Files
webhooker/internal/handlers/handlers.go
sneak fad97445ca
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Verify login credentials before spending rate-limit budget (closes #150)
With TRUSTED_PROXIES empty behind the reverse proxy production is
required to run behind, every login POST keyed on the proxy's address
and shared one 5/minute bucket. A stranger sending five POSTs a
minute -- 0.08 requests per second, from anywhere -- kept that bucket
permanently full, and the operator's own correct password was answered
429 indefinitely with no second administrative path.

The login POST no longer has a pre-emptive limiter. The handler
verifies credentials first and spends budget only on a FAILED attempt,
so a correct password is never throttled whatever the counters hold.
Three things follow, and are implemented together because the first is
unsafe without the other two:

- Failures are counted per (client bucket, submitted username), five
  per minute, after which further failures get 429 with a Retry-After.
  A successful login clears the counter, so mistyping and then
  succeeding does not leave the operator throttled.
- Both key sets are capped at 1024 entries. The submitted username is
  attacker-controlled, so past the first cap failures fall back to a
  counter keyed on the client alone, and past both caps a failure is
  answered as throttled without being recorded. Tracked state stays
  under half a megabyte and does not grow with invented usernames.
- Concurrent Argon2id verifications are capped at two, a 128 MB
  ceiling at 64 MB per hash. Every password-hashing endpoint takes a
  slot, including the password-change endpoint, which holds one across
  both its hashes. A request that waits five seconds without a slot is
  answered 503 and no hash runs for it.

An unknown username is verified against a dummy hash instead of
returning early, so a nonexistent account costs the same time as a
real one and the response cannot be used to enumerate usernames.

The password-change limiter is unchanged: RequireAuth runs ahead of
it, so only a request already carrying a valid session reaches its
bucket.

Also adds the missing test for the third bucketKey call site, where
the peer is a trusted proxy but the forwarded chain names no client.
Every existing test of that fallback uses an IPv4 proxy, where
bucketKey is the identity function, so dropping the /64 masking there
left the suite green.

README and the TRUSTED_PROXIES startup warning updated: a shared
bucket now costs precision, not the availability of the admin path.
2026-08-17 22:17:49 +00:00

