2026-09-29 12:01:33 +02:00
36 changed files with 1574 additions and 221 deletions
@@ -7,6 +7,13 @@ services, durably stores them, and delivers them to configured targets
 with retry support, logging, and observability. Category: infrastructure
 / web service. License: MIT.
 Each entrypoint is a version 4 UUID served at `/webhook/{uuid}`, and
 that UUID is the entrypoint's only credential. webhooker does not use
 shared secrets, HMAC signatures or token headers on the receiver, and
 will not add them — read
 [The entrypoint URL is the authentication secret](#the-entrypoint-url-is-the-authentication-secret)
 before deploying one.
 ## Getting Started
 ### Prerequisites
@@ -37,9 +44,9 @@ make bootstrap
 # Run all checks (test, lint, format check)
 make check
-# Run in development mode. DATA_DIR defaults to /var/lib/webhooker in
+# Run the server from the clone. DATA_DIR defaults to
-# every environment, so set it (in .env or the shell) to a writable
+# /var/lib/webhooker in every environment, so set it (in .env or the
-# directory when running from a clone.
+# shell) to a writable directory.
 DATA_DIR=./data make dev
 # Build Docker image
@@ -85,7 +92,8 @@ them at once. A variable already present in the real environment wins
 over the file's value for the same name.
 The environment is selected by setting `WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT` to `dev`
-or `prod` (default: `dev`). The setting controls exactly one behavior:
+or `prod` (default: `prod`; `dev` must be set explicitly). The setting
 controls exactly one behavior:
 | Behavior | `dev`                   | `prod`           |
 | -------- | ----------------------- | ---------------- |
@@ -127,7 +135,7 @@ TTY detection, and security headers are always applied.
 | Variable                | Description                         | Default  |
 | ----------------------- | ----------------------------------- | -------- |
-| `WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT` | `dev` or `prod`                     | `dev`    |
+| `WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT` | `dev` or `prod`                     | `prod`   |
 | `PORT`                  | HTTP listen port                    | `8080`   |
 | `BIND_ADDRESS`          | IP address the HTTP listener binds. Loopback by default, so the cleartext listener is not published on every interface. The Docker image ships `0.0.0.0` instead. See [Bind address](#bind-address) | `127.0.0.1` (image: `0.0.0.0`) |
 | `DATA_DIR`              | Directory for all SQLite databases  | `/var/lib/webhooker` |
@@ -149,6 +157,11 @@ private and reserved ranges — RFC 1918, loopback, CGNAT, link-local and
 the rest — are refused, which stops a target from being used to make
 webhooker probe the network it sits in.
 Besides the private and reserved ranges, the default blocklist refuses
 public cloud metadata addresses: currently only `168.63.129.16`, Azure's
 WireServer, which serves an Azure VM its credentials. Because it is a
 public address, listing it in `ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS` reopens it.
 That default is also inconvenient for the thing webhooker is mostly
 for: taking a public webhook and forwarding it to something on your own
 network. A container on the same Docker network, a box on `10.x`, a
@@ -187,15 +200,16 @@ Two things this setting cannot do:
  the list is always an allowlist; an empty list (the default) means
  every private and reserved range stays refused. Note that
  `0.0.0.0/0` gets you most of the way there anyway, per above.
- **It cannot open link-local, or a cloud metadata endpoint that
+- **It cannot open link-local, or a cloud metadata endpoint at a
-  discloses credentials or user data.** An address is on the list below
+  non-public address that discloses credentials or user data.** An
-  when both of these hold: the provider fixes it, so it cannot collide
+  address is on the list below when it is not a public address and both
-  with anything you run; and reaching it hands out credentials, user
+  of these hold: the provider fixes it, so it cannot collide with
-  data or bootstrap material. Those stay blocked no matter what you
+  anything you run; and reaching it hands out credentials, user data or
-  list, including when you list them outright or list a supernet such
+  bootstrap material. Those stay blocked no matter what you list,
-  as `0.0.0.0/0`, `::/0`, `fd00::/8` or `100.64.0.0/10`. Treat this as
+  including when you list them outright or list a supernet such as
-  best effort rather than a guarantee — it is a hand-maintained list
+  `0.0.0.0/0`, `::/0`, `fd00::/8` or `100.64.0.0/10`. Treat this as best
-  and the caveat below the table applies:
+  effort rather than a guarantee — it is a hand-maintained list and the
  caveat below the table applies:
  | Blocked unconditionally | What it is |
  | ----------------------- | ---------- |
@@ -234,7 +248,8 @@ Two things this setting cannot do:
  encodings, which the default blocklist does not match. A publicly
  routable metadata address is not listed here, because nothing on this
  list can be reopened and blocking one that way would leave you no
-  escape hatch at all.
+  escape hatch at all; Azure's `168.63.129.16` is refused by the default
  blocklist instead, as described above.
  This list is not exhaustive of every cloud's metadata address — if
  yours is not here, do not allowlist the block that contains it.
@@ -392,10 +407,9 @@ the bucket is. See [Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting).
 The remedy is to set `TRUSTED_PROXIES` to your reverse proxy's
 address, which restores per-client buckets. webhooker logs a warning
-at startup whenever `TRUSTED_PROXIES` is empty, in every environment —
+at startup whenever `TRUSTED_PROXIES` is empty, in every environment,
-not only when `WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT=prod`, because that variable
+because behind a proxy every client shares one bucket in `dev` and
-defaults to `dev` and an operator who never set it is precisely the
+`prod` alike. The warning is informational when nothing proxies to the
 one at risk. The warning is informational when nothing proxies to the
 process: with no proxy in front, the peer address is the client's own
 and the buckets are already per-client. See
 [Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting) for what each limit shares.
@@ -631,7 +645,6 @@ decision:
 docker run -d \
  -p 127.0.0.1:8080:8080 \
  -v /path/to/data:/var/lib/webhooker \
  -e WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT=prod \
  -e BIND_ADDRESS=0.0.0.0 \
  webhooker:latest
 ```
@@ -724,6 +737,66 @@ listing the directory and learning your webhook UUIDs from the
 `events-{uuid}.db` filenames — not the barrier protecting the
 credentials.
 ### Running under upaas
 [upaas](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/upaas) builds the image from this
 repository's `Dockerfile` and runs it. The app needs:
 - **Network and port:** add no port mapping in upaas. upaas publishes
  every mapped port on all interfaces of the host
  ([upaas issue 113](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/upaas/issues/113)),
  which would put the plain-HTTP admin UI and receiver there. Instead,
  set the app's Docker Network in upaas to your reverse proxy's Docker
  network; the proxy then reaches the app at `upaas-` followed by the
  app name, port `8080`. Leave `PORT` unset: the image's health check
  probes `8080`.
 - **Volume:** one host directory mounted at `/var/lib/webhooker`.
  upaas bind-mounts the host path it is given and does not create it,
  and the container does not start unless UID 1000 owns it (see
  [Running with Docker](#running-with-docker)). Create it before the
  first deploy:
    ```bash
    mkdir -p /path/to/data
    chown 1000:1000 /path/to/data
    chmod 750 /path/to/data
    ```
 - **Environment variables:**
    - `WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT=prod`
    - `TRUSTED_PROXIES`: your reverse proxy's address on that Docker
      network. The `remoteIP` field of the `http request` log line for a
      request that came through the proxy shows it; the health check's
      own lines show `::1`. See [Trusted proxies](#trusted-proxies).
    - Leave `BIND_ADDRESS` and `DATA_DIR` unset: the image sets
      `BIND_ADDRESS` to `0.0.0.0`, and `DATA_DIR` defaults to
      `/var/lib/webhooker`.
    - Everything else is optional; see [Configuration](#configuration).
 - **Health check:** the image's own, which requests
  `/.well-known/healthcheck`. upaas reads the container's health 60
  seconds after a deploy and marks the deploy failed unless it is
  `healthy`.
 - **First run:** the first start prints the `admin` password once, in
  the banner described under [The admin account](#the-admin-account),
  to the container's log. upaas names the container `upaas-` followed
  by the app name, so for an app named `webhooker`:
    ```bash
    docker logs upaas-webhooker
    ```
  If the password is lost, stop the container, set a new password with
  the app's own image and volume, and start it again (see
  [Recovering a lost admin password](#recovering-a-lost-admin-password)):
    ```bash
    docker stop upaas-webhooker
    docker run --rm --volumes-from upaas-webhooker \
        "$(docker inspect -f '{{.Image}}' upaas-webhooker)" \
        /app/webhooker resetpw -generate admin
    docker start upaas-webhooker
    ```
 ## Deployment behind a reverse proxy
 webhooker terminates no TLS of its own. It serves plaintext HTTP and
@@ -745,17 +818,18 @@ reports.
   serves the admin login form and the unauthenticated receiver with
   no TLS at all, and the proxy in front of it changes nothing about
   that.
-2. **Set `WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT=prod`, and make sure the proxy sends
+2. **Make sure the environment is not `dev` (leave
-   `X-Forwarded-Proto`.** These are two requirements, not one. The
+   `WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT` unset or set it to `prod`), and make sure
-   environment setting decides CORS and nothing else: the default
+   the proxy sends `X-Forwarded-Proto`.** These are two requirements,
   not one. The environment setting decides CORS and nothing else:
   `dev` answers every origin with `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`
   (without credentials), which a server-rendered production
-   deployment has no use for. Cookie `Secure` and the strict
+   deployment has no use for, and `prod` — the default — disables it.
-   Origin/Referer mode are **not** tied to it — they are decided per
+   Cookie `Secure` and the strict Origin/Referer mode are **not** tied
-   request from the transport, which behind a proxy means the
+   to it — they are decided per request from the transport, which
-   `X-Forwarded-Proto` header. The block below sets it; without it
+   behind a proxy means the `X-Forwarded-Proto` header. The block below
-   every request is read as plaintext and cookies ship without
+   sets it; without it every request is read as plaintext and cookies
-   `Secure`. See [Configuration](#configuration).
+   ship without `Secure`. See [Configuration](#configuration).
 3. **Set `TRUSTED_PROXIES` to the proxy's address.** Unset, every rate
   limiter keys on the connecting peer, which behind a proxy is the
   proxy on every request: all clients collapse into one global bucket
@@ -847,7 +921,6 @@ sent — `$scheme` above does.
 With that block, webhooker's environment is:
 ```sh
 WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT=prod
 BIND_ADDRESS=127.0.0.1   # the default; stated here to be explicit
 TRUSTED_PROXIES=127.0.0.1
 ```
@@ -902,15 +975,10 @@ scratch file**: it holds committed transactions that are not yet in the
 have no readable schema at all. `-shm` is regenerable, but there is no
 reason to separate the two — copy the directory and you have them.
-A clean shutdown closes `webhooker.db` and every `events-*.db`, which
+A clean shutdown closes every database, which checkpoints and removes
-checkpoints and removes their sidecars; a killed or crashed instance
+its sidecars; a killed or crashed instance leaves them, and they must be
-leaves them, and they must be carried with the `.db`. **Archive
+carried with the `.db`. An archive the service has not opened since a
-databases are different**: their handle is not closed at shutdown, so
+crash keeps that crash's sidecars, even across a later clean stop.
 `archive-*.db-wal` and `-shm` normally survive a clean stop and the
 `-wal` can hold every row the archive has. Measured on a stopped
 instance: `archive-….db` 4096 bytes with no table, its `-wal` 157 KB
 holding all 8 archived events. Copying `DATA_DIR` in full is what makes
 this a non-issue; copying `.db` files out of it by name is not.
 Configuration is **not** in `DATA_DIR` — it comes from the environment
 and from a `.env` file read out of the process working directory. Back
@@ -985,10 +1053,9 @@ The file becomes self-contained again when the handle closes, which
 happens on the next write past the debounce window, when the connection
 pool retires the idle connection (about a minute after the last write),
 or at the idle archive sweep — measured, the same file was a complete
-20 KB `.db` with no sidecars about a minute after its last write.
+20 KB `.db` with no sidecars about a minute after its last write. A
-Shutdown is **not** on that list: the archive handle is not closed when
+clean stop closes it too. So either move `archive-{uuid}.db` together
-the service stops. So either move `archive-{uuid}.db` together with any
+with any `-wal`/`-shm` beside it, or wait until there are none.
 `-wal`/`-shm` beside it, or wait until there are none.
