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Security hardening implementing three issues: CSRF Protection (#35): - Session-based CSRF tokens with cryptographically random generation - Constant-time token comparison to prevent timing attacks - CSRF middleware applied to /pages, /sources, /source, and /user routes - Hidden csrf_token field added to all 12+ POST forms in templates - Excluded from /webhook (inbound) and /api (stateless) routes SSRF Prevention (#36): - ValidateTargetURL blocks private/reserved IP ranges at target creation - Blocked ranges: 127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 169.254.0.0/16, ::1, fc00::/7, fe80::/10, plus multicast, reserved, test-net, and CGN ranges - SSRF-safe HTTP transport with custom DialContext for defense-in-depth at delivery time (prevents DNS rebinding attacks) - Only http/https schemes allowed Login Rate Limiting (#37): - Per-IP rate limiter using golang.org/x/time/rate - 5 attempts per minute per IP on POST /pages/login - GET requests (form rendering) pass through unaffected - Automatic cleanup of stale per-IP limiter entries - X-Forwarded-For and X-Real-IP header support for reverse proxies Closes #35, closes #36, closes #37
115 lines
3.3 KiB
Go
115 lines
3.3 KiB
Go
package middleware
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/rand"
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"encoding/hex"
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"net/http"
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)
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const (
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// csrfTokenLength is the byte length of generated CSRF tokens.
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// 32 bytes = 64 hex characters, providing 256 bits of entropy.
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csrfTokenLength = 32
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// csrfSessionKey is the session key where the CSRF token is stored.
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csrfSessionKey = "csrf_token"
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// csrfFormField is the HTML form field name for the CSRF token.
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csrfFormField = "csrf_token"
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)
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// csrfContextKey is the context key type for CSRF tokens.
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type csrfContextKey struct{}
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// CSRFToken retrieves the CSRF token from the request context.
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// Returns an empty string if no token is present.
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func CSRFToken(r *http.Request) string {
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if token, ok := r.Context().Value(csrfContextKey{}).(string); ok {
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return token
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}
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return ""
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}
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// CSRF returns middleware that provides CSRF protection for state-changing
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// requests. For every request, it ensures a CSRF token exists in the
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// session and makes it available via the request context. For POST, PUT,
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// PATCH, and DELETE requests, it validates the submitted csrf_token form
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// field against the session token. Requests with an invalid or missing
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// token receive a 403 Forbidden response.
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func (m *Middleware) CSRF() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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sess, err := m.session.Get(r)
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if err != nil {
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m.log.Error("csrf: failed to get session", "error", err)
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http.Error(w, "Forbidden", http.StatusForbidden)
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return
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}
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// Ensure a CSRF token exists in the session
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token, ok := sess.Values[csrfSessionKey].(string)
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if !ok {
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token = ""
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}
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if token == "" {
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token, err = generateCSRFToken()
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if err != nil {
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m.log.Error("csrf: failed to generate token", "error", err)
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http.Error(w, "Internal Server Error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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sess.Values[csrfSessionKey] = token
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if saveErr := m.session.Save(r, w, sess); saveErr != nil {
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m.log.Error("csrf: failed to save session", "error", saveErr)
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http.Error(w, "Internal Server Error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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}
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// Store token in context for templates
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ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), csrfContextKey{}, token)
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r = r.WithContext(ctx)
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// Validate token on state-changing methods
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switch r.Method {
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case http.MethodPost, http.MethodPut, http.MethodPatch, http.MethodDelete:
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submitted := r.FormValue(csrfFormField)
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if !secureCompare(submitted, token) {
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m.log.Warn("csrf: token mismatch",
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"method", r.Method,
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"path", r.URL.Path,
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"remote_addr", r.RemoteAddr,
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)
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http.Error(w, "Forbidden - invalid CSRF token", http.StatusForbidden)
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return
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}
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}
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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}
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// generateCSRFToken creates a cryptographically random hex-encoded token.
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func generateCSRFToken() (string, error) {
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b := make([]byte, csrfTokenLength)
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if _, err := rand.Read(b); err != nil {
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return "", err
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}
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return hex.EncodeToString(b), nil
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}
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// secureCompare performs a constant-time string comparison to prevent
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// timing attacks on CSRF token validation.
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func secureCompare(a, b string) bool {
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if len(a) != len(b) {
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return false
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}
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var result byte
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for i := 0; i < len(a); i++ {
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result |= a[i] ^ b[i]
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}
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return result == 0
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}
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