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The SSRF blocklist had no escape hatch, so the thing webhooker is mostly for — taking a public webhook and forwarding it to something on your own network — could not be configured at all. Every private address, Docker sibling and loopback service was permanently unreachable as a delivery destination. ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS (default empty) names blocks that delivery targets may reach despite the default blocklist. It is an allowlist and only ever adds destinations: there is no boolean, and no value disables SSRF protection wholesale. Empty, the guard behaves exactly as before. A fixed set of addresses is refused before the allowlist is consulted, so no supplied CIDR opens one — not the exact address, not a supernet, not 0.0.0.0/0 or ::/0. It is the two link-local blocks (169.254.0.0/16, fe80::/10) plus host routes for the cloud metadata endpoints that sit outside them: AWS's IPv6 IMDS at fd00:ec2::254, which lives in ordinary ULA space, and Alibaba's 100.100.100.200, which lives in CGNAT. Allowlisting fd00::/8 or 100.64.0.0/10 (Tailscale's range) is an ordinary thing for an operator to do and must not reopen instance-credential theft. The IPv4-compatible (::a9fe:a9fe) and NAT64 (64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe) spellings of 169.254.169.254 are listed too, because To4() does not normalise them into the link-local block the way it does the IPv4-mapped form. Reaching any of these is credential theft rather than delivery to an internal service. The policy now lives in one function, Guard.checkIP, which both target-creation validation and the delivery dialer call. The two paths previously decided separately, which is how they came to disagree about a destination. The guard is built once from config and injected via fx into both the handlers and the delivery engine, so there is a single instance and a single answer. A set-but-unparseable value aborts startup naming the variable, reusing the existing envPrefixList parser. A non-empty list is logged at startup with the blocks spelled out, not counted, so the hole is visible in the log of any deployment that has one. Tests: an allowlisted loopback CIDR both validates and delivers to a live server (and the same URL still fails without the allowlist); a private address outside the listed block stays refused on both paths; every unconditionally blocked address stays refused on both paths under an allowlist that covers it, and the set itself is pinned entry by entry; public addresses are unaffected either way; and config coverage for parsing, startup abort, and the warning's contents.
173 lines
3.5 KiB
Go
173 lines
3.5 KiB
Go
package delivery_test
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import (
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"context"
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"net"
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"testing"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
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"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
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)
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func TestIsBlockedIP_PrivateRanges(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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tests := []struct {
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name string
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ip string
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blocked bool
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}{
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{"loopback 127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.1", true},
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{"loopback 127.0.0.2", "127.0.0.2", true},
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{"loopback 127.255.255.255", "127.255.255.255", true},
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{"10.0.0.0", "10.0.0.0", true},
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{"10.0.0.1", "10.0.0.1", true},
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{"10.255.255.255", "10.255.255.255", true},
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{"172.16.0.1", "172.16.0.1", true},
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{"172.31.255.255", "172.31.255.255", true},
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{"172.15.255.255", "172.15.255.255", false},
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{"172.32.0.0", "172.32.0.0", false},
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{"192.168.0.1", "192.168.0.1", true},
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{"192.168.255.255", "192.168.255.255", true},
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{"169.254.0.1", "169.254.0.1", true},
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{metadataIP, metadataIP, true},
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{"8.8.8.8", "8.8.8.8", false},
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{"1.1.1.1", "1.1.1.1", false},
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{publicIP, publicIP, false},
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{"::1", "::1", true},
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{"fd00::1", "fd00::1", true},
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{"fc00::1", "fc00::1", true},
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{"fe80::1", "fe80::1", true},
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{
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"2607:f8b0:4004:800::200e",
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"2607:f8b0:4004:800::200e",
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false,
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},
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}
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for _, tt := range tests {
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t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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ip := net.ParseIP(tt.ip)
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require.NotNil(t, ip,
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"failed to parse IP %s", tt.ip,
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)
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assert.Equal(t,
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tt.blocked,
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delivery.ExportIsBlockedIP(ip),
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"isBlockedIP(%s) = %v, want %v",
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tt.ip,
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delivery.ExportIsBlockedIP(ip),
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tt.blocked,
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)
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})
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}
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}
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func TestValidateTargetURL_Blocked(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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blockedURLs := []string{
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loopbackHookURL,
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"http://127.0.0.1:8080/hook",
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"https://10.0.0.1/hook",
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"http://192.168.1.1/webhook",
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"http://172.16.0.1/api",
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metadataURL,
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"http://[::1]/hook",
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"http://[fc00::1]/hook",
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"http://[fe80::1]/hook",
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"http://0.0.0.0/hook",
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}
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for _, u := range blockedURLs {
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t.Run(u, func(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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err := delivery.NewTestGuard().ValidateTargetURL(
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context.Background(), u,
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)
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assert.Error(t, err,
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"URL %s should be blocked", u,
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)
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})
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}
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}
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func TestValidateTargetURL_Allowed(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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allowedURLs := []string{
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"https://example.com/hook",
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"http://93.184.216.34/webhook",
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"https://hooks.slack.com/services/T00/B00/xxx",
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}
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for _, u := range allowedURLs {
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t.Run(u, func(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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err := delivery.NewTestGuard().ValidateTargetURL(
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context.Background(), u,
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)
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assert.NoError(t, err,
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"URL %s should be allowed", u,
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)
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})
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}
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}
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func TestValidateTargetURL_InvalidScheme(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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err := delivery.NewTestGuard().ValidateTargetURL(
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context.Background(), "ftp://example.com/hook",
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)
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require.Error(t, err)
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assert.Contains(t, err.Error(),
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"unsupported URL scheme",
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)
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}
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func TestValidateTargetURL_EmptyHost(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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err := delivery.NewTestGuard().ValidateTargetURL(
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context.Background(), "http:///path",
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)
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assert.Error(t, err)
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}
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func TestValidateTargetURL_InvalidURL(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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err := delivery.NewTestGuard().ValidateTargetURL(
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context.Background(), "://invalid",
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)
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assert.Error(t, err)
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}
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func TestBlockedNetworks_Initialized(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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nets := delivery.ExportBlockedNetworks()
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assert.NotEmpty(t, nets,
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"blockedNetworks should be initialized",
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)
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assert.GreaterOrEqual(t, len(nets), 8,
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"should have at least 8 blocked network ranges",
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)
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}
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