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With TRUSTED_PROXIES empty behind the reverse proxy production is required to run behind, every login POST keyed on the proxy's address and shared one 5/minute bucket. A stranger sending five POSTs a minute -- 0.08 requests per second, from anywhere -- kept that bucket permanently full, and the operator's own correct password was answered 429 indefinitely with no second administrative path. The login POST no longer has a pre-emptive limiter. The handler verifies credentials first and spends budget only on a FAILED attempt, so a correct password is never throttled whatever the counters hold. Three things follow, and are implemented together because the first is unsafe without the other two: - Failures are counted per (client bucket, submitted username), five per minute, after which further failures get 429 with a Retry-After. A successful login clears the counter, so mistyping and then succeeding does not leave the operator throttled. - Both key sets are capped at 1024 entries. The submitted username is attacker-controlled, so past the first cap failures fall back to a counter keyed on the client alone, and past both caps a failure is answered as throttled without being recorded. Tracked state stays under half a megabyte and does not grow with invented usernames. - Concurrent Argon2id verifications are capped at two, a 128 MB ceiling at 64 MB per hash. Every password-hashing endpoint takes a slot, including the password-change endpoint, which holds one across both its hashes. A request that waits five seconds without a slot is answered 503 and no hash runs for it. An unknown username is verified against a dummy hash instead of returning early, so a nonexistent account costs the same time as a real one and the response cannot be used to enumerate usernames. The password-change limiter is unchanged: RequireAuth runs ahead of it, so only a request already carrying a valid session reaches its bucket. Also adds the missing test for the third bucketKey call site, where the peer is a trusted proxy but the forwarded chain names no client. Every existing test of that fallback uses an IPv4 proxy, where bucketKey is the identity function, so dropping the /64 masking there left the suite green. README and the TRUSTED_PROXIES startup warning updated: a shared bucket now costs precision, not the availability of the admin path.
280 lines
6.9 KiB
Go
280 lines
6.9 KiB
Go
// Package handlers provides HTTP request handlers for the
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// webhooker web UI and API.
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package handlers
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import (
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"bytes"
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"html/template"
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"log/slog"
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"net/http"
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"sync/atomic"
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"go.uber.org/fx"
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"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
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"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
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"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/globals"
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"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/healthcheck"
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"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
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"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
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"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
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"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/templates"
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)
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const (
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// maxBodyShift is the bit shift for 1 MB body limit.
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maxBodyShift = 20
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// recentEventLimit is the number of recent events to show.
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recentEventLimit = 20
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// paginationPerPage is the number of items per page.
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paginationPerPage = 25
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// tmplKeyError is the template data key for an error message.
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tmplKeyError = "Error"
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// tmplKeyWebhook is the template data key for a webhook.
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tmplKeyWebhook = "Webhook"
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)
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// errInvalidPassword is returned when a password does not match.
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var errInvalidPassword = errors.New("invalid password")
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// errVerificationBusy is returned when no password-verification slot
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// became free before the wait elapsed, so no password was verified.
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var errVerificationBusy = errors.New(
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"password verification capacity exhausted",
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)
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//nolint:revive // HandlersParams is a standard fx naming convention.
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type HandlersParams struct {
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fx.In
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Logger *logger.Logger
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Globals *globals.Globals
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Database *database.Database
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WebhookDBMgr *database.WebhookDBManager
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Healthcheck *healthcheck.Healthcheck
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Session *session.Session
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Middleware *middleware.Middleware
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Notifier delivery.Notifier
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Evictor delivery.WebhookEvictor
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}
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// Handlers provides HTTP handler methods for all application
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// routes.
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type Handlers struct {
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params *HandlersParams
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log *slog.Logger
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hc *healthcheck.Healthcheck
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db *database.Database
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dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager
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session *session.Session
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mw *middleware.Middleware
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notifier delivery.Notifier
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evictor delivery.WebhookEvictor
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templates map[string]*template.Template
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// dummyVerifications counts the equivalent-cost verifications
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// charged for usernames that do not exist. It exists so a test
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// can prove that path runs without measuring wall-clock time.
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dummyVerifications atomic.Uint64
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}
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// parsePageTemplate parses a page-specific template set from the
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// embedded FS. Each page template is combined with the shared
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// base, htmlheader, and navbar templates. The page file must be
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// listed first so that its root action ({{template "base" .}})
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// becomes the template set's entry point.
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func parsePageTemplate(pageFile string) *template.Template {
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return template.Must(
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template.ParseFS(
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templates.Templates,
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pageFile,
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"base.html",
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"htmlheader.html",
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"navbar.html",
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),
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)
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}
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// New creates a Handlers instance, parsing all page templates at
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// startup.
