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Three findings from the review of the per-target request headers feature, plus the follow-up they raised about the inbound headers the same delivery path forwards. One rule now governs every header a delivery carries on someone else's behalf: a redirect hop that leaves the origin the target names carries none of them. That covers the operator's configured headers and the inbound event headers forwarded from the sender alike. net/http withholds only Authorization and Cookie across a host change, so an operator's X-Api-Key or a sender's X-Hub-Signature would otherwise follow a 302 to a host nobody configured. Redirects are still followed — refusing them would break every destination that legitimately redirects and would record the 3xx as the delivery's result — but a hop to another host, another port, or down from https to http drops the lot. The shared SSRF-safe transport is kept on that client, so each hop is still dialled through the private-IP guard. The set to strip is not a name list. applyRequestHeaders now returns the canonical names of everything it applied on the sender's or operator's behalf, and the redirect policy strips exactly that, so a header added to the forward set is covered without a second edit. Content-Type and User-Agent are the delivery path's own rather than anyone else's, and both are excluded from that set so they always travel: Content-Type is set from the event and a 307 preserves the body across hosts, so it has to stay typed, and User-Agent is overwritten with this delivery path's own after the forwarded headers are applied, so the sender's never reaches the wire and stripping it off-origin would only substitute net/http's default. The origin comparison no longer collapses two IPv6 origins into one. Hostname() unwraps a literal's brackets, so re-appending the port with a bare colon rendered https://[2001:db8::1]:8080 and https://[2001:db8::1:8080] identically — a different address on a different port passing as the same origin. The port is joined with net.JoinHostPort, and both spellings are in TestSameDeliveryOrigin. The ten-hop cap gains a regression test. Installing a CheckRedirect is precisely what discards net/http's own limit, so a self-redirecting destination is driven through the policy and asserted to stop after exactly ten requests with the sentinel surfacing to the caller. Trailer joins the reserved names. net/http strips it from the request it writes, so a configured one was accepted, stored, and provably never sent. The invalid-header-name error no longer quotes the text before the first colon. That text is only a name if it parses as one; when it does not, a pasted value whose own colon split the line put half a token into a 400 body. TestParseTargetHeaders_ErrorsNeverQuoteAValue asserted this invariant while only exercising the after-the-colon case, and now covers the before-the-colon one. README documents the http target's config keys, the 300-second timeout ceiling, the reserved-header list and the redirect behaviour as one rule over both header classes, including that the drop is per hop rather than permanent: net/http re-copies the initial request's headers each hop, so a chain returning to the configured origin carries them again, exactly as it treats Authorization. It also records what following a 301, 302 or 303 costs, since that is net/http's own behaviour and the decision to follow redirects is what buys it: the POST becomes a GET and the event body and its Content-Type are dropped, so the destination the chain ends at receives no event while the delivery is still recorded Delivered. The edit form's hint gains Trailer and the redirect note. Closes #243
615 lines
14 KiB
Go
615 lines
14 KiB
Go
package delivery
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import (
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"bytes"
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"net/http"
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"sort"
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"sync"
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"time"
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"gorm.io/gorm"
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"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
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)
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// Sentinel errors returned by the config parsers.
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var (
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errEmptyTargetConfig = errors.New(
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"empty target config",
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)
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errMissingTargetURL = errors.New(
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"target URL is required",
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)
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)
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// HTTPTargetConfig holds configuration for http target
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// types.
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type HTTPTargetConfig struct {
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URL string `json:"url"`
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Headers map[string]string `json:"headers,omitempty"`
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Timeout int `json:"timeout,omitempty"`
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}
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// httpCore holds the retry, backoff, and circuit-breaker
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// machinery shared by the HTTP and Slack targets. Each of
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// those targets owns its own httpCore instance (and thus its
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// own circuit breakers); the per-attempt request differs
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// between them and is supplied as a closure.
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type httpCore struct {
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eng *Engine
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// circuitBreakers stores a *CircuitBreaker per target ID.
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circuitBreakers sync.Map
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}
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// deliver runs one delivery attempt through the retry core.
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// A maxRetries of 0 is fire-and-forget: a single attempt is
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// recorded and no circuit breaker is consulted. A positive
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// maxRetries gates the attempt on the circuit breaker and
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// schedules a backed-off retry on failure.
