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sneak
88e283f728 Add optional inbound webhook signature verification (closes #67)
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Details 
A receiver URL was a bare v4 UUID and nothing else: anyone who learned
it could store events and, because inbound headers are forwarded to
targets almost verbatim, choose what the downstream service received.

Entrypoints gain an optional scheme/secret pair. GitHub's
X-Hub-Signature-256 (HMAC-SHA256 hex over the raw body) and GitLab's
X-Gitlab-Token (plain shared token) are supported; both compare with
hmac.Equal. With nothing configured an entrypoint behaves exactly as
before, which is also where every pre-existing row lands after
AutoMigrate adds the columns.

Verification runs after the capped body read and before the first
write, so a rejected request leaves no event row, no delivery row and
no delivery task. A configuration the receiver cannot apply — unknown
scheme, or one half of the pair missing — is refused with a 500 rather
than falling back to unverified.

The secret is credential-bearing and is stored in the clear because
HMAC needs the key itself. It is excluded from JSON, kept out of
templates by a new handlers.EntrypointView projection, and absent from
every log line including the rejection path. The UI sets and rotates
it through one form that never renders the stored value.

Under the GitLab scheme the signature header is the secret rather than
a digest over the request, so an accepted request's headers are cloned
and the configured scheme's credential header dropped before they are
serialized onto the event. Stored headers are persisted verbatim in
the per-webhook database and replayed onto every outbound delivery, so
keeping the token would put it in every backup and hand every target
operator the means to forge signed requests to the entrypoint it
authenticates. Stripping sits once above the first write rather than
at each egress, and is driven by the scheme's own description with
stripping as the default: a scheme added later is covered unless it
declares its header a digest, as GitHub's HMAC over the body does.

An entrypoint holding one half of the pair now renders as
misconfigured rather than as unverified, and the scheme selector
follows the stored scheme so such a row no longer marks two options
selected.
 2026-08-20 05:26:07 +00:00
53 changed files with 267 additions and 7327 deletions
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326
README.md
View File

@@ -114,116 +114,6 @@ TTY detection, and security headers are always applied.
| `SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT` | Idle session timeout (Go duration) | `24h` |
| `RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT` | Receiver requests/minute per IP per entrypoint (10x that per IP across the route) | `120` |
| `TRUSTED_PROXIES` | CIDRs whose forwarded headers are trusted (unset: all clients behind a proxy share one rate-limit bucket; a correct login password is never throttled either way) | `""` (none) |
| `ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS` | CIDRs that delivery targets may reach despite the SSRF blocklist. Read [Allowing egress to your own network](#allowing-egress-to-your-own-network) before setting it | `""` (none) |
#### Allowing egress to your own network
By default every delivery target must resolve to a public address. The
private and reserved ranges — RFC 1918, loopback, CGNAT, link-local and
the rest — are refused, which stops a target from being used to make
webhooker probe the network it sits in.
That default is also inconvenient for the thing webhooker is mostly
for: taking a public webhook and forwarding it to something on your own
network. A container on the same Docker network, a box on `10.x`, a
service on `127.0.0.1` — all refused, until you name them.
`ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS` is a comma-separated list of CIDR blocks (a bare
address such as `10.0.0.7` is accepted and treated as a single host),
for example `10.0.0.0/8, 172.17.0.0/16`. Addresses inside those blocks
become valid delivery destinations. Everything outside them keeps the
default answer, so this only ever adds destinations — it never removes
any, and it cannot narrow what was already reachable.
**The risk, plainly.** Each block you list is a network that anyone who
can create a delivery target can now make this process issue requests
into, and read the response body back out of via the delivery log. That
is server-side request forgery, deliberately enabled and scoped by you.
A webhooker admin account is therefore as trusted as the narrowest
thing on those networks: an unauthenticated admin panel, a database
listening without a password, or an internal API that trusts its
network position is reachable through it. List the smallest blocks that
cover the destinations you actually deliver to — prefer
`10.1.2.3/32` over `10.0.0.0/8` — and never list a block wider than the
network you are willing to expose.
Listing `0.0.0.0/0` or `::/0` opens **every** other private and
reserved range at once — loopback, RFC 1918, CGNAT, ULA, the lot. It is
a functional off switch for everything except the addresses listed as
unconditionally blocked below, and it makes any delivery target a probe
into your entire network and this host's own loopback services. Do not
list it.
Two things this setting cannot do:
- **It cannot turn the guard off.** There is no boolean, and no value
that disables SSRF protection wholesale. The guard is always on and
the list is always an allowlist; an empty list (the default) means
every private and reserved range stays refused. Note that
`0.0.0.0/0` gets you most of the way there anyway, per above.
- **It cannot open link-local, or a cloud metadata endpoint that
discloses credentials or user data.** An address is on the list below
when both of these hold: the provider fixes it, so it cannot collide
with anything you run; and reaching it hands out credentials, user
data or bootstrap material. Those stay blocked no matter what you
list, including when you list them outright or list a supernet such
as `0.0.0.0/0`, `::/0`, `fd00::/8` or `100.64.0.0/10`. Treat this as
best effort rather than a guarantee — it is a hand-maintained list
and the caveat below the table applies:
| Blocked unconditionally | What it is |
| ----------------------- | ---------- |
| `169.254.0.0/16` | IPv4 link-local, carrying `169.254.169.254` (AWS, Azure, DigitalOcean, Hetzner, OpenStack and others — not Alibaba, which uses `100.100.100.200` below) |
| `fe80::/10` | IPv6 link-local |
| `fd00:ec2::254/128` | AWS IPv6 IMDS |
| `fd00:ec2::23/128` | AWS EKS Pod Identity Agent |
| `fd20:ce::254/128` | GCP metadata for IPv6-only instances |
| `fd00:c1::a9fe:a9fe/128` | Oracle OCI IMDS over IPv6 |
| `fd00:42::42/128` | Scaleway metadata over IPv6 |
| `fd00:a9fe:a9fe::1/128` | Linode/Akamai metadata over IPv6 |
| `100.100.100.200/32` | Alibaba Cloud metadata, inside CGNAT |
| `192.0.0.192/32` | Oracle Cloud Classic metadata |
| `::a9fe:a9fe/128` | `169.254.169.254` as an IPv4-compatible IPv6 address |
| `64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe/128` | `169.254.169.254` behind the NAT64 well-known prefix |
The IPv4-mapped form `::ffff:169.254.169.254` is covered by the
`169.254.0.0/16` entry. Reaching any of these is credential or
user-data theft rather than delivery to an internal service. Every
entry outside the two link-local blocks is a single address, so
blocking it costs you nothing else on the network around it.
The six ULA entries, all inside `fd00::/8`, are why this matters in
practice: `fd00::/8` is an ordinary block to allowlist for your own
IPv6 network, and without those host routes that one line would hand
out cloud credentials on five providers at once. There is only one
`/8` involved — `fd20:ce::254` masks into `fd00::/8` as well — and
the six endpoints are five providers because AWS appears twice, IMDS
and EKS Pod Identity. Several of them are described as "link-local" —
or even "localhost" — in their own vendor's documentation, but they
are ULAs and `fe80::/10` does not cover them.
Every entry above is reserved space. All but the last two are already
refused with no allowlist set, and listing them here is only what
stops an allowlist from reopening them; the last two are the alternate
encodings, which the default blocklist does not match. A publicly
routable metadata address is not listed here, because nothing on this
list can be reopened and blocking one that way would leave you no
escape hatch at all.
This list is not exhaustive of every cloud's metadata address — if
yours is not here, do not allowlist the block that contains it.
The list is applied at one place in the code, which both target
creation and delivery consult, so a URL that the target form accepts is
one that delivery will actually attempt — the two cannot disagree.
Delivery re-resolves and re-checks the destination at dial time, so a
hostname that resolves to an allowed address during validation and a
different one later (DNS rebinding) is still refused unless the new
address is also allowed.
A set but unparseable value aborts startup. When the list is non-empty
webhooker logs it at startup, blocks and all, so the hole is visible in
the log of any deployment that has one.
#### Metrics credentials
@@ -382,9 +272,8 @@ additionally be a number in the range 1–65535,
`RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT` must be at least 1,
`RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL` must be greater than zero (it is a ticker
period, so `0s` or a negative value would crash the reaper after
startup), and every entry in `TRUSTED_PROXIES` and
`ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS` must be a CIDR block or a bare IP address.
`SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT` is the exception: a
startup), and every entry in `TRUSTED_PROXIES` must be a CIDR block or
a bare IP address. `SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT` is the exception: a
non-positive value there means idle expiry is disabled, not invalid.
Boolean variables (`DEBUG`, `MAINTENANCE_MODE`) accept exactly the
@@ -397,84 +286,9 @@ On first startup, webhooker automatically generates a cryptographically
secure session encryption key and stores it in the database. This key
persists across restarts — no manual key management is needed.
#### The admin account
On first startup — a `DATA_DIR` with no accounts in it — webhooker
creates an `admin` user with a randomly generated password and prints
it to standard output as a ruled banner:
```
========================================================================
WEBHOOKER FIRST BOOT: an admin account has been created.
username: admin
password: 3xamPl3-p4ssw0rd
Save this password now: it is shown only here, and only once.
If it is lost, run `webhooker resetpw admin` on a stopped deployment.
========================================================================
```
It is a banner rather than a log line because that is the only time it
is ever shown: as one `INFO` record it sat among the roughly 45 fx
`PROVIDE`/`RUN`/`HOOK` lines a boot writes, and under `docker run -d`
it is one line in a log subject to rotation. The database stores only
its Argon2id hash. There is no second account and no forgot-password
flow, so the banner and the reset command below are the only two ways
in.
#### Recovering a lost admin password
`webhooker resetpw` sets an existing account's password from the
command line:
```bash
# Generate a new password and print it.
DATA_DIR=/var/lib/webhooker webhooker resetpw -generate admin
# Or supply one on standard input (minimum 8 characters).
printf '%s' "$NEW_PASSWORD" | \
DATA_DIR=/var/lib/webhooker webhooker resetpw admin
```
In a container it is the same binary, which the image sets as `CMD`
rather than `ENTRYPOINT`, so the whole command has to be given:
```bash
docker run --rm -v webhooker-data:/var/lib/webhooker \
webhooker /app/webhooker resetpw -generate admin
```
Stop the service first — with the volume still attached to a running
container, the command refuses.
The password is never taken as a command-line argument: on Linux argv
is readable through `/proc` by every account on the host for as long as
the process lives. Standard input is echoed when it is a terminal — the
prompt says so — so `-generate` or a pipe is preferable on a shared
machine.
What it will not do:
- **Run against a live deployment.** It takes the same exclusive
`DATA_DIR` lock the server does (see
[Single-instance lock](#single-instance-lock)) and refuses while a
running instance holds it, naming the directory and exiting non-zero.
A running process keeps serving every session that authenticated with
the old password, so a reset underneath it would report a change the
service does not honour.
- **Create anything.** A `DATA_DIR` that does not exist, or that holds
no `webhooker.db`, is an error rather than a new empty deployment —
a mistyped path must not be built out and then reported as a success.
- **Create an account.** A username that does not exist is an error.
`resetpw` changes an existing account's password and nothing else.
`DATA_DIR` selects the deployment exactly as it does for the server. A
password that changes on disk takes effect at the next login; sessions
that are already authenticated are unaffected either way.
Changing a password you still know needs none of this — use
`POST /user/{username}/password` in the web UI.
On first startup, webhooker creates an `admin` user
with a randomly generated password and logs it to stdout. This password
is only displayed once.
#### What `DEBUG=true` exposes
@@ -511,14 +325,11 @@ What it does **not** put in the log:
What is in the log regardless of `DEBUG`, and is not a debug-logging
decision:
- **The initial `admin` password**, in the clear, once, on the first
boot that creates the account — as the banner described under
[The admin account](#the-admin-account), written straight to standard
output rather than through the logger. That banner is the only place
- **The initial `admin` password**, in the clear, once, at `INFO`, on
the first boot that creates the account. That line is the only place
it is ever shown; the database stores the hash. A first boot's output
is not safe to paste anywhere until that account's password has been
changed. The same applies to `webhooker resetpw -generate`, which
prints the password it generated in the same form.
changed.
- **An authenticated operator's own configuration**, echoed back
untruncated — webhook names, target hostnames. See the logging
section under Security for the full list and for the per-line size
@@ -695,28 +506,14 @@ backups at rest and restrict who can read them.
- `events-{uuid}.db` and `archive-{uuid}.db` hold the **full payload
body and headers** of every event as received, including whatever the
sending service put in them — tokens, signatures, personal data.
- Event databases written before
[issue #206](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/206) was fixed
**also contain target credentials**: a GORM association upsert on the
delivery and retry write path copied `targets` rows, `config`
included, into the per-webhook database. For a Slack target the
`webhookUrl` *is* the bearer credential, and an `http` target's URL
can embed userinfo. This version never writes those rows; the first
time it opens such a file it deletes them and vacuums the file, which
removes the credential bytes rather than only unlinking the rows.
Deleting alone would not: the bytes stay readable in the file's free
pages until it is rewritten. The sweep is recorded in the file's
`user_version` only once the vacuum returns, so a sweep that fails or
is interrupted fails the open and is retried on the next one, and a
file this version has opened without error holds no leaked rows and
no recoverable bytes from them. On upgrade this rewrites each
existing `events-{uuid}.db` once, on its first open. Two cases still
hand over live delivery destinations: a backup taken from an older
build, and a backup of a file this version has not yet opened
successfully. Copies already made stay affected — the sweep only
rewrites the file it opens, and freed blocks may persist in
filesystem snapshots and on the underlying storage. Rotate any target
credential that was in a backup you cannot account for.
- Until
[issue #206](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/206) is fixed,
the event databases **also contain target credentials**: a GORM
association upsert on the delivery and retry write path copies
`targets` rows, `config` included, into the per-webhook database. For
a Slack target the `webhookUrl` *is* the bearer credential, and an
`http` target's URL can embed userinfo. Handing someone an
`events-*.db` today hands them live delivery destinations.
- `webhooker.db` stores target config **unencrypted**, tracked at
[issue #212](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/212), next to
the session encryption key and the Argon2id password hashes. It also
@@ -1031,10 +828,7 @@ A registered user of the webhooker service.
Passwords are hashed with Argon2id using secure defaults (64 MB memory,
1 iteration, 4 threads, 32-byte key, 16-byte salt). On first startup,
an `admin` user is created with a randomly generated 16-character
password printed once to stdout; `webhooker resetpw` sets it again if
it is lost (see [The admin account](#the-admin-account)). Every one of
those paths hashes through the same `internal/database` code, so the
parameters cannot drift between them.
password logged to stdout.
#### Webhook
@@ -1160,53 +954,6 @@ events should be forwarded.
The `config` field stores type-specific configuration as JSON (e.g.,
destination URL, custom headers, timeout settings).
**`http` target configuration:**
| Key | Type | Description |
| --------- | ------------- | ----------- |
| `url` | string | Destination the event is POSTed to |
| `headers` | object | Extra request headers, applied last so they win over the event's own forwarded headers |
| `timeout` | integer (sec) | Per-target request timeout; unset (or 0) uses the shared 30-second client timeout |
`timeout` is capped at **300 seconds**, and the form rejects anything
above it rather than substituting the cap. A delivery attempt holds one
of the bounded pool's workers for its whole duration, so an unbounded
timeout would let a single unresponsive destination stall the queue.
`headers` rejects the names the delivery path or `net/http` writes
regardless of what is configured: `Host`, `Content-Length`,
`Transfer-Encoding`, `Connection`, `Trailer` and `User-Agent`. These are
refused at the form rather than accepted and ignored, because a stored
header that provably never reaches the wire tells the operator their
configuration took effect when it did not. `Content-Type` is _not_
reserved: a configured one deliberately overrides the event's.
**Redirects.** A redirect from an `http` target's destination is
followed, up to ten hops, and the delivery's recorded status and body
come from the final hop. One rule governs every header the delivery
carries for someone else — the configured `headers` and the inbound
event headers forwarded from the sender alike: **a hop that leaves the
origin the target names carries none of them.** Leaving the origin
means a different host, a different port, or a step down from `https`
to `http`. Both classes routinely carry a secret — a configured
`X-Api-Key` or `PRIVATE-TOKEN`, an inbound `X-Hub-Signature` — and an
open redirect at the destination would otherwise hand it to a host the
operator never chose. `net/http` already does this for `Authorization`
and `Cookie`. The delivery path's own headers (`Content-Type`,
`User-Agent`) are not origin-scoped and always travel, so a body
preserved across a `307` is still typed. A `301`, `302` or `303` is a
different matter, and this is `net/http`'s behaviour rather than
webhooker's: the POST becomes a GET and the event body and its
`Content-Type` are dropped, so the destination the chain ends at
receives no event at all — and the delivery is still recorded
`Delivered` on that hop's `2xx`. Redirects within the target's own
origin keep everything, so a destination that redirects its own paths
is unaffected; the drop is per hop rather than permanent, so a chain
that returns to the configured origin carries the headers again,
exactly as `net/http` treats `Authorization`. Each hop is dialled
through the same SSRF guard as the first, so a redirect aimed at a
private or reserved address is refused at connect time.
#### APIKey
A programmatic access credential for API authentication.
@@ -1266,23 +1013,6 @@ DeliveryResults.
succeeded).
- **`failed`** — All retry attempts exhausted without success.
**Replay.** A `delivered` or `failed` delivery is finished as far as
the engine is concerned, but the event is still stored, so the event
log offers a per-delivery **Replay** action for it. Replay creates a
NEW `pending` delivery for the same event and target and hands it to
the engine on the ordinary path — same retries, same SSRF guard, same
circuit breaker as a first attempt. It never touches the delivery it
repeats: that row's status, timestamps and recorded attempts stand as
the record of what happened.
What is re-sent is the stored event body, against the target's
configuration **as it stands now** — the point of a replay is to
deliver where the destination has since been fixed. A target that has
been deleted or deactivated therefore refuses the replay with a
message on the event log rather than delivering from stale
configuration, and a replay is refused while an earlier one for the
same event and target is still pending or retrying.
#### DeliveryResult
The result of a single delivery attempt. Every attempt (including
@@ -1614,7 +1344,6 @@ arriving and being stored, they are just not getting anywhere.
| `webhooker_deliveries_succeeded_total` | counter | Deliveries that reached `delivered` |
| `webhooker_deliveries_failed_total` | counter | Deliveries that failed terminally and will not be retried |
| `webhooker_delivery_retries_total` | counter | Deliveries put back into `retrying` |
| `webhooker_delivery_replays_total` | counter | Deliveries an operator replayed from the event log. A replay runs the ordinary engine path, so it also moves the attempt, outcome and duration series; this is the only one that separates it from ordinary traffic |
| `webhooker_delivery_duration_seconds` | histogram | Wall time of a single dispatched delivery attempt, the same duration the attempt's `DeliveryResult` records |
| `webhooker_deliveries_pending` | gauge | Deliveries currently in `pending` |
| `webhooker_deliveries_retrying` | gauge | Deliveries currently in `retrying` |
@@ -2212,7 +1941,6 @@ abuse limit later; they are tracked as future work.
| `POST` | `/source/{id}/edit` | Edit webhook submission |
| `POST` | `/source/{id}/delete` | Delete webhook |
| `GET` | `/source/{id}/logs` | Webhook event logs |
| `POST` | `/source/{id}/deliveries/{deliveryID}/replay` | Replay a finished delivery: creates a new delivery for the same event against the target's current configuration (30 per minute per bucket, then `429`) |
| `POST` | `/source/{id}/entrypoints` | Add entrypoint to webhook |
| `POST` | `/source/{id}/entrypoints/{entrypointID}/delete` | Delete an entrypoint |
| `POST` | `/source/{id}/entrypoints/{entrypointID}/toggle` | Enable or disable an entrypoint |
@@ -2252,12 +1980,8 @@ imports. The entry point is `cmd/webhooker/main.go`.
```
webhooker/
├── cmd/webhooker/
│ └── main.go # Entry point: subcommand dispatch; no args locks DATA_DIR and wires fx
│ └── main.go # Entry point: sets globals, locks DATA_DIR, wires fx
├── internal/
│ ├── banner/
│ │ └── banner.go # Ruled block for the one credential shown in the clear
│ ├── resetpw/
│ │ └── resetpw.go # `webhooker resetpw`: set an account's password, stopped deployments only
│ ├── config/
│ │ └── config.go # Configuration loading from environment variables
│ ├── database/
@@ -2302,7 +2026,6 @@ webhooker/
│ ├── handlers/
│ │ ├── handlers.go # Base handler struct, JSON helpers, template rendering
│ │ ├── auth.go # Login, logout handlers
│ │ ├── delivery_replay.go # Per-delivery replay: new delivery, current target config
│ │ ├── entrypoint_view.go # Masked entrypoint view for templates
│ │ ├── event_log_view.go # Event log projection, byte-capped in SQL
│ │ ├── healthcheck.go # Health check handler
@@ -2454,9 +2177,6 @@ check, see [The login endpoint](#the-login-endpoint).
header. API keys are stored per-user with usage tracking
(`last_used_at`).
- **Metrics:** Basic authentication protecting the `/metrics` endpoint.
- **Recovery:** `webhooker resetpw <username>` on a stopped deployment
is the only way back into an account whose password was lost (see
[Recovering a lost admin password](#recovering-a-lost-admin-password)).
### Security
@@ -2490,15 +2210,7 @@ check, see [The login endpoint](#the-login-endpoint).
ranges (RFC 1918, loopback, link-local, cloud metadata) are blocked
both at target creation time (URL validation) and at delivery time
(custom HTTP transport with SSRF-safe dialer that validates resolved
IPs before connecting, preventing DNS rebinding attacks). Both paths
route through a single decision function, so they cannot disagree
about a destination. An operator can permit specific blocks with
[`ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS`](#allowing-egress-to-your-own-network); the
guard cannot be switched off, and link-local plus a
[pinned set](#allowing-egress-to-your-own-network) of known cloud
metadata endpoints — several of which are ULAs outside link-local —
stay blocked whatever is listed, though listing `0.0.0.0/0` or
`::/0` does open every other private range
IPs before connecting, preventing DNS rebinding attacks)
- **Login limiting is inverted, deliberately.** The login `POST` has
no pre-emptive rate limiter in front of it. Credentials are
verified first and only a _failed_ attempt spends budget, so a

113
TODO.md
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@@ -18,52 +18,68 @@ Issue branches do NOT touch this file — the manager maintains it on
# Status
1.0.0 is complete: 55 closed, 0 open. `next` (6874059) is 62 commits
ahead of `main` and a strict fast-forward. No git tags exist yet.
pre-1.0. No git tags exist. `main` (4f5ecb1) is a working webhook proxy
with auth, CSRF/SSRF protections, login rate limiting, Slack target,
event retention (#63), the database archiving target (#43), the admin
password change flow (#65), policy compliance (#6), pinned lint tooling
(#55), and fail-loud configuration parsing (#80).
The bar was not "the milestone is empty" but "sneak can deploy this and
use it in low-volume production". Every gap the deployability audit
named against that bar is now closed:
`next` is green — verified both by CI and by cache-defeated container
runs (`docker build --no-cache-filter=lint --no-cache-filter=builder`) —
but the **1.0.0 milestone is no longer complete**. It was reopened on
2026-08-20 by a code-level deployability audit that ran the service end
to end (verdict:
https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/33#issuecomment-66686).
- `DATA_DIR` locking, so two instances cannot both deliver
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/201)
- shutdown on listener failure, rather than a live non-serving process
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/200)
- inbound signature verification
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/67)
- per-attempt delivery detail in the event log
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/202)
- replay of a terminally failed delivery
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/203)
- `ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS`, an allowlist escape hatch for the SSRF guard
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/204)
- the three credential exposures
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/205,
https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/206,
https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/207)
The bar for 1.0 is not "the milestone is empty" but "sneak can deploy
this and use it in low-volume production". The audit found the gap
between those two: two instances on one `DATA_DIR` both deliver
(reproduced), a failed listen leaves a live non-serving process that
restart policies never fire on, there is no inbound authentication of
any kind, delivery failures render as a bare word with no status code or
error, a terminally failed delivery can never be replayed, the SSRF
blocklist has no escape hatch so the proxy cannot forward to your own
network at all, and target credentials leak into the per-webhook event
databases.
One caveat on reading a green check: a docs-only commit deliberately
replays from the layer cache
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/119), so a green status on
such a commit evidences a replay rather than an executed run. A code
commit invalidates the `COPY` layer and genuinely executes.
One caveat on reading a green check, narrower than it used to be. A
docs-only commit deliberately replays from the layer cache (#119), so a
green status on such a commit evidences a replay rather than an executed
run; a code commit invalidates the `COPY` layer and genuinely executes.
Superseded runs are no longer the hazard they were: before #152 they
were recorded as `skipped` and rolled up green, and before #119 a warm
layer cache let the gate report success without executing anything,
replaying the previous build's console log so the lie looked like a real
run. Both are fixed. Note: `TODO.md` was deliberately
deleted from this repo in f9a9569 (2026-03-01, #6); its content was
folded into the README TODO section, which this draft reconstructs as
of 2026-07-06.
# Next Step
Merge the milestone PR (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/pulls/111)
and tag `v1.0.0`. It is `merge-ready` and assigned to sneak; nothing
else gates it.
Clear the reopened 1.0.0 milestone. The milestone PR
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/pulls/111) is held: it carries a
`WIP: ` prefix, no labels and is assigned to `clawbot`, and it stays
that way until the milestone is empty. Correctness first — the
duplicate-delivery lock and the listen-failure shutdown — then the
operability gaps that make the service usable in production, then the
three credential exposures.
Post-1.0 follow-ups are open, none blocking the tag:
https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/245,
https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/246,
https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/247 and
https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/248. Also still open and
unmilestoned: https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/193 (a design
question, not a defect), https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/198
(`make test` is past the org 20s target) and
https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/212 (encrypting target config
at rest).
Three items belong to the owner, none of them blocking. #150 was decided
by the manager rather than left to stall the queue and is flagged on the
issue for reversal if that call was wrong. #112 (whether `Completed
Steps` should exist at all, given it once conflicted on every unit) is
unanswered; the provisional ruling in force is that issue branches do
not touch this file. #198 records that `make test` is past the org 20s
target — 46s of test execution inside a 62.8s CI layer — and turns on
which quantity the 60s hard cap governs; it is scoped as the improvement
bug the 20-60s band requires, and should be milestoned instead if the
cap is read as covering the whole invocation.
After the tag, the largest open cluster is the unmilestoned follow-up
backlog these units generated: #183, #184, #185, #190, #191, #193, #198,
#211 and #212 (encrypting target config at rest, split out of the
credential-leak fix because it needs a key-rotation and re-wrap story).
# Completed Steps
@@ -292,16 +308,14 @@ at rest).
# Future Steps
- Delivery status and retry management UI. Replay of a terminally
failed delivery and per-attempt detail already landed
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/203,
https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/202)
- Manual event redelivery from the web UI — the "Replay" capability the
README describes as planned. No redelivery code exists anywhere in the
tree; events are stored in full, which is all it would be built on
- Delivery status and retry management UI
- Per-webhook rate limiting in the receiver handler (per-webhook config
plus handler enforcement; global limits must not apply to receiver
endpoints)
- Stripe HMAC signature verification. The GitHub and GitLab schemes
landed with inbound verification
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/67)
- Webhook signature verification for GitHub and Stripe HMAC formats
- API key authentication for programmatic access (APIKey model exists;
Bearer token middleware does not)
- REST API v1
@@ -311,10 +325,9 @@ at rest).
- OpenAPI specification
- Analytics dashboard: success rates, response times, volume
- A remember-me option at login
- Password reset flow for a forgotten password over the web. The
authenticated password *change* flow already landed, and a lost
password is recoverable from the console with `webhooker resetpw`
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/208)
- Password reset flow for a forgotten password. The authenticated
password *change* flow already landed on `main` (#65); reset does not
exist
- Later, nice to have
- email delivery target type
- SNS and S3 delivery targets

59
cmd/webhooker/main.go
View File

@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/healthcheck"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/resetpw"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/server"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
)
@@ -49,11 +48,6 @@ import (
// and can still consume the whole budget on their own.
const stopTimeout = 5 * time.Second
// exitUsage is the status for a command line this binary cannot make
// sense of, kept distinct from the 1 a refusal exits with so that a
// caller can tell "called wrong" from "declined".
const exitUsage = 2
// Build-time variables set via -ldflags.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // Build-time variables injected by the linker.
@@ -66,54 +60,7 @@ func main() {
globals.Appname = appname
globals.Version = version
os.Exit(dispatch(os.Args[1:], os.Stdin, os.Stdout, os.Stderr))
}
// dispatch routes the command line to a subcommand.
//
// No arguments runs the server, which is what the image's CMD and
// every existing deployment invoke; that path is unchanged, including
// where the DATA_DIR lock is taken relative to building the fx graph
// and how fx propagates a non-zero exit itself.
func dispatch(
args []string,
stdin io.Reader,
stdout, stderr io.Writer,
) int {
if len(args) == 0 {
return run(stderr)
}
switch args[0] {
case resetpw.Name:
return resetpw.Run(args[1:], stdin, stdout, stderr)
case "help", "-h", "-help", "--help":
usage(stdout)
return 0
default:
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(
stderr, "%s: unknown subcommand %q\n", appname, args[0],
)
usage(stderr)
return exitUsage
}
}
// usage lists what the binary can be asked to do.
func usage(w io.Writer) {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(w, `usage: %s [subcommand]
With no subcommand, runs the webhooker server.
Subcommands:
%s [-generate] <username>
Set an existing account's password on a stopped deployment.
Recovers an admin account whose bootstrap password was lost.
help
Print this message.
`, appname, resetpw.Name)
os.Exit(run(os.Stderr))
}
// run takes the exclusive DATA_DIR lock, then runs the application
@@ -157,10 +104,6 @@ func newApp() *fx.App {
session.New,
handlers.New,
middleware.New,
// The one SSRF guard both target-creation validation
// and the delivery dialer consult, so they cannot
// disagree about a destination.
delivery.NewGuard,
delivery.New,
delivery.NewArchiveSweeper,
// Wire *delivery.Engine as delivery.Notifier so the

61
cmd/webhooker/main_test.go
View File

@@ -2,14 +2,12 @@ package main
import (
"bytes"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/datadir"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/resetpw"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/server"
)
@@ -70,65 +68,6 @@ func TestRunRefusesLockedDataDir(t *testing.T) {
assert.Contains(t, stderr.String(), "another instance")
}
// TestDispatch_NoArgumentsRunsTheServer pins the routing of a bare
// invocation, which is what the image's CMD and every deployment use.
