Refactor by moving the email-the-admin code out of the status checks and into a new separate tool.
This is why I suppressed non-error output of the backups last commit - so it doesn't send a daily email.
For HTTPS for the non-primary domains, instead of selecting an SSL certificate by expecting it to be in a directory named after the domain name (with special-case lookups
for www domains, and reusing the server certificate where possible), now scan all of the certificates that have been installed and just pick the best to use for each domain.
If no certificate is available, don't create a self-signed certificate anymore. This wasn't ever really necessary. Instead just use the server certificate.
This is an extension of #427. Building on that change it adds support in the
aliases table for flagging aliases as:
1. Applicable to inbound and outbound mail.
2. Applicable to inbound mail only.
3. Applicable to outbound mail only.
4. Disabled.
The aliases UI is also updated to allow administrators to set the direction of
each alias.
Using this extra information, the sqlite queries executed by Postfix are
updated so only the relevant alias types are checked.
The goal and result of this change is that outbound-only catch-all aliases can
now be defined (in fact catch-all aliases of any type can be defined).
This allow us to continue supporting relaying as described at
https://mailinabox.email/advanced-configuration.html#relay
without requiring that administrators either create regular aliases for each
outbound *relay* address, or that they create a catch-all alias and then face a
flood of spam.
I have tested the code as it is in this commit and fixed every issue I found,
so in that regard the change is complete. However I see room for improvement
in terms of updating terminology to make the UI etc. easier to understand.
I'll make those changes as subsequent commits so that this tested checkpoint is
not lost, but also so they can be rejected independently of the actual change
if not wanted.
* Use `cryptography` instead of parsing openssl's output.
* When checking if we can reuse the primary domain certificate or a www-parent-domain certificate for a domain, avoid shelling out to openssl entirely.
* Split the nginx templates again so we have just the part needed to make a domain do a redirect separate from the rest.
* Add server blocks to the nginx config for these domains.
* List these domains in the SSL certificate install admin panel.
* Generate default 'www' records just for domains we provide default redirects for.
Fixes#321.
I changed my mind. In 1bf8f1991f I allowed Unicode domain names to go into the database. I thought that was nice because it's what the user *means*. But it's not how the web works. Web and DNS were working, but mail wasn't. Postfix (as shipped with Ubuntu 14.04 without support for SMTPUTF8) exists in an ASCII-only world. When it goes to the users/aliases table, it queries in ASCII (IDNA) only and had no hope of delivering mail if the domain was in full Unicode in the database. I was thinking ahead to SMTPUTF8, where we *could* put Unicode in the database (though that would prevent IDNA-encoded addressing from being deliverable) not realizing it isn't well supported yet anyway.
It's IDNA that goes on the wire in most places anyway (SMTP without SMTPUTF8 (and therefore how Postfix queries our users/aliases tables), DNS zone files, nginx config, CSR 'CN' field, X509 Common Name and Subject Alternative Names fields), so we should really be talking in terms of IDNA (i.e. ASCII).
This partially reverts commit 1bf8f1991f, where I added a lot of Unicode=>IDNA conversions when writing configuration files. Instead I'm doing Unicode=>IDNA before email addresses get into the users/aliases table. Now we assume the database uses IDNA-encoded ASCII domain names. When adding/removing aliases, addresses are converted to ASCII (w/ IDNA). User accounts must be ASCII-only anyway because of Dovecot's auth limitations, so we don't do any IDNA conversion (don't want to change the user's login info behind their back!). The aliases control panel page converts domains back to Unicode for display to be nice. The status checks converts the domains to Unicode just for the output headings.
A migration is added to convert existing aliases with Unicode domains into IDNA. Any custom DNS or web settings with Unicode may need to be changed.
Future support for SMTPUTF8 will probably need to add columns in the users/aliases table so that it lists both IDNA and Unicode forms.
* For non-ASCII domain names, we will keep the Unicode encoding in our users/aliases table. This is nice for the user and also simplifies things like sorting domain names (using Unicode lexicographic order is good, using ASCII lexicogrpahic order on IDNA is confusing).
* Write nsd config, nsd zone files, nginx config, and SSL CSRs with domains in IDNA-encoded ASCII.
* When checking SSL certificates, treat the CN and SANs as IDNA.
* Since Chrome has an interesting feature of converting Unicode to IDNA in <input type="email"> form fields, we'll also forcibly convert IDNA to Unicode in the domain part of email addresses before saving email addresses in the users/aliases tables so that the table is normalized to Unicode.
* Don't allow non-ASCII characters in user account email addresses. Dovecot gets confused when querying the Sqlite database (which we observed even for non-word ASCII characters too, so it may not be related to the character encoding).
If bind9 isn't running, dont proceed with other checks because we can't do DNS checks. Even though we skip, add error handling so that a failed call to rndc doesn't crash and that a timeout in a DNS check doesn't crash the status checks.
Relative hostnames have a fall-back lookup with the machine's hostname appended, which makes no sense. Add a period, e.g. "my.hostname.com" => "my.hostname.com.", to prevent that.
This caused false positive Spamhaus checks. Fixes#185.
* If the PRIMARY_HOSTNAME is in a zone with a DS record set at the registrar, show any DNSSEC failure (but only a failure) immediately since it is probably the cause of other DNS errors displayed later.
* For zones, if a DS record is set at the register, do the DNSSEC test first because even the NS test will fail if DNSSEC is improperly configure.
* But if a DS record is not set, the this is just a suggestion to configure DNSSEC so offer the suggestion last --- after mail and web checks.
see https://discourse.mailinabox.email/t/dns-nameserver-gandi-glue-records-issues/105/3
Joshua Tauberer
Michael Kroes
Norman Stanke
root
David Piggott
Brian Bustin
Jack Twilley
Ian Beringer
Marc Schiller