package handlers

import (
	"context"
	"encoding/json"
	"errors"
	"fmt"
	"net/http"
	"strings"

	"github.com/go-chi/chi"
	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
)

// HandleTargetCreate handles adding a new target to a webhook.
func (h *Handlers) HandleTargetCreate() http.HandlerFunc {
	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
		userID, ok := h.getUserID(r)
		if !ok {
			http.Redirect(
				w, r, "/pages/login", http.StatusSeeOther,
			)

			return
		}

		sourceID := chi.URLParam(r, "sourceID")

		h.renameMu.Lock()
		defer h.renameMu.Unlock()

		var webhook database.Webhook

		err := h.db.DB().Where(
			"id = ? AND user_id = ?", sourceID, userID,
		).First(&webhook).Error
		if err != nil {
			h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusNotFound)

			return
		}

		// The body size cap is enforced by the MaxBodySize
		// middleware, which runs before CSRF parses the form.
		err = r.ParseForm()
		if err != nil {
			h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest)

			return
		}

		h.processTargetCreate(w, r, webhook)
	}
}

// processTargetCreate validates and creates a new target. A refused
// submission shows the webhook page again, with the add target form
// open on the chosen type, the values entered, and the reason.
func (h *Handlers) processTargetCreate(
	w http.ResponseWriter,
	r *http.Request,
	webhook database.Webhook,
) {
	in := targetFormInputFrom(r)

	target, errMsg, err := h.newTarget(r.Context(), webhook.ID, in)
	if err != nil {
		h.serverError(w, r, "failed to encode target config", err)

		return
	}

	if errMsg != "" {
		h.renderSourceDetail(w, r, webhook, in, errMsg)

		return
	}

	err = h.db.DB().Create(target).Error
	if err != nil {
		h.serverError(w, r, "failed to create target", err)

		return
	}

	http.Redirect(
		w, r, withNotice("/hook/"+webhook.ID, targetAdded),
		http.StatusSeeOther,
	)
}

// newTarget validates a new target for a webhook and returns the row
// to create, or, when it refuses the target, the message the form
// shows. An error is the server's fault, not a refusal: the accepted
// configuration could not be encoded. Every form that creates a
// target goes through here, so they all accept and refuse the same
// things.
func (h *Handlers) newTarget(
	ctx context.Context,
	webhookID string,
	in targetFormInput,
) (*database.Target, string, error) {
	target := &database.Target{
		WebhookID: webhookID,
		Type:      in.Type,
		Active:    true,
	}

	errMsg, err := h.setTargetFromForm(ctx, target, in)
	if err != nil || errMsg != "" {
		return nil, errMsg, err
	}

	return target, "", nil
}

// setTargetFromForm validates a target form against the target's type
// and, when it accepts it, sets the target's name, configuration and
// retry count from it. It returns the message the form shows for
// anything it refuses, an unknown type among them, and then leaves the
// target unchanged; an error is the server's fault, as for newTarget.
// The add target form and the target edit form both go through here,
// so the two cannot come to disagree about what a target may be.
func (h *Handlers) setTargetFromForm(
	ctx context.Context,
	target *database.Target,
	in targetFormInput,
) (string, error) {
	if in.Name == "" {
		return "Name is required", nil
	}

	configJSON, errMsg, err := h.buildTargetConfig(ctx, target.Type, in)
	if err != nil || errMsg != "" {
		return errMsg, err
	}

	// An empty max_retries keeps the target's count: the
	// fire-and-forget default of 0 for a new target, and the stored
	// count for an edited one, since the forms for target types that
	// do not retry have no such field. A value that is filled in but
	// invalid is refused rather than becoming that count, so a typo
	// cannot destroy the count a target is delivering with.
	maxRetries, err := parseMaxRetries(in.MaxRetries, target.MaxRetries)
	if err != nil {
		return "Invalid delivery attempts: " + retriesErrorMessage(err), nil
	}

	target.Name = in.Name
	target.Config = configJSON
	target.MaxRetries = maxRetries

	return "", nil
}

// targetFormInput carries the raw values of a target form. Both the
// create and the edit path fill one and hand it to setTargetFromForm,
// so neither can come to validate a target differently from the
// other. Both forms are filled from one: the edit form with the
// stored values, and a refused form with the values submitted.
type targetFormInput struct {
	// Name is the target's name.
	Name string
	// Type is the type chosen on the add target form. The edit form
	// has none: a target's stored type decides.
	Type database.TargetType
	// URL is the destination for an HTTP target and the webhook URL
	// for a Slack target.
	URL string
	// Headers is an HTTP target's headers, one "Name: value" per
	// line.
	Headers string
	// Timeout is an HTTP target's per-request timeout in seconds.
	Timeout string
	// MaxRetries is an HTTP or Slack target's max_retries.
	MaxRetries string
	// Expiry is a database (archive) target's row expiry.
	Expiry string
	// Rotation is a database (archive) target's rotation.
	Rotation string
}

// targetFormInputFrom reads a target form from a request body. The
// body size cap is enforced by the MaxBodySize middleware, which runs
// before CSRF parses the form.
//
// Every field is read with PostFormValue, not FormValue. FormValue
// falls back to the query string, which would let
// `POST /hook/{id}/targets?url=https://hooks.slack.com/...`
// configure a target from a value the request line carries — and the
// request line, unlike the body, is what logs, proxies, Referer
// headers and error trackers record. The headers field is under the
// same rule and for the same reason: its values are authorization
// tokens.
func targetFormInputFrom(r *http.Request) targetFormInput {
	return targetFormInput{
		Name:       r.PostFormValue("name"),
		Type:       database.TargetType(r.PostFormValue("type")),
		URL:        r.PostFormValue("url"),
		Headers:    r.PostFormValue("headers"),
		Timeout:    r.PostFormValue("timeout"),
		MaxRetries: r.PostFormValue("max_retries"),
		Expiry:     r.PostFormValue("expiry"),
		Rotation:   r.PostFormValue("rotation"),
	}
}

