All checks were successful
check / check (push) Successful in 2m48s
internal/handlers/source_management.go read the target destination
with r.FormValue, which falls back to the URL query string when the
field is absent from the body. So
POST /source/{id}/targets?url=https://hooks.slack.com/services/T/B/S
created a working target from a value carried on the request line,
where logs, proxies, Referer headers and error trackers record it.
That is the remaining ingress path of the credential-exposure class
the render, delivery-error and log-line paths were each closed for.
Every form read in these handlers is now r.PostFormValue, so no
query-string value can populate stored configuration or be taken as a
credential. The one deliberate query read, `page` on the authenticated
pagination links, is untouched: it uses r.URL.Query().Get already.
The access log no longer carries the query on any branch, so the log
half of the report is already mitigated; the Sentry half is not, and
making the body the only place these fields are read from aims every
credential at Sentry's request context. The SDK attaches the request
to every captured event, and SendDefaultPII=false does not cover all
of what it copies: Scope.SetRequest tees the first 10 KiB of the body
into a buffer that ParseForm then fills, and Scope.ApplyToEvent copies
both that buffer and r.URL.RawQuery into the event with no guard,
before BeforeSend runs.
So the BeforeSend hook replaces the query string and the body with a
marker, drops cookies and the remote-address environment, and reduces
the headers to an allowlist. The body is replaced on every route
rather than filtered by route, and that is a choice rather than a
limitation: sentryhttp's recover path puts the request on the context
it hands to RecoverWithContext, the SDK carries that context through
to BeforeSend as hint.Context, and chi's RoutePattern is reachable
from it. Redacting unconditionally is still the right call. Every
handler reads its fields with PostFormValue, so the body is exactly
where the credentials are; the one route whose body is genuine signal
is the receiver, and that body is already stored on the event and
served from the UI, so a tracker is not where anyone reads it; and an
unconditional rule cannot leak on a route somebody forgets to add to
it, which a route-conditional one can.
The headers need an allowlist because the SDK's own filter removes
four names and passes everything else, including X-Csrf-Token and the
shared secrets senders put on the receiver route. Scheme, host, path,
method and X-Request-Id stay, which is what names the failing route
and ties it to the access log line. Nothing dropped is needed to debug
a CSRF rejection: Origin and Referer are kept, and the TLS decision is
already in the retained URL, whose scheme sentry-go derives from the
same r.TLS-or-X-Forwarded-Proto predicate the CSRF middleware uses to
pick its handler.
Second barrier, for the JSON path that does not exist yet: the fields
that hold a credential are tagged json:"-" so the first handler to
marshal a model cannot serialise one. Target.Config holds the
incoming-webhook URL, APIKey.Key is a bearer token, and Setting.Value
holds the session encryption key. delivery.TargetView remains the
masking barrier for the HTML path, which is unaffected.
207 lines
5.2 KiB
Go
207 lines
5.2 KiB
Go
package handlers
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import (
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"net/http"
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"github.com/go-chi/chi"
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"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
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)
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// HandleProfile returns a handler for the user profile page
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func (h *Handlers) HandleProfile() http.HandlerFunc {
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return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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sessionUserID, sessionUsername, ok :=
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h.profileOwnerOrDeny(w, r)
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if !ok {
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return
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}
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h.renderProfile(w, r, sessionUserID, sessionUsername, "", "")
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}
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}
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// HandlePasswordChange returns a handler that lets an authenticated
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// user change their own password. It is served by the CSRF- and
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// auth-protected POST /password route under /user/{username}.
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func (h *Handlers) HandlePasswordChange() http.HandlerFunc {
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return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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sessionUserID, sessionUsername, ok :=
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h.profileOwnerOrDeny(w, r)
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if !ok {
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return
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}
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// The body size cap is enforced by the MaxBodySize
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// middleware, which runs before CSRF parses the form.
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err := r.ParseForm()
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if err != nil {
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h.log.Error("failed to parse form", "error", err)
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http.Error(w, "Bad request", http.StatusBadRequest)
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return
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}
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successMessage, errorMessage, handled := h.applyPasswordChange(
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w,
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sessionUsername,
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// PostFormValue, not FormValue: the credential must
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// come from the body, never from the query string.
