Cover the kept Content-Type in the origin-scoped names test

TestApplyRequestHeaders_ReportsOriginScopedNames now configures a Content-Type on the target and asserts it is not among the returned names, so dropping the delete in applyRequestHeaders fails it. Its comment now says the inbound Content-Type is absent because it is not forwarded. Model: opus-5-5
Send Content-Type once on a delivery (closes #246 )
2026-09-29 04:15:07 +00:00 · 2026-09-29 04:15:07 +00:00
21 changed files with 197 additions and 926 deletions
@@ -88,9 +88,7 @@ RUN CGO_ENABLED=1 make build VERSION="$VERSION" GO_LDFLAGS='-extldflags "-static
 # alpine:3.21, 2026-03-17
 FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:c3f8e73fdb79deaebaa2037150150191b9dcbfba68b4a46d70103204c53f4709

-# su-exec 0.2-r3 (Alpine 3.21), 2026-09-29: the entrypoint runs the app
-# as webhooker with it.
-RUN apk --no-cache add ca-certificates su-exec=0.2-r3
+RUN apk --no-cache add ca-certificates

 # Create non-root user
 RUN addgroup -g 1000 -S webhooker && \
@@ -101,17 +99,13 @@ WORKDIR /app
 # Copy binary from builder
 COPY --from=builder /build/bin/webhooker /app/webhooker

-# Not under /app, which belongs to webhooker: this script runs as root.
-COPY deploy/docker-entrypoint.sh /usr/local/bin/docker-entrypoint.sh
-
 # Create data directory for all SQLite databases (main app DB +
 # per-webhook event DBs). DATA_DIR defaults to /var/lib/webhooker.
 RUN mkdir -p /var/lib/webhooker

 RUN chown -R webhooker:webhooker /app /var/lib/webhooker

-# No USER: the entrypoint starts as root to make the data directory
-# webhooker's, then runs the app as webhooker.
+USER webhooker

 EXPOSE 8080

@@ -130,5 +124,4 @@ ENV BIND_ADDRESS=0.0.0.0
 HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=3s --start-period=5s --retries=3 \
    CMD wget --no-verbose --tries=1 --spider http://localhost:8080/.well-known/healthcheck || exit 1

-ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/local/bin/docker-entrypoint.sh"]
 CMD ["/app/webhooker"]
@@ -157,11 +157,6 @@ private and reserved ranges — RFC 1918, loopback, CGNAT, link-local and
 the rest — are refused, which stops a target from being used to make
 webhooker probe the network it sits in.

-Besides the private and reserved ranges, the default blocklist refuses
-public cloud metadata addresses: currently only `168.63.129.16`, Azure's
-WireServer, which serves an Azure VM its credentials. Because it is a
-public address, listing it in `ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS` reopens it.
-
 That default is also inconvenient for the thing webhooker is mostly
 for: taking a public webhook and forwarding it to something on your own
 network. A container on the same Docker network, a box on `10.x`, a
@@ -200,16 +195,15 @@ Two things this setting cannot do:
  the list is always an allowlist; an empty list (the default) means
  every private and reserved range stays refused. Note that
  `0.0.0.0/0` gets you most of the way there anyway, per above.
- **It cannot open link-local, or a cloud metadata endpoint at a
-  non-public address that discloses credentials or user data.** An
-  address is on the list below when it is not a public address and both
-  of these hold: the provider fixes it, so it cannot collide with
-  anything you run; and reaching it hands out credentials, user data or
-  bootstrap material. Those stay blocked no matter what you list,
-  including when you list them outright or list a supernet such as
-  `0.0.0.0/0`, `::/0`, `fd00::/8` or `100.64.0.0/10`. Treat this as best
-  effort rather than a guarantee — it is a hand-maintained list and the
-  caveat below the table applies:
+- **It cannot open link-local, or a cloud metadata endpoint that
+  discloses credentials or user data.** An address is on the list below
+  when both of these hold: the provider fixes it, so it cannot collide
+  with anything you run; and reaching it hands out credentials, user
+  data or bootstrap material. Those stay blocked no matter what you
+  list, including when you list them outright or list a supernet such
+  as `0.0.0.0/0`, `::/0`, `fd00::/8` or `100.64.0.0/10`. Treat this as
+  best effort rather than a guarantee — it is a hand-maintained list
+  and the caveat below the table applies:

  | Blocked unconditionally | What it is |
  | ----------------------- | ---------- |
@@ -248,8 +242,7 @@ Two things this setting cannot do:
  encodings, which the default blocklist does not match. A publicly
  routable metadata address is not listed here, because nothing on this
  list can be reopened and blocking one that way would leave you no
-  escape hatch at all; Azure's `168.63.129.16` is refused by the default
-  blocklist instead, as described above.
+  escape hatch at all.

  This list is not exhaustive of every cloud's metadata address — if
  yours is not here, do not allowlist the block that contains it.
@@ -538,12 +531,6 @@ its Argon2id hash. There is no second account and no forgot-password
 flow, so the banner and the reset command below are the only two ways
 in.

-A start that finds no `webhooker.db` in `DATA_DIR` also logs
-`created a new, empty database` at `WARN`, with the file's path,
-shortly before the banner. On a deployment that has run before, that
-line means `DATA_DIR` was empty, most often because its volume is not
-mounted.
-
 #### Recovering a lost admin password

 `webhooker resetpw` sets an existing account's password from the
@@ -558,9 +545,8 @@ printf '%s' "$NEW_PASSWORD" | \
    DATA_DIR=/var/lib/webhooker webhooker resetpw admin
 ```

-In a container it is the same binary. The image's `CMD` is
-`/app/webhooker`, and a command given to `docker run` replaces all of
-it, so the whole command has to be given:
+In a container it is the same binary, which the image sets as `CMD`
+rather than `ENTRYPOINT`, so the whole command has to be given:

 ```bash
 docker run --rm -v webhooker-data:/var/lib/webhooker \
@@ -697,22 +683,38 @@ those three values rather than trusting the figure. Measured at 65s on
 Docker 29.7.2.) A container `unhealthy` with `connection refused` in
 its health log, or a published port that resets connections, is this.

-The app runs as a non-root user (`webhooker`, UID 1000), exposes port
-8080, and includes a health check against `/.well-known/healthcheck`.
-The `/var/lib/webhooker` volume holds all SQLite databases: the main
-application database (`webhooker.db`), the per-webhook event databases
-(`events-{uuid}.db`), and any archive databases written by `database`
-targets (`archive-{uuid}.db`). Mount this as a persistent volume to
-preserve data across container restarts.
+The container runs as a non-root user (`webhooker`, UID 1000), exposes
+port 8080, and includes a health check against
+`/.well-known/healthcheck`. The `/var/lib/webhooker` volume holds all
+SQLite databases: the main application database (`webhooker.db`), the
+per-webhook event databases (`events-{uuid}.db`), and any archive
+databases written by `database` targets (`archive-{uuid}.db`). Mount
+this as a persistent volume to preserve data across container
+restarts.

-**The container sets its data directory's owner and mode itself
-before the app starts**, so a host directory can be mounted as it is,
-whoever owns it. The image's `ENTRYPOINT`,
-`deploy/docker-entrypoint.sh`, starts as root, creates `DATA_DIR` if
-it is missing, gives the directory and anything in it that belongs to
-another user to `webhooker`, sets the directory to `0750`, and only
-then runs the app as `webhooker`. Started with `--user`, it changes
-nothing and runs the app as that user.
+**The bind-mounted directory must be owned by UID 1000, or the
+container does not start.** Docker creates a `-v` source path that
+does not exist yet as `root:root`, and the process runs as UID 1000,
+so it cannot take its `DATA_DIR` lock:
+
+```
+webhooker: locking data directory /var/lib/webhooker: open
+/var/lib/webhooker/webhooker.lock: permission denied
+```
+
+It exits non-zero at that point, before opening any database. Create
+the directory ahead of the first `docker run`:
+
+```bash
+mkdir -p /path/to/data
+chown 1000:1000 /path/to/data
+chmod 750 /path/to/data
+```
+
+The same `chown` is what a restore needs — see step 4 of
+[Restore](#restore). A **named volume** does not have this problem:
+Docker copies the image's ownership onto a volume it initializes, and
+the image creates `/var/lib/webhooker` owned by `webhooker`.