// Adding subcommands must not move the server off the empty argument
// list, and must not move the DATA_DIR lock: this asserts the refusal
// arrives with no fx graph built, exactly as run does on its own.
func TestDispatch_NoArgumentsRunsTheServer(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
t.Setenv("DATA_DIR", dir)
lock, err := datadir.Acquire(dir)
require.NoError(t, err)
defer func() { _ = lock.Release() }()
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
code := dispatch(nil, strings.NewReader(""), &stdout, &stderr)
require.Equal(t, 1, code)
assert.Contains(t, stderr.String(), "another instance")
}
// TestDispatch_UnknownSubcommand keeps a mistyped subcommand from
// starting a server. Anything else would have `webhooker resetpww`
// silently take the DATA_DIR lock and serve.
func TestDispatch_UnknownSubcommand(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
code := dispatch(
[]string{"resetpww", "admin"},
strings.NewReader(""), &stdout, &stderr,
)
require.Equal(t, 2, code)
assert.Contains(t, stderr.String(), "unknown subcommand")
assert.Contains(
t, stderr.String(), resetpw.Name,
"the usage must name the subcommand that does exist",
)
}
// TestDispatch_Help answers on standard output with a zero status, so
// `webhooker help` is usable in a pipe.
func TestDispatch_Help(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
code := dispatch(
[]string{"help"}, strings.NewReader(""), &stdout, &stderr,
)
require.Equal(t, 0, code)
assert.Empty(t, stderr.String())
assert.Contains(t, stdout.String(), resetpw.Name)
}
// tailHeadroom is the slack the fx stop budget must keep beyond the
// server stop hook. The hooks that run after the server — the
// delivery engine, the healthcheck, the webhook DB manager and the

47
internal/banner/banner.go
View File

@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
// Package banner renders the operator-facing blocks that carry a
// plaintext credential.
//
// A generated password printed as one more structured log line is lost:
// a boot writes roughly 45 fx PROVIDE/RUN/HOOK lines around it, and
// under `docker run -d` it is one line in a log subject to rotation. A
// credential that is shown exactly once has to be findable by eye when
// an operator scrolls back, so it is written as a ruled block rather
// than as a log record.
//
// It is deliberately not a log line: it goes straight to the writer the
// caller names — standard output for both the first-boot account and
// the `resetpw` subcommand — so it is neither levelled, filtered, nor
// rendered as JSON by whichever handler internal/logger installed.
package banner
import (
"fmt"
"io"
"strings"
)
// ruleWidth is the length of the horizontal rules, chosen to fit an
// 80-column terminal without wrapping.
const ruleWidth = 72
// Credentials writes a ruled block naming an account and its plaintext
// password. headline says which event produced it, and note says what
// the operator must do about it; both are written verbatim, so a
// multi-line note must already be wrapped.
func Credentials(
w io.Writer,
headline, username, password, note string,
) error {
rule := strings.Repeat("=", ruleWidth)
_, err := fmt.Fprintf(
w,
"\n%s\n%s\n\n username: %s\n password: %s\n\n%s\n%s\n\n",
rule, headline, username, password, note, rule,
)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("writing credentials banner: %w", err)
}
return nil
}

59
internal/banner/banner_test.go
View File

@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
package banner_test
import (
"bytes"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/banner"
)
// TestCredentials_IsFindableByEye pins the properties that make the
// block worth having: rules above and below it, the two fields on
// their own lines, and blank lines separating it from whatever the
// surrounding log wrote.
func TestCredentials_IsFindableByEye(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var out bytes.Buffer
require.NoError(t, banner.Credentials(
&out, "HEADLINE", "admin", "s3cret", "NOTE",
))
got := out.String()
lines := strings.Split(strings.Trim(got, "\n"), "\n")
require.GreaterOrEqual(t, len(lines), 3)
assert.Equal(t, lines[0], lines[len(lines)-1], "rules must match")
assert.Greater(
t, len(lines[0]), 40, "the rule must be visible at a glance",
)
assert.Equal(t, strings.Repeat("=", len(lines[0])), lines[0])
assert.Contains(t, got, "\n username: admin\n")
assert.Contains(t, got, "\n password: s3cret\n")
assert.Contains(t, got, "HEADLINE")
assert.Contains(t, got, "NOTE")
assert.True(t, strings.HasPrefix(got, "\n"))
}
// failingWriter reports the write error a banner must not swallow: it
// is the one copy of a password that will never be shown again.
type failingWriter struct{}
func (failingWriter) Write([]byte) (int, error) {
return 0, assert.AnError
}
func TestCredentials_ReportsAWriteFailure(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := banner.Credentials(
failingWriter{}, "HEADLINE", "admin", "s3cret", "NOTE",
)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, assert.AnError)
}

63
internal/config/config.go
View File

@@ -128,22 +128,6 @@ type Config struct {
// clients.
TrustedProxies []netip.Prefix
// AllowedEgressCIDRs is the set of networks a delivery target
// may reach even though the SSRF guard's default blocklist
// covers them. It is empty unless ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS is set,
// and empty means every private/reserved range stays refused.
//
// This only ever adds destinations to what the guard would
// otherwise refuse. The guard itself is always on: there is no
// setting that disables SSRF protection, and delivery's
// alwaysBlockedNetworks stays blocked no matter what is listed
// here. That set is link-local plus the cloud metadata
// endpoints outside it that disclose credentials or user data
// at a provider-fixed address; it is not exhaustive of every
// cloud's metadata address. See alwaysBlockedNetworks for the
// authoritative list and the criterion it is built from.
AllowedEgressCIDRs []netip.Prefix
params *ConfigParams
log *slog.Logger
}
@@ -488,11 +472,6 @@ func loadFromEnv() (*Config, error) {
return nil, err
}
allowedEgressCIDRs, err := envPrefixList("ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS")
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
metricsUsername, metricsPassword, err := resolveMetricsAuth()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@@ -511,49 +490,9 @@ func loadFromEnv() (*Config, error) {
SessionIdleTimeout: sessionIdleTimeout,
ReceiverRateLimit: receiverRateLimit,
TrustedProxies: trustedProxies,
AllowedEgressCIDRs: allowedEgressCIDRs,
}, nil
}
// PrefixStrings renders a prefix list as its CIDR strings, for
// logging a list an operator has to be able to read back.
func PrefixStrings(prefixes []netip.Prefix) []string {
out := make([]string, 0, len(prefixes))
for _, prefix := range prefixes {
out = append(out, prefix.String())
}
return out
}
// warnEgressAllowlist logs the effective ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS
// whenever it is non-empty.
//
// It prints the blocks themselves rather than a count, because
// this is the one setting that lets a delivery target reach the
// host's own network: an operator reading the startup log has to
// be able to see exactly which hole is open. Silence means the
// list is empty and the SSRF guard is refusing every
// private/reserved range, which is the default.
func (c *Config) warnEgressAllowlist(log *slog.Logger) {
if len(c.AllowedEgressCIDRs) == 0 {
return
}
log.Warn(
"ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS lets delivery targets reach these "+
"otherwise-blocked private/reserved networks. Anyone "+
"who can create a delivery target can now make this "+
"process issue requests into them, and read back the "+
"response. Link-local and the known cloud instance "+
"metadata endpoints outside it stay blocked "+
"regardless of what is listed here.",
"allowedEgressCIDRs",
strings.Join(PrefixStrings(c.AllowedEgressCIDRs), ","),
)
}
// warnSharedRateLimitBucket logs a startup warning whenever
// TRUSTED_PROXIES is empty, in any environment.
//
@@ -635,13 +574,11 @@ func New(lc fx.Lifecycle, params ConfigParams) (*Config, error) {
"sessionIdleTimeout", s.SessionIdleTimeout.String(),
"receiverRateLimit", s.ReceiverRateLimit,
"trustedProxies", len(s.TrustedProxies),
"allowedEgressCIDRs", len(s.AllowedEgressCIDRs),
"hasSentryDSN", s.SentryDSN != "",
"hasMetricsAuth", s.MetricsAuthEnabled(),
)
s.warnSharedRateLimitBucket(log)
s.warnEgressAllowlist(log)
return s, nil
}

181
internal/config/config_test.go
View File

@@ -663,187 +663,6 @@ func testTrustedProxiesSuccess(
assert.Equal(t, expected, got)
}
// TestAllowedEgressCIDRs covers ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS, the escape
// hatch that lets a self-hosted deployment forward to its own
// network. Unset it must stay empty, so the SSRF guard keeps
// refusing every private/reserved range; a set-but-unparseable
// value must abort startup naming the variable rather than
// silently running with a list the operator did not write.
func TestAllowedEgressCIDRs(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
set bool
value string
expected []string
expectError bool
}{
{
name: caseUnsetUsesDefault,
set: false,
expected: []string{},
},
{
name: "empty value yields empty list",
set: true,
value: "",
expected: []string{},
},
{
name: caseValidValueParsed,
set: true,
value: cidrPrivateV4,
expected: []string{cidrPrivateV4},
},
{
name: "multiple blocks with whitespace",
set: true,
value: " 10.0.0.0/8 , 127.0.0.0/8 ",
expected: []string{cidrPrivateV4, "127.0.0.0/8"},
},
{
name: "bare address becomes a single host",
set: true,
value: "172.17.0.5",
expected: []string{"172.17.0.5/32"},
},
{
name: caseUnparseableFails,
set: true,
value: cidrPrivateV4 + ",not-an-address",
expectError: true,
},
{
name: "out-of-range prefix length fails startup",
set: true,
value: "10.0.0.0/33",
expectError: true,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Cannot use t.Parallel() here because t.Setenv
// is incompatible with parallel subtests.
t.Setenv("WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT", "dev")
if tt.set {
t.Setenv("ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS", tt.value)
} else {
require.NoError(
t, os.Unsetenv("ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS"),
)
}
if tt.expectError {
expectStartupErrorFor(
t, "ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS", config.ErrInvalidCIDR,
)
} else {
testAllowedEgressCIDRsSuccess(t, tt.expected)
}
})
}
}
func testAllowedEgressCIDRsSuccess(
t *testing.T,
expected []string,
) {
t.Helper()
var cfg *config.Config
app := fxtest.New(
t,
fx.Provide(
globals.New,
logger.New,
config.New,
),
fx.Populate(&cfg),
)
require.NoError(t, app.Err())
app.RequireStart()
defer app.RequireStop()
assert.Equal(
t, expected, config.PrefixStrings(cfg.AllowedEgressCIDRs),
)
}
// TestEgressAllowlistWarning covers the startup log that shows an
// operator the hole ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS opened. It must stay
// silent on the default (empty) list and, when set, print the
// blocks themselves rather than a count.
func TestEgressAllowlistWarning(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
allowed string
expectWarning bool
}{
{
name: "empty allowlist is quiet",
expectWarning: false,
},
{
name: "non-empty allowlist warns",
allowed: "10.0.0.0/8,127.0.0.0/8",
expectWarning: true,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Cannot use t.Parallel() here because t.Setenv
// is incompatible with parallel subtests.
t.Setenv("WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT", config.EnvironmentDev)
if tt.allowed == "" {
require.NoError(
t, os.Unsetenv("ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS"),
)
} else {
t.Setenv("ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS", tt.allowed)
}
var buf bytes.Buffer
log := slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(
&buf, &slog.HandlerOptions{
Level: slog.LevelDebug,
},
))
require.NoError(
t, config.WarnEgressAllowlistForTest(log),
)
if !tt.expectWarning {
assert.Empty(t, buf.String())
return
}
logged := buf.String()
assert.Contains(t, logged, `"level":"WARN"`)
assert.Contains(t, logged, "ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS")
// The blocks themselves, not a count: the operator has
// to be able to read back which networks are open.
assert.Contains(t, logged, "10.0.0.0/8")
assert.Contains(t, logged, "127.0.0.0/8")
// What stays shut. Asserted on the clause naming the
// wider set rather than on "Link-local" alone, so the
// string cannot narrow back to link-local only while
// the always-blocked set covers ULA, CGNAT and two
// public metadata addresses as well.
assert.Contains(t, logged, "metadata endpoints outside it")
})
}
}
// TestSharedRateLimitBucketWarning covers the startup warning that
// tells an operator a deployment behind a reverse proxy shares one
// rate-limit bucket between every client, which turns the receiver

15
internal/config/export_test.go
View File

@@ -21,21 +21,6 @@ func WarnSharedRateLimitBucketForTest(log *slog.Logger) error {
return nil
}
// WarnEgressAllowlistForTest loads a Config from the current
// environment and emits its egress-allowlist startup warning to
// log, so a test can assert both that the warning fires only when
// the list is non-empty and that it names the blocks it opened.
func WarnEgressAllowlistForTest(log *slog.Logger) error {
c, err := loadFromEnv()
if err != nil {
return err
}
c.warnEgressAllowlist(log)
return nil
}
// EnvBoolForTest exposes envBool.
func EnvBoolForTest(key string, defaultValue bool) (bool, error) {
return envBool(key, defaultValue)

85
internal/database/bootstrap_banner_test.go
View File

@@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
package database_test
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
// passwordField is the banner line carrying the plaintext.
const passwordField = "password: "
// bannerPassword returns the password the banner printed.
func bannerPassword(t *testing.T, out string) string {
t.Helper()
for line := range strings.SplitSeq(out, "\n") {
_, value, found := strings.Cut(line, passwordField)
if found {
return strings.TrimSpace(value)
}
}
t.Fatalf("no %q line in the banner:\n%s", passwordField, out)
return ""
}
// TestFirstBoot_PrintsTheAdminPasswordAsABanner is the bootstrap half
// of https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/208.
//
// The password is shown exactly once, and it used to be shown as one
// slog record among the roughly 45 fx PROVIDE/RUN/HOOK lines a boot
// writes — which is how deployments lost it and, with no reset path,
// locked themselves out. It must be emitted as a block an operator can
// find by eye, it must carry the plaintext that actually opens the
// account, and it must name the command that recovers it.
func TestFirstBoot_PrintsTheAdminPasswordAsABanner(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
db, lc := setupTestDB(t)
var out bytes.Buffer
db.ExportSetBannerOut(&out)
ctx := context.Background()
require.NoError(t, lc.Start(ctx))
defer func() { require.NoError(t, lc.Stop(ctx)) }()
printed := out.String()
require.Contains(
t, printed, strings.Repeat("=", 20),
"the banner must be ruled off, not read as one more log line",
)
require.Contains(t, printed, "username: admin")
assert.Contains(
t, printed, "resetpw",
"the banner must name the command that recovers the account",
)
password := bannerPassword(t, printed)
require.NotEmpty(t, password)
// The printed plaintext must be the one that opens the account:
// a banner showing a different string would be worse than none.
var user database.User
require.NoError(
t,
db.DB().Where("username = ?", "admin").First(&user).Error,
)
ok, err := database.VerifyPassword(password, user.Password)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(
t, ok, "the printed password must open the seeded account",
)
}

115
internal/database/database.go
View File

@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ import (
"encoding/base64"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"log/slog"
"os"
"path/filepath"
@@ -17,7 +16,6 @@ import (
"gorm.io/driver/sqlite"
"gorm.io/gorm"
_ "modernc.org/sqlite" // Pure Go SQLite driver
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/banner"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/gormlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
@@ -29,20 +27,6 @@ const (
sessionKeyLen = 32
)
// MainDBFileName is the main application database inside DATA_DIR. It
// is exported so that an entry point acting on a data directory
// outside the fx graph can test for a deployment's existence without
// spelling the name a second time.
const MainDBFileName = "webhooker.db"
// BootstrapPasswordNote is what the first-boot banner tells the
// operator to do about the password it just printed. It names the
// recovery command, because the moment that line scrolls away is
// exactly when the operator needs to know one exists.
const BootstrapPasswordNote = "Save this password now: it is shown " +
"only here, and only once.\nIf it is lost, run `webhooker " +
"resetpw admin` on a stopped deployment."
//nolint:revive // DatabaseParams is a standard fx naming convention.
type DatabaseParams struct {
fx.In
@@ -56,39 +40,6 @@ type Database struct {
db *gorm.DB
log *slog.Logger
params *DatabaseParams
// bannerOut receives the first-boot credentials banner. Nil means
// os.Stdout, resolved at write time rather than at construction so
// that a caller which redirects the variable still captures it.
bannerOut io.Writer
}
// Open connects to the main database in dataDir and migrates it,
// without the fx lifecycle and without seeding an admin account.
//
// It is for entry points that act on an existing deployment's data
// directory from outside the server graph — `webhooker resetpw`. Such a
// caller must already hold the DATA_DIR lock (see internal/datadir),
// and must Close the result.
//
// It does not create the admin account: seeding belongs to a server
// start, and a maintenance command that silently invented an account
// would answer "no such user" by creating one.
func Open(dataDir string, log *slog.Logger) (*Database, error) {
d := &Database{log: log}
err := d.connectTo(dataDir)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return d, nil
}
// Close closes the underlying connection. It is the exported form of
// the fx stop hook, for callers that built the Database with Open.
func (d *Database) Close() error {
return d.close()
}
// New creates a Database that connects on fx start and disconnects on stop.
@@ -171,22 +122,10 @@ func (d *Database) GetOrCreateSessionKey() (string, error) {
return encoded, nil
}
// connect opens the configured data directory and, this being a
// server start, seeds the admin account when the deployment has none.
func (d *Database) connect() error {
err := d.connectTo(d.params.Config.DataDir)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return d.ensureAdminUser()
}
// connectTo opens and migrates the main database in dataDir. It seeds
// nothing: whether an empty deployment gets an admin account is the
// caller's decision.
func (d *Database) connectTo(dataDir string) error {
// Ensure the data directory exists before opening the database.
dataDir := d.params.Config.DataDir
err := os.MkdirAll(dataDir, dataDirPerm)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf(
@@ -197,7 +136,7 @@ func (d *Database) connectTo(dataDir string) error {
}
// Construct the main application database path inside DATA_DIR.
dbPath := filepath.Join(dataDir, MainDBFileName)
dbPath := filepath.Join(dataDir, "webhooker.db")
dbURL := fmt.Sprintf(
"file:%s?cache=shared&mode=rwc",
dbPath,
@@ -251,16 +190,10 @@ func (d *Database) migrate() error {
d.log.Info("database migrations completed")
return nil
}
// ensureAdminUser creates the bootstrap admin account when the
// deployment has no users at all.
func (d *Database) ensureAdminUser() error {
// Check if admin user exists
var userCount int64
err := d.db.Model(&User{}).Count(&userCount).Error
err = d.db.Model(&User{}).Count(&userCount).Error
if err != nil {
d.log.Error(
"failed to count users",
@@ -320,46 +253,16 @@ func (d *Database) createAdminUser() error {
return err
}
// The plaintext leaves this process here and nowhere else. It is
// deliberately not a log field: as one INFO record among the fx
// graph's own output it read as one more startup line, which is
// how deployments lost it. See internal/banner.
err = banner.Credentials(
d.banner(),
"WEBHOOKER FIRST BOOT: an admin account has been created.",
adminUser.Username,
password,
BootstrapPasswordNote,
d.log.Info("admin user created",
"username", "admin",
"password", password,
"message",
"SAVE THIS PASSWORD - it will not be shown again!",
)
if err != nil {
// Fail the start. The account is already committed, so the
// next boot seeds nothing and prints nothing: continuing here
// would hand the operator a running service whose only
// password was never shown. `webhooker resetpw` recovers it.
d.log.Error(
"failed to print the admin credentials banner",
"error", err,
)
return err
}
d.log.Info("admin user created", "username", adminUser.Username)
return nil
}
// banner returns where the credentials banner is written. os.Stdout is
// resolved here rather than stored, so that a test which redirects the
// variable captures the banner.
func (d *Database) banner() io.Writer {
if d.bannerOut != nil {
return d.bannerOut
}
return os.Stdout
}
func (d *Database) close() error {
if d.db != nil {
sqlDB, err := d.db.DB()

159
internal/database/event_db_isolation.go
View File

@@ -1,159 +0,0 @@
package database
import (
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"gorm.io/gorm/clause"
)
// omitAssociationsCallback is the name the association guard is
// registered under on a per-webhook database's create and update
// callback chains.
const omitAssociationsCallback = "webhooker:omit_associations"
// omitAssociations makes every create and update issued against a
// per-webhook database skip GORM's automatic association save.
//
// A per-webhook database holds the event tier only, but Delivery
// declares belongs-to Event and Target and the delivery engine fills
// both in memory before writing. Without this guard GORM upserts
// those parent rows here on the delivery and retry write paths,
// copying targets.config, which holds destination URLs and bearer
// credentials, into the file most likely to be backed up or handed
// to someone else. Registering the guard on the connection covers
// every write path, including writes inside a transaction and write
// paths added later. Every event-tier row this file holds is written
// explicitly, so nothing depends on the automatic save.
func omitAssociations(db *gorm.DB) error {
omit := func(tx *gorm.DB) {
tx.Statement.Omits = append(
tx.Statement.Omits, clause.Associations,
)
}
err := db.Callback().Create().
Before("gorm:save_before_associations").
Register(omitAssociationsCallback, omit)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf(
"registering create association guard: %w", err,
)
}
err = db.Callback().Update().
Before("gorm:save_before_associations").
Register(omitAssociationsCallback, omit)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf(
"registering update association guard: %w", err,
)
}
return nil
}
// eventDBSweptVersion is the PRAGMA user_version purgeTargetRows
// stamps into a per-webhook database once it has removed any leaked
// target rows *and* the VACUUM that removes their bytes has returned.
// Nothing else in the tree uses user_version, so 0 means "not swept
// by this build".
//
// The stamp, not the DELETE, is what records that a file is done. A
// DELETE commits on its own, so a sweep that is interrupted or whose
// VACUUM fails leaves a file whose rows are gone but whose credential
// bytes are still in the free pages -- indistinguishable, by row
// count, from a file that never leaked. Both leave the stamp unset,
// so the next open sweeps again.
const eventDBSweptVersion = 1
// purgeTargetRows deletes target rows that an earlier build's
// association upsert wrote into a per-webhook database, and rewrites
// the file so their bytes are gone with them. AutoMigrate creates a
// targets table in every one of these files because Delivery declares
// a belongs-to Target, but nothing in the event tier may put rows in
// it. The rows it did put there are junk, not history: they carry an
// empty webhook_id, and delivery rows resolve their target against
// the main database, so nothing here refers to them.
//
// The DELETE only unlinks the rows: modernc.org/sqlite leaves
// secure_delete at SQLite's default of off, so the credential bytes
// stay readable in the file's free pages and a backup of a swept file
// would still hand them over. VACUUM rewrites the file without them.
//
// This runs before every migration and is gated on
// eventDBSweptVersion, so a file pays for the rewrite once, on the
// first open that finds it unstamped, and every open after that is a
// PRAGMA read. A file this build created is stamped before its
// targets table exists, so it never vacuums at all. A failure here
// fails the open with the stamp left unset, so the sweep is retried
// rather than skipped -- a webhook whose file cannot be swept stays
// unusable instead of quietly serving from a file that still holds
// recoverable credentials.
func purgeTargetRows(
db *gorm.DB, log *slog.Logger, webhookID string,
) error {
var version int
// Row().Scan, not (*gorm.DB).Scan: see internal/gormlog.
err := db.Raw("PRAGMA user_version").Row().Scan(&version)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf(
"reading sweep marker of webhook database %s: %w",
webhookID, err,
)
}
if version >= eventDBSweptVersion {
return nil
}
var purged int64
if db.Migrator().HasTable("targets") {
res := db.Exec("DELETE FROM targets")
if res.Error != nil {
return fmt.Errorf(
"purging target rows from webhook database %s: %w",
webhookID, res.Error,
)
}
purged = res.RowsAffected
// Unconditional: a zero row count here does not mean there is
// nothing to remove, only that no *live* row is left. See
// eventDBSweptVersion.
err = db.Exec("VACUUM").Error
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf(
"purged %d leaked target rows from webhook database "+
"%s but vacuuming it failed, so the deleted "+
"target credentials are still recoverable from "+
"the file; it stays marked unswept and the next "+
"open retries: %w",
purged, webhookID, err,
)
}
}
err = db.Exec(fmt.Sprintf(
"PRAGMA user_version = %d", eventDBSweptVersion,
)).Error
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf(
"marking webhook database %s swept: %w", webhookID, err,
)
}
if purged > 0 {
log.Warn(
"purged leaked target rows from per-webhook database",
"webhook_id", webhookID,
"rows", purged,
)
}
return nil
}

438
internal/database/event_db_isolation_test.go
View File

@@ -1,438 +0,0 @@
package database_test
import (
"bytes"
"database/sql"
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
_ "modernc.org/sqlite"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
// testDataDirPerm is the mode the test data directory is created
// with.
const testDataDirPerm = 0o750
// eventDBDataDir returns a data directory that a WebhookDBManager
// can be pointed at.
func eventDBDataDir(t *testing.T) string {
t.Helper()
dir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "events")
require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(dir, testDataDirPerm))
return dir
}
// openRawEventDB opens the per-webhook database file directly,
// without the manager, so a test can put a file on disk in a state
// the manager has to cope with, or inspect one afterwards.
func openRawEventDB(
t *testing.T, dataDir, webhookID string,
) *sql.DB {
t.Helper()
path := filepath.Join(
dataDir, fmt.Sprintf("events-%s.db", webhookID),
)
sqlDB, err := sql.Open(
"sqlite",
fmt.Sprintf("file:%s?mode=rwc", path),
)
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = sqlDB.Close() })
return sqlDB
}
// eventDBFileBytes reads a per-webhook database file off disk, so a
// test can assert on what the file itself still holds rather than on
// what a query returns.
func eventDBFileBytes(t *testing.T, dataDir, webhookID string) []byte {
t.Helper()
//nolint:gosec // reads a file the test just created under t.TempDir()
raw, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(
dataDir, fmt.Sprintf("events-%s.db", webhookID),
))
require.NoError(t, err)
return raw
}
// eventDBUserVersion returns the PRAGMA user_version of a per-webhook
// database file, which is the marker purgeTargetRows stamps once it
// has swept and vacuumed.
func eventDBUserVersion(t *testing.T, sqlDB *sql.DB) int {
t.Helper()
var version int
require.NoError(t, sqlDB.QueryRowContext(
t.Context(), "PRAGMA user_version",
).Scan(&version))
return version
}
// clearEventDBSweptMarker resets the sweep marker to 0, which is what
// a file written by a build without the sweep looks like. Tests that
// seed a leaked row have to create the file through the manager to
// get the real targets table shape, and that stamps it.
func clearEventDBSweptMarker(t *testing.T, sqlDB *sql.DB) {
t.Helper()
_, err := sqlDB.ExecContext(t.Context(), "PRAGMA user_version = 0")
require.NoError(t, err)
}
// countTargetRows returns the number of rows in the targets table of
// a per-webhook database file, or -1 if the table does not exist.
func countTargetRows(t *testing.T, sqlDB *sql.DB) int {
t.Helper()
var tables int
require.NoError(t, sqlDB.QueryRowContext(
t.Context(),
"SELECT count(*) FROM sqlite_master "+
"WHERE type = 'table' AND name = 'targets'",
).Scan(&tables))
if tables == 0 {
return -1
}
var rows int
require.NoError(t, sqlDB.QueryRowContext(
t.Context(), "SELECT count(*) FROM targets",
).Scan(&rows))
return rows
}
// TestOpenPurgesLeakedTargetRows covers the sweep for event
// databases written by a build that let GORM upsert target rows
// into them: opening the database clears them, and opening it again
// is a no-op.
func TestOpenPurgesLeakedTargetRows(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dataDir := eventDBDataDir(t)
webhookID := uuid.New().String()
// Create the file the way the application does, so the targets
// table has exactly the shape AutoMigrate gives it, then write
// a leaked row into it the way the association upsert did.
initial := database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir)
_, err := initial.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, initial.CloseAll())
seed := openRawEventDB(t, dataDir, webhookID)
_, err = seed.ExecContext(
t.Context(),
"INSERT INTO targets "+
"(id, webhook_id, name, type, config) "+
"VALUES (?, '', ?, ?, ?)",
uuid.New().String(),
"leaked-target",
"slack",
`{"webhookUrl":"https://hooks.example/T000/B000/secret"}`,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, 1, countTargetRows(t, seed))
clearEventDBSweptMarker(t, seed)
require.NoError(t, seed.Close())
mgr := database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir)
_, err = mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, mgr.CloseAll())
check := openRawEventDB(t, dataDir, webhookID)
assert.Zero(t, countTargetRows(t, check))
assert.Equal(
t, 1, eventDBUserVersion(t, check),
"a completed sweep must mark the file so later opens skip it",
)
require.NoError(t, check.Close())
// Idempotent: a second open leaves it at zero and does not
// error.
again := database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir)
_, err = again.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, again.CloseAll())
recheck := openRawEventDB(t, dataDir, webhookID)
assert.Zero(t, countTargetRows(t, recheck))
}
// TestOpenPurgeRemovesCredentialBytes covers the sweep at the level
// that matters for a backup handed to someone else: the leaked
// credential must be gone from the raw bytes of the file, not merely
// unreachable by query. A bare DELETE unlinks the row and leaves the
// bytes readable in the free pages, so this fails without the VACUUM
// in purgeTargetRows.
func TestOpenPurgeRemovesCredentialBytes(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dataDir := eventDBDataDir(t)
webhookID := uuid.New().String()
credential := "T00000000/B00000000/" + uuid.New().String()
initial := database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir)
_, err := initial.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, initial.CloseAll())
seed := openRawEventDB(t, dataDir, webhookID)
_, err = seed.ExecContext(
t.Context(),
"INSERT INTO targets "+
"(id, webhook_id, name, type, config) "+
"VALUES (?, '', ?, ?, ?)",
uuid.New().String(),
"leaked-target",
"slack",
fmt.Sprintf(
`{"webhookUrl":"https://hooks.example/%s"}`, credential,
),
)
require.NoError(t, err)
clearEventDBSweptMarker(t, seed)
require.NoError(t, seed.Close())
// The seed has to be in the file for its absence later to mean
// anything.
require.True(
t,
bytes.Contains(
eventDBFileBytes(t, dataDir, webhookID),
[]byte(credential),
),
"seeded credential is not in the file, so this test proves nothing",
)
mgr := database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir)
_, err = mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, mgr.CloseAll())
assert.NotContains(
t,
string(eventDBFileBytes(t, dataDir, webhookID)),
credential,
"leaked credential is still recoverable from the raw file",
)
}
// TestOpenRevacuumsAfterIncompleteSweep covers the case a row count
// cannot see: the rows are already deleted but the file was never
// vacuumed, because an earlier sweep died between the two or its
// VACUUM failed. The credential bytes are still recoverable, and the
// unset marker is the only thing that says so, so the next open must
// vacuum rather than conclude from the empty table that there is
// nothing to do.
func TestOpenRevacuumsAfterIncompleteSweep(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dataDir := eventDBDataDir(t)
webhookID := uuid.New().String()
credential := "T00000000/B00000000/" + uuid.New().String()
initial := database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir)
_, err := initial.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, initial.CloseAll())
seed := openRawEventDB(t, dataDir, webhookID)
_, err = seed.ExecContext(
t.Context(),
"INSERT INTO targets "+
"(id, webhook_id, name, type, config) "+
"VALUES (?, '', ?, ?, ?)",
uuid.New().String(),
"leaked-target",
"slack",
fmt.Sprintf(
`{"webhookUrl":"https://hooks.example/%s"}`, credential,
),
)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Exactly the state an interrupted sweep leaves: rows gone,
// marker unset, bytes still in the free pages.
