD values, explorer links, and the node and explorer its
checks ask. explorerUrl(), renderAddressHtml(), getPrice(), formatFee()
and checkEtherscanLabel() take an optional chain id for this. A saved
transaction whose chain id names no network is not restored.
Model: opus-5-5
The polarity check now counts only `hostile` and `falsy` values, not a
`hostileRestore` value, which reaches only the views its entry names.
The stale index 5 moves into `hostile` for `selectedWallet` and
`selectedAddress`, as each field's one value still truthy after the
floor.
Each `hostileRestore` entry declares whether its boot lands on its view
or falls back to Home, and the test checks the one view on screen. A
value driven onto every restorable view lists only the views it falls
back on, so a view added later is driven by default.
The header and the README restate the remaining limits as built and say
which boots are held to where the popup lands.
Model: opus-5-5
The stand-in in tests/support/popupBoot.js returned a bare list, while the
real filterTransactions returns { transactions, newFraudContracts }. Home,
AddressDetail and AddressToken read both fields, so every test boot onto
one of them threw inside its transaction loading, logged loadHomeTxs failed
or loadTransactions failed, and never ran the rest of that code. The
stand-in now returns the real shape, and tests/persistedFieldContract.test.js
boots onto each of the three views and asserts neither message is logged.
Model: opus-5-5
allowedSites and deniedSites held the bare hostname, so a grant to
https://dapp.example also authorised http://dapp.example and every port
on that host, and the connection, transaction and signature prompts
named only the hostname. Both lists now store and match the full origin
(scheme://host[:port]), the key the connections approved without
Remember already used. The prompts, the Settings site lists and
AUTISTMASK_REMOVE_SITE use the origin too. Entries saved by hostname
are not migrated (pre-1.0): they match no site.
Model: opus-5-5
A stored allowedSites whose value was not a list rendered a working popup and then made every subsequent save fail silently, so the user operated a wallet that persisted nothing -- worse than a blank popup, which is at least visibly broken. fraudContracts and selectedToken had the same shape: a container floored by truthiness or not at all, while its entries were dereferenced. Entries are now floored as well as containers, following the idiom #311 established, and a failed save raises a persistent banner instead of vanishing into a swallowed rejection.
The per-field justifications that used to live in a hand-written header are replaced by a contract test that drives each field's hostile and falsy values through a real popup boot, so a claim about a field answers to the code rather than to prose. Its guarantee is stated narrowly and deliberately: no structural dereference on the code paths a wholly-corrupted profile takes, which is not every path a stored record takes. The paths it does not drive are named where the claim is made, and are tracked in #379.
sneak
clawbot