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webhooker/internal/database/model_secrets_test.go
sneak 88e283f728
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Add optional inbound webhook signature verification (closes #67)
A receiver URL was a bare v4 UUID and nothing else: anyone who learned
it could store events and, because inbound headers are forwarded to
targets almost verbatim, choose what the downstream service received.

Entrypoints gain an optional scheme/secret pair. GitHub's
X-Hub-Signature-256 (HMAC-SHA256 hex over the raw body) and GitLab's
X-Gitlab-Token (plain shared token) are supported; both compare with
hmac.Equal. With nothing configured an entrypoint behaves exactly as
before, which is also where every pre-existing row lands after
AutoMigrate adds the columns.

Verification runs after the capped body read and before the first
write, so a rejected request leaves no event row, no delivery row and
no delivery task. A configuration the receiver cannot apply — unknown
scheme, or one half of the pair missing — is refused with a 500 rather
than falling back to unverified.

The secret is credential-bearing and is stored in the clear because
HMAC needs the key itself. It is excluded from JSON, kept out of
templates by a new handlers.EntrypointView projection, and absent from
every log line including the rejection path. The UI sets and rotates
it through one form that never renders the stored value.

Under the GitLab scheme the signature header is the secret rather than
a digest over the request, so an accepted request's headers are cloned
and the configured scheme's credential header dropped before they are
serialized onto the event. Stored headers are persisted verbatim in
the per-webhook database and replayed onto every outbound delivery, so
keeping the token would put it in every backup and hand every target
operator the means to forge signed requests to the entrypoint it
authenticates. Stripping sits once above the first write rather than
at each egress, and is driven by the scheme's own description with
stripping as the default: a scheme added later is covered unless it
declares its header a digest, as GitHub's HMAC over the body does.

An entrypoint holding one half of the pair now renders as
misconfigured rather than as unverified, and the scheme selector
follows the stored scheme so such a row no longer marks two options
selected.
2026-08-20 05:26:07 +00:00

139 lines
3.5 KiB
Go

package database_test
import (
"encoding/json"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
// keptField is a non-secret value planted alongside each secret, so
// the assertions below cannot pass by the model marshalling to nothing.
const keptField = "keepme"
// marshalModel encodes a model the way a future JSON handler would.
func marshalModel(t *testing.T, v any) string {
t.Helper()
encoded, err := json.Marshal(v)
require.NoError(t, err)
return string(encoded)
}
// TestModelsDoNotMarshalTheirSecrets pins the barrier for the JSON
// path. The /api/v1 route group exists and is empty; delivery's
// TargetView masks the credential for the HTML path only, so without
// these tags the first handler that marshals a model serialises the
// secret with it. Each field below is a live credential:
//
// - Target.Config holds an incoming-webhook URL whose path segments
// are the bearer token.
// - APIKey.Key is a bearer token outright.
// - Setting.Value holds the session encryption key.
// - User.Password holds the Argon2 hash, and was already tagged.
// - Entrypoint.SignatureSecret is the secret its senders sign with,
// stored in the clear because HMAC verification needs the key.
func TestModelsDoNotMarshalTheirSecrets(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const marker = "QQMODELMARKERQQ"
cases := []struct {
name string
model any
}{
{
name: "target config",
model: database.Target{
Name: keptField,
Type: database.TargetTypeSlack,
Config: `{"webhookUrl":"https://h/s/` + marker + `"}`,
},
},
{
name: "api key",
model: database.APIKey{
Description: keptField,
Key: marker,
},
},
{
name: "setting value",
model: database.Setting{
Key: keptField,
Value: marker,
},
},
{
name: "user password hash",
model: database.User{
Username: keptField,
Password: marker,
},
},
{
name: "entrypoint signature secret",
model: database.Entrypoint{
Description: keptField,
SignatureScheme: database.SignatureSchemeGitHub,
SignatureSecret: marker,
},
},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
encoded := marshalModel(t, tc.model)
assert.NotContains(t, encoded, marker)
assert.Contains(t, encoded, keptField)
})
}
}
// TestWebhookMarshalsNoTargetConfig covers the nested case: a webhook
// marshalled with its targets preloaded must not carry the credential
// through the association either.
func TestWebhookMarshalsNoTargetConfig(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const marker = "QQNESTEDMARKERQQ"
encoded := marshalModel(t, database.Webhook{
Name: keptField,
Targets: []database.Target{{
Name: "slack",
Config: `{"webhookUrl":"https://h/s/` + marker + `"}`,
}},
})
assert.NotContains(t, encoded, marker)
assert.Contains(t, encoded, keptField)
}
// TestWebhookMarshalsNoEntrypointSecret covers the same nested case
// for the entrypoint's inbound signature secret, which reaches a
// marshalled webhook through the Entrypoints association.
func TestWebhookMarshalsNoEntrypointSecret(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const marker = "QQENTRYPOINTMARKERQQ"
encoded := marshalModel(t, database.Webhook{
Name: keptField,
Entrypoints: []database.Entrypoint{{
Path: "some-uuid",
SignatureScheme: database.SignatureSchemeGitLab,
SignatureSecret: marker,
}},
})
assert.NotContains(t, encoded, marker)
assert.Contains(t, encoded, keptField)
}