_, err = seed.ExecContext(t.Context(), "DELETE FROM targets")
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Zero(t, countTargetRows(t, seed))
clearEventDBSweptMarker(t, seed)
require.NoError(t, seed.Close())
require.True(
t,
bytes.Contains(
eventDBFileBytes(t, dataDir, webhookID),
[]byte(credential),
),
"the deleted row's bytes must still be in the file, or this "+
"test proves nothing",
)
mgr := database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir)
_, err = mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, mgr.CloseAll())
assert.NotContains(
t,
string(eventDBFileBytes(t, dataDir, webhookID)),
credential,
"an interrupted sweep was not retried, so the credential is "+
"still recoverable from the raw file",
)
check := openRawEventDB(t, dataDir, webhookID)
assert.Equal(t, 1, eventDBUserVersion(t, check))
}
// TestOpenSkipsSweptDatabase covers the other half of the marker: a
// file this build created is marked without ever being vacuumed, and
// a marked file is not swept again.
func TestOpenSkipsSweptDatabase(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dataDir := eventDBDataDir(t)
webhookID := uuid.New().String()
mgr := database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir)
_, err := mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, mgr.CloseAll())
marked := openRawEventDB(t, dataDir, webhookID)
assert.Equal(t, 1, eventDBUserVersion(t, marked))
// A marked file is left alone, so a row written into it survives
// a reopen. Nothing writes target rows any more; this stands in
// for the sweep having run.
_, err = marked.ExecContext(
t.Context(),
"INSERT INTO targets "+
"(id, webhook_id, name, type, config) "+
"VALUES (?, '', ?, ?, ?)",
uuid.New().String(), "sentinel", "slack", `{}`,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, marked.Close())
again := database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir)
_, err = again.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, again.CloseAll())
check := openRawEventDB(t, dataDir, webhookID)
assert.Equal(
t, 1, countTargetRows(t, check),
"a marked file must not be swept again",
)
}
// TestOpenSucceedsWithoutTargetsTable covers an existing event
// database that never grew a targets table. The sweep must not fail
// startup on it.
func TestOpenSucceedsWithoutTargetsTable(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dataDir := eventDBDataDir(t)
webhookID := uuid.New().String()
seed := openRawEventDB(t, dataDir, webhookID)
_, err := seed.ExecContext(
t.Context(),
"CREATE TABLE events (id text PRIMARY KEY)",
)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, seed.Close())
mgr := database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir)
db, err := mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.NotNil(t, db)
require.NoError(t, mgr.CloseAll())
}
// TestEventDBCreateOmitsAssociations covers the connection-level
// guard directly: a Delivery carrying its Event and Target in
// memory, written through the manager's handle, must store only the
// delivery row.
func TestEventDBCreateOmitsAssociations(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dataDir := eventDBDataDir(t)
webhookID := uuid.New().String()
mgr := database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir)
db, err := mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
target := database.Target{
WebhookID: webhookID,
Name: "leaky-target",
Type: database.TargetTypeSlack,
Config: `{"webhookUrl":"https://hooks.example/secret"}`,
}
target.ID = uuid.New().String()
event := database.Event{
WebhookID: webhookID,
EntrypointID: uuid.New().String(),
Method: "POST",
Headers: `{}`,
Body: `{}`,
}
event.ID = uuid.New().String()
d := &database.Delivery{
EventID: event.ID,
TargetID: target.ID,
Status: database.DeliveryStatusPending,
Event: event,
Target: target,
}
d.ID = uuid.New().String()
require.NoError(t, db.Create(d).Error)
require.NoError(t, db.Model(d).
Update("status", database.DeliveryStatusDelivered).
Error)
require.NoError(t, mgr.CloseAll())
check := openRawEventDB(t, dataDir, webhookID)
assert.Zero(t, countTargetRows(t, check))
}

8
internal/database/export_test.go
View File

@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ package database
import (
"context"
"io"
"log/slog"
"os"
"time"
@@ -67,13 +66,6 @@ func (r *RetentionReaper) ExportSetInterval(d time.Duration) {
r.interval = d
}
// ExportSetBannerOut redirects the first-boot credentials banner, so a
// test can read what the operator would have seen. It must be called
// before the fx start hook runs, which is where the account is seeded.
func (d *Database) ExportSetBannerOut(w io.Writer) {
d.bannerOut = w
}
// DummyPasswordHashForTest exposes the encoded hash that unknown
// usernames are verified against.
func DummyPasswordHashForTest() string {

17
internal/database/model_delivery.go
View File

@@ -11,23 +11,6 @@ const (
DeliveryStatusRetrying DeliveryStatus = "retrying"
)
// Terminal reports whether a delivery in this status has finished, so
// the delivery engine will make no further attempt of its own.
//
// It is what decides which deliveries the event log offers to replay:
// a pending or retrying delivery is still the engine's, and replaying
// one would race it.
func (s DeliveryStatus) Terminal() bool {
switch s {
case DeliveryStatusDelivered, DeliveryStatusFailed:
return true
case DeliveryStatusPending, DeliveryStatusRetrying:
return false
default:
return false
}
}
// Delivery represents a delivery attempt for an event to a target
type Delivery struct {
BaseModel

19
internal/database/testing.go
View File

@@ -24,24 +24,11 @@ func NewTestDatabase(db *gorm.DB) *Database {
// NewTestWebhookDBManager creates a WebhookDBManager backed by the given
// data directory. Intended for use in tests without the fx lifecycle.
func NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir string) *WebhookDBManager {
return NewTestWebhookDBManagerWithLogger(
dataDir,
slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(
return &WebhookDBManager{
dataDir: dataDir,
log: slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(
os.Stderr,
&slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug},
)),
)
}
// NewTestWebhookDBManagerWithLogger is NewTestWebhookDBManager with the
// logger supplied by the caller. The per-webhook databases this manager
// opens hand that logger to gormlog, so a test that needs to see the SQL
// the service emits can capture it.
func NewTestWebhookDBManagerWithLogger(
dataDir string, log *slog.Logger,
) *WebhookDBManager {
return &WebhookDBManager{
dataDir: dataDir,
log: log,
}
}

19
internal/database/webhook_db_manager.go
View File

@@ -262,25 +262,6 @@ func (m *WebhookDBManager) openDB(
)
}
// Keep main-database rows out of this file. See
// event_db_isolation.go.
err = omitAssociations(db)
if err != nil {
_ = sqlDB.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"guarding webhook database %s: %w",
webhookID, err,
)
}
err = purgeTargetRows(db, m.log, webhookID)
if err != nil {
_ = sqlDB.Close()
return nil, err
}
// Run migrations for event-tier models only
err = db.AutoMigrate(
&Event{}, &Delivery{}, &DeliveryResult{},

62
internal/delivery/client_ssrf_test.go
View File

@@ -19,26 +19,25 @@ func newSSRFTestEngine() *delivery.Engine {
client := &http.Client{
Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
Transport: delivery.NewTestGuard().
NewSSRFSafeTransport(),
Transport: delivery.NewSSRFSafeTransport(),
}
return delivery.NewTestEngine(log, client, 1)
}
// TestClientForRequest_TimeoutKeepsSSRFGuard asserts that a
// client returned by clientForRequest for a config with a
// TestClientForConfig_TimeoutKeepsSSRFGuard asserts that a
// client returned by clientForConfig for a config with a
// per-target timeout still refuses connections to
// private/reserved addresses (the timeout must not drop the
// SSRF-safe transport).
func TestClientForRequest_TimeoutKeepsSSRFGuard(t *testing.T) {
func TestClientForConfig_TimeoutKeepsSSRFGuard(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
engine := newSSRFTestEngine()
blocked := []string{
loopbackHookURL,
metadataURL,
"http://127.0.0.1/hook",
"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/",
"http://[fe80::1]/hook",
}
@@ -51,7 +50,7 @@ func TestClientForRequest_TimeoutKeepsSSRFGuard(t *testing.T) {
Timeout: 5,
}
client := engine.ExportClientForRequest(cfg, nil)
client := engine.ExportClientForConfig(cfg)
require.NotSame(t, engine.ExportClient(), client,
"a per-target timeout must yield a "+
@@ -92,11 +91,10 @@ func TestClientForRequest_TimeoutKeepsSSRFGuard(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestClientForRequest_NoTimeoutUnchanged asserts that a
// request with neither a per-target timeout nor an origin-scoped
// header gets the shared SSRF-safe client unchanged: there is then
// nothing for a redirect policy to strip.
func TestClientForRequest_NoTimeoutUnchanged(t *testing.T) {
// TestClientForConfig_NoTimeoutUnchanged asserts that with
// no per-target timeout the shared SSRF-safe client is
// returned unchanged.
func TestClientForConfig_NoTimeoutUnchanged(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
engine := newSSRFTestEngine()
@@ -105,46 +103,10 @@ func TestClientForRequest_NoTimeoutUnchanged(t *testing.T) {
URL: "https://example.com/hook",
}
client := engine.ExportClientForRequest(cfg, nil)
client := engine.ExportClientForConfig(cfg)
assert.Same(t, engine.ExportClient(), client,
"without a per-target timeout the shared client "+
"must be returned unchanged",
)
}
// TestClientForRequest_HeadersKeepSSRFGuard asserts that the
// redirect policy an origin-scoped header installs is added to a
// client that still carries the SSRF-safe transport. The guard is
// a dial hook, so keeping it is what makes each redirect hop pass
// the private-IP check too.
func TestClientForRequest_HeadersKeepSSRFGuard(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
engine := newSSRFTestEngine()
cfg := &delivery.HTTPTargetConfig{
URL: "https://example.com/with-headers",
Headers: map[string]string{
"X-Api-Key": "configured",
},
}
client := engine.ExportClientForRequest(
cfg, []string{"X-Api-Key"},
)
require.NotNil(t, client.CheckRedirect,
"an origin-scoped header must install a redirect policy",
)
assert.Same(t,
engine.ExportClient().Transport, client.Transport,
"the SSRF-safe transport must be reused, not dropped",
)
assert.Equal(t,
engine.ExportClient().Timeout, client.Timeout,
"the shared client's timeout must be inherited",
)
}

3
internal/delivery/engine.go
View File

@@ -121,7 +121,6 @@ type EngineParams struct {
DB *database.Database
DBManager *database.WebhookDBManager
Logger *logger.Logger
SSRFGuard *Guard
}
// Engine processes queued deliveries in the background
@@ -177,7 +176,7 @@ func New(
e.initTargets(&http.Client{
Timeout: httpClientTimeout,
Transport: params.SSRFGuard.NewSSRFSafeTransport(),
Transport: NewSSRFSafeTransport(),
})
e.registerHooks(lc)

77
internal/delivery/engine_integration_test.go
View File

@@ -1201,83 +1201,6 @@ func TestDeliverHTTP_TargetTimeout(t *testing.T) {
iAssertResultFailed(t, db, del.ID)
}
// TestDeliverHTTP_CutsStoredResponseAtMaxBodyLog pins the size
// this engine stores for an oversized response, because the
// event log's redaction is written against it: the row holds
// exactly maxBodyLog bytes and records nothing about how much
// more the remote sent, so a credential echoed across that
// boundary reaches the database already severed and no reader
// of the row can tell the cut happened.
func TestDeliverHTTP_CutsStoredResponseAtMaxBodyLog(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
// Padded so the cut falls five bytes before the end of the
// echoed webhook URL.
const (
severedTail = 5
overshoot = 100000
)
sent := strings.Repeat(
"A",
delivery.ExportMaxBodyLog-len(slackWebhookURL)+
severedTail,
) + slackWebhookURL + strings.Repeat("Z", overshoot)
s := newISetup(t)
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadGateway)
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, sent)
},
))
defer ts.Close()
cfgJSON := iHTTPConfig(ts.URL)
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"cut":"test"}`,
)
targetID := uuid.New().String()
del := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
bodyStr := event.Body
task := iTask(
del, event, s.WebhookID, targetID,
"cut-target", cfgJSON, 0, 1, &bodyStr,
)
s.Engine.ExportProcessNewTask(context.TODO(), &task)
results := iResults(t, s.WebhookDB, del.ID)
require.Len(t, results, 1)
stored := results[0].ResponseBody
assert.Len(
t, stored, delivery.ExportMaxBodyLog,
"an oversized response is stored at exactly the cap",
)
assert.Equal(
t, sent[:delivery.ExportMaxBodyLog], stored,
)
assert.NotContains(
t, stored, slackWebhookURL,
"the echoed URL is severed by the cut",
)
assert.Contains(
t, stored, "T00000000",
"the severed prefix still carries the credential",
)
}
// iSeedEventAndDelivery creates event + delivery
// for standalone tests.
func iSeedEventAndDelivery(

157
internal/delivery/event_db_isolation_test.go
View File

@@ -1,157 +0,0 @@
package delivery_test
import (
"context"
"database/sql"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
_ "modernc.org/sqlite"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
// assertNoTargetRows opens the per-webhook database file directly,
// outside GORM, and fails if its targets table holds any rows.
// Target config is the credential for slack and http targets, and
// event databases are the files that get backed up and handed
// around.
func assertNoTargetRows(t *testing.T, dbPath string) {
t.Helper()
sqlDB, err := sql.Open(
"sqlite", fmt.Sprintf("file:%s?mode=ro", dbPath),
)
require.NoError(t, err)
defer func() { _ = sqlDB.Close() }()
var tables int
require.NoError(t, sqlDB.QueryRowContext(
t.Context(),
"SELECT count(*) FROM sqlite_master "+
"WHERE type = 'table' AND name = 'targets'",
).Scan(&tables))
if tables == 0 {
return
}
var rows int
require.NoError(t, sqlDB.QueryRowContext(
t.Context(), "SELECT count(*) FROM targets",
).Scan(&rows))
assert.Zero(
t, rows,
"per-webhook event database must hold no target rows",
)
}
// TestEventDBHoldsNoTargetRows drives a delivery and then a retry
// through the real engine write paths and asserts neither leaves a
// target row behind in events-*.db.
func TestEventDBHoldsNoTargetRows(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
},
))
defer ts.Close()
cfg := iHTTPConfig(ts.URL)
targetID := uuid.New().String()
dbPath := s.DBMgr.DBPath(s.WebhookID)
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"leak":"none"}`,
)
body := event.Body
// A new delivery.
d := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
task := iTask(
d, event, s.WebhookID, targetID,
"leaky-target", cfg, 5, 1, &body,
)
s.Engine.ExportProcessNewTask(context.TODO(), &task)
iAssertStatus(
t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
)
assertNoTargetRows(t, dbPath)
// A retry.
rd := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
)
rTask := iTask(
rd, event, s.WebhookID, targetID,
"leaky-target", cfg, 5, 2, &body,
)
s.Engine.ExportProcessRetryTask(context.TODO(), &rTask)
iAssertStatus(
t, s.WebhookDB, rd.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
)
assertNoTargetRows(t, dbPath)
}
// TestEventDBHoldsNoTargetRowsOnFailedDelivery covers the failure
// write path, which updates the delivery to failed and records a
// result, rather than the success path above.
func TestEventDBHoldsNoTargetRowsOnFailedDelivery(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
},
))
defer ts.Close()
cfg := iHTTPConfig(ts.URL)
targetID := uuid.New().String()
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"leak":"none"}`,
)
body := event.Body
d := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
task := iTask(
d, event, s.WebhookID, targetID,
"leaky-target", cfg, 0, 1, &body,
)
s.Engine.ExportProcessNewTask(context.TODO(), &task)
iAssertStatus(
t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
)
assertNoTargetRows(t, s.DBMgr.DBPath(s.WebhookID))
}

58
internal/delivery/export_test.go
View File

@@ -5,8 +5,6 @@ import (
"log/slog"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"net/url"
"time"
"go.uber.org/fx"
@@ -27,12 +25,6 @@ const (
ExportRetryChannelSize = retryChannelSize
ExportDefaultFailureThreshold = defaultFailureThreshold
ExportDefaultCooldown = defaultCooldown
// ExportMaxBodyLog is the cap the engine applies to a
// recorded response body. The event log's handling of a cut
// response is written against this number, so a test has to
// be able to name it.
ExportMaxBodyLog = maxBodyLog
)
// ExportIsBlockedIP exposes isBlockedIP for testing.
@@ -40,26 +32,6 @@ func ExportIsBlockedIP(ip net.IP) bool {
return isBlockedIP(ip)
}
// NewTestGuard builds an SSRF Guard from an explicit egress
// allowlist, without going through config. Passing no prefixes
// yields the default guard, which blocks every private/reserved
// range.
func NewTestGuard(allowed ...netip.Prefix) *Guard {
return &Guard{allowed: allowed}
}
// ExportCheckIP exposes the guard's single decision point, so a
// test can assert the policy both the validator and the dialer
// inherit without needing a live destination.
func (g *Guard) ExportCheckIP(ip net.IP) error {
return g.checkIP(ip)
}
// ExportAlwaysBlockedNetworks exposes alwaysBlockedNetworks.
func ExportAlwaysBlockedNetworks() []*net.IPNet {
return alwaysBlockedNetworks
}
// ExportBlockedNetworks exposes blockedNetworks.
func ExportBlockedNetworks() []*net.IPNet {
return blockedNetworks
@@ -71,14 +43,13 @@ func ExportIsForwardableHeader(name string) bool {
}
// ExportApplyRequestHeaders exposes applyRequestHeaders, so a test
// can inspect the header set an outbound delivery actually carries
// and the origin-scoped names it reports for the redirect policy.
// can inspect the header set an outbound delivery actually carries.
func ExportApplyRequestHeaders(
req *http.Request,
event *database.Event,
cfg *HTTPTargetConfig,
) []string {
return applyRequestHeaders(req, event, cfg)
) {
applyRequestHeaders(req, event, cfg)
}
// ExportTruncate exposes truncate for testing.
@@ -188,27 +159,12 @@ func (e *Engine) ExportDoHTTPRequest(
return e.httpTarget.doHTTPRequest(ctx, cfg, event)
}
// ExportClientForRequest exposes the http target's
// clientForRequest.
func (e *Engine) ExportClientForRequest(
// ExportClientForConfig exposes the http target's
// clientForConfig.
func (e *Engine) ExportClientForConfig(
cfg *HTTPTargetConfig,
originScoped []string,
) *http.Client {
return e.httpTarget.clientForRequest(cfg, originScoped)
}
// ErrExportTooManyRedirects exposes the sentinel the redirect
// policy returns once a chain exceeds the hop cap. It carries the
// Err prefix rather than this file's usual Export one because it
// is a sentinel error.
var ErrExportTooManyRedirects = errTooManyRedirects
// ExportMaxDeliveryRedirects exposes the redirect hop cap.
const ExportMaxDeliveryRedirects = maxDeliveryRedirects
// ExportSameDeliveryOrigin exposes sameDeliveryOrigin.
func ExportSameDeliveryOrigin(origin, dest *url.URL) bool {
return sameDeliveryOrigin(origin, dest)
return e.httpTarget.clientForConfig(cfg)
}
// ExportClient returns the http target's shared HTTP client.

13
internal/delivery/queue_depth.go
View File

@@ -95,8 +95,6 @@ func (e *Engine) sampleQueueDepths(ctx context.Context) {
// targetTypesByID maps every configured target id to its type. The
// deliveries live in the per-webhook databases but carry only a
// target id, so the type label has to come from the main database.
//
// Find rather than Scan: see sampleWebhookQueueDepths.
func (e *Engine) targetTypesByID() (
map[string]database.TargetType, error,
) {
@@ -108,7 +106,7 @@ func (e *Engine) targetTypesByID() (
err := e.database.DB().
Model(&database.Target{}).
Select("id", "type").
Find(&rows).Error
Scan(&rows).Error
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("loading targets: %w", err)
}
@@ -130,13 +128,6 @@ func (e *Engine) targetTypesByID() (
// folds that into the unknown series rather than dropping it: a
// backlog stuck behind a deleted target is a backlog that still needs
// to be alertable.
//
// The aggregate is read with Find, not Scan. (*gorm.DB).Scan swaps
// GORM's own trace recorder in for the logging adapter, and that
// recorder does not implement gorm.ParamsFilter, so the statement
// reaches the log with its bound values interpolated — here, the
// status list. Find goes through the normal query callback, which is
// filtered. See internal/gormlog and its scan_guard_test.go.
func (e *Engine) sampleWebhookQueueDepths(
webhookID string,
types map[string]database.TargetType,
@@ -167,7 +158,7 @@ func (e *Engine) sampleWebhookQueueDepths(
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
}).
Group("target_id, status").
Find(&rows).Error
Scan(&rows).Error
if err != nil {
e.log.Error(
"queue depth sample: "+

179
internal/delivery/queue_depth_gormlog_test.go
View File

@@ -1,179 +0,0 @@
package delivery_test
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"database/sql"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"gorm.io/driver/sqlite"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/gormlog"
)
// qdAggregateMarker identifies the queue-depth aggregate in the
// captured SQL. It is the one statement in this test that binds
// anything, and the raw count() expression appears in no other.
const qdAggregateMarker = "count(*)"
// qdSyncBuf collects log output from whichever goroutine GORM writes
// on.
type qdSyncBuf struct {
mu sync.Mutex
b bytes.Buffer
}
func (q *qdSyncBuf) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
q.mu.Lock()
defer q.mu.Unlock()
return q.b.Write(p)
}
func (q *qdSyncBuf) String() string {
q.mu.Lock()
defer q.mu.Unlock()
return q.b.String()
}
// qdMainDB opens a main database whose GORM logger is the service's
// adapter, writing through log.
func qdMainDB(t *testing.T, log *slog.Logger) *gorm.DB {
t.Helper()
dsn := fmt.Sprintf(
"file:%s?cache=shared&mode=rwc",
filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "main-gormlog.db"),
)
sqlDB, err := sql.Open("sqlite", dsn)
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = sqlDB.Close() })
db, err := gorm.Open(
sqlite.Dialector{Conn: sqlDB},
&gorm.Config{Logger: gormlog.New(log)},
)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, db.AutoMigrate(
&database.Webhook{},
&database.Target{},
))
return db
}
// qdLinesContaining returns every captured line carrying marker.
func qdLinesContaining(out, marker string) []string {
var found []string
for line := range strings.SplitSeq(out, "\n") {
if strings.Contains(line, marker) {
found = append(found, line)
}
}
return found
}
// TestQueueDepthSample_LogsNoBoundValue holds the queue-depth sampler
// to the values-off property internal/gormlog exists to provide.
//
// The aggregate binds the delivery status list. Read with
// (*gorm.DB).Scan it was logged with those values interpolated, because
// Scan records the statement through GORM's own traceRecorder, which
// does not implement gorm.ParamsFilter. Read with Find it goes through
// the normal query callback and the adapter's filter applies. Restore
// the Scan call in queue_depth.go and this fails on the status literals
// below; scan_guard_test.go catches the same regression statically.
func TestQueueDepthSample_LogsNoBoundValue(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
buf := &qdSyncBuf{}
log := slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(
buf, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug},
))
mainDB := qdMainDB(t, log)
dbMgr := database.NewTestWebhookDBManagerWithLogger(
t.TempDir(), log,
)
webhookID := uuid.New().String()
webhookDB := iSeedWebhookDB(t, dbMgr, webhookID)
iCreateWebhook(t, mainDB, webhookID, "queue-depth-gormlog")
targetID := uuid.New().String()
iCreateTarget(t, mainDB, targetID, webhookID,
"queue-depth-gormlog-target", database.TargetTypeHTTP,
iHTTPConfig("https://example.com/hook"), 3,
)
event := iSeedEvent(
t, webhookDB, webhookID, `{"queued":true}`,
)
iSeedDelivery(
t, webhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
iSeedDelivery(
t, webhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
)
engine := delivery.NewTestEngineWithDB(
database.NewTestDatabase(mainDB),
dbMgr,
log,
&http.Client{Timeout: 5 * time.Second},
2,
)
engine.ExportSampleQueueDepths(context.Background())
out := buf.String()
lines := qdLinesContaining(out, qdAggregateMarker)
require.NotEmpty(
t, lines,
"the queue-depth aggregate was never logged, so the "+
"assertions below are vacuous",
)
for _, line := range lines {
assert.Contains(
t, line, "?",
"the aggregate was logged without its placeholders: %s",
line,
)
for _, status := range []database.DeliveryStatus{
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
} {
assert.NotContains(
t, line, string(status),
"a bound status value was interpolated into the "+
"logged statement: %s", line,
)
}
}
}

107
internal/delivery/redirect.go
View File

@@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
package delivery
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strings"
)
// maxDeliveryRedirects caps a redirect chain. Installing a
// CheckRedirect replaces net/http's default policy including its
// own limit, so the limit is restated rather than dropped.
const maxDeliveryRedirects = 10
// schemeHTTPS names the scheme the origin comparison treats
// specially: a step down from it is never the same origin.
const schemeHTTPS = "https"
var errTooManyRedirects = errors.New("too many redirects")
// offOriginHeaderPolicy returns a CheckRedirect that drops every
// origin-scoped header once a redirect leaves the origin the
// operator configured. names is the set applyRequestHeaders
// reports: the operator's configured headers and the inbound event
// headers this delivery forwarded, under one rule rather than two.
//
// net/http withholds Authorization and Cookie across a host change
// and forwards everything else. A target header is routinely a
// credential under another name — X-Api-Key, PRIVATE-TOKEN,
// X-Auth-Token — and a forwarded inbound header is routinely a
// sender's signature — X-Hub-Signature — so an open redirect at an
// otherwise trusted destination would hand either to a host the
// operator never named. Redirects are still followed: refusing them
// would break every destination that legitimately redirects and
// would record the 3xx as the delivery's result.
//
// The strip is per hop, not permanent: net/http re-copies the
// initial request's headers for every hop, so a chain that returns
// to the configured origin carries them again, exactly as net/http
// treats Authorization.
//
// Each hop is dialled through the same SSRF-safe transport, whose
// guard runs per connection, so a redirect aimed at a private or
// reserved address is still refused at connect time.
func offOriginHeaderPolicy(
names []string,
) func(*http.Request, []*http.Request) error {
return func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
if len(via) >= maxDeliveryRedirects {
return fmt.Errorf(
"%w: stopped after %d",
errTooManyRedirects, maxDeliveryRedirects,
)
}
if sameDeliveryOrigin(via[0].URL, req.URL) {
return nil
}
for _, name := range names {
req.Header.Del(name)
}
return nil
}
}
// sameDeliveryOrigin reports whether dest is close enough to the
// configured target URL to keep carrying its origin-scoped headers.
//
// This is stricter than the rule net/http applies to Authorization:
// the port is part of the comparison (a different port is a
// different service), and a subdomain of the configured host is not
// the same origin. An https origin stepping down to http is never
// the same origin whatever the hosts are, because that puts the
// header on the wire in clear.
func sameDeliveryOrigin(origin, dest *url.URL) bool {
if origin.Scheme == schemeHTTPS && dest.Scheme != schemeHTTPS {
return false
}
return originHostPort(origin) == originHostPort(dest)
}
// originHostPort renders a URL's host for comparison, lowercased
// and with the scheme's default port normalised away so that
// "https://h" and "https://h:443" are one origin.
