Read form fields from the POST body only (closes #160)

internal/handlers/source_management.go read the target destination
with r.FormValue, which falls back to the URL query string when the
field is absent from the body. So

    POST /source/{id}/targets?url=https://hooks.slack.com/services/T/B/S

created a working target from a value carried on the request line,
where logs, proxies, Referer headers and error trackers record it.
That is the remaining ingress path of the credential-exposure class
the render, delivery-error and log-line paths were each closed for.

Every form read in these handlers is now r.PostFormValue, so no
query-string value can populate stored configuration or be taken as a
credential. The one deliberate query read, `page` on the authenticated
pagination links, is untouched: it uses r.URL.Query().Get already.

The access log no longer carries the query on any branch, so the log
half of the report is already mitigated; the Sentry half is not. The
SDK attaches the request to every captured event and copies
r.URL.RawQuery into Request.QueryString independently of the access
log, so a BeforeSend hook clears that field before an event leaves the
process. Scheme, host, path and method stay, which is what names the
failing route.

Second barrier, for the JSON path that does not exist yet: the fields
that hold a credential are tagged json:"-" so the first handler to
marshal a model cannot serialise one. Target.Config holds the
incoming-webhook URL, APIKey.Key is a bearer token, and Setting.Value
holds the session encryption key. delivery.TargetView remains the
masking barrier for the HTML path, which is unaffected.

Dockerfile

@@ -19,14 +19,9 @@ RUN go mod download
 # .dockerignore.
 COPY . .
 
-# Run formatting check and linter. golangci-lint is invoked directly rather
+# Run formatting check and linter
-# than through `make lint`: this stage is already the pinned linter image, and
-# script/lint is a wrapper that builds Dockerfile.lint, so calling it here
-# would need a docker daemon inside the build. Keep these steps in step with
-# Dockerfile.lint, including --network=none (see its header for why).
 RUN make fmt-check
-RUN --network=none golangci-lint config verify --config .golangci.yml
+RUN make lint
-RUN --network=none golangci-lint run --config .golangci.yml ./...
 
 # Build stage
 # golang:1.26.1-bookworm (Debian-based), 2026-03-17

Dockerfile.lint

@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-# Lint-only image, built by script/lint. golangci-lint is never installed on
-# the host: the repo is COPYed into the pinned image and linted as a build
-# step, so a successful build IS a clean lint. This works even when the docker
-# daemon is remote and bind mounts are impossible.
-#
-# script/lint passes --no-cache-filter=lint. Without it an unchanged tree
-# replays the lint stage from cache and the build succeeds in under a second
-# having run no linter at all. Do not drop that flag.
-#
-# The lint steps run with --network=none. `golangci-lint config verify` is
-# documented as fetching its JSON schema over HTTPS, which would make linting
-# depend on an unpinned remote artifact; this pinned image resolves the schema
-# without any network, and --network=none enforces that rather than trusting
-# it. It also proves no linter reaches out at analysis time. If a future image
-# bump makes either step need the network, this build fails loudly instead of
-# quietly acquiring an unpinned dependency.
-
-# golangci/golangci-lint:v2.12.2 (Debian-based), 2026-08-07
-# Using Debian-based image because mattn/go-sqlite3 (CGO) does not
-# compile on Alpine musl (off64_t is a glibc type).
-FROM golangci/golangci-lint:v2.12.2@sha256:5cceeef04e53efe1470638d4b4b4f5ceefd574955ab3941b2d9a68a8c9ad5240 AS deps
-
-WORKDIR /src
-
-# Copy go mod files first for better layer caching. This stage is cacheable;
-# only the lint stage below is forced to re-execute.
-COPY go.mod go.sum ./
-RUN go mod download
-
-FROM deps AS lint
-
-COPY . .
-
-# `run` silently ignores config keys it does not recognize, so a typo would
-# disable a setting without a word. `config verify` is what catches that.
-RUN --network=none golangci-lint config verify --config .golangci.yml
-RUN --network=none golangci-lint run --config .golangci.yml ./...

README.md

@@ -12,16 +12,14 @@ with retry support, logging, and observability. Category: infrastructure
 ### Prerequisites
 
 - Go 1.26.1+ (the version in `go.mod`)
-- Docker (for linting, for the test stage of the CI gate, and for
+- golangci-lint v2.12.2 (the version pinned in `script/bootstrap` and
-  containerized deployment)
+  in the `Dockerfile`'s lint stage; `make bootstrap` installs it)
+- Docker (for containerized deployment, and for the lint and test
+  stages of the CI gate)
 - `curl`, used by `script/fetch-assets` to download the third-party
   browser assets, which are not committed (`make bootstrap` installs
   it if missing)
 