 ### Restore
@@ -1007,12 +1074,10 @@ the service stops. So either move `archive-{uuid}.db` together with any
   They are part of the database, and dropping a `-wal` silently
   discards every transaction it still holds. An `.backup` set will not
   contain any: it writes a single consolidated file per database. A
-   stop-and-copy set has none for `webhooker.db` or the `events-*.db`,
+   stop-and-copy set normally has none, because a clean stop closes
-   because a clean stop closes those and checkpoints their sidecars
+   every database and checkpoints its sidecars away; the exception is an
-   away — but it will normally have them for `archive-*.db`, whose
+   archive not opened since a crash. A copy salvaged from a crashed
-   handle stays open across shutdown, and those carry the archive's
+   instance has them for everything, and needs all of them.
   rows. A copy salvaged from a crashed instance has them for
   everything, and needs all of them.
 4. **Fix ownership.** The container runs as the non-root `webhooker`
   user, UID 1000 / GID 1000. Restored files must be owned by (or
@@ -1149,14 +1214,38 @@ backups at rest and restrict who can read them.
 ## The entrypoint URL is the authentication secret
-The receiver verifies nothing about an inbound request. The UUID in an
+**The entrypoint UUID is the credential, and it is the only one.**
-entrypoint's URL is its credential: anyone who holds that URL can
+webhooker mints a version 4 UUID per entrypoint and serves it at
-submit events to it, and the receiver checks nothing else about the
+`/webhook/{uuid}`. Possession of that URL is the authentication:
-sender. Treat an entrypoint URL the way you would treat an API token.
+anyone who holds it can submit events to the entrypoint, and the
 receiver verifies nothing else about the sender.
-There is no way to rotate the UUID in place. To retire one, delete the
+There is no shared secret, no HMAC signature, no bearer token and no
-entrypoint (or deactivate it, which answers `410`) and create a new
+second factor on the receiver, and none will be added. This was
-one, then point the sender at the new URL.
+considered and rejected; the implementation that existed was removed
 in [PR #279](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/pulls/279), closing
 [issue #67](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/67) and
 [issue #241](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/241). A
 proposal to reintroduce any of them — including as "defence in depth"
 alongside the UUID — is answered by this section. Inbound signature
 headers a sender sends anyway (`X-Hub-Signature` and its
 per-provider equivalents) are stored and forwarded as ordinary
 headers; nothing checks them.
 What that means for an operator:
 - **The URL is a capability, so treat it as a secret.** Keep it out of
  logs, ticket bodies, chat messages and screenshots. Anyone who reads
  it anywhere can post events as that sender.
 - **Rotating means minting a new entrypoint, not changing a key.**
  There is no way to rotate the UUID in place. To retire one, delete
  the entrypoint (or deactivate it, which answers `410`) and create a
  new one, then point the sender at the new URL.
 - **A sender that cannot be given a secret URL is a constraint on that
  integration, not a reason to change this.** If a service only
  supports signed payloads to a well-known URL, raise it as its own
  problem — pick a different integration path, or accept that it
  cannot be used. It is not grounds to reintroduce shared secrets.
 ## Entrypoints
@@ -1166,8 +1255,15 @@ standard: normalized scripts in `script/` are the entrypoints for the
 development workflow. Ten of the Makefile's seventeen targets are thin
 shims that call them; `build`, `run`, `dev`, `deps`, `clean`, `css` and
 `version` are inline commands with no script behind them, though
-`build` and `version` both take their value from `script/version`. We
+`build` and `version` both take their value from `script/version`.
-provide:
+
 `make check` needs the third-party browser assets in `static/`, which
 are not committed, so run `make bootstrap` (or just `make assets`) once
 after cloning. Without them the tests fail with a message naming that
 remedy. `make check` does not fetch them itself because it must not
 change any files in the repo.
 We provide:
 - `script/bootstrap` — install all dependencies (idempotent)
 - `script/setup` — make a fresh clone ready for development
@@ -1476,7 +1572,7 @@ events should be forwarded.
 | `type`           | TargetType | One of: `http`, `slack`, `database`, `log` |
 | `active`         | boolean    | Whether deliveries are enabled (default: true) |
 | `config`         | JSON text  | Type-specific configuration |
-| `max_retries`    | integer    | Maximum retry attempts for `http` and `slack` targets (0 = fire-and-forget, >0 = retries with backoff and a circuit breaker). Ignored by `database` and `log` targets |
+| `max_retries`    | integer    | Total delivery attempts for `http` and `slack` targets, not retries on top of the first: 0 is a single fire-and-forget attempt with no retries and no circuit breaker, and a value of N makes N attempts in all, with exponential backoff and a per-target circuit breaker. Ignored by `database` and `log` targets |
 | `max_queue_size` | integer    | Stored and shown on the target's detail view, but not enforced anywhere yet: nothing in the delivery engine consults it. Queue depth is set by the two fixed 10,000-entry channels |
 **Relations:** Belongs to Webhook. Has many Deliveries.
@@ -1484,12 +1580,12 @@ events should be forwarded.
 **Target types:**
 - **`http`** — Forward the event as an HTTP POST to a configured URL.
-  Behavior depends on `max_retries`: when `max_retries` is 0 (the
+  `max_retries` is the total number of delivery attempts, not retries on
-  default), the target operates in fire-and-forget mode — a single
+  top of the first: when `max_retries` is 0 (the default), the target
-  attempt with no retries and no circuit breaker. When `max_retries` is
+  operates in fire-and-forget mode, a single attempt with no retries and
-  greater than 0, failed deliveries are retried with exponential backoff
+  no circuit breaker; a value of N makes up to N attempts in all,
-  up to `max_retries` attempts, protected by a per-target circuit
+  retrying failed deliveries with exponential backoff and protecting them
-  breaker.
+  with a per-target circuit breaker.
 - **`slack`** — Post the event as a formatted message to a
  Slack-compatible incoming webhook URL (`webhookUrl` in `config`). It
  is built on the same HTTP core as `http` and honours `max_retries`
@@ -1669,6 +1765,28 @@ retries) is individually logged for full observability.
 **Relations:** Belongs to Delivery.
 #### Event-tier indexes
 These indexes on the per-webhook event databases are declared in the model
 tags, so `AutoMigrate` creates them on a fresh and on an existing database:
 | Table              | Columns                     | Serves |
 | ------------------ | --------------------------- | ------ |
 | `deliveries`       | `status`, `deleted_at`      | Startup recovery, the retry and pending sweeps every 60 seconds and the queue-depth sampler every 30 seconds, which select deliveries by status |
 | `deliveries`       | `event_id`, `deleted_at`    | The event log, which loads each event's deliveries, and retention, which selects and deletes the deliveries of expired events |
 | `delivery_results` | `delivery_id`, `deleted_at` | The event log, which loads the attempts of a page's deliveries, and retention, which deletes the attempts of expired events |
 | `events`           | `deleted_at`, `created_at`  | Retention, which selects expired events by age |
 | `events`           | `created_at`                | Retention's delete of the expired events themselves |
 GORM's soft delete adds `deleted_at IS NULL` to these queries; retention's
 deletes leave it out, but their lookups of expired rows keep it. SQLite keeps
 no statistics on these tables, and without them it rates the `deleted_at`
 index, which every live row matches, above an index on a column matched
 against several values or compared with `<`. So every index but the last also
 covers `deleted_at`. It comes second, so that retention's deletes can use the
 index without it, except in `events`, where `created_at` is compared with `<`
 and SQLite narrows by a `<` only on the last column it uses.
 #### Common Fields
 Every entity except `Setting` includes these fields from `BaseModel`.
@@ -1932,7 +2050,7 @@ rescans the database anyway).
 | ----------- | -------- |
 | **Closed**  | Normal operation. Deliveries flow through. Consecutive failures are counted. |
 | **Open**    | Target appears down. Deliveries are skipped and rescheduled for after the cooldown. |
-| **Half-Open** | Cooldown expired. One probe delivery is allowed to test if the target has recovered. |
+| **Half-Open** | Cooldown expired. One probe delivery is allowed to test if the target has recovered. Other deliveries are rescheduled for one whole cooldown later. |
 **Transitions:**
@@ -1970,7 +2088,9 @@ operations), and log targets (stdout) do not use circuit breakers.
 When a circuit is open and a new delivery arrives, the engine marks the
 delivery as `retrying` and schedules a retry timer for after the
 remaining cooldown period. This ensures no deliveries are lost — they're
-just delayed until the target is healthy again.
+just delayed until the target is healthy again. A delivery already in
 `retrying` keeps that status without another database write each time
 the breaker turns it away.
 ### Metrics
@@ -1984,7 +2104,7 @@ arriving and being stored, they are just not getting anywhere.
 | Metric | Type | Meaning |
 | ------ | ---- | ------- |
 | `webhooker_events_received_total` | counter | Events received and durably stored. Compare against the delivery counters on one dashboard |
-| `webhooker_delivery_attempts_total` | counter | Delivery attempts actually dispatched to a target. A delivery an open circuit breaker refused is not one: it is counted as a retry instead |
+| `webhooker_delivery_attempts_total` | counter | Delivery attempts actually dispatched to a target. A delivery a circuit breaker refused is not one: it is counted as a retry instead, but only when the refusal moves it into `retrying` |
 | `webhooker_deliveries_succeeded_total` | counter | Deliveries that reached `delivered` |
 | `webhooker_deliveries_failed_total` | counter | Deliveries that failed terminally and will not be retried |
 | `webhooker_delivery_retries_total` | counter | Deliveries put back into `retrying` |
@@ -2867,6 +2987,10 @@ check, see [The login endpoint](#the-login-endpoint).
 ### Authentication
 - **Webhook receiver:** the entrypoint UUID in the URL, and nothing
  else. No shared secret, no HMAC signature, no token header, and none
  will be added — see
  [The entrypoint URL is the authentication secret](#the-entrypoint-url-is-the-authentication-secret).
 - **Web UI:** Cookie-based sessions using gorilla/sessions with
  encrypted cookies. Sessions are configured with HttpOnly, SameSite
  Lax, and Secure whenever the request is on TLS — the flag follows the
@@ -2906,7 +3030,8 @@ check, see [The login endpoint](#the-login-endpoint).
  mode
 - **The entrypoint URL is the receiver's only credential.** Nothing
  about an inbound request is verified; possession of the UUID
-  authorises submission (see
+  authorises submission, and no shared secret or signature check will
  be added alongside it (see
  [The entrypoint URL is the authentication secret](#the-entrypoint-url-is-the-authentication-secret))
 - **SSRF prevention** for HTTP delivery targets: private/reserved IP
  ranges (RFC 1918, loopback, link-local, cloud metadata) are blocked
@@ -2962,7 +3087,8 @@ each hook. The order, read off the fx stop-hook log:
 3. `server` — the HTTP drain, bounded separately by
   `server.ShutdownTimeout` (**3 seconds**), then a Sentry flush if
   `SENTRY_DSN` is set
-4. `delivery.Engine`
+4. `delivery.Engine` — waits for its workers, then closes the archive
   databases
 5. `healthcheck`
 6. `WebhookDBManager`
 7. the database close
@@ -192,9 +192,10 @@ type Config struct {
 	// alwaysBlockedNetworks stays blocked no matter what is listed
 	// here. That set is link-local plus the cloud metadata
 	// endpoints outside it that disclose credentials or user data
-	// at a provider-fixed address; it is not exhaustive of every
+	// at a provider-fixed, non-public address; it is not
-	// cloud's metadata address. See alwaysBlockedNetworks for the
+	// exhaustive of every cloud's metadata address. See
-	// authoritative list and the criterion it is built from.
+	// alwaysBlockedNetworks for the authoritative list and the
 	// criterion it is built from.
 	AllowedEgressCIDRs []netip.Prefix
 	params *ConfigParams
@@ -585,12 +586,14 @@ func resolveMetricsAuth() (string, string, error) {
 	)
 }
-// resolveEnvironment reads WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT, defaulting to
+// resolveEnvironment reads WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT, defaulting to prod
-// dev, and rejects unrecognised values.