//
// The port is joined with net.JoinHostPort rather than a bare
// colon: Hostname() unwraps an IPv6 literal's brackets, so
// "[2001:db8::1]:8080" and "[2001:db8::1:8080]" — a different
// address on a different port — would otherwise render the same
// string and pass as one origin.
func originHostPort(u *url.URL) string {
host := strings.ToLower(u.Hostname())
port := u.Port()
if port == "" ||
(u.Scheme == "http" && port == "80") ||
(u.Scheme == schemeHTTPS && port == "443") {
return host
}
return net.JoinHostPort(host, port)
}

383
internal/delivery/redirect_test.go
View File

@@ -1,383 +0,0 @@
package delivery_test
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
)
// The headers these tests drive stand in for the two classes the
// off-origin rule covers: an operator-configured credential and an
// inbound header the delivery path forwards. net/http withholds
// Authorization and Cookie across a host change, and nothing else.
const (
probeHeaderName = "X-Api-Key"
probeHeaderValue = "QQNEVERONTHEWIREQQ"
inboundHeaderName = "X-Hub-Signature"
inboundHeaderValue = "sha1=QQINBOUNDQQ"
)
// redirectProbe records what the last hop of a redirect chain
// actually received.
type redirectProbe struct {
mu sync.Mutex
seen http.Header
hits int
}
func (p *redirectProbe) serve(
w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request,
) {
p.mu.Lock()
p.seen = r.Header.Clone()
p.hits++
p.mu.Unlock()
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}
func (p *redirectProbe) result() (http.Header, int) {
p.mu.Lock()
defer p.mu.Unlock()
return p.seen, p.hits
}
// deliverWithProbeHeaders runs one real delivery of a new task
// through the engine to targetURL, carrying both probe headers —
// probeHeaderName configured on the target, inboundHeaderName
// forwarded from the event — and returns the delivery status the
// engine recorded.
func deliverWithProbeHeaders(
t *testing.T, targetURL string,
) database.DeliveryStatus {
t.Helper()
s := newISetup(t)
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"hello":"world"}`,
)
targetID := uuid.New().String()
inbound, err := json.Marshal(map[string][]string{
inboundHeaderName: {inboundHeaderValue},
})
require.NoError(t, err)
event.Headers = string(inbound)
d := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
cfg, err := json.Marshal(delivery.HTTPTargetConfig{
URL: targetURL,
Headers: map[string]string{
probeHeaderName: probeHeaderValue,
},
})
require.NoError(t, err)
body := event.Body
task := iTask(
d, event, s.WebhookID, targetID,
"redirect-target", string(cfg), 0, 1, &body,
)
s.Engine.ExportProcessNewTask(context.TODO(), &task)
var updated database.Delivery
require.NoError(t, s.WebhookDB.First(
&updated, "id = ?", d.ID,
).Error)
return updated.Status
}
// A 302 to an origin the operator never configured must not carry
// the credential they configured for the one they did, nor the
// inbound header this delivery forwarded — one rule for both
// classes. The chain is still followed, so the delivery is recorded
// from the final hop.
func TestDelivery_CrossOriginRedirectDropsOriginScopedHeaders(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
var probe redirectProbe
final := httptest.NewServer(
http.HandlerFunc(probe.serve),
)
defer final.Close()
// httptest listens on loopback, so reach the second server
// under loopback's other name: the hop then differs in
// hostname as well as port and is cross-host by any reading.
finalURL, err := url.Parse(final.URL)
require.NoError(t, err)
finalURL.Host = "localhost:" + finalURL.Port()
finalURL.Path = "/moved"
origin := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
http.Redirect(
w, r, finalURL.String(),
http.StatusFound,
)
},
))
defer origin.Close()
status := deliverWithProbeHeaders(t, origin.URL)
seen, hits := probe.result()
assert.Equal(t, 1, hits,
"the redirect must still be followed",
)
assert.Empty(t, seen.Get(probeHeaderName),
"a configured credential header must not reach an "+
"origin the operator did not configure",
)
assert.Empty(t, seen.Get(inboundHeaderName),
"a forwarded inbound header must not reach an origin "+
"the operator did not configure",
)
assert.Equal(t,
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered, status,
"the final hop's 200 is the delivery's result",
)
}
// Stripping must not fire within the configured origin, or every
// destination that redirects its own path would lose its
// credential and start answering 401 — and would lose the inbound
// signature the receiver verifies.
func TestDelivery_SameOriginRedirectKeepsOriginScopedHeaders(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
var probe redirectProbe
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.URL.Path == "/moved" {
probe.serve(w, r)
return
}
http.Redirect(
w, r, "/moved", http.StatusFound,
)
},
))
defer srv.Close()
status := deliverWithProbeHeaders(t, srv.URL+"/hook")
seen, hits := probe.result()
assert.Equal(t, 1, hits)
assert.Equal(t, probeHeaderValue, seen.Get(probeHeaderName),
"a redirect within the configured origin must keep "+
"the configured header",
)
assert.Equal(t,
inboundHeaderValue, seen.Get(inboundHeaderName),
"a redirect within the configured origin must keep "+
"the forwarded inbound header",
)
assert.Equal(t,
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered, status,
)
}
// The origin comparison is deliberately stricter than the one
// net/http applies to Authorization: the port counts and a
// subdomain does not inherit. Only the default-port spellings of
// one origin are the same origin.
func TestSameDeliveryOrigin(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// The configured target URL every case redirects away from.
// Destination paths differ only so that no literal repeats.
const configured = "https://h/a"
cases := map[string]struct {
origin string
dest string
want bool
}{
"other path": {configured, "https://h/b", true},
"default port spelled": {configured, "https://h:443/c", true},
"host in another case": {configured, "https://H/d", true},
"http default port": {"http://h:80/a", "http://h/e", true},
"upgrade to https": {"http://h/a", "https://h/f", true},
"downgrade to http": {configured, "http://h/g", false},
"another host": {configured, "https://i/h", false},
"a subdomain": {configured, "https://x.h/i", false},
"the parent domain": {"https://x.h/a", "https://h/j", false},
"another port": {configured, "https://h:8443/k", false},
// Hostname() unwraps an IPv6 literal's brackets, so a
// bracketed host whose last group is the origin's port
// renders identically to the origin unless the port is
// re-joined with brackets. Each dest below differs from
// its origin in address AND in port.
"ipv6 port as final group": {
"https://[2001:db8::1]:8080/a",
"https://[2001:db8::1:8080]/l",
false,
},
"ipv6 loopback port as final group": {
"https://[::1]:8080/a",
"https://[::1:8080]/m",
false,
},
"ipv6 same origin": {
"https://[2001:db8::1]:8080/a",
"https://[2001:DB8::1]:8080/n",
true,
},
}
for name, tc := range cases {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
origin, err := url.Parse(tc.origin)
require.NoError(t, err)
dest, err := url.Parse(tc.dest)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, tc.want,
delivery.ExportSameDeliveryOrigin(
origin, dest,
),
)
})
}
}
// Installing a CheckRedirect discards net/http's own redirect
// limit, so the cap this policy restates is the only thing between
// a self-redirecting destination and an unbounded chain. A
// destination that always redirects must be cut off after exactly
// maxDeliveryRedirects requests, with the sentinel surfacing to the
// caller rather than a generic net/http error.
func TestRedirectPolicy_StopsAtHopCap(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var hits atomic.Int64
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
hits.Add(1)
http.Redirect(
w, r, "/loop", http.StatusFound,
)
},
))
defer srv.Close()
engine := delivery.NewTestEngine(
slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler),
&http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second},
1,
)
client := engine.ExportClientForRequest(
&delivery.HTTPTargetConfig{URL: srv.URL},
[]string{probeHeaderName},
)
require.NotNil(t, client.CheckRedirect)
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(), http.MethodGet, srv.URL, http.NoBody,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
resp, doErr := client.Do(req)
if resp != nil {
_ = resp.Body.Close()
}
require.Error(t, doErr,
"an endless redirect chain must not be followed forever",
)
require.ErrorIs(t, doErr, delivery.ErrExportTooManyRedirects)
assert.Equal(t,
int64(delivery.ExportMaxDeliveryRedirects), hits.Load(),
"the chain must stop after exactly %d hops",
delivery.ExportMaxDeliveryRedirects,
)
}
// The set the redirect policy strips is whatever the delivery path
// actually put on the wire, so a header added to the forward set is
// covered without a second edit. A header the event never carried
// is not in the set, and the delivery path's own two are deliberately
// excluded: Content-Type describes the body, which a 307 carries
// across hosts, and the inbound User-Agent every real sender supplies
// is overwritten before the request goes out.
func TestApplyRequestHeaders_ReportsOriginScopedNames(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
inbound, err := json.Marshal(map[string][]string{
inboundHeaderName: {inboundHeaderValue},
"Content-Type": {testContentType},
"User-Agent": {"curl/8.7.1"},
"Host": {"inbound.example.com"},
})
require.NoError(t, err)
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(),
http.MethodPost,
"https://target.example.com/hook",
http.NoBody,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
names := delivery.ExportApplyRequestHeaders(
req,
&database.Event{
Headers: string(inbound),
ContentType: testContentType,
},
&delivery.HTTPTargetConfig{
Headers: map[string]string{
probeHeaderName: probeHeaderValue,
},
},
)
assert.Equal(t,
[]string{probeHeaderName, inboundHeaderName}, names,
"both header classes are reported, and only those: "+
"Host is never forwarded, Content-Type and "+
"User-Agent are the delivery path's own",
)
}

286
internal/delivery/ssrf.go
View File

@@ -6,11 +6,8 @@ import (
"fmt"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"net/url"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
)
const (
@@ -28,83 +25,20 @@ var (
errBlockedIP = errors.New(
"blocked private/reserved IP range",
)
errBlockedMetadata = errors.New(
"blocked link-local or cloud instance metadata " +
"address: ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS cannot open it",
)
errInvalidScheme = errors.New(
"only http and https are allowed",
)
)
// blockedNetworks contains all private/reserved IP ranges
// that should be blocked to prevent SSRF attacks. An operator
// can permit specific blocks out of this set with
// ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS; see Guard.
// that should be blocked to prevent SSRF attacks.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // package-level network list is appropriate here
var blockedNetworks []*net.IPNet
// alwaysBlockedNetworks are the ranges no configuration can
// open: the link-local blocks and the cloud instance metadata
// endpoints that live outside them. Reaching one is credential
// or user-data theft rather than delivery to an internal
// service, so a supplied CIDR that covers such an address still
// leaves it blocked.
//
// Inclusion criterion — an address belongs here only if BOTH
// hold, and every entry below satisfies both:
//
// 1. It is a fixed address assigned by the provider, or a
// range reserved by IANA — never one the operator chose.
// That is what makes a host route free: it cannot collide
// with anything the operator runs.
// 2. Reaching it discloses credentials, or user data or
// bootstrap material — something granting onward access, or
// not cheaply rotated.
//
// Both halves are load-bearing, so use them to refuse a
// candidate and say why. An endpoint disclosing only the
// operator's own inventory (instance id, region, disks, NICs)
// fails (2): letting a delivery target reach the operator's own
// infrastructure is the feature ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS exists to
// provide. But (2) is not "IAM credentials only" either —
// fd00:42::42 serves /user_data and /conf rather than tokens,
// and user data routinely carries bootstrap secrets. An address
// stays out if it fails (1) however well it clears (2): a host
// route inside a block operators really assign from, such as
// 10.0.0.0/8, can collide with a real internal service and
// forfeits the justification in (1).
//
// A publicly routable unicast address does not belong here even
// when it clears both halves. Nothing in this list can be
// reopened, so putting a public address here leaves the operator
// no escape hatch at all — the condition ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS
// exists to remove. Default-block it in blockedNetworks instead,
// which an allowlist can override.
//
// This is a criterion, not an enumeration of every metadata
// address in existence.
//
// Every entry is either already in blockedNetworks — this list is
// what makes it unconditional — or an alternate encoding of
// 169.254.169.254 that Contains does not match against
// 169.254.0.0/16. Every entry outside the link-local blocks is a
// /32 or /128 host route, so blocking it costs an operator
// nothing else on the surrounding network.
//
// Derive membership from the address, never from the vendor's
// prose. Several providers call these endpoints "link-local" or
// even "localhost" in their own documentation while the address
// is a ULA outside fe80::/10, so a set derived from the docs
// comes out wrong.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // package-level network list is appropriate here
var alwaysBlockedNetworks []*net.IPNet
//nolint:gochecknoinits // init is the idiomatic way to parse CIDRs once at startup
func init() {
blockedNetworks = mustParseCIDRs([]string{
cidrs := []string{
"127.0.0.0/8",
"10.0.0.0/8",
"172.16.0.0/12",
@@ -122,73 +56,8 @@ func init() {
"::1/128",
"fc00::/7",
"fe80::/10",
})
// Every entry is named. The set must not grow or shrink
// without a matching change to
// TestAlwaysBlockedNetworks_PinnedSet.
//
// The IPv4-mapped form ::ffff:169.254.169.254 needs no
// entry: net.IPNet.Contains normalises it via To4() before
// comparing, so 169.254.0.0/16 already matches it. To4()
// does not normalise the IPv4-compatible or NAT64 forms,
// which is why those are listed separately.
alwaysBlockedNetworks = mustParseCIDRs([]string{
// IPv4 link-local, carrying the 169.254.169.254
// metadata service used by AWS, Azure, DigitalOcean,
// Hetzner, OpenStack and others. Not Alibaba, which uses
// 100.100.100.200 below exclusively.
"169.254.0.0/16",
// IPv6 link-local, its IPv6 counterpart.
"fe80::/10",
// IPv6 metadata endpoints in ULA space. Each is a host
// route, and fd00::/8 is an ordinary block for an
// operator to allowlist, so without these entries that
// one allowlist line hands out cloud credentials on
// every provider below.
//
// AWS IPv6 IMDS.
"fd00:ec2::254/128",
// AWS EKS Pod Identity Agent, which issues pod identity
// credentials. A second AWS endpoint, distinct from
// IMDS above. AWS's own docs call it "localhost".
"fd00:ec2::23/128",
// GCP metadata server for IPv6-only instances.
"fd20:ce::254/128",
// Oracle OCI IMDS, serving /opc/v2 instance principals.
"fd00:c1::a9fe:a9fe/128",
// Scaleway metadata, serving /user_data and /conf.
"fd00:42::42/128",
// Linode/Akamai metadata. Akamai's docs call it
// "link-local"; it is not.
"fd00:a9fe:a9fe::1/128",
// IPv4 metadata endpoints outside link-local.
//
// Alibaba Cloud metadata. It sits in CGNAT
// 100.64.0.0/10, which Tailscale also uses, so an
// operator allowlisting a Tailscale peer's range would
// otherwise reopen it.
"100.100.100.200/32",
// Oracle Cloud Classic metadata. Inside the blocked
// 192.0.0.0/24, so this entry is what stops an
// allowlist from opening it.
"192.0.0.192/32",
// 169.254.169.254 as an IPv4-compatible IPv6 address.
"::a9fe:a9fe/128",
// 169.254.169.254 behind the NAT64 well-known prefix.
"64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe/128",
})
}
// mustParseCIDRs parses a list of CIDR literals, panicking on a
// bad one. The inputs are compile-time constants, so a failure
// is a programming error rather than a runtime condition.
func mustParseCIDRs(cidrs []string) []*net.IPNet {
networks := make([]*net.IPNet, 0, len(cidrs))
for _, cidr := range cidrs {
_, network, err := net.ParseCIDR(cidr)
if err != nil {
@@ -198,15 +67,16 @@ func mustParseCIDRs(cidrs []string) []*net.IPNet {
))
}
networks = append(networks, network)
blockedNetworks = append(
blockedNetworks, network,
)
}
}
return networks
}
// matchesAny reports whether ip falls inside any of networks.
func matchesAny(networks []*net.IPNet, ip net.IP) bool {
for _, network := range networks {
// isBlockedIP checks whether an IP address falls within
// any blocked private/reserved network range.
func isBlockedIP(ip net.IP) bool {
for _, network := range blockedNetworks {
if network.Contains(ip) {
return true
}
@@ -215,40 +85,9 @@ func matchesAny(networks []*net.IPNet, ip net.IP) bool {
return false
}
// isBlockedIP checks whether an IP address falls within
// any blocked private/reserved network range, before any
// operator allowlist is considered.
func isBlockedIP(ip net.IP) bool {
return matchesAny(blockedNetworks, ip)
}
// Guard makes every SSRF decision in the process.
//
// It holds the operator's ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS allowlist and
// applies it in exactly one place, checkIP, which both the
// target-creation validator (ValidateTargetURL) and the delivery
// dialer call. Routing both through the same function is the
// point: when the two paths decided separately they drifted and
// disagreed, which is what made a target creatable but
// undeliverable.
//
// The guard is always on. The allowlist only ever adds specific
// networks to what the default blocklist refuses, and no
// configuration turns the guard off wholesale.
type Guard struct {
// allowed is the operator's ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS. Empty
// (the default) means the default blocklist stands as-is.
allowed []netip.Prefix
}
// NewGuard builds the process-wide SSRF guard from configuration.
func NewGuard(cfg *config.Config) *Guard {
return &Guard{allowed: cfg.AllowedEgressCIDRs}
}
// ValidateTargetURL checks that an HTTP delivery target
// URL is safe from SSRF attacks.
func (g *Guard) ValidateTargetURL(
func ValidateTargetURL(
ctx context.Context, targetURL string,
) error {
parsed, err := url.Parse(targetURL)
@@ -272,79 +111,36 @@ func (g *Guard) ValidateTargetURL(
}
if ip := net.ParseIP(host); ip != nil {
return g.checkIP(ip)
return checkBlockedIP(ip)
}
return g.validateHostname(ctx, host)
return validateHostname(ctx, host)
}
// NewSSRFSafeTransport creates an http.Transport with a
// custom DialContext that refuses connections to any address
// this guard blocks. It resolves and checks at dial time, so a
// name that passed validation but now answers with a blocked
// address (DNS rebinding) is still refused.
func (g *Guard) NewSSRFSafeTransport() *http.Transport {
return &http.Transport{
DialContext: g.ssrfDialContext,
}
}
// allows reports whether ip falls inside the operator's
// configured egress allowlist.
func (g *Guard) allows(ip net.IP) bool {
if len(g.allowed) == 0 {
return false
}
addr, ok := netip.AddrFromSlice(ip)
if !ok {
return false
}
// Config unmaps every parsed prefix, so an IPv4-mapped
// address has to be unmapped too or it would never match.
addr = addr.Unmap()
for _, prefix := range g.allowed {
if prefix.Contains(addr) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// checkIP is the single point at which SSRF policy is decided.
//
// The order is the policy:
//
// 1. alwaysBlockedNetworks is refused before the allowlist is
// consulted, so no configured CIDR reaches link-local or a
// cloud instance metadata endpoint.
// 2. The allowlist is consulted next, so a listed private
// network becomes reachable.
// 3. Everything else keeps the default blocklist's answer.
func (g *Guard) checkIP(ip net.IP) error {
if matchesAny(alwaysBlockedNetworks, ip) {
func validateScheme(scheme string) error {
if scheme != "http" && scheme != "https" {
return fmt.Errorf(
"target IP %s: %w", ip, errBlockedMetadata,
"unsupported URL scheme %q: %w",
scheme, errInvalidScheme,
)
}
if g.allows(ip) {
return nil
}
func checkBlockedIP(ip net.IP) error {
if isBlockedIP(ip) {
return fmt.Errorf(
"target IP %s: %w", ip, errBlockedIP,
"target IP %s is in a blocked "+
"private/reserved range: %w",
ip, errBlockedIP,
)
}
return nil
}
func (g *Guard) validateHostname(
func validateHostname(
ctx context.Context, host string,
) error {
dnsCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(
@@ -369,11 +165,11 @@ func (g *Guard) validateHostname(
}
for _, ipAddr := range ips {
err = g.checkIP(ipAddr.IP)
if err != nil {
if isBlockedIP(ipAddr.IP) {
return fmt.Errorf(
"hostname %q resolves to a blocked address: %w",
host, err,
"hostname %q resolves to blocked "+
"IP %s: %w",
host, ipAddr.IP, errBlockedIP,
)
}
}
@@ -381,7 +177,16 @@ func (g *Guard) validateHostname(
return nil
}
func (g *Guard) ssrfDialContext(
// NewSSRFSafeTransport creates an http.Transport with a
// custom DialContext that blocks connections to
// private/reserved IP addresses.
func NewSSRFSafeTransport() *http.Transport {
return &http.Transport{
DialContext: ssrfDialContext,
}
}
func ssrfDialContext(
ctx context.Context,
network, addr string,
) (net.Conn, error) {
@@ -404,11 +209,11 @@ func (g *Guard) ssrfDialContext(
}
for _, ipAddr := range ips {
err = g.checkIP(ipAddr.IP)
if err != nil {
if isBlockedIP(ipAddr.IP) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"ssrf: connection to %s blocked: %w",
host, err,
"ssrf: connection to %s (%s) "+
"blocked: %w",
host, ipAddr.IP, errBlockedIP,
)
}
}
@@ -420,14 +225,3 @@ func (g *Guard) ssrfDialContext(
net.JoinHostPort(ips[0].IP.String(), port),
)
}
func validateScheme(scheme string) error {
if scheme != "http" && scheme != "https" {
return fmt.Errorf(
"unsupported URL scheme %q: %w",
scheme, errInvalidScheme,
)
}
return nil
}

562
internal/delivery/ssrf_allowlist_test.go
View File

@@ -1,562 +0,0 @@
package delivery_test
import (
"context"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/netip"
"net/url"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
)
// Addresses the SSRF tests in this package share.
const (
// metadataIP is the cloud instance metadata address, and
// metadataURL an endpoint on it. The guard must never reach
// either, whatever an operator lists.
metadataIP = "169.254.169.254"
metadataURL = "http://" + metadataIP + "/latest/meta-data/"
// loopbackHookURL is a target on this host: blocked by
// default, reachable only once an operator allowlists
// loopback.
loopbackHookURL = "http://127.0.0.1/hook"
// publicIP is an ordinary public address, which the guard
// permits with or without an allowlist.
publicIP = "93.184.216.34"
// allowAllIPv4 and allowAllIPv6 are the widest allowlist
// entries expressible: the whole internet, in each family.
// Nothing unconditionally blocked may be reachable under
// them.
allowAllIPv4 = "0.0.0.0/0"
allowAllIPv6 = "::/0"
// allowAllULA is the ordinary ULA block an operator lists to
// reach their own IPv6 network. Several providers park a
// metadata endpoint inside it.
allowAllULA = "fd00::/8"
// metadataRefusalClause is the part of the refusal that only
// alwaysBlockedNetworks produces. Asserting it, rather than
// the bare word "blocked", is what proves the unconditional
// set did the refusing and not the default blocklist.
metadataRefusalClause = "ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS cannot open it"
)
// TestGuardAllowlist_PermittedCIDRDelivers proves the escape
// hatch actually works end to end: with 127.0.0.0/8 allowed, the
// guard's own transport connects to a loopback server and gets a
// response back. The default guard, given the identical URL,
// refuses it — so the delivery succeeds because of the allowlist
// and nothing else.
func TestGuardAllowlist_PermittedCIDRDelivers(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
},
))
t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
// httptest listens on loopback, which the default blocklist
// covers: exactly the "forward to a service on this host"
// case the allowlist exists for.
requireLoopback(t, srv.URL)
guard := delivery.NewTestGuard(
netip.MustParsePrefix("127.0.0.0/8"),
)
require.NoError(t,
guard.ValidateTargetURL(context.Background(), srv.URL),
"an allowlisted loopback target must pass validation",
)
client := &http.Client{
Timeout: 5 * time.Second,
Transport: guard.NewSSRFSafeTransport(),
}
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(), http.MethodPost, srv.URL, nil,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
resp, err := client.Do(req)
require.NoError(t,
err, "an allowlisted loopback target must be deliverable",
)
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusNoContent, resp.StatusCode)
// The same URL through the default guard must still fail, or
// this test would pass without the allowlist doing anything.
assert.Error(t,
delivery.NewTestGuard().ValidateTargetURL(
context.Background(), srv.URL,
),
"without the allowlist the same target must be refused",
)
}
// TestGuardAllowlist_UnlistedPrivateStillRefused proves the
// allowlist grants only what it names. A guard that opens one
// private block must keep refusing every other one, at both the
// validation and the delivery entry point.
func TestGuardAllowlist_UnlistedPrivateStillRefused(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Only 10.1.0.0/16 is open — a narrow block inside a much
// wider private range, so the test can tell "permits the
// listed block" from "permits anything private".
guard := delivery.NewTestGuard(
netip.MustParsePrefix("10.1.0.0/16"),
)
refused := []string{
"http://192.168.1.10/hook",
"http://172.16.0.1/hook",
loopbackHookURL,
"http://[fc00::1]/hook",
"http://100.64.0.1/hook",
// Private, adjacent to the allowed block, outside it.
"http://10.2.0.1/hook",
}
for _, target := range refused {
t.Run(target, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := guard.ValidateTargetURL(
context.Background(), target,
)
require.Error(t,
err, "%s is not allowlisted and must be refused",
target,
)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "blocked")
assertDialRefused(t, guard, target)
})
}
// The block that is listed must in fact be permitted, so the
// refusals above are selective rather than a guard that
// ignores its allowlist entirely.
assert.NoError(t,
guard.ValidateTargetURL(
context.Background(), "http://10.1.2.3/hook",
),
"the allowlisted block must be permitted",
)
}
// TestGuardAllowlist_MetadataAlwaysRefused is the load-bearing
// case: cloud instance metadata endpoints are credential theft
// rather than delivery to an internal service, so no allowlist
// reaches one. Every guard below names a CIDR that covers its
// target — including 0.0.0.0/0, ::/0, and the ordinary ULA and
// CGNAT blocks an operator would really list — and the address
// must stay refused anyway, on both the validation and the
// delivery path.
func TestGuardAllowlist_MetadataAlwaysRefused(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tt := range metadataAlwaysRefusedCases() {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
guard := delivery.NewTestGuard(
netip.MustParsePrefix(tt.allow),
)
err := guard.ValidateTargetURL(
context.Background(), tt.target,
)
require.Error(t,
err,
"%s must stay blocked even though %s covers it",
tt.target, tt.allow,
)
assert.Contains(t,
err.Error(),
metadataRefusalClause,
"the refusal must say why it cannot be opened",
)
// The metadata clause, not just "blocked": that is
// what distinguishes the unconditional set from the
// ordinary blocklist.
assertDialRefusedWith(
t, guard, tt.target, metadataRefusalClause,
)
})
}
}
// metadataAlwaysRefusedCase is one (allowlist, target) pair that
// must be refused: allow covers target, and target must stay
// blocked regardless.
type metadataAlwaysRefusedCase struct {
name string
allow string
target string
}
// metadataAlwaysRefusedCases enumerates every unconditionally
// blocked address together with an allowlist entry that would
// otherwise reach it. Split by family of address only to stay
// under the function-length limit.
func metadataAlwaysRefusedCases() []metadataAlwaysRefusedCase {
cases := linkLocalRefusedCases()
cases = append(cases, ulaMetadataRefusedCases()...)
cases = append(cases, ipv4MetadataRefusedCases()...)
return append(cases, encodedMetadataRefusedCases()...)
}
// linkLocalRefusedCases covers the link-local blocks, including
// an operator naming the metadata address outright.
func linkLocalRefusedCases() []metadataAlwaysRefusedCase {
return []metadataAlwaysRefusedCase{
{
name: "exact metadata host",
allow: "169.254.169.254/32",
target: metadataURL,
},
{
name: "whole link-local block",
allow: "169.254.0.0/16",
target: metadataURL,
},
{
name: "supernet covering link-local",
allow: "169.0.0.0/8",
target: metadataURL,
},
{
name: "the entire IPv4 internet",
allow: allowAllIPv4,
target: metadataURL,
},
{
name: "other link-local address",
allow: allowAllIPv4,
target: "http://169.254.1.1/",
},
{
name: "IPv6 link-local",
allow: allowAllIPv6,
target: "http://[fe80::1]/",
},
}
}
// ulaMetadataRefusedCases covers the metadata endpoints parked
// in ULA space. Every one is opened by the single ordinary
// allowlist entry fd00::/8, which is the whole reason they need
// their own /128 host routes: fe80::/10 does not cover a ULA,
// whatever the vendor's documentation calls the address.
func ulaMetadataRefusedCases() []metadataAlwaysRefusedCase {
return []metadataAlwaysRefusedCase{
{
name: "AWS IPv6 IMDS under an allowlisted ULA block",
allow: allowAllULA,
target: "http://[fd00:ec2::254]/latest/meta-data/",
},
{
// A second AWS credential endpoint, distinct from
// IMDS. AWS's own docs call this one "localhost".
name: "AWS EKS Pod Identity under an allowlisted ULA block",
allow: allowAllULA,
target: "http://[fd00:ec2::23]/v1/credentials",
},
{
name: "GCP IPv6 metadata under an allowlisted ULA block",
allow: allowAllULA,
target: "http://[fd20:ce::254]/computeMetadata/v1/",
},
{
name: "Oracle OCI IPv6 IMDS under an allowlisted ULA block",
allow: allowAllULA,
target: "http://[fd00:c1::a9fe:a9fe]/opc/v2/instance/",
},
{
name: "Scaleway IPv6 metadata under an allowlisted ULA block",
allow: allowAllULA,
target: "http://[fd00:42::42]/conf",
},
{
// Akamai's docs call this "link-local"; it is a ULA,
// so fe80::/10 does not cover it.
name: "Linode IPv6 metadata under an allowlisted ULA block",
allow: allowAllULA,
target: "http://[fd00:a9fe:a9fe::1]/v1/instance",
},
}
}
// ipv4MetadataRefusedCases covers the IPv4 metadata endpoints
// that sit outside link-local: one in CGNAT and one in the
// blocked 192.0.0.0/24, each reachable only through an allowlist
// that this set overrides.
func ipv4MetadataRefusedCases() []metadataAlwaysRefusedCase {
return []metadataAlwaysRefusedCase{
{
// Tailscale uses 100.64.0.0/10, so an operator
// forwarding to a Tailscale peer lists exactly this.
name: "Alibaba metadata under allowlisted CGNAT",
allow: "100.64.0.0/10",
target: "http://100.100.100.200/latest/meta-data/",
},
{
// Inside the already-blocked 192.0.0.0/24, so only
// an allowlist can reach it — and must not.
name: "Oracle Cloud Classic metadata under 0.0.0.0/0",
allow: allowAllIPv4,
target: "http://192.0.0.192/latest/meta-data/",
},
}
}
// encodedMetadataRefusedCases covers the alternate IPv6
// encodings of 169.254.169.254.
func encodedMetadataRefusedCases() []metadataAlwaysRefusedCase {
return []metadataAlwaysRefusedCase{
{
// To4() does not normalise the IPv4-compatible form,
// so this needs its own always-blocked entry.
name: "IPv4-compatible IPv6 form of the metadata IP",
allow: allowAllIPv6,
target: "http://[::a9fe:a9fe]/latest/meta-data/",
},
{
// Nor the NAT64 well-known prefix form.
name: "NAT64 form of the metadata IP",
allow: allowAllIPv6,
target: "http://[64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe]/latest/meta-data/",
},
{
// Already refused before this change: IPNet.Contains
// calls To4() first, so the mapped form matches
// 169.254.0.0/16. Pinned so it cannot regress.
