Files
webhooker/internal/handlers/profile.go
sneak fad97445ca
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Verify login credentials before spending rate-limit budget (closes #150)
With TRUSTED_PROXIES empty behind the reverse proxy production is
required to run behind, every login POST keyed on the proxy's address
and shared one 5/minute bucket. A stranger sending five POSTs a
minute -- 0.08 requests per second, from anywhere -- kept that bucket
permanently full, and the operator's own correct password was answered
429 indefinitely with no second administrative path.

The login POST no longer has a pre-emptive limiter. The handler
verifies credentials first and spends budget only on a FAILED attempt,
so a correct password is never throttled whatever the counters hold.
Three things follow, and are implemented together because the first is
unsafe without the other two:

- Failures are counted per (client bucket, submitted username), five
  per minute, after which further failures get 429 with a Retry-After.
  A successful login clears the counter, so mistyping and then
  succeeding does not leave the operator throttled.
- Both key sets are capped at 1024 entries. The submitted username is
  attacker-controlled, so past the first cap failures fall back to a
  counter keyed on the client alone, and past both caps a failure is
  answered as throttled without being recorded. Tracked state stays
  under half a megabyte and does not grow with invented usernames.
- Concurrent Argon2id verifications are capped at two, a 128 MB
  ceiling at 64 MB per hash. Every password-hashing endpoint takes a
  slot, including the password-change endpoint, which holds one across
  both its hashes. A request that waits five seconds without a slot is
  answered 503 and no hash runs for it.

An unknown username is verified against a dummy hash instead of
returning early, so a nonexistent account costs the same time as a
real one and the response cannot be used to enumerate usernames.

The password-change limiter is unchanged: RequireAuth runs ahead of
it, so only a request already carrying a valid session reaches its
bucket.

Also adds the missing test for the third bucketKey call site, where
the peer is a trusted proxy but the forwarded chain names no client.
Every existing test of that fallback uses an IPv4 proxy, where
bucketKey is the identity function, so dropping the /64 masking there
left the suite green.

README and the TRUSTED_PROXIES startup warning updated: a shared
bucket now costs precision, not the availability of the admin path.
2026-08-17 22:17:49 +00:00

228 lines
5.7 KiB
Go

package handlers
import (
"context"
"net/http"
"github.com/go-chi/chi"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
// HandleProfile returns a handler for the user profile page
func (h *Handlers) HandleProfile() http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
sessionUserID, sessionUsername, ok :=
h.profileOwnerOrDeny(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
h.renderProfile(w, r, sessionUserID, sessionUsername, "", "")
}
}
// HandlePasswordChange returns a handler that lets an authenticated
// user change their own password. It is served by the CSRF- and
// auth-protected POST /password route under /user/{username}.
func (h *Handlers) HandlePasswordChange() http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
sessionUserID, sessionUsername, ok :=
h.profileOwnerOrDeny(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
// The body size cap is enforced by the MaxBodySize
// middleware, which runs before CSRF parses the form.
err := r.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
h.log.Error("failed to parse form", "error", err)
http.Error(w, "Bad request", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
successMessage, errorMessage, handled := h.applyPasswordChange(
r.Context(),
w,
sessionUsername,
r.FormValue("current_password"),
r.FormValue("new_password"),
r.FormValue("confirm_password"),
)
if !handled {
return
}
h.renderProfile(
w, r, sessionUserID, sessionUsername,
successMessage, errorMessage,
)
}
}
// applyPasswordChange verifies the current password and, on success,
// persists a fresh hash for the user, reusing the same helpers that
// bootstrap the admin user. It returns the success and error messages
// to display on the profile page. On an internal failure it writes a
// 500 response itself and returns handled=false, signalling the caller
// to stop without re-rendering the page.
func (h *Handlers) applyPasswordChange(
ctx context.Context,
w http.ResponseWriter,
username, currentPassword, newPassword, confirmPassword string,
) (string, string, bool) {
// This endpoint verifies one password and hashes another, at
// 64 MB each, so it takes a slot from the same bound the login
// endpoint uses. The bound is per hash, not per endpoint: leaving
// this path outside it would leave a hole in it. The slot is held
// across both hashes.
release, ok := h.mw.BeginPasswordVerification(ctx)
if !ok {
h.log.Warn("password verification capacity exhausted")
http.Error(
w,
"The server is busy verifying credentials. "+
"Please try again.",
http.StatusServiceUnavailable,
)
return "", "", false
}
defer release()
// Load the user row so we can verify the current password and
// persist the new hash.
var user database.User
err := h.db.DB().Where(
"username = ?", username,
).First(&user).Error
if err != nil {
h.serverError(
w, "failed to load user for password change", err,
)
return "", "", false
}
valid, err := database.VerifyPassword(
currentPassword, user.Password,
)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, "failed to verify password", err)
return "", "", false
}
if !valid {
return "", "Current password is incorrect.", true
}
if newPassword == "" {
return "", "New password must not be empty.", true
}
if newPassword != confirmPassword {
return "", "New password and confirmation do not match.", true
}
hashedPassword, err := database.HashPassword(newPassword)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, "failed to hash new password", err)
return "", "", false
}
err = h.db.DB().Model(&user).Update(
"password", hashedPassword,
).Error
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, "failed to update password", err)
return "", "", false
}
h.log.Info("user changed password", "username", username)
return "Password changed successfully.", "", true
}
// profileOwnerOrDeny resolves the session identity and enforces that a
// user may only act on their own profile (the requested username in the
// URL must equal the session username). On any failure it writes the
// appropriate HTTP response and returns ok=false; callers must stop
// when ok is false.
func (h *Handlers) profileOwnerOrDeny(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
) (string, string, bool) {
requestedUsername := chi.URLParam(r, "username")
if requestedUsername == "" {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return "", "", false
}
// RequireAuth middleware guarantees an authenticated session
// before this handler runs, so we only need to guard against an
// unexpected retrieval error.
sess, err := h.session.Get(r)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, "failed to get session", err)
return "", "", false
}
sessionUsername, ok := h.session.GetUsername(sess)
if !ok {
h.log.Error("authenticated session missing username")
http.Error(
w, "Internal server error",
http.StatusInternalServerError,
)
return "", "", false
}
sessionUserID, ok := h.session.GetUserID(sess)
if !ok {
h.log.Error("authenticated session missing user ID")
http.Error(
w, "Internal server error",
http.StatusInternalServerError,
)
return "", "", false
}
// Only allow users to act on their own profile.
if requestedUsername != sessionUsername {
http.Error(w, "Forbidden", http.StatusForbidden)
return "", "", false
}
return sessionUserID, sessionUsername, true
}
// renderProfile renders the profile page for the given user,
// optionally including a success or error message.
func (h *Handlers) renderProfile(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
userID, username, successMessage, errorMessage string,
) {
data := map[string]any{
"User": &UserInfo{
ID: userID,
Username: username,
},
"SuccessMessage": successMessage,
"ErrorMessage": errorMessage,
}
h.renderTemplate(w, r, "profile.html", data)
}