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r.PostFormValue("current_password"),
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r.PostFormValue("new_password"),
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r.PostFormValue("confirm_password"),
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)
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if !handled {
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return
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}
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h.renderProfile(
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w, r, sessionUserID, sessionUsername,
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successMessage, errorMessage,
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)
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}
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}
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// applyPasswordChange verifies the current password and, on success,
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// persists a fresh hash for the user, reusing the same helpers that
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// bootstrap the admin user. It returns the success and error messages
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// to display on the profile page. On an internal failure it writes a
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// 500 response itself and returns handled=false, signalling the caller
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// to stop without re-rendering the page.
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func (h *Handlers) applyPasswordChange(
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w http.ResponseWriter,
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username, currentPassword, newPassword, confirmPassword string,
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) (string, string, bool) {
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// Load the user row so we can verify the current password and
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// persist the new hash.
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var user database.User
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err := h.db.DB().Where(
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"username = ?", username,
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).First(&user).Error
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if err != nil {
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h.serverError(
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w, "failed to load user for password change", err,
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)
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return "", "", false
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}
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valid, err := database.VerifyPassword(
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currentPassword, user.Password,
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)
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if err != nil {
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h.serverError(w, "failed to verify password", err)
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return "", "", false
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}
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if !valid {
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return "", "Current password is incorrect.", true
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}
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if newPassword == "" {
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return "", "New password must not be empty.", true
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}
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if newPassword != confirmPassword {
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return "", "New password and confirmation do not match.", true
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}
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hashedPassword, err := database.HashPassword(newPassword)
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if err != nil {
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h.serverError(w, "failed to hash new password", err)
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return "", "", false
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}
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err = h.db.DB().Model(&user).Update(
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"password", hashedPassword,
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).Error
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if err != nil {
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h.serverError(w, "failed to update password", err)
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return "", "", false
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}
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h.log.Info("user changed password", "username", username)
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return "Password changed successfully.", "", true
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}
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// profileOwnerOrDeny resolves the session identity and enforces that a
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// user may only act on their own profile (the requested username in the
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// URL must equal the session username). On any failure it writes the
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// appropriate HTTP response and returns ok=false; callers must stop
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// when ok is false.
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func (h *Handlers) profileOwnerOrDeny(
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w http.ResponseWriter,
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r *http.Request,
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) (string, string, bool) {
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requestedUsername := chi.URLParam(r, "username")
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if requestedUsername == "" {
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http.NotFound(w, r)
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return "", "", false
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}
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// RequireAuth middleware guarantees an authenticated session
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// before this handler runs, so we only need to guard against an
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// unexpected retrieval error.
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sess, err := h.session.Get(r)
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if err != nil {
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h.serverError(w, "failed to get session", err)
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return "", "", false
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}
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sessionUsername, ok := h.session.GetUsername(sess)
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if !ok {
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h.log.Error("authenticated session missing username")
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http.Error(
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w, "Internal server error",
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http.StatusInternalServerError,
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)
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return "", "", false
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}
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sessionUserID, ok := h.session.GetUserID(sess)
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if !ok {
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h.log.Error("authenticated session missing user ID")
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http.Error(
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w, "Internal server error",
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http.StatusInternalServerError,
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)
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return "", "", false
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}
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// Only allow users to act on their own profile.
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if requestedUsername != sessionUsername {
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http.Error(w, "Forbidden", http.StatusForbidden)
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return "", "", false
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}
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return sessionUserID, sessionUsername, true
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}
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// renderProfile renders the profile page for the given user,
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// optionally including a success or error message.
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func (h *Handlers) renderProfile(
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w http.ResponseWriter,
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r *http.Request,
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userID, username, successMessage, errorMessage string,
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) {
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data := map[string]any{
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"User": &UserInfo{
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ID: userID,
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Username: username,
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},
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"SuccessMessage": successMessage,
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"ErrorMessage": errorMessage,
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}
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h.renderTemplate(w, r, "profile.html", data)
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}
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