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Replace custom CSRF middleware with gorilla/csrf and custom rate-limiting middleware with go-chi/httprate, as requested in code review. CSRF changes: - Replace session-based CSRF tokens with gorilla/csrf cookie-based double-submit pattern (HMAC-authenticated cookies) - Keep same form field name (csrf_token) for template compatibility - Keep same route exclusions (webhook/API routes) - In dev mode, mark requests as plaintext HTTP to skip Referer check Rate limiting changes: - Replace custom token-bucket rate limiter with httprate sliding-window counter (per-IP, 5 POST requests/min on login endpoint) - Remove custom IP extraction (httprate.KeyByRealIP handles X-Forwarded-For, X-Real-IP, True-Client-IP) - Remove custom cleanup goroutine (httprate manages its own state) Kept as-is: - SSRF prevention code (internal/delivery/ssrf.go) — application-specific - CSRFToken() wrapper function — handlers unchanged Updated README security section and architecture overview to reflect library choices.
57 lines
1.8 KiB
Go
57 lines
1.8 KiB
Go
package middleware
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import (
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"net/http"
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"github.com/gorilla/csrf"
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)
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// CSRFToken retrieves the CSRF token from the request context.
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// Returns an empty string if the gorilla/csrf middleware has not run.
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func CSRFToken(r *http.Request) string {
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return csrf.Token(r)
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}
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// CSRF returns middleware that provides CSRF protection using the
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// gorilla/csrf library. The middleware uses the session authentication
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// key to sign a CSRF cookie and validates a masked token submitted via
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// the "csrf_token" form field (or the "X-CSRF-Token" header) on
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// POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE requests. Requests with an invalid or missing
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// token receive a 403 Forbidden response.
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//
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// In development mode, requests are marked as plaintext HTTP so that
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// gorilla/csrf skips the strict Referer-origin check (which is only
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// meaningful over TLS).
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func (m *Middleware) CSRF() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
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protect := csrf.Protect(
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m.session.GetKey(),
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csrf.FieldName("csrf_token"),
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csrf.Secure(!m.params.Config.IsDev()),
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csrf.SameSite(csrf.SameSiteLaxMode),
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csrf.Path("/"),
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csrf.ErrorHandler(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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m.log.Warn("csrf: token validation failed",
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"method", r.Method,
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"path", r.URL.Path,
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"remote_addr", r.RemoteAddr,
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"reason", csrf.FailureReason(r),
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)
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http.Error(w, "Forbidden - invalid CSRF token", http.StatusForbidden)
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})),
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)
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// In development (plaintext HTTP), signal gorilla/csrf to skip
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// the strict TLS Referer check by injecting the PlaintextHTTP
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// context key before the CSRF handler sees the request.
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if m.params.Config.IsDev() {
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return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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csrfHandler := protect(next)
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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csrfHandler.ServeHTTP(w, csrf.PlaintextHTTPRequest(r))
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})
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}
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}
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return protect
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}
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