 **The file modes are not yours to set, and do not depend on the
 directory.** `webhooker.db` holds target configuration in plaintext —
@@ -720,10 +722,13 @@ bearer tokens, API keys, Slack webhook URLs — along with the session
 encryption key, so webhooker creates every SQLite file it owns `0600`:
 each database and both of its `-wal` and `-shm` sidecars, across all
 three tiers. Files an earlier build left `0644` are tightened when
-they are opened. The directory's `0750` is defence in depth — it stops
-other local users listing the directory and learning your webhook
-UUIDs from the `events-{uuid}.db` filenames — not the barrier
-protecting the credentials.
+they are opened. A `DATA_DIR` webhooker creates itself is `0750`, but
+a bind mount supplies its own directory and Docker's default for one
+it creates is `0755`; the `0600` files hold there regardless. The
+`chmod 750` above is defence in depth — it stops other local users
+listing the directory and learning your webhook UUIDs from the
+`events-{uuid}.db` filenames — not the barrier protecting the
+credentials.

 ### Running under upaas

@@ -739,6 +744,17 @@ repository's `Dockerfile` and runs it. The app needs:
  app name, port `8080`. Leave `PORT` unset: the image's health check
  probes `8080`.
 - **Volume:** one host directory mounted at `/var/lib/webhooker`.
+  upaas bind-mounts the host path it is given and does not create it,
+  and the container does not start unless UID 1000 owns it (see
+  [Running with Docker](#running-with-docker)). Create it before the
+  first deploy:
+
+    ```bash
+    mkdir -p /path/to/data
+    chown 1000:1000 /path/to/data
+    chmod 750 /path/to/data
+    ```
+
 - **Environment variables:**
    - `WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT=prod`
    - `TRUSTED_PROXIES`: your reverse proxy's address on that Docker
@@ -952,10 +968,15 @@ scratch file**: it holds committed transactions that are not yet in the
 have no readable schema at all. `-shm` is regenerable, but there is no
 reason to separate the two — copy the directory and you have them.

-A clean shutdown closes every database, which checkpoints and removes
-its sidecars; a killed or crashed instance leaves them, and they must be
-carried with the `.db`. An archive the service has not opened since a
-crash keeps that crash's sidecars, even across a later clean stop.
+A clean shutdown closes `webhooker.db` and every `events-*.db`, which
+checkpoints and removes their sidecars; a killed or crashed instance
+leaves them, and they must be carried with the `.db`. **Archive
+databases are different**: their handle is not closed at shutdown, so
+`archive-*.db-wal` and `-shm` normally survive a clean stop and the
+`-wal` can hold every row the archive has. Measured on a stopped
+instance: `archive-….db` 4096 bytes with no table, its `-wal` 157 KB
+holding all 8 archived events. Copying `DATA_DIR` in full is what makes
+this a non-issue; copying `.db` files out of it by name is not.

 Configuration is **not** in `DATA_DIR` — it comes from the environment
 and from a `.env` file read out of the process working directory. Back
@@ -997,12 +1018,12 @@ done
 `.backup` reads through the WAL and writes a single consistent file with
 no sidecars of its own, so the destination is complete as it stands.
 Two caveats. First, the runtime image is `alpine:3.21` with only
-`ca-certificates` and `su-exec` added — the `sqlite3` CLI is **not** in
-it, so run this on the host against the volume path, or from a
-throwaway container that mounts the volume. Second, each file is
-captured at its own instant, so a webhook created or an event delivered
-between two files being copied lands in one and not the other. If you
-need the whole set coherent as of a single moment, stop the service.
+`ca-certificates` added — the `sqlite3` CLI is **not** in it, so run
+this on the host against the volume path, or from a throwaway container
+that mounts the volume. Second, each file is captured at its own
+instant, so a webhook created or an event delivered between two files
+being copied lands in one and not the other. If you need the whole set
+coherent as of a single moment, stop the service.

 Note that `sqlite3 <db> .dump` is **not** one of these procedures: it is
 an export, it holds a read transaction open for as long as it runs, and
@@ -1030,9 +1051,10 @@ The file becomes self-contained again when the handle closes, which
 happens on the next write past the debounce window, when the connection
 pool retires the idle connection (about a minute after the last write),
 or at the idle archive sweep — measured, the same file was a complete
-20 KB `.db` with no sidecars about a minute after its last write. A
-clean stop closes it too. So either move `archive-{uuid}.db` together
-with any `-wal`/`-shm` beside it, or wait until there are none.
+20 KB `.db` with no sidecars about a minute after its last write.
+Shutdown is **not** on that list: the archive handle is not closed when
+the service stops. So either move `archive-{uuid}.db` together with any
+`-wal`/`-shm` beside it, or wait until there are none.

 ### Restore

@@ -1051,16 +1073,28 @@ with any `-wal`/`-shm` beside it, or wait until there are none.
   They are part of the database, and dropping a `-wal` silently
   discards every transaction it still holds. An `.backup` set will not
   contain any: it writes a single consolidated file per database. A
-   stop-and-copy set normally has none, because a clean stop closes
-   every database and checkpoints its sidecars away; the exception is an
-   archive not opened since a crash. A copy salvaged from a crashed
-   instance has them for everything, and needs all of them.
+   stop-and-copy set has none for `webhooker.db` or the `events-*.db`,
+   because a clean stop closes those and checkpoints their sidecars
+   away — but it will normally have them for `archive-*.db`, whose
+   handle stays open across shutdown, and those carry the archive's
+   rows. A copy salvaged from a crashed instance has them for
+   everything, and needs all of them.

-4. Start the service. The container gives the directory and the
-   restored files to the `webhooker` user before the app starts,
-   whoever restored them (see
-   [Running with Docker](#running-with-docker)). `AutoMigrate` runs
-   against each restored database as it is opened.
+4. **Fix ownership.** The container runs as the non-root `webhooker`
+   user, UID 1000 / GID 1000. Restored files must be owned by (or
+   writable by) that UID, and so must the directory itself — SQLite
+   creates the `-wal` and `-shm` sidecars beside the database, so a
+   writable file inside a directory it cannot write is not enough:
+
+    ```bash
+    chown -R 1000:1000 /path/to/data
+    ```
+
+    Restoring as `root` on the host and forgetting this step is the
+    usual way a restore fails.
+
+5. Start the service. `AutoMigrate` runs against each restored database
+   as it is opened.

 ### Upgrades

@@ -2688,7 +2722,7 @@ abuse limit later; they are tracked as future work.
 | ------ | --------------------------- | ----------- |
 | `GET`  | `/`                         | Root redirect, 303 (authenticated → `/sources`, unauthenticated → `/pages/login`) |
 | `GET`  | `/.well-known/healthcheck`  | Health check (JSON: `status`, `now`, `uptimeSeconds`, `uptimeHuman`, `version`, `appname`, `maintenanceMode`) |
-| `GET`, `HEAD` | `/s/*`              | Static file serving (embedded CSS, JS). `GET` and `HEAD` only — `POST`, `PUT`, `PATCH`, `DELETE`, `OPTIONS`, `TRACE` and `CONNECT` are answered `405 Method Not Allowed` with `Allow: GET, HEAD`. Any other method (such as `PROPFIND`) is refused by chi before it reaches this route, and gets `405` without an `Allow` header. Pinned by `TestStaticServesOnlyGetAndHead` |
+| any    | `/s/*`                      | Static file serving (embedded CSS, JS). Mounted for every method, not just `GET`/`HEAD`: chi's `Mount` registers all methods and `http.FileServer` special-cases only `HEAD` (by omitting the body), so a `POST` or `DELETE` to an asset is answered `200` with the file. Pinned by `TestStaticServesEveryMethod` |
 | `POST` | `/webhook/{uuid}`           | Webhook receiver endpoint. `POST` only — every other method is answered `405 Method Not Allowed` with `Allow: POST`. Rate limited (see [Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting)) |

