webhooker/TODO.md

Workflow

One issue per unit of work, one branch and one PR per issue:

• ensure a tracked issue exists with a definition of done
• branch from next (never from main)
• do the work; open a PR based on next (never on main)
• pass an independent review, then the manager squash-merges into next
• push; nothing stays local-only

next is the branch for the next milestone and must stay green and mergeable to main without notice. One next -> main PR accumulates the milestone; releases are cut from main separately.

Issue branches do NOT touch this file — the manager maintains it on next. Every branch editing TODO.md conflicts with every other (#112).

Status

pre-1.0. No git tags exist. main (4f5ecb1) is a working webhook proxy with auth, CSRF/SSRF protections, login rate limiting, Slack target, event retention (#63), the database archiving target (#43), the admin password change flow (#65), policy compliance (#6), pinned lint tooling (#55), and fail-loud configuration parsing (#80).

next holds the completed 1.0.0 milestone: every issue in it is closed, and it is verified green both by CI and by cache-defeated container runs. The two were only made to mean the same thing this cycle — before #119, a warm layer cache let the gate report success without executing anything, and replayed the previous build's console log so the lie looked like a real run. Note: TODO.md was deliberately deleted from this repo in f9a9569 (2026-03-01, #6); its content was folded into the README TODO section, which this draft reconstructs as of 2026-07-06.

Next Step

Merge the milestone PR to main and tag 1.0.0 from it.

Two decisions are open and belong to the owner, neither blocking the tag: #115 (mask the http target's destination URL, implemented speculatively and awaiting a yes or no) and #125 (whether IPv6 rate-limit keys should bucket by /64).

