harden: escape every interpolation into popup innerHTML, and add default-src to both manifests (closes #307)
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A hostile ERC-20's symbol() reached an innerHTML string unescaped, and neither
manifest declared default-src, so an attacker deploying a token with 1,000+
holders and airdropping one unit could render a full-viewport cross-origin
iframe over the wallet's own UI, on screens where the user types their
password.

escapeHtml is now a pure string replace over & < > " ' — the old version
round-tripped through textContent, which escapes neither quote, while already
being used inside data-copy="...". All 19 files in src/popup/views/ were
audited: beyond the reported symbol site, the explorer-supplied directionLabel
in all three transaction lists, wallet.name, addr.ensName, the blockie data:
URIs and two ad-hoc quote-only escapes were also unescaped. Explorer URLs now
go through one helper that percent-encodes the path segment.

Both manifests add default-src 'self', frame-src 'none', form-action 'none' and
base-uri 'none'. Three loosenings are pinned in tests/manifest.test.js and
justified in README.md: style-src 'unsafe-inline' (39 static style attributes;
Firefox implements neither style-src-attr nor 'unsafe-hashes'), img-src data:
(blockies), connect-src https: http: (user-configurable RPC).

Note frame-src 'none' blocks a frame loading, not the element existing, so the
zero-iframe assertion is a claim about the escaping alone; the test asserts the
element count and the literal rendered text separately, taking the count before
any click an overlay could intercept.

Verified: make check 39 suites / 811 tests, test-e2e 55/55 including the
WebAssembly-under-CSP assertion, test-e2e-firefox 8/8, zero CSP violations
asserted rather than merely unobserved. Reverting only balanceLine's
interpolation reproduces the attack as 2 iframes on the address screen.
This commit was merged in pull request #327.
This commit is contained in:
2026-08-20 13:47:28 +02:00
parent 59f68b8859
commit c8c2af0c6b
24 changed files with 706 additions and 97 deletions

View File

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ const {
addressDotHtml,
addressTitle,
escapeHtml,
displaySymbol,
truncateMiddle,
renderAddressHtml,
attachCopyHandlers,
@@ -109,10 +110,13 @@ function renderHomeTxList(ctx) {
: tx.direction === "sent" || tx.direction === "contract"
? tx.to
: tx.from;
const dirLabel = tx.directionLabel;
// directionLabel is the explorer's own method name for a contract
// call, title-cased — attacker-chosen for an attacker's contract.
const dirLabel = escapeHtml(tx.directionLabel);
const sym = displaySymbol(tx.symbol);
const amountStr = tx.value
? escapeHtml(tx.value + " " + tx.symbol)
: escapeHtml(tx.symbol);
? escapeHtml(tx.value + " " + sym)
: escapeHtml(sym);
const title = addressTitle(counterparty, state.wallets);
const maxAddr = Math.max(32, 36 - Math.max(0, amountStr.length - 10));
const displayAddr = title || truncateMiddle(counterparty, maxAddr);
@@ -226,7 +230,7 @@ function walletListHtml() {
const defect = walletDefect(wallet);
html += `<div>`;
html += `<div class="flex justify-between items-center bg-section py-1 px-2" style="margin:0 -0.5rem">`;
html += `<span class="font-bold cursor-pointer wallet-name underline decoration-dashed" data-wallet="${wi}">${wallet.name}</span>`;
html += `<span class="font-bold cursor-pointer wallet-name underline decoration-dashed" data-wallet="${wi}">${escapeHtml(wallet.name)}</span>`;
// No "+" on a defective wallet: deriving another address from that
// xpub would only add one more address the key does not produce
// under the standard path.
@@ -250,10 +254,13 @@ function walletListHtml() {
const titleBold = isActive ? "font-bold" : "";
html += `<div class="text-xs ${titleBold}">Address ${ai + 1}</div>`;
if (addr.ensName) {
html += `<div class="text-xs font-bold flex items-center">${dot}${addr.ensName}</div>`;
// An ENS reverse record is whatever the name owner set it
// to; renderAddressHtml() escapes its own copy of this and
// this list was the one that did not.
html += `<div class="text-xs font-bold flex items-center">${dot}${escapeHtml(addr.ensName)}</div>`;
}
html += `<div class="flex text-xs items-center justify-between">`;
html += `<span class="flex items-center break-all">${addr.ensName ? "" : dot}${addr.address}</span>`;
html += `<span class="flex items-center break-all">${addr.ensName ? "" : dot}${escapeHtml(addr.address)}</span>`;
html += `<span class="flex-shrink-0 ml-1">${infoBtn}${removeBtn}</span>`;
html += `</div>`;
const addrTotal = formatAddressTotal(getAddressValue(addr));