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With TRUSTED_PROXIES empty behind the reverse proxy production is required to run behind, every login POST keyed on the proxy's address and shared one 5/minute bucket. A stranger sending five POSTs a minute -- 0.08 requests per second, from anywhere -- kept that bucket permanently full, and the operator's own correct password was answered 429 indefinitely with no second administrative path. The login POST no longer has a pre-emptive limiter. The handler verifies credentials first and spends budget only on a FAILED attempt, so a correct password is never throttled whatever the counters hold. Three things follow, and are implemented together because the first is unsafe without the other two: - Failures are counted per (client bucket, submitted username), five per minute, after which further failures get 429 with a Retry-After. A successful login clears the counter, so mistyping and then succeeding does not leave the operator throttled. - Both key sets are capped at 1024 entries. The submitted username is attacker-controlled, so past the first cap failures fall back to a counter keyed on the client alone, and past both caps a failure is answered as throttled without being recorded. Tracked state stays under half a megabyte and does not grow with invented usernames. - Concurrent Argon2id verifications are capped at two, a 128 MB ceiling at 64 MB per hash. Every password-hashing endpoint takes a slot, including the password-change endpoint, which holds one across both its hashes. A request that waits five seconds without a slot is answered 503 and no hash runs for it. An unknown username is verified against a dummy hash instead of returning early, so a nonexistent account costs the same time as a real one and the response cannot be used to enumerate usernames. The password-change limiter is unchanged: RequireAuth runs ahead of it, so only a request already carrying a valid session reaches its bucket. Also adds the missing test for the third bucketKey call site, where the peer is a trusted proxy but the forwarded chain names no client. Every existing test of that fallback uses an IPv4 proxy, where bucketKey is the identity function, so dropping the /64 masking there left the suite green. README and the TRUSTED_PROXIES startup warning updated: a shared bucket now costs precision, not the availability of the admin path.
87 lines
2.4 KiB
Go
87 lines
2.4 KiB
Go
package handlers
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import (
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"html/template"
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"net/http"
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"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
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)
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// MaxRenderedBodyBytesForTest exposes the event log's body cap
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// to the handlers_test package.
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const MaxRenderedBodyBytesForTest = maxRenderedBodyBytes
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// DummyVerificationsForTest reports how many equivalent-cost
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// verifications were charged for usernames that do not exist. It
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// lets a test prove the anti-enumeration path ran without timing
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// anything.
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func (s *Handlers) DummyVerificationsForTest() uint64 {
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return s.dummyVerifications.Load()
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}
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// TrimPartialRuneForTest exposes trimPartialRune for use in the
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// handlers_test package.
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func TrimPartialRuneForTest(b []byte) []byte {
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return trimPartialRune(b)
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}
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// LoadEventLogViewsForTest exposes loadEventsWithDeliveries for
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// use in the handlers_test package. Assertions on the projected
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// body need the bytes as loaded: html/template rewrites invalid
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// UTF-8 on the way out, so the rendered page cannot show whether
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// a binary body survived the projection intact.
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func (s *Handlers) LoadEventLogViewsForTest(
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w http.ResponseWriter,
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webhook database.Webhook,
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page int,
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) []EventLogView {
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views, _ := s.loadEventsWithDeliveries(w, webhook, nil, page)
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return views
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}
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// AddTemplateForTest registers a template under a page name so that
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// the handlers_test package can drive the render path with a
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// template of its own.
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func (s *Handlers) AddTemplateForTest(
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pageTemplate string,
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tmpl *template.Template,
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) {
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s.templates[pageTemplate] = tmpl
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}
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// RenderTemplateForTest exposes renderTemplate for use in the
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// handlers_test package.
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func (s *Handlers) RenderTemplateForTest(
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w http.ResponseWriter,
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r *http.Request,
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pageTemplate string,
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data any,
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) {
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s.renderTemplate(w, r, pageTemplate, data)
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}
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// BuildSlackTargetConfigForTest exposes buildURLTargetConfig
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// with the Slack target parameters for use in the
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// handlers_test package.
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func (s *Handlers) BuildSlackTargetConfigForTest(
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w http.ResponseWriter,
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r *http.Request,
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targetURL string,
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) (string, error) {
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return s.buildURLTargetConfig(
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w, r, targetURL, "webhookUrl",
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"Webhook URL is required for Slack targets",
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)
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}
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// BuildDatabaseTargetConfigForTest exposes
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// buildDatabaseTargetConfig for use in the handlers_test
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// package.
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func (s *Handlers) BuildDatabaseTargetConfigForTest(
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w http.ResponseWriter,
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expiry string,
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) (string, error) {
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return s.buildDatabaseTargetConfig(w, expiry)
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}
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