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Security hardening implementing three issues: CSRF Protection (#35): - Session-based CSRF tokens with cryptographically random generation - Constant-time token comparison to prevent timing attacks - CSRF middleware applied to /pages, /sources, /source, and /user routes - Hidden csrf_token field added to all 12+ POST forms in templates - Excluded from /webhook (inbound) and /api (stateless) routes SSRF Prevention (#36): - ValidateTargetURL blocks private/reserved IP ranges at target creation - Blocked ranges: 127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 169.254.0.0/16, ::1, fc00::/7, fe80::/10, plus multicast, reserved, test-net, and CGN ranges - SSRF-safe HTTP transport with custom DialContext for defense-in-depth at delivery time (prevents DNS rebinding attacks) - Only http/https schemes allowed Login Rate Limiting (#37): - Per-IP rate limiter using golang.org/x/time/rate - 5 attempts per minute per IP on POST /pages/login - GET requests (form rendering) pass through unaffected - Automatic cleanup of stale per-IP limiter entries - X-Forwarded-For and X-Real-IP header support for reverse proxies Closes #35, closes #36, closes #37
173 lines
4.2 KiB
Go
173 lines
4.2 KiB
Go
package middleware
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import (
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"net"
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"net/http"
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"sync"
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"time"
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"golang.org/x/time/rate"
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)
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const (
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// loginRateLimit is the maximum number of login attempts per interval.
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loginRateLimit = 5
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// loginRateInterval is the time window for the rate limit.
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loginRateInterval = 1 * time.Minute
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// limiterCleanupInterval is how often stale per-IP limiters are pruned.
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limiterCleanupInterval = 5 * time.Minute
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// limiterMaxAge is how long an unused limiter is kept before pruning.
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limiterMaxAge = 10 * time.Minute
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)
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// ipLimiter holds a rate limiter and the time it was last used.
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type ipLimiter struct {
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limiter *rate.Limiter
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lastSeen time.Time
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}
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// rateLimiterMap manages per-IP rate limiters with periodic cleanup.
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type rateLimiterMap struct {
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mu sync.Mutex
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limiters map[string]*ipLimiter
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rate rate.Limit
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burst int
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}
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// newRateLimiterMap creates a new per-IP rate limiter map.
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func newRateLimiterMap(r rate.Limit, burst int) *rateLimiterMap {
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rlm := &rateLimiterMap{
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limiters: make(map[string]*ipLimiter),
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rate: r,
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burst: burst,
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}
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// Start background cleanup goroutine
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go rlm.cleanup()
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return rlm
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}
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// getLimiter returns the rate limiter for the given IP, creating one if
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// it doesn't exist.
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func (rlm *rateLimiterMap) getLimiter(ip string) *rate.Limiter {
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rlm.mu.Lock()
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defer rlm.mu.Unlock()
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if entry, ok := rlm.limiters[ip]; ok {
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entry.lastSeen = time.Now()
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return entry.limiter
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}
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limiter := rate.NewLimiter(rlm.rate, rlm.burst)
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rlm.limiters[ip] = &ipLimiter{
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limiter: limiter,
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lastSeen: time.Now(),
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}
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return limiter
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}
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// cleanup periodically removes stale rate limiters to prevent unbounded
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// memory growth from unique IPs.
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func (rlm *rateLimiterMap) cleanup() {
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ticker := time.NewTicker(limiterCleanupInterval)
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defer ticker.Stop()
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for range ticker.C {
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rlm.mu.Lock()
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cutoff := time.Now().Add(-limiterMaxAge)
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for ip, entry := range rlm.limiters {
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if entry.lastSeen.Before(cutoff) {
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delete(rlm.limiters, ip)
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}
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}
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rlm.mu.Unlock()
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}
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}
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// LoginRateLimit returns middleware that enforces per-IP rate limiting
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// on login attempts. Only POST requests are rate-limited; GET requests
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// (rendering the login form) pass through unaffected. When the rate
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// limit is exceeded, a 429 Too Many Requests response is returned.
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func (m *Middleware) LoginRateLimit() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
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// Calculate rate: loginRateLimit events per loginRateInterval
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r := rate.Limit(float64(loginRateLimit) / loginRateInterval.Seconds())
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rlm := newRateLimiterMap(r, loginRateLimit)
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return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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// Only rate-limit POST requests (actual login attempts)
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if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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return
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}
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ip := extractIP(r)
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limiter := rlm.getLimiter(ip)
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if !limiter.Allow() {
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m.log.Warn("login rate limit exceeded",
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"ip", ip,
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"path", r.URL.Path,
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)
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http.Error(w, "Too many login attempts. Please try again later.", http.StatusTooManyRequests)
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return
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}
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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}
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// extractIP extracts the client IP address from the request. It checks
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// X-Forwarded-For and X-Real-IP headers first (for reverse proxy setups),
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// then falls back to RemoteAddr.
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func extractIP(r *http.Request) string {
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// Check X-Forwarded-For header (first IP in chain)
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if xff := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"); xff != "" {
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// X-Forwarded-For can contain multiple IPs: client, proxy1, proxy2
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// The first one is the original client
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for i := 0; i < len(xff); i++ {
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if xff[i] == ',' {
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ip := xff[:i]
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// Trim whitespace
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for len(ip) > 0 && ip[0] == ' ' {
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ip = ip[1:]
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}
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for len(ip) > 0 && ip[len(ip)-1] == ' ' {
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ip = ip[:len(ip)-1]
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}
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if ip != "" {
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return ip
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}
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break
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}
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}
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trimmed := xff
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for len(trimmed) > 0 && trimmed[0] == ' ' {
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trimmed = trimmed[1:]
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}
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for len(trimmed) > 0 && trimmed[len(trimmed)-1] == ' ' {
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trimmed = trimmed[:len(trimmed)-1]
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}
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if trimmed != "" {
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return trimmed
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}
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}
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// Check X-Real-IP header
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if xri := r.Header.Get("X-Real-IP"); xri != "" {
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return xri
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}
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// Fall back to RemoteAddr
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ip, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
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if err != nil {
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return r.RemoteAddr
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}
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return ip
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}
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