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func (c *httpCore) deliver(
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webhookDB *gorm.DB,
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d *database.Delivery,
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task *Task,
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sched Scheduler,
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maxRetries int,
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attempt func() attemptResult,
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) {
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if maxRetries == 0 {
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c.fireAndForget(webhookDB, d, attempt())
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return
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}
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c.withRetry(
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webhookDB, d, task, sched, maxRetries, attempt,
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)
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}
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func (c *httpCore) fireAndForget(
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webhookDB *gorm.DB,
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d *database.Delivery,
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res attemptResult,
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) {
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c.eng.observeAttempt(d.Target.Type, res.elapsed())
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c.eng.recordResult(
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webhookDB, d, 1, res.success,
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res.statusCode, res.respBody, res.errMsg,
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res.duration,
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)
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if res.success {
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c.eng.updateDeliveryStatus(
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webhookDB, d, d.Target.Type,
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database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
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)
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return
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}
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c.eng.updateDeliveryStatus(
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webhookDB, d, d.Target.Type,
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database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
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)
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}
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func (c *httpCore) withRetry(
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webhookDB *gorm.DB,
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d *database.Delivery,
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task *Task,
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sched Scheduler,
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maxRetries int,
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attempt func() attemptResult,
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) {
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cb := c.getCircuitBreaker(task.TargetID)
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if c.circuitBreakerBlock(webhookDB, d, task, sched, cb) {
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return
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}
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// Allow may have moved the breaker to half-open, and the
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// attempt below may open or close it, so the gauge is
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// republished on every exit from here.
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defer c.publishCircuitState(d.Target.Type)
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attemptNum := task.AttemptNum
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res := attempt()
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c.eng.observeAttempt(d.Target.Type, res.elapsed())
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c.eng.recordResult(
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webhookDB, d, attemptNum, res.success,
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res.statusCode, res.respBody, res.errMsg,
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res.duration,
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)
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if res.success {
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cb.RecordSuccess()
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c.eng.updateDeliveryStatus(
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webhookDB, d, d.Target.Type,
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database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
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)
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return
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}
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cb.RecordFailure()
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c.handleRetry(
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webhookDB, d, task, sched, maxRetries, attemptNum,
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)
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}
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func (c *httpCore) circuitBreakerBlock(
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webhookDB *gorm.DB,
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d *database.Delivery,
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task *Task,
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sched Scheduler,
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cb *CircuitBreaker,
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) bool {
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if cb.Allow() {
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return false
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}
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defer c.publishCircuitState(d.Target.Type)
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remaining := cb.CooldownRemaining()
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c.eng.log.Info(
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"circuit breaker open, skipping delivery",
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"target_id", task.TargetID,
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"target_name", task.TargetName,
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"delivery_id", d.ID,
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"cooldown_remaining", remaining,
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)
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c.eng.updateDeliveryStatus(
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webhookDB, d, d.Target.Type,
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database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
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)
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retryTask := *task
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sched.ScheduleRetry(retryTask, remaining)
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return true
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}
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func (c *httpCore) handleRetry(
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webhookDB *gorm.DB,
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d *database.Delivery,
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task *Task,
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sched Scheduler,
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maxRetries int,
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attemptNum int,
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) {
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if attemptNum >= maxRetries {
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c.eng.updateDeliveryStatus(
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webhookDB, d, d.Target.Type,
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database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
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)
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return
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}
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c.eng.updateDeliveryStatus(
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webhookDB, d, d.Target.Type,
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database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
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)
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backoff := calcBackoff(attemptNum)
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retryTask := *task
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retryTask.AttemptNum = attemptNum + 1
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sched.ScheduleRetry(retryTask, backoff)
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}
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func (c *httpCore) getCircuitBreaker(
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targetID string,
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) *CircuitBreaker {
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if val, ok := c.circuitBreakers.Load(targetID); ok {
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cb, _ := val.(*CircuitBreaker)
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return cb
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}
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fresh := NewCircuitBreaker()
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actual, _ := c.circuitBreakers.LoadOrStore(
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targetID, fresh,
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)
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cb, _ := actual.(*CircuitBreaker)
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return cb
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}
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// publishCircuitState recounts this core's open breakers and
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// publishes the gauge. Each core holds the breakers of exactly one
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// target type, so the recount is over that type's targets alone.
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// Counting rather than adjusting a delta keeps the gauge honest
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// however a breaker changed state.
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func (c *httpCore) publishCircuitState(
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targetType database.TargetType,
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) {
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open := 0
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c.circuitBreakers.Range(func(_, val any) bool {
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cb, ok := val.(*CircuitBreaker)
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if ok && cb.State() == CircuitOpen {
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open++
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}
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return true
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})
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c.eng.mtr.SetCircuitBreakersOpen(targetType, open)
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}
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// remainingBackoff returns how long remains of the backoff
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// window for the last attempt of a recovered retrying
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// delivery. It implements rescheduler.
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func (c *httpCore) remainingBackoff(
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webhookDB *gorm.DB,
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deliveryID string,
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attemptNum int,
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) time.Duration {
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var lastResult database.DeliveryResult
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err := webhookDB.
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Where("delivery_id = ?", deliveryID).
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Order("created_at DESC").