+// when it is unset so a deployment that forgets the variable is not
 // silently permissive; dev must be set explicitly. It rejects
 // unrecognised values.
 func resolveEnvironment() (string, error) {
 	environment := os.Getenv("WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT")
 	if environment == "" {
-		environment = EnvironmentDev
+		environment = EnvironmentProd
 	}
 	if environment != EnvironmentDev &&
@@ -744,12 +747,14 @@ func (c *Config) warnEgressAllowlist(log *slog.Logger) {
 	log.Warn(
 		"ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS lets delivery targets reach these "+
-			"otherwise-blocked private/reserved networks. Anyone "+
+			"otherwise-blocked networks. Anyone who can create a "+
-			"who can create a delivery target can now make this "+
+			"delivery target can now make this process issue "+
-			"process issue requests into them, and read back the "+
+			"requests into them, and read back the response. Only "+
-			"response. Link-local and the known cloud instance "+
+			"the addresses the README lists as blocked "+
-			"metadata endpoints outside it stay blocked "+
+			"unconditionally stay blocked regardless of what is "+
-			"regardless of what is listed here.",
+			"listed here; a public cloud metadata address such as "+
 			"168.63.129.16 is reachable once it, or a block "+
 			"covering it, is listed.",
 		"allowedEgressCIDRs",
 		strings.Join(PrefixStrings(c.AllowedEgressCIDRs), ","),
 	)
@@ -772,10 +777,8 @@ func (c *Config) warnEgressAllowlist(log *slog.Logger) {
 // everyone else's wrong passwords, and the receiver's limits become
 // service-wide ceilings.
 //
-// The warning is deliberately not gated on WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT. That
+// The warning is deliberately not gated on WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT:
-// variable defaults to dev, so gating on it would silence the warning
+// behind a proxy every client shares one bucket in dev and prod alike.
 // for exactly the operator who forgot to configure the deployment —
 // the case it exists to catch.
 //
 // The default of trusting nobody is deliberate — trusting forwarded
 // headers from arbitrary peers lets any client choose its own bucket —
@@ -44,9 +44,9 @@ func TestEnvironmentConfig(t *testing.T) {
 		isProd      bool
 	}{
 		{
-			name:   "default is dev",
+			name:   "default is prod",
-			isDev:  true,
+			isDev:  false,
-			isProd: false,
+			isProd: true,
 		},
 		{
 			name:     "explicit dev",
@@ -834,12 +834,13 @@ func TestEgressAllowlistWarning(t *testing.T) {
 			// to be able to read back which networks are open.
 			assert.Contains(t, logged, "10.0.0.0/8")
 			assert.Contains(t, logged, "127.0.0.0/8")
-			// What stays shut. Asserted on the clause naming the
+			// What stays shut is the whole unconditional set, not
-			// wider set rather than on "Link-local" alone, so the
+			// link-local alone; a public metadata address is not in
-			// string cannot narrow back to link-local only while
+			// it, so a listed block covering it opens it.
-			// the always-blocked set covers ULA, CGNAT and two
+			assert.Contains(t, logged, "blocked unconditionally")
-			// public metadata addresses as well.
+			assert.Contains(t, logged, "168.63.129.16 is reachable")
-			assert.Contains(t, logged, "metadata endpoints outside it")
+			// The listed blocks need not be private or reserved.
 			assert.NotContains(t, logged, "private/reserved")
 		})
 	}
 }
@@ -848,10 +849,9 @@ func TestEgressAllowlistWarning(t *testing.T) {
 // tells an operator a deployment behind a reverse proxy shares one
 // rate-limit bucket between every client, which turns the receiver
 // limits into service-wide ceilings and collapses login failure
-// counting. It must fire whenever TRUSTED_PROXIES is empty,
+// counting. It must fire whenever TRUSTED_PROXIES is empty, in any
-// in any environment: WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT defaults to dev, so gating
+// environment, because behind a proxy every client shares one bucket
-// on it would silence the warning for exactly the operator who never
+// in dev and prod alike. It stays quiet once proxies are named.
 // configured the deployment. It stays quiet once proxies are named.
 func TestSharedRateLimitBucketWarning(t *testing.T) {
 	tests := []struct {
 		name           string
@@ -871,10 +871,6 @@ func TestSharedRateLimitBucketWarning(t *testing.T) {
 			expectWarning:  false,
 		},
 		{
 			// The default environment. An internet-exposed
 			// deployment whose operator never set
 			// WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT lands here and has exactly
 			// the exposure the warning announces.
 			name:          "dev without trusted proxies warns",
 			environment:   config.EnvironmentDev,
 			expectWarning: true,
@@ -17,12 +17,12 @@ import (
 	"gorm.io/gorm"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/banner"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/datadir"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/gormlog"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
 )
 const (
 	dataDirPerm       = 0750
 	randomPasswordLen = 16
 	sessionKeyLen     = 32
 )
@@ -185,7 +185,9 @@ func (d *Database) connect() error {
 // caller's decision.
 func (d *Database) connectTo(dataDir string) error {
 	// Ensure the data directory exists before opening the database.
-	err := os.MkdirAll(dataDir, dataDirPerm)
+	// datadir.DirPerm is the single source of the directory mode; this
 	// package creates the directory too, since either may run first.
 	err := os.MkdirAll(dataDir, datadir.DirPerm)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf(
 			"creating data directory %s: %w",
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
 package database_test
 import (
 	"context"
 	"fmt"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 	"github.com/google/uuid"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
 	"gorm.io/gorm"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
 )
 // TestWebhookDBManager_OpenAddsEventTierIndexes verifies that opening a
 // per-webhook database that predates these indexes creates them. It
 // stands in for an older database file by dropping the indexes
 // AutoMigrate just created, then reopening the same file.
 func TestWebhookDBManager_OpenAddsEventTierIndexes(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	indexes := []struct {
 		model any
 		name  string
 	}{
 		{&database.Delivery{}, "idx_deliveries_status"},
 		{&database.Delivery{}, "idx_deliveries_event_id"},
 		{&database.DeliveryResult{}, "idx_delivery_results_delivery_id"},
 		{&database.Event{}, "idx_events_deleted_at_created_at"},
 		{&database.Event{}, "idx_events_created_at"},
 	}
 	mgr, lc := setupTestWebhookDBManager(t)
 	ctx := context.Background()
 	require.NoError(t, lc.Start(ctx))
 	defer func() { require.NoError(t, lc.Stop(ctx)) }()
 	webhookID := uuid.New().String()
 	db, err := mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	// A fresh database has them.
 	for _, ix := range indexes {
 		require.True(t, db.Migrator().HasIndex(ix.model, ix.name))
 	}
 	// Stand in for a database file created before the indexes existed.
 	for _, ix := range indexes {
 		require.NoError(t, db.Migrator().DropIndex(ix.model, ix.name))
 		require.False(t, db.Migrator().HasIndex(ix.model, ix.name))
 	}
 	// Drop the cached connection so the next open reopens the file and
 	// runs AutoMigrate against it, as a restart would.
 	require.NoError(t, mgr.CloseAll())
 	db, err = mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	for _, ix := range indexes {
 		assert.True(t, db.Migrator().HasIndex(ix.model, ix.name),
 			"opening the existing database should create %s", ix.name)
 	}
 }
 // TestEventTierQueriesUseTheirIndexes verifies that the statements the
 // indexes are for use them. GORM builds each statement in a dry run as
 // the code named above it does, soft-delete condition included, and
 // SQLite, which keeps no statistics on these tables, must plan to seek
 // on each index listed by the columns in parentheses.
 func TestEventTierQueriesUseTheirIndexes(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	mgr, lc := setupTestWebhookDBManager(t)
 	ctx := context.Background()
 	require.NoError(t, lc.Start(ctx))
 	defer func() { require.NoError(t, lc.Stop(ctx)) }()
 	db, err := mgr.GetDB(uuid.New().String())
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	dry := db.Session(&gorm.Session{DryRun: true})
 	ids := []string{
 		uuid.New().String(), uuid.New().String(), uuid.New().String(),
 	}
 	cutoff := time.Now()
 	var (
 		deliveries []database.Delivery
 		results    []database.DeliveryResult
 		depths     []struct{ Depth int }
 	)
 	byStatus := "idx_deliveries_status (status=? AND deleted_at=?)"
 	byEvent := "idx_deliveries_event_id (event_id=? AND deleted_at=?)"
 	byAge := "idx_events_deleted_at_created_at (deleted_at=? AND created_at<?)"
 	// The delivery engine: recovery and the retry sweep, the sweep for
 	// stranded pending deliveries, and the queue depth count.
 	assertPlanUses(t, db, dry.Where(
 		"status = ?", database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
 	).Find(&deliveries), byStatus)
 	assertPlanUses(t, db, dry.Where(
 		"status = ? AND updated_at < ?",
 		database.DeliveryStatusPending, cutoff,
 	).Limit(500).Find(&deliveries), byStatus)
 	assertPlanUses(t, db, dry.Model(&database.Delivery{}).
 		Select("target_id", "status", "count(*) as depth").
 		Where("status IN ?", []database.DeliveryStatus{
 			database.DeliveryStatusPending,
 			database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
 		}).Group("target_id, status").Find(&depths), byStatus)
 	// The event log: each event's deliveries, then their attempts
 	// (loadEventsWithDeliveries, loadDeliveryResults).
 	assertPlanUses(t, db, dry.Where("event_id = ?", ids[0]).
 		Find(&deliveries), byEvent)
 	assertPlanUses(t, db, dry.Where("delivery_id IN ?", ids).
 		Order("attempt_num ASC").Find(&results),
 		"idx_delivery_results_delivery_id (delivery_id=? AND deleted_at=?)")
 	// Retention's three deletes (reapExpired), whose subqueries are built
 	// afresh for each statement as it builds them.
 	expiredEventIDs := func() *gorm.DB {
 		return dry.Model(&database.Event{}).Select("id").
 			Where("created_at < ?", cutoff)
 	}
 	assertPlanUses(t, db, dry.Unscoped().Where(
 		"delivery_id IN (?)", dry.Model(&database.Delivery{}).
 			Select("id").Where("event_id IN (?)", expiredEventIDs()),
 	).Delete(&database.DeliveryResult{}),
 		"idx_delivery_results_delivery_id (delivery_id=?)", byEvent, byAge)
 	assertPlanUses(t, db, dry.Unscoped().Where(
 		"event_id IN (?)", expiredEventIDs(),
 	).Delete(&database.Delivery{}),
 		"idx_deliveries_event_id (event_id=?)", byAge)
 	assertPlanUses(t, db, dry.Unscoped().Where(
 		"created_at < ?", cutoff,
 	).Delete(&database.Event{}), "idx_events_created_at (created_at<?)")
 }
 // assertPlanUses asserts that SQLite's plan for a statement GORM built
 // in a dry run, run with the same SQL and arguments GORM would send,
 // names each of the given indexes.
 func assertPlanUses(
 	t *testing.T, db, built *gorm.DB, indexes ...string,
 ) {
 	t.Helper()
 	var plan []struct{ Detail string }
 	require.NoError(t, db.Raw(
 		"EXPLAIN QUERY PLAN "+built.Statement.SQL.String(),
 		built.Statement.Vars...,
 	).Scan(&plan).Error)
 	for _, index := range indexes {
 		assert.Contains(t, fmt.Sprint(plan), index,
 			built.Statement.SQL.String())
 	}
 }
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
 package database
 import "gorm.io/gorm"
 // DeliveryStatus represents the status of a delivery
 type DeliveryStatus string
@@ -29,12 +31,19 @@ func (s DeliveryStatus) Terminal() bool {
 }
 // Delivery represents a delivery attempt for an event to a target
 //
 //nolint:lll // a struct tag cannot wrap
 type Delivery struct {
 	BaseModel
-	EventID  string         `gorm:"type:uuid;not null"         json:"eventId"`
+	EventID  string         `gorm:"type:uuid;not null;index:idx_deliveries_event_id,priority:1"       json:"eventId"`
 	TargetID string         `gorm:"type:uuid;not null"                                                json:"targetId"`
-	Status   DeliveryStatus `gorm:"not null;default:'pending'" json:"status"`
+	Status   DeliveryStatus `gorm:"not null;default:'pending';index:idx_deliveries_status,priority:1" json:"status"`
 	// DeletedAt repeats the BaseModel field only to be the second column
 	// of the event_id and status indexes, for the reason DeliveryResult
 	// gives.
 	DeletedAt gorm.DeletedAt `gorm:"index:idx_deliveries_event_id,priority:2;index:idx_deliveries_status,priority:2" json:"deletedAt,omitzero"`
 	// Relations
 	Event           Event            `json:"event,omitzero"`
@@ -1,10 +1,21 @@
 package database
 import "gorm.io/gorm"
 // DeliveryResult represents the result of a delivery attempt
 //
 //nolint:lll // a struct tag cannot wrap
 type DeliveryResult struct {
 	BaseModel
-	DeliveryID   string `gorm:"type:uuid;not null"   json:"deliveryId"`
+	// DeliveryID and DeletedAt make up one index, in that order.