//
// Allowed under 0.0.0.0/0 rather than ::/0: allows()
// unmaps before matching, so ::/0 would not cover the
// unmapped v4 address and the case would not prove
// the allowlist was overridden.
name: "IPv4-mapped IPv6 form of the metadata IP",
allow: allowAllIPv4,
target: "http://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]/latest/meta-data/",
},
}
}
// TestGuardAllowlist_PublicUnaffected asserts the allowlist does
// not narrow anything: public addresses were reachable before it
// existed and stay reachable, whether or not a list is set.
func TestGuardAllowlist_PublicUnaffected(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
guards := map[string]*delivery.Guard{
"default": delivery.NewTestGuard(),
"with allowlist": delivery.NewTestGuard(
netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/8"),
),
}
for name, guard := range guards {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
assert.NoError(t,
guard.ValidateTargetURL(
context.Background(),
"http://"+publicIP+"/webhook",
),
)
})
}
}
// TestGuardCheckIP_BothPathsShareOneDecision asserts that the
// validator and the dialer are not two policies that happen to
// agree: both are defined in terms of checkIP, so the exported
// decision function is the whole answer for a given address.
func TestGuardCheckIP_BothPathsShareOneDecision(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
guard := delivery.NewTestGuard(
netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/8"),
)
tests := []struct {
ip string
allowed bool
}{
{"10.1.2.3", true},
{publicIP, true},
{"192.168.1.1", false},
{"127.0.0.1", false},
{metadataIP, false},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.ip, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ip := net.ParseIP(tt.ip)
require.NotNil(t, ip)
decision := guard.ExportCheckIP(ip)
validation := guard.ValidateTargetURL(
context.Background(), "http://"+hostFor(tt.ip)+"/x",
)
if tt.allowed {
require.NoError(t, decision)
require.NoError(t, validation)
return
}
require.Error(t, decision)
require.Error(t, validation,
"validation must refuse what checkIP refuses",
)
})
}
}
// TestAlwaysBlockedNetworks_PinnedSet pins the unconditional set
// exactly, so it cannot quietly grow or shrink.
//
// It stays deliberately small. Everything else in the default
// blocklist is an operator's own network and must remain
// openable, or the escape hatch would not work — which is why
// the metadata endpoints outside the link-local range are host
// routes rather than the blocks that contain them.
func TestAlwaysBlockedNetworks_PinnedSet(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
nets := delivery.ExportAlwaysBlockedNetworks()
got := make([]string, 0, len(nets))
for _, n := range nets {
got = append(got, n.String())
}
want := []string{
// IPv4 link-local: the 169.254.169.254 metadata
// service on AWS, Azure and others.
"169.254.0.0/16",
// IPv6 link-local.
"fe80::/10",
// AWS IPv6 IMDS, inside the ULA space an operator may
// legitimately allowlist.
"fd00:ec2::254/128",
// AWS EKS Pod Identity Agent, likewise ULA.
"fd00:ec2::23/128",
// GCP metadata for IPv6-only instances, likewise ULA.
"fd20:ce::254/128",
// Oracle OCI IMDS over IPv6, likewise ULA.
"fd00:c1::a9fe:a9fe/128",
// Scaleway metadata over IPv6, likewise ULA.
"fd00:42::42/128",
// Linode/Akamai metadata over IPv6, likewise ULA.
"fd00:a9fe:a9fe::1/128",
// Alibaba Cloud metadata, inside CGNAT.
"100.100.100.200/32",
// Oracle Cloud Classic metadata, inside the blocked
// 192.0.0.0/24.
"192.0.0.192/32",
// 169.254.169.254 as an IPv4-compatible IPv6 address.
"::a9fe:a9fe/128",
// 169.254.169.254 behind the NAT64 well-known prefix.
"64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe/128",
}
assert.Equal(t, want, got)
}
// requireLoopback fails the test unless rawURL's host is a
// loopback address, so the allowlist test cannot silently stop
// exercising a blocked range.
func requireLoopback(t *testing.T, rawURL string) {
t.Helper()
parsed, err := url.Parse(rawURL)
require.NoError(t, err)
ip := net.ParseIP(parsed.Hostname())
require.NotNil(t, ip, "test server host must be an IP literal")
require.True(t, ip.IsLoopback(),
"test server must listen on loopback, got %s", ip,
)
}
// assertDialRefused asserts the guard's transport refuses to
// connect to target, which is the delivery-time half of the
// policy. It never reaches the network: the guard checks the
// resolved address before dialling.
func assertDialRefused(
t *testing.T, guard *delivery.Guard, target string,
) {
t.Helper()
assertDialRefusedWith(t, guard, target, "blocked")
}
// assertDialRefusedWith is assertDialRefused with the refusal
// text pinned. Callers testing the unconditional set pass
// metadataRefusalClause so the subtest cannot pass on an
// ordinary blocklist refusal instead.
func assertDialRefusedWith(
t *testing.T, guard *delivery.Guard, target, clause string,
) {
t.Helper()
client := &http.Client{
Timeout: 5 * time.Second,
Transport: guard.NewSSRFSafeTransport(),
}
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(), http.MethodPost, target, nil,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if resp != nil {
_ = resp.Body.Close()
}
require.Error(t, err,
"delivery to %s must be refused by the dialer", target,
)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), clause,
"the refusal must come from the SSRF guard",
)
}
// hostFor renders an IP as it appears in a URL host, bracketing
// IPv6 literals.
func hostFor(ip string) string {
if net.ParseIP(ip).To4() == nil {
return "[" + ip + "]"
}
return ip
}

18
internal/delivery/ssrf_test.go
View File

@@ -31,10 +31,10 @@ func TestIsBlockedIP_PrivateRanges(t *testing.T) {
{"192.168.0.1", "192.168.0.1", true},
{"192.168.255.255", "192.168.255.255", true},
{"169.254.0.1", "169.254.0.1", true},
{metadataIP, metadataIP, true},
{"169.254.169.254", "169.254.169.254", true},
{"8.8.8.8", "8.8.8.8", false},
{"1.1.1.1", "1.1.1.1", false},
{publicIP, publicIP, false},
{"93.184.216.34", "93.184.216.34", false},
{"::1", "::1", true},
{"fd00::1", "fd00::1", true},
{"fc00::1", "fc00::1", true},
@@ -72,12 +72,12 @@ func TestValidateTargetURL_Blocked(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
blockedURLs := []string{
loopbackHookURL,
"http://127.0.0.1/hook",
"http://127.0.0.1:8080/hook",
"https://10.0.0.1/hook",
"http://192.168.1.1/webhook",
"http://172.16.0.1/api",
metadataURL,
"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/",
"http://[::1]/hook",
"http://[fc00::1]/hook",
"http://[fe80::1]/hook",
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ func TestValidateTargetURL_Blocked(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(u, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := delivery.NewTestGuard().ValidateTargetURL(
err := delivery.ValidateTargetURL(
context.Background(), u,
)
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ func TestValidateTargetURL_Allowed(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(u, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := delivery.NewTestGuard().ValidateTargetURL(
err := delivery.ValidateTargetURL(
context.Background(), u,
)
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ func TestValidateTargetURL_Allowed(t *testing.T) {
func TestValidateTargetURL_InvalidScheme(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := delivery.NewTestGuard().ValidateTargetURL(
err := delivery.ValidateTargetURL(
context.Background(), "ftp://example.com/hook",
)
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ func TestValidateTargetURL_InvalidScheme(t *testing.T) {
func TestValidateTargetURL_EmptyHost(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := delivery.NewTestGuard().ValidateTargetURL(
err := delivery.ValidateTargetURL(
context.Background(), "http:///path",
)
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ func TestValidateTargetURL_EmptyHost(t *testing.T) {
func TestValidateTargetURL_InvalidURL(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := delivery.NewTestGuard().ValidateTargetURL(
err := delivery.ValidateTargetURL(
context.Background(), "://invalid",
)

13
internal/delivery/target_headers.go
View File

@@ -65,11 +65,6 @@ func isReservedTargetHeader(name string) bool {
// the configured headers, so a configured one would always
// be overwritten.
return true
case "Trailer":
// net/http strips Trailer from the request it writes
// (reqWriteExcludeHeader), so a configured one is accepted
// and stored and then provably never reaches the wire.
return true
default:
return false
}
@@ -123,11 +118,9 @@ func parseHeaderLine(line string) (string, string, error) {
rawName = strings.TrimSpace(rawName)
if !validHeaderName(rawName) {
// Quotes nothing. The text before the first colon is only
// a name if it parses as one; when it does not, it is as
// likely to be a pasted value whose own colon split the
// line, and half of a token would be echoed into the 400.
return "", "", errHeaderNameInvalid
return "", "", fmt.Errorf(
"%w: %q", errHeaderNameInvalid, rawName,
)
}
name := http.CanonicalHeaderKey(rawName)

37
internal/delivery/target_headers_test.go
View File

@@ -82,16 +82,6 @@ func TestParseTargetHeaders_Rejects(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// net/http strips Trailer from the request it writes, so accepting
// one would store a header that never reaches the target.
func TestParseTargetHeaders_RejectsTrailer(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := delivery.ParseTargetHeaders("Trailer: X-Checksum")
require.Error(t, err)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "Trailer")
}
// A header value is routinely a bearer token and these errors are
// rendered into a 400 body, so no message may quote one.
func TestParseTargetHeaders_ErrorsNeverQuoteAValue(t *testing.T) {
@@ -99,26 +89,17 @@ func TestParseTargetHeaders_ErrorsNeverQuoteAValue(t *testing.T) {
const secret = "QQNEVERINAMESSAGEQQ"
inputs := []string{
// The value, after the colon, in a duplicate name.
_, err := delivery.ParseTargetHeaders(
"X-A: " + secret + "\nx-a: " + secret,
// The value after the colon of an unusable name.
"X Bad Name: " + secret,
// The line splits on the value's own colon, so the
// secret lands in the text an unusable-name error is
// tempted to quote as the name.
"X-Api-Key " + secret + ":x",
// The same, with nothing before the secret at all.
secret + " and more:x",
// A control character in the value.
"X-A: " + secret + "\x01",
}
)
require.Error(t, err)
assert.NotContains(t, err.Error(), secret)
for _, input := range inputs {
_, err := delivery.ParseTargetHeaders(input)
require.Error(t, err, input)
assert.NotContains(t, err.Error(), secret, input)
}
_, err = delivery.ParseTargetHeaders(
"X Bad Name: " + secret,
)
require.Error(t, err)
assert.NotContains(t, err.Error(), secret)
}
// Loading the edit form twice without saving must not reshuffle

129
internal/delivery/target_http.go
View File

@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ import (
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"sort"
"sync"
"time"
@@ -405,9 +404,9 @@ func (t *httpTarget) doHTTPRequest(
)
}
originScoped := applyRequestHeaders(req, event, cfg)
applyRequestHeaders(req, event, cfg)
client := t.clientForRequest(cfg, originScoped)
client := t.clientForConfig(cfg)
resp, doErr := executeHTTPRequest(client, req)
@@ -433,41 +432,23 @@ func (t *httpTarget) doHTTPRequest(
return resp.StatusCode, string(body), dur, nil
}
// clientForRequest returns the client for one delivery attempt.
// originScoped is the header set applyRequestHeaders built for that
// attempt; a request with neither a per-target timeout nor an
// origin-scoped header gets the shared client, because there is
// then nothing for the redirect policy to strip and net/http's
// default policy already withholds Authorization and Cookie across
// hosts.
func (t *httpTarget) clientForRequest(
func (t *httpTarget) clientForConfig(
cfg *HTTPTargetConfig,
originScoped []string,
) *http.Client {
if cfg.Timeout <= 0 && len(originScoped) == 0 {
return t.client
}
// Reuse the shared client's SSRF-safe transport so neither a
// per-target timeout nor the redirect policy drops the
// request-time private-IP guard — which, being a dial hook,
// also covers every redirect hop.
client := &http.Client{
Timeout: t.client.Timeout,
if cfg.Timeout > 0 {
// Reuse the shared client's SSRF-safe transport so
// a per-target timeout does not drop the
// request-time private-IP guard. Only the timeout
// is overridden.
return &http.Client{
Timeout: time.Duration(
cfg.Timeout,
) * time.Second,
Transport: t.client.Transport,
}
if cfg.Timeout > 0 {
client.Timeout = time.Duration(
cfg.Timeout,
) * time.Second
}
if len(originScoped) > 0 {
client.CheckRedirect = offOriginHeaderPolicy(originScoped)
}
return client
return t.client
}
func parseHTTPConfig(
@@ -509,88 +490,40 @@ func isForwardableHeader(name string) bool {
}
}
// applyRequestHeaders builds one outbound delivery's header set and
// returns the canonical names of every header in it that is scoped
// to the configured origin: the inbound event headers this delivery
// forwarded, plus the operator's configured headers. The redirect
// policy strips exactly that set on a hop that leaves the origin,
// so the forward set is decided here and only here — a header added
// to it is covered off-origin without a second edit elsewhere.
func applyRequestHeaders(
req *http.Request,
event *database.Event,
cfg *HTTPTargetConfig,
) []string {
) {
if event.ContentType != "" {
req.Header.Set(
"Content-Type", event.ContentType,
)
}
originScoped := forwardEventHeaders(req, event)
for k, v := range cfg.Headers {
req.Header.Set(k, v)
originScoped[http.CanonicalHeaderKey(k)] = struct{}{}
}
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "webhooker/1.0")
// Content-Type describes the body being sent rather than the
// sender, and the delivery path sets it from the event itself.
// A 307/308 preserves the body across hosts, so stripping it
// would send that body untyped.
delete(originScoped, "Content-Type")
// User-Agent is overwritten just above, so an inbound one never
// reaches the wire and the value that does identifies this
// delivery path rather than the sender. Reporting it would strip
// it off-origin and leave net/http's own default in its place.
delete(originScoped, "User-Agent")
names := make([]string, 0, len(originScoped))
for name := range originScoped {
names = append(names, name)
}
sort.Strings(names)
return names
}
// forwardEventHeaders copies the inbound event's forwardable
// headers onto the outbound request and returns the canonical names
// it forwarded. Headers the event never carried are absent from the
// result, so the redirect policy strips what was actually sent.
func forwardEventHeaders(
req *http.Request,
event *database.Event,
) map[string]struct{} {
forwarded := make(map[string]struct{})
if event.Headers == "" {
return forwarded
}
var inbound map[string][]string
if json.Unmarshal([]byte(event.Headers), &inbound) != nil {
return forwarded
}
for k, vals := range inbound {
if !isForwardableHeader(k) || len(vals) == 0 {
continue
}
var originalHeaders map[string][]string
if event.Headers != "" {
jsonErr := json.Unmarshal(
[]byte(event.Headers),
&originalHeaders,
)
if jsonErr == nil {
for k, vals := range originalHeaders {
if isForwardableHeader(k) {
for _, v := range vals {
req.Header.Add(k, v)
}
forwarded[http.CanonicalHeaderKey(k)] = struct{}{}
}
}
}
}
return forwarded
for k, v := range cfg.Headers {
req.Header.Set(k, v)
}
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "webhooker/1.0")
}
// executeHTTPRequest sends an HTTP request using the provided

272
internal/delivery/target_redact.go
View File

@@ -1,272 +0,0 @@
package delivery
import (
"net/url"
"slices"
"strings"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
// RedactionMarker stands in for a target credential found in
// text the target's remote peer chose.
const RedactionMarker = "(redacted)"
// Redactor removes one target's own credential material from
// text that target's remote peer chose: a delivery response
// body, or a delivery error stored before the delivery path
// learned to mask the URLs it embeds.
//
// It removes byte-identical echoes of strings taken from the
// target's stored configuration, and nothing else. Anything
// the remote re-encodes survives: JSON "\/" escaping (what
// PHP's json_encode emits by default), percent-encoding, HTML
// entities, and an echo of only part of a path. It cannot
// remove a secret the remote invented.
//
// The zero Redactor removes nothing, which is what a caller
// holding no target for a delivery gets.
type Redactor struct {
secrets []string
}
// NewRedactor builds the redactor for one target.
func NewRedactor(t *database.Target) Redactor {
// Drop empty strings here rather than at the site that
// produced one. strings.ReplaceAll with an empty old string
// inserts the marker at every byte boundary, so a single
// empty secret destroys every body and error the target
// renders; filtering at the collection point means no field
// added to targetSecrets later can reintroduce that.
// url.Parse("https://@example.com/in") is the known
// producer: a non-nil User whose String is "".
secrets := slices.DeleteFunc(
targetSecrets(t),
func(s string) bool { return s == "" },
)
// Longest first, so replacing a secret that is contained
// in a longer one cannot leave a fragment of the longer
// one behind. Configured headers arrive in map order, so
// the sort is also what makes the result deterministic.
slices.SortFunc(secrets, func(a, b string) int {
if d := len(b) - len(a); d != 0 {
return d
}
return strings.Compare(a, b)
})
return Redactor{secrets: secrets}
}
// Redact replaces every occurrence of the target's credential
// material in s.
func (r Redactor) Redact(s string) string {
if s == "" {
return s
}
for _, secret := range r.secrets {
s = strings.ReplaceAll(s, secret, RedactionMarker)
}
return s
}
// RedactCut redacts s, which its caller has already cut to a
// byte budget, and additionally drops any tail of s that is a
// proper prefix of a secret.
//
// The cut lands wherever the remote's padding puts it, so the
// remote chooses where inside the credential it falls. The
// severed prefix left behind equals no secret, so plain
// Redact would render it verbatim.
func (r Redactor) RedactCut(s string) string {
s = r.Redact(s)
if n := r.secretPrefixSuffix(s); n > 0 {
return s[:len(s)-n] + RedactionMarker
}
return s
}
// secretPrefixSuffix returns the length of the longest suffix
// of s that is a proper prefix of one of the secrets, or 0
// when there is none.
func (r Redactor) secretPrefixSuffix(s string) int {
longest := 0
for _, secret := range r.secrets {
// Proper prefixes only: a whole secret at the tail was
// already replaced by Redact.
n := min(len(secret)-1, len(s))
for ; n > longest; n-- {
if strings.HasSuffix(s, secret[:n]) {
longest = n
break
}
}
}
return longest
}
// targetSecrets returns the credential-bearing strings a
// target's configuration carries.
//
// The destination URL contributes. Its path, query and
// userinfo are the credential for both target types that have
// one — an incoming-webhook URL is a bearer token, which is
// why MaskURL elides exactly those parts — and they are the
// material this service actually sends, so a remote that
// echoes the request back echoes them.
//
// Configured request headers contribute their values, but
// only for the credential-shaped names isCredentialHeaderName
// picks out. That is the same class-based rule applied to
// URLs: an echoed Accept or User-Agent still renders, an
// echoed Authorization does not.
func targetSecrets(t *database.Target) []string {
if t == nil {
return nil
}
switch t.Type {
case database.TargetTypeSlack:
cfg, err := parseSlackConfig(t.Config)
if err != nil {
return nil
}
return urlSecrets(cfg.WebhookURL)
case database.TargetTypeHTTP:
cfg, err := parseHTTPConfig(t.Config)
if err != nil {
return nil
}
return append(
urlSecrets(cfg.URL),
headerSecrets(cfg.Headers)...,
)
case database.TargetTypeDatabase, database.TargetTypeLog:
// Neither has a destination URL, so neither has
// anything to redact.
return nil
default:
return nil
}
}
// urlSecrets returns the substrings of a destination URL that
// must not survive into a rendered page: the whole URL, the
// parts of it MaskURL elides, and any userinfo.
//
// No length floor is applied to the path, and none to the
// userinfo. A short path or a four-byte username is treated as
// a credential exactly like a long one, because the field takes
// an arbitrary URL and no part of it can be assumed non-secret —
// the same rule MaskURL applies. headerSecrets does carry a
// floor, and the difference is deliberate: a header is picked
// out by a name-shaped guess and its value may be ordinary
// text, whereas a URL's path and userinfo are credential
// material by position.
func urlSecrets(raw string) []string {
raw = strings.TrimSpace(raw)
if raw == "" {
return nil
}
secrets := []string{raw}
parsed, err := url.Parse(raw)
if err != nil {
return secrets
}
if parsed.Path != "" && parsed.Path != "/" {
requestURI := parsed.RequestURI()
secrets = append(secrets, requestURI)
if escaped := parsed.EscapedPath(); escaped != requestURI {
secrets = append(secrets, escaped)
}
}
if parsed.User != nil {
secrets = append(secrets, parsed.User.String())
if pw, ok := parsed.User.Password(); ok && pw != "" {
secrets = append(secrets, pw)
}
}
return secrets
}
// minHeaderSecretBytes is the shortest header value treated as
// a credential. Unlike a URL path, a header value can be a
// couple of bytes long, and redacting those would scatter the
// marker through ordinary response text for no gain.
const minHeaderSecretBytes = 4
// headerSecrets returns the values of the configured headers
// whose names are credential-shaped.
func headerSecrets(headers map[string]string) []string {
var secrets []string
for name, value := range headers {
value = strings.TrimSpace(value)
if len(value) < minHeaderSecretBytes {
continue
}
if isCredentialHeaderName(name) {
secrets = append(secrets, value)
}
}
return secrets
}
// isCredentialHeaderName classifies a header by its name. The
// value is never inspected, so the rule is the same
// class-based one MaskURL applies to a destination URL.
//
// The fragments are short on purpose, and match anywhere in
// the name, so abbreviations an operator might use are covered
// too: X-Sig, X-Pass, X-HMAC. That over-matches — a header
// named X-Design contains "sig" — and over-matching is the
// safe direction here: the cost is a marker where an echoed
// header value would have rendered.
func isCredentialHeaderName(name string) bool {
name = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(name))
// Names that carry a credential by definition.
switch name {
case "authorization", "proxy-authorization", "cookie":
return true
}
// What operators call their own credential headers:
// X-Api-Key, X-Hub-Signature, X-Auth-Token.
for _, fragment := range []string{
"auth",
"credential",
"hmac",
"key",
"pass",
"secret",
"sig",
"token",
} {
if strings.Contains(name, fragment) {
return true
}
}
return false
}

284
internal/delivery/target_redact_test.go
View File

@@ -1,284 +0,0 @@
package delivery_test
import (
"net/url"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
)
// The secret path segments of a Slack incoming webhook URL.
const (
redactSecretPath = "/services/T11111111/B11111111/" +
"YYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYY"
redactWebhookURL = "https://hooks.slack.com" +
redactSecretPath
)
func TestRedactor_RemovesSlackWebhookURL(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
r := delivery.NewRedactor(&database.Target{
Type: database.TargetTypeSlack,
Config: `{"webhookUrl":"` + redactWebhookURL + `"}`,
})
got := r.Redact("no_service for " + redactWebhookURL)
assert.NotContains(t, got, redactSecretPath)
assert.NotContains(t, got, "T11111111")
// One marker, not a marker with the host left in front of
// it: the whole URL is replaced before the path it
// contains, which is what sorting the secrets longest
// first buys.
assert.Equal(
t,
"no_service for "+delivery.RedactionMarker,
got,
)
}
// TestRedactor_RemovesSecretSeveredByACut covers the input the
// redactor exists for: text cut to a byte budget with the
// credential straddling the cut. The remote chooses the
// padding, so it chooses where the cut lands inside the
// credential, and the severed prefix that remains equals no
// secret.
func TestRedactor_RemovesSecretSeveredByACut(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
r := delivery.NewRedactor(&database.Target{
Type: database.TargetTypeSlack,
Config: `{"webhookUrl":"` + redactWebhookURL + `"}`,
})
// Every cut position inside the credential, not just a
// convenient one.
for n := 1; n < len(redactWebhookURL); n++ {
severed := redactWebhookURL[:n]
cut := "padding " + severed
got := r.RedactCut(cut)
assert.Equal(
t,
"padding "+delivery.RedactionMarker,
got,
"cut after %d bytes of the credential", n,
)
}
}
// TestRedactor_RedactsCredentialShapedHeaderValues pins the
// class-based header rule: a header whose name says credential
// has its value redacted, and a routine header does not, so
// ordinary response content survives.
func TestRedactor_RedactsCredentialShapedHeaderValues(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
r := delivery.NewRedactor(&database.Target{
Type: database.TargetTypeHTTP,
Config: `{"url":"https://example.com/in",` +
`"headers":{` +
`"Authorization":"Bearer AAAAAAAAAAAA",` +
`"Cookie":"session=BBBBBBBBBBBB",` +
`"X-Api-Key":"CCCCCCCCCCCC",` +
`"X-Hub-Signature":"sha256=DDDDDDDDDDDD",` +
`"X-Sig":"EEEEEEEEEEEE",` +
`"X-Pass":"FFFFFFFFFFFF",` +
`"X-HMAC":"GGGGGGGGGGGG",` +
`"X-Credential":"HHHHHHHHHHHH",` +
`"Accept":"application/json",` +
`"User-Agent":"webhooker/1.0"}}`,
})
for _, secret := range []string{
"Bearer AAAAAAAAAAAA",
"session=BBBBBBBBBBBB",
"CCCCCCCCCCCC",
"sha256=DDDDDDDDDDDD",
// Abbreviated names an operator might use.
"EEEEEEEEEEEE",
"FFFFFFFFFFFF",
"GGGGGGGGGGGG",
"HHHHHHHHHHHH",
} {
got := r.Redact("echo: " + secret)
assert.Equal(
t,
"echo: "+delivery.RedactionMarker,
got,
secret,
)
}
const routine = "Accept: application/json, " +
"User-Agent: webhooker/1.0"
assert.Equal(t, routine, r.Redact(routine))
}
// TestRedactor_IgnoresVeryShortHeaderValues pins the floor
// under a header value. Redacting a two-byte value would put
// the marker through every response that happens to contain
// those bytes.
func TestRedactor_IgnoresVeryShortHeaderValues(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
r := delivery.NewRedactor(&database.Target{
Type: database.TargetTypeHTTP,
Config: `{"url":"https://example.com/in",` +
`"headers":{"X-Api-Key":"ab"}}`,
})
const response = "rabbit"
assert.Equal(t, response, r.Redact(response))
}
// TestRedactor_RemovesBarePath covers a remote that echoes
// only the request path rather than the whole URL. The path
// segments are the credential on their own.
func TestRedactor_RemovesBarePath(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
r := delivery.NewRedactor(&database.Target{
Type: database.TargetTypeSlack,
Config: `{"webhookUrl":"` + redactWebhookURL + `"}`,
})
got := r.Redact("POST " + redactSecretPath + " 404")
assert.NotContains(t, got, redactSecretPath)
assert.Equal(
t,
"POST "+delivery.RedactionMarker+" 404",
got,
)
}
// TestRedactor_RemovesHTTPURLQueryAndUserinfo covers the HTTP
// target, whose destination is an arbitrary URL: the query
// string and the userinfo carry credentials as readily as the
// path does.
func TestRedactor_RemovesHTTPURLQueryAndUserinfo(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Assembled rather than written out, so the literal is
// not itself a credential-shaped string.
dest := url.URL{
Scheme: "https",
User: url.UserPassword("user", "hunter2"),
Host: "example.com",
Path: "/in",
RawQuery: "token=s3cr3t",
}
raw := dest.String()
r := delivery.NewRedactor(&database.Target{
Type: database.TargetTypeHTTP,
Config: `{"url":"` + raw + `"}`,
})
for _, echoed := range []string{
raw,
"/in?token=s3cr3t",
"hunter2",
} {
got := r.Redact("rejected: " + echoed)
assert.NotContains(t, got, "s3cr3t", echoed)
assert.NotContains(t, got, "hunter2", echoed)
assert.Contains(
t, got, delivery.RedactionMarker, echoed,
)
}
}
// TestRedactor_LeavesUnrelatedTextAlone pins that the
// redactor matches literally: it does not guess at what a
// secret looks like, so ordinary response content survives.
func TestRedactor_LeavesUnrelatedTextAlone(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const response = "ok=false error=channel_not_found"
r := delivery.NewRedactor(&database.Target{
Type: database.TargetTypeSlack,
Config: `{"webhookUrl":"` + redactWebhookURL + `"}`,
})
assert.Equal(t, response, r.Redact(response))
}
// TestRedactor_EmptyUserinfoDoesNotShredTheBody covers a
// destination URL written with a bare "@" and no userinfo:
// url.Parse returns a non-nil User whose String is empty. An
// empty secret in the list would make strings.ReplaceAll
// insert the marker at every byte boundary, destroying every
// body and error string the target renders.
func TestRedactor_EmptyUserinfoDoesNotShredTheBody(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const dest = "https://@example.com/in"
// The premise: this URL really does parse to a non-nil
// User contributing an empty string.
parsed, err := url.Parse(dest)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, parsed.User)
require.Empty(t, parsed.User.String())
r := delivery.NewRedactor(&database.Target{
Type: database.TargetTypeHTTP,
Config: `{"url":"` + dest + `"}`,
})
const body = "ok=false error=channel_not_found"
assert.Equal(t, body, r.Redact(body))
assert.Equal(t, body, r.RedactCut(body))
// The real credential material still goes, so filtering the
// empty string out did not disarm the redactor.
assert.Equal(
t,
"POST "+delivery.RedactionMarker,
r.Redact("POST "+dest),
)
}
// TestRedactor_ZeroValueAndConfiglessTargets pins that a
// caller with no target, an unparseable config, or a target
// type with no destination URL gets a redactor that changes
// nothing rather than one that panics.
func TestRedactor_ZeroValueAndConfiglessTargets(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const text = "some response body"
var zero delivery.Redactor
assert.Equal(t, text, zero.Redact(text))
assert.Equal(t, text, delivery.NewRedactor(nil).Redact(text))
for _, tgt := range []database.Target{
{Type: database.TargetTypeLog},
{Type: database.TargetTypeDatabase},
{Type: database.TargetTypeSlack, Config: "not json"},
{Type: database.TargetTypeHTTP, Config: ""},
} {
assert.Equal(
t, text,
delivery.NewRedactor(&tgt).Redact(text),
tgt.Type,
)
}
}

2
internal/delivery/url_mask_test.go
View File

@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ func TestDoHTTPRequest_TransportErrorMasksURL(t *testing.T) {
func TestValidateTargetURL_UnparsableURLIsMasked(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := delivery.NewTestGuard().ValidateTargetURL(
err := delivery.ValidateTargetURL(
context.TODO(),
"https://hooks.slack.com"+maskSecretPath+"\n",
)

378
internal/handlers/delivery_replay.go
View File

@@ -1,378 +0,0 @@
package handlers
import (
"net/http"
"strconv"
"github.com/go-chi/chi"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"gorm.io/gorm/clause"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
)
// replayOutcomeParam is the query parameter the replay POST redirects
// with and the event log page reads its banner from.
const replayOutcomeParam = "replay"
// replayOutcomeCode is the outcome of a replay POST. The redirect
// carries one of these fixed codes rather than a message, so nothing a
// client submits can reach the rendered page through it.
type replayOutcomeCode string
const (
// replayQueued reports that a new delivery was created and handed
// to the delivery engine.
replayQueued replayOutcomeCode = "queued"
// replayTargetDeleted reports a target that once existed and has
// since been deleted. Deletes are soft and deliveries carry no
// foreign key to the target row, so the history survives its
// target and this is the ordinary case for an old event.
replayTargetDeleted replayOutcomeCode = "target-deleted"
// replayTargetMissing reports a target id that names no row at
// all, deleted or otherwise.
replayTargetMissing replayOutcomeCode = "target-missing"
// replayTargetInactive reports a target the operator has
// deactivated. A deactivated target receives no new deliveries, so
// a replay to it would be a delivery they switched off.
replayTargetInactive replayOutcomeCode = "target-inactive"
// replayNotTerminal reports a delivery the engine has not finished
// with.
replayNotTerminal replayOutcomeCode = "not-terminal"
// replayInFlight reports that an earlier replay of this event to
// this target is still running.
replayInFlight replayOutcomeCode = "in-flight"
)
// replayOutcome returns the banner the event log page shows for an
// outcome code, and whether the replay was queued. An unrecognised
// code yields no banner.
func replayOutcome(code string) (string, bool) {
switch replayOutcomeCode(code) {
case replayQueued:
return "Replay queued: a new delivery was created against " +
"the target's current configuration.", true
case replayTargetDeleted:
return "Not replayed: the target this delivery was for has " +
"been deleted. Recreate the target, then replay.", false
case replayTargetMissing:
return "Not replayed: the target this delivery was for no " +
"longer exists.", false
case replayTargetInactive:
return "Not replayed: the target this delivery was for is " +
"deactivated. Activate it, then replay.", false
case replayNotTerminal:
return "Not replayed: this delivery has not finished yet.",
false
case replayInFlight:
return "Not replayed: a delivery of this event to this " +
"target is already in flight.", false
default:
return "", false
}
}
// HandleDeliveryReplay re-sends a finished delivery's event to its
// target.