-golangci-lint is not a prerequisite and must not be installed on the
-host: `script/bootstrap` does not install it, and `make lint` runs the
-digest-pinned linter image via `Dockerfile.lint`.
-
 ### Quick Start
 
 ```bash
@@ -29,9 +27,9 @@ digest-pinned linter image via `Dockerfile.lint`.
 git clone https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker.git
 cd webhooker
 
-# Install Go dependencies and the third-party browser assets.
+# Install Go dependencies, the pinned linter, and the third-party
-# `make deps` alone is not enough: it only runs go mod download/tidy,
+# browser assets. `make deps` alone is not enough: it only runs
-# and the checks below need the fetched assets.
+# go mod download/tidy, and the checks below need the fetched assets.
 make bootstrap
 
 # Run all checks (test, lint, format check)
@@ -54,7 +52,7 @@ make setup      # Bootstrap + install git pre-commit hook
 make assets     # Fetch + verify third-party browser assets
 make fmt        # Format code (gofmt + goimports)
 make fmt-check  # Fail if gofmt would change anything (writes nothing)
-make lint       # Run golangci-lint in Docker (Dockerfile.lint)
+make lint       # Run golangci-lint
 make test       # Run tests with race detection
 make check      # test + lint + fmt-check (CI gate)
 make build      # Build binary to bin/webhooker
@@ -113,7 +111,7 @@ TTY detection, and security headers are always applied.
 | `RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL` | How often the retention reaper and archive sweeper run (Go duration, must be positive) | `1h` |
 | `SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT`  | Idle session timeout (Go duration)  | `24h`    |
 | `RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT`   | Receiver requests/minute per IP per entrypoint (10x that per IP across the route) | `120` |
-| `TRUSTED_PROXIES`       | CIDRs whose forwarded headers are trusted (unset: all clients behind a proxy share one rate-limit bucket; a correct login password is never throttled either way) | `""` (none) |
+| `TRUSTED_PROXIES`       | CIDRs whose forwarded headers are trusted (unset: all clients behind a proxy share one rate-limit bucket) | `""` (none) |
 
 #### Trusted proxies
 
@@ -136,15 +134,13 @@ That default is safe against forged headers, but leaving it unset in
 production has a cost you must know about. Production runs behind a
 TLS-terminating reverse proxy, so with `TRUSTED_PROXIES` unset every
 request keys on the proxy's own address and all clients share a single
-bucket per limit. The receiver limits become service-wide ceilings,
+bucket per limit. For the login and password-change limits that is a
-and the login endpoint's failure counting collapses onto one key, so a
+denial of service anyone can perform: a steady five POSTs per minute
-stranger's wrong passwords throttle every other client's wrong
+from any address on the internet keeps the shared login bucket full,
-passwords.
+and the operator's own login then returns HTTP 429 for as long as the
-
+trickle continues. There is no second administrative path and no
-What it cannot do is lock the operator out. The login endpoint
+bypass. Restarting the service clears the in-memory buckets, but a
-verifies credentials **before** it consults any limit and charges only
+sustained trickle re-locks them immediately.
-failures, so a correct password is never throttled no matter how full
-the bucket is. See [Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting).
 
 The remedy is to set `TRUSTED_PROXIES` to your reverse proxy's
 address, which restores per-client buckets. webhooker logs a warning
@@ -279,7 +275,7 @@ are inline commands with no script behind them. We provide:
 - `script/fetch-assets` — download the third-party browser assets into
   `static/`, verifying each against its pinned sha256
 - `script/test` — run the test suite
-- `script/lint` — run golangci-lint in Docker (see Linting below)
+- `script/lint` — run golangci-lint
 - `script/fmt` — format all code (writes)
 - `script/fmt-check` — check formatting (read-only)
 - `script/check` — run test, lint, and fmt-check
@@ -384,12 +380,11 @@ It uses:
 - **[gorilla/csrf](https://github.com/gorilla/csrf)** for CSRF
   protection (cookie-based double-submit tokens)
 - **[go-chi/httprate](https://github.com/go-chi/httprate)** for
-  sliding-window rate limiting of the password-change and webhook
+  sliding-window rate limiting of the login, password-change and
-  receiver endpoints. The bucket is per client IP only when
+  webhook receiver endpoints. The bucket is per client IP only when
   `TRUSTED_PROXIES` names the reverse proxy; unset, every client
-  behind that proxy shares one bucket per limit. The login endpoint
+  behind that proxy shares one bucket per limit (see
-  counts failed attempts itself instead, so that a correct password is
+  [Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting))
-  never throttled (see [Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting))
 - **[Prometheus](https://prometheus.io)** for metrics, served at
   `/metrics` behind basic auth
 - **[Sentry](https://sentry.io)** for optional error reporting
@@ -994,16 +989,15 @@ costs; log volume it caps rather than eliminates. A path that names no
 entrypoint is recorded by the handler at `DEBUG`, and the aggregate
 limiter logs its own rejections at `DEBUG` and without the path, so
 neither appears at all under the default level. The per-entrypoint
-limiter is the loud one: it logs every rejection at `WARN` with the
+limiter is the loud one: it still logs every rejection at `WARN` with
-request path, which on this route is attacker-controlled text. A client
+the request path, which on this route is attacker-controlled text. A
-hammering a single invented path is served `RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT`
+client hammering a single invented path is served `RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT`
 requests and has the rest of its aggregate budget rejected there, so
-the aggregate limit is what bounds the _number_ of those `WARN` lines —
+the aggregate limit is what bounds those `WARN` lines — to under ten
-to under ten times `RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT` per minute per client IP, 1080
+times `RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT` per minute per client IP, 1080 at the
-at the defaults, where before it there was no bound at all. Their
+defaults, where before it there was no bound at all. The access log is
-_width_ is bounded by the field budgets below, the same ones the access
+bounded by neither limit: every request is recorded once at `INFO`,
-log spends. The access log is bounded by neither limit: every request
+served or rejected alike.
-is recorded once at `INFO`, served or rejected alike.
 
 What the access log does bound is the _content_ of those lines. A 3xx
 or 4xx response logs the chi route pattern — `/webhook/{uuid}`,
@@ -1026,91 +1020,14 @@ buy the same amplification as an invented path. Nothing debuggable is
 lost: `page`, on the authenticated pagination links, is the only query
 parameter this service reads.
 
-Client-supplied request content does not leave the host by the other
+The query string does not leave the host by the other route either.
-route either. The Sentry SDK attaches the request to every event it
+The Sentry SDK attaches the request to every event it captures and
-captures, independently of the access log, and `SendDefaultPII=false`
+copies the raw query into it, independently of the access log, so a
-does not cover all of what it copies: the raw query string and the
+`BeforeSend` hook clears that field before the event is sent. The event
-first 10 KiB of the request body are both taken unconditionally, the
+still carries the scheme, host, path and method, which is what names
-body precisely because these handlers call `ParseForm`. A `BeforeSend`
+the failing route. Nothing in this service reads a form field from the
-hook therefore replaces the query string and the body with
+query: every handler uses `PostFormValue`, so a value on the request
-`(redacted)`, drops cookies and the remote-address environment, and
+line cannot configure anything.
-reduces the headers to a fixed allowlist — `Accept`, `Content-Length`,
-`Content-Type`, `Host`, `Origin`, `Referer`, `User-Agent` and
-`X-Request-Id`.
-
-The same hook rewrites the request URL. The SDK builds it as
-`scheme://host/path` from the concrete path, which on the receiver
-route is `/webhook/<uuid>` in full — and that UUID is a write
-capability, not an identifier: anyone holding it can post events this
-service accepts and its targets then deliver. A tracker has its own
-retention, access control and deletion policy, so the rule the access
-log follows above does not carry across that boundary. What is sent is
-the chi route pattern instead: `http://host/webhook/{uuid}`.
-
-The scheme and the host are kept, and everything else in the URL is
-discarded rather than edited, so a future SDK version that starts
-appending a query string cannot widen this. The scheme has to survive
-for the reason given below. The host is whatever the request's `Host`
-header carried — this service validates no hostname, so on a directly
-exposed deployment a client sets it — and that same header is on the
-allowlist above, so scrubbing the host out of the URL would withhold
-nothing that is not sent anyway.
-
-The body, the query string and the URL are all handled on every route
-rather than filtered by route. For the URL that is also what keeps the
-event locatable: an error event is grouped by its exception and stack
-trace, not by its URL, so replacing the path with the pattern costs no
-grouping and the pattern still names the route in the UI. And an
-unconditional rule cannot leak on a route somebody forgets to add to
-it, which a route-conditional one can. For the body there is a second
-reason: nothing debuggable is lost, because every handler reads its
-fields with `PostFormValue`, so the body is exactly where the
-credentials are — the target destination URL, the login password, both
-password-change fields — and the one route whose body is genuine
-signal is the receiver, whose body is already stored on the event and
-served from the UI, so a tracker is not where anyone reads it.
-
-The route is reachable from the hook only on the error dispatch.
-`sentryhttp`'s recover path puts the request on the context it hands
-to `RecoverWithContext`, and the SDK carries that context through to
-`BeforeSend` as `hint.Context`, so
-`hint.Context.Value(sentry.RequestContextKey)` yields the live request
-and chi's `RoutePattern()` yields the matched pattern off it. The
-transaction dispatch has no such request: a finished span captures
-with a nil hint, which the client replaces with an empty one, so
-`BeforeSendTransaction` sees no context at all. Tracing is off in this
-service, so no transaction event is produced today, but the hook is
-installed on both dispatches as a floor.
-
-Where the pattern is out of reach — the transaction dispatch, an event
-captured outside the router, or a request that matched no route — the
-fallback is never the concrete path. The path becomes the literal
-`/(redacted)`, so the URL reads `http://host/(redacted)`; a URL the
-rewrite cannot parse into a scheme is withheld whole. A transaction
-event additionally carries the SDK's own `METHOD /path` name, built
-from the concrete path as well; it is rewritten on the same terms, to
-`POST /webhook/{uuid}` where the pattern is known and `POST
-/(redacted)` where it is not.
-
-The headers are an allowlist for the same reason the rules above are
-unconditional: the SDK's own filter removes four names and passes
-everything else, which would ship `X-CSRF-Token` and the shared
-secrets senders put on the receiver route. What survives still names
-the failing route — scheme, host, route pattern, method — and
-`X-Request-Id` ties the event to the local access log line that holds
-the rest. Nothing dropped is needed for the likeliest use, debugging a
-CSRF rejection. Its three inputs are the TLS decision, `Origin` and
-`Referer`; the latter two are kept, and the first is the scheme of the
-retained URL, because the SDK derives that scheme from
-`r.TLS != nil || r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto") == "https"` — byte
-for byte the predicate `internal/middleware/csrf.go` uses to choose
-between the `csrf.Secure(true)` and `csrf.Secure(false)` handlers.
-That is what the rewrite above preserves it for, and it is why
-dropping `X-Forwarded-Proto` costs nothing. The dropped provider
-headers (`X-GitHub-Event`, `X-Gitlab-Event` and the like) are real
-signal but are recorded locally on the event, and
-`Sentry-Trace`/`Baggage` are already reflected in the event's trace
-context.
 
 The remaining client-supplied fields are truncated rather than dropped,
 each to a fixed budget: 512 bytes for `url`, `useragent` and `referer`,
@@ -1141,197 +1058,18 @@ the figure has headroom. `internal/middleware/accesslog_test.go`
 asserts it against 8 KB of client-chosen text in the path, in the
 query, and in each of `User-Agent`, `Referer` and `X-Request-Id`,
 including cases built from the characters the handlers escape, and
-against the widest access log line the service can be made to write: a
+against the widest line the service can be made to write: a 5xx that
-5xx that keeps its concrete path while all three header fields are also
+keeps its concrete path while all three header fields are also at their
-at their budget. Every case runs through both handlers
+budget. Every case runs through both handlers `internal/logger` can
-`internal/logger` can select — the JSON one and the text one it installs
+select — the JSON one and the text one it installs on a tty — since the
-on a tty — since the two do not escape alike and the ceiling is quoted
+two do not escape alike and the ceiling is quoted unqualified. Measured
-unqualified. Measured over a real connection, the widest access log line
+over a real connection, the widest line is 1,972 bytes.
-is 1,972 bytes.
 
 Multiply that ceiling by the request rate to size log storage. Note
 that the rate is not bounded by the limits above on every route:
 `/.well-known/healthcheck` and `/s/*` sit behind no limiter, so there
 the multiplier is whatever the deployment will serve.
 
-**The same ceiling covers every other line the service writes through
-`slog` that carries text an unauthenticated client supplies**, with one
-exception stated below it: the recovered-panic record, which carries a
-whole goroutine stack alongside its client-supplied fields and so has
-its own wider ceiling. The access log is not the only line a client can
-put its own text into, and a budget that held for one line and not the
-others would be worse than no stated budget at all. Every `slog` call an
-unauthenticated request can reach spends the same per-field budget
-through `internal/logfield`, and each carries strictly fewer
-client-supplied fields than the access log does, so none of them can be
-wider than it:
-
-| Log line                                   | Level   | Client-chosen value | Reachable unauthenticated                 |
-| ------------------------------------------ | ------- | ------------------- | ----------------------------------------- |
-| `request body exceeds limit` (413)         | `WARN`  | path, method        | yes — `MaxBodySize` precedes `RequireAuth` |
-| `csrf: token validation failed` (403)      | `WARN`  | path, method        | yes — `CSRF` precedes `RequireAuth`        |
-| `... rate limit exceeded` (429)            | `WARN`  | path                | yes, on the receiver                       |
-| `auth middleware: unauthenticated request` | `DEBUG` | path, method        | yes, by definition                         |
-| `entrypoint not found`                     | `DEBUG` | entrypoint UUID     | yes, on the receiver                       |
-| `user not found` / `invalid password`      | `DEBUG` | username            | yes, on the login form                     |
-| `login failure limit exceeded` (429)       | `WARN`  | path                | yes, on the login form                     |
-| `password verification capacity exhausted` | `WARN`  | path                | yes, on the login form                     |
-
-`DEBUG` being off by default is not a bound. An operator turning it on
-to diagnose a flood must not thereby hand the flood an unbounded write,
-so those lines are capped too.
-
-The last two rows are capped defensively rather than against a
-demonstrated width: chi routes `POST /pages/login` on a static pattern,
-so `r.URL.Path` there is the 12-byte constant `/pages/login` and each
-line lands near 120 bytes. `RecordLoginFailure` is nonetheless an
-exported method taking any `*http.Request`, and a future caller on a
-route with a URL parameter would widen the line. Since no request
-through the mux can, both caps are pinned by tests that call those two
-entry points directly with the path such a caller would supply.
-Removing either cap fails 14 subtests.
-
-`internal/middleware/logbound_test.go` and
-`internal/handlers/logbound_test.go` drive 8 KB of client-chosen text
-at each of these — 1 KB at `invalid password`, whose accounts are
-shared with the successful-login line, where a username past 4 KB
-overflows the session cookie and answers 500 before that line is
-written — through both handlers, and through seven fills: plain text
-as the baseline, and then the quotation mark, backslash, tab, newline,
-C0 control and astral non-printable, six characters the wider of the
-two handlers spends more on than the client spent sending them. Every
-case holds each line to the 2,560-byte ceiling. That per-line ceiling
-is what the figure above states, and every row establishes it.
-
-Three of the sites go further and bound the whole flood's output — the
-total bytes a run of distinct invented values wrote, which is the
-shape an operator sizing storage cares about. They are
-`request body exceeds limit`
-(`TestMaxBodySize_FloodOfOversizePathsDoesNotGrowTheLog`),
-`entrypoint not found` and `user not found` (the last two through
-`assertBoundedFlood`). The other rows carry no aggregate assertion;
-the per-line ceiling is what they establish.
-
-`internal/logfield/logfield_test.go` measures the per-rune charge
-against what the handlers really emit, over roughly 3,000 code points on
-each, so an undercharged rune fails a test rather than quietly
-falsifying the ceiling.
-
-**It covers GORM's statement logging as well.** GORM's own default
-logger printed the fully interpolated SQL — parameters and all — to
-standard output on every statement that returned an error, including a
-plain record-not-found, at a level no operator setting reached. Two of
-this service's lookups miss by design on unauthenticated routes: the
-entrypoint lookup behind `/webhook/{uuid}` and the user lookup behind
-the login form, whose path segment and submitted username the client
-picks outright. Every
-`gorm.Open` in the service now installs the adapter in
-`internal/gormlog` instead. It writes through the same `slog` logger as
-everything else, so its lines take the level the operator set and the
-handler `internal/logger` selected, and every value it emits is spent
-through the same `internal/logfield` budget. A record-not-found is not
-logged as an error: it is the expected outcome on both of those paths,
-and each handler already records its own miss at `DEBUG` — bounded, per
-the table above — without the SQL. Slow statements are kept, at `WARN`,
-above the same 200 ms threshold GORM used and with the statement
-bounded, because that report is the one thing GORM's logger gave an
-operator that nothing else here does. The adapter orders its cases
-exactly as GORM's own `Trace` orders them, so a statement that both
-missed and ran slow is still reported as slow, and dropping the miss
-costs an operator no report `IgnoreRecordNotFoundError` would have
-kept. A GORM line spends at most two of those budgets — the statement
-and the driver error — against a smaller fixed portion than the access
-log's, and `internal/gormlog/gormlog_test.go` asserts each line against
-`MaxAccessLogLineBytes` directly rather than leaving it as arithmetic.
-
-What that ceiling does **not** cover, stated here so the figure is not
-read as more than it is:
-
-- **Lines carrying an authenticated operator's own input**, which are
-  not truncated at all. `webhook created` logs the submitted `name`
-  verbatim and `target URL blocked by SSRF protection` logs the target
-  host (both `internal/handlers/source_management.go`), as do the
-  `target_name` lines in `internal/delivery/engine.go` and
-  `internal/delivery/target_http.go`. The only bound on any of them is
-  the 1 MB form body cap, so a 100 KB `name` writes a single line of
-  roughly 600 KB — measured. This is deliberate: every one of these
-  requires an authenticated operator on a service with no
-  self-registration, and truncating the operator's own configuration
-  echoed back would cost debuggability against no adversary. It does
-  mean the 2,560-byte figure sizes unauthenticated traffic, not the
-  operator's own administrative requests.
-- The **`log` delivery target**, which writes the whole inbound event —
-  headers and body — to the log. This one is deliberate: capping it
-  would defeat the target, since emitting the payload is the delivery.
-  It costs nothing unless an authenticated operator creates a target of
-  that type on a specific webhook, and each line it writes is bounded
-  per event by the 1 MB receiver body cap. Adding one is a decision to
-  spend log volume on that webhook's payloads.
-- **Two writers that do not go through `internal/logger` at all**, both
-  on standard error. `fx` prints the dependency graph and the lifecycle
-  hooks through its default console logger at startup and shutdown —
-  nothing calls `fx.WithLogger`, and `fx.New` builds that logger over
-  `os.Stderr`. The Go runtime writes a panic or a fatal error itself; a
-  panic in a background worker rather than in a request handler is the
-  case that reaches it, since nothing recovers those. Neither carries a
-  client-chosen value at a client-chosen length: the five `panic` calls
-  in this service are invariant guards over constants and over
-  `crypto/rand`.
-- **`net/http`'s own faults**, which are _not_ a separate writer.
-  `internal/server/http.go` builds its server with a nil `ErrorLog`, so
-  `net/http` falls back to the `log` package's default logger — and
-  `internal/logger` calls `slog.SetDefault`, which redirects that logger
-  into whichever handler it installed. Those lines therefore arrive on
-  standard output, shaped like every other line, at `INFO`. They are not
-  truncated. A handler panic is no longer one of them: the recover
-  middleware below answers it and writes it as the bounded record
-  described there instead, and `internal/server/recoverer_test.go`
-  requires that `http: panic serving` appear in neither of the process's
-  two streams when a panic is driven through the production router. The
-  one panic still handed back to `net/http` is `http.ErrAbortHandler`,
-  which it special-cases and does not log at all. What is left on this
-  path is `net/http`'s own diagnostics, whose values are the runtime's,
-  not a client's.
-
-Wider than that 2,560-byte ceiling, and stated separately rather than
-carved out of it: the record a recovered panic produces. The recover
-middleware in `internal/middleware` answers `500` and writes one `ERROR`
-record through `internal/logger` carrying the panic value, the stack and
-the request id — the same `request_id` the access log line for that
-request carries, which is how the two are joined. It replaced chi's
-`middleware.Recoverer`, which on a current Go release crashed inside its
-own stack pretty-printer: the connection was dropped rather than
-answered, and what reached the operator described that crash rather than
-the fault behind it.
-
-That record is bounded the same way, in the same encoded bytes and
-through the same `internal/logfield` budget: 512 for the panic value,
-because a handler is free to build one out of the request, 128 for the
-request id, which a client supplies outright through `X-Request-Id`,
-and 8,192 for the stack, cut at its far end so that the panic site
-survives a cut and `net/http`'s accept frames are what is lost. Net:
-**at most 10,240 bytes, once per recovered panic** — 9,121 by the
-arithmetic (523 + 8,203 + 139 + a 256-byte fixed portion), stated at
-10,240 for headroom.
-
-Those two numbers are the claim; the measurements below only
-illustrate it. `internal/middleware/recoverer_test.go` drives all
-three growable fields past their budgets on one record, over both
-handlers, and measured 9,009 bytes on the JSON handler and
-8,982–8,983 on the text one in one checkout. Neither is an invariant:
-the stack's own content decides where its cut lands, so the figures
-move by a byte or so between runs. The real case is far below both —
-through the shipped middleware chain the whole record measures
-roughly 3,960 bytes over a roughly 3,690-byte stack, taken by
-`internal/server/recoverer_test.go` from the process's own file
-descriptors while driving a panic through the production router over
-a real server in a subprocess. That pair moves further still, since
-`debug.Stack()` embeds absolute source paths and so depends on where
-the tree is checked out: four checkouts have reported 3,959, 3,961,
-3,984 and 4,026. What the tests assert is the ceiling, that every
-client-supplied field was cut, and that the shipped chain's stack
-arrived uncut — never the numbers.
-
 Every limiter here — receiver, login, and password change — identifies
 the client the same way, through one shared key function: the
 connection's own address, unless the peer is listed in
@@ -1360,117 +1098,14 @@ opposite directions:
   and all entrypoints, where the per-entrypoint limit's capacity still
   grows with the number of entrypoints. Any deployment with more than a
   handful of busy entrypoints must set `TRUSTED_PROXIES`.
-- For the **login and password-change** limits it costs precision, not
+- For the **login and password-change** limits it costs availability of
-  availability. Login failures from every client land in one counter,
+  the only administrative path, which is not safe at all. Five POSTs
-  so a stranger's wrong passwords make the operator's own wrong
+  per minute from any address on the internet keeps the single shared
-  passwords answer `429` sooner; the operator's _correct_ password is
+  login bucket full, and the operator's own login returns HTTP 429 for
-  never affected, because it is never counted. Production deployments
+  as long as that trickle continues. A restart clears the in-memory
-  should still set `TRUSTED_PROXIES`; webhooker warns at startup
+  buckets and a resumed trickle re-locks them. Production deployments
-  whenever it is empty, in any environment.
+  must set `TRUSTED_PROXIES`; webhooker warns at startup whenever it is
-
+  empty, in any environment.
-#### The login endpoint
-
-The login `POST` is the one endpoint with no pre-emptive limiter in
-front of it, and that is deliberate. A limiter that spends budget on
-arrival is a lockout in this deployment shape: sharing one bucket, a
-stranger sending five POSTs a minute — about 0.08 requests per second,
-from anywhere — keeps it permanently full, and the operator has no
-second administrative path. So the handler inverts the order:
-
-1. **Credentials are verified first, and only a failed attempt spends
-   budget.** A correct password is never rate-limited, whatever the
-   counters hold. This is what guarantees the admin UI stays
-   reachable.
-2. **Failures are counted per (client bucket, submitted username)**,
-   five per minute, after which further _failures_ from that pair are
-   answered `429` with a `Retry-After`. That `429` is a label on the
-   response, not a gate in front of the work: the credential check has
-   already run by the time the counter is consulted, so a throttled
-   client's guess is still evaluated. See the guessing rate below. A
-   successful login clears the counter, so mistyping a few times and
-   then getting it right leaves you unthrottled. Because the submitted
-   username is attacker-controlled, at most 1024 username counters and
-   1024 fallback address counters are tracked; past the first cap
-   failures fall back to the address counter, and past both they are
-   answered as throttled without being recorded. Total tracked state
-   is under half a megabyte and does not grow with the number of
-   usernames an attacker invents.
-3. **Concurrent password verifications are capped at two, and the
-   queue for them at 16.** Verifying before counting means every login
-   request costs an Argon2id hash, and Argon2id here is 64 MB per
-   hash — two slots is a 128 MB ceiling on password hashing. Every
-   endpoint that hashes a password takes a slot, including the
-   password-change endpoint, which holds one across both the
-   verification and the new hash. A request that waits five seconds
-   without getting a slot is answered `503 Service Unavailable` and no
-   hash is computed for it. The wait alone does not bound memory, only
-   how long one request holds some, so the number of waiters is capped
-   as well. Size the queue from what a parked waiter actually retains,
-   not from the 1 MB body cap: that caps the raw body read, while the
-   body-cap, CSRF and form-parsing middleware all run before the
-   guard, so a waiter holds its parsed form plus its request header
-   block for the whole wait. Measured on the pinned Go 1.26.1
-   toolchain, as the heap delta with 64 waiters parked in the handler,
-   an ordinary two-field login form retains ~0 MB, a 1 MB urlencoded
-   body at Go's 10,000-parameter parse cap retains 2.82 MB (3.09 MB
-   with `%41` escapes), and the ~0.9 MB of headers the 1 MB header cap
-   allows takes it to **4.18 MB** — the retained parse and the headers
-   dominate, not the raw body. So the cap is 16 waiters: 16 x 4.18 MB
-   is about 67 MB of committed queue memory, and two slots drain a
-   full 16-deep queue in roughly 0.6 s, far inside the five-second
-   deadline. A request arriving past the cap is shed with `503`
-   immediately instead of joining the queue. **Peak commitment for the
-   endpoint is therefore about 203 MB**: 128 MB of Argon2id, plus the
-   18 requests holding a parsed form — 16 queued and the 2 being
-   hashed — at about 75 MB. That 203 MB is _live_ commitment, not
-   resident size: the Go collector lets the heap reach roughly twice
-   the live set before collecting, with transient parse garbage on top
-   of it. The independent review of this endpoint fired 18 adversarial
-   requests at an idle guard and measured a peak `HeapAlloc` of
-   392 MB. **Provision on the order of 400 MB**, not for the 203 MB
-   itemised here and not for the hashing budget alone.
-
-An unknown username is verified against a dummy hash rather than
-rejected early, so a nonexistent account costs the same time as a real
-one and the response cannot be used to enumerate usernames.
-
-**This raises online guessing throughput by about 300x, and that is
-the trade.** Because the credential check always precedes the counter,
-what bounds online brute force is the semaphore, not the failure
-counter. Two slots at the cost of one Argon2id verification is on the
-order of **27 guesses per second, about 2.3 million per day**, against
-5 per minute under the pre-emptive limiter this replaced. Treat that
-figure as a lower bound rather than a ceiling: it was measured with
-Go's race detector enabled, so real hardware verifies faster and
-guesses faster. Choose the admin password to survive millions of
-online guesses per day — a long random passphrase, not a memorable
-one. Rate-limiting `POST /pages/login` at the reverse proxy, where the
-real client address is visible, is the way to put a cheaper bound back
-on top.
-
-The residual exposure is a bounded, self-clearing loss of login
-**availability** — not merely of latency. A flood can keep both
-verification slots busy, and a request that neither gets a slot within
-five seconds nor finds room in the queue is answered `503`. Above
-roughly 27 requests per second the operator is not served slowly, it
-is shed: its chance per attempt is about the ratio of service rate to
-flood rate, so at 400 requests per second it is roughly one attempt in
-fourteen. A sufficiently determined flood still denies login for as
-long as it runs.
-
-What changed is the price and the aftermath. Denying login used to
-cost an attacker 0.08 requests per second from anywhere; it now costs
-30 or more sustained, about 400 times as much. Nothing accumulates
-while the flood runs, nothing needs resetting when it stops, and the
-operator's correct password succeeds on the first attempt afterwards.
-Restarting the service is **not** a remedy: a restart clears the
-failure counters, which are not what is saturated, and the flood
-re-fills both verification slots on its first two requests. The
-remedies are to block the source at the reverse proxy, or to
-rate-limit `POST /pages/login` there — the one place a limit can be
-applied without reintroducing the lockout, because the proxy sees the
-real client address. Setting `TRUSTED_PROXIES` does not stop the
-saturation, but it makes the source visible in the failure logs.
 
 Finer-grained per-webhook rate limits (configured in the web UI and
 enforced in the webhook handler) can layer on top of this env-level
@@ -1491,8 +1126,8 @@ abuse limit later; they are tracked as future work.
 
 | Method | Path            | Description |
 | ------ | --------------- | ----------- |
-| `GET`  | `/pages/login`  | Login page (not rate limited) |
+| `GET`  | `/pages/login`  | Login page (not rate limited; the limiter applies to POST only) |
-| `POST` | `/pages/login`  | Login form submission. Credentials are verified before any limit is consulted, so a correct password is never throttled; 5 FAILED attempts per minute per bucket per submitted username, then `429`. `503` if no verification slot frees up within 5s, or immediately if 16 requests are already queued for one (see [Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting)) |
+| `POST` | `/pages/login`  | Login form submission (5 per minute per bucket, then 429) |
 | `POST` | `/pages/logout` | Logout (destroys session) |
 
 #### Authenticated Endpoints
@@ -1500,7 +1135,7 @@ abuse limit later; they are tracked as future work.
 | Method | Path                     | Description |
 | ------ | ------------------------ | ----------- |
 | `GET`  | `/user/{username}`       | User profile page |
-| `POST` | `/user/{username}/password` | Change the user's password (5 per minute per bucket, then `429`; `503` if no verification slot frees up within 5s, or immediately if 16 requests are already queued for one) |
+| `POST` | `/user/{username}/password` | Change the user's password (5 per minute per bucket, then 429) |
 | `GET`  | `/sources`               | List user's webhooks |
 | `GET`  | `/sources/new`           | Create webhook form |
 | `POST` | `/sources/new`           | Create webhook submission |
@@ -1570,10 +1205,6 @@ webhooker/
 │   │   └── webhook_db_manager.go  # Per-webhook DB lifecycle manager
 │   ├── globals/
 │   │   └── globals.go         # Build-time variables (appname, version, arch)
-│   ├── gormlog/
-│   │   └── gormlog.go         # GORM's logger.Interface on top of slog, bounded
-│   ├── logfield/
-│   │   └── logfield.go        # Encoded-byte budget for client-supplied log values
 │   ├── delivery/
 │   │   ├── engine.go          # Event-driven delivery engine (channel + timer based)
 │   │   ├── circuit_breaker.go # Per-target circuit breaker for http/slack targets with retries
@@ -1606,7 +1237,6 @@ webhooker/
 │   │   ├── middleware.go      # Logging, CORS, Auth, Metrics, MetricsAuth, SecurityHeaders, MaxBodySize
 │   │   ├── csrf.go            # CSRF protection middleware (gorilla/csrf)
 │   │   ├── ratelimit.go       # Per-IP rate limiting middleware (go-chi/httprate)
-│   │   ├── loginguard.go      # Login failure counters and the Argon2id verification semaphore
 │   │   └── testing.go         # NewForTest: Middleware without the fx lifecycle
 │   ├── server/
 │   │   ├── server.go          # Server struct, fx lifecycle, signal handling
@@ -1626,7 +1256,6 @@ webhooker/
 ├── templates/                 # Go HTML templates (base, login, sources, etc.)
 ├── script/                    # Scripts to Rule Them All entrypoints
 ├── Dockerfile                 # Three stages: lint, test+build, Alpine runtime
-├── Dockerfile.lint            # Lint-only image built by script/lint
 ├── Makefile                   # 10 of 16 targets shim script/; 6 are inline
 ├── go.mod / go.sum
 └── .golangci.yml              # Linter configuration
@@ -1669,32 +1298,19 @@ to record results.
 
 Applied to all routes in this order:
 
-1. **RequestID** — Generate unique request IDs (chi built-in)
+1. **Recoverer** — Panic recovery (chi built-in)
-2. **SecurityHeaders** — Production security headers on every response
+2. **RequestID** — Generate unique request IDs (chi built-in)
+3. **SecurityHeaders** — Production security headers on every response
    (HSTS, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, CSP, Referrer-Policy,
    Permissions-Policy)
-3. **Logging** — Structured request logging (method, URL, status,
+4. **Logging** — Structured request logging (method, URL, status,
    latency, remote IP, user agent, request ID)
-4. **Metrics** — Prometheus HTTP metrics (if `METRICS_USERNAME` is set)
+5. **Metrics** — Prometheus HTTP metrics (if `METRICS_USERNAME` is set)
-5. **CORS** — Cross-origin resource sharing headers
+6. **CORS** — Cross-origin resource sharing headers
-6. **Timeout** — 60-second request timeout
+7. **Timeout** — 60-second request timeout
-7. **Recoverer** — Panic recovery: one `ERROR` record through
-   `internal/logger` and a `500`
 8. **Sentry** — Error reporting to Sentry (if `SENTRY_DSN` is set;
    configured with `Repanic: true` so panics still reach Recoverer)
 
-Recoverer sits seventh rather than first, and both neighbours are the
-reason. It runs **inside** everything that observes the response, so
-the `500` it writes for a panicking handler is the status the access
-log records and the metrics count; registered first, as chi's own
-`middleware.Recoverer` was, the same request was logged as a `200` that
-the client never received. It runs **outside** the Sentry handler, so
-`Repanic: true` has something to re-raise into: an operator with
-`SENTRY_DSN` set keeps the report, and one without it now gets the
-local record instead of nothing. What that placement gives up is
-recovery of a panic in the six entries above it, none of which does
-more than set a header or start a timer.
-
 Additionally, form endpoints (`/pages`, `/user/*`, `/sources`,
 `/source/*`) apply a **MaxBodySize** middleware that limits
 POST/PUT/PATCH request bodies to 1 MB. It is registered ahead of the
@@ -1717,11 +1333,9 @@ one that lies about its length, is hard-capped by
 Those same four route groups then apply **CSRF** and **NoCache**
 (`Cache-Control: no-store`, `Pragma: no-cache`), and every group except
 `/pages` applies **RequireAuth**. The rate limiters are per-route
-rather than global: **PasswordChangeRateLimit** on
+rather than global: **LoginRateLimit** on `/pages/login`,
-`/user/{username}/password` and **ReceiverRateLimit** on
+**PasswordChangeRateLimit** on `/user/{username}/password`, and
-`/webhook/{uuid}`. There is deliberately none on `/pages/login` — that
+**ReceiverRateLimit** on `/webhook/{uuid}`.
-endpoint counts failures inside the handler, after the credential
-check, see [The login endpoint](#the-login-endpoint).
 
 ### Authentication
 
@@ -1759,27 +1373,14 @@ check, see [The login endpoint](#the-login-endpoint).
   both at target creation time (URL validation) and at delivery time
   (custom HTTP transport with SSRF-safe dialer that validates resolved
   IPs before connecting, preventing DNS rebinding attacks)
-- **Login limiting is inverted, deliberately.** The login `POST` has
+- **Login rate limiting** via [go-chi/httprate](https://github.com/go-chi/httprate):
-  no pre-emptive rate limiter in front of it. Credentials are
+  sliding-window rate limiter on the login endpoint, 5 POST attempts
-  verified first and only a _failed_ attempt spends budget, so a
+  per minute per bucket, to slow brute-force attacks. GET requests to
-  correct password is never throttled and no flood of wrong ones can
+  the login page are not limited. The password-change endpoint carries
-  deny the operator the only administrative path. Failures are
+  the same 5-per-minute limit. The bucket is per client IP only when
-  counted per (bucket, submitted username), five per minute, after
-  which further failures are answered `429` with a `Retry-After`.
-  What bounds brute force is not that counter but the cap of two
-  concurrent Argon2id verifications: a throttled client's guess is
-  still evaluated, so roughly 27 guesses a second get through and the
-  admin password has to carry that load (see
-  [The login endpoint](#the-login-endpoint)). `GET` requests to the
-  login page are not limited
-- **Password-change rate limiting** via [go-chi/httprate](https://github.com/go-chi/httprate):
-  sliding-window rate limiter, 5 POST attempts per minute per bucket.
-  It runs behind session auth, so only a client already holding a
-  valid session reaches it, and an operator throttled out of changing
-  a password can still log in. The bucket is per client IP only when
   `TRUSTED_PROXIES` names the reverse proxy; unset, every client
-  shares one bucket, which costs precision rather than availability
+  shares one bucket and the login becomes remotely deniable (see
-  (see [Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting)). webhooker warns at startup
+  [Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting)). webhooker warns at startup
   whenever `TRUSTED_PROXIES` is empty
 - Prometheus metrics behind basic auth
 - Static assets embedded in binary (no filesystem access needed at
@@ -1860,37 +1461,6 @@ Two operational consequences follow from bounding the sequence:
   no shutdown diagnostics at all. Keep the deployment's grace above
   the stop timeout.
 
-### Linting
-
-golangci-lint never runs on the host. `script/lint` builds
-`Dockerfile.lint`, which copies the repo into the digest-pinned
-golangci-lint image and lints as a build step, so a successful build is
-a clean lint. A host binary would share one cache and one lock with
-every other checkout on the machine, which has produced both invented
-findings attributed to other worktrees and unearned passes.
-
-Three properties are load-bearing:
-
-- `script/lint` passes `--no-cache-filter=lint`. Without it an unchanged
-  tree replays the lint layer from cache and the build exits 0 in under
-  a second having linted nothing. The `deps` stage stays cacheable, so
-  module downloads are not repeated. Invalidation is scoped to the one
-  stage; never prune the shared build cache.
-- `script/lint` does not trust that flag. Docker silently ignores
-  `--no-cache-filter` for a stage name that does not match, so a stage
-  rename or a one-character typo would restore the cached false green
-  with no warning and a fast exit 0. The script therefore tees the
-  build output and treats a run as a pass only if golangci-lint's own
-  summary line (`N issues.` / `N issues:`) appears in it: no summary,
-  no lint, whatever the exit code says.
-- Both lint steps use `RUN --network=none`. `golangci-lint config
-  verify` is documented as fetching its JSON schema over HTTPS, which
-  would be an unpinned remote dependency; the pinned image resolves the
-  schema without network access, and `--network=none` enforces that
-  instead of trusting it. Verify is worth keeping because
-  `golangci-lint run` silently ignores config keys it does not
-  recognize, so a typo would disable a setting with no warning.
-
 ### Docker
 
 The Dockerfile uses a three-stage build. Each stage is pinned by
@@ -1899,8 +1469,7 @@ version is fixed independently of the compiler's:
 
 1. **Lint stage** (`golangci/golangci-lint:v2.12.2`, Debian-based) —
    installs `make`, downloads dependencies, copies the source, and runs
-   `make fmt-check`, then `golangci-lint config verify` and
+   `make fmt-check` then `make lint`.
-   `golangci-lint run`, both with `--network=none`.
 2. **Builder stage** (`golang:1.26.1-bookworm`) — depends on the lint
    stage passing (it copies a file from it), runs `script/fetch-assets`
