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Three findings from the review of the per-target request headers feature, plus the follow-up they raised about the inbound headers the same delivery path forwards. One rule now governs every header a delivery carries on someone else's behalf: a redirect hop that leaves the origin the target names carries none of them. That covers the operator's configured headers and the inbound event headers forwarded from the sender alike. net/http withholds only Authorization and Cookie across a host change, so an operator's X-Api-Key or a sender's X-Hub-Signature would otherwise follow a 302 to a host nobody configured. Redirects are still followed — refusing them would break every destination that legitimately redirects and would record the 3xx as the delivery's result — but a hop to another host, another port, or down from https to http drops the lot. The shared SSRF-safe transport is kept on that client, so each hop is still dialled through the private-IP guard. The set to strip is not a name list. applyRequestHeaders now returns the canonical names of everything it applied on the sender's or operator's behalf, and the redirect policy strips exactly that, so a header added to the forward set is covered without a second edit. Content-Type and User-Agent are the delivery path's own and always travel; a 307 preserves the body across hosts and it has to stay typed. The origin comparison no longer collapses two IPv6 origins into one. Hostname() unwraps a literal's brackets, so re-appending the port with a bare colon rendered https://[2001:db8::1]:8080 and https://[2001:db8::1:8080] identically — a different address on a different port passing as the same origin. The port is joined with net.JoinHostPort, and both spellings are in TestSameDeliveryOrigin. The ten-hop cap gains a regression test. Installing a CheckRedirect is precisely what discards net/http's own limit, so a self-redirecting destination is driven through the policy and asserted to stop after exactly ten requests with the sentinel surfacing to the caller. Trailer joins the reserved names. net/http strips it from the request it writes, so a configured one was accepted, stored, and provably never sent. The invalid-header-name error no longer quotes the text before the first colon. That text is only a name if it parses as one; when it does not, a pasted value whose own colon split the line put half a token into a 400 body. TestParseTargetHeaders_ErrorsNeverQuoteAValue asserted this invariant while only exercising the after-the-colon case, and now covers the before-the-colon one. README documents the http target's config keys, the 300-second timeout ceiling, the reserved-header list and the redirect behaviour as one rule over both header classes, including that the drop is per hop rather than permanent: net/http re-copies the initial request's headers each hop, so a chain returning to the configured origin carries them again, exactly as it treats Authorization. The edit form's hint gains Trailer and the redirect note. Closes #243
150 lines
3.6 KiB
Go
150 lines
3.6 KiB
Go
package delivery_test
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import (
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"context"
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"log/slog"
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"net/http"
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"testing"
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"time"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
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"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
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)
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// newSSRFTestEngine builds an Engine whose shared client
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// carries the SSRF-safe transport, mirroring production.
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func newSSRFTestEngine() *delivery.Engine {
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log := slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler)
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client := &http.Client{
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Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
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Transport: delivery.NewSSRFSafeTransport(),
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}
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return delivery.NewTestEngine(log, client, 1)
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}
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// TestClientForRequest_TimeoutKeepsSSRFGuard asserts that a
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// client returned by clientForRequest for a config with a
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// per-target timeout still refuses connections to
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// private/reserved addresses (the timeout must not drop the
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// SSRF-safe transport).
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func TestClientForRequest_TimeoutKeepsSSRFGuard(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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engine := newSSRFTestEngine()
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blocked := []string{
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"http://127.0.0.1/hook",
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"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/",
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"http://[fe80::1]/hook",
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}
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for _, target := range blocked {
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t.Run(target, func(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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cfg := &delivery.HTTPTargetConfig{
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URL: target,
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Timeout: 5,
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}
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client := engine.ExportClientForRequest(cfg, nil)
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require.NotSame(t, engine.ExportClient(), client,
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"a per-target timeout must yield a "+
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"distinct client",
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)
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assert.Equal(t,
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5*time.Second, client.Timeout,
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"the per-target timeout must be applied",
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)
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assert.Same(t,
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engine.ExportClient().Transport,
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client.Transport,
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"the SSRF-safe transport must be reused, "+
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"not dropped",
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)
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req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(
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context.Background(),
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http.MethodPost, target, nil,
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)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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resp, doErr := client.Do(req)
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if resp != nil {
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_ = resp.Body.Close()
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}
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require.Error(t, doErr,
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"request to %s must be blocked", target,
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)
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assert.Contains(t, doErr.Error(), "blocked",
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"error must come from the SSRF guard",
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)
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})
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}
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}
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// TestClientForRequest_NoTimeoutUnchanged asserts that a
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// request with neither a per-target timeout nor an origin-scoped
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// header gets the shared SSRF-safe client unchanged: there is then
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// nothing for a redirect policy to strip.
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func TestClientForRequest_NoTimeoutUnchanged(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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engine := newSSRFTestEngine()
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cfg := &delivery.HTTPTargetConfig{
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URL: "https://example.com/hook",
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}
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client := engine.ExportClientForRequest(cfg, nil)
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assert.Same(t, engine.ExportClient(), client,
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"without a per-target timeout the shared client "+
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"must be returned unchanged",
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)
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}
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// TestClientForRequest_HeadersKeepSSRFGuard asserts that the
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// redirect policy an origin-scoped header installs is added to a
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// client that still carries the SSRF-safe transport. The guard is
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// a dial hook, so keeping it is what makes each redirect hop pass
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// the private-IP check too.
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func TestClientForRequest_HeadersKeepSSRFGuard(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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engine := newSSRFTestEngine()
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cfg := &delivery.HTTPTargetConfig{
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URL: "https://example.com/with-headers",
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Headers: map[string]string{
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"X-Api-Key": "configured",
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},
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}
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client := engine.ExportClientForRequest(
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cfg, []string{"X-Api-Key"},
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)
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require.NotNil(t, client.CheckRedirect,
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"an origin-scoped header must install a redirect policy",
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)
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assert.Same(t,
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engine.ExportClient().Transport, client.Transport,
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"the SSRF-safe transport must be reused, not dropped",
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)
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assert.Equal(t,
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engine.ExportClient().Timeout, client.Timeout,
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"the shared client's timeout must be inherited",
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)
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}
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