//
// A replay never touches the delivery it repeats. It creates a NEW
// pending delivery row for the same event and target and hands it to
// the delivery engine through the same Notifier the receiver uses, so
// the original's status, attempts and timestamps stand as the record
// of what actually happened, and the replay is retried, SSRF-guarded
// and circuit-broken exactly as a first attempt is.
//
// What is re-sent is the stored EVENT body, never the response the
// original delivery received.
//
// The target's configuration is read now rather than as it stood when
// the original ran: a replay exists to deliver where the operator
// currently wants the event to go. That is also why a deleted target
// is refused rather than delivered to from stale configuration.
func (h *Handlers) HandleDeliveryReplay() http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
webhook, ok := h.ownedWebhook(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
// The body size cap is enforced by the MaxBodySize
// middleware, which runs before CSRF parses the form.
err := r.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
http.Error(
w, "Bad request", http.StatusBadRequest,
)
return
}
h.replayDelivery(w, r, webhook)
}
}
// replayDelivery performs the replay for a webhook the caller has
// already established the session's user owns.
func (h *Handlers) replayDelivery(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
webhook database.Webhook,
) {
if !h.dbMgr.DBExists(webhook.ID) {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
webhookDB, err := h.dbMgr.GetDB(webhook.ID)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, "failed to get webhook database", err)
return
}
original, ok := h.loadReplaySource(w, r, webhookDB)
if !ok {
return
}
if !original.Status.Terminal() {
h.finishReplay(w, r, webhook, replayNotTerminal)
return
}
target, code := h.replayTarget(webhook.ID, original.TargetID)
if target == nil {
h.finishReplay(w, r, webhook, code)
return
}
h.queueReplay(w, r, webhookDB, webhook, original, target)
}
// loadReplaySource loads the delivery to be replayed, selecting only
// the columns the replay needs so no association is populated. A
// delivery id that names no row in this webhook's database is a 404.
func (h *Handlers) loadReplaySource(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
webhookDB *gorm.DB,
) (*database.Delivery, bool) {
var original database.Delivery
err := webhookDB.
Select("id", "event_id", "target_id", "status").
First(
&original, "id = ?", chi.URLParam(r, "deliveryID"),
).Error
if err != nil {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return nil, false
}
return &original, true
}
// queueReplay writes the new delivery and hands it to the engine.
func (h *Handlers) queueReplay(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
webhookDB *gorm.DB,
webhook database.Webhook,
original *database.Delivery,
target *database.Target,
) {
inFlight, err := countInFlightDeliveries(
webhookDB, original.EventID, target.ID,
)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(
w, "failed to count in-flight deliveries", err,
)
return
}
if inFlight > 0 {
h.finishReplay(w, r, webhook, replayInFlight)
return
}
var event database.Event
err = webhookDB.
First(&event, "id = ?", original.EventID).Error
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, "failed to load event for replay", err)
return
}
task, err := createReplayDelivery(
webhookDB, webhook.ID, &event, target,
)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(
w, "failed to create replay delivery", err,
)
return
}
h.mtr.DeliveryReplayed(target.Type)
h.notifier.Notify([]delivery.Task{task})
h.log.Info(
"delivery replay queued",
"webhook_id", webhook.ID,
"event_id", event.ID,
"target_id", target.ID,
"replayed_delivery_id", original.ID,
"delivery_id", task.DeliveryID,
)
h.finishReplay(w, r, webhook, replayQueued)
}
// replayTarget loads the delivery's target as it stands now.
//
// The load is Unscoped so that a soft-deleted row is still found:
// deletes are soft and a delivery carries no foreign key to its
// target, so a target's history outlives it, and without the deleted
// row there is no way to tell "you deleted this target" from "this id
// never named anything". A nil target means the replay is refused,
// with the returned code saying why.
func (h *Handlers) replayTarget(
webhookID, targetID string,
) (*database.Target, replayOutcomeCode) {
var target database.Target
err := h.db.DB().Unscoped().Where(
"id = ? AND webhook_id = ?", targetID, webhookID,
).First(&target).Error
if err != nil {
return nil, replayTargetMissing
}
if target.DeletedAt.Valid {
return nil, replayTargetDeleted
}
if !target.Active {
return nil, replayTargetInactive
}
return &target, replayQueued
}
// countInFlightDeliveries reports how many deliveries of this event to
// this target the engine has not finished.
//
// It is the replay-storm guard: a replay is refused while an earlier
// one is still pending or retrying, so a held-down button or a scripted
// loop cannot stack copies of work already queued. It is a check and
// not a lock, so two simultaneous POSTs can still both pass it; the
// per-client rate limit on the route is what bounds that.
func countInFlightDeliveries(
webhookDB *gorm.DB, eventID, targetID string,
) (int64, error) {
var count int64
err := webhookDB.Model(&database.Delivery{}).Where(
"event_id = ? AND target_id = ? AND status IN ?",
eventID, targetID,
[]database.DeliveryStatus{
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
},
).Count(&count).Error
return count, err
}
// createReplayDelivery writes the new pending delivery row and returns
// the task that carries it to the delivery engine.
//
// The row is written with associations omitted, and neither Event nor
// Target is populated on it: GORM's SaveBeforeAssociations would
// otherwise upsert the whole target row — plaintext config, which for a
// Slack target is the credential — into the per-webhook event database.
// See https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/206.
func createReplayDelivery(
webhookDB *gorm.DB,
webhookID string,
event *database.Event,
target *database.Target,
) (delivery.Task, error) {
dlv := &database.Delivery{
EventID: event.ID,
TargetID: target.ID,
Status: database.DeliveryStatusPending,
}
err := webhookDB.Omit(clause.Associations).Create(dlv).Error
if err != nil {
return delivery.Task{}, err
}
return delivery.Task{
DeliveryID: dlv.ID,
EventID: event.ID,
WebhookID: webhookID,
EntrypointID: event.EntrypointID,
TargetID: target.ID,
TargetName: target.Name,
TargetType: target.Type,
TargetConfig: target.Config,
MaxRetries: target.MaxRetries,
Method: event.Method,
Headers: event.Headers,
ContentType: event.ContentType,
Body: replayBody(event.Body),
AttemptNum: 1,
}, nil
}
// replayBody returns the stored event body for a replay task to carry
// inline, or nil when it is large enough that the engine should fetch
// it from the per-webhook database instead.
func replayBody(body string) *string {
if len(body) >= delivery.MaxInlineBodySize {
return nil
}
return &body
}
// finishReplay redirects back to the event log the replay was
// triggered from, carrying the outcome code the page turns into a
// banner and the page number the form submitted.
func (h *Handlers) finishReplay(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
webhook database.Webhook,
code replayOutcomeCode,
) {
dest := "/source/" + webhook.ID + "/logs?" +
replayOutcomeParam + "=" + string(code)
// The page is read from the form rather than the query string:
// this is a POST, and its query string is what logs and Referer
// headers record.
if page := parseNonNegativeInt(
r.PostFormValue("page"),
); page > 1 {
dest += "&page=" + strconv.Itoa(page)
}
http.Redirect(w, r, dest, http.StatusSeeOther)
}

526
internal/handlers/delivery_replay_test.go
View File

@@ -1,526 +0,0 @@
package handlers_test
import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"gorm.io/gorm/clause"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
)
// paramDeliveryID is the chi URL parameter name the replay handler
// reads.
const paramDeliveryID = "deliveryID"
// replayTargetURL is a public destination, so a target configured with
// it is one the SSRF guard would accept. Nothing in these tests
// dispatches to it: the notifier is recorded, not run.
const replayTargetURL = "http://93.184.216.34/hook"
// seedFailedDelivery records an event, a terminally failed delivery of
// it to the given target, and the attempt that failed.
func seedFailedDelivery(
t *testing.T,
dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager,
webhookID, targetID string,
) (*database.Event, *database.Delivery) {
t.Helper()
webhookDB, err := dbMgr.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
event := &database.Event{
WebhookID: webhookID,
EntrypointID: "entrypoint-" + webhookID,
Method: http.MethodPost,
Headers: `{"X-Test":["yes"]}`,
Body: `{"replay":"me"}`,
ContentType: contentTypeJSON,
}
require.NoError(t, webhookDB.Omit(
clause.Associations,
).Create(event).Error)
dlv := &database.Delivery{
EventID: event.ID,
TargetID: targetID,
Status: database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
}
require.NoError(t, webhookDB.Omit(
clause.Associations,
).Create(dlv).Error)
result := &database.DeliveryResult{
DeliveryID: dlv.ID,
AttemptNum: 1,
Success: false,
StatusCode: http.StatusBadGateway,
Error: "connection refused",
}
require.NoError(t, webhookDB.Omit(
clause.Associations,
).Create(result).Error)
return event, dlv
}
// loadDelivery reads a delivery back out of a webhook's database.
func loadDelivery(
t *testing.T, webhookDB *gorm.DB, deliveryID string,
) database.Delivery {
t.Helper()
var dlv database.Delivery
require.NoError(
t,
webhookDB.First(&dlv, "id = ?", deliveryID).Error,
)
return dlv
}
// listDeliveries reads every delivery of an event.
func listDeliveries(
t *testing.T, webhookDB *gorm.DB, eventID string,
) []database.Delivery {
t.Helper()
var deliveries []database.Delivery
require.NoError(t, webhookDB.Where(
"event_id = ?", eventID,
).Find(&deliveries).Error)
return deliveries
}
// theOtherDelivery returns the one delivery in the slice that is not
// excludeID. Identity is used rather than an ordering because the rows
// are minted milliseconds apart and their ids are random.
func theOtherDelivery(
t *testing.T,
deliveries []database.Delivery,
excludeID string,
) database.Delivery {
t.Helper()
var found []database.Delivery
for _, d := range deliveries {
if d.ID != excludeID {
found = append(found, d)
}
}
require.Len(t, found, 1)
return found[0]
}
// postReplay runs the real replay handler for one delivery.
func postReplay(
t *testing.T,
h *handlers.Handlers,
sess *session.Session,
webhookID, deliveryID string,
) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
t.Helper()
req := postRequest(
"/source/"+webhookID+"/deliveries/"+
deliveryID+"/replay",
authenticatedCookies(
t, sess, deleteTestUserID, deleteTestUsername,
),
map[string]string{
paramSourceID: webhookID,
paramDeliveryID: deliveryID,
},
)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.HandleDeliveryReplay().ServeHTTP(w, req)
return w
}
// TestHandleDeliveryReplay_AppendsDeliveryAndLeavesOriginal is the
// core requirement: replaying a failed delivery succeeds, appends a
// new delivery, and leaves the original row and its recorded attempt
// exactly as they were.
//
// It also pins the two things a replay would be wrong to get from the
// original: the task carries the target's CURRENT configuration, which
// this test changes between the failure and the replay, and it carries
// the stored EVENT body rather than anything the failed attempt
// received back.
func TestHandleDeliveryReplay_AppendsDeliveryAndLeavesOriginal(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
sess *session.Session
db *database.Database
dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager
notif *recordingNotifier
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db, &dbMgr, &notif)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
wh := seedWebhook(t, db)
tgt := seedConfiguredTarget(
t, db, wh.ID, database.TargetTypeHTTP,
`{"url":"`+replayTargetURL+`"}`,
)
event, original := seedFailedDelivery(
t, dbMgr, wh.ID, tgt.ID,
)
webhookDB, err := dbMgr.GetDB(wh.ID)
require.NoError(t, err)
before := loadDelivery(t, webhookDB, original.ID)
// The operator fixes the destination, which is the whole reason
// to replay. The replay must use this, not the config the
// original delivery ran against.
const fixedConfig = `{"url":"http://93.184.216.34/fixed"}`
require.NoError(t, db.DB().Model(&database.Target{}).
Where("id = ?", tgt.ID).
Update("config", fixedConfig).Error)
w := postReplay(t, h, sess, wh.ID, original.ID)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(
t,
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/logs?replay=queued",
w.Header().Get("Location"),
)
deliveries := listDeliveries(t, webhookDB, event.ID)
require.Len(
t, deliveries, 2,
"replay must append a delivery, not reuse one",
)
replayed := theOtherDelivery(t, deliveries, original.ID)
assert.Equal(t, tgt.ID, replayed.TargetID)
assert.Equal(t, event.ID, replayed.EventID)
assert.Equal(
t, database.DeliveryStatusPending, replayed.Status,
)
assertDeliveryUntouched(t, webhookDB, before)
tasks := notif.Tasks()
require.Len(t, tasks, 1)
assertReplayTask(
t, tasks[0], wh.ID, event, tgt, replayed.ID, fixedConfig,
)
assertNoLeakedTarget(t, webhookDB)
}
// assertDeliveryUntouched proves a delivery row is exactly as it was
// read before: same terminal status, same timestamps, and the same
// recorded attempts.
func assertDeliveryUntouched(
t *testing.T,
webhookDB *gorm.DB,
before database.Delivery,
) {
t.Helper()
after := loadDelivery(t, webhookDB, before.ID)
assert.Equal(
t, before.Status, after.Status,
"replay must not resurrect the original delivery",
)
assert.Equal(t, before.UpdatedAt, after.UpdatedAt)
assert.Equal(t, before.CreatedAt, after.CreatedAt)
var attempts int64
require.NoError(t, webhookDB.
Model(&database.DeliveryResult{}).
Where("delivery_id = ?", before.ID).
Count(&attempts).Error)
assert.Equal(
t, int64(1), attempts,
"the original delivery's attempt history must stand",
)
}
// assertReplayTask proves the task handed to the delivery engine is
// the one the receiver would build for this event and this target, and
// that it carries wantConfig — the target's configuration as it stands
// now rather than as the original delivery ran against it.
func assertReplayTask(
t *testing.T,
task delivery.Task,
webhookID string,
event *database.Event,
target *database.Target,
wantDeliveryID, wantConfig string,
) {
t.Helper()
assert.Equal(t, wantDeliveryID, task.DeliveryID)
assert.Equal(t, event.ID, task.EventID)
assert.Equal(t, webhookID, task.WebhookID)
assert.Equal(t, event.EntrypointID, task.EntrypointID)
assert.Equal(t, target.ID, task.TargetID)
assert.Equal(t, target.Type, task.TargetType)
assert.JSONEq(
t, wantConfig, task.TargetConfig,
"replay must use the target's current configuration",
)
assert.Equal(t, event.Method, task.Method)
assert.Equal(t, event.Headers, task.Headers)
assert.Equal(t, event.ContentType, task.ContentType)
assert.Equal(t, 1, task.AttemptNum)
require.NotNil(t, task.Body)
assert.Equal(
t, event.Body, *task.Body,
"replay re-sends the stored event body",
)
}
// assertNoLeakedTarget proves the per-webhook database holds no target
// rows. AutoMigrate creates the table there because Delivery declares
// the relation, so it is a ROW that signals a leak: an association
// write would have upserted the whole target, plaintext config and
// all, into the event database. See
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/206.
func assertNoLeakedTarget(t *testing.T, webhookDB *gorm.DB) {
t.Helper()
var leaked int64
require.NoError(t, webhookDB.Unscoped().
Model(&database.Target{}).Count(&leaked).Error)
assert.Zero(
t, leaked,
"replay must not write the target into the event database",
)
}
// TestHandleDeliveryReplay_RefusesDeletedTarget proves the required
// refusal: a target deleted since the delivery ran is reported as
// deleted rather than erroring, and nothing is created or queued.
func TestHandleDeliveryReplay_RefusesDeletedTarget(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
sess *session.Session
db *database.Database
dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager
notif *recordingNotifier
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db, &dbMgr, &notif)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
wh := seedWebhook(t, db)
tgt := seedConfiguredTarget(
t, db, wh.ID, database.TargetTypeHTTP,
`{"url":"`+replayTargetURL+`"}`,
)
event, original := seedFailedDelivery(
t, dbMgr, wh.ID, tgt.ID,
)
// Deletes are soft, so the delivery history outlives the target.
require.NoError(t, db.DB().Where(
"id = ?", tgt.ID,
).Delete(&database.Target{}).Error)
w := postReplay(t, h, sess, wh.ID, original.ID)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(
t,
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/logs?replay=target-deleted",
w.Header().Get("Location"),
)
webhookDB, err := dbMgr.GetDB(wh.ID)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Len(
t, listDeliveries(t, webhookDB, event.ID), 1,
"a refused replay must create no delivery",
)
assert.Empty(
t, notif.Tasks(),
"a refused replay must queue nothing",
)
// The refusal is specific, which is why the target is looked up
// including soft-deleted rows: an id that never named a target
// is a different outcome, and a different message, from one the
// operator deleted.
_, orphan := seedFailedDelivery(
t, dbMgr, wh.ID, "target-that-never-existed",
)
missing := postReplay(t, h, sess, wh.ID, orphan.ID)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, missing.Code)
assert.Equal(
t,
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/logs?replay=target-missing",
missing.Header().Get("Location"),
)
}
// TestHandleDeliveryReplay_RefusesWhileEarlierReplayInFlight proves
// the replay-storm guard: a second replay of the same event to the
// same target is refused while the first is still queued, so repeated
// submissions cannot stack copies of work the engine has not done.
func TestHandleDeliveryReplay_RefusesWhileEarlierReplayInFlight(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
sess *session.Session
db *database.Database
dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager
notif *recordingNotifier
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db, &dbMgr, &notif)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
wh := seedWebhook(t, db)
tgt := seedConfiguredTarget(
t, db, wh.ID, database.TargetTypeHTTP,
`{"url":"`+replayTargetURL+`"}`,
)
event, original := seedFailedDelivery(
t, dbMgr, wh.ID, tgt.ID,
)
first := postReplay(t, h, sess, wh.ID, original.ID)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, first.Code)
require.Equal(
t,
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/logs?replay=queued",
first.Header().Get("Location"),
)
second := postReplay(t, h, sess, wh.ID, original.ID)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, second.Code)
assert.Equal(
t,
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/logs?replay=in-flight",
second.Header().Get("Location"),
)
webhookDB, err := dbMgr.GetDB(wh.ID)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Len(
t, listDeliveries(t, webhookDB, event.ID), 2,
"the refused second replay must add nothing",
)
assert.Len(
t, notif.Tasks(), 1,
"only the first replay reaches the delivery engine",
)
// A delivery the engine has not finished is not replayable
// either, which is the same rule seen from the other side.
queued := theOtherDelivery(
t, listDeliveries(t, webhookDB, event.ID), original.ID,
)
pending := postReplay(t, h, sess, wh.ID, queued.ID)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, pending.Code)
assert.Equal(
t,
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/logs?replay=not-terminal",
pending.Header().Get("Location"),
)
}
// TestHandleSourceLogs_RendersReplayControlAndBanner proves the action
// reaches the page it belongs on: a finished delivery renders a POST
// form carrying a CSRF token, and the outcome code a refusal redirects
// with becomes a readable message.
func TestHandleSourceLogs_RendersReplayControlAndBanner(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
sess *session.Session
db *database.Database
dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db, &dbMgr)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
wh := seedWebhook(t, db)
tgt := seedConfiguredTarget(
t, db, wh.ID, database.TargetTypeHTTP,
`{"url":"`+replayTargetURL+`"}`,
)
_, original := seedFailedDelivery(t, dbMgr, wh.ID, tgt.ID)
body := renderSourceLogsPage(t, h, sess, wh.ID)
assert.Contains(
t, body,
`action="/source/`+wh.ID+`/deliveries/`+
original.ID+`/replay"`,
)
assert.Contains(t, body, `method="POST"`)
assert.Contains(t, body, `name="csrf_token"`)
assert.Contains(t, body, ">Replay<")
refused := renderSourceLogsPageWithQuery(
t, h, sess, wh.ID, "?replay=target-deleted",
)
assert.Contains(t, refused, "alert-error")
assert.Contains(t, refused, "has been deleted")
// An outcome code nobody issued renders no banner at all.
unknown := renderSourceLogsPageWithQuery(
t, h, sess, wh.ID, "?replay=made-up",
)
assert.NotContains(t, unknown, "alert-error")
assert.NotContains(t, unknown, "alert-success")
assert.NotContains(t, unknown, "made-up")
}

169
internal/handlers/delivery_result_view.go
View File

@@ -1,169 +0,0 @@
package handlers
import (
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
)
// maxRenderedResponseBytes caps how many bytes of one stored
// delivery response body reach the event log page.
//
// The bound is enforced here and in SQL, because this page's
// memory profile must not depend on a constant in another
// package staying where it is, and because rows predating the
// delivery engine's own cap or restored from an archive are
// not covered by it at all.
//
// It happens to equal that engine cap, so a row written by the
// current engine reaches this one exactly and is never cut
// twice. Nothing here may assume the two differ: see view.
const maxRenderedResponseBytes = 4096
// deliveryResultColumns is the delivery attempt projection.
// The casts to blob are load-bearing for the same reason they
// are in eventLogColumns: they make substr and length count
// bytes rather than characters, and they make SQLite do the
// cut, so an oversized stored response never becomes a Go
// string at all.
const deliveryResultColumns = "delivery_id, attempt_num, success, " +
"status_code, error, duration, " +
"substr(cast(response_body as blob), 1, ?) AS response_body, " +
"length(cast(response_body as blob)) AS response_bytes"
// DeliveryResultView is the display-safe projection of one
// delivery attempt for the event log page. It carries a
// capped response body plus the true stored size, so the page
// can mark a response as truncated without holding the whole
// thing.
//
// Both Error and ResponseBody have been through the target's
// Redactor. The engine already masks the URL out of the
// errors it stores, so for errors this is a second line
// covering rows written before it did; for response bodies it
// is the only line, and its reach is what
// delivery.Redactor documents.
type DeliveryResultView struct {
AttemptNum int
Success bool
// StatusCode is 0 when the attempt never got a response,
// which is why the page asks HasStatusCode rather than
// printing the number.
StatusCode int
// Error is the stored failure message, redacted.
Error string
// DurationMS is how long the attempt took.
DurationMS int64
// ResponseBody holds at most maxRenderedResponseBytes
// bytes of the stored response, redacted. It is remote
// content and must only ever be rendered escaped.
ResponseBody string
// ResponseBytes is the size of the stored response body,
// before the cut and before redaction. It is what the
// remote sent only when ResponseSizeKnown is set.
ResponseBytes int64
// ResponseShownBytes is how much of that the page is
// showing. It is the size of the cut, taken before
// redaction, so the truncation marker reports what SQLite
// returned rather than how much the marker substitution
// then changed the length.
ResponseShownBytes int
// ResponseTruncated reports that the body shown may be
// incomplete, so the page owes the reader a marker. Every
// body that reaches the cap counts, because one the
// delivery engine cut at its own equal cap is
// indistinguishable from a complete one.
ResponseTruncated bool
// ResponseSizeKnown reports that ResponseBytes is the whole
// response the remote sent, so the marker may quote it. It
// is false for a body that only reaches the cap, where how
// much came after it was never recorded.
ResponseSizeKnown bool
}
// HasStatusCode reports whether the attempt got as far as an
// HTTP response. A transport failure stores no status code,
// and rendering that as "0" would read as a real status.
func (v DeliveryResultView) HasStatusCode() bool {
return v.StatusCode != 0
}
// deliveryResultRow is one row of the delivery attempt
// projection. Its response body arrives already cut to the
// cap by SQLite, with the true size beside it.
type deliveryResultRow struct {
DeliveryID string
AttemptNum int
Success bool
StatusCode int
Error string
Duration int64
ResponseBody []byte
ResponseBytes int64
}
// view projects a loaded row for rendering, stripping the
// target's own credential out of the two fields a remote peer
// gets to influence.
func (r *deliveryResultRow) view(
redactor delivery.Redactor,
) DeliveryResultView {
body := r.ResponseBody
// Two different cuts can have shortened this body, and the
// row records only one of them. SQLite cuts here, whenever
// the stored value is larger than the cap. The delivery
// engine cut earlier, whenever the remote sent more than
// its own maxBodyLog — which is this same number, so such a
// row stores the cut length as its whole length and nothing
// in it separates a response that ended at the cap from one
// severed there.
//
// So a body that reaches the cap is treated as cut either
// way. Gating on ResponseBytes alone would assume the two
// caps differ, and they do not: under the current engine
// that gate never opens.
cut := r.ResponseBytes > int64(len(body)) ||
len(body) >= maxRenderedResponseBytes
// The row holds more than the page shows only in the first
// of those cases. In the second the stored row is all there
// is, and its size is a floor rather than the true one.
sizeKnown := r.ResponseBytes > int64(len(body))
// Only a cut response can have been left mid-sequence,
// exactly as with an event body.
if cut {
body = trimPartialRune(body)
}
// A cut body goes through RedactCut: the remote controls
// the padding ahead of a credential it echoes, so it
// controls where the cut falls inside that credential, and
// the severed prefix left behind matches no secret whole.
rendered := string(body)
if cut {
rendered = redactor.RedactCut(rendered)
} else {
rendered = redactor.Redact(rendered)
}
return DeliveryResultView{
AttemptNum: r.AttemptNum,
Success: r.Success,
StatusCode: r.StatusCode,
Error: redactor.Redact(r.Error),
DurationMS: r.Duration,
ResponseBody: rendered,
ResponseBytes: r.ResponseBytes,
ResponseShownBytes: len(body),
ResponseTruncated: cut,
ResponseSizeKnown: sizeKnown,
}
}

515
internal/handlers/delivery_result_view_test.go
View File

@@ -1,515 +0,0 @@
package handlers_test
import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strconv"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"gorm.io/gorm/clause"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
)
// responseCap is the number of response bytes the event log
// page is allowed to render for one delivery attempt.
const responseCap = handlers.MaxRenderedResponseBytesForTest
// failedAttempt describes the failed delivery every test in
// this file seeds. The values are distinctive so that finding
// them in the rendered page cannot be a coincidence.
const (
attemptStatusCode = 502
attemptDurationMS = 1234
attemptNumber = 3
attemptError = "upstream returned 502 Bad Gateway"
)
// seedFailedDeliveryWithResponse records an event, a failed
// delivery against targetID, and one delivery result carrying
// the given response body. It returns the delivery.