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func New(
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lc fx.Lifecycle,
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params HandlersParams,
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) (*Handlers, error) {
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s := new(Handlers)
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s.params = ¶ms
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s.log = params.Logger.Get()
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s.hc = params.Healthcheck
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s.db = params.Database
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s.dbMgr = params.WebhookDBMgr
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s.session = params.Session
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s.mw = params.Middleware
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s.notifier = params.Notifier
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s.evictor = params.Evictor
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// Parse all page templates once at startup
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s.templates = map[string]*template.Template{
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"login.html": parsePageTemplate("login.html"),
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"profile.html": parsePageTemplate("profile.html"),
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"sources_list.html": parsePageTemplate("sources_list.html"),
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"sources_new.html": parsePageTemplate("sources_new.html"),
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"source_detail.html": parsePageTemplate("source_detail.html"),
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"source_edit.html": parsePageTemplate("source_edit.html"),
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"source_logs.html": parsePageTemplate("source_logs.html"),
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}
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lc.Append(fx.Hook{
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OnStart: func(_ context.Context) error {
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return nil
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},
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})
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return s, nil
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}
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func (s *Handlers) respondJSON(
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w http.ResponseWriter,
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_ *http.Request,
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data any,
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status int,
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) {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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w.WriteHeader(status)
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if data != nil {
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err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(data)
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if err != nil {
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s.log.Error("json encode error", "error", err)
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}
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}
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}
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// serverError logs an error and sends a 500 response.
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func (s *Handlers) serverError(
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w http.ResponseWriter, msg string, err error,
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) {
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s.log.Error(msg, "error", err)
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http.Error(
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w, "Internal server error",
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http.StatusInternalServerError,
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)
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}
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// UserInfo represents user information for templates
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type UserInfo struct {
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ID string
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Username string
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}
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// templateDataWrapper wraps non-map data with common fields.
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type templateDataWrapper struct {
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User *UserInfo
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CSRFToken string
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Data any
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}
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// getUserInfo extracts user info from the session.
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func (s *Handlers) getUserInfo(
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r *http.Request,
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) *UserInfo {
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sess, err := s.session.Get(r)
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if err != nil || !s.session.IsAuthenticated(sess) {
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return nil
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}
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username, ok := s.session.GetUsername(sess)
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if !ok {
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return nil
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}
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userID, ok := s.session.GetUserID(sess)
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if !ok {
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return nil
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}
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return &UserInfo{ID: userID, Username: username}
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}
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// renderTemplate renders a pre-parsed template with common
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// data
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func (s *Handlers) renderTemplate(
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w http.ResponseWriter,
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r *http.Request,
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pageTemplate string,
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data any,
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) {
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tmpl, ok := s.templates[pageTemplate]
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if !ok {
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s.log.Error(
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"template not found",
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"template", pageTemplate,
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)
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http.Error(
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w, "Internal server error",
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http.StatusInternalServerError,
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)
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return
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}
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userInfo := s.getUserInfo(r)
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csrfToken := middleware.CSRFToken(r)
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if m, ok := data.(map[string]any); ok {
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m["User"] = userInfo
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m["CSRFToken"] = csrfToken
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s.executeTemplate(w, tmpl, m)
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return
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}
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wrapper := templateDataWrapper{
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User: userInfo,
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CSRFToken: csrfToken,
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Data: data,
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}
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s.executeTemplate(w, tmpl, wrapper)
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}
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// executeTemplate renders the template into a buffer and writes to
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// the response only once rendering has fully succeeded. Executing
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// straight into the ResponseWriter commits a partial body and a 200
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// status before a mid-render error can be reported, leaving no way
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// to serve a 500. Buffering makes a page's rendered size resident
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// memory per concurrent viewer, so every page owes it a bound: the
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// event log caps each stored body at maxRenderedBodyBytes for exactly
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// this reason.
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func (s *Handlers) executeTemplate(
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w http.ResponseWriter,
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tmpl *template.Template,
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data any,
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) {
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var buf bytes.Buffer
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err := tmpl.Execute(&buf, data)
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if err != nil {
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s.log.Error(
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"failed to execute template", "error", err,
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)
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http.Error(
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w, "Internal server error",
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http.StatusInternalServerError,
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)
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return
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}
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
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_, err = buf.WriteTo(w)
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if err != nil {
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s.log.Error(
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"failed to write rendered page", "error", err,
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)
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}
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}
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