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First(&lastResult).Error
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if err != nil {
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return 0
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}
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backoff := calcBackoff(attemptNum)
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elapsed := time.Since(lastResult.CreatedAt)
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remaining := backoff - elapsed
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return max(remaining, 0)
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}
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// backoffElapsed reports whether the backoff window for the
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// last attempt of a retrying delivery has passed. It
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// implements rescheduler.
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func (c *httpCore) backoffElapsed(
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webhookDB *gorm.DB,
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deliveryID string,
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attemptNum int,
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) bool {
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var lastResult database.DeliveryResult
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err := webhookDB.
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Where("delivery_id = ?", deliveryID).
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Order("created_at DESC").
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First(&lastResult).Error
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if err != nil {
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return true
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}
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backoff := calcBackoff(attemptNum)
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return time.Since(lastResult.CreatedAt) >= backoff
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}
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func calcBackoff(attemptNum int) time.Duration {
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shift := max(attemptNum-1, 0)
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shift = min(shift, maxBackoffShift)
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return time.Duration(1<<uint(shift)) * time.Second
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}
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// httpTarget delivers events to http targets. It forwards the
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// event body and (filtered) request headers to the configured
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// URL and owns retry, backoff, and circuit breaking through
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// the shared httpCore.
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type httpTarget struct {
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*httpCore
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client *http.Client
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}
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// Deliver implements Target.
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func (t *httpTarget) Deliver(
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ctx context.Context,
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webhookDB *gorm.DB,
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d *database.Delivery,
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task *Task,
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sched Scheduler,
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) {
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cfg, err := parseHTTPConfig(d.Target.Config)
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if err != nil {
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t.eng.log.Error(
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"invalid HTTP target config",
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"target_id", d.TargetID,
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"error", err,
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)
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t.eng.recordResult(
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webhookDB, d, task.AttemptNum,
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false, 0, "", err.Error(), 0,
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)
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t.eng.updateDeliveryStatus(
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webhookDB, d, d.Target.Type,
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database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
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)
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return
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}
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attempt := func() attemptResult {
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return t.attempt(ctx, cfg, &d.Event)
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}
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t.deliver(
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webhookDB, d, task, sched,
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d.Target.MaxRetries, attempt,
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)
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}
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// attempt performs a single HTTP delivery attempt and derives
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// the success flag and error message the same way the engine
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// did: a non-2xx response is a failure but carries no error
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// string; only a transport-level error does.
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func (t *httpTarget) attempt(
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ctx context.Context,
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cfg *HTTPTargetConfig,
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event *database.Event,
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) attemptResult {
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statusCode, respBody, duration, reqErr :=
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t.doHTTPRequest(ctx, cfg, event)
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success := reqErr == nil &&
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statusCode >= httpSuccessMin &&
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statusCode < httpSuccessMax
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errMsg := ""
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if reqErr != nil {
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errMsg = reqErr.Error()
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}
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return attemptResult{
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statusCode: statusCode,
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respBody: respBody,
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duration: duration,
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success: success,
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errMsg: errMsg,
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}
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}
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func (t *httpTarget) doHTTPRequest(
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ctx context.Context,
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cfg *HTTPTargetConfig,
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event *database.Event,
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) (int, string, int64, error) {
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start := time.Now()
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req, reqErr := http.NewRequestWithContext(
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ctx,
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http.MethodPost,
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cfg.URL,
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bytes.NewReader([]byte(event.Body)),
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)
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if reqErr != nil {
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return 0, "", 0, fmt.Errorf(
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"creating request: %w",
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maskURLError(reqErr),
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)
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}
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originScoped := applyRequestHeaders(req, event, cfg)
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client := t.clientForRequest(cfg, originScoped)
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resp, doErr := executeHTTPRequest(client, req)
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dur := time.Since(start).Milliseconds()
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if doErr != nil {
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return 0, "", dur, fmt.Errorf(
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"sending request: %w", doErr,
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)
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}
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defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
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body, readErr := io.ReadAll(
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io.LimitReader(resp.Body, maxBodyLog),
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)
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if readErr != nil {
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return resp.StatusCode, "", dur,
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fmt.Errorf(
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"reading response body: %w", readErr,
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)
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}
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return resp.StatusCode, string(body), dur, nil
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}
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// clientForRequest returns the client for one delivery attempt.
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// originScoped is the header set applyRequestHeaders built for that
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// attempt; a request with neither a per-target timeout nor an
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// origin-scoped header gets the shared client, because there is
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// then nothing for the redirect policy to strip and net/http's
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// default policy already withholds Authorization and Cookie across
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// hosts.
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func (t *httpTarget) clientForRequest(
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cfg *HTTPTargetConfig,
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originScoped []string,
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) *http.Client {
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if cfg.Timeout <= 0 && len(originScoped) == 0 {
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return t.client
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}
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// Reuse the shared client's SSRF-safe transport so neither a
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// per-target timeout nor the redirect policy drops the
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// request-time private-IP guard — which, being a dial hook,
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// also covers every redirect hop.
