Port 465 with "implicit" (i.e. always-on) TLS is a more secure approach than port 587 with explicit (i.e. optional and only on with STARTTLS). Although we reject credentials on port 587 without STARTTLS, by that point credentials have already been sent.
* SC2068: Double quote array expansions to avoid re-splitting elements.
* SC2186: tempfile is deprecated. Use mktemp instead.
* SC2124: Assigning an array to a string! Assign as array, or use * instead of @ to concatenate.
* SC2102: Ranges can only match single chars (mentioned due to duplicates).
* SC2005: Useless echo? Instead of 'echo $(cmd)', just use 'cmd'.
This change will force everyone to be logged out of Roundcube since the encryption key and cipher won't match anyone's already-set cookie, but this happens anyway after every Mail-in-a-Box update since we generate a new key each time already.
Fixes#1968.
* Stop generating RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 keys on new installs since it is no longer recommended, but preserve the key on existing installs so that we continue to sign zones with existing keys to retain the chain of trust with existing DS records.
* Start generating ECDSAP256SHA256 keys during setup, the current best practice (in addition to RSASHA256 which is also ok). See https://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers/dns-sec-alg-numbers.xhtml#dns-sec-alg-numbers-1 and https://www.cloudflare.com/dns/dnssec/ecdsa-and-dnssec/.
* Sign zones using all available keys rather than choosing just one based on the TLD to enable rotation/migration to the new key and to give the user some options since not every registrar/TLD supports every algorithm.
* Allow a user to drop a key from signing specific domains using DOMAINS= in our key configuration file. Signing the zones with extraneous keys may increase the size of DNS responses, which isn't ideal, although I don't know if this is a problem in practice. (Although a user can delete the RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 key file, the other keys will be re-generated on upgrade.)
* When generating zonefiles, add a hash of all of the DNSSEC signing keys so that when the keys change the zone is definitely regenerated and re-signed.
* In status checks, if DNSSEC is not active (or not valid), offer to use all of the keys that have been generated (for RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 on existing installs, RSASHA256, and now ECDSAP256SHA256) with all digest types, since not all registers support everything, but list them in an order that guides users to the best practice.
* In status checks, if the deployed DS record doesn't use a ECDSAP256SHA256 key, prompt the user to update their DS record.
* In status checks, if multiple DS records are set, only fail if none are valid. If some use ECDSAP256SHA256 and some don't, remind the user to delete the DS records that don't.
* Don't fail if the DS record uses the SHA384 digest (by pre-generating a DS record with that digest type) but don't recommend it because it is not in the IANA mandatory list yet (https://www.iana.org/assignments/ds-rr-types/ds-rr-types.xhtml).
See #1953
Configures opendmarc to send failure reports for domains that request them, including when p=none.
The emails are sent as the package default of package name and user@hostname: OpenDMARC Filter <opendmarc@box.example.com>
Note I have been running this for several months with a configuration I did not include in the PR to have reports BCC'd to me (FailureReportsBcc postmaster@example.com). Very low load for my personal server of rarely more than a dozen emails sent out per day.
I am not familiar with editing scripts, so apologies in advance and please feel free to correct me.
roundcube Bug Fixes:
Fix for Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via HTML messages with malicious CSS content
General Improvements from roundcube's Issue Tracker
This reverts commit b1d703a5e7 and adds python3-setuptools per the first version of #1899 which fixes an installation error for the b2sdk Python package.
* Installing b2sdk for b2 support
* Added Duplicity PPA so the most recent version is used
* Implemented list_target_files for b2
* Implemented b2 in frontend
* removed python2 boto package
Software updates:
* Upgraded Nextcloud from 17.0.6 to 20.0.1 (with Contacts from 3.3.0 to 3.4.1 and Calendar from 2.0.3 to 2.1.2)
* Upgraded Roundcube to version 1.4.9.
Mail:
* The MTA-STA max_age value was increased to the normal one week.
Control Panel:
* Two-factor authentication can now be enabled for logins to the control panel. However, keep in mind that many online services (including domain name registrars, cloud server providers, and TLS certificate providers) may allow an attacker to take over your account or issue a fraudulent TLS certificate with only access to your email address, and this new two-factor authentication does not protect access to your inbox. It therefore remains very important that user accounts with administrative email addresses have strong passwords.
* TLS certificate expiry dates are now shown in ISO8601 format for clarity.
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Merge upstream v0.51
* add user interface for managing 2fa
* update user schema with 2fa columns
* implement two factor check during login
* Use pyotp for validating TOTP codes
* also implements resynchronisation support via `pyotp`'s `valid_window option
* Update API route naming, update setup page
* Rename /two-factor-auth/ => /2fa/
* Nest totp routes under /2fa/totp/
* Update ids and methods in panel to allow for different setup types
* Autofocus otp input when logging in, update layout
* Extract TOTPStrategy class to totp.py
* this decouples `TOTP` validation and storage logic from `auth` and moves it to `totp`
* reduce `pyotp.validate#valid_window` from `2` to `1`
* Update OpenApi docs, rename /2fa/ => /mfa/
* Decouple totp from users table by moving to totp_credentials table
* this allows implementation of other mfa schemes in the future (webauthn)
* also makes key management easier and enforces one totp credentials per user on db-level
* Add sqlite migration
* Rename internal validate_two_factor_secret => validate_two_factor_secret
* conn.close() if mru_token update can't .commit()
* Address review feedback, thanks @hija
* Use hmac.compare_digest() to compare mru_token
* Safeguard against empty mru_token column
* hmac.compare_digest() expects arguments of type string, make sure we don't pass None
* Currently, this cannot happen but we might not want to store `mru_token` during setup
* Do not log failed login attempts for MissingToken errors
* Due to the way that the /login UI works, this persists at least one failed login each time a user logs into the admin panel. This in turn triggers fail2ban at some point.
* Add TOTP secret to user_key hash
thanks @downtownallday
* this invalidates all user_keys after TOTP status is changed for user
* after changing TOTP state, a login is required
* due to the forced login, we can't and don't need to store the code used for setup in `mru_code`
* Typo
* Reorganize the MFA backend methods
* Reorganize MFA front-end and add label column
* Fix handling of bad input when enabling mfa
* Update openAPI docs
* Remove unique key constraint on foreign key user_id in mfa table
* Don't expose mru_token and secret for enabled mfas over HTTP
* Only update mru_token for matched mfa row
* Exclude mru_token in user key hash
* Rename tools/mail.py to management/cli.py
* Add MFA list/disable to the management CLI so admins can restore access if MFA device is lost
Co-authored-by: Joshua Tauberer <jt@occams.info>
