Files
webhooker/internal/middleware/middleware.go
sneak fad97445ca
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Verify login credentials before spending rate-limit budget (closes #150)
With TRUSTED_PROXIES empty behind the reverse proxy production is
required to run behind, every login POST keyed on the proxy's address
and shared one 5/minute bucket. A stranger sending five POSTs a
minute -- 0.08 requests per second, from anywhere -- kept that bucket
permanently full, and the operator's own correct password was answered
429 indefinitely with no second administrative path.

The login POST no longer has a pre-emptive limiter. The handler
verifies credentials first and spends budget only on a FAILED attempt,
so a correct password is never throttled whatever the counters hold.
Three things follow, and are implemented together because the first is
unsafe without the other two:

- Failures are counted per (client bucket, submitted username), five
  per minute, after which further failures get 429 with a Retry-After.
  A successful login clears the counter, so mistyping and then
  succeeding does not leave the operator throttled.
- Both key sets are capped at 1024 entries. The submitted username is
  attacker-controlled, so past the first cap failures fall back to a
  counter keyed on the client alone, and past both caps a failure is
  answered as throttled without being recorded. Tracked state stays
  under half a megabyte and does not grow with invented usernames.
- Concurrent Argon2id verifications are capped at two, a 128 MB
  ceiling at 64 MB per hash. Every password-hashing endpoint takes a
  slot, including the password-change endpoint, which holds one across
  both its hashes. A request that waits five seconds without a slot is
  answered 503 and no hash runs for it.

An unknown username is verified against a dummy hash instead of
returning early, so a nonexistent account costs the same time as a
real one and the response cannot be used to enumerate usernames.

The password-change limiter is unchanged: RequireAuth runs ahead of
it, so only a request already carrying a valid session reaches its
bucket.

Also adds the missing test for the third bucketKey call site, where
the peer is a trusted proxy but the forwarded chain names no client.
Every existing test of that fallback uses an IPv4 proxy, where
bucketKey is the identity function, so dropping the /64 masking there
left the suite green.

README and the TRUSTED_PROXIES startup warning updated: a shared
bucket now costs precision, not the availability of the admin path.
2026-08-17 22:17:49 +00:00