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client := &http.Client{
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Timeout: t.client.Timeout,
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Transport: t.client.Transport,
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}
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if cfg.Timeout > 0 {
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client.Timeout = time.Duration(
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cfg.Timeout,
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) * time.Second
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}
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if len(originScoped) > 0 {
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client.CheckRedirect = offOriginHeaderPolicy(originScoped)
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}
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return client
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}
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func parseHTTPConfig(
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configJSON string,
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) (*HTTPTargetConfig, error) {
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if configJSON == "" {
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return nil, errEmptyTargetConfig
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}
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var cfg HTTPTargetConfig
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err := json.Unmarshal(
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[]byte(configJSON), &cfg,
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)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf(
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"parsing config JSON: %w", err,
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)
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}
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if cfg.URL == "" {
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return nil, errMissingTargetURL
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}
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return &cfg, nil
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}
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// isForwardableHeader returns true if the header should
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// be forwarded to targets.
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func isForwardableHeader(name string) bool {
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switch http.CanonicalHeaderKey(name) {
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case "Host", "Connection", "Keep-Alive",
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"Transfer-Encoding", "Te", "Trailer",
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"Upgrade", "Proxy-Authorization",
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"Proxy-Connection", "Content-Length":
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return false
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default:
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return true
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}
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}
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|
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// applyRequestHeaders builds one outbound delivery's header set and
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// returns the canonical names of every header in it that is scoped
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// to the configured origin: the inbound event headers this delivery
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// forwarded, plus the operator's configured headers. The redirect
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// policy strips exactly that set on a hop that leaves the origin,
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// so the forward set is decided here and only here — a header added
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// to it is covered off-origin without a second edit elsewhere.
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func applyRequestHeaders(
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req *http.Request,
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event *database.Event,
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cfg *HTTPTargetConfig,
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) []string {
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if event.ContentType != "" {
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req.Header.Set(
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"Content-Type", event.ContentType,
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)
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}
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originScoped := forwardEventHeaders(req, event)
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for k, v := range cfg.Headers {
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req.Header.Set(k, v)
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originScoped[http.CanonicalHeaderKey(k)] = struct{}{}
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}
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|
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req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "webhooker/1.0")
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|
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// Content-Type describes the body being sent rather than the
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|
// sender, and the delivery path sets it from the event itself.
|
|
// A 307/308 preserves the body across hosts, so stripping it
|
|
// would send that body untyped.
|
|
delete(originScoped, "Content-Type")
|
|
|
|
// User-Agent is overwritten just above, so an inbound one never
|
|
// reaches the wire and the value that does identifies this
|
|
// delivery path rather than the sender. Reporting it would strip
|
|
// it off-origin and leave net/http's own default in its place.
|
|
delete(originScoped, "User-Agent")
|
|
|
|
names := make([]string, 0, len(originScoped))
|
|
for name := range originScoped {
|
|
names = append(names, name)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sort.Strings(names)
|
|
|
|
return names
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// forwardEventHeaders copies the inbound event's forwardable
|
|
// headers onto the outbound request and returns the canonical names
|
|
// it forwarded. Headers the event never carried are absent from the
|
|
// result, so the redirect policy strips what was actually sent.
|
|
func forwardEventHeaders(
|
|
req *http.Request,
|
|
event *database.Event,
|
|
) map[string]struct{} {
|
|
forwarded := make(map[string]struct{})
|
|
|
|
if event.Headers == "" {
|
|
return forwarded
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var inbound map[string][]string
|
|
|
|
if json.Unmarshal([]byte(event.Headers), &inbound) != nil {
|
|
return forwarded
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for k, vals := range inbound {
|
|
if !isForwardableHeader(k) || len(vals) == 0 {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, v := range vals {
|
|
req.Header.Add(k, v)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
forwarded[http.CanonicalHeaderKey(k)] = struct{}{}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return forwarded
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// executeHTTPRequest sends an HTTP request using the provided
|
|
// client. URLs are validated by the config parsers and the
|
|
// SSRF-safe transport before reaching here.
|
|
//
|
|
// Transport failures are masked here, at the single point
|
|
// where every target's request errors are born, because the
|
|
// caller stores them in DeliveryResult.Error: an unmasked
|
|
// *url.Error would write the target URL — the credential for
|
|
// a Slack incoming webhook — into the per-webhook database.
|
|
func executeHTTPRequest(
|
|
client *http.Client, req *http.Request,
|
|
) (*http.Response, error) {
|
|
resp, err := client.Do(req) //#nosec G704 -- validated URL, SSRF-safe transport
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, maskURLError(err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return resp, nil
|
|
}
|