 	// DeletedAt repeats the BaseModel field only to join it: GORM adds
 	// "deleted_at IS NULL" to almost every query, and where a column is
 	// matched against several values SQLite otherwise reads through the
 	// deleted_at index, which every live row matches.
 	DeliveryID string         `gorm:"type:uuid;not null;index:idx_delivery_results_delivery_id,priority:1" json:"deliveryId"`
 	DeletedAt  gorm.DeletedAt `gorm:"index:idx_delivery_results_delivery_id,priority:2"                    json:"deletedAt,omitzero"`
 	AttemptNum   int    `gorm:"not null"             json:"attemptNum"`
 	Success      bool   `json:"success"`
 	StatusCode   int    `json:"statusCode,omitempty"`
@@ -1,9 +1,27 @@
 package database
 import (
 	"time"
 	"gorm.io/gorm"
 )
 // Event represents a captured webhook event
 //
 //nolint:lll // a struct tag cannot wrap
 type Event struct {
 	BaseModel
 	// CreatedAt and DeletedAt repeat the BaseModel fields only to index
 	// them for retention, which finds events by age. Its lookups carry
 	// GORM's "deleted_at IS NULL" (see DeliveryResult) and compare
 	// created_at with <, so their index has deleted_at first: SQLite
 	// narrows by a < only on the last column it uses. Its final delete
 	// has no deleted_at condition and uses the index on created_at
 	// alone. The other tables keep the unindexed BaseModel created_at.
 	CreatedAt time.Time      `gorm:"index;index:idx_events_deleted_at_created_at,priority:2" json:"createdAt"`
 	DeletedAt gorm.DeletedAt `gorm:"index:idx_events_deleted_at_created_at,priority:1"       json:"deletedAt,omitzero"`
 	WebhookID    string `gorm:"type:uuid;not null" json:"webhookId"`
 	EntrypointID string `gorm:"type:uuid;not null" json:"entrypointId"`
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import (
 	"gorm.io/driver/sqlite"
 	"gorm.io/gorm"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/datadir"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/gormlog"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
 )
@@ -40,6 +41,11 @@ type WebhookDBManager struct {
 	dataDir string
 	dbs     sync.Map // map[webhookID]*gorm.DB
 	log     *slog.Logger
 	// mu is held while a database is opened, deleted, or closed, so
 	// each file has at most one open handle. Reading an already cached
 	// handle does not take it.
 	mu sync.Mutex
 }
 // NewWebhookDBManager creates a new WebhookDBManager and
@@ -53,8 +59,9 @@ func NewWebhookDBManager(
 		log:     params.Logger.Get(),
 	}
-	// Create data directory if it doesn't exist
+	// Create data directory if it doesn't exist. datadir.DirPerm is the
-	err := os.MkdirAll(m.dataDir, dataDirPerm)
+	// single source of the directory mode; either package may run first.
 	err := os.MkdirAll(m.dataDir, datadir.DirPerm)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf(
 			"creating data directory %s: %w",
@@ -84,35 +91,34 @@ func (m *WebhookDBManager) GetDB(
 ) (*gorm.DB, error) {
 	// Fast path: already open
 	if val, ok := m.dbs.Load(webhookID); ok {
-		cachedDB, castOK := val.(*gorm.DB)
+		return asGormDB(val, webhookID)
 		if !castOK {
 			return nil, fmt.Errorf(
 				"%w for webhook %s",
 				errInvalidCachedDBType,
 				webhookID,
 			)
 	}
-		return cachedDB, nil
+	// Slow path: open the database under the lock, looking in the
 	// cache again first. A caller that raced another one here then
 	// waits for its handle instead of opening a second one.
 	m.mu.Lock()
 	defer m.mu.Unlock()
 	if val, ok := m.dbs.Load(webhookID); ok {
 		return asGormDB(val, webhookID)
 	}
 	// Slow path: open/create the database
 	db, err := m.openDB(webhookID)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
-	// Store it; if another goroutine beat us, close ours
+	m.dbs.Store(webhookID, db)
-	actual, loaded := m.dbs.LoadOrStore(webhookID, db)
+
-	if loaded {
+	return db, nil
 		// Another goroutine created it first; close our duplicate
 		sqlDB, closeErr := db.DB()
 		if closeErr == nil {
 			_ = sqlDB.Close()
 }
-		existingDB, castOK := actual.(*gorm.DB)
+// asGormDB returns a value read from the cache as the database
-		if !castOK {
+// handle it is.
 func asGormDB(val any, webhookID string) (*gorm.DB, error) {
 	db, ok := val.(*gorm.DB)
 	if !ok {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf(
 			"%w for webhook %s",
 			errInvalidCachedDBType,
@@ -120,9 +126,6 @@ func (m *WebhookDBManager) GetDB(
 		)
 	}
 		return existingDB, nil
 	}
 	return db, nil
 }
@@ -151,6 +154,11 @@ func (m *WebhookDBManager) DBExists(
 func (m *WebhookDBManager) DeleteDB(
 	webhookID string,
 ) error {
 	// Held until the files are gone, so GetDB cannot open the file
 	// again between the close and the removal.
 	m.mu.Lock()
 	defer m.mu.Unlock()
 	// Close and remove from cache
 	if val, ok := m.dbs.LoadAndDelete(webhookID); ok {
 		if gormDB, castOK := val.(*gorm.DB); castOK {
@@ -184,6 +192,11 @@ func (m *WebhookDBManager) DeleteDB(
 // CloseAll closes all open per-webhook database connections.
 // Called during application shutdown.
 func (m *WebhookDBManager) CloseAll() error {
 	// An open already under way finishes and is cached first, so it
 	// is closed here rather than cached after this loop has passed.
 	m.mu.Lock()
 	defer m.mu.Unlock()
 	var lastErr error
 	m.dbs.Range(func(key, value any) bool {
@@ -1,10 +1,14 @@
 package database_test
 import (
 	"bytes"
 	"context"
 	"log/slog"
 	"net/http"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
 	"testing"
 	"github.com/google/uuid"
@@ -104,6 +108,54 @@ func TestWebhookDBManager_CreateAndGetDB(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.Equal(t, `{"test": true}`, readEvent.Body)
 }
 // Many callers ask for one webhook's database at the same moment,
 // before it is cached. Only one of them may open the file; the others
 // must wait for its handle. openDB logs one "opened per-webhook
 // database" line per open, and those lines are what is counted.
 func TestWebhookDBManager_ConcurrentFirstTouchOpensOnce(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	var logs bytes.Buffer
 	mgr := database.NewTestWebhookDBManagerWithLogger(
 		t.TempDir(),
 		slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(&logs, nil)),
 	)
 	t.Cleanup(func() { assert.NoError(t, mgr.CloseAll()) })
 	webhookID := uuid.New().String()
 	const callers = 16
 	start := make(chan struct{})
 	handles := make([]*gorm.DB, callers)
 	errs := make([]error, callers)
 	var wg sync.WaitGroup
 	for i := range callers {
 		wg.Go(func() {
 			<-start
 			handles[i], errs[i] = mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
 		})
 	}
 	close(start)
 	wg.Wait()
 	for i := range callers {
 		require.NoError(t, errs[i])
 		assert.Same(t, handles[0], handles[i])
 	}
 	assert.Equal(
 		t, 1,
 		strings.Count(logs.String(), "opened per-webhook database"),
 	)
 }
 func TestWebhookDBManager_DeleteDB(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
@@ -29,9 +29,11 @@ import (
 // process that was killed with SIGKILL blocks nothing.
 const LockFileName = "webhooker.lock"
-// dirPerm is the mode Acquire creates DATA_DIR with. It matches what
+// DirPerm is the mode DATA_DIR is created with. It is the single
-// internal/database uses, since whichever runs first creates it.
+// source of that mode: internal/database consumes it rather than
-const dirPerm = 0o750
+// keeping its own copy, so the two packages that both create the
 // directory cannot drift into disagreeing about its permissions.
 const DirPerm = 0o750
 // ErrLocked reports that another live process holds the data
 // directory. Callers that need to know whether a deployment is running
@@ -64,7 +66,7 @@ func Acquire(dir string) (*Lock, error) {
 		return nil, ErrNoDir
 	}
-	err := os.MkdirAll(dir, dirPerm)
+	err := os.MkdirAll(dir, DirPerm)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf(
 			"creating data directory %s: %w", dir, err,
@@ -76,12 +76,20 @@ func (cb *CircuitBreaker) Allow() bool {
 	}
 }
-// CooldownRemaining returns how much time is left before
+// CooldownRemaining returns how long a delivery that Allow refused
-// an open circuit transitions to half-open.
+// should wait before it is tried again. Closed, it returns zero.
 // Open, it returns what is left of the cooldown, or zero once that
 // has passed. Half-open, it returns the whole cooldown: the one
 // probe delivery is still in flight, and if it fails the circuit
 // reopens for that long.
 func (cb *CircuitBreaker) CooldownRemaining() time.Duration {
 	cb.mu.Lock()
 	defer cb.mu.Unlock()
 	if cb.state == CircuitHalfOpen {
 		return cb.cooldown
 	}
 	if cb.state != CircuitOpen {
 		return 0
 	}
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ func TestCircuitBreaker_CooldownRemaining_ClosedReturnsZero(
 	)
 }
-func TestCircuitBreaker_CooldownRemaining_HalfOpenReturnsZero(
+func TestCircuitBreaker_CooldownRemaining_HalfOpenReturnsCooldown(
 	t *testing.T,
 ) {
 	t.Parallel()
@@ -282,9 +282,11 @@ func TestCircuitBreaker_CooldownRemaining_HalfOpenReturnsZero(
 	require.True(t, cb.Allow())
-	assert.Equal(t, time.Duration(0),
+	// The cooldown newShortCooldownCB gives the breaker.
 	assert.Equal(t, 50*time.Millisecond,
 		cb.CooldownRemaining(),
-		"half-open circuit should have zero cooldown remaining",
+		"a delivery refused while half-open should wait "+
 			"a whole cooldown",
 	)
 }
@@ -362,6 +362,15 @@ func (e *Engine) start() {
 // stop cancels the worker pool's context and waits for the pool
 // to drain, bounded by the stop hook's context: a wedged worker
 // must not hang the process past fx's stop timeout.
 //
 // Once the pool has drained it closes the archive writers, so a
 // clean stop leaves no archive -wal behind. Nothing else holds a
 // writer for long by then: the archive sweeper stops before the
 // engine, and deleting a webhook only closes one. If the pool did
 // not drain in time, the writers are left open, as a kill would
 // leave them. Closing them would wait for any write in progress,
 // and a worker still running would then open new writers that
 // nothing closes, so it gains nothing over a kill.
 func (e *Engine) stop(ctx context.Context) error {
 	e.log.Info("delivery engine stopping")
@@ -376,6 +385,8 @@ func (e *Engine) stop(ctx context.Context) error {
 		return err
 	}
 	e.dbTarget.evictAll()
 	e.log.Info("delivery engine stopped")
 	return nil
@@ -438,6 +449,31 @@ func (e *Engine) processNewTask(
 		return
 	}
 	// Restart recovery can send and release this delivery before the
 	// receiver's Notify queues it. Ownership cannot refuse a delivery
 	// nobody holds, so the row decides whether it still needs sending.
 	row, err := e.loadDelivery(webhookDB, task.DeliveryID)
 	if err != nil {
 		e.log.Error(
 			"failed to load delivery",
 			"delivery_id", task.DeliveryID,
 			"error", err,
 		)
 		return
 	}
 	if row.Status != database.DeliveryStatusPending {
 		e.log.Info(
 			"delivery already handled, not sent again",
 			"delivery_id", task.DeliveryID,
 			"event_id", task.EventID,
 			"status", row.Status,
 		)
 		return
 	}
 	event := buildEventFromTask(task)
 	event, err = e.hydrateEvent(
@@ -482,7 +518,7 @@ func (e *Engine) processRetryTask(
 		return
 	}
-	d, err := e.loadRetryDelivery(
+	d, err := e.loadDelivery(
 		webhookDB, task.DeliveryID,
 	)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -703,9 +739,7 @@ func (e *Engine) recoverSingleRetry(
 		// webhook on one bad read would be a far larger fault than
 		// the strand it is meant to clear.
 		if errors.Is(err, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound) {
-			e.failMissingTargetRetry(
+			e.failMissingTarget(webhookDB, webhookID, d)
 				webhookDB, webhookID, d,
 			)
 			return
 		}
@@ -1108,9 +1142,7 @@ func (e *Engine) sweepSingleRetry(
 		// Deleted is terminal, unreadable is not; see
 		// recoverSingleRetry.
 		if errors.Is(err, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound) {
-			e.failMissingTargetRetry(
+			e.failMissingTarget(webhookDB, webhookID, d)
 				webhookDB, webhookID, d,
 			)
 			return
 		}
@@ -1224,19 +1256,19 @@ func (e *Engine) failUnretryableRetry(
 	e.failDelivery(webhookDB, d, target.Type, reason)
 }
-// failMissingTargetRetry terminally fails an orphaned retrying
+// failMissingTarget terminally fails a recovered delivery, pending or
-// delivery whose target row is gone. Both restart recovery and the
+// retrying, whose target row is gone. Restart recovery and the periodic
-// periodic sweep call it, so the transition exists once.