    to download and verify the third-party browser assets, then runs
@@ -1911,21 +1480,20 @@ version is fixed independently of the compiler's:
    runs as the non-root `webhooker` user (UID 1000), exposes port 8080,
    and includes a health check against `/.well-known/healthcheck`.
 
-The lint stage invokes `golangci-lint` directly rather than `make lint`:
-it is already the pinned linter image, and `make lint` builds
-`Dockerfile.lint`, which would need a docker daemon inside this build.
-
 Both check stages use Debian rather than Alpine because
 `gorm.io/driver/sqlite` pulls in `mattn/go-sqlite3`, which needs CGO
 and does not compile against musl. Only the final binary is statically
 linked, which is what lets it run on the Alpine runtime image.
 
-`script/cibuild` — `docker build .` — is the CI gate: the checks run
+`script/cibuild` — `docker build .` — is the CI gate: the four check
-inside the image, so a build that succeeds is a repo that is formatted,
+targets run inside the image, so a build that succeeds is a repo that
-linted, tested and compiled. `script/lint` also uses Docker
+is formatted, linted, tested and compiled. Only `script/cibuild` and
-(`Dockerfile.lint`, see Linting above), so `make lint` and `make check`
+`script/docker` involve Docker. `script/lint`, and therefore
-run the same pinned linter version the gate does; only `script/test`
+`make lint` and `make check`, run whatever `golangci-lint` is on the
-and `script/fmt-check` run on the host.
+host, which can be a different version from the pinned one — so the
+container is the authoritative lint result
+([issue #109](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/109) tracks
+routing local linting through it as well).
 
 #### CI gate honesty
 
@@ -1938,8 +1506,8 @@ the hash of the last commit that touched the build context, so:
 - Any commit that changes code (including a squash merge whose tree
   matches an already-built branch) gets a new fingerprint, invalidates
   the `COPY . .` layer of both check stages, and really runs
-  `make fmt-check`, `golangci-lint`, `make test`, and `make build`. A
+  `make fmt-check`, `make lint`, `make test`, and `make build`. A run
-  run that reports success ran them.
+  that reports success ran them.
 - A docs-only commit leaves the fingerprint unchanged — `.dockerignore`
   excludes `*.md`, `LICENSE` and `.editorconfig` from the context
   anyway — so the image replays from cache and costs seconds.

REPO_POLICIES.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 title: Repository Policies
-last_modified: 2026-08-07
+last_modified: 2026-07-06
 ---
 
 This document covers repository structure, tooling, and workflow standards. Code
@@ -189,13 +189,8 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
   module under test to verify it compiles/parses. There is no excuse for
   `make test` to be a no-op.
 
-- `make test` must complete in under 60 seconds. That is the hard cap, and a
+- `make test` must complete in under 20 seconds. Add a 30-second timeout in the
-  suite that exceeds it fails. Under 20 seconds is the target. A suite between
+  Makefile.
-  20 and 60 seconds is still green, but the overage must be filed as an
-  improvement bug against that repo. Add a 90-second timeout to the test
-  invocation in the Makefile (`go test -timeout 90s`). The backstop deliberately
-  sits above the hard cap so that it catches a genuinely hung test rather than a
-  merely slow one.
 
 - **`make test` should use the conditional verbose rerun pattern.** Run tests
   without `-v` (verbose) first. If tests fail, automatically rerun with `-v` to
@@ -214,9 +209,9 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
 
     ```makefile
     test:
-    	@go test -timeout 90s -race -cover ./... || \
+    	@go test -timeout 30s -race -cover ./... || \
     		{ echo "--- Rerunning with -v for details ---"; \
-    		  go test -timeout 90s -race -v ./...; exit 1; }
+    		  go test -timeout 30s -race -v ./...; exit 1; }
     ```
 
     Python example:
@@ -265,10 +260,7 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
 
 - `.golangci.yml` is standardized and must _NEVER_ be modified by an agent, only
   manually by the user. Fetch from
-  `https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/prompts/raw/branch/main/.golangci.yml`. The
+  `https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/prompts/raw/branch/main/.golangci.yml`.
-  canonical golangci-lint version is v2.12.2 (released 2026-05-06), installed
-  commit-pinned via
-  `go install github.com/golangci/golangci-lint/v2/cmd/golangci-lint@c0d3ddc9cf3faa61a4e378e879ece580256d76e5`.
 
 - When pinning images or packages by hash, add a comment above the reference
   with the version and date (YYYY-MM-DD).

TODO.md

@@ -24,142 +24,30 @@ event retention (#63), the database archiving target (#43), the admin
 password change flow (#65), policy compliance (#6), pinned lint tooling
 (#55), and fail-loud configuration parsing (#80).
 
-`next` holds the **complete 1.0.0 milestone**: every issue in it is
+`next` holds the completed 1.0.0 milestone: every issue in it is closed,
-closed, and it is verified green both by CI and by cache-defeated
+and it is verified green by cache-defeated container runs
-container runs (`docker build --no-cache-filter=lint
+(`docker build --no-cache-filter=lint --no-cache-filter=builder`). The
---no-cache-filter=builder`).
+CI status is not independently claimed here: a superseded run is
-
+recorded as `skipped` and still rolls up green, so a commit status on
-One caveat on reading a green check, narrower than it used to be. A
+`next` does not by itself evidence an executed check (#152). Before
-docs-only commit deliberately replays from the layer cache (#119), so a
+#119, a warm layer cache also let the gate report success without
-green status on such a commit evidences a replay rather than an executed
+executing anything, and replayed the previous build's console log so
-run; a code commit invalidates the `COPY` layer and genuinely executes.
+the lie looked like a real run. Note: `TODO.md` was deliberately
-Superseded runs are no longer the hazard they were: before #152 they
-were recorded as `skipped` and rolled up green, and before #119 a warm
-layer cache let the gate report success without executing anything,
-replaying the previous build's console log so the lie looked like a real
-run. Both are fixed. Note: `TODO.md` was deliberately
 deleted from this repo in f9a9569 (2026-03-01, #6); its content was
 folded into the README TODO section, which this draft reconstructs as
 of 2026-07-06.
 
 # Next Step
 
-Merge the milestone PR (#111) to `main` and tag 1.0.0 from it. The
+Merge the milestone PR to `main` and tag 1.0.0 from it.
-milestone is empty and `next` is green; nothing else blocks the tag.
 
-Three items belong to the owner, none of them blocking. #150 was decided
+Two decisions are open and belong to the owner, neither blocking the
-by the manager rather than left to stall the queue and is flagged on the
+tag: #115 (mask the `http` target's destination URL, implemented
-issue for reversal if that call was wrong. #112 (whether `Completed
+speculatively and awaiting a yes or no) and #125 (whether IPv6
-Steps` should exist at all, given it once conflicted on every unit) is
+rate-limit keys should bucket by `/64`).
-unanswered; the provisional ruling in force is that issue branches do
-not touch this file. #198 records that `make test` is past the org 20s
-target — 46s of test execution inside a 62.8s CI layer — and turns on
-which quantity the 60s hard cap governs; it is scoped as the improvement
-bug the 20-60s band requires, and should be milestoned instead if the
-cap is read as covering the whole invocation.
-
-After the tag, the largest open cluster is the unmilestoned follow-up
-backlog these units generated: #183, #184, #185, #190, #191, #193 and
-#198.
 
 # Completed Steps
 
-- 2026-08-18 Raise `script/test`'s per-package timeout from 30s to 90s,
-  matching the org-wide backstop. `go test` applies `-timeout` per
-  package, and `internal/handlers` had grown past the old budget: a
-  cache-defeated build failed outright at `GOMAXPROCS=4`, and every run
-  under deliberate host load breached 30s. The measurement table lives
-  in the script (#194)
-- 2026-08-18 Re-sync `REPO_POLICIES.md` from `prompts`. The local copy
-  was stale and still mandated a 20s test target with a 30s timeout,
-  which the org replaced with a 60s cap and a 90s backstop. A synced
-  copy is not a source; reading it as one nearly produced a PR against
-  `prompts` proposing a change already merged there (#196)
-- 2026-08-18 Report handler panics through the logger and answer 500.
-  chi v1.5.5's `Recoverer` scans for a `panic(0x` frame the runtime no
-  longer emits, then indexes `pkg[-1:]`, so it panicked inside its own
-  stack printer before writing a byte: the recovery never ran, the
-  client got a dropped connection instead of a 500, and the original
-  panic was lost. A local middleware replaces it, bounded by
-  `MaxPanicLogLineBytes` (#187)
-- 2026-08-18 Route GORM's logger through `slog` and bound it. Every
-  `gorm.Open` left `logger.Default` in place at `Warn` with
-  `IgnoreRecordNotFoundError` false, so **every record-not-found
-  printed the fully interpolated SQL to stdout** — including the
-  client-chosen path on `/webhook/{uuid}` and the submitted username on
-  the login form, at no level the operator set and outside
-  `internal/logger` entirely. Three call sites, not the two the issue
-  named (#178)
-- 2026-08-18 Bound every `slog` line against client-chosen text. Eight
-  sites reachable unauthenticated, found by reading every `slog` call in
-  the tree rather than only the one reported; the budget moved to a
-  shared `internal/logfield` so no second truncation exists. `DEBUG`
-  being off by default is not a bound and is not treated as one (#176)
-- 2026-08-18 Stop a slow host turning a login-guard test into a
-  segfault. A non-fatal `assert` on an acquire result was dereferenced
-  on the next line, so one timing miss killed the whole
-  `internal/middleware` binary and reddened CI for unrelated PRs. The
-  fix also removed a real production race — `acquire` could shed a
-  request with a slot standing free, because Go picks uniformly among
-  ready `select` cases (#186)
-- 2026-08-18 Send the chi route pattern to Sentry rather than the
-  concrete path. The receiver's path carries the entrypoint capability
-  token, so every Sentry event from `/webhook/{uuid}` shipped a live
-  credential to a third party. Request `Data`, `QueryString`, `Cookies`
-  and `Env` are dropped and headers reduced to an allowlist (#179)
-- 2026-08-18 Read form fields from the POST body only. `r.FormValue`
-  merges the query string, so a login could be driven by URL parameters
-  — putting the password somewhere that lands in access logs, proxy
-  logs and browser history (#160)
-- 2026-08-18 Verify login credentials before spending rate-limit
-  budget, so a flood of wrong passwords cannot lock out the account it
-  is guessing at. The manager took this decision rather than stall the
-  queue; it is flagged on the issue for reversal (#150)
-- 2026-08-18 Run all linting in Docker via `Dockerfile.lint`. Host lint
-  was wrong in both directions from version skew and shared caches.
-  `script/lint` asserts the summary line, because `--no-cache-filter`
-  silently ignores a stage name it does not match — the flag that makes
-  the gate meaningful fails open (#109)
-- 2026-08-18 Serve an event's full stored body over HTTP. The list
-  query truncates for rendering, and that truncated value was the only
-  way to read a body, so the full payload was unreachable (#157)
-- 2026-08-18 Bound the access log line against client-chosen text.
-  `internal/logfield` budgets by *encoded* bytes, not runes, so a
-  handler's JSON escaping cannot multiply a field past its allowance
-  (#146)
-- 2026-08-18 Mark superseded CI commits `failure` rather than
-  `skipped`. A skipped run rolls up green, so a commit that was never
-  tested reported success (#152)
-- 2026-08-18 Set `fx.StopTimeout` inside the container stop grace, so
-  shutdown hooks are bounded by a deadline the orchestrator will
-  actually honour rather than being killed mid-flush (#134)
-- 2026-08-17 Bucket IPv6 rate-limit keys by `/64`. A single allocation
-  hands out 2^64 addresses, so per-address keying let one client mint
-  unlimited buckets. Manager decision, recorded on the issue (#125)
-- 2026-08-17 Correct release-blocking README and startup-warning
-  inaccuracies, including claims about behaviour the code does not have
-  (#151)
-- 2026-08-17 Fetch and verify Alpine.js at build time against
-  `static/vendor.sha256` instead of committing the minified blob, so
-  the dependency is pinned by hash rather than by trust (#145)
-- 2026-08-17 Bound the event log's rendered bodies in the query itself,
-  so a large stored payload cannot be read into memory just to be
-  truncated for display (#135)
-- 2026-08-17 Mask the `http` target's destination URL in the UI: it can
-  carry a bearer credential in its path or query, and was rendered
-  verbatim. Manager decision to mask unconditionally (#115)
-- 2026-08-14 Bound shutdown hooks by their stop context, so a hook that
-  hangs cannot hold the process past its grace period (#102)
-- 2026-08-14 Render templates via a buffer rather than the
-  `ResponseWriter`, so a template error part-way through cannot commit
-  a 200 and then fail — the response is written only once it is whole
-  (#123)
-- 2026-08-14 Align the session codec's max-age with the 7-day absolute
-  cap. The codec accepted cookies the session layer considered expired,
-  so the cap was enforced in one place and not the other (#108)
-- 2026-08-12 Warn when `TRUSTED_PROXIES` is empty in production, where
-  the safe default silently discards forwarded headers and every client
-  rate-limits as the proxy's address (#149)
 - 2026-08-12 Bound the receiver rate limit per client IP across the
   whole `/webhook/*` route. The existing limiter keyed on the request
   path and `/webhook/{uuid}` matches any single segment, so a client

internal/config/config.go

@@ -430,14 +430,10 @@ func loadFromEnv() (*Config, error) {
 // what is in front of the process, which this code cannot observe:
 // with nothing in front, the peer is the client and the limits are
 // per-client as intended; behind a reverse proxy the peer is the proxy
-// for every request, so all clients share one bucket per limiter.
+// for every request, so all clients share one bucket per limiter. The
-//
+// login limiter's bucket is the dangerous one: any remote client can
-// The login endpoint no longer spends budget on arrival — it verifies
+// keep it full, which denies the only administrative login to everyone
-// credentials first and charges only failures — so a shared bucket
+// until the process restarts.
-// cannot deny the operator a correct password. What it does collapse
-// is the failure counting: one client's wrong passwords throttle
-// everyone else's wrong passwords, and the receiver's limits become
-// service-wide ceilings.
 //
 // The warning is deliberately not gated on WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT. That
 // variable defaults to dev, so gating on it would silence the warning
@@ -458,11 +454,11 @@ func (c *Config) warnSharedRateLimitBucket(log *slog.Logger) {
 			"this process that is the client itself and the limits "+
 			"are per-client as intended. Behind a reverse proxy the "+
 			"peer is the proxy on every request, so all clients "+
-			"share one bucket per limit: the receiver limits become "+
+			"share one bucket per limit and any remote client can "+
-			"service-wide ceilings, and one client's failed logins "+
+			"keep the login limit full, denying the admin login — "+
-			"throttle every other client's failed logins — a "+
+			"the only administrative path — until restart. If "+
-			"correct password still gets in. If anything proxies to "+
+			"anything proxies to this process, set TRUSTED_PROXIES "+
-			"this process, set TRUSTED_PROXIES to its address.",
+			"to its address.",
 		"environment", c.Environment,
 		"trustedProxies", len(c.TrustedProxies),
 	)

internal/config/config_test.go

@@ -629,9 +629,8 @@ func testTrustedProxiesSuccess(
 
 // TestSharedRateLimitBucketWarning covers the startup warning that
 // tells an operator a deployment behind a reverse proxy shares one
-// rate-limit bucket between every client, which turns the receiver
+// rate-limit bucket between every client, which makes the admin login
-// limits into service-wide ceilings and collapses login failure
+// remotely deniable. It must fire whenever TRUSTED_PROXIES is empty,
-// counting. It must fire whenever TRUSTED_PROXIES is empty,
 // in any environment: WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT defaults to dev, so gating
 // on it would silence the warning for exactly the operator who never
 // configured the deployment. It stays quiet once proxies are named.
@@ -708,15 +707,7 @@ func TestSharedRateLimitBucketWarning(t *testing.T) {
 			assert.Contains(t, logged, `"level":"WARN"`)
 			assert.Contains(t, logged, "TRUSTED_PROXIES")
 			assert.Contains(t, logged, "share one bucket")
-			assert.Contains(
+			assert.Contains(t, logged, "denying the admin login")
-				t, logged, "throttle every other client's failed logins",
-			)
-			// The warning must not claim a lockout the login
-			// endpoint no longer permits: credentials are verified
-			// before any budget is spent.
-			assert.Contains(
-				t, logged, "a correct password still gets in",
-			)
 			// The text must stay accurate for a developer with
 			// nothing in front of the process, where an empty
 			// list costs nothing.

internal/database/database.go

@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ import (
 	"gorm.io/gorm"
 	_ "modernc.org/sqlite" // Pure Go SQLite driver
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/gormlog"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
 )
 
@@ -156,10 +155,7 @@ func (d *Database) connect() error {
 	// Then use it with GORM
 	db, err := gorm.Open(sqlite.Dialector{
 		Conn: sqlDB,
-	}, &gorm.Config{
+	}, &gorm.Config{})
-		// Never leave this at GORM's default. See internal/gormlog.
-		Logger: gormlog.New(d.log),
-	})
 	if err != nil {
 		d.log.Error(
 			"failed to connect to database",

internal/database/export_test.go

@@ -65,9 +65,3 @@ func (r *RetentionReaper) ExportWedgeLoop(
 func (r *RetentionReaper) ExportSetInterval(d time.Duration) {
 	r.interval = d
 }
-
-// DummyPasswordHashForTest exposes the encoded hash that unknown
-// usernames are verified against.
-func DummyPasswordHashForTest() string {
-	return dummyPasswordHash()
-}

internal/database/password.go

@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"math/big"
 	"strings"
-	"sync"
 
 	"golang.org/x/crypto/argon2"
 )
@@ -30,10 +29,6 @@ const hashParts = 6
 // triggers per-character-class complexity enforcement.
 const minPasswordComplexityLen = 4
 
-// dummyPasswordLen is the length of the throwaway password behind
-// dummyPasswordHash.
-const dummyPasswordLen = 32
-
 // Sentinel errors returned by decodeHash.
 var (
 	errInvalidHashFormat    = errors.New("invalid hash format")
@@ -127,38 +122,6 @@ func VerifyPassword(
 	return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(hash, otherHash) == 1, nil
 }
 
-// dummyPasswordHash is an encoded Argon2id hash of a random
-// password, computed once on first use. Nothing can match it: the
-// password it encodes is discarded as soon as it is hashed. It is
-// process-wide because building it per request would add a second
-// 64 MB Argon2id pass to every login for an unknown username.
-//
-//nolint:gochecknoglobals // computed once, see above
-var dummyPasswordHash = sync.OnceValue(func() string {
-	password, err := GenerateRandomPassword(dummyPasswordLen)
-	if err != nil {
-		panic(fmt.Sprintf("generating the dummy password: %v", err))
-	}
-
-	hash, err := HashPassword(password)
-	if err != nil {
-		panic(fmt.Sprintf("hashing the dummy password: %v", err))
-	}
-
-	return hash
-})
-
-// VerifyDummyPassword performs a credential verification that cannot
-// succeed, at the same cost as a real one.
-//
-// Login must charge an unknown username the same work as a known
-// one. Returning early for an account that does not exist answers in
-// microseconds where a real account takes tens of milliseconds, which
-// is a username oracle any client can read off the response time.
-func VerifyDummyPassword(password string) {
-	_, _ = VerifyPassword(password, dummyPasswordHash())
-}
-
 // decodeHash extracts parameters, salt, and hash from an
 // encoded hash string.
 func decodeHash(

internal/database/password_test.go

@@ -191,41 +191,3 @@ func TestHashPasswordUniqueness(t *testing.T) {
 		)
 	}
 }
-
-// TestVerifyDummyPassword_DoesRealWork covers the anti-enumeration
-// path. Login charges an unknown username a verification against a
-// dummy hash so that a nonexistent account is not answered in
-// microseconds where a real one takes tens of milliseconds. That only
-// works if the dummy hash is a real, decodable Argon2id hash: a
-// malformed one would make VerifyPassword fail on the decode and
-// return before hashing anything.
-func TestVerifyDummyPassword_DoesRealWork(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	// Runs the OnceValue that builds the dummy hash, so a panic in
-	// it surfaces here rather than on a live login.
-	database.VerifyDummyPassword("whatever was submitted")
-
-	dummy := database.DummyPasswordHashForTest()
-
-	// A hash the verifier cannot decode would make VerifyPassword
-	// return on the decode error, before hashing anything — the
-	// timing oracle this path exists to close.
-	valid, err := database.VerifyPassword("whatever", dummy)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf(
-			"the dummy hash must decode like a real one: %v", err,
-		)
-	}
-
-	if valid {
-		t.Error("nothing may authenticate against the dummy hash")
-	}
-
-	if !strings.HasPrefix(dummy, "$argon2id$") {
-		t.Errorf(
-			"the dummy hash must use the same algorithm as real "+
-				"hashes, got %q", dummy,
-		)
-	}
-}

internal/database/webhook_db_manager.go

@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ import (
 	"gorm.io/driver/sqlite"
 	"gorm.io/gorm"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/gormlog"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
 )
 
@@ -249,10 +248,7 @@ func (m *WebhookDBManager) openDB(
 
 	db, err := gorm.Open(sqlite.Dialector{
 		Conn: sqlDB,
-	}, &gorm.Config{
+	}, &gorm.Config{})
-		// Never leave this at GORM's default. See internal/gormlog.
-		Logger: gormlog.New(m.log),
-	})
 	if err != nil {
 		_ = sqlDB.Close()
 

internal/database/webhook_db_manager_test.go

@@ -339,12 +339,7 @@ func TestWebhookDBManager_MultipleWebhooks(t *testing.T) {
 	var events []database.Event
 
 	require.NoError(t, db2.Find(&events).Error)
-
+	assert.Len(t, events, 1)
-	// require, not assert: this is exactly the regression the test
-	// guards, so the empty slice is the expected failure, and a
-	// non-fatal length check would index into it on the next line and
-	// panic the whole package test binary instead of failing here.
-	require.Len(t, events, 1)
 	assert.Equal(t, "PUT", events[0].Method)
 }
 

internal/delivery/target_database_archive.go

@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ import (
 
 	"gorm.io/driver/sqlite"
 	"gorm.io/gorm"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/gormlog"
 )
 
 // archiveExpiryNever is the expiry sentinel (and default) that
@@ -283,11 +282,7 @@ func (w *archiveWriter) openMode(
 	}
 
 	gdb, err := gorm.Open(
-		sqlite.Dialector{Conn: sqlDB}, &gorm.Config{
+		sqlite.Dialector{Conn: sqlDB}, &gorm.Config{},
-			// Never leave this at GORM's default. See
-			// internal/gormlog.
-			Logger: gormlog.New(w.log),
-		},
 	)
 	if err != nil {
 		_ = sqlDB.Close()

internal/delivery/target_database_archive_gormlog_test.go

@@ -1,155 +0,0 @@
-package delivery_test
-
-import (
-	"bytes"
-	"log"
-	"log/slog"
-	"path/filepath"
-	"strings"
-	"sync"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-	"gorm.io/gorm"
-	gormlogger "gorm.io/gorm/logger"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
-)
-
-// archiveGORMTailMarker sits at the far end of the value this file
-// drives into an archive lookup. Its presence in a log line means the
-// whole value reached the log, so nothing truncated it.
-const archiveGORMTailMarker = "ENDOFCLIENTVALUE"
-
-// archiveGORMFillBytes is how much text the lookup carries. It is far
-// past every budget in play.
-const archiveGORMFillBytes = 8 << 10
-
-// gormDefaultBuf collects what GORM's package-level default logger
-// writes, if anything reaches it.
-type gormDefaultBuf struct {
-	mu sync.Mutex
-	b  bytes.Buffer
-}
-
-func (g *gormDefaultBuf) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
-	g.mu.Lock()
-	defer g.mu.Unlock()
-
-	return g.b.Write(p)
-}
-
-func (g *gormDefaultBuf) String() string {
-	g.mu.Lock()
-	defer g.mu.Unlock()
-
-	return g.b.String()
-}
-
-// captureArchiveGORMDefault replaces GORM's package-level default
-// logger with one configured exactly as GORM configures its own,
-// writing to a buffer.
-//
-// This duplicates the detector in internal/handlers rather than
-// sharing it: a test helper cannot cross a package's test boundary
-// without exporting production code to carry it, and a logging
-// detector is not worth a production symbol. What it detects is the
-// third gorm.Open in this service, at
-// internal/delivery/target_database_archive.go — the archive writer,
-// whose type is unexported, so nothing outside this package can drive
-// it.
-func captureArchiveGORMDefault(t *testing.T) *gormDefaultBuf {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	buf := &gormDefaultBuf{}
-	orig := gormlogger.Default
-
-	gormlogger.Default = gormlogger.New(
-		log.New(buf, "", log.LstdFlags),
-		gormlogger.Config{
-			SlowThreshold:             200 * time.Millisecond,
-			LogLevel:                  gormlogger.Warn,
-			IgnoreRecordNotFoundError: false,
-			Colorful:                  false,
-		},
-	)
-
-	t.Cleanup(func() { gormlogger.Default = orig })
-
-	return buf
-}
-
-// TestArchiveWriter_NeverUsesGORMsDefaultLogger pins the archive
-// writer's gorm.Open to the adapter.
-//
-// Restore a bare &gorm.Config{} at
-// internal/delivery/target_database_archive.go and this fails: the
-// default logger prints the fully interpolated SELECT on every
-// ErrRecordNotFound, so the client-chosen event id below arrives whole
-// and unbounded on stdout, answering to no level the operator set.
-//
-// Not parallel: gormlogger.Default is process-global. Go runs every
-// non-parallel top-level test to completion before it resumes the
-// parallel ones.
-//
-//nolint:paralleltest // Deliberately sequential; see above.
-func TestArchiveWriter_NeverUsesGORMsDefaultLogger(t *testing.T) {
-	var captured bytes.Buffer
-
-	gormDefault := captureArchiveGORMDefault(t)
-
-	w := delivery.NewExportArchiveWriter(
-		filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "archive.db"),
-		slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(
-			&captured, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug},
-		)),
-		0,
-	)
-
-	require.NoError(t, w.Open(0))
-
-	t.Cleanup(w.Evict)
-
-	// A lookup that misses, carrying a value the size of an inbound
-	// event id. Under the default logger this is the line that gets
-	// interpolated and printed.
-	value := strings.Repeat("\x01", archiveGORMFillBytes) +
-		archiveGORMTailMarker
-
-	var row delivery.ExportArchivedEvent
-
-	err := w.DB().Where("event_id = ?", value).First(&row).Error
-	require.ErrorIs(t, err, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound)
-
-	got := gormDefault.String()
-	assert.Empty(
-		t, got,
-		"GORM's default logger wrote %d bytes, so the archive "+
-			"writer's gorm.Open is back on a bare &gorm.Config{}; "+
-			"the first of them: %s",
-		len(got), got[:min(len(got), 300)],
-	)
-
-	// The adapter drops a miss, so this should be silent too — and
-	// whatever it does write stays inside the stated ceiling.
-	out := captured.String()
-
-	assert.NotContains(
-		t, out, archiveGORMTailMarker,
-		"the far end of the client-chosen value reached the log",
-	)
-
-	for line := range strings.SplitSeq(strings.TrimRight(out, "\n"), "\n") {
-		if line == "" {
-			continue
-		}
-
-		assert.LessOrEqual(
-			t, len(line), middleware.MaxAccessLogLineBytes,
-			"log line exceeded its bound: %s",
-			line[:min(len(line), 300)],
-		)
-	}
-}

internal/delivery/target_log.go

@@ -11,17 +11,6 @@ import (
 // inbound webhook — the full request body and headers, plus
 // the method, content type, and the webhook and entrypoint
 // ids — then records a single successful attempt.
-//
-// This is the one log call in the service that deliberately writes
-// unbounded client-chosen bytes, so it is the one exception to the
-// per-field budgets in internal/logfield and to the ceiling stated on
-// middleware.MaxAccessLogLineBytes. Capping here would defeat the
-// target: emitting the payload IS the delivery. It costs nothing by
-// default — an authenticated operator has to create a target of this
-// type on a specific webhook before a single line is written — and the
-// bytes it writes are bounded per event by maxWebhookBodySize (1 MB).
-// An operator who adds one is choosing to spend log volume on the
-// payloads that webhook receives.
 type logTarget struct {
 	eng *Engine
 }

internal/gormlog/export_test.go

@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-package gormlog
-
-import (
-	"log/slog"
-	"time"
-)
-
-// ExportNewWithSlowThreshold builds a Logger whose slow-statement
-// threshold is d rather than DefaultSlowThreshold, so a test can pin
-// which arm of Trace it is exercising instead of racing the clock on a
-// loaded machine. The threshold is set at construction, like every
-// other field, so the type's concurrency guarantee still holds.
-func ExportNewWithSlowThreshold(
-	log *slog.Logger, d time.Duration,
-) *Logger {
-	return &Logger{log: log, slowThreshold: d}
-}

internal/gormlog/gormlog.go

@@ -1,168 +0,0 @@
-// Package gormlog adapts GORM's logger onto the service's slog
-// logger.
-//
-// GORM's own default logger is not usable here. It is built at package
-// init with log.New(os.Stdout, ...) at LogLevel Warn with
-// IgnoreRecordNotFoundError false, so it writes the fully interpolated
-// SQL — parameters and all — for every statement that returns an
-// error, including gorm.ErrRecordNotFound. Two of this service's
-// lookups miss by design on unauthenticated routes: the entrypoint
-// lookup on /webhook/{uuid}, whose path segment the client picks
-// outright, and the user lookup behind the login form, whose username
-// the client picks outright. Under the default logger each of those
-// misses printed an unbounded, attacker-chosen string, at no level the
-// operator can turn down, past every handler internal/logger installs.
-//
-// This adapter fixes all three properties at once: the lines get a
-// level the operator controls, they are shaped by whichever handler
-// internal/logger selected, and every value a client can influence is
-// spent through logfield.Truncate.
-package gormlog
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"errors"
-	"fmt"
-	"log/slog"
-	"time"
-
-	gormlogger "gorm.io/gorm/logger"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logfield"
-)
-
-// DefaultSlowThreshold is the duration at or above which a statement
-// is logged as slow. It is GORM's own default, kept deliberately: slow
-// SQL is the one thing GORM's logger reports that nothing else in this
-// service does, so silencing the logger outright would have cost real
-// observability to fix a log-volume defect.
-const DefaultSlowThreshold = 200 * time.Millisecond
-
-// Logger implements gormlogger.Interface on top of an *slog.Logger.
-//
-// It is safe for concurrent use: every field is set at construction
-// and never written again.
-type Logger struct {
-	log           *slog.Logger
-	slowThreshold time.Duration
-}
-
-// Interface compliance is asserted here rather than discovered at the
-// gorm.Open call sites.
-var _ gormlogger.Interface = (*Logger)(nil)
-
-// New returns a GORM logger that writes through log.
-func New(log *slog.Logger) *Logger {
-	return &Logger{
-		log:           log,
-		slowThreshold: DefaultSlowThreshold,
-	}
-}
-
-// LogMode returns the logger unchanged.
-//
-// GORM's LogLevel is deliberately not honoured. Level is the operator's
-// decision and it is expressed once, through LOG_LEVEL and the
-// slog.LevelVar internal/logger holds; a second level knob inside the
-// database layer could only disagree with it. The mapping from GORM's
-// four categories onto slog levels is fixed in Trace below.
-//
-//nolint:ireturn // The interface return is GORM's signature, not a choice.
-func (l *Logger) LogMode(gormlogger.LogLevel) gormlogger.Interface {
-	return l
-}
-
-// Info logs one of GORM's own informational messages.
-func (l *Logger) Info(
-	ctx context.Context, msg string, data ...any,
-) {
-	l.log.InfoContext(ctx, "gorm", "message", format(msg, data...))
-}
-
-// Warn logs one of GORM's own warnings.
-func (l *Logger) Warn(
-	ctx context.Context, msg string, data ...any,
-) {
-	l.log.WarnContext(ctx, "gorm", "message", format(msg, data...))
-}
-
-// Error logs one of GORM's own errors.
-func (l *Logger) Error(
-	ctx context.Context, msg string, data ...any,
-) {
-	l.log.ErrorContext(ctx, "gorm", "message", format(msg, data...))
-}
-
-// Trace reports the outcome of a single statement. GORM calls it for
-// every statement it runs, so the cheap paths stay cheap: fc()
-// renders the interpolated SQL and is called only on a branch that
-// will actually emit.
-//
-// The arms are ordered exactly as GORM's own Trace orders them —
-// non-record-not-found error, then slow, then the routine case — so
-// that a statement which both misses and runs slow is still reported
-// as slow. A miss is the likeliest statement to be slow, since it is
-// the one that scans without finding a row, and ordering the drop
-// ahead of the slow arm would have made this adapter less observant
-// than the IgnoreRecordNotFoundError option it was chosen over.
-func (l *Logger) Trace(
-	ctx context.Context,
-	begin time.Time,
-	fc func() (string, int64),
-	err error,
-) {
-	elapsed := time.Since(begin)
-
-	switch {
-	case err != nil && !errors.Is(err, gormlogger.ErrRecordNotFound):
-		sql, rows := fc()
-		l.log.ErrorContext(ctx, "sql statement failed",
-			"error", logfield.Truncate(err.Error(), logfield.MaxBytes),
-			"sql", logfield.Truncate(sql, logfield.MaxBytes),
-			"rows", rows,
-			"elapsed_ms", elapsed.Milliseconds(),
-		)
-
-	case l.slowThreshold > 0 && elapsed >= l.slowThreshold:
-		sql, rows := fc()
-		l.log.WarnContext(ctx, "slow sql statement",
-			"sql", logfield.Truncate(sql, logfield.MaxBytes),
-			"rows", rows,
-			"elapsed_ms", elapsed.Milliseconds(),
-			"threshold_ms", l.slowThreshold.Milliseconds(),
-		)
-
-	case err != nil:
-		// gorm.ErrRecordNotFound is not an error on the paths that
-		// produce it here: an invented entrypoint UUID and an unknown
-		// username are the expected outcome of an unauthenticated
-		// request, not a fault. This is the IgnoreRecordNotFoundError
-		// behaviour, and it is unconditional rather than configurable
-		// because no caller in this service wants the other one — the
-		// two handlers that care already record the miss themselves,
-		// at DEBUG, without the SQL. A miss that ran slow has already
-		// been reported by the arm above.
-		return
-
-	case l.log.Enabled(ctx, slog.LevelDebug):
-		sql, rows := fc()
-		l.log.DebugContext(ctx, "sql statement",
-			"sql", logfield.Truncate(sql, logfield.MaxBytes),
-			"rows", rows,
-			"elapsed_ms", elapsed.Milliseconds(),
-		)
-	}
-}
-
-// format renders one of GORM's printf-style internal messages and
-// bounds it. GORM builds these itself, but they can quote a value the
-// statement carried, so they are spent through the same budget as
-// everything else rather than trusted.
-func format(msg string, data ...any) string {
-	if len(data) == 0 {
-		return logfield.Truncate(msg, logfield.MaxBytes)
-	}
-
-	return logfield.Truncate(
-		fmt.Sprintf(msg, data...), logfield.MaxBytes,
-	)
-}

internal/gormlog/gormlog_test.go

@@ -1,436 +0,0 @@
-package gormlog_test
-
-import (
-	"bytes"
-	"context"
-	"database/sql"
-	"fmt"
-	"log/slog"
-	"path/filepath"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-	"gorm.io/driver/sqlite"
-	"gorm.io/gorm"
-	_ "modernc.org/sqlite" // Pure Go SQLite driver.
-	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/gormlog"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
-)
-
-// fillBytes is how much client-chosen text each case drives into the
-// statement. It is well past every budget in play, so a value that
-// arrives short arrived short because something cut it.
-const fillBytes = 8 << 10
-
-// tailMarker sits at the far end of every generated value. A line that
-// contains it carried the whole value, which means nothing cut it — so
-// a value that merely happened to be short cannot pass for a truncated
-// one.
-const tailMarker = "ENDOFCLIENTVALUE"
-
-// fills are the characters a client can drive into a SQL parameter,
-// chosen for what the log handlers charge for them rather than for
-// looking dangerous.
-//
-// The C0 control is the one that matters. Both handlers spell U+0001
-// as a six-byte escape for the single byte it costs a client to send,
-// which is the widest multiplier available in the basic multilingual
-// plane and the case a raw-byte budget breaks on first. The astral
-// non-printable costs ten under the text handler, four more than the
-// JSON handler ever spends.
-func fills() []struct {
-	name string
-	fill string
-} {
-	return []struct {
-		name string
-		fill string
-	}{
-		{"plain", "x"},
-		{"quote", `"`},
-		{"backslash", `\`},
-		{"tab", "\t"},
-		{"newline", "\n"},
-		{"c0_control", "\x01"},
-		{"astral_nonprintable", "\U0001000C"},
-	}
-}
-
-// clientValue builds a value of at least fillBytes raw bytes out of
-// fill, ending in tailMarker.
-func clientValue(fill string) string {
-	var b strings.Builder
-
-	for b.Len() < fillBytes {
-		b.WriteString(fill)
-	}
-
-	b.WriteString(tailMarker)
-
-	return b.String()
-}
-
-// handlers are the two slog handlers internal/logger can install. The
-// ceiling is quoted to operators unqualified, so every case is
-// asserted under both.
-func handlers() []struct {
-	name string
-	make func(*bytes.Buffer) slog.Handler
-} {
-	opts := &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug}
-
-	return []struct {
-		name string
-		make func(*bytes.Buffer) slog.Handler
-	}{
-		{"json", func(b *bytes.Buffer) slog.Handler {
-			return slog.NewJSONHandler(b, opts)
-		}},
-		{"text", func(b *bytes.Buffer) slog.Handler {
-			return slog.NewTextHandler(b, opts)
-		}},
-	}
-}
-
-type thing struct {
-	ID   string `gorm:"primaryKey"`
-	Name string
-}
-
-// neverSlow is a slow-statement threshold no statement in this file
-// can reach. Cases that are about a non-slow arm of Trace set it, so
-// that a machine under load cannot turn a miss into a slow report and
-// decide the outcome for them.
-const neverSlow = time.Hour
-
-// alwaysSlow makes every statement count as slow, so the slow arm is
-// reached without the test waiting for it.
-const alwaysSlow = time.Nanosecond
-
-// openDB opens a real SQLite database behind the adapter under test,
-// so every assertion below is made against SQL that GORM actually
-// rendered rather than against a string a test wrote by hand. slow is
-// the adapter's slow-statement threshold.
-func openDB(
-	t *testing.T, buf *bytes.Buffer, h slog.Handler, slow time.Duration,
-) *gorm.DB {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	sqlDB, err := sql.Open("sqlite", fmt.Sprintf(
-		"file:%s?mode=rwc",
-		filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "gormlog.db"),
-	))
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = sqlDB.Close() })
-
-	gl := gormlog.ExportNewWithSlowThreshold(slog.New(h), slow)
-
-	gdb, err := gorm.Open(
-		sqlite.Dialector{Conn: sqlDB},
-		&gorm.Config{Logger: gl},
-	)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	require.NoError(t, gdb.AutoMigrate(&thing{}))
-
-	// Migration chatter is not what any of these cases is about.
-	buf.Reset()
-
-	return gdb
-}
-
-// assertBounded holds every line the adapter wrote to the stated
-// ceiling and proves each was cut rather than merely short.
-func assertBounded(t *testing.T, out string) {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	assert.NotContains(
-		t, out, tailMarker,
-		"the far end of the client value reached the log, so "+
-			"nothing truncated it",
-	)
-
-	for line := range strings.SplitSeq(
-		strings.TrimRight(out, "\n"), "\n",
-	) {
-		if line == "" {
-			continue
-		}
-
-		assert.LessOrEqual(
-			t, len(line), middleware.MaxAccessLogLineBytes,
-			"log line exceeded its bound: %s",
-			line[:min(len(line), 300)],
-		)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestRecordNotFound_WritesNothing is the defect itself. GORM's own
-// default logger prints the fully interpolated SELECT on every
-// ErrRecordNotFound, and on this service's two unauthenticated
-// lookups the interpolated parameter is whatever the client sent.
-func TestRecordNotFound_WritesNothing(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	for _, h := range handlers() {
-		for _, f := range fills() {
-			t.Run(h.name+"/"+f.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-				t.Parallel()
-
-				var buf bytes.Buffer
-
-				gdb := openDB(t, &buf, h.make(&buf), neverSlow)
-
-				var got thing
-
-				err := gdb.Where(
-					"id = ?", clientValue(f.fill),
-				).First(&got).Error
-				require.ErrorIs(t, err, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound)
-
-				assert.Empty(
-					t, buf.String(),
-					"a miss on a client-chosen key must not "+
-						"write a log line",
-				)
-			})
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-// TestSlowRecordNotFound_IsStillReportedSlow pins the arm ordering in
-// Trace against the drop above.
-//
-// GORM's own Trace orders its cases error-that-is-not-a-miss, then
-// slow, then routine, so IgnoreRecordNotFoundError: true — the cheap
-// option this adapter was chosen over — still reports a miss that ran
-// slow. An adapter that dropped the miss first would be strictly less
-// observant than the option it replaced, on exactly the two lookups
-// this package exists for. A miss is also the statement most likely to
-// be slow, since it is the one that scans without finding a row.
-func TestSlowRecordNotFound_IsStillReportedSlow(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	for _, h := range handlers() {
-		for _, f := range fills() {
-			t.Run(h.name+"/"+f.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-				t.Parallel()
-
-				var buf bytes.Buffer
-
-				gdb := openDB(t, &buf, h.make(&buf), alwaysSlow)
-
-				var got thing
-
-				err := gdb.Where(
-					"id = ?", clientValue(f.fill),
-				).First(&got).Error
-				require.ErrorIs(t, err, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound)
-
-				assert.Contains(
-					t, buf.String(), "slow sql statement",
-					"a slow statement that missed was not "+
-						"reported as slow",
-				)
-				assertBounded(t, buf.String())
-			})
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-// TestRecordNotFoundFlood_DoesNotGrowWithInput states the definition
-// of done directly: a flood of misses at two input sizes 64 times
-// apart must cost the same number of bytes of log.
-func TestRecordNotFoundFlood_DoesNotGrowWithInput(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	const requests = 50
-
-	flood := func(t *testing.T, size int) int {
-		t.Helper()
-
-		var buf bytes.Buffer
-
-		gdb := openDB(
-			t, &buf,
-			slog.NewJSONHandler(&buf, &slog.HandlerOptions{
-				Level: slog.LevelDebug,
-			}),
-			neverSlow,
-		)
-
-		value := strings.Repeat("\x01", size)
-
-		for range requests {
-			var got thing
-
-			_ = gdb.Where("id = ?", value).First(&got).Error
-		}
-
-		return buf.Len()
-	}
-
-	small := flood(t, 128)
-	big := flood(t, 128*64)
-
-	assert.Equal(
-		t, small, big,
-		"log volume tracked the size of the client's input",
-	)
-}
-
-// TestStatementError_LineIsBounded covers the branch that does log.
-// A driver error is not ErrRecordNotFound, so the interpolated
-// statement is written — and on an insert the interpolated value is
-// still whatever the client supplied.
