diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index c66e5ca..319989c 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -7,6 +7,13 @@ services, durably stores them, and delivers them to configured targets
 with retry support, logging, and observability. Category: infrastructure
 / web service. License: MIT.
 
+Each entrypoint is a version 4 UUID served at `/webhook/{uuid}`, and
+that UUID is the entrypoint's only credential. webhooker does not use
+shared secrets, HMAC signatures or token headers on the receiver, and
+will not add them — read
+[The entrypoint URL is the authentication secret](#the-entrypoint-url-is-the-authentication-secret)
+before deploying one.
+
 ## Getting Started
 
 ### Prerequisites
@@ -1149,14 +1156,38 @@ backups at rest and restrict who can read them.
 
 ## The entrypoint URL is the authentication secret
 
-The receiver verifies nothing about an inbound request. The UUID in an
-entrypoint's URL is its credential: anyone who holds that URL can
-submit events to it, and the receiver checks nothing else about the
-sender. Treat an entrypoint URL the way you would treat an API token.
+**The entrypoint UUID is the credential, and it is the only one.**
+webhooker mints a version 4 UUID per entrypoint and serves it at
+`/webhook/{uuid}`. Possession of that URL is the authentication:
+anyone who holds it can submit events to the entrypoint, and the
+receiver verifies nothing else about the sender.
 
-There is no way to rotate the UUID in place. To retire one, delete the
-entrypoint (or deactivate it, which answers `410`) and create a new
-one, then point the sender at the new URL.
+There is no shared secret, no HMAC signature, no bearer token and no
+second factor on the receiver, and none will be added. This was
+considered and rejected; the implementation that existed was removed
+in [PR #279](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/pulls/279), closing
+[issue #67](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/67) and
+[issue #241](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/241). A
+proposal to reintroduce any of them — including as "defence in depth"
+alongside the UUID — is answered by this section. Inbound signature
+headers a sender sends anyway (`X-Hub-Signature` and its
+per-provider equivalents) are stored and forwarded as ordinary
+headers; nothing checks them.
+
+What that means for an operator:
+
+- **The URL is a capability, so treat it as a secret.** Keep it out of
+  logs, ticket bodies, chat messages and screenshots. Anyone who reads
+  it anywhere can post events as that sender.
+- **Rotating means minting a new entrypoint, not changing a key.**
+  There is no way to rotate the UUID in place. To retire one, delete
+  the entrypoint (or deactivate it, which answers `410`) and create a
+  new one, then point the sender at the new URL.
+- **A sender that cannot be given a secret URL is a constraint on that
+  integration, not a reason to change this.** If a service only
+  supports signed payloads to a well-known URL, raise it as its own
+  problem — pick a different integration path, or accept that it
+  cannot be used. It is not grounds to reintroduce shared secrets.
 
 ## Entrypoints
 
@@ -2867,6 +2898,10 @@ check, see [The login endpoint](#the-login-endpoint).
 
 ### Authentication
 
+- **Webhook receiver:** the entrypoint UUID in the URL, and nothing
+  else. No shared secret, no HMAC signature, no token header, and none
+  will be added — see
+  [The entrypoint URL is the authentication secret](#the-entrypoint-url-is-the-authentication-secret).
 - **Web UI:** Cookie-based sessions using gorilla/sessions with
   encrypted cookies. Sessions are configured with HttpOnly, SameSite
   Lax, and Secure whenever the request is on TLS — the flag follows the
@@ -2906,7 +2941,8 @@ check, see [The login endpoint](#the-login-endpoint).
   mode
 - **The entrypoint URL is the receiver's only credential.** Nothing
   about an inbound request is verified; possession of the UUID
-  authorises submission (see
+  authorises submission, and no shared secret or signature check will
+  be added alongside it (see
   [The entrypoint URL is the authentication secret](#the-entrypoint-url-is-the-authentication-secret))
 - **SSRF prevention** for HTTP delivery targets: private/reserved IP
   ranges (RFC 1918, loopback, link-local, cloud metadata) are blocked
diff --git a/internal/delivery/redirect_test.go b/internal/delivery/redirect_test.go
index 31e3d66..1534697 100644
--- a/internal/delivery/redirect_test.go
+++ b/internal/delivery/redirect_test.go
@@ -170,7 +170,8 @@ func TestDelivery_CrossOriginRedirectDropsOriginScopedHeaders(
 // Stripping must not fire within the configured origin, or every
 // destination that redirects its own path would lose its
 // credential and start answering 401 — and would lose the inbound
-// signature the receiver verifies.
+// signature header the target endpoint verifies. webhooker's own
+// receiver verifies no signature; it only forwards the header.
 func TestDelivery_SameOriginRedirectKeepsOriginScopedHeaders(
 	t *testing.T,
 ) {