+// sweep call it for both statuses, so the transition exists once.
 //
-// Until it existed both paths logged the failed lookup and returned,
+// Until it existed those paths logged the failed lookup and moved on,
-// which left the delivery retrying for the life of the database and
+// which left the delivery where it was for the life of the database and
 // the sweep repeating the same error every minute forever. Failing it
 // with a recorded reason is the treatment the other orphaned-retry
 // cases already get, so all of them read alike in the event log.
 //
 // Logged at warn rather than error: a deleted target is an operator
 // action, not a system fault.
-func (e *Engine) failMissingTargetRetry(
+func (e *Engine) failMissingTarget(
 	webhookDB *gorm.DB,
 	webhookID string,
 	d *database.Delivery,
@@ -1249,13 +1281,37 @@ func (e *Engine) failMissingTargetRetry(
 	defer e.inflight.release(d.ID)
 	// The batch was read before ownership was taken, and a worker may
 	// have settled the delivery and let it go in between. Only a row
 	// still in the status the batch read is failed.
 	row, err := e.loadDelivery(webhookDB, d.ID)
 	if err != nil {
 		e.log.Error(
 			"failed to load delivery",
 			"delivery_id", d.ID,
 			"error", err,
 		)
 		return
 	}
 	if row.Status != d.Status {
 		e.log.Debug(
 			"delivery already handled, not failed",
 			"delivery_id", d.ID,
 			"status", row.Status,
 		)
 		return
 	}
 	targetType, reason := e.missingTargetReason(d.TargetID)
 	e.log.Warn(
-		"failing orphaned retrying delivery: "+
+		"failing recovered delivery: its target no longer exists",
 			"its target no longer exists",
 		"webhook_id", webhookID,
 		"delivery_id", d.ID,
 		"status", d.Status,
 		"target_id", d.TargetID,
 		"target_type", targetType,
 	)
@@ -1289,15 +1345,14 @@ func (e *Engine) missingTargetReason(
 	if err != nil {
 		return "", fmt.Sprintf(
 			"target %s no longer exists; the delivery "+
-				"cannot be retried and has been failed "+
+				"has been failed terminally",
 				"terminally",
 			targetID,
 		)
 	}
 	return target.Type, fmt.Sprintf(
 		"target %q (type %s) was deleted; the delivery "+
-			"cannot be retried and has been failed terminally",
+			"has been failed terminally",
 		target.Name, target.Type,
 	)
 }
@@ -1643,7 +1698,7 @@ func (e *Engine) hydrateEvent(
 	return event, nil
 }
-func (e *Engine) loadRetryDelivery(
+func (e *Engine) loadDelivery(
 	webhookDB *gorm.DB, deliveryID string,
 ) (*database.Delivery, error) {
 	var d database.Delivery
@@ -1996,14 +2051,31 @@ func (e *Engine) sendRecoveredDeliveries(
 		target, ok := targetMap[deliveries[i].TargetID]
 		if !ok {
 			// A missing entry does not mean the target is gone: the
 			// map is also empty when its query failed. Only a lookup
 			// that finds no row ends the delivery; any other error
 			// leaves it pending for the next sweep. See
 			// recoverSingleRetry.
 			var err error
 			target, err = e.loadTarget(deliveries[i].TargetID)
 			if errors.Is(err, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound) {
 				e.failMissingTarget(webhookDB, webhookID, &deliveries[i])
 				continue
 			}
 			if err != nil {
 				e.log.Error(
-				"target not found for delivery",
+					"failed to load target for recovered delivery",
 					"delivery_id", deliveries[i].ID,
 					"target_id", deliveries[i].TargetID,
 					"error", err,
 				)
 				continue
 			}
 		}
 		if !e.takeForRedispatch(
 			webhookDB, deliveries[i].ID,
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ package delivery_test
 import (
 	"context"
 	"fmt"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
@@ -269,3 +271,88 @@ func TestEngine_StopHookHonoursStopTimeout(t *testing.T) {
 	requireStopHookExpires(t, lc.hooks[0], "delivery engine")
 }
 // deliverToArchive runs one delivery to a database target through
 // the running engine and returns the webhook's archive file path.
 // The archive writer holds the file open afterwards.
 func deliverToArchive(t *testing.T, s iSetup) string {
 	t.Helper()
 	deliveryID, task := seedLogTask(t, s)
 	task.TargetType = database.TargetTypeDatabase
 	s.Engine.Notify([]delivery.Task{task})
 	iWaitForDelivered(t, s.WebhookDB, deliveryID)
 	return filepath.Join(
 		filepath.Dir(s.DBMgr.DBPath(s.WebhookID)),
 		fmt.Sprintf("archive-%s.db", s.WebhookID),
 	)
 }
 // TestEngine_StopHookClosesArchives is the regression test for an
 // archive split across two files by a clean stop. The engine never
 // closed its archive writers, so after a stop the archived rows
 // could sit in archive-{id}.db-wal while archive-{id}.db held no
 // table at all, and copying the .db on its own gave an empty
 // database.
 func TestEngine_StopHookClosesArchives(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s := newISetup(t)
 	lc := startEngineViaHook(t, s.Engine)
 	path := deliverToArchive(t, s)
 	require.FileExists(
 		t, path+"-wal",
 		"an open archive should have a -wal for the stop to remove",
 	)
 	require.NoError(t, lc.hooks[0].OnStop(context.Background()))
 	wals, err := filepath.Glob(
 		filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(path), "archive-*.db-wal"),
 	)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	require.Empty(
 		t, wals, "a clean stop must leave no archive -wal behind",
 	)
 	// With no -wal beside it, the row can only be in the .db.
 	count, err := countArchivedRows(path)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	require.Equal(t, int64(1), count)
 }
 // TestEngine_StopHookTimeoutLeavesArchivesOpen covers a stop whose
 // budget runs out while a worker is still running. The archive
 // writers are left open, as a kill would leave them: closing them
 // would wait for any write in progress, and that worker would then
 // open new writers that nothing closes.
 func TestEngine_StopHookTimeoutLeavesArchivesOpen(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s := newISetup(t)
 	lc := startEngineViaHook(t, s.Engine)
 	deliverToArchive(t, s)
 	release := make(chan struct{})
 	t.Cleanup(func() {
 		close(release)
 		s.Engine.EvictWebhook(s.WebhookID)
 	})
 	s.Engine.ExportWedgeWorker(release)
 	requireStopHookExpires(t, lc.hooks[0], "delivery engine")
 	require.True(
 		t, s.Engine.ExportArchiveHandleOpen(s.WebhookID),
 		"a stop that timed out must not close archive writers",
 	)
 }
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ import (
 	"time"
 	"github.com/google/uuid"
 	"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
 	"gorm.io/driver/sqlite"
@@ -24,6 +25,7 @@ import (
 	_ "modernc.org/sqlite"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/metrics"
 )
 // testContentType is the event content type used in tests.
@@ -894,6 +896,100 @@ func TestDeliverHTTP_CircuitBreakerBlocks(t *testing.T) {
 	)
 }
 // recordingScheduler keeps the delay of every retry it is asked to
 // schedule, and schedules nothing.
 type recordingScheduler struct {
 	delays []time.Duration
 }
 func (s *recordingScheduler) ScheduleRetry(
 	_ delivery.Task, delay time.Duration,
 ) {
 	s.delays = append(s.delays, delay)
 }
 // TestDeliverHTTP_HalfOpenBreakerDelaysQueuedTasks proves that while a
 // half-open breaker's one probe delivery is in flight, every other task
 // for the target is put back with a whole cooldown as its delay rather
 // than none, and that its status is written the first time the breaker
 // turns it away and not on each pass after that.
 func TestDeliverHTTP_HalfOpenBreakerDelaysQueuedTasks(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	db := testWebhookDB(t)
 	e := testEngine(t, 1)
 	// Every write of retrying moves the retry counter, so on a registry
 	// this test owns the counter is the number of those writes.
 	reg := prometheus.NewRegistry()
 	e.ExportSetMetrics(metrics.New(reg))
 	targetID := uuid.New().String()
 	cb := newShortCooldownCB(t)
 	e.ExportSetCircuitBreaker(targetID, cb)
 	for range delivery.ExportDefaultFailureThreshold {
 		cb.RecordFailure()
 	}
 	time.Sleep(60 * time.Millisecond)
 	require.True(t, cb.Allow(), "the probe delivery should go through")
 	require.Equal(t, delivery.CircuitHalfOpen, cb.State())
 	cfg := newHTTPTargetConfig(
 		"http://will-not-be-called.invalid",
 	)
 	sched := &recordingScheduler{}
 	const queued, passes = 3, 4
 	for range queued {
 		event := seedEvent(t, db, `{"cb":"half-open"}`)
 		dlv := seedDelivery(
 			t, db, event.ID, targetID,
 			database.DeliveryStatusPending,
 		)
 		for range passes {
 			// Each pass starts from the stored row, as a retry does.
 			var row database.Delivery
 			require.NoError(t, db.First(
 				&row, "id = ?", dlv.ID,
 			).Error)
 			fix := buildHTTPFixture(
 				row, event, targetID,
 				"test-cb-half-open", cfg, 5, 1,
 			)
 			e.ExportDeliverHTTPWithScheduler(
 				context.TODO(), db, fix.Delivery, fix.Task, sched,
 			)
 		}
 		assertDeliveryStatus(t, db, dlv.ID,
 			database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
 		)
 	}
 	require.Len(t, sched.delays, queued*passes)
 	for _, delay := range sched.delays {
 		// The cooldown newShortCooldownCB gives the breaker.
 		assert.Equal(t, 50*time.Millisecond, delay,
 			"a task turned away while half-open should wait "+
 				"a whole cooldown",
 		)
 	}
 	assert.InDelta(t, float64(queued),
 		mCounter(t, reg, mRetries, mTypeHTTP), 0,
 		"status should be written once per task, not once per pass",
 	)
 }
 func TestGetCircuitBreaker_CreatesOnDemand(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
@@ -1070,6 +1166,10 @@ func TestIsForwardableHeader(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.False(t,
 		delivery.ExportIsForwardableHeader("Content-Length"),
 	)
 	assert.False(t,
 		delivery.ExportIsForwardableHeader("Content-Type"),
 	)
 }
 func TestTruncate(t *testing.T) {
@@ -1151,6 +1251,81 @@ func TestDoHTTPRequest_ForwardsHeaders(t *testing.T) {
 	)
 }
 // The event's stored inbound headers carry the same Content-Type the
 // receiver saved as the event's ContentType, so a delivery could send
 // it twice. It must go out exactly once, with a Content-Type configured
 // on the target winning, then the event's ContentType.