-func TestStatementError_LineIsBounded(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	for _, h := range handlers() {
-		for _, f := range fills() {
-			t.Run(h.name+"/"+f.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-				t.Parallel()
-
-				var buf bytes.Buffer
-
-				gdb := openDB(t, &buf, h.make(&buf), neverSlow)
-
-				row := thing{ID: clientValue(f.fill), Name: "a"}
-
-				require.NoError(t, gdb.Create(&row).Error)
-
-				buf.Reset()
-
-				// The same primary key a second time: a UNIQUE
-				// constraint failure, which is an error GORM logs.
-				err := gdb.Create(&thing{
-					ID: row.ID, Name: "b",
-				}).Error
-				require.Error(t, err)
-
-				assert.Contains(
-					t, buf.String(), "sql statement failed",
-				)
-				assertBounded(t, buf.String())
-			})
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-// TestSucceedingStatement_LineIsBoundedOnEitherArm covers the two
-// arms a statement that returns no error can take, over the same
-// query, so neither can be bounded by accident of the other.
-//
-//   - slow. Silencing GORM outright would have been the cheaper fix
-//     and would have cost this report, which is the one thing GORM's
-//     logger gave an operator that nothing else in this service does.
-//   - routine. The branch an operator reaches by turning the level
-//     down to DEBUG: every statement is reported, so every
-//     statement's interpolated parameters have to be bounded too.
-func TestSucceedingStatement_LineIsBoundedOnEitherArm(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	// "sql statement" is a substring of "slow sql statement", so the
-	// routine arm carries notWant as well: Contains alone cannot tell
-	// the two arms apart in that direction.
-	arms := []struct {
-		name    string
-		slow    time.Duration
-		want    string
-		notWant string
-	}{
-		{"slow", alwaysSlow, "slow sql statement", ""},
-		{"routine", neverSlow, "sql statement", "slow sql statement"},
-	}
-
-	for _, a := range arms {
-		for _, h := range handlers() {
-			for _, f := range fills() {
-				name := a.name + "/" + h.name + "/" + f.name
-
-				t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
-					t.Parallel()
-
-					var buf bytes.Buffer
-
-					gdb := openDB(t, &buf, h.make(&buf), a.slow)
-
-					var got []thing
-
-					require.NoError(t, gdb.Where(
-						"name = ?", clientValue(f.fill),
-					).Find(&got).Error)
-
-					assert.Contains(t, buf.String(), a.want)
-
-					if a.notWant != "" {
-						assert.NotContains(
-							t, buf.String(), a.notWant,
-						)
-					}
-
-					assertBounded(t, buf.String())
-				})
-			}
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-// TestGORMOwnMessages_AreBounded covers the three printf-style
-// entry points. GORM builds these itself, but nothing stops one of
-// them quoting a value the statement carried.
-func TestGORMOwnMessages_AreBounded(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	for _, h := range handlers() {
-		for _, f := range fills() {
-			t.Run(h.name+"/"+f.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-				t.Parallel()
-
-				var buf bytes.Buffer
-
-				gl := gormlog.New(slog.New(h.make(&buf)))
-				ctx := context.Background()
-				value := clientValue(f.fill)
-
-				gl.Info(ctx, "%s", value)
-				gl.Warn(ctx, "%s", value)
-				gl.Error(ctx, "%s", value)
-
-				// The no-argument form, which is how GORM reports
-				// most of its own conditions. Reached through a
-				// function value so the vet printf check does not
-				// read the message as a format string — which is
-				// also why the adapter does not.
-				noArgs := func(
-					f func(context.Context, string, ...any),
-					msg string,
-				) {
-					f(ctx, msg)
-				}
-				noArgs(gl.Info, value)
-
-				assertBounded(t, buf.String())
-			})
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-// TestLogMode_KeepsTheOperatorsLevel records that GORM's own level
-// knob is deliberately inert: level belongs to LOG_LEVEL, and a
-// second one inside the database layer could only disagree with it.
-func TestLogMode_KeepsTheOperatorsLevel(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	var buf bytes.Buffer
-
-	gl := gormlog.New(slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(
-		&buf, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug},
-	)))
-
-	assert.Same(t, gl, gl.LogMode(0))
-}

internal/handlers/auth.go

@@ -2,10 +2,8 @@ package handlers
 
 import (
 	"net/http"
-	"strconv"
 
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logfield"
 )
 
 // HandleLoginPage returns a handler for the login page (GET)
@@ -71,9 +69,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleLoginSubmit() http.HandlerFunc {
 
 		h.log.Info(
 			"user logged in",
-			"username", logfield.Truncate(
+			"username", username,
-				username, logfield.MaxBytes,
-			),
 			"user_id", user.ID,
 		)
 
@@ -99,16 +95,6 @@ func (h *Handlers) renderLoginError(
 
 // authenticateUser looks up and verifies a user's credentials.
 // On failure it writes an HTTP response and returns an error.
-//
-// The credential check runs BEFORE any rate-limit budget is
-// consulted, and only a failed check spends budget. That is what
-// keeps the single administrative path reachable: behind the reverse
-// proxy this deployment requires, with TRUSTED_PROXIES unset, every
-// client shares one bucket, so a limiter spent on arrival lets any
-// stranger deny the operator's own correct password indefinitely.
-//
-// Verifying first means every login POST costs an Argon2id hash, so
-// the work is taken under a bounded number of verification slots.
 func (h *Handlers) authenticateUser(
 	w http.ResponseWriter,
 	r *http.Request,
@@ -116,49 +102,16 @@ func (h *Handlers) authenticateUser(
 ) (database.User, error) {
 	var user database.User
 
-	release, ok := h.mw.BeginPasswordVerification(r.Context())
-	if !ok {
-		h.log.Warn(
-			"password verification capacity exhausted",
-			"path", logfield.Truncate(
-				r.URL.Path, logfield.MaxBytes,
-			),
-		)
-		h.renderLoginError(
-			w, r,
-			"The server is busy verifying credentials. "+
-				"Please try again.",
-			http.StatusServiceUnavailable,
-		)
-
-		return user, errVerificationBusy
-	}
-
-	defer release()
-
 	err := h.db.DB().Where(
 		"username = ?", username,
 	).First(&user).Error
 	if err != nil {
-		// A username that does not exist is charged the same work
+		h.log.Debug("user not found", "username", username)
-		// as one that does. Skipping the hash here would answer in
+		h.renderLoginError(
-		// microseconds where a real account takes tens of
+			w, r,
-		// milliseconds, handing every client a username oracle.
+			"Invalid username or password",
-		h.dummyVerifications.Add(1)
+			http.StatusUnauthorized,
-		database.VerifyDummyPassword(password)
-
-		// Login is unauthenticated, and the submitted username is
-		// a form field the client fills to any length the 1 MB
-		// body cap allows. On this branch it matched no row, so
-		// nothing else bounds it. The rate limiter caps how often
-		// the line is written, not how wide it is.
-		h.log.Debug(
-			"user not found",
-			"username", logfield.Truncate(
-				username, logfield.MaxBytes,
-			),
 		)
-		h.rejectLogin(w, r, username)
 
 		return user, err
 	}
@@ -175,60 +128,17 @@ func (h *Handlers) authenticateUser(
 	}
 
 	if !valid {
-		// Reached only once the username matched a stored row, so
+		h.log.Debug("invalid password", "username", username)
-		// it is bounded by the operator's own data. Capped anyway,
-		// so that every username this unauthenticated endpoint
-		// logs is capped and no reader has to work out which
-		// branch narrowed it.
-		h.log.Debug(
-			"invalid password",
-			"username", logfield.Truncate(
-				username, logfield.MaxBytes,
-			),
-		)
-		h.rejectLogin(w, r, username)
-
-		return user, errInvalidPassword
-	}
-
-	// The password was correct, so forgive whatever failures this
-	// client accumulated: an operator who mistypes a few times and
-	// then gets it right must not stay throttled afterwards.
-	h.mw.ForgiveLoginFailures(r, username)
-
-	return user, nil
-}
-
-// rejectLogin counts one failed credential verification and answers
-// it: 401 while this client still has failure budget against the
-// submitted username, 429 with a Retry-After once it is spent.
-//
-// The 429 throttles wrong passwords only. A correct one never
-// reaches here, so no amount of failure — from this client or any
-// other sharing its bucket — can keep the operator out.
-func (h *Handlers) rejectLogin(
-	w http.ResponseWriter,
-	r *http.Request,
-	username string,
-) {
-	if !h.mw.RecordLoginFailure(r, username) {
 		h.renderLoginError(
 			w, r,
 			"Invalid username or password",
 			http.StatusUnauthorized,
 		)
 
-		return
+		return user, errInvalidPassword
 	}
 
-	w.Header().Set("Retry-After", strconv.Itoa(int(
+	return user, nil
-		h.mw.LoginFailureInterval().Seconds(),
-	)))
-	h.renderLoginError(
-		w, r,
-		"Too many failed login attempts. Please try again later.",
-		http.StatusTooManyRequests,
-	)
 }
 
 // createAuthenticatedSession regenerates the session and stores

internal/handlers/auth_test.go

@@ -1,455 +0,0 @@
-package handlers_test
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"fmt"
-	"net/http"
-	"net/http/httptest"
-	"net/url"
-	"strings"
-	"sync"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
-)
-
-const (
-	// operatorUser and operatorPassword are the single admin account
-	// these tests defend.
-	operatorUser     = "admin"
-	operatorPassword = "correct horse battery staple"
-
-	// sharedProxyPeer is the whole point of this file. Production is
-	// required to run behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy, and
-	// TRUSTED_PROXIES defaults to empty, so every client — attacker
-	// and operator alike — reaches the process from the proxy's
-	// address and shares one rate-limit bucket. Both parties in
-	// these tests therefore use the same RemoteAddr.
-	sharedProxyPeer = "10.0.0.1:44444"
-
-	// loginFailureLimit is the failure budget one client has against
-	// one submitted username. Restated here rather than imported
-	// from the middleware package, so that changing the production
-	// limit fails these tests instead of silently moving with them.
-	loginFailureLimit = 5
-)
-
-// seedOperator gives the bootstrapped admin account a password these
-// tests know. The account itself is created at startup with a random
-// password, which is exactly why its username is predictable to an
-// attacker and why keying failures by username alone does not fix
-// this issue.
-func seedOperator(t *testing.T, db *database.Database) {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	hash, err := database.HashPassword(operatorPassword)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	result := db.DB().Model(&database.User{}).
-		Where("username = ?", operatorUser).
-		Update("password", hash)
-
-	require.NoError(t, result.Error)
-	require.EqualValues(
-		t, 1, result.RowsAffected,
-		"the bootstrap admin account must exist",
-	)
-}
-
-// loginPost builds a login form POST arriving from peer.
-func loginPost(peer, username, password string) *http.Request {
-	form := url.Values{}
-	form.Set("username", username)
-	form.Set("password", password)
-
-	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
-		context.Background(),
-		http.MethodPost,
-		"/pages/login",
-		strings.NewReader(form.Encode()),
-	)
-	req.Header.Set(
-		"Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
-	)
-	req.RemoteAddr = peer
-
-	return req
-}
-
-// submitLogin drives one login POST through the handler.
-func submitLogin(
-	h *handlers.Handlers, peer, username, password string,
-) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
-	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
-	h.HandleLoginSubmit().ServeHTTP(w, loginPost(
-		peer, username, password,
-	))
-
-	return w
-}
-
-// floodFailures sends attempts wrong-password logins for username
-// from peer, which is what an attacker does.
-func floodFailures(
-	t *testing.T,
-	h *handlers.Handlers,
-	peer, username string,
-	attempts int,
-) {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	for i := range attempts {
-		w := submitLogin(h, peer, username, fmt.Sprintf("guess-%d", i))
-		require.NotEqual(
-			t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code,
-			"attempt %d must not authenticate", i,
-		)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestLogin_StrangersFloodCannotLockOutTheOperator is the
-// done-criterion of https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/150.
-//
-// The attacker and the operator share one rate-limit bucket, because
-// behind the mandated reverse proxy with TRUSTED_PROXIES unset every
-// client keys on the proxy's address. The attacker floods the
-// operator's own username — a single-admin product has a predictable
-// one — far past the failure limit. The operator must still be able
-// to log in with the correct password.
-//
-// This fails if credentials stop being verified ahead of the limiter.
-func TestLogin_StrangersFloodCannotLockOutTheOperator(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	var (
-		h  *handlers.Handlers
-		db *database.Database
-	)
-
-	app := newTestApp(t, &h, &db)
-	app.RequireStart()
-
-	t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
-
-	seedOperator(t, db)
-
-	// Well past the limit, and from the same bucket the operator
-	// will arrive in.
-	floodFailures(
-		t, h, sharedProxyPeer, operatorUser,
-		loginFailureLimit*2,
-	)
-
-	w := submitLogin(
-		h, sharedProxyPeer, operatorUser, operatorPassword,
-	)
-
-	assert.Equal(
-		t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code,
-		"a correct password must never be throttled: the operator "+
-			"has no second administrative path",
-	)
-	assert.Equal(t, "/", w.Header().Get("Location"))
-}
-
-// TestLogin_StrangersFloodCannotDenyAnotherAccount is the
-// cross-account half: flooding one username must not spend another
-// account's budget, even from the same shared bucket.
-func TestLogin_StrangersFloodCannotDenyAnotherAccount(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	var (
-		h  *handlers.Handlers
-		db *database.Database
-	)
-
-	app := newTestApp(t, &h, &db)
-	app.RequireStart()
-
-	t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
-
-	seedOperator(t, db)
-
-	floodFailures(
-		t, h, sharedProxyPeer, "someone-else",
-		loginFailureLimit*2,
-	)
-
-	w := submitLogin(h, sharedProxyPeer, operatorUser, "wrong")
-
-	assert.Equal(
-		t, http.StatusUnauthorized, w.Code,
-		"a flood against one username must not spend another "+
-			"account's failure budget",
-	)
-}
-
-// TestLogin_RepeatedWrongPasswordsAreThrottled is the brute-force
-// half. Verifying before counting must not remove the throttle:
-// repeated wrong passwords for one username from one client key run
-// out of budget and are answered 429 with a Retry-After.
-func TestLogin_RepeatedWrongPasswordsAreThrottled(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	var (
-		h  *handlers.Handlers
-		db *database.Database
-	)
-
-	app := newTestApp(t, &h, &db)
-	app.RequireStart()
-
-	t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
-
-	seedOperator(t, db)
-
-	for i := range loginFailureLimit - 1 {
-		w := submitLogin(
-			h, sharedProxyPeer, operatorUser,
-			fmt.Sprintf("guess-%d", i),
-		)
-		assert.Equal(
-			t, http.StatusUnauthorized, w.Code,
-			"attempt %d is still inside the budget", i,
-		)
-	}
-
-	w := submitLogin(h, sharedProxyPeer, operatorUser, "guess-last")
-	assert.Equal(
-		t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, w.Code,
-		"wrong passwords must still run out of budget",
-	)
-	assert.NotEmpty(
-		t, w.Header().Get("Retry-After"),
-		"a throttled login must say when to come back",
-	)
-}
-
-// TestLogin_SuccessForgivesEarlierMistakes covers the operator who
-// mistypes several times and then gets it right: the successful
-// attempt clears the counter, so the next mistake is answered 401
-// rather than 429.
-func TestLogin_SuccessForgivesEarlierMistakes(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	var (
-		h  *handlers.Handlers
-		db *database.Database
-	)
-
-	app := newTestApp(t, &h, &db)
-	app.RequireStart()
-
-	t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
-
-	seedOperator(t, db)
-
-	floodFailures(
-		t, h, sharedProxyPeer, operatorUser,
-		loginFailureLimit,
-	)
-
-	require.Equal(
-		t, http.StatusSeeOther,
-		submitLogin(
-			h, sharedProxyPeer, operatorUser, operatorPassword,
-		).Code,
-	)
-
-	w := submitLogin(h, sharedProxyPeer, operatorUser, "typo")
-	assert.Equal(
-		t, http.StatusUnauthorized, w.Code,
-		"a success must forgive the failures before it",
-	)
-}
-
-// TestLogin_UnknownUsernameCostsTheSameVerification is the
-// username-enumeration guard. Verifying credentials before the
-// limiter means response time is observable per attempt, so an
-// unknown username must be charged an equivalent-cost verification
-// against a dummy hash rather than returning early.
-//
-// The assertion is on the code path, not on wall-clock time: timing
-// assertions are flaky, and what actually has to hold is that the
-// hash is computed.
-func TestLogin_UnknownUsernameCostsTheSameVerification(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	var (
-		h  *handlers.Handlers
-		db *database.Database
-	)
-
-	app := newTestApp(t, &h, &db)
-	app.RequireStart()
-
-	t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
-
-	seedOperator(t, db)
-
-	require.Zero(t, h.DummyVerificationsForTest())
-
-	// A username that exists, with the wrong password: a real
-	// Argon2id verification runs, and no dummy is needed.
-	require.Equal(
-		t, http.StatusUnauthorized,
-		submitLogin(h, sharedProxyPeer, operatorUser, "wrong").Code,
-	)
-	assert.Zero(
-		t, h.DummyVerificationsForTest(),
-		"a known username verifies against its own hash",
-	)
-
-	// A username that does not exist: indistinguishable response,
-	// and the equivalent-cost verification must have run.
-	require.Equal(
-		t, http.StatusUnauthorized,
-		submitLogin(h, sharedProxyPeer, "nosuchuser", "wrong").Code,
-	)
-	assert.Equal(
-		t, uint64(1), h.DummyVerificationsForTest(),
-		"an unknown username must still pay for a hash, or the "+
-			"response time says whether the account exists",
-	)
-}
-
-// TestLogin_ConcurrentLoginsAreAllAnswered covers the login path
-// under the verification bound. The bound itself is pinned in the
-// middleware package; what matters here is that funnelling every
-// login through two slots does not lose or wedge a request — each one
-// is answered, whether it got a slot or was shed with 503.
-func TestLogin_ConcurrentLoginsAreAllAnswered(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	const workers = 4
-
-	var (
-		h  *handlers.Handlers
-		db *database.Database
-	)
-
-	app := newTestApp(t, &h, &db)
-	app.RequireStart()
-
-	t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
-
-	seedOperator(t, db)
-
-	var (
-		wg      sync.WaitGroup
-		mu      sync.Mutex
-		answers = map[int]int{}
-	)
-
-	for i := range workers {
-		wg.Go(func() {
-			w := submitLogin(
-				h, fmt.Sprintf("203.0.113.%d:5000", i),
-				operatorUser, fmt.Sprintf("guess-%d", i),
-			)
-
-			mu.Lock()
-			answers[w.Code]++
-			mu.Unlock()
-		})
-	}
-
-	wg.Wait()
-
-	mu.Lock()
-	defer mu.Unlock()
-
-	assert.Zero(
-		t, answers[http.StatusInternalServerError],
-		"concurrent logins must not error",
-	)
-	assert.Equal(
-		t, workers,
-		answers[http.StatusUnauthorized]+
-			answers[http.StatusTooManyRequests]+
-			answers[http.StatusServiceUnavailable],
-		"every concurrent login must be answered, whether it got "+
-			"a verification slot or was shed with 503",
-	)
-}
-
-// TestLogin_MissingCredentialsRejectedBeforeAnyHash pins that the
-// empty-field check still runs ahead of the verification slot, so a
-// client sending nothing cannot occupy one.
-func TestLogin_MissingCredentialsRejectedBeforeAnyHash(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	var (
-		h  *handlers.Handlers
-		db *database.Database
-	)
-
-	app := newTestApp(t, &h, &db)
-	app.RequireStart()
-
-	t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
-
-	seedOperator(t, db)
-
-	w := submitLogin(h, sharedProxyPeer, "", "")
-
-	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, w.Code)
-	assert.Zero(
-		t, h.DummyVerificationsForTest(),
-		"an empty submission must not cost a hash",
-	)
-}
-
-// TestLogin_SuccessCreatesSession is the control for the tests above:
-// the success path they assert on really does authenticate.
-func TestLogin_SuccessCreatesSession(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	var (
-		h    *handlers.Handlers
-		db   *database.Database
-		sess *session.Session
-	)
-
-	app := newTestApp(t, &h, &db, &sess)
-	app.RequireStart()
-
-	t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
-
-	seedOperator(t, db)
-
-	w := submitLogin(
-		h, sharedProxyPeer, operatorUser, operatorPassword,
-	)
-
-	require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
-	require.NotEmpty(
-		t, w.Result().Cookies(), "a session cookie must be issued",
-	)
-
-	next := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
-		context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil,
-	)
-
-	// Login regenerates the session, so the response carries two
-	// Set-Cookie headers under the same name: one expiring the
-	// pre-login cookie and one issuing the new one. A browser keeps
-	// only the second, so replay only the one that is not an
-	// expiry.
-	for _, c := range w.Result().Cookies() {
-		if c.MaxAge >= 0 {
-			next.AddCookie(c)
-		}
-	}
-
-	s, err := sess.Get(next)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.True(
-		t, sess.IsAuthenticated(s),
-		"the issued cookie must carry an authenticated session",
-	)
-}

internal/handlers/export_test.go

@@ -2,31 +2,15 @@ package handlers
 
 import (
 	"html/template"
-	"log/slog"
 	"net/http"
 
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
 )
 
-// SetLogForTest replaces the handler's logger, so the handlers_test
-// package can assert on what a log line actually contains rather than
-// on what it is meant to contain.
-func (s *Handlers) SetLogForTest(log *slog.Logger) {
-	s.log = log
-}
-
 // MaxRenderedBodyBytesForTest exposes the event log's body cap
 // to the handlers_test package.
 const MaxRenderedBodyBytesForTest = maxRenderedBodyBytes
 
-// DummyVerificationsForTest reports how many equivalent-cost
-// verifications were charged for usernames that do not exist. It
-// lets a test prove the anti-enumeration path ran without timing
-// anything.
-func (s *Handlers) DummyVerificationsForTest() uint64 {
-	return s.dummyVerifications.Load()
-}
-
 // TrimPartialRuneForTest exposes trimPartialRune for use in the
 // handlers_test package.
 func TrimPartialRuneForTest(b []byte) []byte {

internal/handlers/gormlogbound_test.go

@@ -1,462 +0,0 @@
-package handlers_test
-
-import (
-	"bytes"
-	"context"
-	"io"
-	"log"
-	"net/http"
-	"net/http/httptest"
-	"os"
-	"strconv"
-	"strings"
-	"sync"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/go-chi/chi"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-	"gorm.io/gorm"
-	gormlogger "gorm.io/gorm/logger"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
-)
-
-// gormBoundTailMarker sits at the far end of every client-chosen value
-// this file sends. Its presence in the log means the whole value
-// reached the log, so a value that merely happened to be short cannot
-// pass for a truncated one.
-const gormBoundTailMarker = "ENDOFCLIENTVALUE"
-
-// gormBoundFills are the characters a client can drive through the
-// receiver path segment and the login username, chosen for what a log
-// handler charges for them.
-//
-// The bare C0 control is the one that matters: both handlers spell
-// U+0001 as a six-byte escape for the one byte it costs to send, the
-// widest multiplier available below U+10000 and the case a raw-byte
-// budget breaks on first. GORM's default logger applies no budget at
-// all, so under the mutation every one of these arrives whole.
-func gormBoundFills() []struct {
-	name string
-	fill string
-} {
-	return []struct {
-		name string
-		fill string
-	}{
-		{"plain", "x"},
-		{"quote", `"`},
-		{"backslash", `\`},
-		{"tab", "\t"},
-		{"newline", "\n"},
-		{"c0_control", "\x01"},
-		{"astral_nonprintable", "\U0001000C"},
-	}
-}
-
-// syncBuf collects captured output from the goroutine draining the
-// pipe.
-type syncBuf struct {
-	mu sync.Mutex
-	b  bytes.Buffer
-}
-
-func (s *syncBuf) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
-	s.mu.Lock()
-	defer s.mu.Unlock()
-
-	return s.b.Write(p)
-}
-
-func (s *syncBuf) String() string {
-	s.mu.Lock()
-	defer s.mu.Unlock()
-
-	return s.b.String()
-}
-
-func (s *syncBuf) reset() {
-	s.mu.Lock()
-	defer s.mu.Unlock()
-
-	s.b.Reset()
-}
-
-// stdoutCapture redirects os.Stdout for the duration of a test.
-//
-// internal/logger builds its handler over os.Stdout at construction
-// time, so redirecting the variable before the application is built
-// captures everything the service logger — and therefore the GORM
-// adapter, which writes through it — emits.
-type stdoutCapture struct {
-	buf  *syncBuf
-	r    *os.File
-	w    *os.File
-	orig *os.File
-	done chan struct{}
-	seq  int
-}
-
-func captureStdout(t *testing.T) *stdoutCapture {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	r, w, err := os.Pipe()
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	c := &stdoutCapture{
-		buf:  &syncBuf{},
-		r:    r,
-		w:    w,
-		orig: os.Stdout,
-		done: make(chan struct{}),
-	}
-
-	os.Stdout = w
-
-	go func() {
-		defer close(c.done)
-
-		_, _ = io.Copy(c.buf, r)
-	}()
-
-	t.Cleanup(func() {
-		os.Stdout = c.orig
-		_ = w.Close()
-
-		<-c.done
-
-		_ = r.Close()
-	})
-
-	return c
-}
-
-// drain returns everything written since the previous drain and
-// clears the buffer.
-//
-// A sentinel is pushed through the same pipe and waited for, so the
-// draining goroutine is known to have caught up before the buffer is
-// read. Without it the comparison below would race the reader rather
-// than measure the writers.
-func (c *stdoutCapture) drain(t *testing.T) string {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	c.seq++
-
-	sentinel := "\n<<drain-" + strconv.Itoa(c.seq) + ">>\n"
-
-	_, err := c.w.WriteString(sentinel)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	deadline := time.Now().Add(10 * time.Second)
-	for !strings.Contains(c.buf.String(), sentinel) {
-		require.False(
-			t, time.Now().After(deadline),
-			"timed out waiting for captured output",
-		)
-		time.Sleep(time.Millisecond)
-	}
-
-	out := strings.Replace(c.buf.String(), sentinel, "", 1)
-
-	c.buf.reset()
-
-	return out
-}
-
-// teeStdout writes to a buffer and to whatever os.Stdout is at the
-// moment of the write.
-//
-// The second half is the point. GORM's package-level default logger
-// resolves os.Stdout once, at package init, so a logger built over the
-// variable would keep writing to the real terminal no matter what a
-// test redirects. Resolving it per write puts the bytes a defaulted
-// gorm.Config would cost in production into the same capture as
-// everything else internal/logger emits, which is what lets the volume
-// assertions below measure the whole writer set rather than one member
-// of it.
-type teeStdout struct {
-	buf *syncBuf
-}
-
-func (w teeStdout) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
-	_, _ = os.Stdout.Write(p)
-
-	return w.buf.Write(p)
-}
-
-// captureGORMDefault replaces GORM's package-level default logger with
-// one configured exactly as GORM configures its own, writing to a
-// buffer and to os.Stdout.
-//
-// This is the mutation detector. gormlogger.Default is what a bare
-// &gorm.Config{} installs, and its config here is GORM's verbatim —
-// Warn, IgnoreRecordNotFoundError false — so a reverted call site
-// behaves as it would in production rather than as a test dialed it.
-// With every gorm.Open in this service naming its own logger, nothing
-// consults this value and the buffer stays empty; revert any one of
-// the three and the interpolated SQL lands here.
-func captureGORMDefault(t *testing.T) *syncBuf {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	buf := &syncBuf{}
-	orig := gormlogger.Default
-
-	gormlogger.Default = gormlogger.New(
-		log.New(teeStdout{buf: buf}, "", log.LstdFlags),
-		gormlogger.Config{
-			SlowThreshold:             200 * time.Millisecond,
-			LogLevel:                  gormlogger.Warn,
-			IgnoreRecordNotFoundError: false,
-			Colorful:                  false,
-		},
-	)
-
-	t.Cleanup(func() { gormlogger.Default = orig })
-
-	return buf
-}
-
-// floodUnauthenticated drives reps requests at each of the two
-// unauthenticated lookups that miss by design, for every fill, with a
-// client-chosen value of size raw bytes.
-func floodUnauthenticated(
-	t *testing.T, h *handlers.Handlers, size, reps int,
-) int {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	requests := 0
-
-	for _, f := range gormBoundFills() {
-		var b strings.Builder
-
-		for b.Len() < size {
-			b.WriteString(f.fill)
-		}
-
-		b.WriteString(gormBoundTailMarker)
-
-		value := b.String()
-
-		for range reps {
-			postWebhook(t, h, value)
-			postUnknownLogin(t, h, value)
-
-			requests += 2
-		}
-	}
-
-	return requests
-}
-
-// floodPerWebhook drives the same client-chosen values at the second
-// gorm.Open site, the per-webhook database internal/database's
-// WebhookDBManager opens.
-//
-// That site is behind authentication in production, so this is not
-// part of the unauthenticated flood above and is counted separately.
-// It is here because the ceiling the README states covers every
-// writer, and the manager is one of them: with nothing driving it, a
-// bare &gorm.Config{} could be restored at
-// internal/database/webhook_db_manager.go and the whole suite would
-// stay green.
-func floodPerWebhook(
-	t *testing.T, mgr *database.WebhookDBManager, size, reps int,
-) int {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	requests := 0
-
-	for _, f := range gormBoundFills() {
-		var b strings.Builder
-
-		for b.Len() < size {
-			b.WriteString(f.fill)
-		}
-
-		b.WriteString(gormBoundTailMarker)
-
-		value := b.String()
-
-		db, err := mgr.GetDB("pin-" + f.name)
-		require.NoError(t, err)
-
-		for range reps {
-			var got database.Event
-
-			err = db.Where("id = ?", value).First(&got).Error
-			require.ErrorIs(t, err, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound)
-
-			requests++
-		}
-	}
-
-	return requests
-}
-
-// postWebhook drives the receiver with an invented entrypoint path.
-// The route pattern matches any single segment, so every byte of the
-// value is the client's, and the lookup behind it misses by design.
-func postWebhook(
-	t *testing.T, h *handlers.Handlers, entrypoint string,
-) {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
-		context.Background(), http.MethodPost, "/webhook/x",
-		strings.NewReader("{}"),
-	)
-
-	rctx := chi.NewRouteContext()
-	rctx.URLParams.Add("uuid", entrypoint)
-
-	req = req.WithContext(context.WithValue(
-		req.Context(), chi.RouteCtxKey, rctx,
-	))
-
-	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
-	h.HandleWebhook().ServeHTTP(w, req)
-
-	require.Equal(t, http.StatusNotFound, w.Code)
-}
-
-// postUnknownLogin submits the login form with an unknown username,
-// through the postLogin helper in logbound_test.go. The field is
-// bounded only by the 1 MB body cap, and the lookup behind it misses
-// by design.
-func postUnknownLogin(
-	t *testing.T, h *handlers.Handlers, username string,
-) {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	// 401 while the client still has failure budget against this
-	// username, 429 once the login guard has taken it away. Both
-	// outcomes sit behind the user lookup, which is the query this
-	// test is here to drive.
-	require.Contains(
-		t,
-		[]int{http.StatusUnauthorized, http.StatusTooManyRequests},
-		postLogin(t, h, username),
-	)
-}
-
-// assertFloodBounded holds every captured line to the stated ceiling
-// and proves nothing carried a whole client value.
-func assertFloodBounded(t *testing.T, label, out string) {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	assert.NotContains(
-		t, out, gormBoundTailMarker,
-		"%s: the far end of a client-chosen value reached the "+
-			"log, so nothing truncated it", label,
-	)
-
-	for line := range strings.SplitSeq(
-		strings.TrimRight(out, "\n"), "\n",
-	) {
-		if line == "" {
-			continue
-		}
-
-		assert.LessOrEqual(
-			t, len(line), middleware.MaxAccessLogLineBytes,
-			"%s: log line exceeded its bound: %s",
-			label, line[:min(len(line), 300)],
-		)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestFlood_NoWriterGrowsWithTheInput is the definition of done for
-// the GORM logger defect, stated over every writer at once, for two of
-// this service's three gorm.Open sites: the main database behind the
-// two unauthenticated lookups, and the per-webhook database the
-// WebhookDBManager opens. The third, the archive writer, is pinned in
-// internal/delivery, where its type lives.
-//
-// What each assertion is worth, since two of the three would pass
-// against a service that had never been fixed if the capture were set
-// up differently:
-//
-//   - The gormDefault check is the sharp one. It fires the moment any
-//     gorm.Open in this service goes back to a bare &gorm.Config{}.
-//   - The volume and per-line checks bite only because the replaced
-//     default logger tees into os.Stdout, so a reverted call site
-//     shows up in the same capture as everything internal/logger
-//     writes — the way it would in production. Without that tee both
-//     were vacuous: at INFO the two handler misses log at DEBUG and
-//     the adapter drops the record-not-found, so the capture holds
-//     nothing but fixed-string warnings.
-//
-// The level is left where newTestApp leaves it, at INFO: the level an
-// operator runs at by default, and the one the defect was visible at.
-// The handlers' own miss lines sit at DEBUG and spend the same
-// logfield budget as everything else, so they are not what makes
-// either assertion above bite at any level.
-//
-// It is deliberately not parallel: it redirects os.Stdout and replaces
-// gormlogger.Default, both of which are process-global. Go runs every
-// non-parallel top-level test to completion before it resumes the
-// parallel ones, so nothing else in this package is running while the
-// capture is installed.
-//
-//nolint:paralleltest // Deliberately sequential; see above.
-func TestFlood_NoWriterGrowsWithTheInput(t *testing.T) {
-	const (
-		smallBytes = 128
-		bigBytes   = 8 << 10
-		reps       = 5
-	)
-
-	gormDefault := captureGORMDefault(t)
-	capture := captureStdout(t)
-
-	var (
-		h   *handlers.Handlers
-		mgr *database.WebhookDBManager
-	)
-
-	app := newTestApp(t, &h, &mgr)
-	app.RequireStart()
-
-	t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
-
-	// Startup chatter is not what this test measures.
-	capture.drain(t)
-
-	floodUnauthenticated(t, h, smallBytes, reps)
-	floodPerWebhook(t, mgr, smallBytes, reps)
-
-	small := capture.drain(t)
-
-	requests := floodUnauthenticated(t, h, bigBytes, reps)
-	requests += floodPerWebhook(t, mgr, bigBytes, reps)
-	big := capture.drain(t)
-
-	assertFloodBounded(t, "small flood", small)
-	assertFloodBounded(t, "big flood", big)
-
-	// GORM's default logger is what the defect was. Nothing in this
-	// service may reach it.
-	got := gormDefault.String()
-	assert.Empty(
-		t, got,
-		"GORM's default logger wrote %d bytes; the first of them: %s",
-		len(got), got[:min(len(got), 300)],
-	)
-
-	// The same flood, with 64 times the client-chosen input, must not
-	// buy 64 times the log. A few bytes of slack covers a latency
-	// field changing width; the input grew by roughly half a megabyte.
-	const slackPerRequest = 64
-
-	assert.LessOrEqual(
-		t, len(big), len(small)+slackPerRequest*requests,
-		"log volume tracked the size of the client's input: "+
-			"%d bytes at %d bytes of input per request, %d bytes "+
-			"at %d",
-		len(small), smallBytes, len(big), bigBytes,
-	)
-}

internal/handlers/handlers.go

@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ import (
 	"html/template"
 	"log/slog"
 	"net/http"
-	"sync/atomic"
 
 	"go.uber.org/fx"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
@@ -40,12 +39,6 @@ const (
 // errInvalidPassword is returned when a password does not match.
 var errInvalidPassword = errors.New("invalid password")
 
-// errVerificationBusy is returned when no password-verification slot
-// became free before the wait elapsed, so no password was verified.
-var errVerificationBusy = errors.New(
-	"password verification capacity exhausted",
-)
-
 //nolint:revive // HandlersParams is a standard fx naming convention.
 type HandlersParams struct {
 	fx.In
@@ -56,7 +49,6 @@ type HandlersParams struct {
 	WebhookDBMgr *database.WebhookDBManager
 	Healthcheck  *healthcheck.Healthcheck
 	Session      *session.Session
-	Middleware   *middleware.Middleware
 	Notifier     delivery.Notifier
 	Evictor      delivery.WebhookEvictor
 }
@@ -70,15 +62,9 @@ type Handlers struct {
 	db        *database.Database
 	dbMgr     *database.WebhookDBManager
 	session   *session.Session
-	mw        *middleware.Middleware
 	notifier  delivery.Notifier
 	evictor   delivery.WebhookEvictor
 	templates map[string]*template.Template
-
-	// dummyVerifications counts the equivalent-cost verifications
-	// charged for usernames that do not exist. It exists so a test
-	// can prove that path runs without measuring wall-clock time.
-	dummyVerifications atomic.Uint64
 }
 
 // parsePageTemplate parses a page-specific template set from the
@@ -111,7 +97,6 @@ func New(
 	s.db = params.Database
 	s.dbMgr = params.WebhookDBMgr
 	s.session = params.Session
-	s.mw = params.Middleware
 	s.notifier = params.Notifier
 	s.evictor = params.Evictor
 

internal/handlers/handlers_test.go

@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ import (
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/healthcheck"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
 )
 
@@ -83,7 +82,6 @@ func newTestApp(
 			func(r *recordingEvictor) delivery.WebhookEvictor {
 				return r
 			},
-			middleware.New,
 			handlers.New,
 		),
 		fx.Populate(targets...),

internal/handlers/logbound_test.go

@@ -1,543 +0,0 @@
-package handlers_test
-
-// The handler-side half of the log-field audit. Two slog calls in
-// this package reach a value an UNAUTHENTICATED client picks outright
-// and of a length it picks outright:
-//
-//   - the unknown-entrypoint DEBUG line on /webhook/{uuid}, whose
-//     path segment matched no stored entrypoint and so is bounded by
-//     nothing;
-//   - the failed-login DEBUG lines, whose username is a form field.
-//
-// Both are at DEBUG, which is off in production by default. That is
-// not a bound: an operator turning DEBUG on to diagnose a flood must
-// not thereby hand the flood an unbounded write. Both spend the same
-// internal/logfield budget as the access log, and both are held here
-// to middleware.MaxAccessLogLineBytes.
-//
-// The two login lines past the username lookup — "invalid password"
-// and "user logged in" — carry the same cap without needing it, since
-// by then the value is a stored row rather than the client's. They are
-// pinned here too, so the caps cannot be dropped silently.
-//
-// So is the "password verification capacity exhausted" WARN line,
-// whose path chi pins to the constant "/pages/login" on the one route
-// that reaches it. Its cap is defensive, and the test below drives the
-// handler directly with the path a parameterised route would give it,
-// because an unasserted cap is one a later edit removes for free.
-
-import (
-	"bytes"
-	"context"
-	"io"
-	"log/slog"
-	"net/http"
-	"net/http/httptest"
-	"net/url"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/go-chi/chi"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
-)
-
-// floodRequests is the number of distinct invented values each flood
-// drives through the call site under test.
-const floodRequests = 32
-
-// oversizedFillBytes is the length of the single client-chosen value
-// used to show that line size does not track input size.
-const oversizedFillBytes = 8192
-
-// attackerMarker and tailMarker sit at the END of every oversized
-// value, past every budget. Their absence from the log is what
-// proves the value was cut rather than merely being short.
-const (
-	attackerMarker = "QQATTACKERTEXTQQ"
-	tailMarker     = "QQTRUNCATEDTAILQQ"
-)
-
-// escapeFills are the characters the log handlers escape, so a value
-// built out of them costs more on the line than it did on the wire. A
-// budget counted in raw bytes passes the plain case and fails these.
-//
-// U+1000C is unassigned, hence non-printable, and strconv.Quote
-// spells it as a ten-byte \UXXXXXXXX while the JSON handler passes
-// its four UTF-8 bytes through; only the text shape of these tests
-// reaches that charge.
-func escapeFills() map[string]string {
-	return map[string]string{
-		"plain":     "x",
-		"quote":     `"`,
-		"backslash": `\`,
-		"tab":       "\t",
-		"newline":   "\n",
-		// A C0 control neither handler has a short escape for, so
-		// each one costs six bytes on the line against the single
-		// byte it cost to send: the widest multiplier a client can
-		// drive, and the case a raw-byte budget breaks on first.
-		//
-		// This fill is load-bearing, not decoration. Budgeting raw
-		// bytes instead of encoded is caught by this fill alone,
-		// and only under the JSON handler, at 3,072 bytes against
-		// the 2,560 ceiling. Drop it and that mutation passes.
-		"control": "\x01",
-		"astral":  "\U0001000C",
-	}
-}
-
-// logHandlers are the two handlers internal/logger can install.
-func logHandlers() map[string]func(
-	io.Writer, *slog.HandlerOptions,
-) slog.Handler {
-	return map[string]func(
-		io.Writer, *slog.HandlerOptions,
-	) slog.Handler{
-		"json": func(
-			w io.Writer, o *slog.HandlerOptions,
-		) slog.Handler {
-			return slog.NewJSONHandler(w, o)
-		},
-		"text": func(
-			w io.Writer, o *slog.HandlerOptions,
-		) slog.Handler {
-			return slog.NewTextHandler(w, o)
-		},
-	}
-}
-
-// oversizedFill builds an 8 KB client-chosen value out of
-// repetitions of ch, with both markers at its far end.
-func oversizedFill(ch string) string {
-	return "x" + strings.Repeat(ch, oversizedFillBytes) +
-		attackerMarker + tailMarker
-}
-
-// capturingHandlers builds a Handlers whose log is captured into the
-// returned buffer at DEBUG through the named handler.
-//
-// extra is passed to fx.Populate alongside the Handlers, for the call
-// sites that also need the database the client's value is looked up
-// in, or the Middleware whose resource has to be exhausted before the
-// branch under test is reached.
-func capturingHandlers(
-	t *testing.T,
-	newHandler func(io.Writer, *slog.HandlerOptions) slog.Handler,
-	extra ...any,
-) (*handlers.Handlers, *bytes.Buffer) {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	var h *handlers.Handlers
-
-	app := newTestApp(t, append([]any{&h}, extra...)...)
-	app.RequireStart()
-
-	t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
-
-	buf := new(bytes.Buffer)
-	h.SetLogForTest(slog.New(newHandler(
-		buf, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug},
-	)))
-
-	return h, buf
-}
-
-// logLines splits the captured buffer into non-empty lines, holding
-// each to the stated per-line ceiling.
-func logLines(t *testing.T, buf *bytes.Buffer) []string {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	var lines []string
-
-	for line := range strings.SplitSeq(
-		strings.TrimSpace(buf.String()), "\n",
-	) {
-		if line == "" {
-			continue
-		}
-
-		require.LessOrEqual(
-			t, len(line), middleware.MaxAccessLogLineBytes,
-			"log line exceeded its bound: %s", line,
-		)
-
-		lines = append(lines, line)
-	}
-
-	return lines
-}
-
-// assertNoClientText fails if the far end of the client-chosen input
-// survived into the log.
-func assertNoClientText(t *testing.T, buf *bytes.Buffer) {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	assert.NotContains(
-		t, buf.String(), attackerMarker,
-		"log carried attacker-chosen text",
-	)
-	assert.NotContains(
-		t, buf.String(), tailMarker,
-		"log carried the tail of the attacker-chosen text",
-	)
-}
-
-// receiverRouter mounts the real receiver handler at the production
-// route pattern.
-func receiverRouter(h *handlers.Handlers) *chi.Mux {
-	router := chi.NewRouter()
-	router.Post("/webhook/{uuid}", h.HandleWebhook())
-
-	return router
-}
-
-// postReceiver sends one POST at /webhook/<segment>.
-//
-// RawPath is cleared after parsing so chi routes on the decoded path
-// and the handler sees the raw bytes rather than their percent-escaped