 #### Authentication Endpoints
@@ -3038,11 +3072,7 @@ check, see [The login endpoint](#the-login-endpoint).
 - Prometheus metrics behind basic auth
 - Static assets embedded in binary (no filesystem access needed at
  runtime)
- The app runs as the non-root `webhooker` user (UID 1000) in the
-  container. The image sets no `USER`, so these run as root: the
-  `ENTRYPOINT` script, which sets the data directory's owner and mode
-  before the app starts; the image's health check; and `docker exec`,
-  unless given `--user`
+- Container runs as non-root user (UID 1000)
 - GORM soft deletes on every entity that carries `BaseModel`, which is
  all of them but `Setting` (data preserved for audit)

@@ -3058,8 +3088,7 @@ each hook. The order, read off the fx stop-hook log:
 3. `server` — the HTTP drain, bounded separately by
   `server.ShutdownTimeout` (**3 seconds**), then a Sentry flush if
   `SENTRY_DSN` is set
-4. `delivery.Engine` — waits for its workers, then closes the archive
-   databases
+4. `delivery.Engine`
 5. `healthcheck`
 6. `WebhookDBManager`
 7. the database close
@@ -3169,13 +3198,10 @@ version is fixed independently of the compiler's:
   `GO_LDFLAGS`, so neither can drop the `-X` that stamps the version.
   The version arrives as the `VERSION` build arg, since the context
   has no `.git` (see [Version stamping](#version-stamping)).
-3. **Runtime stage** (`alpine:3.21`) — copies the static binary and
-   `deploy/docker-entrypoint.sh`, creates the `/var/lib/webhooker`
-   directory for all SQLite databases, exposes port 8080, and includes
-   a health check against `/.well-known/healthcheck`. It sets no
-   `USER`: the `ENTRYPOINT` script starts as root, sets the data
-   directory's owner and mode, and runs the app as the non-root
-   `webhooker` user (UID 1000) through `su-exec`.
+3. **Runtime stage** (`alpine:3.21`) — copies the static binary,
+   creates the `/var/lib/webhooker` directory for all SQLite databases,
+   runs as the non-root `webhooker` user (UID 1000), exposes port 8080,
+   and includes a health check against `/.well-known/healthcheck`.

 The lint stage invokes `golangci-lint` directly rather than `make lint`:
 it is already the pinned linter image, and `make lint` builds
@@ -3254,5 +3280,3 @@ MIT
 ## Author

 [@sneak](https://sneak.berlin)
-
-
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-# deploy/docker-entrypoint.sh: the image's ENTRYPOINT. A bind-mounted
-# data directory keeps its owner from the host, often root, and the app
-# could not write to it. Started as root, this creates DATA_DIR if
-# needed, gives it and everything in it to webhooker, sets its mode, and
-# runs the command as webhooker, so the app never runs as root. Started
-# as another user, it only runs the command.
-set -eu
-
-main() {
-    if [ "$(id -u)" != 0 ]; then
-        exec "$@"
-    fi
-
-    dir="${DATA_DIR:-/var/lib/webhooker}"
-    mkdir -p "$dir"
-    find "$dir" ! -user webhooker -exec chown -h webhooker:webhooker {} +
-    chmod 750 "$dir"
-    exec su-exec webhooker "$@"
-}
-
-main "$@"
@@ -192,10 +192,9 @@ type Config struct {
 	// alwaysBlockedNetworks stays blocked no matter what is listed
 	// here. That set is link-local plus the cloud metadata
 	// endpoints outside it that disclose credentials or user data
-	// at a provider-fixed, non-public address; it is not
-	// exhaustive of every cloud's metadata address. See
-	// alwaysBlockedNetworks for the authoritative list and the
-	// criterion it is built from.
+	// at a provider-fixed address; it is not exhaustive of every
+	// cloud's metadata address. See alwaysBlockedNetworks for the
+	// authoritative list and the criterion it is built from.
 	AllowedEgressCIDRs []netip.Prefix

 	params *ConfigParams
@@ -747,14 +746,12 @@ func (c *Config) warnEgressAllowlist(log *slog.Logger) {

 	log.Warn(
 		"ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS lets delivery targets reach these "+
-			"otherwise-blocked networks. Anyone who can create a "+
-			"delivery target can now make this process issue "+
-			"requests into them, and read back the response. Only "+
-			"the addresses the README lists as blocked "+
-			"unconditionally stay blocked regardless of what is "+
-			"listed here; a public cloud metadata address such as "+
-			"168.63.129.16 is reachable once it, or a block "+
-			"covering it, is listed.",
+			"otherwise-blocked private/reserved networks. Anyone "+
+			"who can create a delivery target can now make this "+
+			"process issue requests into them, and read back the "+
+			"response. Link-local and the known cloud instance "+
+			"metadata endpoints outside it stay blocked "+
+			"regardless of what is listed here.",
 		"allowedEgressCIDRs",
 		strings.Join(PrefixStrings(c.AllowedEgressCIDRs), ","),
 	)
@@ -834,13 +834,12 @@ func TestEgressAllowlistWarning(t *testing.T) {
 			// to be able to read back which networks are open.
 			assert.Contains(t, logged, "10.0.0.0/8")
 			assert.Contains(t, logged, "127.0.0.0/8")
-			// What stays shut is the whole unconditional set, not
-			// link-local alone; a public metadata address is not in
-			// it, so a listed block covering it opens it.
-			assert.Contains(t, logged, "blocked unconditionally")
-			assert.Contains(t, logged, "168.63.129.16 is reachable")
-			// The listed blocks need not be private or reserved.
-			assert.NotContains(t, logged, "private/reserved")
+			// What stays shut. Asserted on the clause naming the
+			// wider set rather than on "Link-local" alone, so the
+			// string cannot narrow back to link-local only while
+			// the always-blocked set covers ULA, CGNAT and two
+			// public metadata addresses as well.
+			assert.Contains(t, logged, "metadata endpoints outside it")
 		})
 	}
 }
@@ -3,8 +3,6 @@ package database_test
 import (
 	"bytes"
 	"context"
-	"log/slog"
-	"path/filepath"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"

@@ -85,37 +83,3 @@ func TestFirstBoot_PrintsTheAdminPasswordAsABanner(t *testing.T) {
 		t, ok, "the printed password must open the seeded account",
 	)
 }
-
-// TestNewDatabase_IsLoggedWithItsPath is the log half of
-// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/359. A DATA_DIR that is
-// unexpectedly empty boots exactly like a first start, so the start
-// that creates the database must say so, and where. Opening that
-// database again must not.
-func TestNewDatabase_IsLoggedWithItsPath(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	dir := t.TempDir()
-
-	open := func() string {
-		var out bytes.Buffer
-
-		db, err := database.Open(dir, slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(&out, nil)))
-		require.NoError(t, err)
-		require.NoError(t, db.Close())
-
-		return out.String()
-	}
-
-	const created = `level=WARN msg="created a new, empty database"`
-
-	first := open()
-	second := open()
-
-	assert.Contains(
-		t, first,
-		created+" path="+filepath.Join(dir, database.MainDBFileName),
-	)
-	assert.NotContains(
-		t, second, created, "an existing database is not new",
-	)
-}
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ import (
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
-	"io/fs"
 	"log/slog"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
@@ -200,12 +199,6 @@ func (d *Database) connectTo(dataDir string) error {
 	// Construct the main application database path inside DATA_DIR.
 	dbPath := filepath.Join(dataDir, MainDBFileName)