 func TestApplyRequestHeaders_SendsOneContentType(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	cases := map[string]struct {
 		inbound    string
 		event      string
 		configured string
 		want       []string
 	}{
 		"inbound and event agree": {
 			inbound: testContentType,
 			event:   testContentType,
 			want:    []string{testContentType},
 		},
 		"inbound and event disagree": {
 			inbound: "text/plain",
 			event:   testContentType,
 			want:    []string{testContentType},
 		},
 		"event has none": {
 			inbound: testContentType,
 			want:    nil,
 		},
 		"target configures its own": {
 			inbound:    testContentType,
 			event:      testContentType,
 			configured: "application/xml",
 			want:       []string{"application/xml"},
 		},
 	}
 	for name, tc := range cases {
 		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
 			inbound, err := json.Marshal(map[string][]string{
 				headerContentType: {tc.inbound},
 			})
 			require.NoError(t, err)
 			cfg := &delivery.HTTPTargetConfig{}
 			if tc.configured != "" {
 				cfg.Headers = map[string]string{
 					headerContentType: tc.configured,
 				}
 			}
 			req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(
 				context.Background(),
 				http.MethodPost,
 				"https://target.example.com/hook",
 				http.NoBody,
 			)
 			require.NoError(t, err)
 			delivery.ExportApplyRequestHeaders(
 				req,
 				&database.Event{
 					Headers:     string(inbound),
 					ContentType: tc.event,
 				},
 				cfg,
 			)
 			assert.Equal(t,
 				tc.want, req.Header.Values(headerContentType),
 			)
 		})
 	}
 }
 func TestProcessDelivery_RoutesToCorrectHandler(
 	t *testing.T,
 ) {
@@ -101,6 +101,19 @@ func (e *Engine) ExportDeliverHTTP(
 	e.httpTarget.Deliver(ctx, webhookDB, d, task, e)
 }
 // ExportDeliverHTTPWithScheduler delivers via the http target, handing
 // any retry to sched instead of the engine, so a test can see the
 // delay each retry is given.
 func (e *Engine) ExportDeliverHTTPWithScheduler(
 	ctx context.Context,
 	webhookDB *gorm.DB,
 	d *database.Delivery,
 	task *Task,
 	sched Scheduler,
 ) {
 	e.httpTarget.Deliver(ctx, webhookDB, d, task, sched)
 }
 // ExportDeliverDatabase delivers via the database target.
 func (e *Engine) ExportDeliverDatabase(
 	webhookDB *gorm.DB, d *database.Delivery,
@@ -179,6 +192,14 @@ func (e *Engine) ExportGetCircuitBreaker(
 	return e.httpTarget.getCircuitBreaker(targetID)
 }
 // ExportSetCircuitBreaker makes cb the http target's circuit breaker
 // for targetID, so a test can use one with a short cooldown.
 func (e *Engine) ExportSetCircuitBreaker(
 	targetID string, cb *CircuitBreaker,
 ) {
 	e.httpTarget.circuitBreakers.Store(targetID, cb)
 }
 // ExportParseHTTPConfig exposes parseHTTPConfig.
 func (e *Engine) ExportParseHTTPConfig(
 	configJSON string,
@@ -321,6 +342,31 @@ func (e *Engine) ExportRecoverRetryingDeliveries(
 	e.recoverRetryingDeliveries(webhookDB, webhookID)
 }
 // ExportFailMissingTarget exposes failMissingTarget, so a test can hand
 // it a delivery as a batch read it earlier.
 func (e *Engine) ExportFailMissingTarget(
 	webhookDB *gorm.DB,
 	webhookID string,
 	d *database.Delivery,
 ) {
 	e.failMissingTarget(webhookDB, webhookID, d)
 }
 // ExportSendRecoveredDeliveries exposes sendRecoveredDeliveries, so a
 // test can hand it a target map that lacks a delivery's target.
 func (e *Engine) ExportSendRecoveredDeliveries(
 	ctx context.Context,
 	webhookDB *gorm.DB,
 	deliveries []database.Delivery,
 	webhookID string,
 	targetMap map[string]database.Target,
 	settled map[string]struct{},
 ) {
 	e.sendRecoveredDeliveries(
 		ctx, webhookDB, deliveries, webhookID, targetMap, settled,
 	)
 }
 // ExportDeliveryCh returns the delivery channel.
 func (e *Engine) ExportDeliveryCh() chan Task {
 	return e.deliveryCh
@@ -273,6 +273,73 @@ func TestOwnershipIsReleasedAfterDelivery(t *testing.T) {
 	)
 }
 // TestNotifyAfterRecoveryDoesNotSendAgain is the startup race of
 // https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/299. The receiver has
 // written a delivery, restart recovery finds it pending, sends it and
 // releases it, and only then does the receiver's Notify for it arrive.
 // Nothing owns the delivery by then, so Notify takes it.
 func TestNotifyAfterRecoveryDoesNotSendAgain(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	targetID := uuid.New().String()
 	s := fSweepSetup(t, targetID, "recovered")
 	event := iSeedEvent(
 		t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"recovered":true}`,
 	)
 	d := iSeedDelivery(
 		t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
 		database.DeliveryStatusPending,
 	)
 	s.Engine.ExportStart()
 	defer func() {
 		require.NoError(
 			t, s.Engine.ExportStop(context.Background()),
 		)
 	}()
 	// Restart recovery sends the delivery and lets it go.
 	iWaitForDelivered(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID)
 	require.Eventually(
 		t,
 		func() bool {
 			return s.Engine.ExportInflightHeld() == 0
 		},
 		5*time.Second, 20*time.Millisecond,
 	)
 	body := event.Body
 	s.Engine.Notify([]delivery.Task{{
 		DeliveryID:   d.ID,
 		EventID:      event.ID,
 		WebhookID:    s.WebhookID,
 		TargetID:     targetID,
 		TargetName:   "recovered",
 		TargetType:   database.TargetTypeLog,
 		Body:         &body,
 		EntrypointID: event.EntrypointID,
 	}})
 	// Notify took the delivery, and a worker releases it once it has
 	// run the task.
 	require.Eventually(
 		t,
 		func() bool {
 			return s.Engine.ExportInflightHeld() == 0
 		},
 		5*time.Second, 20*time.Millisecond,
 	)
 	assert.Len(
 		t, iResults(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID), 1,
 		"the delivery was sent a second time",
 	)
 }
 // TestRetryingRecoverySkipsASuccessfulResult is the retrying-side twin
 // of the pending reconcile. A second attempt that reached the receiver
 // and whose status write then failed sits at retrying holding a
@@ -412,9 +412,10 @@ func TestDeliveryMetrics_BreakerBlockedIsNotAnAttempt(
 	s.Engine.ExportProcessRetryTask(context.TODO(), &blocked)
-	// The breaker refused it: rescheduled, so the retry counter
+	// The breaker refused it: rescheduled without rewriting the
-	// moved, but nothing was attempted or timed.
+	// retrying status it already had, so the retry counter did not
-	assert.InDelta(t, retriesBefore+1,
+	// move, and nothing was attempted or timed.
 	assert.InDelta(t, retriesBefore,
 		mCounter(t, reg, mRetries, mTypeHTTP), 0)
 	assert.InDelta(t, threshold,
 		mCounter(t, reg, mAttempts, mTypeHTTP), 0)
@@ -170,7 +170,8 @@ func TestDelivery_CrossOriginRedirectDropsOriginScopedHeaders(
 // Stripping must not fire within the configured origin, or every
 // destination that redirects its own path would lose its
 // credential and start answering 401 — and would lose the inbound
-// signature the receiver verifies.
+// signature header the target endpoint verifies. webhooker's own
 // receiver verifies no signature; it only forwards the header.
 func TestDelivery_SameOriginRedirectKeepsOriginScopedHeaders(
 	t *testing.T,
 ) {
@@ -338,10 +339,11 @@ func TestRedirectPolicy_StopsAtHopCap(t *testing.T) {
 // The set the redirect policy strips is whatever the delivery path
 // actually put on the wire, so a header added to the forward set is
 // covered without a second edit. A header the event never carried
-// is not in the set, and the delivery path's own two are deliberately
+// is not in the set, and neither is the inbound Content-Type, because
-// excluded: Content-Type describes the body, which a 307 carries
+// it is not forwarded. Two more are deliberately excluded: a
-// across hosts, and the inbound User-Agent every real sender supplies
+// Content-Type configured on the target describes the body, which a
-// is overwritten before the request goes out.
+// 307 carries across hosts, and the inbound User-Agent every real
 // sender supplies is overwritten before the request goes out.
 func TestApplyRequestHeaders_ReportsOriginScopedNames(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
@@ -370,6 +372,7 @@ func TestApplyRequestHeaders_ReportsOriginScopedNames(t *testing.T) {
 		&delivery.HTTPTargetConfig{
 			Headers: map[string]string{
 				probeHeaderName: probeHeaderValue,
 				"Content-Type":  testContentType,
 			},
 		},
 	)
@@ -377,7 +380,11 @@ func TestApplyRequestHeaders_ReportsOriginScopedNames(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.Equal(t,
 		[]string{probeHeaderName, inboundHeaderName}, names,
 		"both header classes are reported, and only those: "+
-			"Host is never forwarded, Content-Type and "+
+			"Host and the inbound Content-Type are never "+
-			"User-Agent are the delivery path's own",
+			"forwarded, User-Agent is the delivery path's own",
 	)
 	assert.NotContains(t, names, "Content-Type",
 		"a Content-Type configured on the target must survive "+
 			"a cross-origin 307/308 with the body it describes",
 	)
 }
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ var (
 		"hostname resolved to no IP addresses",
 	)
 	errBlockedIP = errors.New(
-		"blocked private/reserved IP range",
+		"blocked private, reserved or cloud metadata address",
 	)
 	errBlockedMetadata = errors.New(
 		"blocked link-local or cloud instance metadata " +
@@ -37,9 +37,10 @@ var (
 	)
 )
-// blockedNetworks contains all private/reserved IP ranges
+// blockedNetworks is the default blocklist: the private and
-// that should be blocked to prevent SSRF attacks. An operator
+// reserved IP ranges, plus the public cloud metadata addresses,
-// can permit specific blocks out of this set with
+// that are blocked to prevent SSRF attacks. An operator can
 // permit specific blocks out of this set with
 // ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS; see Guard.
 //
 //nolint:gochecknoglobals // package-level network list is appropriate here
@@ -122,6 +123,8 @@ func init() {
 		"::1/128",
 		"fc00::/7",
 		"fe80::/10",
 		// Azure WireServer, a public address that serves VM credentials.
 		"168.63.129.16/32",
 	})
 	// Every entry is named. The set must not grow or shrink
@@ -216,8 +219,8 @@ func matchesAny(networks []*net.IPNet, ip net.IP) bool {
 }
 // isBlockedIP checks whether an IP address falls within
-// any blocked private/reserved network range, before any
+// the default blocklist, before any operator allowlist is
-// operator allowlist is considered.
+// considered.
 func isBlockedIP(ip net.IP) bool {
 	return matchesAny(blockedNetworks, ip)
 }
@@ -320,7 +323,7 @@ func (g *Guard) allows(ip net.IP) bool {
 //
 //  1. alwaysBlockedNetworks is refused before the allowlist is
 //     consulted, so no configured CIDR reaches link-local or a
-//     cloud instance metadata endpoint.
+//     cloud metadata endpoint at a non-public address.
 //  2. The allowlist is consulted next, so a listed private
 //     network becomes reachable.
 //  3. Everything else keeps the default blocklist's answer.