-// spelling. That is the harder case for the budget: the escaped
-// spelling is plain ASCII, which costs one byte per byte, while the
-// decoded bytes are what the log handler has to escape.
-func postReceiver(
-	t *testing.T, router *chi.Mux, segment string,
-) int {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
-		context.Background(),
-		http.MethodPost,
-		"/webhook/"+url.PathEscape(segment),
-		strings.NewReader(""),
-	)
-	req.URL.RawPath = ""
-
-	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
-	router.ServeHTTP(w, req)
-
-	return w.Code
-}
-
-// postLogin submits the login form with the given username and a
-// non-empty password.
-func postLogin(
-	t *testing.T, h *handlers.Handlers, username string,
-) int {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	return postLoginWithPassword(t, h, username, "not-the-password")
-}
-
-// postLoginWithPassword submits the login form with both credentials
-// chosen by the caller, so a test can reach the branches past the
-// username lookup.
-func postLoginWithPassword(
-	t *testing.T, h *handlers.Handlers, username, password string,
-) int {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	form := url.Values{
-		"username": {username},
-		"password": {password},
-	}
-
-	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
-		context.Background(),
-		http.MethodPost,
-		"/pages/login",
-		strings.NewReader(form.Encode()),
-	)
-	req.Header.Set(
-		"Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
-	)
-
-	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
-	h.HandleLoginSubmit().ServeHTTP(w, req)
-
-	return w.Code
-}
-
-// TestUnknownEntrypoint_LogLineDoesNotTrackPathSize drives 8 KB of
-// client-chosen path at the unauthenticated receiver's
-// unknown-entrypoint DEBUG line and holds it to the same ceiling the
-// access log states.
-func TestUnknownEntrypoint_LogLineDoesNotTrackPathSize(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	for handlerName, newHandler := range logHandlers() {
-		for fillName, fill := range escapeFills() {
-			t.Run(handlerName+"/"+fillName, func(t *testing.T) {
-				t.Parallel()
-
-				h, buf := capturingHandlers(t, newHandler)
-				router := receiverRouter(h)
-
-				for i := range floodRequests {
-					assert.Equal(
-						t,
-						http.StatusNotFound,
-						postReceiver(
-							t, router,
-							oversizedFill(fill)+
-								strings.Repeat("y", i),
-						),
-					)
-				}
-
-				lines := logLines(t, buf)
-				require.Len(t, lines, floodRequests)
-				assertNoClientText(t, buf)
-
-				assertBoundedFlood(t, buf.Len())
-			})
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-// TestFailedLogin_LogLineDoesNotTrackUsernameSize drives 8 KB of
-// client-chosen username at the unauthenticated login endpoint's
-// DEBUG line and holds it to the same ceiling.
-func TestFailedLogin_LogLineDoesNotTrackUsernameSize(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	for handlerName, newHandler := range logHandlers() {
-		for fillName, fill := range escapeFills() {
-			t.Run(handlerName+"/"+fillName, func(t *testing.T) {
-				t.Parallel()
-
-				h, buf := capturingHandlers(t, newHandler)
-
-				for i := range floodRequests {
-					assert.Equal(
-						t,
-						http.StatusUnauthorized,
-						postLogin(
-							t, h,
-							oversizedFill(fill)+
-								strings.Repeat("y", i),
-						),
-					)
-				}
-
-				lines := logLines(t, buf)
-				require.Len(t, lines, floodRequests)
-				assertNoClientText(t, buf)
-
-				assertBoundedFlood(t, buf.Len())
-			})
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-// storedUserPassword is the password held by the oversize accounts
-// the test below creates.
-const storedUserPassword = "correct-horse-battery-staple"
-
-// storedFillBytes is the raw length of the client-chosen value in
-// those accounts' usernames. It is well past the 512-byte field
-// budget, so the line is still truncated, but short enough that the
-// session cookie a successful login writes stays inside
-// securecookie's 4 KB limit: the cookie is written BEFORE the
-// "user logged in" line, so an 8 KB username answers 500 and never
-// reaches it.
-const storedFillBytes = 1024
-
-// storedFill builds a username fill of storedFillBytes raw bytes out
-// of repetitions of ch, with both markers at its far end.
-func storedFill(ch string) string {
-	return "x" + strings.Repeat(ch, storedFillBytes/len(ch)) +
-		attackerMarker + tailMarker
-}
-
-// TestStoredUsername_LogLinesDoNotTrackUsernameSize pins the two
-// login lines that are reached only AFTER the username matched a
-// stored row: "invalid password" and "user logged in". Neither
-// strictly needs its cap — the value is the operator's own data by
-// then, not the client's — but both carry one so that every username
-// this unauthenticated endpoint logs is capped, and an unasserted cap
-// is one a later edit removes for free.
-//
-// One app per handler with the accounts created inside it, and no
-// parallelism below that level: every account costs an Argon2id hash
-// and every attempt costs a verification.
-func TestStoredUsername_LogLinesDoNotTrackUsernameSize(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	for handlerName, newHandler := range logHandlers() {
-		t.Run(handlerName, func(t *testing.T) {
-			t.Parallel()
-
-			var db *database.Database
-
-			h, buf := capturingHandlers(t, newHandler, &db)
-
-			hash, err := database.HashPassword(storedUserPassword)
-			require.NoError(t, err)
-
-			fills := escapeFills()
-			for fillName, fill := range fills {
-				username := storedFill(fill) + fillName
-
-				require.NoError(t, db.DB().Create(&database.User{
-					Username: username,
-					Password: hash,
-				}).Error)
-
-				// Matched the row, wrong secret: "invalid
-				// password".
-				assert.Equal(
-					t, http.StatusUnauthorized,
-					postLoginWithPassword(
-						t, h, username, "not-the-password",
-					),
-				)
-
-				// Matched the row, right secret: "user logged
-				// in".
-				assert.Equal(
-					t, http.StatusSeeOther,
-					postLoginWithPassword(
-						t, h, username, storedUserPassword,
-					),
-				)
-			}
-
-			lines := logLines(t, buf)
-			require.Len(t, lines, 2*len(fills))
-			assertNoClientText(t, buf)
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// maxVerificationSlots bounds how many slots the loop below will
-// take before it gives up, so a semaphore that never fills fails the
-// test instead of hanging it. It is deliberately larger than the
-// real concurrency bound, which is not exported to this package.
-const maxVerificationSlots = 64
-
-// canceledContext returns a context that is already done. A
-// verification request carrying one takes the ctx.Done() branch of
-// the semaphore's bounded wait immediately, so these cases turn on
-// the semaphore being full rather than on a five-second timer firing.
-// Nothing here is timing-dependent.
-func canceledContext() context.Context {
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
-	cancel()
-
-	return ctx
-}
-
-// holdEveryVerificationSlot takes verification slots until one is
-// refused, and releases them when the test ends. A free slot is
-// handed out before any context is consulted, so a canceled context
-// cannot make this loop stop early: it stops exactly when the slots
-// are gone.
-func holdEveryVerificationSlot(
-	t *testing.T, mw *middleware.Middleware,
-) {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	for range maxVerificationSlots {
-		release, ok := mw.BeginPasswordVerification(canceledContext())
-		if !ok {
-			return
-		}
-
-		t.Cleanup(release)
-	}
-
-	require.Fail(t, "the verification semaphore never filled")
-}
-
-// postLoginAtPath submits the login form at a path of the caller's
-// choosing, with a canceled context.
-func postLoginAtPath(
-	t *testing.T, h *handlers.Handlers, path string,
-) int {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	form := url.Values{
-		"username": {"someone"},
-		"password": {"not-the-password"},
-	}
-
-	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
-		canceledContext(),
-		http.MethodPost,
-		path,
-		strings.NewReader(form.Encode()),
-	)
-	req.Header.Set(
-		"Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
-	)
-
-	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
-	h.HandleLoginSubmit().ServeHTTP(w, req)
-
-	return w.Code
-}
-
-// TestVerificationCapacity_LogLineDoesNotTrackPathSize pins the cap
-// on the "password verification capacity exhausted" WARN line.
-//
-// The one route that reaches it is chi's static "/pages/login", so no
-// request through the mux can widen the line; the handler is driven
-// directly here with the path a parameterised route would give it,
-// which is what that cap exists for. Without this test, removing the
-// logfield.Truncate there fails nothing.
-func TestVerificationCapacity_LogLineDoesNotTrackPathSize(
-	t *testing.T,
-) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	for handlerName, newHandler := range logHandlers() {
-		for fillName, fill := range escapeFills() {
-			t.Run(handlerName+"/"+fillName, func(t *testing.T) {
-				t.Parallel()
-
-				var mw *middleware.Middleware
-
-				h, buf := capturingHandlers(t, newHandler, &mw)
-
-				holdEveryVerificationSlot(t, mw)
-
-				assert.Equal(
-					t,
-					http.StatusServiceUnavailable,
-					postLoginAtPath(
-						t, h,
-						"/source/"+url.PathEscape(
-							oversizedFill(fill),
-						)+"/login",
-					),
-				)
-
-				lines := logLines(t, buf)
-				require.Len(t, lines, 1)
-				assertNoClientText(t, buf)
-			})
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-// assertBoundedFlood holds the whole flood's log output to what the
-// stated per-line ceiling allows. The flood sent
-// floodRequests * oversizedFillBytes bytes of client-chosen text;
-// this is the assertion that the log did not grow with it.
-func assertBoundedFlood(t *testing.T, got int) {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	sent := floodRequests * oversizedFillBytes
-
-	require.Less(
-		t, got, sent/2,
-		"log volume tracked the size of the flood's input",
-	)
-	require.LessOrEqual(
-		t, got,
-		floodRequests*middleware.MaxAccessLogLineBytes,
-	)
-}

internal/handlers/profile.go

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
 package handlers
 
 import (
-	"context"
 	"net/http"
 
 	"github.com/go-chi/chi"
@@ -43,7 +42,6 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandlePasswordChange() http.HandlerFunc {
 		}
 
 		successMessage, errorMessage, handled := h.applyPasswordChange(
-			r.Context(),
 			w,
 			sessionUsername,
 			// PostFormValue, not FormValue: the credential must
@@ -70,30 +68,9 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandlePasswordChange() http.HandlerFunc {
 // 500 response itself and returns handled=false, signalling the caller
 // to stop without re-rendering the page.
 func (h *Handlers) applyPasswordChange(
-	ctx context.Context,
 	w http.ResponseWriter,
 	username, currentPassword, newPassword, confirmPassword string,
 ) (string, string, bool) {
-	// This endpoint verifies one password and hashes another, at
-	// 64 MB each, so it takes a slot from the same bound the login
-	// endpoint uses. The bound is per hash, not per endpoint: leaving
-	// this path outside it would leave a hole in it. The slot is held
-	// across both hashes.
-	release, ok := h.mw.BeginPasswordVerification(ctx)
-	if !ok {
-		h.log.Warn("password verification capacity exhausted")
-		http.Error(
-			w,
-			"The server is busy verifying credentials. "+
-				"Please try again.",
-			http.StatusServiceUnavailable,
-		)
-
-		return "", "", false
-	}
-
-	defer release()
-
 	// Load the user row so we can verify the current password and
 	// persist the new hash.
 	var user database.User

internal/handlers/webhook.go

@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ import (
 	"gorm.io/gorm"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logfield"
 )
 
 const (
@@ -126,16 +125,9 @@ func (h *Handlers) lookupEntrypoint(
 		"path = ?", entrypointUUID,
 	).First(&entrypoint)
 	if result.Error != nil {
-		// The receiver is unauthenticated and /webhook/{uuid}
-		// matches any single segment, so this value is entirely
-		// client-chosen on exactly the branch where the lookup
-		// failed. DEBUG is off by default; the cap is what keeps
-		// turning it on from restoring an unbounded write.
 		h.log.Debug(
 			"entrypoint not found",
-			"path", logfield.Truncate(
+			"path", entrypointUUID,
-				entrypointUUID, logfield.MaxBytes,
-			),
 		)
 		http.NotFound(w, r)
 

internal/logfield/logfield.go

@@ -1,143 +0,0 @@
-// Package logfield bounds the client-supplied values this service
-// writes into its logs.
-//
-// Any log field whose content a client picks is spent against a budget
-// here, in ENCODED bytes rather than in the bytes the client sent, so
-// that escaping cannot multiply a field past its nominal size. One
-// budget and one implementation serves the access log in
-// internal/middleware and every other slog call that reaches a
-// client-chosen path, header or form value; a second, ad-hoc
-// truncation somewhere else in the tree is the thing this package
-// exists to prevent.
-package logfield
-
-import (
-	"strings"
-	"unicode"
-	"unicode/utf8"
-)
-
-const (
-	// MaxBytes is the default budget for a log field whose value the
-	// client supplies outright: a URL, a path, a header, a form value.
-	// The budget is spent in ENCODED bytes (see Truncate), so 512 still
-	// holds a real browser's User-Agent whole — those are plain ASCII,
-	// which encodes one byte for one — while a value built from
-	// characters the encoder escapes keeps a shorter prefix. That is
-	// the intended trade: 500 quotation marks are not a debugging
-	// asset.
-	MaxBytes = 512
-
-	// TruncationMarker is appended to any field that was cut, so a
-	// short value and a truncated one cannot be confused. It is charged
-	// on top of the budget, not inside it.
-	TruncationMarker = "[truncated]"
-)
-
-// EncodedBytes is what r costs on the line once the log handler has
-// escaped it, taking the worse of the two handlers internal/logger
-// configures.
-//
-// slog's JSON handler escapes quote, backslash, newline, carriage
-// return and tab to two bytes each, and every other C0 control plus
-// LINE SEPARATOR and PARAGRAPH SEPARATOR to a six-byte \u escape; it
-// passes every other rune through as its own UTF-8. Its text handler
-// quotes with strconv.Quote, which spells a non-printable rune below
-// U+10000 as \uXXXX but one at or above U+10000 as \UXXXXXXXX — ten
-// bytes, not six. The text handler is therefore the worse of the two
-// for every non-printable rune, and by four bytes apiece for the
-// 955,086 unassigned, private-use and format code points on planes 1
-// to 16.
-//
-// Charging ten there is what makes the stated line ceilings hold for
-// the tty handler as well: U+1000C encodes as F0 90 80 8C, every byte
-// >= 0x80, which httpguts.ValidHeaderFieldValue accepts and
-// net/textproto does not strip, so a header can be filled with them.
-//
-// Both handlers pass printable runes through as their own UTF-8, so
-// unicode.IsPrint separates the escaped cases from the plain ones for
-// either handler.
-func EncodedBytes(r rune) int {
-	const (
-		// A backslash and the character itself.
-		shortEscapeBytes = 2
-		// \uXXXX, which is also the width of \u00XX.
-		escapedRuneBytes = 6
-		// \UXXXXXXXX, strconv.Quote's spelling of a non-printable
-		// rune outside the basic multilingual plane.
-		escapedAstralRuneBytes = 10
-		// The first code point strconv.Quote spells with \U.
-		firstAstralRune = 0x10000
-	)
-
-	switch {
-	case r == '"' || r == '\\' || r == '\n' || r == '\r' || r == '\t':
-		return shortEscapeBytes
-	case !unicode.IsPrint(r) && r >= firstAstralRune:
-		return escapedAstralRuneBytes
-	case !unicode.IsPrint(r):
-		return escapedRuneBytes
-	default:
-		return utf8.RuneLen(r)
-	}
-}
-
-// Truncate caps s at maxBytes of ENCODED output, marking the value
-// when it cuts.
-//
-// Budgeting raw bytes would not bound the line. Escaping only ever
-// grows a value, so a raw budget spent on characters the encoder
-// escapes buys a field several times its nominal size — and the line
-// is the thing an operator is told to multiply by their request rate.
-// Charging each rune what it will actually cost is what makes a stated
-// ceiling true rather than merely larger. The visible consequence is
-// that an escape-heavy value keeps a shorter prefix than a plain one,
-// which is the correct trade.
-//
-// The result is always valid UTF-8. A cut on a byte boundary can split
-// a multi-byte rune, and a header can carry bytes that were never
-// valid UTF-8 to begin with; both are dropped rather than kept, since
-// an encoder would otherwise spend six bytes replacing each one.
-func Truncate(s string, maxBytes int) string {
-	// No rune encodes to fewer bytes than it occupies, so nothing past
-	// maxBytes raw can fit the budget. Slicing first bounds the scan
-	// below to the budget rather than to the size of the header the
-	// client sent.
-	window, cut := s, false
-	if len(window) > maxBytes {
-		window, cut = window[:maxBytes], true
-	}
-
-	var (
-		kept  strings.Builder
-		spent int
-	)
-
-	for i := 0; i < len(window); {
-		r, size := utf8.DecodeRuneInString(window[i:])
-		if r == utf8.RuneError && size == 1 {
-			i += size
-
-			continue
-		}
-
-		cost := EncodedBytes(r)
-		if spent+cost > maxBytes {
-			cut = true
-
-			break
-		}
-
-		spent += cost
-
-		kept.WriteString(window[i : i+size])
-
-		i += size
-	}
-
-	if !cut {
-		return kept.String()
-	}
-
-	return kept.String() + TruncationMarker
-}

internal/logfield/logfield_test.go

@@ -1,321 +0,0 @@
-package logfield_test
-
-import (
-	"bytes"
-	"io"
-	"log/slog"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-	"unicode/utf8"
-
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logfield"
-)
-
-// budget is the field budget these tests spend. Small enough that a
-// cut is unambiguous, large enough to hold several runes of every
-// width.
-const budget = 64
-
-// sampleRunes is how many runes wide the values in the charge test
-// are. The handlers add a constant per field — a pair of quotes when
-// the value needs quoting — so the per-rune charge is only visible
-// once it is amortised over a run of them.
-const sampleRunes = 64
-
-// quotingSlack is that constant: the pair of quotes a handler adds to
-// a value that needs them and omits from one that does not.
-const quotingSlack = 2
-
-// newHandlers are the two handlers internal/logger can install. Time
-// is dropped so a line's width is a function of its value alone —
-// RFC3339Nano trims trailing zeros, so two consecutive timestamps do
-// not render to the same number of bytes.
-func newHandlers() map[string]func(io.Writer) slog.Handler {
-	opts := &slog.HandlerOptions{
-		Level: slog.LevelDebug,
-		ReplaceAttr: func(_ []string, a slog.Attr) slog.Attr {
-			if a.Key == slog.TimeKey {
-				return slog.Attr{}
-			}
-
-			return a
-		},
-	}
-
-	return map[string]func(io.Writer) slog.Handler{
-		"json": func(w io.Writer) slog.Handler {
-			return slog.NewJSONHandler(w, opts)
-		},
-		"text": func(w io.Writer) slog.Handler {
-			return slog.NewTextHandler(w, opts)
-		},
-	}
-}
-
-// renderedWidth is the number of bytes a handler writes for a line
-// carrying value in a single attribute.
-func renderedWidth(
-	newHandler func(io.Writer) slog.Handler,
-	value string,
-) int {
-	buf := new(bytes.Buffer)
-	slog.New(newHandler(buf)).Info("m", "v", value)
-
-	return buf.Len()
-}
-
-// chargeTestRunes is the set of code points the charge test measures:
-// every rune in the first two planes' worth of the BMP that the
-// handlers are most likely to treat specially, the separators that
-// only slog's JSON handler escapes, and a stratified sample across
-// the rest of Unicode so the astral charge is exercised on more than
-// one hand-picked rune.
-func chargeTestRunes() []rune {
-	const (
-		denseCeiling = 0x800
-		stride       = 1021
-		surrogateLo  = 0xD800
-		surrogateHi  = 0xDFFF
-	)
-
-	var runes []rune
-
-	keep := func(r rune) {
-		if r >= surrogateLo && r <= surrogateHi {
-			return
-		}
-
-		runes = append(runes, r)
-	}
-
-	for r := range rune(denseCeiling) {
-		keep(r)
-	}
-
-	for _, r := range []rune{
-		0x2028, 0x2029, 0x200B, 0x4E00, 0xE000, 0xFFFD,
-		0x1000C, 0x1F600, 0xE0001, 0x10FFFF,
-	} {
-		keep(r)
-	}
-
-	for r := rune(denseCeiling); r <= utf8.MaxRune; r += stride {
-		keep(r)
-	}
-
-	return runes
-}
-
-// TestEncodedBytes_ChargesAtLeastWhatTheHandlersEmit is the property
-// the whole capping scheme rests on: a rune may not cost more on the
-// line than the budget was charged for it. An undercharged rune is
-// how a stated ceiling becomes false without any test noticing, so
-// the charge is measured against what the handlers actually write
-// rather than against the escaping rules as read.
-func TestEncodedBytes_ChargesAtLeastWhatTheHandlersEmit(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	for name, newHandler := range newHandlers() {
-		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			t.Parallel()
-
-			// 'a' is a printable ASCII rune, charged exactly one
-			// byte, so it is the zero point the other runes are
-			// measured against.
-			base := renderedWidth(
-				newHandler, strings.Repeat("a", sampleRunes),
-			)
-
-			for _, r := range chargeTestRunes() {
-				got := renderedWidth(
-					newHandler,
-					strings.Repeat(string(r), sampleRunes),
-				)
-				charged := sampleRunes *
-					(logfield.EncodedBytes(r) - 1)
-
-				require.LessOrEqual(
-					t, got-base, charged+quotingSlack,
-					"U+%04X costs more on the line than "+
-						"EncodedBytes charges for it",
-					r,
-				)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// TestTruncate_SpendsNoMoreThanTheBudget holds the result to the
-// budget in ENCODED bytes, which is the unit the budget is stated in.
-// A raw-byte cap passes the ASCII case here and fails every other
-// one.
-func TestTruncate_SpendsNoMoreThanTheBudget(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	for name, fill := range map[string]string{
-		"plain":     "x",
-		"quote":     `"`,
-		"backslash": `\`,
-		"tab":       "\t",
-		"newline":   "\n",
-		"control":   "\x01",
-		"astral":    "\U0001000C",
-		// U+4E00, a printable multi-byte rune, charged its three
-		// UTF-8 bytes rather than an escape. Spelled numerically
-		// because gosmopolitan rejects Han in a string literal.
-		"cjk": string(rune(0x4E00)),
-	} {
-		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			t.Parallel()
-
-			got := logfield.Truncate(
-				strings.Repeat(fill, budget*8), budget,
-			)
-
-			require.True(
-				t, strings.HasSuffix(
-					got, logfield.TruncationMarker,
-				),
-				"an oversized value must be marked as cut",
-			)
-
-			spent := 0
-			for _, r := range strings.TrimSuffix(
-				got, logfield.TruncationMarker,
-			) {
-				spent += logfield.EncodedBytes(r)
-			}
-
-			assert.LessOrEqual(t, spent, budget)
-			assert.True(t, utf8.ValidString(got))
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// TestTruncate_LeavesShortValuesAlone keeps the marker meaningful: a
-// value that fits comes back byte for byte, so a marked value is
-// always a cut one.
-func TestTruncate_LeavesShortValuesAlone(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	for _, s := range []string{
-		"", "GET", "/source/abc/edit", "Mozilla/5.0 (X11)",
-	} {
-		assert.Equal(t, s, logfield.Truncate(s, budget))
-	}
-}
-
-// TestTruncate_DropsInvalidUTF8 covers the bytes a header can carry
-// that were never valid UTF-8. Keeping them would make the encoder
-// spend six bytes apiece replacing them, which is exactly the
-// amplification the budget exists to prevent.
-func TestTruncate_DropsInvalidUTF8(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	got := logfield.Truncate("a\xffb\xfe\xfec", budget)
-
-	assert.Equal(t, "abc", got)
-	assert.True(t, utf8.ValidString(got))
-}
-
-// encodedCost is what a whole string costs on a line, by the same
-// accounting Truncate spends its budget with.
-func encodedCost(s string) int {
-	total := 0
-	for _, r := range s {
-		total += logfield.EncodedBytes(r)
-	}
-
-	return total
-}
-
-// TestTruncate_SpendsEncodedBytesNotRawBytes is the zero-headroom
-// version of TestTruncate_SpendsNoMoreThanTheBudget above, and of the
-// line-length assertions elsewhere.
-//
-// A line ceiling has slack in it by construction, and a LessOrEqual
-// against the budget cannot tell a budget spent exactly from one
-// spent under. Here the budget is checked against exactly what it
-// bought: a value built from a single rune must keep exactly
-// MaxBytes/EncodedBytes(r) of them, with nothing spare. A raw-byte
-// budget — cost := utf8.RuneLen(r) — fails this for every rune the
-// handlers escape.
-func TestTruncate_SpendsEncodedBytesNotRawBytes(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	for name, r := range map[string]rune{
-		"plain":           'x',
-		"quote":           '"',
-		"backslash":       '\\',
-		"tab":             '\t',
-		"newline":         '\n',
-		"carriage_return": '\r',
-		"c0_control":      '\x01',
-		"del":             '\x7f',
-		// U+2028 LINE SEPARATOR, which only the JSON handler
-		// escapes.
-		"line_separator":      '
',
-		"astral_nonprintable": '\U0001000C',
-		"multibyte_printable": 'é',
-		// U+20AC, a three-byte printable rune, charged its own
-		// UTF-8 bytes rather than an escape.
-		"three_byte_printable": '€',
-		"emoji_printable":      '\U0001F600',
-	} {
-		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			t.Parallel()
-
-			cost := logfield.EncodedBytes(r)
-			want := logfield.MaxBytes / cost
-
-			// Far past the budget under either accounting.
-			in := strings.Repeat(string(r), logfield.MaxBytes*2)
-
-			got := logfield.Truncate(in, logfield.MaxBytes)
-
-			require.True(
-				t, strings.HasSuffix(
-					got, logfield.TruncationMarker,
-				),
-				"a value past the budget must be marked",
-			)
-
-			kept := strings.TrimSuffix(
-				got, logfield.TruncationMarker,
-			)
-
-			assert.Equal(
-				t, want, utf8.RuneCountInString(kept),
-				"budget bought the wrong number of runes at "+
-					"%d encoded bytes each", cost,
-			)
-			assert.LessOrEqual(
-				t, encodedCost(kept), logfield.MaxBytes,
-			)
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// TestTruncate_NeverSplitsARune covers a cut landing inside a
-// multi-byte encoding rather than between two of them.
-func TestTruncate_NeverSplitsARune(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	// U+20AC, three bytes and printable, so a small budget lands
-	// inside an encoding rather than on a boundary.
-	in := strings.Repeat("€", logfield.MaxBytes)
-
-	for b := 1; b <= 16; b++ {
-		got := strings.TrimSuffix(
-			logfield.Truncate(in, b), logfield.TruncationMarker,
-		)
-
-		assert.True(
-			t, utf8.ValidString(got),
-			"budget %d produced invalid UTF-8", b,
-		)
-		assert.LessOrEqual(t, encodedCost(got), b)
-	}
-}

internal/middleware/accesslog_test.go

@@ -376,7 +376,7 @@ func lineSizeCases() map[string]sizeCase {
 
 	// The url field on a 5xx keeps the concrete path, so it reaches its
 	// own budget on the same line as the three header fields. That is
-	// the widest access log line the service can be made to write.
+	// the widest line the service can be made to write.
 	longPath := "/boom/" + strings.Repeat("x", oversizedSegmentBytes)
 	wantLongURL := longPath[:maxFieldBytes] + truncationSuffix
 

internal/middleware/csrf.go

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ import (
 	"net/http"
 
 	"github.com/gorilla/csrf"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logfield"
 )
 
 // CSRFToken retrieves the CSRF token from the request context.
@@ -43,22 +42,9 @@ func isClientTLS(r *http.Request) bool {
 // csrf.Secure option is set at creation time, not per-request.
 func (m *Middleware) CSRF() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
 	csrfErrorHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-		// CSRF is registered ahead of RequireAuth on every route
-		// group that uses it, so this WARN is reachable by an
-		// unauthenticated client: a POST with no token to
-		// /source/<any length of any text>/edit lands here. The
-		// method and path are capped against the same budgets as
-		// the access log. remote_addr is set by net/http from the
-		// accepted connection rather than by the client, and
-		// csrf.FailureReason returns one of gorilla/csrf's own
-		// fixed error values, so neither is client-sized.
 		m.log.Warn("csrf: token validation failed",
-			"method", logfield.Truncate(
+			"method", r.Method,
-				r.Method, maxLogMethodBytes,
+			"path", r.URL.Path,
-			),
-			"path", logfield.Truncate(
-				r.URL.Path, logfield.MaxBytes,
-			),
 			"remote_addr", r.RemoteAddr,
 			"reason", csrf.FailureReason(r),
 		)

internal/middleware/export_test.go

@@ -1,9 +1,7 @@
 package middleware
 
 import (
-	"context"
 	"net/http"
-	"time"
 )
 
 // NewLoggingResponseWriterForTest wraps newLoggingResponseWriter
@@ -37,79 +35,9 @@ func IsClientTLS(r *http.Request) bool {
 	return isClientTLS(r)
 }
 
-// LoginRateLimitConst exposes the loginRateLimit constant: the
+// LoginRateLimitConst exposes the loginRateLimit constant.
-// number of FAILED login attempts one client may make against one
-// submitted username per interval.
 const LoginRateLimitConst = loginRateLimit
 
-// LoginFailureMaxKeysConst exposes the cap on each of the login
-// guard's key sets.
-const LoginFailureMaxKeysConst = loginFailureMaxKeys
-
-// PasswordVerifyConcurrencyConst exposes the bound on concurrent
-// Argon2id verifications.
-const PasswordVerifyConcurrencyConst = passwordVerifyConcurrency
-
-// PasswordVerifyMaxWaitersConst exposes the bound on how many
-// requests may queue for a verification slot.
-const PasswordVerifyMaxWaitersConst = passwordVerifyMaxWaiters
-
-// LoginGuard is the login failure counter and verification
-// semaphore, exposed for direct testing.
-type LoginGuard = loginGuard
-
-// NewLoginGuardForTest builds a guard with test-sized parameters.
-func NewLoginGuardForTest(
-	limit int,
-	interval time.Duration,
-	maxKeys, concurrency, maxWaiters int,
-	wait time.Duration,
-) *LoginGuard {
-	return newLoginGuard(
-		limit, interval, maxKeys, concurrency, maxWaiters, wait,
-	)
-}
-
-// QueuedWaitersForTest reports how many requests are currently
-// queued for a verification slot.
-func (g *LoginGuard) QueuedWaitersForTest() int {
-	return len(g.queue)
-}
-
-// SetNowForTest replaces the guard's clock.
-func (g *LoginGuard) SetNowForTest(now func() time.Time) {
-	g.mu.Lock()
-	defer g.mu.Unlock()
-
-	g.now = now
-}
-
-// FailForTest exposes fail.
-func (g *LoginGuard) FailForTest(clientKey, username string) bool {
-	return g.fail(clientKey, username)
-}
-
-// SucceedForTest exposes succeed.
-func (g *LoginGuard) SucceedForTest(clientKey, username string) {
-	g.succeed(clientKey, username)
-}
-
-// AcquireForTest exposes acquire.
-func (g *LoginGuard) AcquireForTest(
-	ctx context.Context,
-) (func(), bool) {
-	return g.acquire(ctx)
-}
-
-// TrackedKeysForTest reports how many failure counters the guard
-// holds, per-username and per-address respectively.
-func (g *LoginGuard) TrackedKeysForTest() (int, int) {
-	g.mu.Lock()
-	defer g.mu.Unlock()
-
-	return len(g.byUser), len(g.byAddr)
-}
-
 // PasswordChangeRateLimitConst exposes the
 // passwordChangeRateLimit constant.
 const PasswordChangeRateLimitConst = passwordChangeRateLimit

internal/middleware/logbound_test.go

@@ -1,544 +0,0 @@
-package middleware_test
-
-// This file covers the log lines OUTSIDE the access log that carry a
-// client-chosen value. accesslog_test.go bounds the one INFO line the
-// Logging middleware writes; these are the separate slog calls that
-// were never in that sweep and so never got the budget:
-//
-//   - MaxBodySize's 413 rejection, at WARN, registered ahead of
-//     RequireAuth and therefore reachable unauthenticated at a URL of
-//     the client's choosing.
-//   - CSRF's 403 rejection, at WARN, also registered ahead of
-//     RequireAuth.
-//   - The rate limiters' 429 rejection, at WARN, on the
-//     unauthenticated receiver among others.
-//   - RequireAuth's own unauthenticated-request line, at DEBUG.
-//   - RecordLoginFailure's throttle rejection, at WARN. Its cap is
-//     defensive rather than load-bearing today: chi pins the one
-//     route that calls it to the constant path "/pages/login". The
-//     method is exported and takes any *http.Request, so the test
-//     below hands it the request a caller on a parameterised route
-//     would, which is what the cap exists for.
-//
-// Every case here holds the ENCODED line to
-// middleware.MaxAccessLogLineBytes, under both handlers
-// internal/logger can install, against 8 KB of client-chosen text
-// built out of the characters those handlers escape. A budget spent
-// in raw bytes passes the plain-ASCII cases and fails the rest.
-
-import (
-	"bytes"
-	"context"
-	"io"
-	"log/slog"
-	"net/http"
-	"net/http/httptest"
-	"net/url"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
-)
-
-// bodyLimitBytes is the MaxBodySize cap these tests install. Any
-// declared Content-Length above it takes the 413 branch.
-const bodyLimitBytes = 1024
-
-// declaredBodyBytes is the Content-Length an oversize request
-// declares. Nothing is actually sent: the 413 branch fires off the
-// declaration alone, which is what makes the attack free.
-const declaredBodyBytes = bodyLimitBytes * 2
-
-// receiverLimitPerMinute is the per-entrypoint receiver limit these
-// tests install. The aggregate limiter sits at ten times this, so a
-// flood stays under it and the rejections come from the
-// per-entrypoint limiter, which is the one that logs the path.
-const receiverLimitPerMinute = 8
-
-// escapeFills are the characters a client can put in a request that
-// the log handlers then escape, coming out wider than they went in.
-// A budget counted in raw bytes lets any of them buy a field several
-// times its nominal size.
-//
-// U+1000C is the case the JSON handler alone does not reach: it is
-// unassigned, so it is non-printable, and strconv.Quote spells a
-// non-printable rune at or above U+10000 as a ten-byte \UXXXXXXXX
-// while the JSON handler passes its four UTF-8 bytes through. Only
-// the text-handler shape of these tests holds that charge honest.
-func escapeFills() map[string]string {
-	return map[string]string{
-		"plain":     "x",
-		"quote":     `"`,
-		"backslash": `\`,
-		"tab":       "\t",
-		"newline":   "\n",
-		// A C0 control neither handler has a short escape for, so
-		// each one costs six bytes on the line against the single
-		// byte it cost to send. This is the widest multiplier a
-		// client can drive, and the case a raw-byte budget breaks
-		// on first.
-		//
-		// This fill is load-bearing, not decoration. Budgeting raw
-		// bytes instead of encoded is caught by this fill alone,
-		// and only under the JSON handler, at 3,072 bytes against
-		// the 2,560 ceiling. Drop it and that mutation passes.
-		"control": "\x01",
-		"astral":  "\U0001000C",
-	}
-}
-
-// logHandlers are the two handlers internal/logger can install: the
-// JSON one, and the text one it selects when stderr is a tty. They do
-// not escape alike, and MaxAccessLogLineBytes is quoted unqualified,
-// so every case runs through both.
-func logHandlers() map[string]func(
-	io.Writer, *slog.HandlerOptions,
-) slog.Handler {
-	return map[string]func(
-		io.Writer, *slog.HandlerOptions,
-	) slog.Handler{
-		"json": func(
-			w io.Writer, o *slog.HandlerOptions,
-		) slog.Handler {
-			return slog.NewJSONHandler(w, o)
-		},
-		"text": func(
-			w io.Writer, o *slog.HandlerOptions,
-		) slog.Handler {
-			return slog.NewTextHandler(w, o)
-		},
-	}
-}
-
-// oversizedPathSegment builds an 8 KB client-chosen path segment out
-// of repetitions of ch, percent-encoded so it survives URL parsing
-// into r.URL.Path the way it would arriving off a socket.
-//
-// Both markers sit at the END, past every budget, so their absence
-// from the log is what proves the value was cut rather than merely
-// being short. The leading 'x' keeps the segment non-empty for fills
-// that a parser might otherwise fold away.
-func oversizedPathSegment(ch string) string {
-	return url.PathEscape(
-		"x" + strings.Repeat(ch, oversizedSegmentBytes) +
-			attackerMarker + tailMarker,
-	)
-}
-
-// capturingLogger returns a logger at DEBUG writing into the returned
-// buffer through the named handler.
-func capturingLogger(
-	newHandler func(io.Writer, *slog.HandlerOptions) slog.Handler,
-) (*slog.Logger, *bytes.Buffer) {
-	buf := new(bytes.Buffer)
-	opts := &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug}
-
-	return slog.New(newHandler(buf, opts)), buf
-}
-
-// capturingBoundMiddleware builds a Middleware with a real session
-// manager (CSRF needs its key, RequireAuth needs its store) whose log
-// is captured at DEBUG.
-func capturingBoundMiddleware(
-	t *testing.T,
-	newHandler func(io.Writer, *slog.HandlerOptions) slog.Handler,
-) (*middleware.Middleware, *bytes.Buffer) {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	log, buf := capturingLogger(newHandler)
-
-	cfg := &config.Config{
-		Environment:       config.EnvironmentDev,
-		ReceiverRateLimit: receiverLimitPerMinute,
-	}
-
-	sess := newTestSessionManager(cfg, log, nil)
-
-	return middleware.NewForTest(log, cfg, sess), buf
-}
-
-// unreachable is a next-handler that fails the test if the middleware
-// under test let the request through. Every site here rejects.
-func unreachable(t *testing.T) http.Handler {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	return http.HandlerFunc(func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
-		assert.Fail(t, "rejected request reached the next handler")
-	})
-}
-
-// logSite is one non-access-log call site that logs a client-chosen
-// path. drive sends requests at it that all take the rejecting
-// branch; linesPerRequest is how many log lines one such request
-// produces there.
-type logSite struct {
-	// build wraps the site's middleware around a handler that must
-	// not be reached.
-	build func(
-		t *testing.T, m *middleware.Middleware,
-	) http.Handler
-	// send issues one request for the given client-chosen path and
-	// returns the status. Some sites need a warm-up request before
-	// they reject, which send performs itself.
-	send func(h http.Handler, path string) int
-	// wantStatus is the status the rejecting branch answers with.
-	wantStatus int
-}
-
-// postOversize sends a POST whose declared Content-Length exceeds the
-// body limit without sending a body, which is the whole cost of the
-// attack on the MaxBodySize branch.
-func postOversize(h http.Handler, path string) int {
-	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
-		context.Background(), http.MethodPost, path, nil,
-	)
-	req.ContentLength = declaredBodyBytes
-	req.Header.Set(
-		"Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
-	)
-
-	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
-	h.ServeHTTP(w, req)
-
-	return w.Code
-}
-
-// postNoToken sends a POST carrying no CSRF token and no session
-// cookie, which is what an unauthenticated client sends.
-func postNoToken(h http.Handler, path string) int {
-	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
-		context.Background(), http.MethodPost, path,
-		strings.NewReader(""),
-	)
-	req.Header.Set(
-		"Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
-	)
-
-	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
-	h.ServeHTTP(w, req)
-
-	return w.Code
-}
-
-// getNoSession sends a GET with no session cookie.
-func getNoSession(h http.Handler, path string) int {
-	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
-		context.Background(), http.MethodGet, path, nil,
-	)
-
-	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
-	h.ServeHTTP(w, req)
-
-	return w.Code
-}
-
-// logSites enumerates the call sites under test.
-func logSites() map[string]logSite {
-	return map[string]logSite{
-		// The site this file exists for: WARN, on by default, and
-		// registered ahead of RequireAuth.
-		"maxbodysize 413": {
-			build: func(
-				t *testing.T, m *middleware.Middleware,
-			) http.Handler {
-				t.Helper()
-
-				return m.MaxBodySize(bodyLimitBytes)(
-					unreachable(t),
-				)
-			},
-			send:       postOversize,
-			wantStatus: http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge,
-		},
-		// Also ahead of RequireAuth, also WARN.
-		"csrf 403": {
-			build: func(
-				t *testing.T, m *middleware.Middleware,
-			) http.Handler {
-				t.Helper()
-
-				return m.CSRF()(unreachable(t))
-			},
-			send:       postNoToken,
-			wantStatus: http.StatusForbidden,
-		},
-		// The per-entrypoint receiver limiter, unauthenticated. Its
-		// bucket is keyed on the path, so the first request through a
-		// fresh path is served and only the ones after it are
-		// rejected; sendUntilLimited absorbs that.
-		"receiver rate limit 429": {
-			build: func(
-				t *testing.T, m *middleware.Middleware,
-			) http.Handler {
-				t.Helper()
-
-				return m.ReceiverRateLimit()(okHandler())
-			},
-			send:       sendUntilLimited,
-			wantStatus: http.StatusTooManyRequests,
-		},
-		// RequireAuth's own line. DEBUG is off in production by
-		// default, but turning it on to diagnose a flood must not
-		// restore an unbounded write.
-		"requireauth redirect": {
-			build: func(
-				t *testing.T, m *middleware.Middleware,
-			) http.Handler {
-				t.Helper()
-
-				return m.RequireAuth()(unreachable(t))
-			},
-			send:       getNoSession,
-			wantStatus: http.StatusSeeOther,
-		},
-	}
-}
-
-// sendUntilLimited drives the per-entrypoint receiver limiter past
-// its allowance on one path and returns the status of the rejected
-// request. Every request before the last is served, and only the last
-// one logs.
-func sendUntilLimited(h http.Handler, path string) int {
-	code := http.StatusOK
-
-	for range receiverLimitPerMinute + 1 {
-		req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
-			context.Background(), http.MethodPost, path, nil,
-		)
-		req.RemoteAddr = "203.0.113.7:5555"
-
-		w := httptest.NewRecorder()
-		h.ServeHTTP(w, req)
-		code = w.Code
-	}
-
-	return code
-}
-
-// logLines splits the captured buffer into non-empty lines, holding
-// each to bound bytes.
-func logLines(t *testing.T, buf *bytes.Buffer, bound int) []string {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	var lines []string
-
-	for line := range strings.SplitSeq(
-		strings.TrimSpace(buf.String()), "\n",
-	) {
-		if line == "" {
-			continue
-		}
-
-		require.LessOrEqual(
-			t, len(line), bound,
-			"log line exceeded its bound: %s", line,
-		)
-
-		lines = append(lines, line)
-	}
-
-	return lines
-}
-
-// assertNoClientText fails if any marker from the far end of the
-// client-chosen input survived into the log. Their absence is what
-// distinguishes a real cut from a value that merely happened to be
-// short.
-func assertNoClientText(t *testing.T, buf *bytes.Buffer) {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	assert.NotContains(
-		t, buf.String(), attackerMarker,
-		"log carried attacker-chosen text",
-	)
-	assert.NotContains(
-		t, buf.String(), tailMarker,
-		"log carried the tail of the attacker-chosen text",
-	)
-}
-
-// TestLogLines_ClientChosenPathDoesNotSizeTheLine points 8 KB of
-// client-chosen path at each non-access-log call site that logs one,
-// through both handlers and through every character those handlers
-// escape, and holds the resulting line to MaxAccessLogLineBytes.
-//
-// Removing any one of the logfield.Truncate calls at those sites
-// fails this test: the line grows to roughly the size of the input,
-// or to several times it on the escaping fills.
-func TestLogLines_ClientChosenPathDoesNotSizeTheLine(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	for siteName, site := range logSites() {
-		for handlerName, newHandler := range logHandlers() {
-			for fillName, fill := range escapeFills() {
-				name := siteName + "/" + handlerName + "/" + fillName
-
-				t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
-					t.Parallel()
-
-					m, buf := capturingBoundMiddleware(
-						t, newHandler,
-					)
-
-					path := "/source/" +
-						oversizedPathSegment(fill) + "/edit"
-
-					assert.Equal(
-						t,
-						site.wantStatus,
-						site.send(site.build(t, m), path),
-					)
-
-					lines := logLines(
-						t, buf,
-						middleware.MaxAccessLogLineBytes,
-					)
-					require.NotEmpty(
-						t, lines,
-						"the site under test logged nothing, "+
-							"so the bound proves nothing",
-					)
-					assertNoClientText(t, buf)
-				})
-			}
