# Workflow

One issue per unit of work, one branch and one PR per issue:

* ensure a tracked issue exists with a definition of done
* branch from `next` (never from `main`)
* do the work; open a PR based on `next` (never on `main`)
* pass an independent review, then the manager squash-merges into `next`
* push; nothing stays local-only

`next` is the branch for the next milestone and must stay green and
mergeable to `main` without notice. One `next` -> `main` PR accumulates
the milestone; releases are cut from `main` separately.

Issue branches do NOT touch this file — the manager maintains it on
`next`. Every branch editing `TODO.md` conflicts with every other
(#112).

# Status

pre-1.0. No git tags exist. `main` (4f5ecb1) is a working webhook proxy
with auth, CSRF/SSRF protections, login rate limiting, Slack target,
event retention (#63), the database archiving target (#43), the admin
password change flow (#65), policy compliance (#6), pinned lint tooling
(#55), and fail-loud configuration parsing (#80).

`next` holds the completed 1.0.0 milestone: every issue in it is closed,
and it is verified green both by CI and by cache-defeated container
runs. The two were only made to mean the same thing this cycle — before
#119, a warm layer cache let the gate report success without executing
anything, and replayed the previous build's console log so the lie
looked like a real run. Note: TODO.md was deliberately deleted from this
repo in f9a9569 (2026-03-01, #6); its content was folded into the README
TODO section, which this draft reconstructs as of 2026-07-06.

# Next Step

Merge the milestone PR to `main` and tag 1.0.0 from it.

Two decisions are open and belong to the owner, neither blocking the
tag: #115 (mask the `http` target's destination URL, implemented
speculatively and awaiting a yes or no) and #125 (whether IPv6
rate-limit keys should bucket by `/64`).