-	// Checked before opening, which creates the file. A DATA_DIR that
-	// is unexpectedly empty -- its volume not mounted, say -- looks
-	// exactly like a first start, so a new database is a warning.
-	_, statErr := os.Stat(dbPath)
-	created := errors.Is(statErr, fs.ErrNotExist)
-
 	// Opened through OpenSQLite so this handle carries the same WAL
 	// journaling, busy timeout, immediate-transaction locking, and pool
 	// bounds as every other database file. See sqlite_open.go.
@@ -236,12 +229,7 @@ func (d *Database) connectTo(dataDir string) error {
 	}

 	d.db = db
-
-	if created {
-		d.log.Warn("created a new, empty database", "path", dbPath)
-	} else {
 	d.log.Info("connected to database", "path", dbPath)
-	}

 	// Run migrations
 	return d.migrate()
@@ -362,15 +362,6 @@ func (e *Engine) start() {
 // stop cancels the worker pool's context and waits for the pool
 // to drain, bounded by the stop hook's context: a wedged worker
 // must not hang the process past fx's stop timeout.
-//
-// Once the pool has drained it closes the archive writers, so a
-// clean stop leaves no archive -wal behind. Nothing else holds a
-// writer for long by then: the archive sweeper stops before the
-// engine, and deleting a webhook only closes one. If the pool did
-// not drain in time, the writers are left open, as a kill would
-// leave them. Closing them would wait for any write in progress,
-// and a worker still running would then open new writers that
-// nothing closes, so it gains nothing over a kill.
 func (e *Engine) stop(ctx context.Context) error {
 	e.log.Info("delivery engine stopping")

@@ -385,8 +376,6 @@ func (e *Engine) stop(ctx context.Context) error {
 		return err
 	}

-	e.dbTarget.evictAll()
-
 	e.log.Info("delivery engine stopped")

 	return nil
@@ -739,7 +728,9 @@ func (e *Engine) recoverSingleRetry(
 		// webhook on one bad read would be a far larger fault than
 		// the strand it is meant to clear.
 		if errors.Is(err, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound) {
-			e.failMissingTarget(webhookDB, webhookID, d)
+			e.failMissingTargetRetry(
+				webhookDB, webhookID, d,
+			)

 			return
 		}
@@ -1142,7 +1133,9 @@ func (e *Engine) sweepSingleRetry(
 		// Deleted is terminal, unreadable is not; see
 		// recoverSingleRetry.
 		if errors.Is(err, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound) {
-			e.failMissingTarget(webhookDB, webhookID, d)
+			e.failMissingTargetRetry(
+				webhookDB, webhookID, d,
+			)

 			return
 		}
@@ -1256,19 +1249,19 @@ func (e *Engine) failUnretryableRetry(
 	e.failDelivery(webhookDB, d, target.Type, reason)
 }

-// failMissingTarget terminally fails a recovered delivery, pending or
-// retrying, whose target row is gone. Restart recovery and the periodic
-// sweep call it for both statuses, so the transition exists once.
+// failMissingTargetRetry terminally fails an orphaned retrying
+// delivery whose target row is gone. Both restart recovery and the
+// periodic sweep call it, so the transition exists once.
 //
-// Until it existed those paths logged the failed lookup and moved on,
-// which left the delivery where it was for the life of the database and
+// Until it existed both paths logged the failed lookup and returned,
+// which left the delivery retrying for the life of the database and
 // the sweep repeating the same error every minute forever. Failing it
 // with a recorded reason is the treatment the other orphaned-retry
 // cases already get, so all of them read alike in the event log.
 //
 // Logged at warn rather than error: a deleted target is an operator
 // action, not a system fault.
-func (e *Engine) failMissingTarget(
+func (e *Engine) failMissingTargetRetry(
 	webhookDB *gorm.DB,
 	webhookID string,
 	d *database.Delivery,
@@ -1281,37 +1274,13 @@ func (e *Engine) failMissingTarget(

 	defer e.inflight.release(d.ID)

-	// The batch was read before ownership was taken, and a worker may
-	// have settled the delivery and let it go in between. Only a row
-	// still in the status the batch read is failed.
-	row, err := e.loadDelivery(webhookDB, d.ID)
-	if err != nil {
-		e.log.Error(
-			"failed to load delivery",
-			"delivery_id", d.ID,
-			"error", err,
-		)
-
-		return
-	}
-
-	if row.Status != d.Status {
-		e.log.Debug(
-			"delivery already handled, not failed",
-			"delivery_id", d.ID,
-			"status", row.Status,
-		)
-
-		return
-	}
-
 	targetType, reason := e.missingTargetReason(d.TargetID)

 	e.log.Warn(
-		"failing recovered delivery: its target no longer exists",
+		"failing orphaned retrying delivery: "+
+			"its target no longer exists",
 		"webhook_id", webhookID,
 		"delivery_id", d.ID,
-		"status", d.Status,
 		"target_id", d.TargetID,
 		"target_type", targetType,
 	)
@@ -1345,14 +1314,15 @@ func (e *Engine) missingTargetReason(
 	if err != nil {
 		return "", fmt.Sprintf(
 			"target %s no longer exists; the delivery "+
-				"has been failed terminally",
+				"cannot be retried and has been failed "+
+				"terminally",
 			targetID,
 		)
 	}

 	return target.Type, fmt.Sprintf(
 		"target %q (type %s) was deleted; the delivery "+
-			"has been failed terminally",
+			"cannot be retried and has been failed terminally",
 		target.Name, target.Type,
 	)
 }
@@ -2051,31 +2021,14 @@ func (e *Engine) sendRecoveredDeliveries(

 		target, ok := targetMap[deliveries[i].TargetID]
 		if !ok {
-			// A missing entry does not mean the target is gone: the
-			// map is also empty when its query failed. Only a lookup
-			// that finds no row ends the delivery; any other error
-			// leaves it pending for the next sweep. See
-			// recoverSingleRetry.
-			var err error
-
-			target, err = e.loadTarget(deliveries[i].TargetID)
-			if errors.Is(err, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound) {
-				e.failMissingTarget(webhookDB, webhookID, &deliveries[i])
-
-				continue
-			}
-
-			if err != nil {
 			e.log.Error(
-					"failed to load target for recovered delivery",
+				"target not found for delivery",
 				"delivery_id", deliveries[i].ID,
 				"target_id", deliveries[i].TargetID,
-					"error", err,
 			)

 			continue
 		}
-		}

 		if !e.takeForRedispatch(
 			webhookDB, deliveries[i].ID,
@@ -2,8 +2,6 @@ package delivery_test

 import (
 	"context"
-	"fmt"
-	"path/filepath"
 	"testing"
 	"time"

@@ -271,88 +269,3 @@ func TestEngine_StopHookHonoursStopTimeout(t *testing.T) {

 	requireStopHookExpires(t, lc.hooks[0], "delivery engine")
 }
-
-// deliverToArchive runs one delivery to a database target through
-// the running engine and returns the webhook's archive file path.
-// The archive writer holds the file open afterwards.
-func deliverToArchive(t *testing.T, s iSetup) string {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	deliveryID, task := seedLogTask(t, s)
-	task.TargetType = database.TargetTypeDatabase
-
-	s.Engine.Notify([]delivery.Task{task})
-
-	iWaitForDelivered(t, s.WebhookDB, deliveryID)
-
-	return filepath.Join(
-		filepath.Dir(s.DBMgr.DBPath(s.WebhookID)),
-		fmt.Sprintf("archive-%s.db", s.WebhookID),
-	)
-}
-
-// TestEngine_StopHookClosesArchives is the regression test for an
-// archive split across two files by a clean stop. The engine never
-// closed its archive writers, so after a stop the archived rows
-// could sit in archive-{id}.db-wal while archive-{id}.db held no
-// table at all, and copying the .db on its own gave an empty
-// database.
-func TestEngine_StopHookClosesArchives(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	s := newISetup(t)
-
-	lc := startEngineViaHook(t, s.Engine)
-
-	path := deliverToArchive(t, s)
-	require.FileExists(
-		t, path+"-wal",
-		"an open archive should have a -wal for the stop to remove",
-	)
-
-	require.NoError(t, lc.hooks[0].OnStop(context.Background()))
-
-	wals, err := filepath.Glob(
-		filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(path), "archive-*.db-wal"),
-	)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	require.Empty(
-		t, wals, "a clean stop must leave no archive -wal behind",
-	)
-
-	// With no -wal beside it, the row can only be in the .db.
-	count, err := countArchivedRows(path)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	require.Equal(t, int64(1), count)
-}
-
-// TestEngine_StopHookTimeoutLeavesArchivesOpen covers a stop whose
-// budget runs out while a worker is still running. The archive
-// writers are left open, as a kill would leave them: closing them
-// would wait for any write in progress, and that worker would then
-// open new writers that nothing closes.
-func TestEngine_StopHookTimeoutLeavesArchivesOpen(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	s := newISetup(t)
-
-	lc := startEngineViaHook(t, s.Engine)
-
-	deliverToArchive(t, s)
-
-	release := make(chan struct{})
-
-	t.Cleanup(func() {
-		close(release)
-		s.Engine.EvictWebhook(s.WebhookID)
-	})
-
-	s.Engine.ExportWedgeWorker(release)
-
-	requireStopHookExpires(t, lc.hooks[0], "delivery engine")
-
-	require.True(
-		t, s.Engine.ExportArchiveHandleOpen(s.WebhookID),
-		"a stop that timed out must not close archive writers",
-	)
-}
@@ -342,31 +342,6 @@ func (e *Engine) ExportRecoverRetryingDeliveries(
 	e.recoverRetryingDeliveries(webhookDB, webhookID)
 }