386 lines
10 KiB
Go

// Package middleware provides HTTP middleware for logging, auth,
// CORS, and metrics.
package middleware
import (
"log/slog"
"net"
"net/http"
"sync"
"time"
basicauth "github.com/99designs/basicauth-go"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/middleware"
"github.com/go-chi/cors"
metrics "github.com/slok/go-http-metrics/metrics/prometheus"
ghmm "github.com/slok/go-http-metrics/middleware"
"github.com/slok/go-http-metrics/middleware/std"
"go.uber.org/fx"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/globals"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
)
const (
// corsMaxAge is the maximum time (in seconds) that a
// preflight response can be cached.
corsMaxAge = 300
)
//nolint:revive // MiddlewareParams is a standard fx naming convention.
type MiddlewareParams struct {
fx.In
Logger *logger.Logger
Globals *globals.Globals
Config *config.Config
Session *session.Session
}
// Middleware provides HTTP middleware for logging, CORS, auth, and
// metrics.
type Middleware struct {
log *slog.Logger
params *MiddlewareParams
session *session.Session
// loginGuard counts failed credential verifications and bounds
// concurrent password hashing. It is built on first use so that
// every construction path gets one; see guard().
loginGuardOnce sync.Once
loginGuard *loginGuard
}
// New creates a Middleware from the provided fx parameters.
//
//nolint:revive // lc parameter is required by fx even if unused.
func New(
lc fx.Lifecycle,
params MiddlewareParams,
) (*Middleware, error) {
s := new(Middleware)
s.params = &params
s.log = params.Logger.Get()
s.session = params.Session
return s, nil
}
// the following is from
// https://learning-cloud-native-go.github.io/docs/a6.adding_zerolog_logger/
func ipFromHostPort(hp string) string {
h, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(hp)
if err != nil {
return ""
}
if len(h) > 0 && h[0] == '[' {
return h[1 : len(h)-1]
}
return h
}
type loggingResponseWriter struct {
http.ResponseWriter
statusCode int
}
// newLoggingResponseWriter wraps w and records status codes.
func newLoggingResponseWriter(
w http.ResponseWriter,
) *loggingResponseWriter {
return &loggingResponseWriter{w, http.StatusOK}
}
func (lrw *loggingResponseWriter) WriteHeader(code int) {
lrw.statusCode = code
lrw.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(code)
}
// Logging returns middleware that logs each HTTP request with
// timing and metadata.
func (s *Middleware) Logging() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
) {
start := time.Now()
lrw := newLoggingResponseWriter(w)
ctx := r.Context()
defer func() {
latency := time.Since(start)
requestID := ""
if reqID := ctx.Value(
middleware.RequestIDKey,
); reqID != nil {
if id, ok := reqID.(string); ok {
requestID = id
}
}
s.log.Info("http request",
"request_start", start,
"method", r.Method,
"url", r.URL.String(),
"useragent", r.UserAgent(),
"request_id", requestID,
"referer", r.Referer(),
"proto", r.Proto,
"remoteIP", ipFromHostPort(r.RemoteAddr),
"status", lrw.statusCode,
"latency_ms", latency.Milliseconds(),
)
}()
next.ServeHTTP(lrw, r)
})
}
}
// CORS returns middleware that sets CORS headers (permissive in
// dev, no-op in prod).
func (s *Middleware) CORS() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
if s.params.Config.IsDev() {
// In development, allow any origin for local testing.
return cors.Handler(cors.Options{
AllowedOrigins: []string{"*"},
AllowedMethods: []string{
"GET", "POST", "PUT", "DELETE", "OPTIONS",
},
AllowedHeaders: []string{
"Accept", "Authorization",
"Content-Type", "X-CSRF-Token",
},
ExposedHeaders: []string{"Link"},
AllowCredentials: false,
MaxAge: corsMaxAge,
})
}
// In production, the web UI is server-rendered so
// cross-origin requests are not expected. Return a no-op
// middleware.
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return next
}
}
// RequireAuth returns middleware that checks for a valid session.
// Unauthenticated users are redirected to the login page.
func (s *Middleware) RequireAuth() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
) {
sess, err := s.session.Get(r)
if err != nil {
s.log.Debug(
"auth middleware: failed to get session",
"error", err,
)
http.Redirect(
w, r, "/pages/login", http.StatusSeeOther,
)
return
}
// IsAuthenticated also enforces both session expiry
// deadlines, so an idle-expired or absolutely-expired
// session lands here and is sent back to the login
// page.
if !s.session.IsAuthenticated(sess) {
s.log.Debug(
"auth middleware: unauthenticated request",
"path", r.URL.Path,
"method", r.Method,
)
http.Redirect(
w, r, "/pages/login", http.StatusSeeOther,
)
return
}
// This request authenticated with the session, so it
// counts as activity: push the idle deadline forward.
// This is the only place sessions are refreshed, which
// is what keeps an unauthenticated request from
// extending someone else's session. Touch advances the
// idle clock only -- the absolute cap is untouched --
// and reports false when nothing changed, so most
// requests do not re-issue the cookie. Save before the
// handler runs, while the headers are still ours to
// write.
if s.session.Touch(sess) {
saveErr := s.session.Save(r, w, sess)
if saveErr != nil {
s.log.Error(
"auth middleware: failed to refresh session",
"error", saveErr,
)
}
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
}
// Metrics returns middleware that records Prometheus HTTP metrics.
func (s *Middleware) Metrics() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
mdlw := ghmm.New(ghmm.Config{
Recorder: metrics.NewRecorder(metrics.Config{}),
})
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return std.Handler("", mdlw, next)
}
}
// MetricsAuth returns middleware that protects metrics endpoints
// with basic auth.
func (s *Middleware) MetricsAuth() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return basicauth.New(
"metrics",
map[string][]string{
s.params.Config.MetricsUsername: {
s.params.Config.MetricsPassword,
},
},
)
}
// SecurityHeaders returns middleware that sets production security
// headers on every response: HSTS, X-Content-Type-Options,
// X-Frame-Options, CSP, Referrer-Policy, and Permissions-Policy.
func (s *Middleware) SecurityHeaders() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
) {
w.Header().Set(
"Strict-Transport-Security",
"max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload",
)
w.Header().Set(
"X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff",
)
w.Header().Set("X-Frame-Options", "DENY")
w.Header().Set(
"Content-Security-Policy",
"default-src 'self'; "+
"script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; "+
"style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'",
)
w.Header().Set(
"Referrer-Policy",
"strict-origin-when-cross-origin",
)
w.Header().Set(
"Permissions-Policy",
"camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()",
)
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
}
// NoCache returns middleware that instructs browsers and
// intermediary proxies not to cache the response. It sets
// Cache-Control: no-store and Pragma: no-cache (the latter for
// older HTTP/1.0 intermediaries). Apply it to authenticated pages
// so webhook configuration and captured event data are not stored
// by caches.
func (s *Middleware) NoCache() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
) {
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
w.Header().Set("Pragma", "no-cache")
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
}
// bodyLimitedMethod reports whether the request method carries a
// body that the MaxBodySize middleware should cap.
func bodyLimitedMethod(method string) bool {
return method == http.MethodPost ||
method == http.MethodPut ||
method == http.MethodPatch
}
// MaxBodySize returns middleware that limits the size of
// POST/PUT/PATCH request bodies to maxBytes. It must be registered
// before any middleware that parses the body — notably CSRF, which
// calls r.PostFormValue — so that form parsing happens under this
// cap rather than net/http's 10 MB default.
//
// Two enforcement paths exist, because http.MaxBytesReader alone
// cannot produce a 413: it reports the overflow as an error from
// Read, by which point the body parser downstream has already
// converted that error into its own response.
//
// - Declared oversize: the request announces a Content-Length
// greater than maxBytes. The middleware answers 413 Request
// Entity Too Large immediately and does not call the next
// handler, so neither CSRF nor the endpoint handler runs.
// - Undeclared oversize: the request is chunked (Content-Length
// of -1) or lies about its Content-Length. There is nothing to
// check up front, so http.MaxBytesReader hard-caps the body at
// maxBytes and the request fails downstream — the form parse
// errors out and CSRF rejects it with 403. The response is less
// precise than a 413, but the body is still never buffered
// beyond the cap, which is the property that matters.
func (s *Middleware) MaxBodySize(
maxBytes int64,
) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
) {
if !bodyLimitedMethod(r.Method) {
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
if r.ContentLength > maxBytes {
s.log.Warn(
"request body exceeds limit",
"method", r.Method,
"path", r.URL.Path,
"content_length", r.ContentLength,
"limit", maxBytes,
)
http.Error(
w,
"Request Entity Too Large",
http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge,
)
return
}
r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, maxBytes)
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
}