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-// TestLoginThrottle_LogLineDoesNotTrackPathSize pins the cap on
-// RecordLoginFailure's "login failure limit exceeded" WARN line.
-//
-// That site does not fit logSites above: it is not a middleware
-// wrapping a handler but an exported method the login handler calls,
-// and the only route that calls it today is chi's static
-// "/pages/login", so no request through the mux can widen the line.
-// Driving the method directly is therefore the whole point rather
-// than a shortcut — it is exactly the call a second caller on a route
-// with a URL parameter would make, and without this test removing the
-// logfield.Truncate there fails nothing.
-func TestLoginThrottle_LogLineDoesNotTrackPathSize(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	for handlerName, newHandler := range logHandlers() {
-		for fillName, fill := range escapeFills() {
-			t.Run(handlerName+"/"+fillName, func(t *testing.T) {
-				t.Parallel()
-
-				m, buf := capturingBoundMiddleware(
-					t, newHandler,
-				)
-
-				req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
-					context.Background(),
-					http.MethodPost,
-					"/source/"+
-						oversizedPathSegment(fill)+"/login",
-					nil,
-				)
-				req.RemoteAddr = "203.0.113.9:5555"
-
-				// The budget is spent per client and username,
-				// so one more failure than the budget allows is
-				// what takes the throttled branch.
-				var throttled bool
-				for range middleware.LoginRateLimitConst + 1 {
-					throttled = m.RecordLoginFailure(
-						req, "someone",
-					)
-				}
-
-				require.True(
-					t, throttled,
-					"the throttled branch never ran, so the "+
-						"bound proves nothing",
-				)
-
-				lines := logLines(
-					t, buf, middleware.MaxAccessLogLineBytes,
-				)
-				require.NotEmpty(t, lines)
-				assertNoClientText(t, buf)
-			})
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-// TestMaxBodySize_FloodOfOversizePathsDoesNotGrowTheLog is the
-// flood shape from the issue: an unauthenticated client posting
-// oversize declarations at invented 8 KB paths, as fast as it likes.
-//
-// It asserts the property directly rather than by proxy — the bytes
-// the flood writes to the operator's log do not track the bytes the
-// flood sent. The same flood at a one-character path is the control:
-// 8 KB of extra input per request buys at most the field budget, not
-// 8 KB of log.
-func TestMaxBodySize_FloodOfOversizePathsDoesNotGrowTheLog(
-	t *testing.T,
-) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	for handlerName, newHandler := range logHandlers() {
-		for fillName, fill := range escapeFills() {
-			t.Run(handlerName+"/"+fillName, func(t *testing.T) {
-				t.Parallel()
-
-				flood := func(segment func(i int) string) int {
-					m, buf := capturingBoundMiddleware(
-						t, newHandler,
-					)
-					h := m.MaxBodySize(bodyLimitBytes)(
-						unreachable(t),
-					)
-
-					for i := range floodRequests {
-						assert.Equal(
-							t,
-							http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge,
-							postOversize(
-								h,
-								"/source/"+segment(i)+"/edit",
-							),
-						)
-					}
-
-					lines := logLines(
-						t, buf,
-						middleware.MaxAccessLogLineBytes,
-					)
-					require.Len(t, lines, floodRequests)
-					assertNoClientText(t, buf)
-
-					return buf.Len()
-				}
-
-				sent := oversizedSegmentBytes * floodRequests
-
-				oversize := flood(func(i int) string {
-					return oversizedPathSegment(fill) +
-						strings.Repeat("y", i)
-				})
-				control := flood(func(i int) string {
-					return "a" + strings.Repeat("y", i)
-				})
-
-				// The whole point: 8 KB per request of extra
-				// client-chosen input bought a bounded amount of
-				// log, not a proportional amount.
-				assert.Less(
-					t, oversize-control, sent/2,
-					"log volume tracked the size of the flood's "+
-						"input",
-				)
-				assert.LessOrEqual(
-					t,
-					oversize,
-					floodRequests*
-						middleware.MaxAccessLogLineBytes,
-				)
-			})
-		}
-	}
-}

internal/middleware/loginguard.go

@@ -1,409 +0,0 @@
-package middleware
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"crypto/sha256"
-	"encoding/hex"
-	"net/http"
-	"sync"
-	"time"
-
-	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logfield"
-)
-
-const (
-	// loginFailureMaxKeys bounds how many distinct failure counters
-	// each of the guard's two key sets holds. The submitted username
-	// is part of a key, so the key set is attacker-influenced and
-	// needs a hard cap or the limiter becomes the memory
-	// amplification surface it exists to protect.
-	//
-	// A single-admin deployment has a handful of legitimate (client,
-	// username) pairs, so 1024 is three orders of magnitude of
-	// headroom before a real operator can be pushed onto the
-	// fallback. It costs little: a counter is a ~64-byte key string,
-	// a 32-byte window and map overhead, call it 170 bytes, so both
-	// key sets full is 2 * 1024 * 170 bytes, under 0.4 MB.
-	loginFailureMaxKeys = 1024
-
-	// passwordVerifyConcurrency bounds how many Argon2id
-	// verifications may run at once across every password-verifying
-	// endpoint. Because credentials are now verified before any
-	// limiter budget is spent, an attacker can force one hash per
-	// request, and each hash allocates argon2Memory — 64 MB. Two
-	// slots commit at most 128 MB to password hashing, which fits
-	// inside the smallest container this service is realistically
-	// given alongside its own working set; four would commit 256 MB
-	// and crowd it. A single-admin product needs no concurrent
-	// logins at all, so the second slot exists only so that one
-	// stalled request does not serialise the endpoint.
-	passwordVerifyConcurrency = 2
-
-	// passwordVerifyWait is how long a request waits for a
-	// verification slot before it is answered 503. Slots are handed
-	// out in arrival order, so a legitimate request queues behind
-	// the requests already waiting rather than behind the flood as a
-	// whole. The wait is well inside the 60s request timeout.
-	passwordVerifyWait = 5 * time.Second
-
-	// passwordVerifyMaxWaiters bounds how many requests may be
-	// queued for a slot at once. Past it, acquire sheds immediately
-	// with 503 instead of joining the queue.
-	//
-	// The wait bounds how long one request occupies memory; this
-	// bounds how many do so at the same time, and without it the
-	// 128 MB hashing budget above is the smaller half of the real
-	// footprint. At the 400 req/s a saturation attack can offer, an
-	// unbounded queue would park ~2000 requests for the full five
-	// seconds.
-	//
-	// A waiter costs far more than maxFormBodySize suggests: that
-	// caps the raw body read, not what the parse retains. MaxBodySize,
-	// CSRF and ParseForm all run before acquire, so a parked waiter
-	// holds r.Form plus r.PostForm plus its header block for the
-	// whole wait. Measured on the pinned go1.26.1 toolchain, as the
-	// HeapAlloc delta across two GCs with 64 waiters parked in the
-	// handler: an ordinary two-field login form retains ~0 MB, but a
-	// 1 MB urlencoded body at Go's 10,000-parameter parse cap retains
-	// 2.82 MB (3.09 MB with %41 escapes), and adding the ~0.9 MB of
-	// headers httpMaxHeaderBytes allows takes it to 4.18 MB. The
-	// retained parse and the header block dominate; the raw body does
-	// not.
-	//
-	// Arithmetic, from the measured 4.18 MB worst case: 16 waiters
-	// commit ~67 MB of queue memory, and peak commitment for the
-	// endpoint is 128 MB of Argon2id plus the 18 requests that retain
-	// a parsed form — 16 queued and the 2 being hashed — at
-	// 18 * 4.18 MB, so ~75 MB: about 203 MB in all. Cross-check
-	// against the deadline: two slots at the ~27 verifications/s
-	// measured on a review host (with the race detector on, so the
-	// real rate is higher) drain a full 16-deep queue in about 0.6 s,
-	// far inside passwordVerifyWait.
-	//
-	// Those 203 MB are live bytes, not resident bytes: the Go
-	// collector lets the heap reach roughly twice the live set before
-	// collecting, with transient parse garbage on top. The review
-	// measured a peak HeapAlloc of 392 MB against this guard under 18
-	// adversarial requests, so provision on the order of 400 MB rather
-	// than 203 MB.
-	passwordVerifyMaxWaiters = 16
-
-	// failureKeyHashBytes is how much of the username digest goes
-	// into a failure key. 64 bits over at most loginFailureMaxKeys
-	// live keys makes a collision negligible, and a collision would
-	// only merge two usernames' failure counters, which throttles
-	// sooner rather than later.
-	failureKeyHashBytes = 8
-)
-
-// failureWindow counts failed credential verifications for one
-// bucket, and records when that count lapses.
-type failureWindow struct {
-	count   int
-	resetAt time.Time
-}
-
-// loginGuard is what replaced the pre-emptive rate limiter on the
-// login POST.
-//
-// A limiter that spends budget on arrival cannot protect a
-// single-admin product: behind the reverse proxy the deployment
-// requires, with TRUSTED_PROXIES unset, every client keys on the
-// proxy, so a stranger trickling five POSTs a minute keeps the one
-// bucket full and the operator's own correct password is answered 429
-// forever. There is no second administrative path.
-//
-// So budget is spent only by a FAILED verification. A correct
-// password is never throttled, whatever the counters say, which is
-// the only shape that guarantees the operator can get in. Two
-// consequences follow and are handled here:
-//
-//   - Every login request now costs an Argon2id hash, so the number
-//     running concurrently is bounded by slots. Without that bound
-//     this trades an admin lockout for memory exhaustion, which is
-//     strictly worse.
-//   - Counting per (client, username) makes the key set
-//     attacker-influenced, so both key sets are capped. Beyond the
-//     per-username cap, failures fall back to a counter keyed on the
-//     client alone; beyond that cap too, a failure is answered as
-//     throttled without being recorded, since refusing to answer a
-//     wrong password costs the operator nothing.
-type loginGuard struct {
-	mu     sync.Mutex
-	byUser map[string]*failureWindow
-	byAddr map[string]*failureWindow
-
-	slots chan struct{}
-
-	// queue holds one token per request waiting for a slot. A token
-	// is taken non-blockingly, so a request that finds it full is
-	// shed rather than queued, and is given up as soon as the wait
-	// ends however it ends.
-	queue chan struct{}
-
-	limit    int
-	interval time.Duration
-	maxKeys  int
-	wait     time.Duration
-
-	// now is time.Now outside tests.
-	now func() time.Time
-}
-
-// newLoginGuard builds a guard with the given failure limit per
-// interval, key-set cap, verification concurrency, queue depth and
-// slot wait.
-func newLoginGuard(
-	limit int,
-	interval time.Duration,
-	maxKeys, concurrency, maxWaiters int,
-	wait time.Duration,
-) *loginGuard {
-	return &loginGuard{
-		byUser:   make(map[string]*failureWindow),
-		byAddr:   make(map[string]*failureWindow),
-		slots:    make(chan struct{}, concurrency),
-		queue:    make(chan struct{}, maxWaiters),
-		limit:    limit,
-		interval: interval,
-		maxKeys:  maxKeys,
-		wait:     wait,
-		now:      time.Now,
-	}
-}
-
-// acquire reserves a verification slot, waiting up to the guard's
-// wait for one. It reports false when the queue of waiters is
-// already full, when no slot became available in time, or when the
-// request was cancelled while waiting; the caller must then answer
-// 503 without verifying anything. The returned function releases the
-// slot and must be called exactly once.
-//
-// ctx is consulted only once the request has to wait: a slot that is
-// free on arrival is handed out without looking at it, so an
-// already-cancelled request can be granted one. That is deliberate
-// and matches lifecycle.waitDone — the caller abandons the work on
-// its own ctx and releases the slot immediately, so nothing is spent
-// on it, and refusing instead would mean shedding a request with
-// capacity standing free.
-func (g *loginGuard) acquire(ctx context.Context) (func(), bool) {
-	// A free slot is taken before any timer is armed, and before a
-	// queue place is claimed: a request that never waits is not a
-	// waiter. Without this preamble the bounded select below can find
-	// its slot send and an already-expired timer ready at the same
-	// time, and Go picks among ready cases uniformly at random — so a
-	// process descheduled for longer than the wait sheds a request
-	// with slots standing free, which is precisely when shedding is
-	// least defensible.
-	//
-	// This cannot let a late arrival barge past a queued waiter. A
-	// waiter can only be parked on a FULL buffer, and a release
-	// refills that buffer from the head of the send queue under the
-	// channel lock, so the buffer never appears non-full while anyone
-	// is parked and this send fails whenever there is a waiter.
-	select {
-	case g.slots <- struct{}{}:
-		return func() { <-g.slots }, true
-	default:
-	}
-
-	// Shedding past the queue depth is what keeps waiting memory
-	// bounded; the wait alone only bounds how long one waiter holds
-	// its parsed form, not how many hold one at once.
-	select {
-	case g.queue <- struct{}{}:
-	default:
-		return nil, false
-	}
-
-	// Held only for the wait. A request that gets a slot gives its
-	// queue token back before it starts hashing, so the depth is a
-	// bound on waiters rather than on requests in the handler.
-	defer func() { <-g.queue }()
-
-	timer := time.NewTimer(g.wait)
-	defer timer.Stop()
-
-	// The blocking send is deliberate: a receive on a full buffered
-	// channel hands the slot straight to the head of the send queue,
-	// so slots go out in arrival order and a later arrival cannot
-	// barge past a request already waiting.
-	select {
-	case g.slots <- struct{}{}:
-		return func() { <-g.slots }, true
-	case <-timer.C:
-		return nil, false
-	case <-ctx.Done():
-		return nil, false
-	}
-}
-
-// fail records one failed credential verification by clientKey
-// against username, and reports whether this client has now spent
-// its failure budget and should be answered 429.
-func (g *loginGuard) fail(clientKey, username string) bool {
-	g.mu.Lock()
-	defer g.mu.Unlock()
-
-	now := g.now()
-
-	window := g.window(
-		g.byUser, userFailureKey(clientKey, username), now,
-	)
-	if window == nil {
-		window = g.window(g.byAddr, clientKey, now)
-	}
-
-	if window == nil {
-		// Both key sets are full and neither already tracks this
-		// client, so nothing can be counted without unbounded
-		// growth. Answering the failure as throttled is the safe
-		// direction: it never touches a correct password.
-		return true
-	}
-
-	window.count++
-
-	return window.count >= g.limit
-}
-
-// succeed forgives clientKey's failures against username. A correct
-// password clears the counters, so an operator who mistypes several
-// times and then gets it right is not throttled afterwards.
-func (g *loginGuard) succeed(clientKey, username string) {
-	g.mu.Lock()
-	defer g.mu.Unlock()
-
-	delete(g.byUser, userFailureKey(clientKey, username))
-	delete(g.byAddr, clientKey)
-}
-
-// window returns the live counter for key in set, resetting a lapsed
-// one and creating a missing one when the cap allows. It returns nil
-// only when key is absent and set is full even after lapsed entries
-// are swept.
-func (g *loginGuard) window(
-	set map[string]*failureWindow,
-	key string,
-	now time.Time,
-) *failureWindow {
-	window, ok := set[key]
-	if ok {
-		if !now.Before(window.resetAt) {
-			window.count = 0
-			window.resetAt = now.Add(g.interval)
-		}
-
-		return window
-	}
-
-	if len(set) >= g.maxKeys {
-		sweepLapsed(set, now)
-	}
-
-	if len(set) >= g.maxKeys {
-		return nil
-	}
-
-	window = &failureWindow{resetAt: now.Add(g.interval)}
-	set[key] = window
-
-	return window
-}
-
-// sweepLapsed drops counters whose interval has elapsed.
-func sweepLapsed(set map[string]*failureWindow, now time.Time) {
-	for key, window := range set {
-		if !now.Before(window.resetAt) {
-			delete(set, key)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-// userFailureKey identifies one (client, submitted username) pair.
-// The username is hashed rather than embedded: a submitted username
-// is attacker-controlled text of attacker-chosen length, and hashing
-// makes every key the same size whatever was sent.
-func userFailureKey(clientKey, username string) string {
-	sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(username))
-
-	return clientKey + "|" +
-		hex.EncodeToString(sum[:failureKeyHashBytes])
-}
-
-// guard returns the middleware's login guard, building it on first
-// use so that every construction path — fx and the test constructor
-// alike — gets one.
-func (m *Middleware) guard() *loginGuard {
-	m.loginGuardOnce.Do(func() {
-		m.loginGuard = newLoginGuard(
-			loginRateLimit,
-			loginRateInterval,
-			loginFailureMaxKeys,
-			passwordVerifyConcurrency,
-			passwordVerifyMaxWaiters,
-			passwordVerifyWait,
-		)
-	})
-
-	return m.loginGuard
-}
-
-// BeginPasswordVerification reserves one of the bounded Argon2id
-// verification slots. It reports false when the queue of waiting
-// requests is already at passwordVerifyMaxWaiters, or when no slot
-// became free within passwordVerifyWait; in either case the caller
-// must answer 503 and must not verify a password. The returned
-// function releases the slot and must be called exactly once.
-//
-// Every endpoint that hashes a password on request must go through
-// this, or the bound has a hole: the memory is committed per hash,
-// not per endpoint.
-func (m *Middleware) BeginPasswordVerification(
-	ctx context.Context,
-) (func(), bool) {
-	return m.guard().acquire(ctx)
-}
-
-// RecordLoginFailure counts a failed credential verification for the
-// request's client against the submitted username, and reports
-// whether the response should be 429 rather than 401.
-func (m *Middleware) RecordLoginFailure(
-	r *http.Request,
-	username string,
-) bool {
-	throttled := m.guard().fail(m.clientKey(r), username)
-	if throttled {
-		// Truncated even though chi pins this route's path to
-		// the 12-byte constant "/pages/login": RecordLoginFailure
-		// is exported and takes any *http.Request, so a caller on
-		// a route with a URL parameter would otherwise widen this
-		// line. logbound_test.go pins the cap by making exactly
-		// that call, since no request through the mux can.
-		m.log.Warn(
-			"login failure limit exceeded",
-			"path", logfield.Truncate(
-				r.URL.Path, logfield.MaxBytes,
-			),
-		)
-	}
-
-	return throttled
-}
-
-// ForgiveLoginFailures clears the failure counters for the request's
-// client and the submitted username after a successful
-// authentication.
-func (m *Middleware) ForgiveLoginFailures(
-	r *http.Request,
-	username string,
-) {
-	m.guard().succeed(m.clientKey(r), username)
-}
-
-// LoginFailureInterval is how long a spent login failure budget
-// takes to refill, which is what a throttled login answers as
-// Retry-After.
-func (m *Middleware) LoginFailureInterval() time.Duration {
-	return m.guard().interval
-}

internal/middleware/loginguard_test.go

@@ -1,629 +0,0 @@
-package middleware_test
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"fmt"
-	"sync"
-	"sync/atomic"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
-)
-
-// mib converts the Argon2id memory parameter, which is in KiB, to MB.
-const mib = 1024
-
-const (
-	// guardInterval is the failure window these tests use. It is
-	// long enough that nothing lapses mid-test on its own; tests
-	// that need a lapse drive the clock instead.
-	guardInterval = time.Minute
-
-	// guardWait is the slot wait for tests that expect to get a
-	// slot. Tests that expect to be refused set their own.
-	guardWait = 2 * time.Second
-
-	guardClient = "198.51.100.7"
-	guardUser   = "admin"
-
-	// racePasses is how many times a both-cases-ready select race is
-	// run. A pass can only go the wrong way once the zero-duration
-	// timer has fired, so the per-pass detection probability is
-	// somewhere below 1/2 rather than exactly it; the bound that
-	// matters is that passes are independent, so a regression that
-	// survives is exponentially unlikely in N. The test still waits
-	// on nothing.
-	racePasses = 1000
-)
-
-// newGuard builds a guard with production-shaped defaults and the
-// given key-set cap and verification concurrency.
-func newGuard(maxKeys, concurrency int) *middleware.LoginGuard {
-	return middleware.NewLoginGuardForTest(
-		middleware.LoginRateLimitConst,
-		guardInterval,
-		maxKeys,
-		concurrency,
-		middleware.PasswordVerifyMaxWaitersConst,
-		guardWait,
-	)
-}
-
-// TestLoginGuard_ThrottlesRepeatedFailures is the brute-force half:
-// wrong passwords for one username from one client key still run out
-// of budget and are answered 429.
-func TestLoginGuard_ThrottlesRepeatedFailures(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	g := newGuard(middleware.LoginFailureMaxKeysConst, 1)
-
-	for i := range middleware.LoginRateLimitConst - 1 {
-		assert.False(
-			t, g.FailForTest(guardClient, guardUser),
-			"failure %d is still inside the budget", i,
-		)
-	}
-
-	assert.True(
-		t, g.FailForTest(guardClient, guardUser),
-		"the last failure of the budget must throttle",
-	)
-	assert.True(
-		t, g.FailForTest(guardClient, guardUser),
-		"failures past the budget must stay throttled",
-	)
-}
-
-// TestLoginGuard_SuccessForgivesFailures pins the forgiveness rule:
-// an operator who mistypes several times and then gets it right must
-// not be left throttled.
-func TestLoginGuard_SuccessForgivesFailures(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	g := newGuard(middleware.LoginFailureMaxKeysConst, 1)
-
-	for range middleware.LoginRateLimitConst {
-		g.FailForTest(guardClient, guardUser)
-	}
-
-	g.SucceedForTest(guardClient, guardUser)
-
-	assert.False(
-		t, g.FailForTest(guardClient, guardUser),
-		"a success must reset the counter, so the next mistake "+
-			"starts a fresh budget",
-	)
-}
-
-// TestLoginGuard_FailuresAreKeyedPerUsername proves the second half
-// of the keying: one username's spent budget does not throttle
-// another's from the same client.
-func TestLoginGuard_FailuresAreKeyedPerUsername(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	g := newGuard(middleware.LoginFailureMaxKeysConst, 1)
-
-	for range middleware.LoginRateLimitConst {
-		g.FailForTest(guardClient, guardUser)
-	}
-
-	assert.True(t, g.FailForTest(guardClient, guardUser))
-	assert.False(
-		t, g.FailForTest(guardClient, "someone-else"),
-		"a different submitted username must have its own budget",
-	)
-}
-
-// TestLoginGuard_WindowLapses covers the interval: a counter that has
-// gone quiet for the whole window starts again from zero.
-func TestLoginGuard_WindowLapses(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	g := newGuard(middleware.LoginFailureMaxKeysConst, 1)
-
-	var now atomic.Int64
-
-	now.Store(time.Now().UnixNano())
-	g.SetNowForTest(func() time.Time {
-		return time.Unix(0, now.Load())
-	})
-
-	for range middleware.LoginRateLimitConst {
-		g.FailForTest(guardClient, guardUser)
-	}
-
-	assert.True(t, g.FailForTest(guardClient, guardUser))
-
-	now.Add(int64(guardInterval) + 1)
-
-	assert.False(
-		t, g.FailForTest(guardClient, guardUser),
-		"a lapsed window must start a fresh budget",
-	)
-}
-
-// TestLoginGuard_UsernameKeySetIsBounded is the memory bound. The
-// submitted username is attacker-controlled, so an attacker rotating
-// usernames must not be able to grow the guard without limit: past
-// the cap, tracking falls back to a counter keyed on the client
-// address alone.
-func TestLoginGuard_UsernameKeySetIsBounded(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	const (
-		maxKeys  = 8
-		attempts = 500
-	)
-
-	g := newGuard(maxKeys, 1)
-
-	for i := range attempts {
-		g.FailForTest(guardClient, fmt.Sprintf("user-%d", i))
-	}
-
-	byUser, byAddr := g.TrackedKeysForTest()
-
-	assert.LessOrEqual(
-		t, byUser, maxKeys,
-		"the per-username key set must not grow past its cap",
-	)
-	assert.LessOrEqual(
-		t, byAddr, maxKeys,
-		"the fallback key set must not grow past its cap either",
-	)
-	assert.Positive(
-		t, byAddr,
-		"past the cap, failures must fall back to the address "+
-			"bucket rather than being dropped",
-	)
-	assert.Less(
-		t, byUser+byAddr, attempts,
-		"memory must not grow with the number of distinct "+
-			"usernames submitted",
-	)
-}
-
-// TestLoginGuard_BeyondBothCapsStaysThrottled covers the hard stop.
-// When both key sets are full of live counters and the client is in
-// neither, there is nothing to count without unbounded growth, so the
-// failure is answered as throttled. That costs the operator nothing:
-// a correct password never reaches this path.
-func TestLoginGuard_BeyondBothCapsStaysThrottled(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	const maxKeys = 4
-
-	g := newGuard(maxKeys, 1)
-
-	// Fill the per-username set from one client, then fill the
-	// address set from distinct clients.
-	for i := range maxKeys {
-		g.FailForTest(guardClient, fmt.Sprintf("user-%d", i))
-	}
-
-	for i := range maxKeys {
-		g.FailForTest(fmt.Sprintf("203.0.113.%d", i), "whoever")
-	}
-
-	assert.True(
-		t, g.FailForTest("203.0.113.200", "brand-new"),
-		"a client that fits in neither full key set must be "+
-			"answered as throttled rather than tracked",
-	)
-
-	byUser, byAddr := g.TrackedKeysForTest()
-	assert.LessOrEqual(t, byUser, maxKeys)
-	assert.LessOrEqual(t, byAddr, maxKeys)
-}
-
-// TestLoginGuard_SemaphoreBoundsConcurrentVerifications is the memory
-// bound on the hashing itself. Verifying credentials before spending
-// limiter budget means an attacker can force one Argon2id hash per
-// request, and each allocates 64 MB; without this bound the fix for
-// an admin lockout would be a memory-exhaustion DoS instead.
-func TestLoginGuard_SemaphoreBoundsConcurrentVerifications(
-	t *testing.T,
-) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	const (
-		concurrency = 2
-		workers     = 12
-
-		// rendezvousDeadlock is the deadlock guard described below.
-		// It is orders of magnitude longer than any scheduling delay,
-		// so it never decides the result, and well inside script/test's
-		// 30s timeout, so a wedge fails on the assertion instead of
-		// blowing the package timeout.
-		rendezvousDeadlock = 5 * time.Second
-	)
-
-	g := newGuard(middleware.LoginFailureMaxKeysConst, concurrency)
-
-	var (
-		mu       sync.Mutex
-		inside   int
-		highest  int
-		wg       sync.WaitGroup
-		recorded sync.WaitGroup
-		once     sync.Once
-	)
-
-	// Slot holders rendezvous instead of sleeping, and they hold until
-	// every worker has been answered. A sleep only makes overlap
-	// likely — on a host loaded enough to deschedule a goroutine for
-	// longer than the sleep the workers serialise and the maximum
-	// observed comes back as 1 — so the rendezvous is what makes the
-	// overlap a fact rather than a race won.
-	//
-	// The barrier must not open at the concurrency-th holder, which
-	// would fix the lower bound at the cost of the upper one this test
-	// exists to enforce: holders would leave as soon as the count
-	// reached concurrency, so a guard admitting extra requests would
-	// let them arrive after the first holders had already left and
-	// highest would report concurrency however many were really let
-	// in. It opens instead once every worker's acquire has returned
-	// and any slot it won has been counted, so under a broken guard
-	// every admitted worker is inside simultaneously and highest is
-	// the true maximum. Under a correct guard the refused workers
-	// return within the guard's own wait, which decides nothing beyond
-	// how long that takes.
-	overlapped := make(chan struct{})
-	closeOverlapped := func() {
-		once.Do(func() { close(overlapped) })
-	}
-
-	// Deadlock guard, not a timing margin: no assertion depends on its
-	// length, and the only way to reach it is a worker that never
-	// returns from acquire at all. It is here so that such a wedge
-	// fails legibly on the assertion below instead of hanging until
-	// the package test timeout.
-	abandon := time.AfterFunc(rendezvousDeadlock, closeOverlapped)
-	defer abandon.Stop()
-
-	recorded.Add(workers)
-
-	go func() {
-		recorded.Wait()
-		closeOverlapped()
-	}()
-
-	for range workers {
-		wg.Go(func() {
-			release, ok := g.AcquireForTest(context.Background())
-			if !ok {
-				recorded.Done()
-
-				return
-			}
-
-			defer release()
-
-			mu.Lock()
-
-			inside++
-			if inside > highest {
-				highest = inside
-			}
-
-			mu.Unlock()
-
-			// Counted before signalling, so the barrier can never open
-			// while an admitted worker is still on its way to being
-			// counted.
-			recorded.Done()
-
-			<-overlapped
-
-			mu.Lock()
-			inside--
-			mu.Unlock()
-		})
-	}
-
-	wg.Wait()
-
-	mu.Lock()
-	defer mu.Unlock()
-
-	assert.Equal(
-		t, concurrency, highest,
-		"no more than %d verifications may run at once", concurrency,
-	)
-}
-
-// TestLoginGuard_SaturatedSemaphoreRefusesRatherThanQueueing pins
-// what happens when every slot is taken for longer than the wait: the
-// request is refused, so the caller answers 503 without allocating
-// another 64 MB hash.
-//
-// Neither half of this rides on the wait being long enough. The
-// refusal holds the only slot across the whole of the second call, so
-// there is no wait it could get lucky with — the wait fixes only how
-// long the refusal takes, not whether it happens. The reuse after
-// release is settled by acquire's non-blocking preamble, which is
-// pinned separately by TestLoginGuard_FreeSlotBeatsAnExpiredWait. So
-// the wait below is sized to keep the test quick, not to win a race.
-func TestLoginGuard_SaturatedSemaphoreRefusesRatherThanQueueing(
-	t *testing.T,
-) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	g := middleware.NewLoginGuardForTest(
-		middleware.LoginRateLimitConst,
-		guardInterval,
-		middleware.LoginFailureMaxKeysConst,
-		1,
-		middleware.PasswordVerifyMaxWaitersConst,
-		10*time.Millisecond,
-	)
-
-	release, ok := g.AcquireForTest(context.Background())
-	require.True(t, ok, "the first acquire must get the only slot")
-
-	_, ok = g.AcquireForTest(context.Background())
-	assert.False(
-		t, ok,
-		"with the only slot held, a second request must be refused "+
-			"rather than wait indefinitely",
-	)
-
-	release()
-
-	release, ok = g.AcquireForTest(context.Background())
-
-	// require, not assert: acquire returns a nil release alongside a
-	// false ok, so calling it after a non-fatal assertion turns one
-	// failed test into a segfault that takes the whole package test
-	// binary down. Every assertion whose value is dereferenced later
-	// has to stop the test.
-	require.True(
-		t, ok, "the slot must be reusable once released",
-	)
-
-	release()
-}
-
-// TestLoginGuard_FreeSlotBeatsAnExpiredWait is the determinism this
-// file used to lack. acquire selects over a slot send and a wait
-// timer, and Go chooses among ready cases uniformly at random, so a
-// call made after the timer had already fired was a coin flip: on a
-// loaded host the previous test's third acquire could be refused
-// with its slot standing free, and then dereference the nil release
-// it got back.
-//
-// The wait here is already elapsed on arrival, which is the worst
-// case that scheduling can produce, so a free slot must still be
-// granted every time. Without acquire's non-blocking preamble each
-// pass is an independent coin flip and the loop fails within a few
-// passes; with it the property holds by construction and no wall
-// clock is involved.
-func TestLoginGuard_FreeSlotBeatsAnExpiredWait(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	g := middleware.NewLoginGuardForTest(
-		middleware.LoginRateLimitConst,
-		guardInterval,
-		middleware.LoginFailureMaxKeysConst,
-		1,
-		middleware.PasswordVerifyMaxWaitersConst,
-		0,
-	)
-
-	for pass := range racePasses {
-		release, ok := g.AcquireForTest(context.Background())
-		require.Truef(
-			t, ok,
-			"pass %d was refused a slot that was free; an expired "+
-				"wait must never beat an available slot",
-			pass,
-		)
-
-		release()
-	}
-}
-
-// TestLoginGuard_AcquireHonoursCancellation proves a client that
-// disconnects while queued frees its place immediately instead of
-// holding it for the full wait.
-func TestLoginGuard_AcquireHonoursCancellation(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	g := newGuard(middleware.LoginFailureMaxKeysConst, 1)
-
-	release, ok := g.AcquireForTest(context.Background())
-	require.True(t, ok)
-
-	defer release()
-
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
-	cancel()
-
-	_, ok = g.AcquireForTest(ctx)
-	assert.False(
-		t, ok, "a cancelled request must not wait for a slot",
-	)
-}
-
-// TestPasswordVerifyConcurrency_MatchesMemoryBudget pins the
-// concurrency constant to the arithmetic behind it: the number of
-// slots is the hashing budget divided by what one Argon2id hash
-// actually costs.
-//
-// The per-hash figure is read out of the shipped password
-// parameters rather than copied here. A guard that asserts a literal
-// against a literal cannot see the thing it guards: raising
-// argon2Memory would leave it green while the real ceiling doubled.
-func TestPasswordVerifyConcurrency_MatchesMemoryBudget(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	// Memory is the real argon2Memory, in KiB.
-	perHashMB := int(database.DefaultPasswordConfig().Memory) / mib
-
-	require.Positive(
-		t, perHashMB,
-		"the Argon2id memory parameter must be readable in MB",
-	)
-
-	// The memory this service commits to password hashing.
-	const budgetMB = 128
-
-	assert.Equal(
-		t,
-		middleware.PasswordVerifyConcurrencyConst,
-		budgetMB/perHashMB,
-		"the verification concurrency must be the %d MB hashing "+
-			"budget divided by the %d MB one Argon2id hash costs; "+
-			"if the Argon2id parameters changed, the slot count "+
-			"must change with them",
-		budgetMB, perHashMB,
-	)
-}
-
-// TestLoginGuard_ShedsPastTheQueueCap pins the memory bound on
-// waiting, as distinct from the bound on hashing. A waiter arrives
-// with its form already parsed, and the retained parse plus its
-// header block cost several MB — far more than maxFormBodySize
-// suggests, since that caps only the raw body read — so an unbounded
-// queue would hold that much per waiting request for the whole wait;
-// past the cap the guard must refuse instantly rather than grow.
-func TestLoginGuard_ShedsPastTheQueueCap(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	const (
-		maxWaiters = 2
-
-		// Long enough that a queued waiter never times out on its
-		// own, so anything the test observes leaving the queue left
-		// because it was shed.
-		neverElapses = time.Minute
-
-		// The probe carries its own deadline, so a guard that queues
-		// the probe instead of shedding it fails here rather than
-		// hanging until the package test timeout.
-		//
-		// This is a patience budget, not a margin to be won. A shed
-		// returns in microseconds and a probe that queued instead
-		// would not return for neverElapses, so the two are a whole
-		// minute apart and any budget between them separates them. It
-		// is set far above any scheduling stall a loaded host can
-		// produce, because the previous 200 ms — and the 100 ms
-		// elapsed-time assertion it fed — bounded the latency of a
-		// goroutine hand-off, which is a false red waiting to happen
-		// on the machine this suite runs on. What actually proves the
-		// probe was not queued is the queue depth asserted below.
-		probePatience = 5 * time.Second
-	)
-
-	g := middleware.NewLoginGuardForTest(
-		middleware.LoginRateLimitConst,
-		guardInterval,
-		middleware.LoginFailureMaxKeysConst,
-		1,
-		maxWaiters,
-		neverElapses,
-	)
-
-	// Occupy the only slot, so everything after this queues.
-	release, ok := g.AcquireForTest(context.Background())
-	require.True(t, ok)
-
-	defer release()
-	defer fillQueue(t, g, maxWaiters)()
-
-	granted, answered := probeQueueCap(g, probePatience)
-
-	require.True(
-		t, answered,
-		"a request arriving past the queue cap is still waiting to "+
-			"be queued; it must have been shed",
-	)
-	assert.False(
-		t, granted,
-		"a request arriving past the queue cap must be shed",
-	)
-	assert.Equal(
-		t, maxWaiters, g.QueuedWaitersForTest(),
-		"a shed request must not have grown the queue",
-	)
-}
-
-// fillQueue starts n waiters on g and returns once all of them are
-// queued for a slot. The returned function releases them and waits
-// for them to exit.
-func fillQueue(
-	t *testing.T,
-	g *middleware.LoginGuard,
-	n int,
-) func() {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
-
-	var wg sync.WaitGroup
-
-	for range n {
-		wg.Go(func() {
-			done, got := g.AcquireForTest(ctx)
-			if got {
-				done()
-			}
-		})
-	}
-
-	// Patience budget, not a margin: the waiters park in microseconds
-	// and nothing releases them, so the only way to exhaust this is a
-	// guard that never queues. One second is the same order as the
-	// scheduling stalls this suite has to survive, so it is not one.
-	require.Eventually(
-		t,
-		func() bool { return g.QueuedWaitersForTest() == n },
-		5*time.Second, time.Millisecond,
-		"the waiters must reach the queue before the cap is tested",
-	)
-
-	return func() {
-		cancel()
-		wg.Wait()
-	}
-}
-
-// probeQueueCap acquires from another goroutine. It reports, in
-// order, whether the call was granted a slot and whether it was
-// answered at all within wait; a call that never returned reports
-// false for both.
-//
-// It runs off the test goroutine deliberately. Joining a full queue
-// is not cancellable by context — refusing to join is the property
-// under test — so a guard that fails this would otherwise hang the
-// package until the test timeout instead of failing here.
-//
-// It reports no elapsed time. Timing a goroutine hand-off measures
-// the host, not the guard, and the caller distinguishes shedding from
-// queueing by the queue depth instead.
-func probeQueueCap(
-	g *middleware.LoginGuard,
-	wait time.Duration,
-) (bool, bool) {
-	probed := make(chan bool, 1)
-
-	go func() {
-		release, ok := g.AcquireForTest(context.Background())
-		if ok {
-			release()
-		}
-
-		probed <- ok
-	}()
-
-	select {
-	case result := <-probed:
-		return result, true
-	case <-time.After(wait):
-		return false, false
-	}
-}

internal/middleware/middleware.go

@@ -6,8 +6,10 @@ import (
 	"log/slog"
 	"net"
 	"net/http"
-	"sync"
+	"strings"
 	"time"
+	"unicode"
+	"unicode/utf8"
 
 	basicauth "github.com/99designs/basicauth-go"
 	"github.com/go-chi/chi"
@@ -19,7 +21,6 @@ import (
 	"go.uber.org/fx"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/globals"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logfield"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
 )
@@ -42,6 +43,16 @@ const (
 	// pick the size of the line it writes.
 	redactedQuery = "?(redacted)"
 
+	// maxLogFieldBytes bounds each access log field whose value the
+	// client supplies outright: the URL, the User-Agent and the
+	// Referer. The budget is spent in ENCODED bytes (see
+	// truncateLogField), so 512 still holds a real browser's User-Agent
+	// whole — those are plain ASCII, which encodes one byte for one —
+	// while a value built from characters the encoder escapes keeps a
+	// shorter prefix. That is the intended trade: 500 quotation marks
+	// are not a debugging asset.
+	maxLogFieldBytes = 512
+
 	// maxLogRequestIDBytes bounds the request id, which is also
 	// client-supplied: chi's RequestID middleware passes an inbound
 	// X-Request-Id header through verbatim. Its generated form is an
@@ -54,10 +65,15 @@ const (
 	// is half this.
 	maxLogMethodBytes = 32
 
+	// truncationMarker is appended to any field the access log cut, so
+	// a short value and a truncated one cannot be confused. It is
+	// charged on top of the budget, not inside it.
+	truncationMarker = "[truncated]"
+
 	// MaxAccessLogLineBytes is the ceiling on one JSON access log line,
 	// and the number an operator multiplies by the request rate to size
 	// log storage. It is not an observation of a sample: it is the sum
-	// of the budgets above, each of which logfield.Truncate enforces in
+	// of the budgets above, each of which truncateLogField enforces in
 	// ENCODED bytes, plus the part of the line no client can influence.
 	//
 	//	url, useragent, referer   3*(512+11) = 1569
@@ -67,9 +83,6 @@ const (
 	//	                                        ----
 	//	                                        2087
 	//
-	// The 512 is logfield.MaxBytes; the 11 is the truncation marker,
-	// charged on top of each budget rather than inside it.
-	//
 	// The fixed portion is the JSON punctuation, the field names, the
 	// level and the message, both timestamps at their longest, an IPv6
 	// remoteIP with a zone, a three-digit status and a full-width int64
@@ -77,68 +90,13 @@ const (
 	// than sitting on the arithmetic.
 	//
 	// The tty text handler in internal/logger is covered by the same
-	// figure. logfield.EncodedBytes charges every rune at least what
+	// figure. encodedLogFieldBytes charges every rune at least what
 	// the wider of the two handlers emits for it — including the ten
 	// bytes strconv.Quote spends on a non-printable rune at or above
 	// U+10000, which is four more than the JSON handler ever spends —
 	// so each budget bounds the encoded field under either handler.
 	// The text handler's fixed portion is 286, the smaller of the two,
 	// which puts its worst case at 2037.
-	//
-	// It is also the ceiling on every OTHER line this service writes
-	// THROUGH SLOG that carries text an UNAUTHENTICATED client
-	// supplies. Those lines — the MaxBodySize rejection, the CSRF
-	// rejection, the rate-limit rejection, the unauthenticated-request
-	// and unknown-entrypoint DEBUG lines, the failed-login DEBUG
-	// lines, and the two login-throttle WARN lines ("login failure
-	// limit exceeded" in loginguard.go and "password verification
-	// capacity exhausted" in internal/handlers/auth.go) — spend the
-	// same per-field budgets, and each carries strictly fewer
-	// client-supplied fields than the access log does,
-	// so none of them can reach a width the access log cannot. That is
-	// asserted directly, per line and under both handlers, rather than
-	// left to the reasoning: see logbound_test.go in this package and
-	// in internal/handlers.
-	//
-	// The two login-throttle lines are capped defensively: chi pins
-	// their route to the constant path "/pages/login", so no request
-	// through the mux can widen either one. Their assertions call
-	// RecordLoginFailure and the login handler directly with the path
-	// a caller on a parameterised route would supply, which is the
-	// only way those caps can be pinned at all.
-	//
-	// One writer in that set is not a handler's own slog call. The
-	// GORM adapter in internal/gormlog logs the statement with the
-	// client-chosen parameter already interpolated into it, which on
-	// the receiver and login lookups is exactly the value the budgets
-	// above exist for. Its widest line spends two logfield.MaxBytes
-	// budgets — the statement and the driver error — against a fixed
-	// portion smaller than this one's, and
-	// internal/gormlog/gormlog_test.go asserts every line it emits
-	// against this constant directly rather than leaving it as
-	// arithmetic.
-	//
-	// What it does NOT cover, so that the figure above is not read as
-	// more than it is:
-	//
-	//   - Lines carrying an AUTHENTICATED operator's own input, which
-	//     are not truncated at all: the webhook name on "webhook
-	//     created" and the target host on "target URL blocked by SSRF
-	//     protection" (both internal/handlers/source_management.go),
-	//     and target_name in internal/delivery/engine.go and
-	//     target_http.go. Each is bounded only by the 1 MB form body
-	//     cap, so a 100 KB name writes one line of roughly 600 KB.
-	//     Deliberate: truncating the operator's own configuration
-	//     echoed back costs debuggability against no adversary.
-	//   - The "log" delivery target, which exists to write the whole
-	//     inbound event to the log. Deliberate; see
-	//     internal/delivery/target_log.go.
-	//   - The record a recovered panic writes, which is not an access
-	//     log line: its client-supplied fields are charged the same
-	//     budgets, but it carries a whole goroutine stack as well and
-	//     is wider than this figure. It has its own stated ceiling,
-	//     MaxPanicLogLineBytes in recoverer.go, and is written once
-	//     per recovered panic rather than once per request.