-// ExportFailMissingTarget exposes failMissingTarget, so a test can hand
-// it a delivery as a batch read it earlier.
-func (e *Engine) ExportFailMissingTarget(
-	webhookDB *gorm.DB,
-	webhookID string,
-	d *database.Delivery,
-) {
-	e.failMissingTarget(webhookDB, webhookID, d)
-}
-
-// ExportSendRecoveredDeliveries exposes sendRecoveredDeliveries, so a
-// test can hand it a target map that lacks a delivery's target.
-func (e *Engine) ExportSendRecoveredDeliveries(
-	ctx context.Context,
-	webhookDB *gorm.DB,
-	deliveries []database.Delivery,
-	webhookID string,
-	targetMap map[string]database.Target,
-	settled map[string]struct{},
-) {
-	e.sendRecoveredDeliveries(
-		ctx, webhookDB, deliveries, webhookID, targetMap, settled,
-	)
-}
-
 // ExportDeliveryCh returns the delivery channel.
 func (e *Engine) ExportDeliveryCh() chan Task {
 	return e.deliveryCh
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ var (
 		"hostname resolved to no IP addresses",
 	)
 	errBlockedIP = errors.New(
-		"blocked private, reserved or cloud metadata address",
+		"blocked private/reserved IP range",
 	)
 	errBlockedMetadata = errors.New(
 		"blocked link-local or cloud instance metadata " +
@@ -37,10 +37,9 @@ var (
 	)
 )

-// blockedNetworks is the default blocklist: the private and
-// reserved IP ranges, plus the public cloud metadata addresses,
-// that are blocked to prevent SSRF attacks. An operator can
-// permit specific blocks out of this set with
+// blockedNetworks contains all private/reserved IP ranges
+// that should be blocked to prevent SSRF attacks. An operator
+// can permit specific blocks out of this set with
 // ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS; see Guard.
 //
 //nolint:gochecknoglobals // package-level network list is appropriate here
@@ -123,8 +122,6 @@ func init() {
 		"::1/128",
 		"fc00::/7",
 		"fe80::/10",
-		// Azure WireServer, a public address that serves VM credentials.
-		"168.63.129.16/32",
 	})

 	// Every entry is named. The set must not grow or shrink
@@ -219,8 +216,8 @@ func matchesAny(networks []*net.IPNet, ip net.IP) bool {
 }

 // isBlockedIP checks whether an IP address falls within
-// the default blocklist, before any operator allowlist is
-// considered.
+// any blocked private/reserved network range, before any
+// operator allowlist is considered.
 func isBlockedIP(ip net.IP) bool {
 	return matchesAny(blockedNetworks, ip)
 }
@@ -323,7 +320,7 @@ func (g *Guard) allows(ip net.IP) bool {
 //
 //  1. alwaysBlockedNetworks is refused before the allowlist is
 //     consulted, so no configured CIDR reaches link-local or a
-//     cloud metadata endpoint at a non-public address.
+//     cloud instance metadata endpoint.
 //  2. The allowlist is consulted next, so a listed private
 //     network becomes reachable.
 //  3. Everything else keeps the default blocklist's answer.
@@ -390,41 +390,6 @@ func TestGuardAllowlist_PublicUnaffected(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

-// TestGuardAllowlist_AzureWireServerReopenable covers Azure's
-// WireServer, a public address that serves VM credentials. The
-// default guard refuses it, but because it is public it sits in
-// the default blocklist rather than the unconditional set, so an
-// operator who lists it can reach it.
-func TestGuardAllowlist_AzureWireServerReopenable(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	const wireServerIP = "168.63.129.16"
-
-	target := "http://" + wireServerIP + "/?comp=versions"
-
-	defaultGuard := delivery.NewTestGuard()
-
-	err := defaultGuard.ValidateTargetURL(context.Background(), target)
-	require.Error(t, err,
-		"WireServer must be refused with no allowlist set",
-	)
-	assert.NotContains(t, err.Error(), metadataRefusalClause,
-		"WireServer must be refused by the default blocklist, "+
-			"which an allowlist can override",
-	)
-
-	assertDialRefused(t, defaultGuard, target)
-
-	listed := delivery.NewTestGuard(
-		netip.MustParsePrefix(wireServerIP + "/32"),
-	)
-
-	assert.NoError(t,
-		listed.ValidateTargetURL(context.Background(), target),
-		"an operator who lists WireServer must be able to reach it",
-	)
-}
-
 // TestGuardCheckIP_BothPathsShareOneDecision asserts that the
 // validator and the dialer are not two policies that happen to
 // agree: both are defined in terms of checkIP, so the exported
@@ -277,24 +277,6 @@ func (t *databaseTarget) evict(webhookID string) {
 	)
 }

-// evictAll evicts every cached archive writer, exactly as evict
-// does for one webhook. The engine calls it at shutdown, once its
-// workers have returned. Closing the last handle on an archive
-// moves the contents of its -wal into the .db and removes the
-// -wal, so a clean stop leaves each archive as a single file.
-func (t *databaseTarget) evictAll() {
-	t.mu.Lock()
-
-	writers := t.writers
-	t.writers = nil
-
-	t.mu.Unlock()
-
-	for _, w := range writers {
-		w.evict()
-	}
-}
-
 // sweepWebhook prunes one webhook's archive of rows older than
 // expiry, without requiring a write. It returns nil (nothing to
 // do) when the archive file does not exist, so a sweep never
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
 package delivery_test

 import (
-	"context"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"net/http"
@@ -362,46 +361,3 @@ func TestEvictWebhook_LaterDeliveryRecreatesWriter(t *testing.T) {
 		"a later delivery should recreate the writer",
 	)
 }
-
-// TestEngineStop_WriteAfterStopIsRefused proves the engine's stop
-// closes each archive writer the way deleting its webhook does: a
-// write that reaches a writer after the stop is refused, reopens
-// nothing and adds no row.
-func TestEngineStop_WriteAfterStopIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	eng, _ := evictTestEngine(t)
-
-	webhookDB := testWebhookDB(t)
-	event := seedEvent(t, webhookDB, `{"archived":true}`)
-	d := seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(t, webhookDB, event, "")
-
-	eng.ExportDeliverDatabase(webhookDB, d)
-
-	w := eng.ExportArchiveWriterFor(event.WebhookID)
-	require.NotNil(t, w)
-	require.True(t, w.HandleOpen())
-
-	require.NoError(t, eng.ExportStop(context.Background()))
-
-	err := w.Write(evictTestRow("ev-after-stop"), 0)
-
-	require.ErrorIs(
-		t, err, delivery.ErrExportArchiveWriterEvicted,
-		"a write after the stop must be refused",
-	)
-	assert.False(
-		t, w.HandleOpen(),
-		"a refused write must not reopen the archive",
-	)
-	assert.False(
-		t, eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(event.WebhookID),
-		"the stop should empty the registry",
-	)
-
-	count, err := countArchivedRows(w.Path())
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.Equal(
-		t, int64(1), count, "the refused row must not be written",
-	)
-}
@@ -18,17 +18,16 @@ import (
 // https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/107: a delivery failed
 // with nothing in its event log to say why, and a retrying delivery
 // whose target was deleted, which used to keep sending and then never
-// terminalise. Section 4 is the same deleted-target gap for a pending
-// delivery: https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/293.
+// terminalise.