//
// Distinct from seedFailedDelivery in delivery_replay_test.go,
// which seeds an attempt with no response body and returns the
// event as well; these tests need the recorded response.
func seedFailedDeliveryWithResponse(
t *testing.T,
dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager,
webhookID, targetID, responseBody string,
) *database.Delivery {
t.Helper()
webhookDB, err := dbMgr.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
event := &database.Event{
WebhookID: webhookID,
Method: http.MethodPost,
Body: `{"test":true}`,
ContentType: contentTypeJSON,
}
require.NoError(t, webhookDB.Omit(
clause.Associations,
).Create(event).Error)
dlv := &database.Delivery{
EventID: event.ID,
TargetID: targetID,
Status: database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
}
require.NoError(t, webhookDB.Omit(
clause.Associations,
).Create(dlv).Error)
result := &database.DeliveryResult{
DeliveryID: dlv.ID,
AttemptNum: attemptNumber,
Success: false,
StatusCode: attemptStatusCode,
ResponseBody: responseBody,
Error: attemptError,
Duration: attemptDurationMS,
}
require.NoError(t, webhookDB.Omit(
clause.Associations,
).Create(result).Error)
return dlv
}
// seedFailureAndRender seeds a failed delivery against a
// target of the given type and config, and returns the
// rendered event log page.
func seedFailureAndRender(
t *testing.T,
targetType database.TargetType,
config, responseBody string,
) string {
t.Helper()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
sess *session.Session
db *database.Database
dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db, &dbMgr)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
wh := seedWebhook(t, db)
tgt := seedConfiguredTarget(
t, db, wh.ID, targetType, config,
)
seedFailedDeliveryWithResponse(
t, dbMgr, wh.ID, tgt.ID, responseBody,
)
return renderSourceLogsPage(t, h, sess, wh.ID)
}
// TestHandleSourceLogs_RendersFailedAttempt is the regression
// test for the reported gap: a failed delivery used to render
// as the status word alone, so diagnosing it meant opening the
// per-webhook SQLite file by hand.
func TestHandleSourceLogs_RendersFailedAttempt(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
body := seedFailureAndRender(
t,
database.TargetTypeHTTP,
`{"url":"https://example.com/hook/abc"}`,
"upstream exploded",
)
assert.Contains(
t, body, strconv.Itoa(attemptStatusCode),
"the attempt's status code must reach the page",
)
assert.Contains(
t, body, attemptError,
"the attempt's error must reach the page",
)
assert.Contains(
t, body, strconv.Itoa(attemptDurationMS),
"the attempt's duration must reach the page",
)
assert.Contains(
t, body, "Attempt "+strconv.Itoa(attemptNumber),
"the attempt number must reach the page",
)
assert.Contains(
t, body, "upstream exploded",
"the attempt's response body must reach the page",
)
}
// TestHandleSourceLogs_EscapesResponseBody proves the
// response body is treated as the untrusted remote content it
// is. The remote chooses these bytes and the page is rendered
// inside the operator's authenticated origin, where the
// application's own CSP allows inline script from 'self'.
func TestHandleSourceLogs_EscapesResponseBody(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const payload = `<script>alert("xss")</script>`
body := seedFailureAndRender(
t,
database.TargetTypeHTTP,
`{"url":"https://example.com/hook/abc"}`,
payload,
)
assert.NotContains(t, body, payload)
assert.NotContains(t, body, "<script>alert")
assert.Contains(t, body, "alert")
}
// TestHandleSourceLogs_RedactsCredentialEchoedInResponse
// covers the case that makes rendering a response body a
// disclosure question at all: the remote echoes back the
// credential the request carried, and the page would then put
// it on the operator's screen.
func TestHandleSourceLogs_RedactsCredentialEchoedInResponse(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
body := seedFailureAndRender(
t,
database.TargetTypeSlack,
`{"webhookUrl":"`+slackWebhookURL+`"}`,
"no_service: "+slackWebhookURL,
)
assert.NotContains(t, body, slackSecretPath)
assert.NotContains(t, body, "T00000000")
assert.NotContains(t, body, "B00000000")
assert.Contains(t, body, delivery.RedactionMarker)
// The rest of the response is still shown, or the
// redaction would have cost the operator the diagnosis.
assert.Contains(t, body, "no_service")
}
// TestHandleSourceLogs_RedactsCredentialEchoedInError covers
// the same disclosure through the error field. The delivery
// engine masks the URL out of the errors it stores, so this
// holds the read path to the rows written before it did.
func TestHandleSourceLogs_RedactsCredentialEchoedInError(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
sess *session.Session
db *database.Database
dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db, &dbMgr)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
wh := seedWebhook(t, db)
tgt := seedConfiguredTarget(
t, db, wh.ID,
database.TargetTypeSlack,
`{"webhookUrl":"`+slackWebhookURL+`"}`,
)
dlv := seedFailedDeliveryWithResponse(t, dbMgr, wh.ID, tgt.ID, "")
webhookDB, err := dbMgr.GetDB(wh.ID)
require.NoError(t, err)
// An unmasked transport error, exactly as Go's HTTP
// client renders one.
require.NoError(t, webhookDB.Model(
&database.DeliveryResult{},
).Where(
"delivery_id = ?", dlv.ID,
).Update(
"error",
`Post "`+slackWebhookURL+`": dial tcp: i/o timeout`,
).Error)
body := renderSourceLogsPage(t, h, sess, wh.ID)
assert.NotContains(t, body, slackSecretPath)
assert.Contains(t, body, delivery.RedactionMarker)
assert.Contains(t, body, "i/o timeout")
}
// severedPadding is the filler that puts the end of an echoed
// webhook URL five bytes past a cut at the response cap, so
// the cut leaves the workspace ID, the bot ID and all but the
// last few token characters behind.
func severedPadding() string {
const severedTail = 5
return strings.Repeat(
"A", responseCap-len(slackWebhookURL)+severedTail,
)
}
// TestHandleSourceLogs_RedactsCredentialSeveredByTheEngineCut
// is the regression test for a redactor gated on the SQL cut
// alone. The delivery engine stops reading a response at its
// own cap, which is the same number of bytes this page
// renders, so a row the engine cut is byte-for-byte
// indistinguishable from a complete response and that gate
// never opened on anything the engine writes.
//
// The seeded body is what the engine stores for any remote
// that sends at least that much: exactly responseCap bytes,
// ending in a severed webhook URL.
// TestDeliverHTTP_CutsStoredResponseAtMaxBodyLog in
// internal/delivery pins that this is the size it produces.
func TestHandleSourceLogs_RedactsCredentialSeveredByTheEngineCut(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
sent := severedPadding() + slackWebhookURL +
strings.Repeat("Z", 128)
stored := sent[:responseCap]
require.Len(
t, stored, responseCap,
"the engine stores exactly the cap, never more",
)
require.Contains(
t, stored, "T00000000",
"the severed credential must be in what is seeded",
)
body := seedFailureAndRender(
t,
database.TargetTypeSlack,
`{"webhookUrl":"`+slackWebhookURL+`"}`,
stored,
)
assert.NotContains(t, body, "T00000000")
assert.NotContains(t, body, "B00000000")
assert.Contains(t, body, delivery.RedactionMarker)
assert.Contains(
t, body, "reached the recording limit",
"a body the engine cut must not be shown as complete",
)
}
// TestHandleSourceLogs_RedactsCredentialSeveredBySQLCut covers
// the same severing for a row larger than the cap, which is
// SQLite's cut rather than the engine's. The current engine
// writes no such row; rows predating its cap or restored from
// an archive are not bounded by it, which is why the page cuts
// again in SQL and has to redact that cut too.
func TestHandleSourceLogs_RedactsCredentialSeveredBySQLCut(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
stored := severedPadding() + slackWebhookURL +
strings.Repeat("Z", 128)
require.Greater(
t, len(stored), responseCap,
"the stored body must exceed the cap or nothing is cut",
)
body := seedFailureAndRender(
t,
database.TargetTypeSlack,
`{"webhookUrl":"`+slackWebhookURL+`"}`,
stored,
)
assert.NotContains(t, body, "T00000000")
assert.NotContains(t, body, "B00000000")
assert.NotContains(
t, body, slackWebhookURL[:len(slackWebhookURL)-10],
)
assert.Contains(t, body, delivery.RedactionMarker)
}
// TestHandleSourceLogs_RedactsForSoftDeletedTarget covers a
// target an operator has deleted. The row is only soft deleted
// and its deliveries survive in the per-webhook database, so
// its redactor has to survive with it or every response body
// it ever recorded renders unredacted.
func TestHandleSourceLogs_RedactsForSoftDeletedTarget(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
sess *session.Session
db *database.Database
dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db, &dbMgr)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
wh := seedWebhook(t, db)
tgt := seedConfiguredTarget(
t, db, wh.ID,
database.TargetTypeSlack,
`{"webhookUrl":"`+slackWebhookURL+`"}`,
)
seedFailedDeliveryWithResponse(
t, dbMgr, wh.ID, tgt.ID,
"no_service: "+slackWebhookURL,
)
require.NoError(t, db.DB().Delete(tgt).Error)
body := renderSourceLogsPage(t, h, sess, wh.ID)
assert.NotContains(t, body, slackSecretPath)
assert.NotContains(t, body, "T00000000")
assert.Contains(t, body, delivery.RedactionMarker)
assert.Contains(t, body, "no_service")
}
// TestHandleSourceLogs_BoundsRenderedAttempts pins the ceiling
// on how many of one delivery's attempts reach the page, and
// that what it drops is counted rather than hidden.
func TestHandleSourceLogs_BoundsRenderedAttempts(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const extraAttempts = 7
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
sess *session.Session
db *database.Database
dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db, &dbMgr)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
wh := seedWebhook(t, db)
tgt := seedConfiguredTarget(
t, db, wh.ID, database.TargetTypeLog, "",
)
dlv := seedFailedDeliveryWithResponse(t, dbMgr, wh.ID, tgt.ID, "")
webhookDB, err := dbMgr.GetDB(wh.ID)
require.NoError(t, err)
total := handlers.MaxRenderedAttemptsForTest + extraAttempts
// seedFailedDeliveryWithResponse already recorded one attempt.
for i := range total - 1 {
require.NoError(t, webhookDB.Omit(
clause.Associations,
).Create(&database.DeliveryResult{
DeliveryID: dlv.ID,
AttemptNum: attemptNumber + 1 + i,
Error: attemptError,
}).Error)
}
views := h.LoadEventLogViewsForTest(
httptest.NewRecorder(), *wh, 1,
)
require.Len(t, views, 1)
require.Len(t, views[0].Deliveries, 1)
dv := views[0].Deliveries[0]
assert.Equal(t, total, dv.AttemptCount)
assert.Len(
t, dv.Results, handlers.MaxRenderedAttemptsForTest,
)
assert.Equal(t, extraAttempts, dv.AttemptsOmitted)
page := renderSourceLogsPage(t, h, sess, wh.ID)
assert.Contains(t, page, "attempts omitted")
assert.Contains(
t, page, strconv.Itoa(total)+" attempts",
"the header must count every recorded attempt",
)
}
// TestHandleSourceLogs_BoundsOversizeResponse proves the
// rendered page is bounded by the response cap rather than by
// the stored response size. The cut happens in SQLite, so the
// oversized value never becomes a Go string; this asserts the
// observable consequence, that neither the page nor the
// projection carries the tail.
func TestHandleSourceLogs_BoundsOversizeResponse(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const tail = "QQRESPONSETAILQQ"
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
sess *session.Session
db *database.Database
dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db, &dbMgr)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
wh := seedWebhook(t, db)
tgt := seedConfiguredTarget(
t, db, wh.ID, database.TargetTypeLog, "",
)
stored := strings.Repeat("A", responseCap*4) + tail
seedFailedDeliveryWithResponse(t, dbMgr, wh.ID, tgt.ID, stored)
views := h.LoadEventLogViewsForTest(
httptest.NewRecorder(), *wh, 1,
)
require.Len(t, views, 1)
require.Len(t, views[0].Deliveries, 1)
require.Len(t, views[0].Deliveries[0].Results, 1)
attempt := views[0].Deliveries[0].Results[0]
assert.LessOrEqual(
t, len(attempt.ResponseBody), responseCap,
)
assert.Equal(
t, int64(len(stored)), attempt.ResponseBytes,
)
assert.True(t, attempt.ResponseTruncated)
page := renderSourceLogsPage(t, h, sess, wh.ID)
assert.NotContains(t, page, tail)
assert.Contains(
t, page, "Response truncated for display",
)
}

12
internal/handlers/export_test.go
View File

@@ -19,14 +19,6 @@ func (s *Handlers) SetLogForTest(log *slog.Logger) {
// to the handlers_test package.
const MaxRenderedBodyBytesForTest = maxRenderedBodyBytes
// MaxRenderedResponseBytesForTest exposes the event log's
// delivery response cap to the handlers_test package.
const MaxRenderedResponseBytesForTest = maxRenderedResponseBytes
// MaxRenderedAttemptsForTest exposes the event log's
// per-delivery attempt ceiling to the handlers_test package.
const MaxRenderedAttemptsForTest = maxRenderedAttempts
// DummyVerificationsForTest reports how many equivalent-cost
// verifications were charged for usernames that do not exist. It
// lets a test prove the anti-enumeration path ran without timing
@@ -51,9 +43,7 @@ func (s *Handlers) LoadEventLogViewsForTest(
webhook database.Webhook,
page int,
) []EventLogView {
views, _, _ := s.loadEventsWithDeliveries(
w, webhook, nil, page,
)
views, _ := s.loadEventsWithDeliveries(w, webhook, nil, page)
return views
}

7
internal/handlers/handlers.go
View File

@@ -60,7 +60,6 @@ type HandlersParams struct {
Middleware *middleware.Middleware
Notifier delivery.Notifier
Evictor delivery.WebhookEvictor
SSRFGuard *delivery.Guard
}
// Handlers provides HTTP handler methods for all application
@@ -78,11 +77,6 @@ type Handlers struct {
mtr *metrics.Set
templates map[string]*template.Template
// ssrf validates submitted target URLs. It is the same guard
// the delivery engine dials through, so a URL accepted here
// is one delivery will actually attempt.
ssrf *delivery.Guard
// dummyVerifications counts the equivalent-cost verifications
// charged for usernames that do not exist. It exists so a test
// can prove that path runs without measuring wall-clock time.
@@ -123,7 +117,6 @@ func New(
s.notifier = params.Notifier
s.evictor = params.Evictor
s.mtr = metrics.Default()
s.ssrf = params.SSRFGuard
// Parse all page templates once at startup
s.templates = map[string]*template.Template{

35
internal/handlers/handlers_test.go
View File

@@ -24,32 +24,9 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
)
// recordingNotifier is a delivery.Notifier that records the tasks it
// was handed, so a test can prove a handler queued the delivery it
// claims to have queued — and, on the refusal paths, that it queued
// nothing.
type recordingNotifier struct {
mu sync.Mutex
tasks []delivery.Task
}
type noopNotifier struct{}
func (n *recordingNotifier) Notify(tasks []delivery.Task) {
n.mu.Lock()
defer n.mu.Unlock()
n.tasks = append(n.tasks, tasks...)
}
// Tasks returns a copy of the recorded tasks.
func (n *recordingNotifier) Tasks() []delivery.Task {
n.mu.Lock()
defer n.mu.Unlock()
out := make([]delivery.Task, len(n.tasks))
copy(out, n.tasks)
return out
}
func (n *noopNotifier) Notify([]delivery.Task) {}
// recordingEvictor is a delivery.WebhookEvictor that records
// the webhook ids it was asked to evict, so a test can prove
@@ -97,11 +74,8 @@ func newTestApp(
database.NewWebhookDBManager,
healthcheck.New,
session.New,
func() *recordingNotifier {
return &recordingNotifier{}
},
func(n *recordingNotifier) delivery.Notifier {
return n
func() delivery.Notifier {
return &noopNotifier{}
},
func() *recordingEvictor {
return &recordingEvictor{}
@@ -110,7 +84,6 @@ func newTestApp(
return r
},
middleware.New,
delivery.NewGuard,
handlers.New,
),
fx.Populate(targets...),

25
internal/handlers/source_logs_test.go
View File

@@ -15,11 +15,6 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
)
// contentTypeJSON is the content type the seeded events in this
// package carry. Shared across the seed helpers so the literal
// appears once.
const contentTypeJSON = "application/json"
// seedDeliveredEvent records an event and a delivery for it in
// the webhook's own database, so the log page has a delivery
// to render against the target.
@@ -37,7 +32,7 @@ func seedDeliveredEvent(
WebhookID: webhookID,
Method: http.MethodPost,
Body: `{"test":true}`,
ContentType: contentTypeJSON,
ContentType: "application/json",
}
require.NoError(t, webhookDB.Omit(
@@ -65,26 +60,10 @@ func renderSourceLogsPage(
) string {
t.Helper()
return renderSourceLogsPageWithQuery(
t, h, sess, webhookID, "",
)
}
// renderSourceLogsPageWithQuery is renderSourceLogsPage over a
// caller-supplied query string, for the page state a redirect back to
// the log carries in one.
func renderSourceLogsPageWithQuery(
t *testing.T,
h *handlers.Handlers,
sess *session.Session,
webhookID, query string,
) string {
t.Helper()
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(),
http.MethodGet,
"/source/"+webhookID+"/logs"+query,
"/source/"+webhookID+"/logs",
nil,
)

259
internal/handlers/source_management.go
View File

@@ -4,13 +4,11 @@ import (
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"net/http"
"slices"
"strconv"
"strings"
"github.com/go-chi/chi"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/signature"
@@ -103,32 +101,6 @@ type DeliveryView struct {
ID string
Status database.DeliveryStatus
Target delivery.TargetView
// Results is this delivery's attempts in attempt order,
// bounded by maxRenderedAttempts. Without them a failure
// renders as the status word alone and says nothing about
// why.
Results []DeliveryResultView
// AttemptCount is how many attempts were recorded, which
// is more than len(Results) once the middle was dropped.
AttemptCount int
// AttemptsOmitted is how many attempts were dropped from
// the middle of Results. The page must show it, or the
// bound would hide history rather than fold it.
AttemptsOmitted int
}
// eventLogTarget is what the event log needs to know about
// one target: the display-safe view its template renders, and
// the redactor that keeps that target's own credential out of
// the text its remote peer chose. The two are kept together
// so a caller cannot pick up one without the other, and apart
// from TargetView so the secrets never reach a template.
type eventLogTarget struct {
View delivery.TargetView
Redactor delivery.Redactor
}
// HandleSourceList shows a list of user's webhooks.
@@ -797,42 +769,21 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleSourceLogs() http.HandlerFunc {
return
}
targets, err := h.loadTargetMap(webhook.ID)
if err != nil {
// Without the map every delivery renders through a
// zero redactor, so failing the page is the only
// safe answer.
h.serverError(w, "failed to load targets", err)
return
}
targets := h.loadTargetMap(webhook.ID)
page := h.parsePage(r)
evts, total, ok := h.loadEventsWithDeliveries(
evts, total := h.loadEventsWithDeliveries(
w, webhook, targets, page,
)
if !ok {
return
}
totalPages := int(total) / paginationPerPage
if int(total)%paginationPerPage != 0 {
totalPages++
}
// The banner a replay POST redirected back with. The
// message comes from a fixed set keyed by the outcome
// code, never from the query string itself.
replayMsg, replayOK := replayOutcome(
r.URL.Query().Get(replayOutcomeParam),
)
data := map[string]any{
tmplKeyWebhook: &webhook,
"Events": evts,
"ReplayMessage": replayMsg,
"ReplayQueued": replayOK,
"Page": page,
"TotalPages": totalPages,
"TotalEvents": total,
@@ -847,54 +798,29 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleSourceLogs() http.HandlerFunc {
}
// loadTargetMap loads targets into a map of display-safe
// views keyed by target ID, each paired with its redactor.
// The projection happens here so that no caller can hand a
// raw target, configuration blob and all, to a template: the
// raw rows do not leave this function.
//
// The load is Unscoped because deleting a target only soft
// deletes the row while its deliveries survive in the
// per-webhook database: a scoped load leaves those deliveries
// with a zero redactor, which renders their response bodies
// unredacted. Only the redactor half of the map is built from
// deleted rows. The view half, which is what the page lists,
// stays scoped.
// views keyed by target ID. The projection happens here so
// that no caller can hand a raw target, configuration blob
// and all, to a template.
func (h *Handlers) loadTargetMap(
webhookID string,
) (map[string]eventLogTarget, error) {
) map[string]delivery.TargetView {
var targets []database.Target
err := h.db.DB().Unscoped().Where(
h.db.DB().Where(
"webhook_id = ?", webhookID,
).Find(&targets).Error
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
).Find(&targets)
views := delivery.NewTargetViews(targets)
targetMap := make(
map[string]eventLogTarget, len(targets),
map[string]delivery.TargetView, len(views),
)
live := make([]database.Target, 0, len(targets))
for i := range targets {
targetMap[targets[i].ID] = eventLogTarget{
Redactor: delivery.NewRedactor(&targets[i]),
for _, v := range views {
targetMap[v.ID] = v
}
if !targets[i].DeletedAt.Valid {
live = append(live, targets[i])
}
}
// The views come from NewTargetViews rather than being
// rebuilt here, so the masking rules stay in one place.
for _, v := range delivery.NewTargetViews(live) {
entry := targetMap[v.ID]
entry.View = v
targetMap[v.ID] = entry
}
return targetMap, nil
return targetMap
}
// parsePage extracts a page number from the query string.
@@ -915,22 +841,18 @@ func (h *Handlers) parsePage(r *http.Request) int {
// deliveries from the per-webhook database. Events come back
// as capped projections rather than database.Event rows: see
// eventLogColumns for why the cut happens in SQL.
//
// The bool reports whether the load succeeded. It is false
// once this has answered the request with an error, and the
// caller must then render nothing further.
func (h *Handlers) loadEventsWithDeliveries(
w http.ResponseWriter,
webhook database.Webhook,
targetMap map[string]eventLogTarget,
targetMap map[string]delivery.TargetView,
page int,
) ([]EventLogView, int64, bool) {
) ([]EventLogView, int64) {
var totalEvents int64
var result []EventLogView
if !h.dbMgr.DBExists(webhook.ID) {
return result, totalEvents, true
return result, totalEvents
}
webhookDB, err := h.dbMgr.GetDB(webhook.ID)
@@ -939,7 +861,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) loadEventsWithDeliveries(
w, "failed to get webhook database", err,
)
return nil, 0, false
return nil, 0
}
webhookDB.Model(&database.Event{}).Where(
@@ -959,170 +881,43 @@ func (h *Handlers) loadEventsWithDeliveries(
).Find(&rows)
result = make([]EventLogView, len(rows))
eventDeliveries := make([][]database.Delivery, len(rows))
var deliveryIDs []string
for i := range rows {
result[i] = rows[i].view()
var deliveries []database.Delivery
webhookDB.Where(
"event_id = ?", rows[i].ID,
).Find(&eventDeliveries[i])
).Find(&deliveries)
for j := range eventDeliveries[i] {
deliveryIDs = append(
deliveryIDs, eventDeliveries[i][j].ID,
)
}
}
attempts, err := h.loadDeliveryResults(
webhookDB, deliveryIDs,
)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(
w, "failed to load delivery attempts", err,
)
return nil, 0, false
}
for i := range rows {
result[i].Deliveries = newDeliveryViews(
eventDeliveries[i], targetMap, attempts,
deliveries, targetMap,
)
}
return result, totalEvents, true
}
// deliveryIDChunkSize bounds how many delivery IDs go into one
// IN clause. SQLite refuses a statement carrying more than
// SQLITE_MAX_VARIABLE_NUMBER (32766) bound parameters, and a
// page holds one delivery per target per event, so a webhook
// with enough targets would turn the whole query into an error
// and the page into zero attempts.
const deliveryIDChunkSize = 500
// loadDeliveryResults loads the recorded attempts for the
// page's deliveries, keyed by delivery ID.
//
// Each response body is cut by SQLite rather than in Go, for
// the reason deliveryResultColumns gives. How many attempts a
// delivery has is the target's MaxRetries, which the
// authenticated operator sets; how many of them reach the page
// is bounded again by maxRenderedAttempts.
func (h *Handlers) loadDeliveryResults(
webhookDB *gorm.DB,
deliveryIDs []string,
) (map[string][]deliveryResultRow, error) {
byDelivery := make(map[string][]deliveryResultRow)
for chunk := range slices.Chunk(
deliveryIDs, deliveryIDChunkSize,
) {
var rows []deliveryResultRow
err := webhookDB.Model(
&database.DeliveryResult{},
).Select(
deliveryResultColumns, maxRenderedResponseBytes,
).Where(
"delivery_id IN ?", chunk,
).Order("attempt_num ASC").Find(&rows).Error
if err != nil {
// Returning what was loaded so far renders the
// deliveries in the failed chunk as never having run,
// which is indistinguishable from ones that really
// never ran. The page fails instead.
return nil, err
}
for i := range rows {
byDelivery[rows[i].DeliveryID] = append(
byDelivery[rows[i].DeliveryID], rows[i],
)
}
}
return byDelivery, nil
return result, totalEvents
}
// newDeliveryViews projects deliveries for rendering,
// resolving each one's target to its display-safe view and
// each one's attempts through that target's redactor.
// resolving each one's target to its display-safe view.
func newDeliveryViews(
deliveries []database.Delivery,
targetMap map[string]eventLogTarget,
attempts map[string][]deliveryResultRow,
targetMap map[string]delivery.TargetView,
) []DeliveryView {
views := make([]DeliveryView, len(deliveries))
for i := range deliveries {
target := targetMap[deliveries[i].TargetID]
rows := attempts[deliveries[i].ID]
results, omitted := renderedAttempts(
rows, target.Redactor,
)
views[i] = DeliveryView{
ID: deliveries[i].ID,
Status: deliveries[i].Status,
Target: target.View,
Results: results,
AttemptCount: len(rows),
AttemptsOmitted: omitted,
Target: targetMap[deliveries[i].TargetID],
}
}
return views
}
// maxRenderedAttempts bounds how many of one delivery's
// attempts the page renders. Past it the middle is dropped and
// counted, keeping the first attempts and the last ones: how
// the delivery started failing and how it ended are what a
// reader needs, and the count says plainly that the rest was
// dropped rather than never recorded.
const (
renderedAttemptsHead = 10
renderedAttemptsTail = 10
maxRenderedAttempts = renderedAttemptsHead +
renderedAttemptsTail
)
// renderedAttempts projects a delivery's attempts through the
// target's redactor, at most maxRenderedAttempts of them, and
// reports how many it dropped.
func renderedAttempts(
rows []deliveryResultRow,
redactor delivery.Redactor,
) ([]DeliveryResultView, int) {
omitted := 0
if len(rows) > maxRenderedAttempts {
omitted = len(rows) - maxRenderedAttempts
kept := make(
[]deliveryResultRow, 0, maxRenderedAttempts,
)
kept = append(kept, rows[:renderedAttemptsHead]...)
kept = append(
kept, rows[len(rows)-renderedAttemptsTail:]...,
)
rows = kept
}
views := make([]DeliveryResultView, len(rows))
for i := range rows {
views[i] = rows[i].view(redactor)
}
return views, omitted
}
// HandleEntrypointCreate handles adding a new entrypoint.
func (h *Handlers) HandleEntrypointCreate() http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
@@ -1607,7 +1402,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) validateTargetURL(
return errMissingURL
}
err := h.ssrf.ValidateTargetURL(
err := delivery.ValidateTargetURL(
r.Context(), targetURL,
)
if err != nil {

28
internal/metrics/metrics.go
View File

@@ -82,7 +82,6 @@ type Set struct {
deliveriesSucceeded *prometheus.CounterVec
deliveriesFailed *prometheus.CounterVec
deliveryRetries *prometheus.CounterVec
deliveryReplays *prometheus.CounterVec
deliveryDuration *prometheus.HistogramVec
deliveriesPending *prometheus.GaugeVec
deliveriesRetrying *prometheus.GaugeVec
@@ -150,22 +149,6 @@ func (s *Set) ObserveDeliveryDuration(
Observe(d.Seconds())
}
// DeliveryReplayed counts one delivery an operator replayed from the
// event log.
//
// A replay runs the ordinary engine path, so it already moves the
// attempt, outcome and duration series exactly as a first delivery
// does — deliberately, since a replay is a real delivery and hiding it
// from those would misreport the pipeline. This counter is the one
// place the two are distinguishable, and it carries the existing
// target-type label rather than adding a replay dimension to every
// other series.
func (s *Set) DeliveryReplayed(t database.TargetType) {
s.deliveryReplays.
WithLabelValues(normalizeTargetType(t)).
Inc()
}
// DeliveryStatusChanged counts a delivery's transition into a new
// status. The mapping from status to counter lives here, next to the
// collectors, so the engine has a single call for every transition it
@@ -288,16 +271,6 @@ func (s *Set) registerCounters(factory promauto.Factory) {
},
[]string{targetTypeLabel},
)
s.deliveryReplays = factory.NewCounterVec(
prometheus.CounterOpts{
Namespace: namespace,
Name: "delivery_replays_total",
Help: "Deliveries an operator replayed from the " +
"event log, by target type.",
},
[]string{targetTypeLabel},
)
}
func (s *Set) registerGauges(factory promauto.Factory) {
@@ -349,7 +322,6 @@ func (s *Set) initSeries() {
s.deliveriesSucceeded.WithLabelValues(label)
s.deliveriesFailed.WithLabelValues(label)
s.deliveryRetries.WithLabelValues(label)
s.deliveryReplays.WithLabelValues(label)
s.deliveriesPending.WithLabelValues(label)
s.deliveriesRetrying.WithLabelValues(label)
s.circuitBreakersOpen.WithLabelValues(label)

25
internal/middleware/ratelimit.go
View File

@@ -34,16 +34,6 @@ const (
// password change rate limit.
passwordChangeRateInterval = 1 * time.Minute
// replayRateLimit is the maximum number of delivery replays one
// client may queue per interval. Each replay puts a delivery on
// the engine's queue, so without a ceiling one operator holding
// the button down — or scripting it — queues unbounded outbound
// work. It sits far above any rate a person clicks at.
replayRateLimit = 30
// replayRateInterval is the time window for the replay limit.
replayRateInterval = 1 * time.Minute
// receiverRateInterval is the time window for the webhook
// receiver rate limit. The configured limit is expressed in
// requests per minute.
@@ -300,21 +290,6 @@ func (m *Middleware) PasswordChangeRateLimit() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
)
}
// ReplayRateLimit returns middleware that enforces per-IP rate
// limiting on delivery replays.
//
// Like the password-change limit it is spent on arrival, which is safe
// for the same reason: RequireAuth runs ahead of it, so only a request
// already carrying a valid session can reach the bucket.
func (m *Middleware) ReplayRateLimit() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return m.postRateLimit(
replayRateLimit,
replayRateInterval,
"delivery replay rate limit exceeded",
"Too many replays. Please try again later.",
)
}
// postRateLimit builds middleware that enforces a per-IP rate
// limit on POST requests only; all other methods pass through
// unaffected. Requests over the limit receive a 429 with the

472
internal/resetpw/resetpw.go
View File

@@ -1,472 +0,0 @@
// Package resetpw implements the `webhooker resetpw` subcommand,
// which sets an existing account's password from the command line.
//
// It exists because the bootstrap password is shown exactly once. If it
// is lost — the boot's output rotated away, the terminal closed — the
// deployment has no other way in: there is no second account, no
// forgot-password flow, and no environment override. The only recovery
// before this command was deleting the row from webhooker.db with a
// SQLite client so the next start would re-seed.
//
// It operates on a stopped deployment only. The password is read from
// standard input or generated, never taken from argv, and it reuses the
// service's own Argon2id hashing rather than reimplementing it.
package resetpw
import (
"bufio"
"errors"
"flag"
"fmt"
"io"
"io/fs"
"log/slog"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/banner"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/datadir"
)
// Name is the subcommand's name on the command line.
const Name = "resetpw"
const (
// generatedPasswordLen is the length of a -generate password. It
// is longer than the 16 characters the first boot generates: this
// one is typed or pasted once by an operator recovering a
// deployment, not carried around.
generatedPasswordLen = 24
// minPasswordLen is the shortest password accepted on standard
// input. It is a floor against a stray keystroke or a truncated
// pipe silently becoming the account's credential, not a password
// policy.
minPasswordLen = 8
)
// Exit statuses. Usage errors are distinguished from operational ones
// so that a script can tell "you called it wrong" from "it refused".
const (
exitOK = 0
exitFailure = 1
exitUsage = 2
)
// Sentinel errors, exported so a test can assert on the refusal rather
// than on the wording of a message.
var (
// ErrNoDataDir reports that DATA_DIR names nothing, or names
// something that is not a directory.
ErrNoDataDir = errors.New("no data directory")
// ErrNoDatabase reports that the data directory holds no main
// database, so there is no deployment to reset a password in.
ErrNoDatabase = errors.New("no webhooker database")
// ErrLiveInstance reports that a running webhooker holds the data
// directory.
ErrLiveInstance = errors.New(
"data directory is held by a running webhooker",
)
// ErrNoSuchUser reports that the named account does not exist.