# Completed Steps

- 2026-08-12 Bound the receiver rate limit per client IP across the
  whole `/webhook/*` route. The existing limiter keyed on the request
  path and `/webhook/{uuid}` matches any single segment, so a client
  that invented a fresh path per request minted a fresh bucket per
  request: the limit on the only unauthenticated endpoint bounded
  nothing in aggregate, and every request still cost an entrypoint
  lookup before it 404ed. An outer limiter keyed on the client address
  alone now bounds that, chained in front of the unchanged
  per-entrypoint limiter (#139)
- 2026-08-12 Correct release-blocking documentation inaccuracies: the
  README promised manual redelivery in the present tense in three
  places when nothing implements it (the same false claim also sat in
  the doc comment that was its source text), the env table omitted
  `RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL`, and `TODO.md` itself omitted five landed
  units (#141)
- 2026-08-12 Make the CI gate execute the checks it reports on. The
  workflow now writes a build-context fingerprint before calling
  `script/cibuild`, so a code commit invalidates the `COPY` layer of
  the lint and builder stages while a docs-only commit still replays
  from cache; a superseding run also rewrites the `failure` status
  Gitea leaves on commits it cancelled and never tested. Verified by
  pushing a deliberately broken test and watching CI go red (#119)
- 2026-08-12 Require a positive `RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL`: a
  non-positive value reached `time.NewTicker` in both the retention
  reaper and the archive sweeper, panicking two goroutines with no
  recover after startup had already reported success (#140)
- 2026-08-12 Bound the `X-Forwarded-For` scan's allocation to the hop
  cap: the reverse walk cuts entries with `strings.LastIndexByte`
  instead of joining and splitting, so a 1 MB header allocates 16 bytes
  rather than 1.6 MB per request on the unauthenticated receiver.
  Semantics proven unchanged by differential testing against the
  previous implementation (#133)
- 2026-08-12 Cap the `X-Forwarded-For` hop walk at 64 entries, so an
  attacker-supplied chain cannot burn unbounded CPU in the rate-limit
  key function; running off the end falls back to the peer address
  (#124)
- 2026-08-12 Gate forwarded-header trust behind a `TRUSTED_PROXIES` CIDR
  list: all three rate limiters key on the connection's own address
  unless the direct peer is a configured proxy, in which case
  `X-Forwarded-For` is walked right to left for the first non-proxy hop.
  Default trusts nothing, and a set-but-unparseable value aborts
  startup. Before this, any client could mint a fresh bucket or drain
  another's by rotating a spoofed header (#88)
- 2026-08-11 Web UI cleanup: nav terminology unified on Webhooks, the
  Profile settings placeholder removed, a progressive-enhancement copy
  button for the entrypoint URL, and retention form copy that states the
  actual policy (deletion by the reaper, 0 retains forever) (#57)
- 2026-08-11 Mask the webhook credential in delivery errors and logs:
  Go embeds the request URL in `*url.Error`, so every transport failure
  persisted the full Slack webhook URL into the per-webhook event
  database via `DeliveryResult.Error`, a field a future REST API would
  have served. `maskURLError` drops path, query and userinfo while
  preserving the wrapped cause, so `errors.Is`/`As` and `Timeout()`
  still work and DNS, TLS and timeout failures still read differently
  (#118)
- 2026-08-11 Rate-limit the public webhook receiver endpoint
  (`RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT`, default 120/min), keyed on client IP plus
  entrypoint path so one entrypoint cannot exhaust another's budget;
  over-limit requests get 429 with `Retry-After`. It was the one
  unauthenticated, internet-facing endpoint with no limit at all (#64)
- 2026-08-11 Enforce the body size limit before CSRF parses the form:
  `MaxBodySize` is now first in all four form-parsing route groups, so
  an oversized request is rejected with 413 instead of being read in
  full by the CSRF middleware before any cap applied (#90)
- 2026-08-11 Mask target config on the source detail page, which
  rendered the stored blob verbatim and so exposed the Slack
  incoming-webhook URL — a bearer credential that cannot be revoked
  per-holder. Config reaches the template only as a `TargetView` of
  labelled fields, and header values are rendered as a count (#113)
- 2026-08-11 Allow `retention_days` of 0 to mean retain forever, via a
  sentinel written in `BeforeSave` so the GORM column default cannot
  win the race. Also bounds the reaper's cutoff arithmetic: day counts
  above 106751 overflowed `time.Duration` and wrapped the cutoff into
  the future, where every row matched and the sweep deleted everything
  (#79)
- 2026-08-09 Inactivity-based session timeout: sliding idle expiry
  (`SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT`, default `24h`) refreshed on authenticated
  requests, with the 7-day absolute cap kept as an independent
  backstop that activity never extends (#66)
- 2026-08-09 Restart recovery and the 60s retry sweep terminally fail an
  orphaned `retrying` delivery whose target type no longer supports
  retries, recording a `DeliveryResult` with the reason instead of
  leaving the delivery stuck forever (#82)
- 2026-08-09 Root the delivery engine's worker pool and the retention
  reaper's sweep loop at `context.Background()` rather than the fx
  `OnStart` hook context (#97), which carries fx's 15s start timeout and
  killed both roughly fifteen seconds after boot: the proxy silently
  stopped delivering webhooks entirely, and the reaper never ran a
  single sweep under its default one-hour interval
- 2026-08-09 Archive writer lifecycle (#89): deleting a webhook (or its
  last `database` target) evicts the cached archive writer and closes
  its handle while deliberately leaving `archive-{webhookID}.db` on
  disk, and a new `ArchiveSweeper` prunes idle archives on the existing
  `RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL` without ever creating an archive file
- 2026-08-09 Configuration parsing fails loudly on set-but-unparseable
  environment values: `envInt` removed in favour of `envPositiveInt`
  plus a `PORT` range check, `envBool` now parses with
  `strconv.ParseBool`, and defaults apply only to unset variables (#80)
- 2026-08-07 Automatic event retention cleanup based on
  `retention_days`, deleting expired events, deliveries, and delivery
  results from each per-webhook event database (#63)
- 2026-08-07 Update golangci-lint to v2.12.2 (Docker image digest in
  `Dockerfile`, release-archive sha256 pins in `script/bootstrap`),
  adopt the canonical `.golangci.yml` (v2 `linters.settings` layout so
  `lll`/`funlen`/`cyclop`/`dupl` thresholds actually apply), and fix
  all newly surfaced lint findings
- 2026-07-07 Adopted scripts-to-rule-them-all: `script/` entrypoints,
  Makefile shims, README Entrypoints section
- 2026-03-25 pin golangci-lint Docker image for linting (#55)
- 2026-03-18 CSRF middleware detects TLS per-request, fixing login over
  plain HTTP and behind reverse proxies (#54)
- 2026-03-17 root path redirects based on auth state (#52)
- 2026-03-17 CSRF protection, SSRF prevention for HTTP delivery targets
  with DNS rebinding defense, and per-IP login rate limiting (#42)
- 2026-03-17 Slack target type for incoming webhook notifications (#47)
- 2026-03-17 Dockerfile absolute paths and static linking (#49);
  absolute dev DATA_DIR default and clarified env docs (#46)
- 2026-03-05 security headers middleware, session regeneration on
  login, request body size limits (#41)
- 2026-03-04 tests for delivery, middleware, and session packages
  (#32); removed globals.Buildarch (#31)
- 2026-03-04 1.0 MVP merge: Webhook/Entrypoint/Target rename, core
  delivery engine with bounded worker pool and circuit breaker,
  parallel fan-out, per-webhook event databases, management UI (#16)
- 2026-03-01 repo brought to REPO_POLICIES standards; TODO.md folded
  into README (#6)

# Future Steps

- Manual event redelivery from the web UI — the "Replay" capability the
  README describes as planned. No redelivery code exists anywhere in the
  tree; events are stored in full, which is all it would be built on
- Delivery status and retry management UI
- Per-webhook rate limiting in the receiver handler (per-webhook config
  plus handler enforcement; global limits must not apply to receiver
  endpoints)
- Webhook signature verification for GitHub and Stripe HMAC formats
- API key authentication for programmatic access (APIKey model exists;
  Bearer token middleware does not)
- REST API v1
    - CRUD for webhooks, entrypoints, targets
    - event viewing and filtering endpoints
    - event redelivery endpoint
    - OpenAPI specification
- Analytics dashboard: success rates, response times, volume
- A remember-me option at login
- Password change and reset flow
- Later, nice to have
    - email delivery target type
    - SNS and S3 delivery targets
    - data transformations (e.g. webhook to Slack message formatting)
    - JSONL file delivery with periodic S3 upload
    - webhook event search and filtering
    - multi-user with role-based access control