 	MaxAccessLogLineBytes = 2560
 )
 
@@ -158,12 +116,6 @@ type Middleware struct {
 	log     *slog.Logger
 	params  *MiddlewareParams
 	session *session.Session
-
-	// loginGuard counts failed credential verifications and bounds
-	// concurrent password hashing. It is built on first use so that
-	// every construction path gets one; see guard().
-	loginGuardOnce sync.Once
-	loginGuard     *loginGuard
 }
 
 // New creates a Middleware from the provided fx parameters.
@@ -215,6 +167,114 @@ func (lrw *loggingResponseWriter) WriteHeader(code int) {
 	lrw.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(code)
 }
 
+// encodedLogFieldBytes is what r costs on the line once the log
+// handler has escaped it, taking the worse of the two handlers
+// internal/logger configures.
+//
+// slog's JSON handler escapes quote, backslash, newline, carriage
+// return and tab to two bytes each, and every other C0 control plus
+// LINE SEPARATOR and PARAGRAPH SEPARATOR to a six-byte \u escape; it
+// passes every other rune through as its own UTF-8. Its text handler
+// quotes with strconv.Quote, which spells a non-printable rune below
+// U+10000 as \uXXXX but one at or above U+10000 as \UXXXXXXXX — ten
+// bytes, not six. The text handler is therefore the worse of the two
+// for every non-printable rune, and by four bytes apiece for the
+// 955,086 unassigned, private-use and format code points on planes 1
+// to 16.
+//
+// Charging ten there is what makes MaxAccessLogLineBytes hold for the
+// tty handler as well: U+1000C encodes as F0 90 80 8C, every byte
+// >= 0x80, which httpguts.ValidHeaderFieldValue accepts and
+// net/textproto does not strip, so a header can be filled with them.
+//
+// Both handlers pass printable runes through as their own UTF-8, so
+// unicode.IsPrint separates the escaped cases from the plain ones for
+// either handler.
+func encodedLogFieldBytes(r rune) int {
+	const (
+		// A backslash and the character itself.
+		shortEscapeBytes = 2
+		// \uXXXX, which is also the width of \u00XX.
+		escapedRuneBytes = 6
+		// \UXXXXXXXX, strconv.Quote's spelling of a non-printable
+		// rune outside the basic multilingual plane.
+		escapedAstralRuneBytes = 10
+		// The first code point strconv.Quote spells with \U.
+		firstAstralRune = 0x10000
+	)
+
+	switch {
+	case r == '"' || r == '\\' || r == '\n' || r == '\r' || r == '\t':
+		return shortEscapeBytes
+	case !unicode.IsPrint(r) && r >= firstAstralRune:
+		return escapedAstralRuneBytes
+	case !unicode.IsPrint(r):
+		return escapedRuneBytes
+	default:
+		return utf8.RuneLen(r)
+	}
+}
+
+// truncateLogField caps s at maxBytes of ENCODED output, marking the
+// value when it cuts.
+//
+// Budgeting raw bytes would not bound the line. Escaping only ever
+// grows a value, so a raw budget spent on characters the encoder
+// escapes buys a field several times its nominal size — and the line
+// is the thing an operator is told to multiply by their request rate.
+// Charging each rune what it will actually cost is what makes
+// MaxAccessLogLineBytes true rather than merely larger. The visible
+// consequence is that an escape-heavy value keeps a shorter prefix
+// than a plain one, which is the correct trade.
+//
+// The result is always valid UTF-8. A cut on a byte boundary can split
+// a multi-byte rune, and a header can carry bytes that were never
+// valid UTF-8 to begin with; both are dropped rather than kept, since
+// an encoder would otherwise spend six bytes replacing each one.
+func truncateLogField(s string, maxBytes int) string {
+	// No rune encodes to fewer bytes than it occupies, so nothing past
+	// maxBytes raw can fit the budget. Slicing first bounds the scan
+	// below to the budget rather than to the size of the header the
+	// client sent.
+	window, cut := s, false
+	if len(window) > maxBytes {
+		window, cut = window[:maxBytes], true
+	}
+
+	var (
+		kept  strings.Builder
+		spent int
+	)
+
+	for i := 0; i < len(window); {
+		r, size := utf8.DecodeRuneInString(window[i:])
+		if r == utf8.RuneError && size == 1 {
+			i += size
+
+			continue
+		}
+
+		cost := encodedLogFieldBytes(r)
+		if spent+cost > maxBytes {
+			cut = true
+
+			break
+		}
+
+		spent += cost
+
+		kept.WriteString(window[i : i+size])
+
+		i += size
+	}
+
+	if !cut {
+		return kept.String()
+	}
+
+	return kept.String() + truncationMarker
+}
+
 // concreteLogURL renders the request's own URL for the access log
 // branches that keep it, with the query string replaced by a fixed
 // marker.
@@ -308,21 +368,21 @@ func (s *Middleware) Logging() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
 				// line does not track the size of the request.
 				s.log.Info("http request",
 					"request_start", start,
-					"method", logfield.Truncate(
+					"method", truncateLogField(
 						r.Method, maxLogMethodBytes,
 					),
-					"url", logfield.Truncate(
+					"url", truncateLogField(
 						accessLogURL(r, lrw.statusCode),
-						logfield.MaxBytes,
+						maxLogFieldBytes,
 					),
-					"useragent", logfield.Truncate(
+					"useragent", truncateLogField(
-						r.UserAgent(), logfield.MaxBytes,
+						r.UserAgent(), maxLogFieldBytes,
 					),
-					"request_id", logfield.Truncate(
+					"request_id", truncateLogField(
 						requestID, maxLogRequestIDBytes,
 					),
-					"referer", logfield.Truncate(
+					"referer", truncateLogField(
-						r.Referer(), logfield.MaxBytes,
+						r.Referer(), maxLogFieldBytes,
 					),
 					"proto", r.Proto,
 					"remoteIP", ipFromHostPort(r.RemoteAddr),
@@ -390,21 +450,10 @@ func (s *Middleware) RequireAuth() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
 			// session lands here and is sent back to the login
 			// page.
 			if !s.session.IsAuthenticated(sess) {
-				// This is the unauthenticated branch, so both
-				// fields are entirely client-chosen and neither
-				// is bounded by anything the router did. DEBUG
-				// is off by default, but turning it on to
-				// diagnose a problem must not hand a client an
-				// unbounded write into the log, so the same
-				// budgets apply here as in the access log.
 				s.log.Debug(
 					"auth middleware: unauthenticated request",
-					"path", logfield.Truncate(
+					"path", r.URL.Path,
-						r.URL.Path, logfield.MaxBytes,
+					"method", r.Method,
-					),
-					"method", logfield.Truncate(
-						r.Method, maxLogMethodBytes,
-					),
 				)
 				http.Redirect(
 					w, r, "/pages/login", http.StatusSeeOther,
@@ -564,26 +613,10 @@ func (s *Middleware) MaxBodySize(
 			}
 
 			if r.ContentLength > maxBytes {
-				// This runs ahead of RequireAuth (see
-				// setupUserRoutes and friends in
-				// internal/server/routes.go), so an
-				// unauthenticated client reaches it with a path
-				// of its own choosing and its own length —
-				// POST /source/<8 KB>/edit with an oversize
-				// declared Content-Length costs nothing to
-				// send. At WARN, on by default, that is a
-				// write into the operator's log sized by the
-				// attacker unless the path is capped. Same
-				// budgets as the access log, so this line
-				// cannot be wider than that one.
 				s.log.Warn(
 					"request body exceeds limit",
-					"method", logfield.Truncate(
+					"method", r.Method,
-						r.Method, maxLogMethodBytes,
+					"path", r.URL.Path,
-					),
-					"path", logfield.Truncate(
-						r.URL.Path, logfield.MaxBytes,
-					),
 					"content_length", r.ContentLength,
 					"limit", maxBytes,
 				)

internal/middleware/middleware_test.go

@@ -57,21 +57,7 @@ func testMiddlewareWithSessionClock(
 		SessionIdleTimeout: idleTimeout,
 	}
 
-	sessManager := newTestSessionManager(cfg, log, clock)
+	// Create a real session manager with a known key
-
-	m := middleware.NewForTest(log, cfg, sessManager)
-
-	return m, sessManager, clock
-}
-
-// newTestSessionManager builds the real session.Session the
-// middleware tests run against: an in-memory cookie store with a
-// known key, and optionally a manually advanced clock.
-func newTestSessionManager(
-	cfg *config.Config,
-	log *slog.Logger,
-	clock *fakeClock,
-) *session.Session {
 	key := make([]byte, testKeySize)
 
 	for i := range key {
@@ -93,7 +79,11 @@ func newTestSessionManager(
 		now = clock.Now
 	}
 
-	return session.NewForTest(store, cfg, log, key, now)
+	sessManager := session.NewForTest(store, cfg, log, key, now)
+
+	m := middleware.NewForTest(log, cfg, sessManager)
+
+	return m, sessManager, clock
 }
 
 // fakeClock is a manually advanced clock, so session expiry can be

internal/middleware/ratelimit.go

@@ -9,19 +9,14 @@ import (
 	"time"
 
 	"github.com/go-chi/httprate"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logfield"
 )
 
 const (
-	// loginRateLimit is the maximum number of FAILED login attempts
+	// loginRateLimit is the maximum number of login attempts
-	// one client may make against one submitted username per
+	// per interval.
-	// interval before further failures are answered 429. Successful
-	// attempts are never counted and never throttled — see
-	// loginGuard.
 	loginRateLimit = 5
 
-	// loginRateInterval is the time window for the login failure
+	// loginRateInterval is the time window for the rate limit.
-	// limit.
 	loginRateInterval = 1 * time.Minute
 
 	// passwordChangeRateLimit is the maximum number of password
@@ -221,27 +216,16 @@ func (m *Middleware) clientKey(r *http.Request) string {
 	return bucketKey(peer)
 }
 
-// tooManyRequests returns the 429 handler used by the
+// tooManyRequests returns the 429 handler used by the login,
 // password-change and per-entrypoint receiver limiters: it logs the
 // rejection with logMessage and answers with responseMessage.
 // httprate adds the Retry-After header (RFC 6585). The aggregate
 // receiver limiter uses floodTooManyRequests instead.
-//
-// The path is capped against the same budget as the access log's url
-// field. The per-entrypoint receiver limiter is unauthenticated and
-// its path is a client-chosen segment of client-chosen length, so at
-// WARN an uncapped path would let a sender pick the size of the line
-// it writes — the same defect the access log capping closed.
 func (m *Middleware) tooManyRequests(
 	logMessage, responseMessage string,
 ) http.HandlerFunc {
 	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-		m.log.Warn(
+		m.log.Warn(logMessage, "path", r.URL.Path)
-			logMessage,
-			"path", logfield.Truncate(
-				r.URL.Path, logfield.MaxBytes,
-			),
-		)
 		http.Error(w, responseMessage, http.StatusTooManyRequests)
 	}
 }
@@ -271,15 +255,26 @@ func (m *Middleware) floodTooManyRequests(
 	}
 }
 
+// LoginRateLimit returns middleware that enforces per-IP rate
+// limiting on login attempts using go-chi/httprate. Only POST
+// requests are rate-limited; GET requests (rendering the login
+// form) pass through unaffected. When the rate limit is exceeded,
+// a 429 Too Many Requests response is returned. Clients are
+// identified by rateLimitKey.
+func (m *Middleware) LoginRateLimit() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
+	return m.postRateLimit(
+		loginRateLimit,
+		loginRateInterval,
+		"login rate limit exceeded",
+		"Too many login attempts. Please try again later.",
+	)
+}
+
 // PasswordChangeRateLimit returns middleware that enforces
 // per-IP rate limiting on password change attempts. The change
 // endpoint verifies the current password, so without a limit a
-// stolen session could be used to brute-force it.
+// stolen session could be used to brute-force it; the limit
-//
+// matches the login endpoint's.
-// Unlike the login POST this limit is still spent on arrival, which
-// is safe here: RequireAuth runs ahead of it, so only a request
-// already carrying a valid session can reach the bucket, and an
-// operator locked out of changing a password can still log in.
 func (m *Middleware) PasswordChangeRateLimit() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
 	return m.postRateLimit(
 		passwordChangeRateLimit,

internal/middleware/ratelimit_test.go

@@ -20,14 +20,14 @@ import (
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
 )
 
-func TestPostRateLimit_AllowsGET(t *testing.T) {
+func TestLoginRateLimit_AllowsGET(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
 	m, _ := testMiddleware(t, config.EnvironmentDev)
 
 	var callCount int
 
-	handler := m.PasswordChangeRateLimit()(http.HandlerFunc(
+	handler := m.LoginRateLimit()(http.HandlerFunc(
 		func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
 			callCount++
 
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ func TestPostRateLimit_AllowsGET(t *testing.T) {
 	for i := range 20 {
 		req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
 			context.Background(),
-			http.MethodGet, "/user/admin/password", nil,
+			http.MethodGet, "/pages/login", nil,
 		)
 		req.RemoteAddr = "192.168.1.1:12345"
 
@@ -110,6 +110,20 @@ func runPostLimitTest(
 	assert.Equal(t, limit, callCount)
 }
 
+func TestLoginRateLimit_LimitsPOST(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	m, _ := testMiddleware(t, config.EnvironmentDev)
+
+	runPostLimitTest(
+		t,
+		m.LoginRateLimit(),
+		middleware.LoginRateLimitConst,
+		"/pages/login",
+		"10.0.0.1:12345",
+	)
+}
+
 func TestPasswordChangeRateLimit_LimitsPOST(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
@@ -124,19 +138,19 @@ func TestPasswordChangeRateLimit_LimitsPOST(t *testing.T) {
 	)
 }
 
-func TestPostRateLimit_IndependentPerIP(t *testing.T) {
+func TestLoginRateLimit_IndependentPerIP(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
 	m, _ := testMiddleware(t, config.EnvironmentDev)
 
-	handler := m.PasswordChangeRateLimit()(http.HandlerFunc(
+	handler := m.LoginRateLimit()(http.HandlerFunc(
 		func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
 			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
 		},
 	))
 
 	// Exhaust limit for IP1
-	for range middleware.PasswordChangeRateLimitConst {
+	for range middleware.LoginRateLimitConst {
 		req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
 			context.Background(),
 			http.MethodPost, "/pages/login", nil,
@@ -353,14 +367,7 @@ func TestReceiverRateLimit_CountsEveryMethod(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 const (
-	// limitedPath is the endpoint these tests drive the shared POST
+	loginPath  = "/pages/login"
-	// rate limiter through. It is the password-change path: since
-	// the login POST verifies credentials before spending any
-	// budget, the password-change limiter is the only pre-emptive
-	// POST limiter left, and it is what pins the shared key
-	// function's behaviour here.
-	limitedPath = "/user/admin/password"
-
 	headerXFF  = "X-Forwarded-For"
 	headerReal = "X-Real-IP"
 	headerTrue = "True-Client-IP"
@@ -408,10 +415,10 @@ func assertSharedBucket(
 	m := rateLimitMiddleware(
 		t, &config.Config{TrustedProxies: proxies},
 	)
-	handler := m.PasswordChangeRateLimit()(okHandler())
+	handler := m.LoginRateLimit()(okHandler())
 
-	for i := range middleware.PasswordChangeRateLimitConst {
+	for i := range middleware.LoginRateLimitConst {
-		w := postWithHeaders(handler, peer, limitedPath, headers(i))
+		w := postWithHeaders(handler, peer, loginPath, headers(i))
 		assert.Equal(
 			t, http.StatusOK, w.Code,
 			"request %d should pass", i,
@@ -419,8 +426,8 @@ func assertSharedBucket(
 	}
 
 	w := postWithHeaders(
-		handler, peer, limitedPath,
+		handler, peer, loginPath,
-		headers(middleware.PasswordChangeRateLimitConst),
+		headers(middleware.LoginRateLimitConst),
 	)
 	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, w.Code, msg)
 }
@@ -542,24 +549,24 @@ func TestRateLimitKey_ForwardedHonouredFromTrustedPeer(
 	m := rateLimitMiddleware(t, &config.Config{
 		TrustedProxies: trustedProxies(trustedProxyCIDR),
 	})
-	handler := m.PasswordChangeRateLimit()(okHandler())
+	handler := m.LoginRateLimit()(okHandler())
 
 	const peer = trustedPeer
 
 	first := map[string]string{headerXFF: clientIPv4}
 
-	for range middleware.PasswordChangeRateLimitConst {
+	for range middleware.LoginRateLimitConst {
-		postWithHeaders(handler, peer, limitedPath, first)
+		postWithHeaders(handler, peer, loginPath, first)
 	}
 
-	w := postWithHeaders(handler, peer, limitedPath, first)
+	w := postWithHeaders(handler, peer, loginPath, first)
 	assert.Equal(
 		t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, w.Code,
 		"the forwarded client's own bucket must fill up",
 	)
 
 	w = postWithHeaders(
-		handler, peer, limitedPath,
+		handler, peer, loginPath,
 		map[string]string{headerXFF: clientIPv4Alt},
 	)
 	assert.Equal(
@@ -655,7 +662,7 @@ func TestRateLimitKey_LongChainAllocationIsBounded(t *testing.T) {
 	})
 
 	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
-		context.Background(), http.MethodPost, limitedPath, nil,
+		context.Background(), http.MethodPost, loginPath, nil,
 	)
 	req.RemoteAddr = trustedPeer
 	req.Header.Set(
@@ -862,7 +869,7 @@ func clientKeyFor(
 	t.Helper()
 
 	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
-		context.Background(), http.MethodPost, limitedPath, nil,
+		context.Background(), http.MethodPost, loginPath, nil,
 	)
 	req.RemoteAddr = remoteAddr
 
@@ -1012,23 +1019,23 @@ func TestRateLimitKey_UnparseablePeerKeepsDistinctBuckets(
 	)
 }
 
-// TestPostRateLimit_IPv6SharesBucketWithinSlash64 is the behavioural
+// TestLoginRateLimit_IPv6SharesBucketWithinSlash64 is the behavioural
 // half, and the regression test for the bypass itself: a client that
 // rotates source addresses inside its own routed /64 must stay in one
 // bucket. Reverting the masking makes this test fail, because each
 // rotated address would mint a fresh bucket and nothing would be
 // rejected.
-func TestPostRateLimit_IPv6SharesBucketWithinSlash64(t *testing.T) {
+func TestLoginRateLimit_IPv6SharesBucketWithinSlash64(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
 	m := rateLimitMiddleware(t, &config.Config{})
-	handler := m.PasswordChangeRateLimit()(okHandler())
+	handler := m.LoginRateLimit()(okHandler())
 
-	for i := range middleware.PasswordChangeRateLimitConst {
+	for i := range middleware.LoginRateLimitConst {
 		w := postWithHeaders(
 			handler,
 			fmt.Sprintf("[2001:db8:1:2::%d]:44444", i+1),
-			limitedPath, nil,
+			loginPath, nil,
 		)
 		assert.Equal(
 			t, http.StatusOK, w.Code, "request %d should pass", i,
@@ -1036,7 +1043,7 @@ func TestPostRateLimit_IPv6SharesBucketWithinSlash64(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 
 	w := postWithHeaders(
-		handler, "[2001:db8:1:2::ffff]:44444", limitedPath, nil,
+		handler, "[2001:db8:1:2::ffff]:44444", loginPath, nil,
 	)
 	assert.Equal(
 		t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, w.Code,
@@ -1045,23 +1052,23 @@ func TestPostRateLimit_IPv6SharesBucketWithinSlash64(t *testing.T) {
 	)
 }
 
-// TestPostRateLimit_IPv6IndependentAcrossSlash64 is the other side
+// TestLoginRateLimit_IPv6IndependentAcrossSlash64 is the other side
 // of the trade: bucketing by /64 must not merge separate allocations,
 // so a client in a different /64 keeps its own limit.
-func TestPostRateLimit_IPv6IndependentAcrossSlash64(t *testing.T) {
+func TestLoginRateLimit_IPv6IndependentAcrossSlash64(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
 	m := rateLimitMiddleware(t, &config.Config{})
-	handler := m.PasswordChangeRateLimit()(okHandler())
+	handler := m.LoginRateLimit()(okHandler())
 
-	for range middleware.PasswordChangeRateLimitConst + 1 {
+	for range middleware.LoginRateLimitConst + 1 {
 		postWithHeaders(
-			handler, "[2001:db8:1:2::1]:44444", limitedPath, nil,
+			handler, "[2001:db8:1:2::1]:44444", loginPath, nil,
 		)
 	}
 
 	w := postWithHeaders(
-		handler, "[2001:db8:1:3::1]:44444", limitedPath, nil,
+		handler, "[2001:db8:1:3::1]:44444", loginPath, nil,
 	)
 	assert.Equal(
 		t, http.StatusOK, w.Code,
@@ -1069,23 +1076,23 @@ func TestPostRateLimit_IPv6IndependentAcrossSlash64(t *testing.T) {
 	)
 }
 
-// TestPostRateLimit_IPv4IndependentPerAddress guards against the
+// TestLoginRateLimit_IPv4IndependentPerAddress guards against the
 // masking leaking into IPv4: two addresses one apart must still hold
 // separate buckets.
-func TestPostRateLimit_IPv4IndependentPerAddress(t *testing.T) {
+func TestLoginRateLimit_IPv4IndependentPerAddress(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
 	m := rateLimitMiddleware(t, &config.Config{})
-	handler := m.PasswordChangeRateLimit()(okHandler())
+	handler := m.LoginRateLimit()(okHandler())
 
-	for range middleware.PasswordChangeRateLimitConst + 1 {
+	for range middleware.LoginRateLimitConst + 1 {
 		postWithHeaders(
-			handler, clientIPv4+":44444", limitedPath, nil,
+			handler, clientIPv4+":44444", loginPath, nil,
 		)
 	}
 
 	w := postWithHeaders(
-		handler, clientIPv4Alt+":44444", limitedPath, nil,
+		handler, clientIPv4Alt+":44444", loginPath, nil,
 	)
 	assert.Equal(
 		t, http.StatusOK, w.Code,
@@ -1105,7 +1112,7 @@ func forwardedKeyFor(
 	t.Helper()
 
 	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
-		context.Background(), http.MethodPost, limitedPath, nil,
+		context.Background(), http.MethodPost, loginPath, nil,
 	)
 	req.RemoteAddr = trustedPeer
 	req.Header.Set(headerXFF, forwarded)
@@ -1170,77 +1177,11 @@ func TestRateLimitKey_ForwardedIPv6BucketsByPrefix(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-// TestRateLimitKey_TrustedPeerUnusableForwardedMasksPeer covers the
+// TestLoginRateLimit_ForwardedIPv6SharesBucketWithinSlash64 is the
-// third bucketKey call site: the peer IS a trusted proxy, but the
-// forwarded chain cannot name a client, so the key falls back to the
-// peer address — and that fallback owes the same /64 masking every
-// other key gets.
-//
-// Every existing test of this fallback uses an IPv4 proxy, where
-// bucketKey is the identity function, so replacing the call with
-// peer.String() leaves the whole suite green. Only operator-listed
-// addresses reach this line and the fallback is fail-closed, so this
-// pins behaviour rather than fixing a defect.
-func TestRateLimitKey_TrustedPeerUnusableForwardedMasksPeer(
-	t *testing.T,
-) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	const (
-		proxyCIDR = "2001:db8:ffff::/48"
-		proxyPeer = "[2001:db8:ffff:1::5]:44444"
-		wantKey   = "2001:db8:ffff:1::/64"
-	)
-
-	m := rateLimitMiddleware(t, &config.Config{
-		TrustedProxies: trustedProxies(proxyCIDR),
-	})
-
-	for _, tc := range []struct {
-		name      string
-		forwarded string
-		about     string
-	}{{
-		name:  "absent",
-		about: "no X-Forwarded-For at all falls back to the peer",
-	}, {
-		name:      "unreadable-hop",
-		forwarded: "unknown",
-		about: "a hop that is not a bare address ends the walk " +
-			"and falls back to the peer",
-	}, {
-		name:      "all-hops-trusted",
-		forwarded: "2001:db8:ffff:2::9",
-		about: "a chain naming only trusted proxies names no " +
-			"client, so the peer is used",
-	}} {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			t.Parallel()
-
-			req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
-				context.Background(),
-				http.MethodPost, limitedPath, nil,
-			)
-			req.RemoteAddr = proxyPeer
-
-			if tc.forwarded != "" {
-				req.Header.Set(headerXFF, tc.forwarded)
-			}
-
-			assert.Equal(
-				t, wantKey,
-				middleware.ClientKeyForTest(m, req),
-				"%s, masked to its /64", tc.about,
-			)
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// TestPostRateLimit_ForwardedIPv6SharesBucketWithinSlash64 is the
 // behavioural half on the production path: behind a trusted proxy, a
 // client rotating source addresses inside its own routed /64 must
 // stay in one bucket.
-func TestPostRateLimit_ForwardedIPv6SharesBucketWithinSlash64(
+func TestLoginRateLimit_ForwardedIPv6SharesBucketWithinSlash64(
 	t *testing.T,
 ) {
 	t.Parallel()
@@ -1257,10 +1198,10 @@ func TestPostRateLimit_ForwardedIPv6SharesBucketWithinSlash64(
 	)
 }
 
-// TestPostRateLimit_ForwardedIPv6IndependentAcrossSlash64 is the
+// TestLoginRateLimit_ForwardedIPv6IndependentAcrossSlash64 is the
 // other side of that trade on the same path: bucketing by /64 must
 // not merge two allocations reaching the proxy.
-func TestPostRateLimit_ForwardedIPv6IndependentAcrossSlash64(
+func TestLoginRateLimit_ForwardedIPv6IndependentAcrossSlash64(
 	t *testing.T,
 ) {
 	t.Parallel()
@@ -1268,15 +1209,15 @@ func TestPostRateLimit_ForwardedIPv6IndependentAcrossSlash64(
 	m := rateLimitMiddleware(t, &config.Config{
 		TrustedProxies: trustedProxies(trustedProxyCIDR),
 	})
-	handler := m.PasswordChangeRateLimit()(okHandler())
+	handler := m.LoginRateLimit()(okHandler())
 
 	spent := map[string]string{headerXFF: clientIPv6}
-	for range middleware.PasswordChangeRateLimitConst + 1 {
+	for range middleware.LoginRateLimitConst + 1 {
-		postWithHeaders(handler, trustedPeer, limitedPath, spent)
+		postWithHeaders(handler, trustedPeer, loginPath, spent)
 	}
 
 	w := postWithHeaders(
-		handler, trustedPeer, limitedPath,
+		handler, trustedPeer, loginPath,
 		map[string]string{headerXFF: clientIPv6Other},
 	)
 	assert.Equal(

internal/middleware/recoverer.go

@@ -1,209 +0,0 @@
-package middleware
-
-import (
-	"errors"
-	"fmt"
-	"net/http"
-	"runtime/debug"
-
-	"github.com/go-chi/chi/middleware"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logfield"
-)
-
-const (
-	// maxPanicValueBytes bounds the recovered panic value. The value
-	// is our own text, but a handler is free to build one out of the
-	// request — panic(fmt.Sprintf("bad %q", r.URL.Path)) — so it is
-	// charged the same budget the access log gives a field the
-	// client supplies outright.
-	maxPanicValueBytes = logfield.MaxBytes
-
-	// maxPanicStackBytes bounds the stack, in the same ENCODED bytes
-	// logfield.Truncate charges everywhere else. Nothing a client
-	// sends chooses the depth of our own call stack, so this is not
-	// a safety limit; it is what makes MaxPanicLogLineBytes an
-	// arithmetic ceiling rather than an observation. A stack is cut
-	// at its far end, which is net/http's accept frames — the panic
-	// site and the handler that reached it are at the near end and
-	// are always kept.
-	//
-	// For scale: a handler panicking under the full shipped
-	// middleware chain produces a stack of roughly 3,690 bytes in a
-	// record of roughly 3,960, so this budget holds better than
-	// twice the depth that case reaches. Neither number is an
-	// invariant — debug.Stack() embeds absolute source paths, so
-	// both move with where the tree sits, and four checkouts have
-	// reported records of 3,959, 3,961, 3,984 and 4,026 bytes.
-	// internal/server's TestPanicThroughProductionRouter asserts the
-	// ceiling and that the stack arrived uncut, not the figures.
-	maxPanicStackBytes = 8192
-
-	// MaxPanicLogLineBytes is the ceiling on the single line a
-	// recovered panic writes. It is wider than
-	// MaxAccessLogLineBytes, which bounds a line written once per
-	// request, where this one is written once per recovered panic.
-	//
-	//	panic                     512+11 =  523
-	//	stack                    8192+11 = 8203
-	//	request_id                128+11 =  139
-	//	fixed portion                    =  256
-	//	                                    ----
-	//	                                    9121
-	//
-	// The fixed portion is the JSON punctuation, the field names,
-	// the level, the message, the timestamp at its longest and the
-	// response_committed boolean.
-	//
-	// Stated at 10240 so the figure carries headroom rather than
-	// sitting on the arithmetic, exactly as MaxAccessLogLineBytes
-	// is. Both handlers internal/logger can install are covered, for
-	// the reason given there: logfield.EncodedBytes charges every
-	// rune the wider of the two.
-	//
-	// The 9121 and the 10240 are the invariants here. What follows
-	// is illustration: with all three growable fields — the stack,
-	// the panic value and a client-supplied X-Request-Id — driven
-	// past their budgets at once, TestRecovererBoundsTheStack
-	// measured 9,009 bytes on the JSON handler and 8,982 to 8,983 on
-	// the text one in this checkout. Neither is fixed: the stack's
-	// own content decides where its cut lands, so the figures move by
-	// a byte or so between runs and with the checkout. The test
-	// asserts the ceiling and that every growable field was cut,
-	// never the figures.
-	MaxPanicLogLineBytes = 10240
-)
-
-// recoverResponseWriter records whether the response has been
-// committed, which is the one thing the recoverer cannot learn from
-// the panic itself: a handler that panics after writing a status has
-// already spent the response, and a second WriteHeader would only
-// draw net/http's "superfluous response.WriteHeader" complaint
-// without changing what the client received.
-type recoverResponseWriter struct {
-	http.ResponseWriter
-
-	committed bool
-}
-
-func (w *recoverResponseWriter) WriteHeader(code int) {
-	w.committed = true
-
-	w.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(code)
-}
-
-func (w *recoverResponseWriter) Write(b []byte) (int, error) {
-	// An unheralded Write commits the response just as surely as
-	// WriteHeader does: net/http sends 200 in front of it.
-	w.committed = true
-
-	//nolint:wrapcheck // Pass the writer's own error through unchanged.
-	return w.ResponseWriter.Write(b)
-}
-
-// Unwrap lets http.ResponseController reach the writer underneath, so
-// a handler can still flush or set a write deadline through this
-// wrapper.
-func (w *recoverResponseWriter) Unwrap() http.ResponseWriter {
-	return w.ResponseWriter
-}
-
-// Recoverer returns middleware that turns a handler panic into one
-// structured ERROR record and a 500, rather than a dropped
-// connection.
-//
-// It replaces chi's middleware.Recoverer, which does neither on a
-// current Go release. chi v1.5.5's pretty-printer scans the stack for
-// a frame beginning "panic(0x", which the runtime has not emitted
-// since it started printing "panic({0x...}"; the scan therefore never
-// terminates early, every line reaches decorateFuncCallLine, and that
-// function slices pkg[strings.Index(pkg, "."):] without checking for
-// -1. The resulting second panic escapes chi's own deferred function,
-// so its WriteHeader(500) never runs and net/http closes the
-// connection reporting its own crash instead of the original one.
-// See https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/187.
-//
-// chi v5.3.1 has since fixed both halves of that — it scans for
-// "panic(" and guards the index — so upgrading would restore the 500.
-// It would not give what this does: v5 still writes an ANSI-coloured
-// pretty stack straight to os.Stderr, outside internal/logger, outside
-// any budget, at no level the operator set.
-//
-// Where this sits in the chain is load-bearing, and routes.go states
-// it: inside everything that observes the response, so the 500 is
-// what the access log records and the metrics count, and outside the
-// sentryhttp handler, whose Repanic option depends on something
-// further out recovering what it re-raises.
-func (s *Middleware) Recoverer() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
-	return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
-		return http.HandlerFunc(func(
-			w http.ResponseWriter,
-			r *http.Request,
-		) {
-			rw := &recoverResponseWriter{ResponseWriter: w}
-
-			defer func() {
-				rvr := recover()
-				if rvr == nil {
-					return
-				}
-
-				// http.ErrAbortHandler is a handler stating that it
-				// is abandoning the connection on purpose, not a
-				// fault. net/http special-cases it, suppressing both
-				// the stack trace and any response, so it is passed
-				// straight back out rather than logged and answered.
-				err, isError := rvr.(error)
-				if isError &&
-					errors.Is(err, http.ErrAbortHandler) {
-					panic(rvr)
-				}
-
-				s.logPanic(r, rvr, rw.committed)
-
-				if rw.committed {
-					return
-				}
-
-				http.Error(
-					rw,
-					http.StatusText(
-						http.StatusInternalServerError,
-					),
-					http.StatusInternalServerError,
-				)
-			}()
-
-			next.ServeHTTP(rw, r)
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// logPanic writes the record. Every field it can grow is truncated to
-// a fixed budget, so MaxPanicLogLineBytes holds.
-//
-// The request is identified by request_id alone rather than by
-// repeating the method, URL and address: the access log line for the
-// same request carries all of those, already bounded, and — because
-// the recoverer runs inside the logging middleware — now carries the
-// 500 as its status too. Repeating them here would double those
-// budgets against a line already wider than the access log's ceiling,
-// to say a second time what one join already says.
-func (s *Middleware) logPanic(
-	r *http.Request,
-	rvr any,
-	committed bool,
-) {
-	s.log.Error("handler panic",
-		"panic", logfield.Truncate(
-			fmt.Sprint(rvr), maxPanicValueBytes,
-		),
-		"stack", logfield.Truncate(
-			string(debug.Stack()), maxPanicStackBytes,
-		),
-		"request_id", logfield.Truncate(
-			middleware.GetReqID(r.Context()),
-			maxLogRequestIDBytes,
-		),
-		"response_committed", committed,
-	)
-}

internal/middleware/recoverer_test.go

@@ -1,645 +0,0 @@
-package middleware_test
-
-import (
-	"bytes"
-	"encoding/json"
-	"io"
-	"log"
-	"net/http"
-	"net/http/httptest"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/go-chi/chi"
-	chimw "github.com/go-chi/chi/middleware"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
-)
-
-// panicMarker is the panic value the probe handlers raise. The
-// recoverer's whole job is to put this string, and not some second
-// panic's, in front of an operator.
-const panicMarker = "QQORIGINALPANICVALUEQQ"
-
-// probeFuncName appears in the stack of every panic raised below,
-// since that is the function raising it. Its presence is how these
-// tests tell a real stack from an empty field.
-const probeFuncName = "panicProbe"
-
-// committedStatus is the status a handler sends before panicking in
-// the already-committed case. It is deliberately not 200, so a test
-// cannot pass on net/http's implicit default.
-const committedStatus = http.StatusMultiStatus
-
-// recovererProbe is a test server carrying one panicking route,
-// behind the production recoverer.
-type recovererProbe struct {
-	server *httptest.Server
-
-	// logs holds every record the middleware wrote.
-	logs *bytes.Buffer
-
-	// serverErrors holds everything net/http wrote to its own error
-	// log. A working recoverer leaves it empty: net/http only reports
-	// a request when a panic escapes the handler chain, which is the
-	// failure this issue is about.
-	serverErrors *bytes.Buffer
-}
-
-// newRecovererProbe stands up a real HTTP server — a real listener, a
-// real connection, a real client — behind the production recoverer.
-//
-// A real server rather than an httptest.ResponseRecorder, because a
-// recorder cannot express the outcome that made this a defect: chi's
-// Recoverer left net/http to close the connection, which a recorder
-// records as an ordinary unwritten response while a client sees EOF.
-// The status a client actually receives is only observable over a
-// socket.
-func newRecovererProbe(
-	t *testing.T,
-	textHandler bool,
-	handler http.HandlerFunc,
-) *recovererProbe {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	newMiddleware := capturingMiddleware
-	if textHandler {
-		newMiddleware = capturingTextMiddleware
-	}
-
-	m, logs := newMiddleware(t)
-
-	router := chi.NewRouter()
-	// The registration order the production router uses: RequestID
-	// outside so the recoverer's record can name the request,
-	// Logging outside so the recovered 500 is the status it records.
-	router.Use(chimw.RequestID)
-	router.Use(m.Logging())
-	router.Use(m.Recoverer())
-	router.Get("/probe", handler)
-
-	serverErrors := new(bytes.Buffer)
-
-	server := httptest.NewUnstartedServer(router)
-	server.Config.ErrorLog = log.New(serverErrors, "", 0)
-	server.Start()
-	t.Cleanup(server.Close)
-
-	return &recovererProbe{
-		server:       server,
-		logs:         logs,
-		serverErrors: serverErrors,
-	}
-}
-
-// get drives one request at the probe route and returns the response,
-// or the transport error if the connection was dropped instead.
-func (p *recovererProbe) get(t *testing.T) (*http.Response, error) {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	return p.getWithRequestID(t, "")
-}
-
-// getWithRequestID drives the same request carrying a client-supplied
-// X-Request-Id. chi's RequestID middleware adopts that header verbatim
-// when it is present and only generates a value when it is absent, so
-// this is the third growable field on the panic record and the only
-// one a client fills outright.
-func (p *recovererProbe) getWithRequestID(
-	t *testing.T,
-	requestID string,
-) (*http.Response, error) {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(
-		t.Context(), http.MethodGet, p.server.URL+"/probe", nil,
-	)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	if requestID != "" {
-		req.Header.Set(chimw.RequestIDHeader, requestID)
-	}
-
-	return p.server.Client().Do(req)
-}
-
-// wait shuts the server down and blocks until every in-flight request
-// has finished, which is what makes the log buffer safe to read.
-//
-// A client returns as soon as the response is complete — or, for a
-// deliberately aborted connection, as soon as it is closed — while the
-// access log line for the same request is still being written on the
-// server goroutine. It is idempotent, so a test may call it directly
-// before reading the buffer itself.
-func (p *recovererProbe) wait() {
-	p.server.Close()
-}
-
-// records decodes every JSON log line the probe captured.
-func (p *recovererProbe) records(t *testing.T) []map[string]any {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	p.wait()
-
-	var out []map[string]any
-
-	for line := range strings.SplitSeq(
-		strings.TrimSpace(p.logs.String()), "\n",
-	) {
-		if line == "" {
-			continue
-		}
-
-		record := map[string]any{}
-		require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal([]byte(line), &record))
-
-		out = append(out, record)
-	}
-
-	return out
-}
-
-// panicRecord returns the single "handler panic" record, failing if
-// there is not exactly one.
-func (p *recovererProbe) panicRecord(t *testing.T) map[string]any {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	var found []map[string]any
-
-	for _, record := range p.records(t) {
-		if record["msg"] == "handler panic" {
-			found = append(found, record)
-		}
-	}
-
-	require.Len(
-		t, found, 1,
-		"exactly one panic record expected, log was:\n%s",
-		p.logs.String(),
-	)
-
-	return found[0]
-}
-
-// panicProbe panics with the marker. It is a named function so the
-// stack assertions have something to look for.
-func panicProbe(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
-	panic(panicMarker)
-}
-
-func TestRecovererAnswers500AndLogsTheOriginalPanic(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	probe := newRecovererProbe(t, false, panicProbe)
-
-	resp, err := probe.get(t)
-	require.NoError(
-		t, err,
-		"a panicking handler must answer, not drop the connection",
-	)
-
-	defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
-
-	body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusInternalServerError, resp.StatusCode)
-	assert.Contains(t, string(body), "Internal Server Error")
-
-	record := probe.panicRecord(t)
-	assert.Equal(t, "ERROR", record["level"])
-	assert.Equal(t, panicMarker, record["panic"])
-	assert.Equal(t, false, record["response_committed"])
-
-	stack, ok := record["stack"].(string)
-	require.True(t, ok, "the record must carry a stack")
-	assert.Contains(
-		t, stack, probeFuncName,
-		"the stack must reach the function that panicked",
-	)
-	assert.NotContains(
-		t, stack, "slice bounds out of range",
-		"a secondary panic must not have occurred",
-	)
-
-	assert.Empty(
-		t, probe.serverErrors.String(),
-		"net/http must not have had to report anything",
-	)
-}
-
-// TestRecovererStatusReachesTheAccessLog pins the placement. The
-// recoverer runs inside the logging middleware precisely so the status
-// it writes is the one the access log records; registered outside it,
-// as chi's Recoverer was, the same request is logged as a 200 that the
-// client never received.
-func TestRecovererStatusReachesTheAccessLog(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	probe := newRecovererProbe(t, false, panicProbe)
-
-	resp, err := probe.get(t)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	require.NoError(t, resp.Body.Close())
-	require.Equal(t, http.StatusInternalServerError, resp.StatusCode)
-
-	var access map[string]any
-
-	for _, record := range probe.records(t) {
-		if record["msg"] == "http request" {
-			access = record
-		}
-	}
-
-	require.NotNil(t, access, "the request must still be logged")
-	assert.EqualValues(
-		t, http.StatusInternalServerError, access["status"],
-		"the access log must record the status the client got",
-	)
-
-	// The panic record identifies its request by request_id alone,
-	// so that join has to work.
-	assert.Equal(
-		t, access["request_id"],
-		probe.panicRecord(t)["request_id"],
-	)
-	assert.NotEmpty(t, access["request_id"])
-}
-
-// TestRecovererRepanicsErrAbortHandler covers the one panic value that
-// must not be turned into a 500. net/http documents it as the way a
-// handler abandons a connection deliberately and special-cases it,
-// suppressing both the response and its own stack report.
-func TestRecovererRepanicsErrAbortHandler(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	probe := newRecovererProbe(
-		t, false,
-		func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
-			panic(http.ErrAbortHandler)
-		},
-	)
-
-	resp, err := probe.get(t)
-	if err == nil {
-		_ = resp.Body.Close()
-	}
-
-	require.Error(
-		t, err,
-		"an aborted handler must not answer with a status",
-	)
-
-	for _, record := range probe.records(t) {
-		assert.NotEqual(
-			t, "handler panic", record["msg"],
-			"a deliberate abort is not a fault to report",
-		)
-	}
-
-	assert.Empty(
-		t, probe.serverErrors.String(),
-		"net/http suppresses ErrAbortHandler; it must still see it",
-	)
-}
-
-// TestRecovererKeepsAnAlreadyCommittedResponse covers a handler that
-// panics after sending its status. The bytes are already on the wire,
-// so a second WriteHeader would change nothing the client sees and
-// would draw net/http's "superfluous response.WriteHeader" report.
-func TestRecovererKeepsAnAlreadyCommittedResponse(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	probe := newRecovererProbe(
-		t, false,
-		func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
-			w.WriteHeader(committedStatus)
-			_, _ = w.Write([]byte("partial"))
-
-			panic(panicMarker)
-		},
-	)
-
-	resp, err := probe.get(t)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
-
-	body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	assert.Equal(t, committedStatus, resp.StatusCode)
-	assert.Equal(t, "partial", string(body))
-
-	record := probe.panicRecord(t)
-	assert.Equal(t, panicMarker, record["panic"])
-	assert.Equal(
-		t, true, record["response_committed"],
-		"the record must say why no 500 was sent",
-	)
-
-	assert.NotContains(
-		t, probe.serverErrors.String(),
-		"superfluous response.WriteHeader",
-	)
-}
-
-// TestRecovererKeepsAnImplicitlyCommittedResponse is the same case
-// without an explicit WriteHeader: a bare Write commits the response
-// to 200 just as surely.
-func TestRecovererKeepsAnImplicitlyCommittedResponse(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	probe := newRecovererProbe(
-		t, false,
-		func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
-			_, _ = w.Write([]byte("partial"))
-
-			panic(panicMarker)
-		},
-	)
-
-	resp, err := probe.get(t)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	require.NoError(t, resp.Body.Close())
-
-	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, resp.StatusCode)
-	assert.Equal(
-		t, true, probe.panicRecord(t)["response_committed"],
-	)
-	assert.NotContains(
-		t, probe.serverErrors.String(),
-		"superfluous response.WriteHeader",
-	)
-}
-
-// panicLogHandler names one of the two handlers internal/logger can
-// install. The recoverer's probe selects between them with a bool
-// rather than by constructing one, which is why this does not reuse
-// logHandlers() the way the fills reuse escapeFills().
-type panicLogHandler struct {
-	name string
-	text bool
-}
-
-func panicLogHandlers() []panicLogHandler {
-	return []panicLogHandler{{"json", false}, {"text", true}}
-}
-
-// TestRecovererBoundsThePanicRecord holds the record to its stated
-// ceiling with a panic value the size of a request. A handler is free
-// to build a panic value out of what the client sent, so the value is
-// charged a client-sized budget even though the stack is not.
