Files
webhooker/internal/handlers/profile.go
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Verify login credentials before spending rate-limit budget (closes #150)
In the shipped default, any stranger denied the operator the only
administrative path at 5 requests per minute: TRUSTED_PROXIES is empty,
the README requires a reverse proxy, so every login POST shared one
bucket keyed on the proxy.

Credentials are now verified first and only a FAILED attempt spends
budget, so a correct password is never throttled. Failures are counted
per (client bucket, submitted username), bounded. Concurrent Argon2id
verifications are capped at two, and the queue for them at 16 — because
verifying first lets an attacker force a 64 MB hash per request, and
bounding the wait alone bounds nothing.

The issue's own recommendation was insufficient and is rejected here:
keying by username stops an attacker locking out a DIFFERENT account,
but this is a single-admin product with a predictable bootstrap
username, so flooding the operator's own name still locks them out.

This is speculative — it implements a corrected recommendation ahead of
the owner's ruling so the decision can be made by merging or reverting.
Three things are disclosed rather than glossed: online guessing rises
from 5/min to roughly 27/s, because the 429 is a label on the response
and not a gate in front of the hash; the residual exposure is a loss of
login AVAILABILITY, not latency, and a determined flood still denies
login while it runs, at ~400x the cost and clearing the moment it
stops; and the endpoint should be provisioned for ~400 MB resident, not
the 203 MB of live commitment it itemises.

Independently reviewed four times. Reviewers disproved the suspected
FIFO starvation by measurement, then caught two successive memory
bounds the code did not have — the second by parking waiters and
reading the heap rather than checking the arithmetic.
2026-08-18 01:55:41 +02:00

228 lines
5.7 KiB
Go

package handlers
import (
"context"
"net/http"
"github.com/go-chi/chi"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
// HandleProfile returns a handler for the user profile page
func (h *Handlers) HandleProfile() http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
sessionUserID, sessionUsername, ok :=
h.profileOwnerOrDeny(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
h.renderProfile(w, r, sessionUserID, sessionUsername, "", "")
}
}
// HandlePasswordChange returns a handler that lets an authenticated
// user change their own password. It is served by the CSRF- and
// auth-protected POST /password route under /user/{username}.
func (h *Handlers) HandlePasswordChange() http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
sessionUserID, sessionUsername, ok :=
h.profileOwnerOrDeny(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
// The body size cap is enforced by the MaxBodySize
// middleware, which runs before CSRF parses the form.
err := r.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
h.log.Error("failed to parse form", "error", err)
http.Error(w, "Bad request", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
successMessage, errorMessage, handled := h.applyPasswordChange(
r.Context(),
w,
sessionUsername,
r.FormValue("current_password"),
r.FormValue("new_password"),
r.FormValue("confirm_password"),
)
if !handled {
return
}
h.renderProfile(
w, r, sessionUserID, sessionUsername,
successMessage, errorMessage,
)
}
}
// applyPasswordChange verifies the current password and, on success,
// persists a fresh hash for the user, reusing the same helpers that
// bootstrap the admin user. It returns the success and error messages
// to display on the profile page. On an internal failure it writes a
// 500 response itself and returns handled=false, signalling the caller
// to stop without re-rendering the page.
func (h *Handlers) applyPasswordChange(
ctx context.Context,
w http.ResponseWriter,
username, currentPassword, newPassword, confirmPassword string,
) (string, string, bool) {
// This endpoint verifies one password and hashes another, at
// 64 MB each, so it takes a slot from the same bound the login
// endpoint uses. The bound is per hash, not per endpoint: leaving
// this path outside it would leave a hole in it. The slot is held
// across both hashes.
release, ok := h.mw.BeginPasswordVerification(ctx)
if !ok {
h.log.Warn("password verification capacity exhausted")
http.Error(
w,
"The server is busy verifying credentials. "+
"Please try again.",
http.StatusServiceUnavailable,
)
return "", "", false
}
defer release()
// Load the user row so we can verify the current password and
// persist the new hash.
var user database.User
err := h.db.DB().Where(
"username = ?", username,
).First(&user).Error
if err != nil {
h.serverError(
w, "failed to load user for password change", err,
)
return "", "", false
}
valid, err := database.VerifyPassword(
currentPassword, user.Password,
)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, "failed to verify password", err)
return "", "", false
}
if !valid {
return "", "Current password is incorrect.", true
}
if newPassword == "" {
return "", "New password must not be empty.", true
}
if newPassword != confirmPassword {
return "", "New password and confirmation do not match.", true
}
hashedPassword, err := database.HashPassword(newPassword)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, "failed to hash new password", err)
return "", "", false
}
err = h.db.DB().Model(&user).Update(
"password", hashedPassword,
).Error
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, "failed to update password", err)
return "", "", false
}
h.log.Info("user changed password", "username", username)
return "Password changed successfully.", "", true
}
// profileOwnerOrDeny resolves the session identity and enforces that a
// user may only act on their own profile (the requested username in the
// URL must equal the session username). On any failure it writes the
// appropriate HTTP response and returns ok=false; callers must stop
// when ok is false.
func (h *Handlers) profileOwnerOrDeny(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
) (string, string, bool) {
requestedUsername := chi.URLParam(r, "username")
if requestedUsername == "" {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return "", "", false
}
// RequireAuth middleware guarantees an authenticated session
// before this handler runs, so we only need to guard against an
// unexpected retrieval error.
sess, err := h.session.Get(r)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, "failed to get session", err)
return "", "", false
}
sessionUsername, ok := h.session.GetUsername(sess)
if !ok {
h.log.Error("authenticated session missing username")
http.Error(
w, "Internal server error",
http.StatusInternalServerError,
)
return "", "", false
}
sessionUserID, ok := h.session.GetUserID(sess)
if !ok {
h.log.Error("authenticated session missing user ID")
http.Error(
w, "Internal server error",
http.StatusInternalServerError,
)
return "", "", false
}
// Only allow users to act on their own profile.
if requestedUsername != sessionUsername {
http.Error(w, "Forbidden", http.StatusForbidden)
return "", "", false
}
return sessionUserID, sessionUsername, true
}
// renderProfile renders the profile page for the given user,
// optionally including a success or error message.
func (h *Handlers) renderProfile(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
userID, username, successMessage, errorMessage string,
) {
data := map[string]any{
"User": &UserInfo{
ID: userID,
Username: username,
},
"SuccessMessage": successMessage,
"ErrorMessage": errorMessage,
}
h.renderTemplate(w, r, "profile.html", data)
}