ErrNoSuchUser = errors.New("no such user")
// ErrEmptyPassword reports that standard input carried nothing.
ErrEmptyPassword = errors.New("empty password")
// ErrPasswordTooShort reports a password below minPasswordLen.
ErrPasswordTooShort = errors.New("password too short")
// ErrNotUpdated reports that the update matched no row, which
// means the account disappeared between the lookup and the write.
ErrNotUpdated = errors.New("password was not updated")
)
// usage describes the subcommand. It is written to the same stream as
// the error that provoked it.
func usage(w io.Writer, flags *flag.FlagSet) {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(w, `usage: webhooker %s [-generate] <username>
Set an existing account's password. The deployment must be stopped:
webhooker %s takes the same exclusive DATA_DIR lock the server does
and refuses to run while a live instance holds it.
The password is read as one line from standard input, or generated
with -generate. It is never taken as a command-line argument, which
on Linux would publish it in /proc to every account on the host.
DATA_DIR selects the deployment exactly as it does for the server
(default %s). The directory and its database must already exist;
nothing is created.
Flags:
`, Name, Name, config.DefaultDataDir)
flags.PrintDefaults()
}
// Run executes the subcommand and returns the process exit status.
func Run(
args []string,
stdin io.Reader,
stdout, stderr io.Writer,
) int {
flags := flag.NewFlagSet("webhooker "+Name, flag.ContinueOnError)
flags.SetOutput(stderr)
generate := flags.Bool(
"generate", false,
"generate a random password instead of reading one from "+
"standard input, and print it",
)
flags.Usage = func() { usage(stderr, flags) }
err := flags.Parse(args)
if err != nil {
// flag has already reported the error and printed the usage.
return exitUsage
}
if flags.NArg() != 1 {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(
stderr,
"webhooker %s: exactly one username is required\n",
Name,
)
usage(stderr, flags)
return exitUsage
}
err = reset(flags.Arg(0), *generate, stdin, stdout, stderr)
if err != nil {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "webhooker %s: %v\n", Name, err)
return exitFailure
}
return exitOK
}
// reset performs the whole operation against the configured data
// directory.
func reset(
username string,
generate bool,
stdin io.Reader,
stdout, stderr io.Writer,
) error {
dir := config.DataDir()
err := checkDataDir(dir)
if err != nil {
return err
}
lock, err := acquire(dir)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// The kernel drops the lock when this process exits, whatever
// happens below; releasing explicitly is what makes a long-running
// caller — a test — see it freed. A release error tells the
// operator nothing they can act on.
defer func() { _ = lock.Release() }()
db, err := database.Open(dir, cliLogger(stderr))
if err != nil {
return err
}
password, err := setPassword(db, username, generate, stdin, stderr)
closeErr := db.Close()
if err != nil {
return err
}
if closeErr != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("closing the database: %w", closeErr)
}
return report(stdout, stderr, dir, username, password, generate)
}
// report tells the operator what happened.
//
// A generated password is printed in the same banner the first boot
// uses, because this is the only time it is ever shown. A password the
// operator supplied is not echoed back: they already have it, and
// writing it to standard output a second time would put it in another
// log for no gain.
func report(
stdout, stderr io.Writer,
dir, username, password string,
generate bool,
) error {
if generate {
write := func(w io.Writer) error {
return banner.Credentials(
w,
"WEBHOOKER PASSWORD RESET: this account's new "+
"password is",
username,
password,
"Save this password now: it is shown only here.\n"+
"The database stores only its Argon2id hash.",
)
}
err := write(stdout)
if err == nil {
return nil
}
// The password is already stored. Standard output failing
// here is the difference between a recovered deployment and
// one locked out behind a password nobody has ever seen, so
// try the other stream before giving up.
if write(stderr) == nil {
return nil
}
return err
}
_, err := fmt.Fprintf(
stdout,
"password updated for user %q in %s\n", username, dir,
)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("writing the result: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// acquire takes the DATA_DIR lock, translating the contended case into
// the refusal this command owes the operator.
//
// Resetting a password underneath a live instance would not corrupt
// anything, but the running process keeps serving every session that
// authenticated with the old one, so the operator would be told the
// password changed while the deployment still behaved as though it had
// not. Refusing is also what the lock is for.
func acquire(dir string) (*datadir.Lock, error) {
lock, err := datadir.Acquire(dir)
if err == nil {
return lock, nil
}
if errors.Is(err, datadir.ErrLocked) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"%w: %s. Stop it and run this again: a password reset "+
"does not reach a running process, whose existing "+
"sessions stay authenticated",
ErrLiveInstance, dir,
)
}
return nil, err
}
// checkDataDir refuses to act on a path that does not already hold a
// deployment.
//
// This runs before datadir.Acquire on purpose. Acquire calls
// os.MkdirAll, so a mistyped DATA_DIR would otherwise be built out —
// the directory tree, the lock file, and then an empty migrated
// database — and the command would report success against a deployment
// that does not exist while the real one stayed locked out. Nothing
// here creates anything.
func checkDataDir(dir string) error {
info, err := os.Stat(dir)
switch {
case errors.Is(err, fs.ErrNotExist):
return fmt.Errorf(
"%w: %s (DATA_DIR). This acts on an existing "+
"deployment and creates nothing",
ErrNoDataDir, dir,
)
case err != nil:
return fmt.Errorf("checking data directory %s: %w", dir, err)
case !info.IsDir():
return fmt.Errorf(
"%w: %s (DATA_DIR) is not a directory", ErrNoDataDir, dir,
)
}
dbPath := filepath.Join(dir, database.MainDBFileName)
_, err = os.Stat(dbPath)
switch {
case errors.Is(err, fs.ErrNotExist):
return fmt.Errorf(
"%w: %s does not exist. The admin account is created by "+
"the first server start",
ErrNoDatabase, dbPath,
)
case err != nil:
return fmt.Errorf("checking %s: %w", dbPath, err)
}
return nil
}
// setPassword looks the account up, obtains the new password, and
// writes its hash.
//
// The order matters: the account is resolved before an operator is
// asked to type anything, and the hash is computed in full before the
// single UPDATE that stores it. A failure at any step therefore leaves
// the stored credential exactly as it was — there is no half-written
// state to recover from.
func setPassword(
db *database.Database,
username string,
generate bool,
stdin io.Reader,
stderr io.Writer,
) (string, error) {
var user database.User
err := db.DB().Where("username = ?", username).First(&user).Error
if errors.Is(err, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound) {
return "", fmt.Errorf(
"%w: %q. This changes an existing account's password "+
"and never creates an account",
ErrNoSuchUser, username,
)
}
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("looking up user %q: %w", username, err)
}
password, err := newPassword(generate, stdin, stderr)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
hash, err := database.HashPassword(password)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("hashing the new password: %w", err)
}
result := db.DB().Model(&database.User{}).
Where("id = ?", user.ID).
Update("password", hash)
if result.Error != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf(
"updating user %q: %w", username, result.Error,
)
}
if result.RowsAffected != 1 {
return "", fmt.Errorf(
"%w: %q matched %d rows",
ErrNotUpdated, username, result.RowsAffected,
)
}
return password, nil
}
// newPassword returns the password to store: generated, or read from
// standard input.
func newPassword(
generate bool,
stdin io.Reader,
stderr io.Writer,
) (string, error) {
if generate {
password, err := database.GenerateRandomPassword(
generatedPasswordLen,
)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("generating a password: %w", err)
}
return password, nil
}
return readPassword(stdin, stderr)
}
// readPassword reads the new password as one line from standard input,
// minus its line ending.
//
// Standard input rather than an argument: on Linux argv is readable
// through /proc by every account on the host for as long as the process
// lives, and a password typed as an argument lands in shell history
// besides.
//
// When standard input is a terminal the input is echoed — no attempt is
// made to put the terminal into no-echo mode — so the prompt says so
// rather than letting an operator assume otherwise.
func readPassword(stdin io.Reader, stderr io.Writer) (string, error) {
if f, ok := stdin.(*os.File); ok && isTerminal(f) {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(
stderr,
"New password (echoed as you type), then Enter: ",
)
}
line, err := bufio.NewReader(stdin).ReadString('\n')
if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
return "", fmt.Errorf(
"reading the password from standard input: %w", err,
)
}
password := strings.TrimRight(line, "\r\n")
if password == "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf(
"%w: standard input carried no password. Pipe one in, "+
"or pass -generate",
ErrEmptyPassword,
)
}
if len(password) < minPasswordLen {
return "", fmt.Errorf(
"%w: %d bytes, minimum %d",
ErrPasswordTooShort, len(password), minPasswordLen,
)
}
return password, nil
}
// isTerminal reports whether f is a character device, which is as much
// as this needs to know to decide whether to prompt.
func isTerminal(f *os.File) bool {
info, err := f.Stat()
if err != nil {
return false
}
return info.Mode()&os.ModeCharDevice != 0
}
// cliLogger builds the logger the database layer writes through while
// this command runs. It is deliberately quiet: connecting and migrating
// are steps the operator did not ask about, and the one thing they need
// to see is the outcome on standard output.
func cliLogger(stderr io.Writer) *slog.Logger {
return slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(stderr, &slog.HandlerOptions{
Level: slog.LevelWarn,
}))
}

444
internal/resetpw/resetpw_test.go
View File

@@ -1,444 +0,0 @@
package resetpw_test
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"go.uber.org/fx"
"go.uber.org/fx/fxtest"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/datadir"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/globals"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/healthcheck"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/resetpw"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
)
const (
// operatorUser is the account these tests recover.
operatorUser = "admin"
// newPassword is what the operator sets it to.
newPassword = "correct horse battery staple"
// placeholderHash stands in for the stored credential nobody
// knows any more — the lost bootstrap password. Nothing here
// verifies against it; what matters is whether it is still there
// after a refusal, or replaced after a reset.
placeholderHash = "$argon2id$lost"
// exitOK and exitFailure are the statuses Run returns.
exitOK = 0
exitFailure = 1
)
// testLogger is quiet unless something goes wrong.
func testLogger() *slog.Logger {
return slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(os.Stderr, &slog.HandlerOptions{
Level: slog.LevelWarn,
}))
}
// newDeployment builds a data directory holding a migrated database
// with one account whose password is unknown, and points DATA_DIR at
// it. It deliberately does not boot the server graph: seeding through
// it would spend an Argon2id hash on a password no test can use.
func newDeployment(t *testing.T) string {
t.Helper()
dir := t.TempDir()
t.Setenv("DATA_DIR", dir)
db, err := database.Open(dir, testLogger())
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, db.DB().Create(&database.User{
Username: operatorUser,
Password: placeholderHash,
}).Error)
require.NoError(t, db.Close())
return dir
}
// storedHash reads the account's stored credential back.
func storedHash(t *testing.T, dir string) string {
t.Helper()
db, err := database.Open(dir, testLogger())
require.NoError(t, err)
defer func() { require.NoError(t, db.Close()) }()
var user database.User
require.NoError(t, db.DB().
Where("username = ?", operatorUser).
First(&user).Error)
return user.Password
}
// bannerPassword returns the plaintext a credentials banner printed.
func bannerPassword(t *testing.T, out string) string {
t.Helper()
for line := range strings.SplitSeq(out, "\n") {
_, value, found := strings.Cut(line, "password: ")
if found {
return strings.TrimSpace(value)
}
}
t.Fatalf("no password line in:\n%s", out)
return ""
}
// run drives the subcommand with the given standard input and returns
// its status alongside what it wrote.
func run(
t *testing.T, stdin string, args ...string,
) (int, string, string) {
t.Helper()
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
code := resetpw.Run(
args, strings.NewReader(stdin), &stdout, &stderr,
)
return code, stdout.String(), stderr.String()
}
type noopNotifier struct{}
func (n *noopNotifier) Notify([]delivery.Task) {}
type noopEvictor struct{}
func (n *noopEvictor) EvictWebhook(string) {}
// newServerApp starts the real login path against dir: the handlers,
// the middleware that bounds password verification, the session store
// and the database, exactly as internal/handlers builds them.
//
// One application per test function, not per case: every start that
// finds no account seeds one at 64 MB of Argon2id, and this package's
// budget is not the place to spend that repeatedly.
func newServerApp(
t *testing.T, dir string,
) (*handlers.Handlers, *fxtest.App) {
t.Helper()
var h *handlers.Handlers
app := fxtest.New(
t,
fx.Provide(
globals.New,
logger.New,
func() *config.Config {
return &config.Config{DataDir: dir}
},
database.New,
database.NewWebhookDBManager,
healthcheck.New,
session.New,
func() delivery.Notifier { return &noopNotifier{} },
func() delivery.WebhookEvictor { return &noopEvictor{} },
middleware.New,
delivery.NewGuard,
handlers.New,
),
fx.Populate(&h),
)
app.RequireStart()
return h, app
}
// submitLogin drives one login form POST through the real handler.
func submitLogin(
h *handlers.Handlers, username, password string,
) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
form := url.Values{}
form.Set("username", username)
form.Set("password", password)
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(),
http.MethodPost,
"/pages/login",
strings.NewReader(form.Encode()),
)
req.Header.Set(
"Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
)
req.RemoteAddr = "10.0.0.1:44444"
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.HandleLoginSubmit().ServeHTTP(w, req)
return w
}
// TestResetThenLogin is the definition of done of
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/208: an operator who lost
// the one-time bootstrap password sets a new one from the command line
// and logs in with it.
//
// The login is the real one — the form POST through
// handlers.HandleLoginSubmit, which looks the account up and verifies
// the stored Argon2id hash — so a reset that wrote a hash the login
// path cannot verify fails here rather than passing a re-implementation
// of the check.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // newDeployment sets DATA_DIR with t.Setenv.
func TestResetThenLogin(t *testing.T) {
dir := newDeployment(t)
code, stdout, stderr := run(t, newPassword+"\n", operatorUser)
require.Equal(t, exitOK, code, "stderr: %s", stderr)
assert.NotContains(
t, stdout, newPassword,
"a password the operator supplied must not be echoed back",
)
assert.Contains(t, stdout, operatorUser)
h, app := newServerApp(t, dir)
defer app.RequireStop()
got := submitLogin(h, operatorUser, newPassword)
require.Equal(
t, http.StatusSeeOther, got.Code,
"the new password must log in",
)
got = submitLogin(h, operatorUser, "not-"+newPassword)
require.NotEqual(
t, http.StatusSeeOther, got.Code,
"the reset must not make every password work",
)
}
// TestGeneratedPasswordIsPrintedAndWorks covers -generate, the mode an
// operator recovering a deployment actually reaches for. The generated
// password is shown once, in the banner, and must be the one stored.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // newDeployment sets DATA_DIR with t.Setenv.
func TestGeneratedPasswordIsPrintedAndWorks(t *testing.T) {
dir := newDeployment(t)
code, stdout, stderr := run(t, "", "-generate", operatorUser)
require.Equal(t, exitOK, code, "stderr: %s", stderr)
require.Contains(
t, stdout, strings.Repeat("=", 20),
"a generated password must be printed as a banner",
)
password := bannerPassword(t, stdout)
ok, err := database.VerifyPassword(password, storedHash(t, dir))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(
t, ok, "the printed password must open the account",
)
}
// failingWriter is a standard output that cannot be written to.
type failingWriter struct{}
func (failingWriter) Write([]byte) (int, error) {
return 0, assert.AnError
}
// TestGeneratedPasswordSurvivesAFailedStdout covers the one outcome
// worse than an error: the password is already stored, so a banner
// that cannot be written to standard output must go to standard error
// rather than leaving the deployment behind a password nobody has seen.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // newDeployment sets DATA_DIR with t.Setenv.
func TestGeneratedPasswordSurvivesAFailedStdout(t *testing.T) {
dir := newDeployment(t)
var stderr bytes.Buffer
code := resetpw.Run(
[]string{"-generate", operatorUser},
strings.NewReader(""), failingWriter{}, &stderr,
)
require.Equal(t, exitOK, code)
password := bannerPassword(t, stderr.String())
ok, err := database.VerifyPassword(password, storedHash(t, dir))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, ok)
}
// TestRefusesLiveInstance pins the refusal the issue requires. The
// running deployment keeps serving the sessions that authenticated
// with the old password, so a reset underneath it would report a
// change the service does not honour.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // newDeployment sets DATA_DIR with t.Setenv.
func TestRefusesLiveInstance(t *testing.T) {
dir := newDeployment(t)
lock, err := datadir.Acquire(dir)
require.NoError(t, err)
defer func() { require.NoError(t, lock.Release()) }()
code, _, stderr := run(t, newPassword+"\n", operatorUser)
require.Equal(t, exitFailure, code)
assert.Contains(t, stderr, dir, "the refusal must name DATA_DIR")
assert.Contains(t, stderr, "running webhooker")
assert.Equal(
t, placeholderHash, storedHash(t, dir),
"a refused reset must not touch the stored credential",
)
}
// TestMissingDataDirCreatesNothing pins the side effect that must not
// happen. datadir.Acquire calls os.MkdirAll, so reaching it with a
// mistyped DATA_DIR would build the directory, take a lock in it and
// migrate an empty database there — reporting success against a
// deployment that does not exist.
func TestMissingDataDirCreatesNothing(t *testing.T) {
dir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "typo", "webhooker")
t.Setenv("DATA_DIR", dir)
code, _, stderr := run(t, newPassword+"\n", operatorUser)
require.Equal(t, exitFailure, code)
assert.Contains(t, stderr, dir)
_, err := os.Stat(dir)
assert.ErrorIs(
t, err, os.ErrNotExist,
"a mistyped DATA_DIR must not be created",
)
}
// TestMissingDatabaseCreatesNothing covers the directory that exists
// but holds no deployment: an empty volume, or the wrong one. Nothing
// may be written there either, lock file included.
func TestMissingDatabaseCreatesNothing(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
t.Setenv("DATA_DIR", dir)
code, _, stderr := run(t, newPassword+"\n", operatorUser)
require.Equal(t, exitFailure, code)
assert.Contains(t, stderr, database.MainDBFileName)
entries, err := os.ReadDir(dir)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Empty(
t, entries,
"nothing may be created in a directory holding no database",
)
}
// TestUnknownUserFails states the decision: resetpw changes an
// existing account's password and never creates an account. A typo in
// the username must say so rather than quietly adding a second user.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // newDeployment sets DATA_DIR with t.Setenv.
func TestUnknownUserFails(t *testing.T) {
dir := newDeployment(t)
code, _, stderr := run(t, newPassword+"\n", "amdin")
require.Equal(t, exitFailure, code)
assert.Contains(t, stderr, "amdin")
assert.Equal(t, placeholderHash, storedHash(t, dir))
var count int64
db, err := database.Open(dir, testLogger())
require.NoError(t, err)
defer func() { require.NoError(t, db.Close()) }()
require.NoError(t, db.DB().Model(&database.User{}).
Count(&count).Error)
assert.EqualValues(
t, 1, count, "no account may have been created",
)
}
// TestRejectsUnusablePasswords covers what standard input can carry by
// accident: nothing at all, and a stray keystroke. Either would
// otherwise become the account's only credential.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // newDeployment sets DATA_DIR with t.Setenv.
func TestRejectsUnusablePasswords(t *testing.T) {
dir := newDeployment(t)
for name, stdin := range map[string]string{
"empty": "",
"newline": "\n",
"short": "hunter2\n",
} {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
code, _, stderr := run(t, stdin, operatorUser)
require.Equal(t, exitFailure, code)
assert.NotEmpty(t, stderr)
assert.Equal(
t, placeholderHash, storedHash(t, dir),
"a rejected password must not be stored",
)
})
}
}
// TestUsageErrors pins the statuses a caller can script against: 2 for
// being called wrong, which is not the same as a refusal.
func TestUsageErrors(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for name, args := range map[string][]string{
"no username": {},
"two usernames": {"admin", "root"},
"unknown flag": {"-force", "admin"},
} {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
code := resetpw.Run(
args, strings.NewReader(""), &stdout, &stderr,
)
assert.Equal(t, 2, code)
assert.NotEmpty(t, stderr)
})
}
}

12
internal/server/routes.go
View File

@@ -201,18 +201,6 @@ func (s *Server) setupSourceRoutes() {
"/logs/{eventID}/body",
s.h.HandleEventBodyDownload(),
)
// Replay is the one page action that queues outbound work:
// it creates a delivery from a stored event and hands it to
// the delivery engine. The rate limit is what bounds a
// held-down button or a scripted loop; the handler
// separately refuses a replay while an earlier one for the
// same event and target is still in flight. POST only, so
// the action cannot be taken by a link, a prefetch or an
// image tag.
r.With(s.mw.ReplayRateLimit()).Post(
"/deliveries/{deliveryID}/replay",
s.h.HandleDeliveryReplay(),
)
r.Post(
"/entrypoints",
s.h.HandleEntrypointCreate(),

149
internal/server/routes_test.go
View File

@@ -113,7 +113,6 @@ func newTestEnvWithConfig(
func() delivery.Notifier { return &noopNotifier{} },
func() delivery.WebhookEvictor { return &noopEvictor{} },
middleware.New,
delivery.NewGuard,
handlers.New,
),
fx.Populate(&log, &mw, &hnd, &sess, &db, &dbMgr),
@@ -311,75 +310,6 @@ func (e *testEnv) seedEvent(
return event
}
// seedTarget creates an active HTTP target for a webhook.
func (e *testEnv) seedTarget(
t *testing.T,
webhookID string,
) *database.Target {
t.Helper()
tgt := &database.Target{
WebhookID: webhookID,
Name: "routed-target",
Type: database.TargetTypeHTTP,
Active: true,
Config: `{"url":"http://93.184.216.34/hook"}`,
}
require.NoError(
t,
e.db.DB().Omit(clause.Associations).Create(tgt).Error,
)
return tgt
}
// seedFailedDelivery records a terminally failed delivery of an event
// to a target in the webhook's own database.
func (e *testEnv) seedFailedDelivery(
t *testing.T,
webhookID, eventID, targetID string,
) *database.Delivery {
t.Helper()
webhookDB, err := e.dbMgr.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
dlv := &database.Delivery{
EventID: eventID,
TargetID: targetID,
Status: database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
}
require.NoError(
t,
webhookDB.Omit(clause.Associations).Create(dlv).Error,
)
return dlv
}
// countDeliveries reports how many deliveries a webhook's database
// holds.
func (e *testEnv) countDeliveries(
t *testing.T, webhookID string,
) int64 {
t.Helper()
webhookDB, err := e.dbMgr.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
var count int64
require.NoError(
t,
webhookDB.Model(&database.Delivery{}).
Count(&count).Error,
)
return count
}
// storedHash reads the current password hash for a username.
func (e *testEnv) storedHash(t *testing.T, username string) string {
t.Helper()
@@ -744,85 +674,6 @@ func TestSourceLogsBody_OtherUser404s(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, "/pages/login", anon.Header().Get("Location"))
}
// TestDeliveryReplay_PostOnlyAndCSRFProtected walks the replay action
// through the production router rather than a forged route context,
// which is the only way to prove what the route group actually gives
// it: a GET cannot trigger a replay, an unauthenticated request never
// reaches the handler, a POST without the token is refused by CSRF,
// and the form the template emits — token and action URL both — works
// as rendered.
func TestDeliveryReplay_PostOnlyAndCSRFProtected(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := newTestEnv(t)
userID, _ := env.seedUser(t, "replayer", "somepassword")
cookies := env.authCookies(t, userID, "replayer")
wh := env.seedWebhook(t, userID)
tgt := env.seedTarget(t, wh.ID)
evt := env.seedEvent(t, wh.ID, `{"replay":"me"}`)
dlv := env.seedFailedDelivery(t, wh.ID, evt.ID, tgt.ID)
path := "/source/" + wh.ID + "/deliveries/" + dlv.ID +
"/replay"
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed,
env.get(path, cookies).Code,
"a replay must not be reachable by GET",
)
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusForbidden,
env.post(path, url.Values{}, cookies).Code,
"a replay POST without a CSRF token must be refused",
)
anon := env.post(path, url.Values{}, nil)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusForbidden, anon.Code)
require.Equal(
t, int64(1), env.countDeliveries(t, wh.ID),
"no refused request may have created a delivery",
)
// The token and the action URL both come out of the rendered
// page, so a typo in either the route pattern or the template
// fails here.
logsPath := "/source/" + wh.ID + "/logs"
token, cookies := env.csrfFrom(t, logsPath, cookies)
page := env.get(logsPath, cookies)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, page.Code)
action := regexp.MustCompile(
`action="(/source/[^"]+/replay)"`,
).FindStringSubmatch(page.Body.String())
require.Len(
t, action, 2,
"a finished delivery should render a replay form",
)
form := url.Values{}
form.Set("csrf_token", token)
w := env.post(
html.UnescapeString(action[1]), form, cookies,
)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(
t, logsPath+"?replay=queued",
w.Header().Get("Location"),
)
assert.Equal(
t, int64(2), env.countDeliveries(t, wh.ID),
"the replay appends a delivery",
)
}
// metricsConfig is a Config differing from the routing default only
// in the two /metrics credentials.
func metricsConfig(

2
static/css/tailwind.css
View File

File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long

66
templates/source_logs.html
View File

@@ -12,10 +12,6 @@
</div>
</div>
{{if .ReplayMessage}}
<div class="{{if .ReplayQueued}}alert-success{{else}}alert-error{{end}}">{{.ReplayMessage}}</div>
{{end}}
<div class="card">
<div class="divide-y divide-gray-100">
{{range .Events}}
@@ -44,68 +40,6 @@
{{if .BodyTruncated}}
<p class="mt-2 text-xs text-gray-500">Body truncated for display: showing {{.BodyShownBytes}} of {{.BodyBytes}} bytes. The stored body is unchanged &mdash; <a href="/source/{{$.Webhook.ID}}/logs/{{.ID}}/body" class="text-primary-600 hover:text-primary-700 underline">download the full body</a>.</p>
{{end}}
{{if .Deliveries}}
<div class="mt-4 border-t border-gray-200 pt-3">
<h3 class="text-xs font-medium uppercase tracking-wide text-gray-500">Deliveries</h3>
<div class="mt-2 divide-y divide-gray-200">
{{range .Deliveries}}
<div class="py-2" x-data="{ attempts: false }">
<div class="flex items-center justify-between cursor-pointer" @click="attempts = !attempts">
<div class="flex items-center gap-3">
<span class="text-sm text-gray-700">{{.Target.Name}}</span>
<span class="text-xs {{if eq .Status "delivered"}}text-green-600{{else if eq .Status "failed"}}text-red-600{{else if eq .Status "retrying"}}text-yellow-600{{else}}text-gray-400{{end}}">{{.Status}}</span>
</div>
<div class="flex items-center gap-3">
{{if .Status.Terminal}}
<form method="POST" action="/source/{{$.Webhook.ID}}/deliveries/{{.ID}}/replay" class="inline" @click.stop>
<input type="hidden" name="csrf_token" value="{{$.CSRFToken}}">
<input type="hidden" name="page" value="{{$.Page}}">
<button type="submit" class="text-xs text-primary-600 hover:text-primary-700" title="Send this event to the target again">Replay</button>
</form>
{{end}}
<span class="text-xs text-gray-400">{{.AttemptCount}} attempt{{if ne .AttemptCount 1}}s{{end}}</span>
<svg class="w-3 h-3 text-gray-400 transition-transform" :class="{ 'rotate-180': attempts }" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" viewBox="0 0 24 24">
<path stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" stroke-width="2" d="M19 9l-7 7-7-7"/>
</svg>
</div>
</div>
<div x-show="attempts" x-cloak class="mt-2 space-y-2">
{{if .AttemptsOmitted}}
<p class="text-xs text-gray-500">{{.AttemptsOmitted}} attempt{{if ne .AttemptsOmitted 1}}s{{end}} omitted between the first and last shown.</p>
{{end}}
{{range .Results}}
<div class="rounded-md bg-white border border-gray-200 p-2">
<div class="flex flex-wrap items-center gap-3 text-xs">
<span class="text-gray-500">Attempt {{.AttemptNum}}</span>
<span class="{{if .Success}}text-green-600{{else}}text-red-600{{end}}">{{if .Success}}success{{else}}failure{{end}}</span>
<span class="text-gray-500">Status: {{if .HasStatusCode}}{{.StatusCode}}{{else}}&mdash; (no response){{end}}</span>
<span class="text-gray-500">Duration: {{.DurationMS}} ms</span>
</div>
{{if .Error}}
<p class="mt-2 text-xs text-red-700 break-all">Error: {{.Error}}</p>
{{end}}
{{if .ResponseBody}}
<pre class="mt-2 text-xs text-gray-700 overflow-x-auto whitespace-pre-wrap break-all">{{.ResponseBody}}</pre>
{{end}}
{{if .ResponseTruncated}}
{{if .ResponseSizeKnown}}
<p class="mt-1 text-xs text-gray-500">Response truncated for display: showing {{.ResponseShownBytes}} of {{.ResponseBytes}} bytes.</p>
{{else}}
<p class="mt-1 text-xs text-gray-500">Showing {{.ResponseShownBytes}} of the {{.ResponseBytes}} recorded bytes. The response reached the recording limit, so the remote may have sent more that was never stored.</p>
{{end}}
{{end}}
</div>
{{else}}
<p class="text-xs text-gray-500">No attempts recorded yet.</p>
{{end}}
</div>
</div>
{{end}}
</div>
</div>
{{end}}
</div>
</div>
{{else}}

2
templates/target_edit.html
View File

@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
<div class="form-group">
<label for="headers" class="label">Headers</label>
<textarea id="headers" name="headers" rows="4" class="input" placeholder="Authorization: Bearer ...">{{.Target.Config.Headers}}</textarea>
<p class="text-xs text-gray-500 mt-1">One <code>Name: value</code> per line, sent with every delivery. Leave blank for none. <code>Host</code>, <code>Content-Length</code>, <code>Transfer-Encoding</code>, <code>Connection</code>, <code>Trailer</code> and <code>User-Agent</code> are set by the delivery engine and are rejected here rather than silently ignored. Headers set here are dropped if a redirect leaves the destination's own origin, so a credential cannot follow one to another host.</p>
<p class="text-xs text-gray-500 mt-1">One <code>Name: value</code> per line, sent with every delivery. Leave blank for none. <code>Host</code>, <code>Content-Length</code>, <code>Transfer-Encoding</code>, <code>Connection</code> and <code>User-Agent</code> are set by the delivery engine and are rejected here rather than silently ignored.</p>
</div>
<div class="form-group">