// buildTargetConfig builds the JSON config string for a target from
// the submitted form values, or returns the message the form shows
// for a value it refuses. An error is the server's fault, not a
// refusal: the accepted configuration could not be encoded. Which
// fields of in apply depends on the target type; a type without a URL
// ignores any URL submitted.
func (h *Handlers) buildTargetConfig(
	ctx context.Context,
	targetType database.TargetType,
	in targetFormInput,
) (string, string, error) {
	switch targetType {
	case database.TargetTypeHTTP:
		return h.buildHTTPTargetConfig(ctx, in)
	case database.TargetTypeSlack:
		return h.buildSlackTargetConfig(ctx, in.URL)
	case database.TargetTypeDatabase:
		return buildDatabaseTargetConfig(in.Expiry, in.Rotation)
	case database.TargetTypeLog:
		return "", "", nil
	default:
		return "", "Invalid target type", nil
	}
}

// buildHTTPTargetConfig builds config JSON for an HTTP target: an
// SSRF-validated destination plus the optional headers and timeout
// the delivery path honours.
func (h *Handlers) buildHTTPTargetConfig(
	ctx context.Context,
	in targetFormInput,
) (string, string, error) {
	errMsg := h.validateTargetURL(
		ctx, in.URL, "URL is required for HTTP targets",
	)
	if errMsg != "" {
		return "", errMsg, nil
	}

	headers, err := delivery.ParseTargetHeaders(in.Headers)
	if err != nil {
		return "", fmt.Sprintf("Invalid headers: %v", err), nil
	}

	timeout, err := delivery.ParseTargetTimeout(in.Timeout)
	if err != nil {
		return "", fmt.Sprintf("Invalid timeout: %v", err), nil
	}

	configJSON, err := marshalTargetConfig(delivery.HTTPTargetConfig{
		URL:     in.URL,
		Headers: headers,
		Timeout: timeout,
	})

	return configJSON, "", err
}

// buildSlackTargetConfig builds config JSON for a Slack target,
// whose whole configuration is one SSRF-validated webhook URL.
func (h *Handlers) buildSlackTargetConfig(
	ctx context.Context,
	targetURL string,
) (string, string, error) {
	errMsg := h.validateTargetURL(
		ctx, targetURL,
		"Webhook URL is required for Slack targets",
	)
	if errMsg != "" {
		return "", errMsg, nil
	}

	configJSON, err := marshalTargetConfig(delivery.SlackTargetConfig{
		WebhookURL: targetURL,
	})

	return configJSON, "", err
}

// validateTargetURL refuses an empty or SSRF-blocked destination,
// returning the message the form shows, or "" when the destination
// is accepted. missingMsg is the message for no URL at all.
//
// It is the single point at which a user-supplied destination enters
// the SSRF guard, on create and on edit alike. An edit path that
// reached storage without passing through here would reopen the hole
// the guard closes.
func (h *Handlers) validateTargetURL(
	ctx context.Context,
	targetURL, missingMsg string,
) string {
	if targetURL == "" {
		return missingMsg
	}

	err := h.ssrf.ValidateTargetURL(ctx, targetURL)
	if err != nil {
		// The submitted URL can be a credential (a Slack
		// incoming webhook URL is a bearer token), so the log
		// records only its scheme and host.
		h.log.Warn(
			"target URL blocked by SSRF protection",
			"url", delivery.MaskURL(targetURL),
			"error", err,
		)

		msg := "Invalid target URL: " + err.Error()

		// Only a private or reserved address's refusal says how
		// to allow it. Other refusals never do: link-local, the
		// unspecified addresses and the unconditional metadata
		// addresses cannot be opened, and the default
		// blocklist's public addresses, which listing does open,
		// hand out credentials.
		if errors.Is(err, delivery.ErrBlockedPrivateOrReservedIP) {
			msg += ". Private and reserved addresses are refused " +
				"by default; the server's ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS " +
				"setting allows named networks (see \"Allowing " +
				"egress to your own network\" in the README)."
		}

		return msg
	}

	return ""
}

// marshalTargetConfig serialises a target configuration for storage.
func marshalTargetConfig(cfg any) (string, error) {
	configBytes, err := json.Marshal(cfg)
	if err != nil {
		return "", err
	}

	return string(configBytes), nil
}

// buildDatabaseTargetConfig builds config JSON for a database
// (archive) target. The optional expiry and rotation are validated
// here, at creation time, so a bad value is refused instead of
// failing every subsequent delivery. Each is stored only when set,
// and with neither the config is empty (the keep-forever, one-file
// default).
func buildDatabaseTargetConfig(
	expiry, rotation string,
) (string, string, error) {
	expiry = strings.TrimSpace(expiry)

	err := delivery.ValidateArchiveExpiry(expiry)
	if err != nil {
		return "", fmt.Sprintf("Invalid archive expiry: %v", err), nil
	}

	err = delivery.ValidateArchiveRotation(rotation)
	if err != nil {
		return "", fmt.Sprintf("Invalid archive rotation: %v", err), nil
	}

	cfg := map[string]any{}

	if expiry != "" {
		cfg["expiry"] = expiry
	}

	if rotation != "" {
		cfg["rotation"] = rotation
	}

	if len(cfg) == 0 {
		return "", "", nil
	}

	configJSON, err := marshalTargetConfig(cfg)

	return configJSON, "", err
}