Completed Steps

• 2026-08-12 Bound the receiver rate limit per client IP across the whole /webhook/* route. The existing limiter keyed on the request path and /webhook/{uuid} matches any single segment, so a client that invented a fresh path per request minted a fresh bucket per request: the limit on the only unauthenticated endpoint bounded nothing in aggregate, and every request still cost an entrypoint lookup before it 404ed. An outer limiter keyed on the client address alone now bounds that, chained in front of the unchanged per-entrypoint limiter (#139)
• 2026-08-12 Correct release-blocking documentation inaccuracies: the README promised manual redelivery in the present tense in three places when nothing implements it (the same false claim also sat in the doc comment that was its source text), the env table omitted RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL, and TODO.md itself omitted five landed units (#141)
• 2026-08-12 Make the CI gate execute the checks it reports on. The workflow now writes a build-context fingerprint before calling script/cibuild, so a code commit invalidates the COPY layer of the lint and builder stages while a docs-only commit still replays from cache; a superseding run also rewrites the failure status Gitea leaves on commits it cancelled and never tested. Verified by pushing a deliberately broken test and watching CI go red (#119)
• 2026-08-12 Require a positive RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL: a non-positive value reached time.NewTicker in both the retention reaper and the archive sweeper, panicking two goroutines with no recover after startup had already reported success (#140)
• 2026-08-12 Bound the X-Forwarded-For scan's allocation to the hop cap: the reverse walk cuts entries with strings.LastIndexByte instead of joining and splitting, so a 1 MB header allocates 16 bytes rather than 1.6 MB per request on the unauthenticated receiver. Semantics proven unchanged by differential testing against the previous implementation (#133)
• 2026-08-12 Cap the X-Forwarded-For hop walk at 64 entries, so an attacker-supplied chain cannot burn unbounded CPU in the rate-limit key function; running off the end falls back to the peer address (#124)
• 2026-08-12 Gate forwarded-header trust behind a TRUSTED_PROXIES CIDR list: all three rate limiters key on the connection's own address unless the direct peer is a configured proxy, in which case X-Forwarded-For is walked right to left for the first non-proxy hop. Default trusts nothing, and a set-but-unparseable value aborts startup. Before this, any client could mint a fresh bucket or drain another's by rotating a spoofed header (#88)
• 2026-08-11 Web UI cleanup: nav terminology unified on Webhooks, the Profile settings placeholder removed, a progressive-enhancement copy button for the entrypoint URL, and retention form copy that states the actual policy (deletion by the reaper, 0 retains forever) (#57)
• 2026-08-11 Mask the webhook credential in delivery errors and logs: Go embeds the request URL in *url.Error, so every transport failure persisted the full Slack webhook URL into the per-webhook event database via DeliveryResult.Error, a field a future REST API would have served. maskURLError drops path, query and userinfo while preserving the wrapped cause, so errors.Is/As and Timeout() still work and DNS, TLS and timeout failures still read differently (#118)
• 2026-08-11 Rate-limit the public webhook receiver endpoint (RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT, default 120/min), keyed on client IP plus entrypoint path so one entrypoint cannot exhaust another's budget; over-limit requests get 429 with Retry-After. It was the one unauthenticated, internet-facing endpoint with no limit at all (#64)
• 2026-08-11 Enforce the body size limit before CSRF parses the form: MaxBodySize is now first in all four form-parsing route groups, so an oversized request is rejected with 413 instead of being read in full by the CSRF middleware before any cap applied (#90)
• 2026-08-11 Mask target config on the source detail page, which rendered the stored blob verbatim and so exposed the Slack incoming-webhook URL — a bearer credential that cannot be revoked per-holder. Config reaches the template only as a TargetView of labelled fields, and header values are rendered as a count (#113)
• 2026-08-11 Allow retention_days of 0 to mean retain forever, via a sentinel written in BeforeSave so the GORM column default cannot win the race. Also bounds the reaper's cutoff arithmetic: day counts above 106751 overflowed time.Duration and wrapped the cutoff into the future, where every row matched and the sweep deleted everything (#79)
• 2026-08-09 Inactivity-based session timeout: sliding idle expiry (SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT, default 24h) refreshed on authenticated requests, with the 7-day absolute cap kept as an independent backstop that activity never extends (#66)
• 2026-08-09 Restart recovery and the 60s retry sweep terminally fail an orphaned retrying delivery whose target type no longer supports retries, recording a DeliveryResult with the reason instead of leaving the delivery stuck forever (#82)
• 2026-08-09 Root the delivery engine's worker pool and the retention reaper's sweep loop at context.Background() rather than the fx OnStart hook context (#97), which carries fx's 15s start timeout and killed both roughly fifteen seconds after boot: the proxy silently stopped delivering webhooks entirely, and the reaper never ran a single sweep under its default one-hour interval
• 2026-08-09 Archive writer lifecycle (#89): deleting a webhook (or its last database target) evicts the cached archive writer and closes its handle while deliberately leaving archive-{webhookID}.db on disk, and a new ArchiveSweeper prunes idle archives on the existing RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL without ever creating an archive file
• 2026-08-09 Configuration parsing fails loudly on set-but-unparseable environment values: envInt removed in favour of envPositiveInt plus a PORT range check, envBool now parses with strconv.ParseBool, and defaults apply only to unset variables (#80)
• 2026-08-07 Automatic event retention cleanup based on retention_days, deleting expired events, deliveries, and delivery results from each per-webhook event database (#63)
• 2026-08-07 Update golangci-lint to v2.12.2 (Docker image digest in Dockerfile, release-archive sha256 pins in script/bootstrap), adopt the canonical .golangci.yml (v2 linters.settings layout so lll/funlen/cyclop/dupl thresholds actually apply), and fix all newly surfaced lint findings
• 2026-07-07 Adopted scripts-to-rule-them-all: script/ entrypoints, Makefile shims, README Entrypoints section
• 2026-03-25 pin golangci-lint Docker image for linting (#55)
• 2026-03-18 CSRF middleware detects TLS per-request, fixing login over plain HTTP and behind reverse proxies (#54)
• 2026-03-17 root path redirects based on auth state (#52)
• 2026-03-17 CSRF protection, SSRF prevention for HTTP delivery targets with DNS rebinding defense, and per-IP login rate limiting (#42)
• 2026-03-17 Slack target type for incoming webhook notifications (#47)
• 2026-03-17 Dockerfile absolute paths and static linking (#49); absolute dev DATA_DIR default and clarified env docs (#46)
• 2026-03-05 security headers middleware, session regeneration on login, request body size limits (#41)
• 2026-03-04 tests for delivery, middleware, and session packages (#32); removed globals.Buildarch (#31)
• 2026-03-04 1.0 MVP merge: Webhook/Entrypoint/Target rename, core delivery engine with bounded worker pool and circuit breaker, parallel fan-out, per-webhook event databases, management UI (#16)
• 2026-03-01 repo brought to REPO_POLICIES standards; TODO.md folded into README (#6)

Future Steps

• Manual event redelivery from the web UI — the "Replay" capability the README describes as planned. No redelivery code exists anywhere in the tree; events are stored in full, which is all it would be built on
• Delivery status and retry management UI
• Per-webhook rate limiting in the receiver handler (per-webhook config plus handler enforcement; global limits must not apply to receiver endpoints)
• Webhook signature verification for GitHub and Stripe HMAC formats
• API key authentication for programmatic access (APIKey model exists; Bearer token middleware does not)
• REST API v1
  • CRUD for webhooks, entrypoints, targets
  • event viewing and filtering endpoints
  • event redelivery endpoint
  • OpenAPI specification
• Analytics dashboard: success rates, response times, volume
• A remember-me option at login
• Password change and reset flow
• Later, nice to have
  • email delivery target type
  • SNS and S3 delivery targets
  • data transformations (e.g. webhook to Slack message formatting)
  • JSONL file delivery with periodic S3 upload
  • webhook event search and filtering
  • multi-user with role-based access control