@@ -390,6 +390,41 @@ func TestGuardAllowlist_PublicUnaffected(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 // TestGuardAllowlist_AzureWireServerReopenable covers Azure's
 // WireServer, a public address that serves VM credentials. The
 // default guard refuses it, but because it is public it sits in
 // the default blocklist rather than the unconditional set, so an
 // operator who lists it can reach it.
 func TestGuardAllowlist_AzureWireServerReopenable(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	const wireServerIP = "168.63.129.16"
 	target := "http://" + wireServerIP + "/?comp=versions"
 	defaultGuard := delivery.NewTestGuard()
 	err := defaultGuard.ValidateTargetURL(context.Background(), target)
 	require.Error(t, err,
 		"WireServer must be refused with no allowlist set",
 	)
 	assert.NotContains(t, err.Error(), metadataRefusalClause,
 		"WireServer must be refused by the default blocklist, "+
 			"which an allowlist can override",
 	)
 	assertDialRefused(t, defaultGuard, target)
 	listed := delivery.NewTestGuard(
 		netip.MustParsePrefix(wireServerIP + "/32"),
 	)
 	assert.NoError(t,
 		listed.ValidateTargetURL(context.Background(), target),
 		"an operator who lists WireServer must be able to reach it",
 	)
 }
 // TestGuardCheckIP_BothPathsShareOneDecision asserts that the
 // validator and the dialer are not two policies that happen to
 // agree: both are defined in terms of checkIP, so the exported
@@ -277,6 +277,24 @@ func (t *databaseTarget) evict(webhookID string) {
 	)
 }
 // evictAll evicts every cached archive writer, exactly as evict
 // does for one webhook. The engine calls it at shutdown, once its
 // workers have returned. Closing the last handle on an archive
 // moves the contents of its -wal into the .db and removes the
 // -wal, so a clean stop leaves each archive as a single file.
 func (t *databaseTarget) evictAll() {
 	t.mu.Lock()
 	writers := t.writers
 	t.writers = nil
 	t.mu.Unlock()
 	for _, w := range writers {
 		w.evict()
 	}
 }
 // sweepWebhook prunes one webhook's archive of rows older than
 // expiry, without requiring a write. It returns nil (nothing to
 // do) when the archive file does not exist, so a sweep never
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 package delivery_test
 import (
 	"context"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"net/http"
@@ -361,3 +362,46 @@ func TestEvictWebhook_LaterDeliveryRecreatesWriter(t *testing.T) {
 		"a later delivery should recreate the writer",
 	)
 }
 // TestEngineStop_WriteAfterStopIsRefused proves the engine's stop
 // closes each archive writer the way deleting its webhook does: a
 // write that reaches a writer after the stop is refused, reopens
 // nothing and adds no row.
 func TestEngineStop_WriteAfterStopIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	eng, _ := evictTestEngine(t)
 	webhookDB := testWebhookDB(t)
 	event := seedEvent(t, webhookDB, `{"archived":true}`)
 	d := seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(t, webhookDB, event, "")
 	eng.ExportDeliverDatabase(webhookDB, d)
 	w := eng.ExportArchiveWriterFor(event.WebhookID)
 	require.NotNil(t, w)
 	require.True(t, w.HandleOpen())
 	require.NoError(t, eng.ExportStop(context.Background()))
 	err := w.Write(evictTestRow("ev-after-stop"), 0)
 	require.ErrorIs(
 		t, err, delivery.ErrExportArchiveWriterEvicted,
 		"a write after the stop must be refused",
 	)
 	assert.False(
 		t, w.HandleOpen(),
 		"a refused write must not reopen the archive",
 	)
 	assert.False(
 		t, eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(event.WebhookID),
 		"the stop should empty the registry",
 	)
 	count, err := countArchivedRows(w.Path())
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	assert.Equal(
 		t, int64(1), count, "the refused row must not be written",
 	)
 }
@@ -11,10 +11,11 @@ import (
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
 )
-// Literals these tests repeat, named so that the header name and the
+// Literals these tests repeat, named so that the header names and the
 // keep-forever archive config each have one definition.
 const (
 	headerAuthorization = "Authorization"
 	headerContentType   = "Content-Type"
 	bearerValue         = "Bearer abc"
 	archiveConfigNever  = "{\"expiry\":\"never\"}"
 )
@@ -197,10 +197,14 @@ func (c *httpCore) circuitBreakerBlock(
 		"cooldown_remaining", remaining,
 	)
 	// A delivery already at retrying is left as it is, so a task
 	// the breaker keeps turning away writes nothing each time.
 	if d.Status != database.DeliveryStatusRetrying {
 		c.eng.settleStatus(
 			webhookDB, d, d.Target.Type,
 			database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
 		)
 	}
 	retryTask := *task
 	sched.ScheduleRetry(retryTask, remaining)
@@ -537,6 +541,11 @@ func isForwardableHeader(name string) bool {
 		"Upgrade", "Proxy-Authorization",
 		"Proxy-Connection", "Content-Length":
 		return false
 	case "Content-Type":
 		// applyRequestHeaders sets Content-Type itself. The receiver
 		// already stored this inbound value as the event's
 		// ContentType, so forwarding it too would send it twice.
 		return false
 	default:
 		return true
 	}
@@ -549,6 +558,10 @@ func isForwardableHeader(name string) bool {
 // policy strips exactly that set on a hop that leaves the origin,
 // so the forward set is decided here and only here — a header added
 // to it is covered off-origin without a second edit elsewhere.
 //
 // Content-Type goes out once: a Content-Type configured on the target
 // wins, otherwise the event's ContentType, otherwise none. The inbound
 // Content-Type in the event's headers is never forwarded.
 func applyRequestHeaders(
 	req *http.Request,
 	event *database.Event,
@@ -569,10 +582,10 @@ func applyRequestHeaders(
 	req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "webhooker/1.0")
-	// Content-Type describes the body being sent rather than the
+	// A Content-Type configured on the target describes the body
-	// sender, and the delivery path sets it from the event itself.
+	// being sent rather than the sender. A 307/308 preserves the
-	// A 307/308 preserves the body across hosts, so stripping it
+	// body across hosts, so stripping it would send that body
-	// would send that body untyped.
+	// untyped.
 	delete(originScoped, "Content-Type")
 	// User-Agent is overwritten just above, so an inbound one never
@@ -18,16 +18,17 @@ import (
 // https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/107: a delivery failed
 // with nothing in its event log to say why, and a retrying delivery
 // whose target was deleted, which used to keep sending and then never
-// terminalise.
+// terminalise. Section 4 is the same deleted-target gap for a pending
 // delivery: https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/293.
 // tUnknownType is a target type no build implements. It stands in for
 // a target whose type was written by a build that knew a type this one
 // does not.
 const tUnknownType = database.TargetType("pubsub")
-// tSeedDeletedTarget creates a target, a retrying delivery against it
+// tSeedDeletedTarget creates a target, a delivery against it at the
-// with one recorded failed attempt, and then deletes the target the
+// given status with one recorded failed attempt, and then deletes the
-// way the source page does.
+// target the way the source page does.
 //
 // It asserts the delete is soft, because that is the whole reason the
 // engine could not tell a deleted target from a target id that never
@@ -36,6 +37,7 @@ func tSeedDeletedTarget(
 	t *testing.T,
 	s iSetup,
 	name, url string,
 	status database.DeliveryStatus,
 ) string {
 	t.Helper()
@@ -51,8 +53,7 @@ func tSeedDeletedTarget(
 	)
 	d := iSeedDelivery(
-		t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
+		t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID, status,
 		database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
 	)
 	iSeedFailedResult(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID)
@@ -173,6 +174,7 @@ func TestRecoverSingleRetry_TargetDeleted(t *testing.T) {
 	deliveryID := tSeedDeletedTarget(
 		t, s, "gone-on-recovery", "http://example.com/hook",
 		database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
 	)
 	s.Engine.ExportRecoverWebhookDeliveries(
@@ -210,6 +212,7 @@ func TestSweepSingleRetry_TargetDeleted(t *testing.T) {
 	deliveryID := tSeedDeletedTarget(
 		t, s, "gone-on-sweep", "http://example.com/hook",
 		database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
 	)
 	// Twice, because the bug was an error the sweep repeated every
@@ -278,11 +281,11 @@ func TestSweepSingleRetry_TargetNeverExisted(t *testing.T) {
 	)
 }
-// TestFailMissingTargetRetry_WritesNoTargetRow holds the new terminal
+// TestFailMissingTarget_WritesNoTargetRow holds the new terminal path
-// path to the same rule as the existing one: no target row, and so no
+// to the same rule as the existing one: no target row, and so no
 // plaintext target config, may be written into the per-webhook event
 // database. See https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/206.
-func TestFailMissingTargetRetry_WritesNoTargetRow(
+func TestFailMissingTarget_WritesNoTargetRow(
 	t *testing.T,
 ) {
 	t.Parallel()
@@ -297,6 +300,7 @@ func TestFailMissingTargetRetry_WritesNoTargetRow(
 	deliveryID := tSeedDeletedTarget(
 		t, s, "credential-bearing", hookURL,
 		database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
 	)
 	s.Engine.ExportSweepWebhookRetries(
@@ -529,3 +533,260 @@ func TestRecoverSingleRetry_TargetUnreadable_LeavesDeliveryAlone(
 	assert.Zero(t, s.Engine.ExportInflightHeld())
 }
 // --- 4. A pending delivery whose target is gone ---
 func TestRecoverPending_TargetDeleted(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s := newISetup(t)
 	deliveryID := tSeedDeletedTarget(
 		t, s, "gone-while-pending", "http://example.com/hook",
 		database.DeliveryStatusPending,
 	)
 	s.Engine.ExportRecoverWebhookDeliveries(
 		context.Background(), s.WebhookID,
 	)
 	iAssertStatus(
 		t, s.WebhookDB, deliveryID,
 		database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
 	)
 	last := tLastResult(t, s, deliveryID, 2)
 	assert.False(t, last.Success)
 	assert.Equal(t, 2, last.AttemptNum)
 	assert.Contains(t, last.Error, "gone-while-pending")
 	assert.Contains(t, last.Error, "was deleted")
 	assert.Empty(t, fDrain(s.Engine),
 		"a delivery whose target is gone was sent",
 	)
 	assert.Zero(t, s.Engine.ExportInflightHeld(),
 		"the terminal path leaked its ownership reference",
 	)
 }
 // TestRecoverPending_TargetDeleted_LeavesAnOwnedDeliveryAlone: the
 // terminal write takes ownership like every other recovery write, so a
 // delivery the engine still holds is not failed underneath its worker.
 func TestRecoverPending_TargetDeleted_LeavesAnOwnedDeliveryAlone(
 	t *testing.T,
 ) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s := newISetup(t)
 	deliveryID := tSeedDeletedTarget(
 		t, s, "gone-but-owned", "http://example.com/hook",
 		database.DeliveryStatusPending,
 	)
 	require.True(t, s.Engine.ExportRetainDelivery(deliveryID))
 	s.Engine.ExportRecoverWebhookDeliveries(
 		context.Background(), s.WebhookID,
 	)
 	iAssertStatus(
 		t, s.WebhookDB, deliveryID,
 		database.DeliveryStatusPending,
 	)
 	assert.Len(t, iResults(t, s.WebhookDB, deliveryID), 1,
 		"a delivery the engine owns was failed underneath it",
 	)
 }
 // TestFailMissingTarget_LeavesASettledDeliveryAlone: the recovery paths
 // read their batch before taking ownership, and a worker may send a
 // delivery and let it go in between. The terminal write goes by the row
 // as it is now, not as the batch read it.
 func TestFailMissingTarget_LeavesASettledDeliveryAlone(
 	t *testing.T,
 ) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s := newISetup(t)
 	deliveryID := tSeedDeletedTarget(
 		t, s, "gone-after-sending", "http://example.com/hook",
 		database.DeliveryStatusPending,
 	)
 	var batch database.Delivery
 	require.NoError(t, s.WebhookDB.First(
 		&batch, "id = ?", deliveryID,
 	).Error)
 	// A worker settles the delivery after the batch was read.
 	require.NoError(t, s.WebhookDB.Model(&database.Delivery{}).
 		Where("id = ?", deliveryID).
