Files
webhooker/internal/handlers/auth.go
clawbot 2de98cedbe
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Render admin page errors in the normal layout (closes #382)
Every 400, 403, 404 and 500 on an admin page now answers with an
error page in the normal layout: one fixed line for the status and a
link back to the webhook list, or to sign-in when nobody is signed
in. The router's handler for unknown paths, the CSRF middleware's
refusal and a panic in an admin page route group use the same page;
each such group has its own recoverer and error reporting for that.
The page always sends Cache-Control: no-store. Status codes are
unchanged. The receiver, the healthcheck and /metrics keep their
plain answers. If the error page cannot render, or panics, the answer
is the same status in plain text.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-02 00:21:49 +00:00

294 lines
7.2 KiB
Go

package handlers
import (
"net/http"
"strconv"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logfield"
)
// HandleLoginPage returns a handler for the login page (GET)
func (h *Handlers) HandleLoginPage() http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Check if already logged in
sess, err := h.session.Get(r)
if err == nil && h.session.IsAuthenticated(sess) {
http.Redirect(w, r, "/", http.StatusSeeOther)
return
}
// Render login page
data := map[string]any{
tmplKeyError: "",
}
h.renderTemplate(w, r, "login.html", data)
}
}
// HandleLoginSubmit handles the login form submission (POST)
func (h *Handlers) HandleLoginSubmit() http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// The body size cap is enforced by the MaxBodySize
// middleware, which runs before CSRF parses the form.
err := r.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
h.log.Error("failed to parse form", "error", err)
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// PostFormValue, not FormValue: the credential must come
// from the body, never from the query string.
username := r.PostFormValue("username")
password := r.PostFormValue("password")
// Validate input
if username == "" || password == "" {
h.renderLoginError(
w, r,
"Username and password are required",
http.StatusBadRequest,
)
return
}
user, err := h.authenticateUser(
w, r, username, password,
)
if err != nil {
return
}
err = h.createAuthenticatedSession(w, r, user)
if err != nil {
return
}
h.log.Info(
"user logged in",
"username", logfield.Truncate(
username, logfield.MaxBytes,
),
"user_id", user.ID,
)
// Redirect to home page
http.Redirect(w, r, "/", http.StatusSeeOther)
}
}
// renderLoginError renders the login page with an error message.
func (h *Handlers) renderLoginError(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
msg string,
status int,
) {
data := map[string]any{
tmplKeyError: msg,
}
w.WriteHeader(status)
h.renderTemplate(w, r, "login.html", data)
}
// authenticateUser looks up and verifies a user's credentials.
// On failure it writes an HTTP response and returns an error.
//
// The credential check runs BEFORE any rate-limit budget is
// consulted, and only a failed check spends budget. That is what
// keeps the single administrative path reachable: behind the reverse
// proxy this deployment requires, when TRUSTED_PROXIES does not cover
// it, every client shares one bucket, so a limiter spent on arrival
// lets any stranger deny the operator's own correct password
// indefinitely.
//
// Verifying first means every login POST costs an Argon2id hash, so
// the work is taken under a bounded number of verification slots.
func (h *Handlers) authenticateUser(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
username, password string,
) (database.User, error) {
var user database.User
release, ok := h.mw.BeginPasswordVerification(r.Context())
if !ok {
h.log.Warn(
"password verification capacity exhausted",
"path", logfield.Truncate(
r.URL.Path, logfield.MaxBytes,
),
)
h.renderLoginError(
w, r,
"The server is busy verifying credentials. "+
"Please try again.",
http.StatusServiceUnavailable,
)
return user, errVerificationBusy
}
defer release()
err := h.db.DB().Where(
"username = ?", username,
).First(&user).Error
if err != nil {
// A username that does not exist is charged the same work
// as one that does. Skipping the hash here would answer in
// microseconds where a real account takes tens of
// milliseconds, handing every client a username oracle.
h.dummyVerifications.Add(1)
database.VerifyDummyPassword(password)
// Login is unauthenticated, and the submitted username is
// a form field the client fills to any length the 1 MB
// body cap allows. On this branch it matched no row, so
// nothing else bounds it. The rate limiter caps how often
// the line is written, not how wide it is.
h.log.Debug(
"user not found",
"username", logfield.Truncate(
username, logfield.MaxBytes,
),
)
h.rejectLogin(w, r, username)
return user, err
}
valid, err := database.VerifyPassword(password, user.Password)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to verify password", err)
return user, err
}
if !valid {
// Reached only once the username matched a stored row, so
// it is bounded by the operator's own data. Capped anyway,
// so that every username this unauthenticated endpoint
// logs is capped and no reader has to work out which
// branch narrowed it.
h.log.Debug(
"invalid password",
"username", logfield.Truncate(
username, logfield.MaxBytes,
),
)
h.rejectLogin(w, r, username)
return user, errInvalidPassword
}
// The password was correct, so forgive whatever failures this
// client accumulated: an operator who mistypes a few times and
// then gets it right must not stay throttled afterwards.
h.mw.ForgiveLoginFailures(r, username)
return user, nil
}
// rejectLogin counts one failed credential verification and answers
// it: 401 while this client still has failure budget against the
// submitted username, 429 with a Retry-After once it is spent.
//
// The 429 throttles wrong passwords only. A correct one never
// reaches here, so no amount of failure — from this client or any
// other sharing its bucket — can keep the operator out.
func (h *Handlers) rejectLogin(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
username string,
) {
if !h.mw.RecordLoginFailure(r, username) {
h.renderLoginError(
w, r,
"Invalid username or password",
http.StatusUnauthorized,
)
return
}
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", strconv.Itoa(int(
h.mw.LoginFailureInterval().Seconds(),
)))
h.renderLoginError(
w, r,
"Too many failed login attempts. Please try again later.",
http.StatusTooManyRequests,
)
}
// createAuthenticatedSession regenerates the session and stores
// user info. On failure it writes an HTTP response and returns
// an error.
func (h *Handlers) createAuthenticatedSession(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
user database.User,
) error {
oldSess, err := h.session.Get(r)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to get session", err)
return err
}
sess, err := h.session.Regenerate(r, w, oldSess)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to regenerate session", err)
return err
}
h.session.SetUser(sess, user.ID, user.Username)
err = h.session.Save(r, w, sess)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to save session", err)
return err
}
return nil
}
// HandleLogout handles user logout
func (h *Handlers) HandleLogout() http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
sess, err := h.session.Get(r)
if err != nil {
h.log.Error("failed to get session", "error", err)
http.Redirect(
w, r, "/pages/login", http.StatusSeeOther,
)
return
}
// Destroy session
h.session.Destroy(sess)
// Save the destroyed session
err = h.session.Save(r, w, sess)
if err != nil {
h.log.Error(
"failed to save destroyed session",
"error", err,
)
}
// Redirect to login page
http.Redirect(w, r, "/pages/login", http.StatusSeeOther)
}
}