 // tUnknownType is a target type no build implements. It stands in for
 // a target whose type was written by a build that knew a type this one
 // does not.
 const tUnknownType = database.TargetType("pubsub")

-// tSeedDeletedTarget creates a target, a delivery against it at the
-// given status with one recorded failed attempt, and then deletes the
-// target the way the source page does.
+// tSeedDeletedTarget creates a target, a retrying delivery against it
+// with one recorded failed attempt, and then deletes the target the
+// way the source page does.
 //
 // It asserts the delete is soft, because that is the whole reason the
 // engine could not tell a deleted target from a target id that never
@@ -37,7 +36,6 @@ func tSeedDeletedTarget(
 	t *testing.T,
 	s iSetup,
 	name, url string,
-	status database.DeliveryStatus,
 ) string {
 	t.Helper()

@@ -53,7 +51,8 @@ func tSeedDeletedTarget(
 	)

 	d := iSeedDelivery(
-		t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID, status,
+		t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
+		database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
 	)

 	iSeedFailedResult(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID)
@@ -174,7 +173,6 @@ func TestRecoverSingleRetry_TargetDeleted(t *testing.T) {

 	deliveryID := tSeedDeletedTarget(
 		t, s, "gone-on-recovery", "http://example.com/hook",
-		database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
 	)

 	s.Engine.ExportRecoverWebhookDeliveries(
@@ -212,7 +210,6 @@ func TestSweepSingleRetry_TargetDeleted(t *testing.T) {

 	deliveryID := tSeedDeletedTarget(
 		t, s, "gone-on-sweep", "http://example.com/hook",
-		database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
 	)

 	// Twice, because the bug was an error the sweep repeated every
@@ -281,11 +278,11 @@ func TestSweepSingleRetry_TargetNeverExisted(t *testing.T) {
 	)
 }

-// TestFailMissingTarget_WritesNoTargetRow holds the new terminal path
-// to the same rule as the existing one: no target row, and so no
+// TestFailMissingTargetRetry_WritesNoTargetRow holds the new terminal
+// path to the same rule as the existing one: no target row, and so no
 // plaintext target config, may be written into the per-webhook event
 // database. See https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/206.
-func TestFailMissingTarget_WritesNoTargetRow(
+func TestFailMissingTargetRetry_WritesNoTargetRow(
 	t *testing.T,
 ) {
 	t.Parallel()
@@ -300,7 +297,6 @@ func TestFailMissingTarget_WritesNoTargetRow(

 	deliveryID := tSeedDeletedTarget(
 		t, s, "credential-bearing", hookURL,
-		database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
 	)

 	s.Engine.ExportSweepWebhookRetries(
@@ -533,260 +529,3 @@ func TestRecoverSingleRetry_TargetUnreadable_LeavesDeliveryAlone(

 	assert.Zero(t, s.Engine.ExportInflightHeld())
 }
-
-// --- 4. A pending delivery whose target is gone ---
-
-func TestRecoverPending_TargetDeleted(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	s := newISetup(t)
-
-	deliveryID := tSeedDeletedTarget(
-		t, s, "gone-while-pending", "http://example.com/hook",
-		database.DeliveryStatusPending,
-	)
-
-	s.Engine.ExportRecoverWebhookDeliveries(
-		context.Background(), s.WebhookID,
-	)
-
-	iAssertStatus(
-		t, s.WebhookDB, deliveryID,
-		database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
-	)
-
-	last := tLastResult(t, s, deliveryID, 2)
-
-	assert.False(t, last.Success)
-	assert.Equal(t, 2, last.AttemptNum)
-	assert.Contains(t, last.Error, "gone-while-pending")
-	assert.Contains(t, last.Error, "was deleted")
-
-	assert.Empty(t, fDrain(s.Engine),
-		"a delivery whose target is gone was sent",
-	)
-	assert.Zero(t, s.Engine.ExportInflightHeld(),
-		"the terminal path leaked its ownership reference",
-	)
-}
-
-// TestRecoverPending_TargetDeleted_LeavesAnOwnedDeliveryAlone: the
-// terminal write takes ownership like every other recovery write, so a
-// delivery the engine still holds is not failed underneath its worker.
-func TestRecoverPending_TargetDeleted_LeavesAnOwnedDeliveryAlone(
-	t *testing.T,
-) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	s := newISetup(t)
-
-	deliveryID := tSeedDeletedTarget(
-		t, s, "gone-but-owned", "http://example.com/hook",
-		database.DeliveryStatusPending,
-	)
-
-	require.True(t, s.Engine.ExportRetainDelivery(deliveryID))
-
-	s.Engine.ExportRecoverWebhookDeliveries(
-		context.Background(), s.WebhookID,
-	)
-
-	iAssertStatus(
-		t, s.WebhookDB, deliveryID,
-		database.DeliveryStatusPending,
-	)
-
-	assert.Len(t, iResults(t, s.WebhookDB, deliveryID), 1,
-		"a delivery the engine owns was failed underneath it",
-	)
-}
-
-// TestFailMissingTarget_LeavesASettledDeliveryAlone: the recovery paths
-// read their batch before taking ownership, and a worker may send a
-// delivery and let it go in between. The terminal write goes by the row
-// as it is now, not as the batch read it.
-func TestFailMissingTarget_LeavesASettledDeliveryAlone(
-	t *testing.T,
-) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	s := newISetup(t)
-
-	deliveryID := tSeedDeletedTarget(
-		t, s, "gone-after-sending", "http://example.com/hook",
-		database.DeliveryStatusPending,
-	)
-
-	var batch database.Delivery
-
-	require.NoError(t, s.WebhookDB.First(
-		&batch, "id = ?", deliveryID,
-	).Error)
-
-	// A worker settles the delivery after the batch was read.
-	require.NoError(t, s.WebhookDB.Model(&database.Delivery{}).
-		Where("id = ?", deliveryID).
-		Update("status", database.DeliveryStatusDelivered).Error)
-
-	s.Engine.ExportFailMissingTarget(
-		s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, &batch,
-	)
-
-	iAssertStatus(
-		t, s.WebhookDB, deliveryID,
-		database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
-	)
-
-	assert.Len(t, iResults(t, s.WebhookDB, deliveryID), 1,
-		"a delivery settled after the batch read was then failed",
-	)
-	assert.Zero(t, s.Engine.ExportInflightHeld())
-}
-
-// TestSweepPending_TargetDeleted sweeps twice over a batch that also
-// holds a healthy stranded delivery. The one whose target is gone is
-// failed once and then left alone; the healthy one is queued by the
-// first sweep and not again by the second.
-func TestSweepPending_TargetDeleted(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	liveTargetID := uuid.New().String()
-	s := fSweepSetup(t, liveTargetID, "still-there")
-
-	deliveryID := tSeedDeletedTarget(
-		t, s, "gone-on-pending-sweep", "http://example.com/hook",
-		database.DeliveryStatusPending,
-	)
-	rAgePending(t, s.WebhookDB, deliveryID)
-
-	event := iSeedEvent(
-		t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"target":"live"}`,
-	)
-
-	healthy := iSeedDelivery(
-		t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, liveTargetID,
-		database.DeliveryStatusPending,
-	)
-	rAgePending(t, s.WebhookDB, healthy.ID)
-
-	ctx := context.Background()
-
-	s.Engine.ExportSweepWebhookRetries(ctx, s.WebhookID)
-
-	tasks := fDrain(s.Engine)
-	require.Len(t, tasks, 1,
-		"the first sweep did not queue the healthy delivery",
-	)
-	assert.Equal(t, healthy.ID, tasks[0].DeliveryID)
-
-	s.Engine.ExportSweepWebhookRetries(ctx, s.WebhookID)
-
-	assert.Empty(t, fDrain(s.Engine),
-		"the second sweep queued a delivery again",
-	)
-
-	iAssertStatus(
-		t, s.WebhookDB, deliveryID,
-		database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
-	)
-
-	last := tLastResult(t, s, deliveryID, 2)
-
-	assert.Contains(t, last.Error, "gone-on-pending-sweep")
-	assert.Contains(t, last.Error, "was deleted")
-}
-
-// TestSendRecoveredDeliveries_TargetMissingFromMap: the batch's target
-// map is empty when its query failed, so every delivery in the batch is
-// looked up on its own. A healthy one is sent to the target that lookup
-// finds.
-func TestSendRecoveredDeliveries_TargetMissingFromMap(
-	t *testing.T,
-) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	s := newISetup(t)
-
-	targetID := uuid.New().String()
-
-	iCreateTarget(
-		t, s.MainDB, targetID, s.WebhookID, "found-on-lookup",
-		database.TargetTypeLog, "", 0,
-	)
-
-	event := iSeedEvent(
-		t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"map":"empty"}`,
-	)
-
-	d := iSeedDelivery(
-		t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
-		database.DeliveryStatusPending,
-	)
-
-	s.Engine.ExportSendRecoveredDeliveries(
-		context.Background(), s.WebhookDB,
-		[]database.Delivery{d}, s.WebhookID,
-		map[string]database.Target{}, nil,
-	)
-
-	tasks := fDrain(s.Engine)
-	require.Len(t, tasks, 1,
-		"the healthy delivery was not queued exactly once",
-	)
-	assert.Equal(t, d.ID, tasks[0].DeliveryID)
-	assert.Equal(t, targetID, tasks[0].TargetID)
-	assert.Equal(t, database.TargetTypeLog, tasks[0].TargetType)
-
-	iAssertStatus(
-		t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID,
-		database.DeliveryStatusPending,
-	)
-}
-
-// TestRecoverPending_TargetUnreadable_LeavesDeliveryAlone: a failed
-// read of the main database is not a deleted target. Restart recovery
-// holds every pending delivery of the webhook in one batch, so failing
-// on this would fail all of them.
-func TestRecoverPending_TargetUnreadable_LeavesDeliveryAlone(
-	t *testing.T,
-) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	s := newISetup(t)
-
-	targetID := uuid.New().String()
-
-	iCreateTarget(
-		t, s.MainDB, targetID, s.WebhookID, "healthy",
-		database.TargetTypeLog, "", 0,
-	)
-
-	event := iSeedEvent(
-		t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"still":"pending"}`,
-	)
-
-	d := iSeedDelivery(
-		t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
-		database.DeliveryStatusPending,
-	)
-
-	sqlDB, err := s.MainDB.DB()
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	require.NoError(t, sqlDB.Close())
-
-	s.Engine.ExportRecoverPendingDeliveries(
-		context.Background(), s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID,
-	)
-
-	iAssertStatus(
-		t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID,
-		database.DeliveryStatusPending,
-	)
-
-	assert.Empty(t, iResults(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID),
-		"an unreadable main database produced a terminal "+
-			"failure row",
-	)
-	assert.Empty(t, fDrain(s.Engine))
-	assert.Zero(t, s.Engine.ExportInflightHeld())
-}
@@ -133,11 +133,6 @@ func (w *recoverResponseWriter) Unwrap() http.ResponseWriter {
 // what the access log records and the metrics count, and outside the
 // sentryhttp handler, whose Repanic option depends on something
 // further out recovering what it re-raises.
-//
-// Unlike http.Error on its own, it deletes any Set-Cookie the handler
-// set before panicking, because a request that failed must not hand
-// the client a credential; every other header is left to http.Error.
-// See https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/193.
 func (s *Middleware) Recoverer() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
 	return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
 		return http.HandlerFunc(func(
@@ -169,8 +164,6 @@ func (s *Middleware) Recoverer() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
 					return
 				}