 		Update("status", database.DeliveryStatusDelivered).Error)
 	s.Engine.ExportFailMissingTarget(
 		s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, &batch,
 	)
 	iAssertStatus(
 		t, s.WebhookDB, deliveryID,
 		database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
 	)
 	assert.Len(t, iResults(t, s.WebhookDB, deliveryID), 1,
 		"a delivery settled after the batch read was then failed",
 	)
 	assert.Zero(t, s.Engine.ExportInflightHeld())
 }
 // TestSweepPending_TargetDeleted sweeps twice over a batch that also
 // holds a healthy stranded delivery. The one whose target is gone is
 // failed once and then left alone; the healthy one is queued by the
 // first sweep and not again by the second.
 func TestSweepPending_TargetDeleted(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	liveTargetID := uuid.New().String()
 	s := fSweepSetup(t, liveTargetID, "still-there")
 	deliveryID := tSeedDeletedTarget(
 		t, s, "gone-on-pending-sweep", "http://example.com/hook",
 		database.DeliveryStatusPending,
 	)
 	rAgePending(t, s.WebhookDB, deliveryID)
 	event := iSeedEvent(
 		t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"target":"live"}`,
 	)
 	healthy := iSeedDelivery(
 		t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, liveTargetID,
 		database.DeliveryStatusPending,
 	)
 	rAgePending(t, s.WebhookDB, healthy.ID)
 	ctx := context.Background()
 	s.Engine.ExportSweepWebhookRetries(ctx, s.WebhookID)
 	tasks := fDrain(s.Engine)
 	require.Len(t, tasks, 1,
 		"the first sweep did not queue the healthy delivery",
 	)
 	assert.Equal(t, healthy.ID, tasks[0].DeliveryID)
 	s.Engine.ExportSweepWebhookRetries(ctx, s.WebhookID)
 	assert.Empty(t, fDrain(s.Engine),
 		"the second sweep queued a delivery again",
 	)
 	iAssertStatus(
 		t, s.WebhookDB, deliveryID,
 		database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
 	)
 	last := tLastResult(t, s, deliveryID, 2)
 	assert.Contains(t, last.Error, "gone-on-pending-sweep")
 	assert.Contains(t, last.Error, "was deleted")
 }
 // TestSendRecoveredDeliveries_TargetMissingFromMap: the batch's target
 // map is empty when its query failed, so every delivery in the batch is
 // looked up on its own. A healthy one is sent to the target that lookup
 // finds.
 func TestSendRecoveredDeliveries_TargetMissingFromMap(
 	t *testing.T,
 ) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s := newISetup(t)
 	targetID := uuid.New().String()
 	iCreateTarget(
 		t, s.MainDB, targetID, s.WebhookID, "found-on-lookup",
 		database.TargetTypeLog, "", 0,
 	)
 	event := iSeedEvent(
 		t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"map":"empty"}`,
 	)
 	d := iSeedDelivery(
 		t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
 		database.DeliveryStatusPending,
 	)
 	s.Engine.ExportSendRecoveredDeliveries(
 		context.Background(), s.WebhookDB,
 		[]database.Delivery{d}, s.WebhookID,
 		map[string]database.Target{}, nil,
 	)
 	tasks := fDrain(s.Engine)
 	require.Len(t, tasks, 1,
 		"the healthy delivery was not queued exactly once",
 	)
 	assert.Equal(t, d.ID, tasks[0].DeliveryID)
 	assert.Equal(t, targetID, tasks[0].TargetID)
 	assert.Equal(t, database.TargetTypeLog, tasks[0].TargetType)
 	iAssertStatus(
 		t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID,
 		database.DeliveryStatusPending,
 	)
 }
 // TestRecoverPending_TargetUnreadable_LeavesDeliveryAlone: a failed
 // read of the main database is not a deleted target. Restart recovery
 // holds every pending delivery of the webhook in one batch, so failing
 // on this would fail all of them.
 func TestRecoverPending_TargetUnreadable_LeavesDeliveryAlone(
 	t *testing.T,
 ) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s := newISetup(t)
 	targetID := uuid.New().String()
 	iCreateTarget(
 		t, s.MainDB, targetID, s.WebhookID, "healthy",
 		database.TargetTypeLog, "", 0,
 	)
 	event := iSeedEvent(
 		t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"still":"pending"}`,
 	)
 	d := iSeedDelivery(
 		t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
 		database.DeliveryStatusPending,
 	)
 	sqlDB, err := s.MainDB.DB()
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	require.NoError(t, sqlDB.Close())
 	s.Engine.ExportRecoverPendingDeliveries(
 		context.Background(), s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID,
 	)
 	iAssertStatus(
 		t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID,
 		database.DeliveryStatusPending,
 	)
 	assert.Empty(t, iResults(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID),
 		"an unreadable main database produced a terminal "+
 			"failure row",
 	)
 	assert.Empty(t, fDrain(s.Engine))
 	assert.Zero(t, s.Engine.ExportInflightHeld())
 }
@@ -300,3 +300,80 @@ func TestEntrypointCopyButtonIsProgressiveEnhancement(t *testing.T) {
 		"the page must render to completion, not abort partway",
 	)
 }
 // maxRetriesHelp is the wording both target forms must carry. The
 // delivery core makes max_retries attempts in total, not that many
 // retries on top of a first try (a fresh delivery starts at attempt 1
 // and target_http gives up once the attempt number reaches
 // max_retries), and 0 is special-cased to a single fire-and-forget
 // attempt with no circuit breaker.
 const maxRetriesHelp = "This is the total number of delivery attempts, " +
 	"not retries on top of the first: a value of 3 makes three attempts " +
 	"in all. 0 means a single attempt with no retries and no circuit " +
 	"breaker."
 // TestTargetFormMaxRetriesCopyMatchesBehaviour pins the max_retries
 // help text on both the create form (the add-target form on the webhook
 // detail page) and the edit form, so the copy cannot drift back to
 // calling the number a retry count.
 func TestTargetFormMaxRetriesCopyMatchesBehaviour(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	var h *handlers.Handlers
 	var sess *session.Session
 	app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess)
 	app.RequireStart()
 	t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
 	webhook := &database.Webhook{Name: "wh", RetentionDays: 14}
 	webhook.ID = testWebhookID
 	entrypoint := database.Entrypoint{Path: "abc123"}
 	entrypoint.ID = "ep-1"
 	createBody := renderPage(
 		t, h, sess, "source_detail.html", map[string]any{
 			dataKeyWebhook: webhook,
 			"Entrypoints": handlers.NewEntrypointViews(
 				[]database.Entrypoint{entrypoint},
 			),
 			"Targets": delivery.NewTargetViews(nil),
 			"Events":  []database.Event{},
 			"BaseURL": "https://hooks.example.com",
 		},
 	)
 	assert.Contains(
 		t, createBody, maxRetriesHelp,
 		"the add-target form must explain max_retries as total attempts",
 	)
 	// A slack target exercises the same max_retries field while needing
 	// only Config.URL from the edit template, so the test data stays
 	// minimal. The Target key mirrors the field names the template reads
 	// off the handler's view value.
 	editBody := renderPage(
 		t, h, sess, "target_edit.html", map[string]any{
 			dataKeyWebhook: webhook,
 			"Target": map[string]any{
 				"ID":         "tg-1",
 				"Name":       "t",
 				"Type":       "slack",
 				"Active":     true,
 				"MaxRetries": 3,
 				"Config": map[string]any{
 					"URL": "https://hooks.slack.com/services/x",
 				},
 			},
 			dataKeyError: "",
 		},
 	)
 	assert.Contains(
 		t, editBody, maxRetriesHelp,
 		"the target edit form must explain max_retries as total attempts",
 	)
 }
@@ -380,9 +380,8 @@ func csrfTookStrictPath(
 // TestCSRF_ForwardedProtoSpellingsTakeStrictPath runs the header
 // spellings a real proxy emits through the middleware. The environment
-// is dev -- the DEFAULT when WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT is unset -- to pin
+// is set to dev -- the permissive setting -- to pin that the routing is
-// that the routing is a per-request transport decision and owes
+// a per-request transport decision and owes nothing to configuration.
 // nothing to configuration.
 func TestCSRF_ForwardedProtoSpellingsTakeStrictPath(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
@@ -133,6 +133,11 @@ func (w *recoverResponseWriter) Unwrap() http.ResponseWriter {
 // what the access log records and the metrics count, and outside the
 // sentryhttp handler, whose Repanic option depends on something
 // further out recovering what it re-raises.
 //
 // Unlike http.Error on its own, it deletes any Set-Cookie the handler
 // set before panicking, because a request that failed must not hand
 // the client a credential; every other header is left to http.Error.
 // See https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/193.
 func (s *Middleware) Recoverer() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
 	return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
 		return http.HandlerFunc(func(
@@ -164,6 +169,8 @@ func (s *Middleware) Recoverer() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
 					return
 				}
 				rw.Header().Del("Set-Cookie")
 				http.Error(
 					rw,
 					http.StatusText(
@@ -304,16 +304,44 @@ func TestRecovererRepanicsErrAbortHandler(t *testing.T) {
 	)
 }
 // TestRecovererDropsSetCookieFromTheRecovered500 covers a handler that
 // sets a cookie and a redirect target and then panics before sending
 // anything. A request that failed must not hand the client a
 // credential, so the 500 carries no cookie; Location is left alone.
 func TestRecovererDropsSetCookieFromTheRecovered500(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	probe := newRecovererProbe(
 		t, false,
 		func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
 			w.Header().Set("Set-Cookie", "session=x")
 			w.Header().Set("Location", "/after")
 			panic(panicMarker)
 		},
 	)
 	resp, err := probe.get(t)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	require.NoError(t, resp.Body.Close())
 	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusInternalServerError, resp.StatusCode)
 	assert.Empty(t, resp.Cookies())
 	assert.Equal(t, "/after", resp.Header.Get("Location"))
 }
 // TestRecovererKeepsAnAlreadyCommittedResponse covers a handler that
 // panics after sending its status. The bytes are already on the wire,
-// so a second WriteHeader would change nothing the client sees and
+// cookie included, so a second WriteHeader would change nothing the
-// would draw net/http's "superfluous response.WriteHeader" report.
+// client sees and would draw net/http's "superfluous
 // response.WriteHeader" report.
 func TestRecovererKeepsAnAlreadyCommittedResponse(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	probe := newRecovererProbe(
 		t, false,
 		func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
 			w.Header().Set("Set-Cookie", "session=x")
 			w.WriteHeader(committedStatus)
 			_, _ = w.Write([]byte("partial"))
@@ -331,6 +359,7 @@ func TestRecovererKeepsAnAlreadyCommittedResponse(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.Equal(t, committedStatus, resp.StatusCode)
 	assert.Equal(t, "partial", string(body))
 	assert.Len(t, resp.Cookies(), 1)
 	record := probe.panicRecord(t)
 	assert.Equal(t, panicMarker, record["panic"])
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 // several packages, by hand, and the answers disagreed. The session
 // cookie's Secure attribute was decided at startup from the configured
 // environment while the CSRF cookie's was decided per-request, so a
-// deployment behind a TLS proxy in the default environment emitted one
+// deployment behind a TLS proxy in the dev environment emitted one
 // Secure cookie and one non-Secure cookie on the same response.
 // Everything kept working, which is exactly why nobody noticed.
 //
@@ -146,8 +146,8 @@ func newStore(key []byte) *sessions.CookieStore {
 //
 // This is decided per-request, not once at startup. Deciding it at
 // startup from the configured environment is what this replaces, and
-// it got the DEFAULT posture wrong: "dev" is the environment when
+// it got the DEFAULT posture wrong: "dev" was then the environment when
-// WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT is unset, so a deployment terminating TLS at a
+// WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT was unset, so a deployment terminating TLS at a
 // proxy without also setting the environment emitted the
 // authentication cookie with no Secure attribute -- silently, and on
 // the same response as a CSRF cookie that did have one.
@@ -990,8 +990,8 @@ func sessionCookieFrom(
 // TestSave_SecureFollowsRequestTransport is the regression test for
 // the defect this replaces: Secure was fixed at startup from the
-// configured environment, and "dev" is the environment when
+// configured environment, and "dev" was then the environment when
-// WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT is unset. A deployment behind a TLS proxy in
+// WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT was unset. A deployment behind a TLS proxy in
 // that DEFAULT posture shipped the authentication cookie with no
 // Secure attribute and said nothing about it.
 //
@@ -120,10 +120,13 @@
                        <label class="text-sm text-gray-700">Timeout (seconds, blank = default):</label>
                        <input type="number" name="timeout" min="0" max="300" :disabled="targetType !== 'http'" class="input text-sm w-24">
                    </div>
-                    <div x-show="targetType === 'http'" class="flex gap-2 items-center">
+                    <div x-show="targetType === 'http'">
-                        <label class="text-sm text-gray-700">Max retries (0 = fire-and-forget):</label>
+                        <div class="flex gap-2 items-center">
                            <label class="text-sm text-gray-700">Max retries:</label>
                            <input type="number" name="max_retries" value="0" min="0" max="20" class="input text-sm w-24">
                        </div>
                        <p class="text-xs text-gray-500 mt-1">This is the total number of delivery attempts, not retries on top of the first: a value of 3 makes three attempts in all. 0 means a single attempt with no retries and no circuit breaker.</p>
                    </div>
                    <div x-show="targetType === 'slack'">
                        <input type="url" name="url" placeholder="https://hooks.slack.com/services/..." :disabled="targetType !== 'slack'" class="input text-sm">
                        <p class="text-xs text-gray-500 mt-1">Slack or Mattermost incoming webhook URL. Payloads are pretty-printed in code blocks.</p>
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@
            <div class="form-group">
                <label for="max_retries" class="label">Max retries</label>
                <input type="number" id="max_retries" name="max_retries" value="{{.Target.MaxRetries}}" min="0" max="20" class="input">
-                <p class="text-xs text-gray-500 mt-1">0 is fire-and-forget: one attempt, no circuit breaker.</p>
+                <p class="text-xs text-gray-500 mt-1">This is the total number of delivery attempts, not retries on top of the first: a value of 3 makes three attempts in all. 0 means a single attempt with no retries and no circuit breaker.</p>
            </div>
            {{end}}