280 lines
6.9 KiB
Go

// Package handlers provides HTTP request handlers for the
// webhooker web UI and API.
package handlers
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"html/template"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"sync/atomic"
"go.uber.org/fx"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/globals"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/healthcheck"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/templates"
)
const (
// maxBodyShift is the bit shift for 1 MB body limit.
maxBodyShift = 20
// recentEventLimit is the number of recent events to show.
recentEventLimit = 20
// paginationPerPage is the number of items per page.
paginationPerPage = 25
// tmplKeyError is the template data key for an error message.
tmplKeyError = "Error"
// tmplKeyWebhook is the template data key for a webhook.
tmplKeyWebhook = "Webhook"
)
// errInvalidPassword is returned when a password does not match.
var errInvalidPassword = errors.New("invalid password")
// errVerificationBusy is returned when no password-verification slot
// became free before the wait elapsed, so no password was verified.
var errVerificationBusy = errors.New(
"password verification capacity exhausted",
)
//nolint:revive // HandlersParams is a standard fx naming convention.
type HandlersParams struct {
fx.In
Logger *logger.Logger
Globals *globals.Globals
Database *database.Database
WebhookDBMgr *database.WebhookDBManager
Healthcheck *healthcheck.Healthcheck
Session *session.Session
Middleware *middleware.Middleware
Notifier delivery.Notifier
Evictor delivery.WebhookEvictor
}
// Handlers provides HTTP handler methods for all application
// routes.
type Handlers struct {
params *HandlersParams
log *slog.Logger
hc *healthcheck.Healthcheck
db *database.Database
dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager
session *session.Session
mw *middleware.Middleware
notifier delivery.Notifier
evictor delivery.WebhookEvictor
templates map[string]*template.Template
// dummyVerifications counts the equivalent-cost verifications
// charged for usernames that do not exist. It exists so a test
// can prove that path runs without measuring wall-clock time.
dummyVerifications atomic.Uint64
}
// parsePageTemplate parses a page-specific template set from the
// embedded FS. Each page template is combined with the shared
// base, htmlheader, and navbar templates. The page file must be
// listed first so that its root action ({{template "base" .}})
// becomes the template set's entry point.
func parsePageTemplate(pageFile string) *template.Template {
return template.Must(
template.ParseFS(
templates.Templates,
pageFile,
"base.html",
"htmlheader.html",
"navbar.html",
),
)
}
// New creates a Handlers instance, parsing all page templates at
// startup.
func New(
lc fx.Lifecycle,
params HandlersParams,
) (*Handlers, error) {
s := new(Handlers)
s.params = &params
s.log = params.Logger.Get()
s.hc = params.Healthcheck
s.db = params.Database
s.dbMgr = params.WebhookDBMgr
s.session = params.Session
s.mw = params.Middleware
s.notifier = params.Notifier
s.evictor = params.Evictor
// Parse all page templates once at startup
s.templates = map[string]*template.Template{
"login.html": parsePageTemplate("login.html"),
"profile.html": parsePageTemplate("profile.html"),
"sources_list.html": parsePageTemplate("sources_list.html"),
"sources_new.html": parsePageTemplate("sources_new.html"),
"source_detail.html": parsePageTemplate("source_detail.html"),
"source_edit.html": parsePageTemplate("source_edit.html"),
"source_logs.html": parsePageTemplate("source_logs.html"),
}
lc.Append(fx.Hook{
OnStart: func(_ context.Context) error {
return nil
},
})
return s, nil
}
func (s *Handlers) respondJSON(
w http.ResponseWriter,
_ *http.Request,
data any,
status int,
) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(status)
if data != nil {
err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(data)
if err != nil {
s.log.Error("json encode error", "error", err)
}
}
}
// serverError logs an error and sends a 500 response.
func (s *Handlers) serverError(
w http.ResponseWriter, msg string, err error,
) {
s.log.Error(msg, "error", err)
http.Error(
w, "Internal server error",
http.StatusInternalServerError,
)
}
// UserInfo represents user information for templates
type UserInfo struct {
ID string
Username string
}
// templateDataWrapper wraps non-map data with common fields.
type templateDataWrapper struct {
User *UserInfo
CSRFToken string
Data any
}
// getUserInfo extracts user info from the session.
func (s *Handlers) getUserInfo(
r *http.Request,
) *UserInfo {
sess, err := s.session.Get(r)
if err != nil || !s.session.IsAuthenticated(sess) {
return nil
}
username, ok := s.session.GetUsername(sess)
if !ok {
return nil
}
userID, ok := s.session.GetUserID(sess)
if !ok {
return nil
}
return &UserInfo{ID: userID, Username: username}
}
// renderTemplate renders a pre-parsed template with common
// data
func (s *Handlers) renderTemplate(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
pageTemplate string,
data any,
) {
tmpl, ok := s.templates[pageTemplate]
if !ok {
s.log.Error(
"template not found",
"template", pageTemplate,
)
http.Error(
w, "Internal server error",
http.StatusInternalServerError,
)
return
}
userInfo := s.getUserInfo(r)
csrfToken := middleware.CSRFToken(r)
if m, ok := data.(map[string]any); ok {
m["User"] = userInfo
m["CSRFToken"] = csrfToken
s.executeTemplate(w, tmpl, m)
return
}
wrapper := templateDataWrapper{
User: userInfo,
CSRFToken: csrfToken,
Data: data,
}
s.executeTemplate(w, tmpl, wrapper)
}
// executeTemplate renders the template into a buffer and writes to
// the response only once rendering has fully succeeded. Executing
// straight into the ResponseWriter commits a partial body and a 200
// status before a mid-render error can be reported, leaving no way
// to serve a 500. Buffering makes a page's rendered size resident
// memory per concurrent viewer, so every page owes it a bound: the
// event log caps each stored body at maxRenderedBodyBytes for exactly
// this reason.
func (s *Handlers) executeTemplate(
w http.ResponseWriter,
tmpl *template.Template,
data any,
) {
var buf bytes.Buffer
err := tmpl.Execute(&buf, data)
if err != nil {
s.log.Error(
"failed to execute template", "error", err,
)
http.Error(
w, "Internal server error",
http.StatusInternalServerError,
)
return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
_, err = buf.WriteTo(w)
if err != nil {
s.log.Error(
"failed to write rendered page", "error", err,
)
}
}