-				rw.Header().Del("Set-Cookie")
-
 				http.Error(
 					rw,
 					http.StatusText(
@@ -304,44 +304,16 @@ func TestRecovererRepanicsErrAbortHandler(t *testing.T) {
 	)
 }

-// TestRecovererDropsSetCookieFromTheRecovered500 covers a handler that
-// sets a cookie and a redirect target and then panics before sending
-// anything. A request that failed must not hand the client a
-// credential, so the 500 carries no cookie; Location is left alone.
-func TestRecovererDropsSetCookieFromTheRecovered500(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	probe := newRecovererProbe(
-		t, false,
-		func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
-			w.Header().Set("Set-Cookie", "session=x")
-			w.Header().Set("Location", "/after")
-
-			panic(panicMarker)
-		},
-	)
-
-	resp, err := probe.get(t)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	require.NoError(t, resp.Body.Close())
-
-	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusInternalServerError, resp.StatusCode)
-	assert.Empty(t, resp.Cookies())
-	assert.Equal(t, "/after", resp.Header.Get("Location"))
-}
-
 // TestRecovererKeepsAnAlreadyCommittedResponse covers a handler that
 // panics after sending its status. The bytes are already on the wire,
-// cookie included, so a second WriteHeader would change nothing the
-// client sees and would draw net/http's "superfluous
-// response.WriteHeader" report.
+// so a second WriteHeader would change nothing the client sees and
+// would draw net/http's "superfluous response.WriteHeader" report.
 func TestRecovererKeepsAnAlreadyCommittedResponse(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

 	probe := newRecovererProbe(
 		t, false,
 		func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
-			w.Header().Set("Set-Cookie", "session=x")
 			w.WriteHeader(committedStatus)
 			_, _ = w.Write([]byte("partial"))

@@ -359,7 +331,6 @@ func TestRecovererKeepsAnAlreadyCommittedResponse(t *testing.T) {

 	assert.Equal(t, committedStatus, resp.StatusCode)
 	assert.Equal(t, "partial", string(body))
-	assert.Len(t, resp.Cookies(), 1)

 	record := probe.panicRecord(t)
 	assert.Equal(t, panicMarker, record["panic"])
@@ -92,25 +92,11 @@ func (s *Server) setupGlobalMiddleware() {
 func (s *Server) setupRoutes() {
 	s.router.Get("/", s.h.HandleIndex())

-	// Static assets answer GET and HEAD only. chi's default 405
-	// carries no Allow header, so this group supplies its own.
-	staticFiles := http.StripPrefix(
-		"/s", http.FileServer(http.FS(static.Static)),
+	s.router.Mount(
+		"/s",
+		http.StripPrefix("/s", http.FileServer(http.FS(static.Static))),
 	)

-	s.router.Route("/s", func(r chi.Router) {
-		r.MethodNotAllowed(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
-			w.Header().Set("Allow", "GET, HEAD")
-			http.Error(
-				w,
-				"Method Not Allowed",
-				http.StatusMethodNotAllowed,
-			)
-		})
-		r.Method(http.MethodGet, "/*", staticFiles)
-		r.Method(http.MethodHead, "/*", staticFiles)
-	})
-
 	s.router.Route("/api/v1", func(_ chi.Router) {
 		// API routes will be added here.
 	})
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import (
 	"net/http/httptest"
 	"net/url"
 	"regexp"
-	"slices"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
@@ -221,21 +220,9 @@ func (e *testEnv) csrfFrom(
 	// out of the markup has to be unescaped before it is submitted.
 	token := html.UnescapeString(match[1])

-	// A cookie the page sets replaces the one of the same name, as in
-	// a browser. Sent both, the server would read the first, older one.
-	set := w.Result().Cookies()
-	combined := make([]*http.Cookie, 0, len(cookies)+len(set))
-
-	for _, c := range cookies {
-		replaced := slices.ContainsFunc(set, func(n *http.Cookie) bool {
-			return n.Name == c.Name
-		})
-		if !replaced {
-			combined = append(combined, c)
-		}
-	}
-
-	combined = append(combined, set...)
+	combined := make([]*http.Cookie, 0, len(cookies))
+	combined = append(combined, cookies...)
+	combined = append(combined, w.Result().Cookies()...)

 	return token, combined
 }
@@ -409,15 +396,13 @@ func (e *testEnv) storedHash(t *testing.T, username string) string {

 // --- /s static group ---

-// TestStaticServesOnlyGetAndHead pins the methods the static group
-// answers: GET and HEAD are served the asset, and the other methods
-// chi routes (POST, PUT, DELETE and the rest) are refused with 405
-// and an Allow header naming those two. A method chi does not route,
-// such as PROPFIND, is refused with 405 by the top-level router
-// before it reaches the static group, so it gets no Allow header.
-// The README documents this; the test is what keeps the two from
-// drifting.
-func TestStaticServesOnlyGetAndHead(t *testing.T) {
+// TestStaticServesEveryMethod pins what the static mount actually
+// answers. chi's Mount registers the handler for all methods and
+// http.FileServer only special-cases HEAD (by suppressing the body),
+// so a POST or a DELETE to an asset is served the file rather than
+// refused. The README documents this; the test is what keeps the two
+// from drifting.
+func TestStaticServesEveryMethod(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

 	env := newTestEnv(t)
@@ -432,7 +417,6 @@ func TestStaticServesOnlyGetAndHead(t *testing.T) {
 		http.MethodPost,
 		http.MethodPut,
 		http.MethodDelete,
-		"PROPFIND",
 	} {
 		t.Run(method, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
@@ -444,38 +428,18 @@ func TestStaticServesOnlyGetAndHead(t *testing.T) {
 			w := httptest.NewRecorder()
 			env.router.ServeHTTP(w, req)

-			switch method {
-			case http.MethodGet:
-				assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
-				assert.Equal(t, body, w.Body.Bytes(),
-					"the asset itself is returned")
-			case http.MethodHead:
-				assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
+			assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code,
+				"static mount answers every method")
+
+			if method == http.MethodHead {
 				assert.Empty(t, w.Body.Bytes(),
 					"HEAD must not carry a body")
-			case "PROPFIND":
-				assert.Equal(
-					t, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, w.Code,
-				)
-				assert.Empty(t, w.Header().Get("Allow"),
-					"chi refuses a method it does not route "+
-						"before the static group runs")
-				assert.NotContains(
-					t, w.Body.String(), string(body),
-					"a refused method must not get the asset",
-				)
-			default:
-				assert.Equal(
-					t, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, w.Code,
-				)
-				assert.Equal(
-					t, "GET, HEAD", w.Header().Get("Allow"),
-				)
-				assert.NotContains(
-					t, w.Body.String(), string(body),
-					"a refused method must not get the asset",
-				)
+
+				return
 			}
+
+			assert.Equal(t, body, w.Body.Bytes(),
+				"the asset itself is returned")
 		})
 	}
 }
@@ -627,59 +591,6 @@ func TestPagesLogin_CorrectPasswordSurvivesASpentBudget(
 	)
 }

-// TestPagesLogin_CookiesFromAnEarlierDatabase is
-// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/359. A new database
-// brings a new session key, and the operator's browser still holds
-// the session and CSRF cookies signed with the old one. Logging in
-// must work as from a fresh browser and leave cookies the new key
-// accepts.
-func TestPagesLogin_CookiesFromAnEarlierDatabase(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	const (
-		username = "operator"
-		password = "correct-horse-battery-staple"
-	)
-
-	earlier := newTestEnv(t)
-	earlierID, _ := earlier.seedUser(t, username, password)
-	_, stale := earlier.csrfFrom(t, "/pages/login", nil)
-	stale = append(stale, earlier.authCookies(t, earlierID, username)...)
-
-	env := newTestEnv(t)
-	env.seedUser(t, username, password)
-
-	token, cookies := env.csrfFrom(t, "/pages/login", stale)
-
-	form := url.Values{}
-	form.Set("csrf_token", token)
-	form.Set("username", username)
-	form.Set("password", password)
-
-	w := env.post("/pages/login", form, cookies)
-	require.Equal(
-		t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code,
-		"a session cookie from another key must not fail the login",
-	)
-
-	// The response deletes the old session cookie and then sets the
-	// new one; a browser keeps the last.
-	var fresh *http.Cookie
-
-	for _, c := range w.Result().Cookies() {
-		if c.Name == session.SessionName {
-			fresh = c
-		}
-	}
-
-	require.NotNil(t, fresh, "login must set a session cookie")
-	assert.Equal(
-		t, "/sources",
-		env.get("/", []*http.Cookie{fresh}).Header().Get("Location"),
-		"the new session cookie must authenticate",
-	)
-}
-
 // --- /user/{username} group ---

 // TestPasswordChange_OversizeBody_RejectedAndPasswordUnchanged
@@ -19,8 +19,8 @@ import (
 )

 // The tests below exercise the securecookie codecs underneath the
-// store and nothing else: they decode through the store itself, so no
-// server-side expiry check takes part in the result. They exist because
+// store and nothing else: Session.Get only decodes, so no server-side
+// expiry check takes part in the result. They exist because
 // NewCookieStore gives its codecs a 30-day max age that assigning
 // store.Options does not override, which would let the codec accept a
 // cookie weeks past the cap the cookie attribute advertises.
@@ -75,11 +75,10 @@ func restamp(
 	return base64.URLEncoding.EncodeToString(payload)
 }

-// decodeCookie feeds value back through the store's decode path. It
-// asks the store rather than Session.Get, which treats a cookie that
-// does not decode as absent and so hides the codec's reason.
+// decodeCookie feeds value back through the store's decode path.
 func decodeCookie(
 	t *testing.T,
+	s *session.Session,
 	value string,
 ) (*sessions.Session, error) {
 	t.Helper()
@@ -95,7 +94,7 @@ func decodeCookie(
 		SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
 	})

-	sess, err := session.NewStore(testKey()).Get(req, session.SessionName)
+	sess, err := s.Get(req)
 	require.NotNil(t, sess)

 	return sess, err
@@ -106,7 +105,7 @@ func TestCodec_AcceptsCookieInsideAbsoluteCap(t *testing.T) {

 	s := testSession(t)

-	sess, err := decodeCookie(t, restamp(
+	sess, err := decodeCookie(t, s, restamp(
 		t,
 		issuedCookie(t, s),
 		time.Now().Add(-(testAbsoluteMaxAge-time.Hour)),
@@ -127,7 +126,7 @@ func TestCodec_RejectsCookiePastAbsoluteCap(t *testing.T) {

 	s := testSession(t)

-	sess, err := decodeCookie(t, restamp(
+	sess, err := decodeCookie(t, s, restamp(
 		t,
 		issuedCookie(t, s),
 		time.Now().Add(-(testAbsoluteMaxAge+time.Hour)),
@@ -224,22 +224,10 @@ func New(
 }

 // Get retrieves a session for the request.
-//
-// A session cookie that does not decode -- one signed with an earlier
-// session key, say, because the database was made anew -- is treated
-// as absent: the caller gets a new, empty session and no error, and
-// the next save replaces the cookie.
 func (s *Session) Get(
 	r *http.Request,
 ) (*sessions.Session, error) {
-	sess, err := s.store.Get(r, SessionName)
-	if sess == nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-
-	// For a cookie that does not decode, gorilla/sessions returns a
-	// new, empty session alongside the error that is dropped here.
-	return sess, nil
+	return s.store.Get(r, SessionName)
 }

 // GetKey returns the raw 32-byte authentication key used for