-func TestRecovererBoundsThePanicRecord(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	for _, handler := range panicLogHandlers() {
-		// The fills are internal/middleware's own access log fills,
-		// shared rather than restated: plain text, the characters
-		// both handlers escape to two bytes, a bare C0 control, and
-		// an astral non-printable the text handler spells with a
-		// ten-byte \U escape.
-		for fillName, fillRune := range escapeFills() {
-			t.Run(handler.name+"/"+fillName, func(t *testing.T) {
-				t.Parallel()
-
-				value := strings.Repeat(
-					fillRune, oversizedSegmentBytes,
-				) + tailMarker
-
-				probe := newRecovererProbe(
-					t, handler.text,
-					func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
-						panic(value)
-					},
-				)
-
-				resp, err := probe.get(t)
-				require.NoError(t, err)
-				require.NoError(t, resp.Body.Close())
-				require.Equal(
-					t, http.StatusInternalServerError,
-					resp.StatusCode,
-				)
-				probe.wait()
-
-				for line := range strings.SplitSeq(
-					strings.TrimSpace(probe.logs.String()), "\n",
-				) {
-					assert.LessOrEqual(
-						t, len(line),
-						middleware.MaxPanicLogLineBytes,
-						"log line exceeded its stated bound",
-					)
-					assert.NotContains(
-						t, line, tailMarker,
-						"the far end of the panic value reached "+
-							"the log, so nothing truncated it",
-					)
-				}
-			})
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-// deepPanic recurses to depth and then panics, so the stack itself
-// overruns its budget. It is the only way to exercise the stack cut:
-// the shipped middleware chain does not come close (see
-// TestPanicThroughProductionRouter in internal/server).
-func deepPanic(depth int, value string) int {
-	if depth == 0 {
-		panic(value)
-	}
-
-	return deepPanic(depth-1, value) + 1
-}
-
-// assertEveryFieldWasCut holds each of the record's three growable
-// fields to its own budget, which is what the ceiling is the sum of.
-// The stack is cut at its far end, so its near end — the panic site —
-// has to survive; the request id is the client's own bytes, so its
-// cut is the one that bounds an attacker rather than our own call
-// depth.
-func assertEveryFieldWasCut(t *testing.T, record map[string]any) {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	stack, ok := record["stack"].(string)
-	require.True(t, ok)
-	assert.True(
-		t, strings.HasSuffix(stack, truncationSuffix),
-		"an oversized stack must be marked as cut",
-	)
-	assert.Contains(
-		t, stack, "deepPanic",
-		"the near end of the stack must survive the cut",
-	)
-	assert.NotContains(
-		t, stack, "net/http.(*conn).serve",
-		"the far end is what a cut discards",
-	)
-
-	id, ok := record["request_id"].(string)
-	require.True(t, ok)
-	assert.True(
-		t, strings.HasSuffix(id, truncationSuffix),
-		"an oversized request id must be marked as cut",
-	)
-	assert.LessOrEqual(
-		t, len(id), maxRequestIDBytes+len(truncationSuffix),
-		"the request id must be held to its own budget",
-	)
-
-	value, ok := record["panic"].(string)
-	require.True(t, ok)
-	assert.True(
-		t, strings.HasSuffix(value, truncationSuffix),
-		"an oversized panic value must be marked as cut",
-	)
-}
-
-// TestRecovererBoundsTheStack drives every growable field on the
-// record past its budget at once — an oversized stack, an oversized
-// panic value and an oversized client-supplied X-Request-Id — over
-// both log handlers. It holds that line to the stated ceiling and
-// reports what it measured, and it pins that a cut stack keeps its
-// near end — the panic site — rather than its far one.
-//
-// The two fields the test picks the content of — the panic value and
-// the request id — are filled with the quotation mark. Both handlers
-// escape it to two bytes, which is exactly what logfield charges for
-// it, so each of those fields emits every byte of its budget; no fill
-// emits more, since logfield charges each rune the wider of the two
-// handlers and a field can therefore never emit more than it spent.
-// The stack is not a fill: recursion drives it past its budget and
-// the cut lands wherever its own content puts it, which is why the
-// measured widths move by a byte between runs.
-func TestRecovererBoundsTheStack(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	for _, handler := range panicLogHandlers() {
-		t.Run(handler.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			t.Parallel()
-
-			value := strings.Repeat(`"`, oversizedSegmentBytes) +
-				tailMarker
-			requestID := strings.Repeat(`"`, oversizedSegmentBytes) +
-				tailMarker
-
-			probe := newRecovererProbe(
-				t, handler.text,
-				func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
-					_ = deepPanic(512, value)
-				},
-			)
-
-			resp, err := probe.getWithRequestID(t, requestID)
-			require.NoError(t, err)
-			require.NoError(t, resp.Body.Close())
-			require.Equal(
-				t, http.StatusInternalServerError, resp.StatusCode,
-			)
-			probe.wait()
-
-			// The text handler does not emit JSON, so the field-level
-			// assertions run on the JSON one; the line bound below
-			// is asserted on both, which is the point of the sweep.
-			if !handler.text {
-				assertEveryFieldWasCut(t, probe.panicRecord(t))
-			}
-
-			widest := 0
-
-			for line := range strings.SplitSeq(
-				strings.TrimSpace(probe.logs.String()), "\n",
-			) {
-				assert.LessOrEqual(
-					t, len(line), middleware.MaxPanicLogLineBytes,
-				)
-				assert.NotContains(t, line, tailMarker)
-
-				widest = max(widest, len(line))
-			}
-
-			t.Logf(
-				"widest line measured: %d bytes (ceiling %d)",
-				widest, middleware.MaxPanicLogLineBytes,
-			)
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// TestRecovererIgnoresANonPanickingHandler is the negative control:
-// the middleware must be inert on the ordinary path.
-func TestRecovererIgnoresANonPanickingHandler(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	probe := newRecovererProbe(
-		t, false,
-		func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
-			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTeapot)
-		},
-	)
-
-	resp, err := probe.get(t)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	require.NoError(t, resp.Body.Close())
-
-	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusTeapot, resp.StatusCode)
-
-	for _, record := range probe.records(t) {
-		assert.NotEqual(t, "handler panic", record["msg"])
-	}
-}
-
-// TestRecovererKeepsResponseControllerWorking pins the Unwrap method.
-// The middleware wraps the ResponseWriter to learn whether the
-// response was committed, and a wrapper without Unwrap hides
-// net/http's own writer from http.ResponseController, so a handler
-// that flushes or sets a deadline starts failing.
-//
-// The recoverer is the only middleware in the chain here. The access
-// logger's own wrapper does not implement Unwrap, so a chain
-// containing it fails this regardless of what the recoverer does;
-// what is being pinned is that the recoverer adds no such opacity of
-// its own.
-func TestRecovererKeepsResponseControllerWorking(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	m, _ := capturingMiddleware(t)
-
-	handler := m.Recoverer()(http.HandlerFunc(
-		func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
-			_, _ = w.Write([]byte("chunk"))
-
-			flushErr := http.NewResponseController(w).Flush()
-			if flushErr != nil {
-				http.Error(
-					w, "flush failed",
-					http.StatusInternalServerError,
-				)
-
-				return
-			}
-		},
-	))
-
-	server := httptest.NewServer(handler)
-	t.Cleanup(server.Close)
-
-	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(
-		t.Context(), http.MethodGet, server.URL, nil,
-	)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	resp, err := server.Client().Do(req)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
-
-	body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, resp.StatusCode)
-	assert.Equal(t, "chunk", string(body))
-}

internal/server/export_test.go

@@ -24,15 +24,6 @@ func ScrubSentryRequestForTest(
 	return scrubSentryRequest(event, hint)
 }
 
-// SentryClientOptionsForTest exposes the exact options enableSentry
-// initialises the SDK with, so a test can capture events through the
-// production hook wiring rather than a hand-built equivalent.
-func SentryClientOptionsForTest(
-	dsn, release string,
-) sentry.ClientOptions {
-	return sentryClientOptions(dsn, release)
-}
-
 // NewRouterForTest builds the real route tree via SetupRoutes with
 // the supplied middleware and handlers, bypassing the fx lifecycle
 // and the HTTP listener. Tests use it so that route-group middleware
@@ -54,40 +45,3 @@ func NewRouterForTest(
 
 	return s.router
 }
-
-// ProbePattern is the route NewRouterWithProbeForTest adds to the
-// production route tree.
-const ProbePattern = "/probe"
-
-// NewRouterWithProbeForTest builds the production route tree exactly
-// as NewRouterForTest does and then registers probe at ProbePattern,
-// so a test can drive a handler that panics through the shipped
-// global middleware chain rather than a hand-assembled one. Nothing
-// about the chain is rebuilt here: the probe is an extra leaf under
-// the same Use() registrations every other route gets.
-//
-// sentryEnabled selects whether the sentryhttp handler is registered,
-// which in production a configured SENTRY_DSN decides. It is a
-// parameter because the relationship between that handler's Repanic
-// option and the recoverer registered outside it is the thing a test
-// has to be able to pin.
-func NewRouterWithProbeForTest(
-	log *slog.Logger,
-	cfg *config.Config,
-	mw *middleware.Middleware,
-	h *handlers.Handlers,
-	sentryEnabled bool,
-	probe http.HandlerFunc,
-) http.Handler {
-	s := &Server{
-		log:           log,
-		mw:            mw,
-		h:             h,
-		params:        ServerParams{Config: cfg},
-		sentryEnabled: sentryEnabled,
-	}
-	s.SetupRoutes()
-	s.router.Handle(ProbePattern, probe)
-
-	return s.router
-}

internal/server/recoverer_test.go

@@ -1,285 +0,0 @@
-package server_test
-
-import (
-	"bytes"
-	"context"
-	"encoding/json"
-	"fmt"
-	"net/http"
-	"net/http/httptest"
-	"os"
-	"os/exec"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/getsentry/sentry-go"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/server"
-)
-
-// panicProbeMarker is the value the probe handler panics with. The
-// defect this pins lost it entirely: what reached the operator was the
-// recoverer's own secondary panic, naming chi's decorateFuncCallLine
-// and nothing about the fault that caused it.
-const panicProbeMarker = "QQPRODUCTIONPANICVALUEQQ"
-
-// panicChildEnv, when set, tells the re-executed test binary to run
-// the child half of the fd-level probe below.
-const panicChildEnv = "WEBHOOKER_PANIC_PROBE_CHILD"
-
-// panicChildResultPrefix labels the child's own one-line report of
-// what the HTTP client saw, so the parent can find it among whatever
-// else lands on the child's standard output.
-const panicChildResultPrefix = "PANIC-PROBE-RESULT "
-
-// stackTruncationMarker mirrors what internal/middleware appends to a
-// field it cut. It is duplicated rather than exported, as the access
-// log's budgets are, so that changing it has to be restated here
-// deliberately.
-const stackTruncationMarker = "[truncated]"
-
-// TestPanicThroughProductionRouter drives a handler panic through the
-// shipped router, over a real server, in a subprocess whose actual
-// file descriptors are captured.
-//
-// Every part of that is load-bearing.
-//
-// A subprocess, because the question is what reaches fd 1 and fd 2 of
-// the process an operator runs. The defect's signature was 0 bytes on
-// standard error and a 2,772-byte record on standard output describing
-// chi's own crash, and neither is visible to a test that swaps the
-// logger for a buffer.
-//
-// A real server, because a panicking handler under chi's Recoverer
-// dropped the connection: the client got EOF, not a status. An
-// httptest.ResponseRecorder has no connection to drop and would have
-// recorded the same unwritten response either way, which is why this
-// defect survived the existing suite.
-//
-// The production router, because the placement of the recoverer among
-// the other global middleware is part of the fix.
-func TestPanicThroughProductionRouter(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	if os.Getenv(panicChildEnv) != "" {
-		t.Skip("child half; run by the parent below")
-	}
-
-	//nolint:gosec // Re-executing this test binary, with a fixed arg.
-	cmd := exec.CommandContext(
-		t.Context(), os.Args[0],
-		"-test.run", "^TestPanicProbeChild$",
-	)
-
-	cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), panicChildEnv+"=1")
-
-	var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
-
-	cmd.Stdout = &stdout
-	cmd.Stderr = &stderr
-
-	require.NoError(
-		t, cmd.Run(),
-		"child failed\nstdout:\n%s\nstderr:\n%s",
-		stdout.String(), stderr.String(),
-	)
-
-	assertPanicProbeOutput(t, stdout.String(), stderr.String())
-}
-
-// assertPanicProbeOutput holds the child's descriptors to what a
-// working recoverer produces.
-func assertPanicProbeOutput(t *testing.T, stdout, stderr string) {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	result := ""
-
-	var record map[string]any
-
-	for line := range strings.SplitSeq(stdout, "\n") {
-		if after, found := strings.CutPrefix(
-			line, panicChildResultPrefix,
-		); found {
-			result = after
-
-			continue
-		}
-
-		if !strings.HasPrefix(line, `{"time"`) {
-			continue
-		}
-
-		decoded := map[string]any{}
-		if json.Unmarshal([]byte(line), &decoded) != nil {
-			continue
-		}
-
-		if decoded["msg"] == "handler panic" {
-			require.Nil(
-				t, record, "one panic record expected, got two",
-			)
-
-			record = decoded
-
-			assert.LessOrEqual(
-				t, len(line), middleware.MaxPanicLogLineBytes,
-				"the panic record must hold its stated ceiling",
-			)
-
-			t.Logf(
-				"panic record through the shipped chain: %d bytes "+
-					"(ceiling %d)",
-				len(line), middleware.MaxPanicLogLineBytes,
-			)
-		}
-	}
-
-	// What the client got. Under the defect this read
-	// `status=0 err=... EOF`.
-	require.Equal(
-		t, "status=500 err=<nil>", result,
-		"the client must receive a 500, not a dropped connection",
-	)
-
-	// What the operator got. Under the defect there was no such
-	// record: standard output carried net/http reporting chi's own
-	// crash, at INFO, with the original panic value nowhere in it.
-	require.NotNil(
-		t, record,
-		"no structured panic record reached standard output",
-	)
-	assert.Equal(t, "ERROR", record["level"])
-	assert.Equal(t, panicProbeMarker, record["panic"])
-	assert.Equal(t, false, record["response_committed"])
-
-	stack, ok := record["stack"].(string)
-	require.True(t, ok)
-	assert.Contains(t, stack, "panicProbeHandler")
-	assert.NotContains(
-		t, stack, stackTruncationMarker,
-		"the shipped middleware chain's own stack must fit the "+
-			"stack budget without being cut",
-	)
-	t.Logf("stack through the shipped chain: %d bytes", len(stack))
-
-	// The secondary panic, in every form it took. net/http's report
-	// is the tell: it only logs a request when something escaped the
-	// handler chain.
-	assert.NotContains(t, stdout, "http: panic serving")
-	assert.NotContains(t, stdout, "slice bounds out of range")
-	assert.NotContains(t, stdout, "decorateFuncCallLine")
-	assert.Empty(
-		t, strings.TrimSpace(stderr),
-		"nothing may reach standard error",
-	)
-}
-
-// panicProbeHandler is the panicking route the child installs. It is a
-// named function so the stack assertion has something to look for.
-func panicProbeHandler(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
-	panic(panicProbeMarker)
-}
-
-// TestPanicProbeChild is the child half of the probe above. It runs
-// only when re-executed with panicChildEnv set; in an ordinary run it
-// returns immediately.
-//
-// It writes its result to standard output with a prefix rather than
-// asserting, because the assertions belong to the parent, which is the
-// only side that can see both descriptors.
-func TestPanicProbeChild(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	if os.Getenv(panicChildEnv) == "" {
-		return
-	}
-
-	env := newTestEnv(t)
-
-	router := server.NewRouterWithProbeForTest(
-		env.log.Get(), env.cfg, env.mw, env.hnd,
-		false, panicProbeHandler,
-	)
-
-	srv := httptest.NewServer(router)
-	defer srv.Close()
-
-	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(
-		context.Background(), http.MethodGet,
-		srv.URL+server.ProbePattern, nil,
-	)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	status := 0
-
-	resp, err := srv.Client().Do(req)
-	if err == nil {
-		status = resp.StatusCode
-
-		_ = resp.Body.Close()
-	}
-
-	// Written to the descriptor rather than through the testing
-	// package's own output, because fd 1 is exactly what the parent
-	// is measuring.
-	_, writeErr := fmt.Fprintf(
-		os.Stdout, "%sstatus=%d err=%v\n",
-		panicChildResultPrefix, status, err,
-	)
-	require.NoError(t, writeErr)
-}
-
-// TestSentryStillSeesAPanic pins the relationship the recoverer's
-// placement has to preserve. sentryhttp is registered with
-// Repanic: true, inside the recoverer, so an operator with SENTRY_DSN
-// set keeps the report and the client still gets a 500. Registered the
-// other way round, the SDK would swallow the panic and the recoverer
-// would never see it.
-func TestSentryStillSeesAPanic(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	env := newTestEnv(t)
-
-	transport := &captureTransport{}
-
-	opts := server.SentryClientOptionsForTest(
-		"https://public@sentry.invalid/1", "webhooker-test",
-	)
-	opts.Transport = transport
-
-	client, err := sentry.NewClient(opts)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	router := server.NewRouterWithProbeForTest(
-		env.log.Get(), env.cfg, env.mw, env.hnd,
-		true, panicProbeHandler,
-	)
-
-	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
-		sentry.SetHubOnContext(
-			context.Background(),
-			sentry.NewHub(client, sentry.NewScope()),
-		),
-		http.MethodGet, server.ProbePattern, nil,
-	)
-
-	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
-	router.ServeHTTP(w, req)
-
-	assert.Equal(
-		t, http.StatusInternalServerError, w.Code,
-		"the recoverer must still answer what sentryhttp re-raised",
-	)
-
-	events := transport.events
-	require.Len(t, events, 1, "Sentry must still see the panic")
-	assert.Equal(t, sentry.LevelFatal, events[0].Level)
-	// The SDK renders a string panic value as the event message
-	// rather than an exception, so the whole payload is checked for
-	// the value rather than one field of it.
-	assert.Contains(
-		t, marshalEvent(t, events[0]), panicProbeMarker,
-	)
-}

internal/server/routes.go

@@ -14,28 +14,6 @@ import (
 // maxFormBodySize is the maximum allowed request body size (in
 // bytes) for form POST endpoints. 1 MB is generous for any form
 // submission while preventing abuse from oversized payloads.
-//
-// Every route group below installs MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize) as
-// its FIRST middleware, ahead of both CSRF and RequireAuth. Both
-// orderings are deliberate.
-//
-// Ahead of CSRF because gorilla/csrf parses the form. The cap has to
-// be installed before anything reads the body, or the parse runs
-// under net/http's 10 MB default instead of this one.
-//
-// Ahead of RequireAuth because an oversize body should be refused
-// before the request buys a cookie decrypt, a session load and the
-// database read behind it. Rejecting first is the cheaper failure,
-// and it is the ordering that keeps an unauthenticated flood from
-// choosing how much session work the process does.
-//
-// What that ordering costs: the 413 branch is reachable
-// unauthenticated, at a URL of the client's choosing and of the
-// client's chosen length. So is the CSRF rejection, which sits in
-// front of RequireAuth for the same reason. Both log that path, so
-// both cap it — see the log calls in Middleware.MaxBodySize and
-// Middleware.CSRF, which spend the same per-field budget as the
-// access log.
 const maxFormBodySize int64 = 1 * 1024 * 1024 // 1 MB
 
 // requestTimeout is the maximum time allowed for a single HTTP
@@ -51,6 +29,7 @@ func (s *Server) SetupRoutes() {
 }
 
 func (s *Server) setupGlobalMiddleware() {
+	s.router.Use(middleware.Recoverer)
 	s.router.Use(middleware.RequestID)
 	s.router.Use(s.mw.SecurityHeaders())
 	s.router.Use(s.mw.Logging())
@@ -63,21 +42,8 @@ func (s *Server) setupGlobalMiddleware() {
 	s.router.Use(s.mw.CORS())
 	s.router.Use(middleware.Timeout(requestTimeout))
 
-	// Panic recovery, deliberately here rather than first. It has to
-	// run inside every middleware that observes the response, so the
-	// 500 it writes is the status the access log records and the
-	// metrics count, and outside the sentryhttp handler below, whose
-	// Repanic option needs something further out to catch what it
-	// re-raises. chi's own middleware.Recoverer held the first slot
-	// until it was measured: on a current Go release it crashes
-	// inside its stack pretty-printer instead of recovering, so the
-	// connection dropped and the original panic was never reported.
-	// See https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/187.
-	s.router.Use(s.mw.Recoverer())
-
 	// Sentry error reporting (if SENTRY_DSN is set). Repanic is
-	// true so panics still bubble up to the Recoverer middleware
+	// true so panics still bubble up to the Recoverer middleware.
-	// registered immediately above.
 	if s.sentryEnabled {
 		sentryHandler := sentryhttp.New(sentryhttp.Options{
 			Repanic: true,
@@ -124,20 +90,17 @@ func (s *Server) setupRoutes() {
 
 func (s *Server) setupPageRoutes() {
 	s.router.Route("/pages", func(r chi.Router) {
-		// MaxBodySize precedes CSRF and RequireAuth deliberately;
+		// MaxBodySize must precede CSRF: gorilla/csrf parses the
-		// see maxFormBodySize for why, and for what it costs.
+		// form, so the cap has to be installed before it runs.
 		r.Use(s.mw.MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize))
 		r.Use(s.mw.CSRF())
 		r.Use(s.mw.NoCache())
 
-		// The login POST carries no pre-emptive rate limiter. Behind
+		r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
-		// the reverse proxy production requires, with TRUSTED_PROXIES
+			r.Use(s.mw.LoginRateLimit())
-		// unset, every client shares one bucket, so a limiter spent
+			r.Get("/login", s.h.HandleLoginPage())
-		// on arrival lets any stranger deny the operator the only
+			r.Post("/login", s.h.HandleLoginSubmit())
-		// administrative path. The handler verifies credentials first
+		})
-		// and charges only failures; see Handlers.authenticateUser.
-		r.Get("/login", s.h.HandleLoginPage())
-		r.Post("/login", s.h.HandleLoginSubmit())
 
 		r.Post("/logout", s.h.HandleLogout())
 	})
@@ -145,8 +108,8 @@ func (s *Server) setupPageRoutes() {
 
 func (s *Server) setupUserRoutes() {
 	s.router.Route("/user/{username}", func(r chi.Router) {
-		// MaxBodySize precedes CSRF and RequireAuth deliberately;
+		// MaxBodySize must precede CSRF: gorilla/csrf parses the
-		// see maxFormBodySize for why, and for what it costs.
+		// form, so the cap has to be installed before it runs.
 		r.Use(s.mw.MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize))
 		r.Use(s.mw.CSRF())
 		r.Use(s.mw.NoCache())
@@ -160,8 +123,8 @@ func (s *Server) setupUserRoutes() {
 
 func (s *Server) setupSourceRoutes() {
 	s.router.Route("/sources", func(r chi.Router) {
-		// MaxBodySize precedes CSRF and RequireAuth deliberately;
+		// MaxBodySize must precede CSRF: gorilla/csrf parses the
-		// see maxFormBodySize for why, and for what it costs.
+		// form, so the cap has to be installed before it runs.
 		r.Use(s.mw.MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize))
 		r.Use(s.mw.CSRF())
 		r.Use(s.mw.NoCache())
@@ -172,8 +135,8 @@ func (s *Server) setupSourceRoutes() {
 	})
 
 	s.router.Route("/source/{sourceID}", func(r chi.Router) {
-		// MaxBodySize precedes CSRF and RequireAuth deliberately;
+		// MaxBodySize must precede CSRF: gorilla/csrf parses the
-		// see maxFormBodySize for why, and for what it costs.
+		// form, so the cap has to be installed before it runs.
 		r.Use(s.mw.MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize))
 		r.Use(s.mw.CSRF())
 		r.Use(s.mw.NoCache())

internal/server/routes_test.go

@@ -52,15 +52,6 @@ type testEnv struct {
 	sess   *session.Session
 	db     *database.Database
 	dbMgr  *database.WebhookDBManager
-
-	// The collaborators the router was built from, kept so a test
-	// that needs a second router over the same graph — one carrying
-	// a panicking probe route, or one with Sentry registered — can
-	// build it without wiring the graph again.
-	log *logger.Logger
-	cfg *config.Config
-	mw  *middleware.Middleware
-	hnd *handlers.Handlers
 }
 
 // newTestEnv wires the dependency graph with fx and builds the
@@ -109,10 +100,6 @@ func newTestEnv(t *testing.T) *testEnv {
 		sess:   sess,
 		db:     db,
 		dbMgr:  dbMgr,
-		log:    log,
-		cfg:    cfg,
-		mw:     mw,
-		hnd:    hnd,
 	}
 }
 
@@ -433,78 +420,6 @@ func TestPagesLogin_UnderLimit_ValidToken_ReachesHandler(
 	)
 }
 
-// TestPagesLogin_CorrectPasswordSurvivesASpentBudget pins the
-// routing half of the fix, which every other login test misses by
-// driving the handler directly: no pre-emptive limiter sits in front
-// of POST /pages/login on the real route tree.
-//
-// A limiter registered there would answer the last request 429
-// however correct its password is, because the wrong passwords
-// before it have already spent the bucket — which is the lockout
-// this endpoint exists to not have. CSRF and the body cap still run,
-// since every request here carries a harvested token.
-func TestPagesLogin_CorrectPasswordSurvivesASpentBudget(
-	t *testing.T,
-) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	const (
-		username = "operator"
-		password = "correct-horse-battery-staple"
-	)
-
-	env := newTestEnv(t)
-	env.seedUser(t, username, password)
-
-	submit := func(t *testing.T, pw string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
-		t.Helper()
-
-		token, cookies := env.csrfFrom(t, "/pages/login", nil)
-
-		form := url.Values{}
-		form.Set("csrf_token", token)
-		form.Set("username", username)
-		form.Set("password", pw)
-
-		return env.post("/pages/login", form, cookies)
-	}
-
-	// Spend the failure budget against this username. The exact
-	// limit belongs to the middleware; this waits for the throttle
-	// to appear rather than restating it, under a ceiling well
-	// above it so a broken limiter fails the test instead of
-	// looping.
-	const maxAttempts = 20
-
-	spent := false
-
-	for range maxAttempts {
-		code := submit(t, "wrong").Code
-		if code == http.StatusTooManyRequests {
-			spent = true
-
-			break
-		}
-
-		require.Equal(
-			t, http.StatusUnauthorized, code,
-			"a wrong password must be rejected, not accepted",
-		)
-	}
-
-	require.True(
-		t, spent,
-		"repeated wrong passwords must eventually be throttled",
-	)
-
-	assert.Equal(
-		t, http.StatusSeeOther, submit(t, password).Code,
-		"a correct password must be accepted on the routed "+
-			"endpoint even with the failure budget spent: the "+
-			"operator has no second administrative path",
-	)
-}
-
 // --- /user/{username} group ---
 
 // TestPasswordChange_OversizeBody_RejectedAndPasswordUnchanged

internal/server/sentry.go

@@ -1,236 +1,40 @@
 package server
 
-import (
+import "github.com/getsentry/sentry-go"
-	"net/http"
-	"net/url"
-	"strings"
 
-	"github.com/getsentry/sentry-go"
+// sentryRedactedQuery stands in for the query string on every event
-	"github.com/go-chi/chi"
+// shipped to Sentry.
-)
+const sentryRedactedQuery = "(redacted)"
 
-// sentryRedacted stands in for a withheld field on every event shipped
+// scrubSentryRequest drops the query string from an event's request
-// to Sentry. It is a marker rather than an empty string so a reader
+// context before it leaves the process.
-// can tell a suppressed value from an absent one.
-const sentryRedacted = "(redacted)"
-
-// sentryRedactedPath is what stands in for the request path when the
-// route pattern is not reachable. It is deliberately not the concrete
-// path: on the receiver route that path carries the entrypoint UUID,
-// which is a write capability rather than an identifier.
-const sentryRedactedPath = "/" + sentryRedacted
-
-// sentryClientOptions builds the options the SDK is initialised with.
-// It is its own function so a test can stand up a client wired exactly
-// as production is, with only the transport swapped.
-func sentryClientOptions(dsn, release string) sentry.ClientOptions {
-	return sentry.ClientOptions{
-		Dsn:     dsn,
-		Release: release,
-		// Both hooks, because the SDK runs one for error events
-		// and the other for transactions.
-		BeforeSend:            scrubSentryRequest,
-		BeforeSendTransaction: scrubSentryRequest,
-	}
-}
-
-// scrubSentryRequest strips client-supplied content from an event's
-// request context before it leaves the process.
 //
-// sentryhttp attaches the whole *http.Request to the scope
+// sentryhttp attaches the whole *http.Request to the scope, and
-// (sentryhttp.go:113), and Scope.ApplyToEvent fills the event's
+// sentry.NewRequest copies r.URL.RawQuery verbatim into
-// Request from it inside prepareEvent, which runs before this hook.
+// Request.QueryString. That path is independent of the access log: it
-// Two of the fields it fills are copied with no SendDefaultPII guard:
+// is populated from the request even though the log line for the same
+// request records only the route pattern or a redacted query. Any
+// error or panic captured while serving a request would therefore ship
+// the query string to a third-party service, and a query string is
+// client-chosen text that a mistyped or hand-built request can put a
+// credential into.
 //
-//   - QueryString, verbatim from r.URL.RawQuery.
+// The query is not debugging signal here. One route in the service
-//   - Data, the first 10 KiB of the request body, teed off r.Body by
+// reads a query parameter at all — `page`, on the authenticated
-//     SetRequest and filled precisely because the handlers call
+// pagination links in internal/handlers/source_management.go — and
-//     ParseForm.
+// Request.URL still carries scheme, host and path, which is what
-//
+// identifies the failing route.
-// Since every form field in this service is read with PostFormValue,
-// the body is the only place a credential is submitted: a target's
-// destination URL, whose path segments are the bearer token, plus the
-// login password and both password-change fields. None of that may
-// reach a third-party service.
-//
-// URL is the third such field. NewRequest builds it as
-// scheme://host/path (interfaces.go:183), and on the receiver route
-// that path is /webhook/<uuid> in full — a write capability, not an
-// identifier. It is rebuilt here from the chi route pattern, on every
-// route, keeping the scheme and the host.
-//
-// This hook is a floor, not a default: the fields it clears stay
-// cleared even if SendDefaultPII is ever turned on.
 func scrubSentryRequest(
 	event *sentry.Event,
-	hint *sentry.EventHint,
+	_ *sentry.EventHint,
 ) *sentry.Event {
-	if event == nil {
+	if event == nil || event.Request == nil {
 		return event
 	}
 
-	pattern := sentryRoutePattern(hint)
+	if event.Request.QueryString != "" {
-
+		event.Request.QueryString = sentryRedactedQuery
-	// Only transaction events carry a Transaction name, and the SDK
-	// builds it from the concrete path too (sentryhttp.go:105 via
-	// tracing.go:553). Rewritten on the same terms.
-	if event.Transaction != "" {
-		event.Transaction = sentryTransactionName(
-			event.Transaction, pattern,
-		)
 	}
 
-	if event.Request == nil {
-		return event
-	}
-
-	req := event.Request
-
-	if req.URL != "" {
-		req.URL = sentryRouteURL(req.URL, pattern)
-	}
-
-	if req.QueryString != "" {
-		req.QueryString = sentryRedacted
-	}
-
-	if req.Data != "" {
-		req.Data = sentryRedacted
-	}
-
-	req.Cookies = ""
-	req.Env = nil
-	req.Headers = keptSentryHeaders(req.Headers)
-
 	return event
 }
-
-// sentryRoutePattern returns the chi route pattern for the request the
-// hint carries, or "" when it is not reachable.
-//
-// The request is reachable on the error dispatch only. sentryhttp's
-// recover path calls RecoverWithContext with the request on the
-// context under sentry.RequestContextKey (sentryhttp.go:124-125), and
-// the client copies that context onto the hint (client.go:484-485)
-// before handing it to BeforeSend (client.go:631). chi's routing
-// context is a pointer placed on the request context before the
-// middleware chain runs (chi mux.go:84) and filled in as the mux
-// routes, so by the time a handler panics it names the matched route.
-//
-// The transaction dispatch has no such request: Span.doFinish calls
-// hub.CaptureEvent (tracing.go:356), which passes a nil hint that the
-// client replaces with an empty one (client.go:620-622). The pattern
-// is therefore always "" there, and the callers fall back.
-func sentryRoutePattern(hint *sentry.EventHint) string {
-	if hint == nil || hint.Context == nil {
-		return ""
-	}
-
-	req, ok := hint.Context.Value(
-		sentry.RequestContextKey,
-	).(*http.Request)
-	if !ok || req == nil {
-		return ""
-	}
-
-	rctx := chi.RouteContext(req.Context())
-	if rctx == nil {
-		return ""
-	}
-
-	// Empty when no route matched, which is the fallback case too.
-	return rctx.RoutePattern()
-}
-
-// sentryRouteURL rebuilds an event's request URL with the route
-// pattern in place of the concrete path.
-//
-// The scheme is load-bearing and is kept: the SDK derives it from
-// r.TLS != nil || r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto") == "https"
-// (interfaces.go:180), byte for byte the predicate
-// internal/middleware/csrf.go uses, so it is the CSRF TLS decision and
-// the reason dropping X-Forwarded-Proto from the header allowlist
-// costs nothing. The host is parsed.Host of the SDK's
-// scheme://r.Host/path, so it is whatever the client's Host header
-// carried: this service validates no hostname. It is kept because that
-// same header is on the allowlist, so scrubbing it here would withhold
-// nothing that is not sent anyway.
-//
-// Everything else in the URL is discarded rather than edited, so a
-// future SDK that starts appending a query string cannot widen this.
-func sentryRouteURL(rawURL, pattern string) string {
-	parsed, err := url.Parse(rawURL)
-	if err != nil || parsed.Scheme == "" {
-		// Not a shape this can safely take apart.
-		return sentryRedacted
-	}
-
-	if pattern == "" {
-		pattern = sentryRedactedPath
-	}
-
-	return parsed.Scheme + "://" + parsed.Host + pattern
-}
-
-// sentryTransactionName rebuilds the SDK's "METHOD /path" transaction
-// name with the route pattern in place of the concrete path. Method is
-// kept for the same reason Request.Method is: net/http admits only a
-// bounded token there. A name in any other shape is withheld whole,
-// since nothing can be said about which part of it is a path.
-func sentryTransactionName(name, pattern string) string {
-	method, _, found := strings.Cut(name, " ")
-	if !found {
-		return sentryRedacted
-	}
-
-	if pattern == "" {
-		pattern = sentryRedactedPath
-	}
-
-	return method + " " + pattern
-}
-
-// keptSentryHeaders returns the subset of headers an event may carry
-// off-host. Dropping by allowlist rather than by blocklist is what
-// makes an unrecognised header safe: the SDK's own filter removes four
-// names and passes everything else, so X-Csrf-Token — which
-// gorilla/csrf accepts in place of the form field — and the shared
-// secrets senders put on the receiver route (X-Gitlab-Token and the
-// per-provider signature headers) would otherwise ship verbatim.
-func keptSentryHeaders(headers map[string]string) map[string]string {
-	if len(headers) == 0 {
-		return headers
-	}
-
-	kept := make(map[string]string, len(headers))
-
-	for name, value := range headers {
-		if sentryKeepsHeader(name) {
-			kept[name] = value
-		}
-	}
-
-	return kept
-}
-
-// sentryKeepsHeader reports whether a request header is routing or
-// content metadata rather than client-chosen payload. Referer is kept
-// on the reasoning that it is browser-set, that this service emits
-// only ?page= in its own links, and that Referrer-Policy is set to
-// strict-origin-when-cross-origin. X-Request-Id ties the event to the
-// local access log line, which holds the rest of the detail.
-func sentryKeepsHeader(name string) bool {
-	switch http.CanonicalHeaderKey(name) {
-	case "Accept",
-		"Content-Length",
-		"Content-Type",
-		"Host",
-		"Origin",
-		"Referer",
-		"User-Agent",
-		"X-Request-Id":
-		return true
-	default:
-		return false
-	}
-}

internal/server/sentry_test.go

@@ -5,469 +5,89 @@ import (
 	"encoding/json"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
-	"net/url"
-	"strings"
-	"sync"
 	"testing"
-	"time"
 
 	"github.com/getsentry/sentry-go"
-	sentryhttp "github.com/getsentry/sentry-go/http"
-	"github.com/go-chi/chi"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/server"
 )
 
-// The four markers below are the credentials a captured event could
+// sentrySecretSegment is the path segment of a Slack incoming-webhook
-// carry off-host, one per field of sentry.Request that the SDK fills
+// URL — the part that is the bearer credential. No Sentry event may
-// from the request without a SendDefaultPII guard.
+// carry it.
-const (
+const sentrySecretSegment = "T00000000/B00000000/QQSENTRYSECRETQQ"
-	// sentryBodyMarker is submitted as a form value. Since every
-	// handler reads its fields with PostFormValue, the body is the
-	// only place a password or a target URL is ever supplied.
-	sentryBodyMarker = "QQSENTRYBODYMARKERQQ"
 
-	// sentryQueryMarker rides the request line.
+// sentryEventFor builds the event Sentry would ship for a request
-	sentryQueryMarker = "T00000000/B00000000/QQSENTRYQUERYMARKERQQ"
+// carrying the given raw query, using the SDK's own request
-
+// conversion rather than a hand-built Request, so the test tracks
-	// sentryHeaderMarker rides X-Csrf-Token, which gorilla/csrf
+// what the SDK actually collects.
-	// accepts in place of the form field.
+func sentryEventFor(t *testing.T, rawQuery string) *sentry.Event {
-	sentryHeaderMarker = "QQSENTRYHEADERMARKERQQ"
-
-	// sentryReceiverUUID is the entrypoint identifier in the path of
-	// a receiver request. It is a write capability: anyone holding
-	// it can POST events this service accepts and its targets then
-	// deliver, so it may not reach a third-party tracker.
-	sentryReceiverUUID = "6d1f9c2a-3b7e-4f58-9a0d-c0ffeebadc0d"
-)
-
-// sentryKeptUserAgent is a non-secret header value planted so the
-// assertions below cannot pass by the event carrying no headers at
-// all.
-const sentryKeptUserAgent = "webhooker-test-agent"
-
-// captureTransport records events instead of shipping them, so a test
-// sees exactly the payload the SDK would have put on the wire.
-type captureTransport struct {
-	mu     sync.Mutex
-	events []*sentry.Event
-}
-
-func (c *captureTransport) Configure(sentry.ClientOptions) {}
-
-func (c *captureTransport) Flush(time.Duration) bool { return true }
-
-func (c *captureTransport) SendEvent(event *sentry.Event) {
-	c.mu.Lock()
-	defer c.mu.Unlock()
-
-	c.events = append(c.events, event)
-}
-
-// sentryCase drives one request through the real sentryhttp middleware
-// inside a real chi router and returns the events the SDK produced.
-//
-// Routing through a chi mux is load-bearing, not decoration. chi puts
-// its routing context on the request context before the middleware
-// chain runs and fills it in as it matches, so a hand-built request
-// carries no route pattern at all and could not distinguish the hook
-// working from the hook falling back.
-//
-// This is also the only construction path on which Request.Data
-// appears: sentryhttp calls Scope.SetRequest, which tees r.Body into a
-// 10 KiB buffer, ParseForm drains the tee, and Scope.ApplyToEvent
-// copies the buffer into the event inside prepareEvent — before
-// BeforeSend runs. A hand-built sentry.NewRequest never reads the body
-// and so cannot regress-test any of it.
-type sentryCase struct {
-	// scrub selects whether the production BeforeSend hooks are
-	// installed, so the same path shows both what the SDK collects
-	// and what survives.
-	scrub bool
-
-	// tracing enables the transaction dispatch, which the service
-	// leaves off. With it on, a served request produces a
-	// transaction event through BeforeSendTransaction.
-	tracing bool
-
-	// panics selects the error dispatch, via BeforeSend.
-	panics bool
-
-	// request builds the request to serve, given the client whose
-	// hub it must carry.
-	request func(*sentry.Client) *http.Request
-}
-
-func (c sentryCase) capture(t *testing.T) []*sentry.Event {
 	t.Helper()
 
-	transport := &captureTransport{}
-
-	opts := server.SentryClientOptionsForTest(
-		"https://public@sentry.invalid/1", "webhooker-test",
-	)
-	opts.Transport = transport
-
-	if !c.scrub {
-		opts.BeforeSend = nil
-		opts.BeforeSendTransaction = nil
-	}
-
-	if c.tracing {
-		opts.EnableTracing = true
-		opts.TracesSampleRate = 1.0
-	}
-
-	client, err := sentry.NewClient(opts)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	c.router().ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), c.request(client))
-
-	return transport.events
-}
-
-// router mirrors the one ordering these tests depend on, over the two
-// route patterns they need: a recovering middleware outside, then the
-// sentryhttp handler registered with Use and Repanic set, exactly as
-// routes.go orders the two. The bare recover stands in for
-// Middleware.Recoverer, which holds that outer slot in production; it
-// is here only to keep panic stacks out of the test output. That the
-// production one really does catch what sentryhttp re-raises is
-// pinned separately, by TestSentryStillSeesAPanic.
-func (c sentryCase) router() http.Handler {
-	handler := func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-		// This call is what drains the body tee and fills the
-		// buffer. Its success is asserted by the unscrubbed case
-		// below, which sees the body in the event.
-		_ = r.ParseForm()
-
-		if c.panics {
-			panic("boom")
-		}
-	}
-
-	router := chi.NewRouter()
-	router.Use(recoveringMiddleware)
-	router.Use(
-		sentryhttp.New(sentryhttp.Options{Repanic: true}).Handle,
-	)
-	router.HandleFunc("/pages/login", handler)
-	router.HandleFunc("/webhook/{uuid}", handler)
-
-	return router
-}
-
-func recoveringMiddleware(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
-	return http.HandlerFunc(
-		func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-			defer func() { _ = recover() }()
-
-			next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
-		},
-	)
-}
-
-// sentryLoginRequest builds the password POST most cases drive, with a
-// credential planted in the body, the query and a header.
-func sentryLoginRequest(client *sentry.Client) *http.Request {
-	form := url.Values{}
-	form.Set("username", "admin")
-	form.Set("password", sentryBodyMarker)
-
-	req := sentryRequest(
-		client,
-		"/pages/login?url=https://hooks.slack.com/services/"+
-			sentryQueryMarker,
-		form.Encode(),
-	)
-
-	req.Header.Set("X-Csrf-Token", sentryHeaderMarker)
-
-	return req
-}
-
-// sentryReceiverRequest builds a POST to the receiver route, whose
-// concrete path carries the entrypoint capability.
-func sentryReceiverRequest(client *sentry.Client) *http.Request {
-	return sentryRequest(
-		client, "/webhook/"+sentryReceiverUUID, "payload=hello",
-	)
-}
-
-func sentryRequest(
-	client *sentry.Client,
-	target, body string,
-) *http.Request {
 	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
-		sentry.SetHubOnContext(
+		context.Background(),
-			context.Background(),
-			sentry.NewHub(client, sentry.NewScope()),
-		),
 		http.MethodPost,
-		target,
+		"/source/abc/targets?"+rawQuery,
-		strings.NewReader(body),
+		nil,
 	)
 
-	req.Header.Set(
-		"Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
-	)
-	req.Header.Set("User-Agent", sentryKeptUserAgent)
-
-	return req
-}
-
-// marshalEvent encodes an event the way the transport does.
-func marshalEvent(t *testing.T, event *sentry.Event) string {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	encoded, err := json.Marshal(event)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	return string(encoded)
-}
-
-// onlyEvent asserts a single event was captured and returns it.
-func onlyEvent(t *testing.T, events []*sentry.Event) *sentry.Event {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	require.Len(t, events, 1)
-	require.NotNil(t, events[0].Request)
-
-	return events[0]
-}
-
-// TestSentryScrub_SDKCollectsTheRequestUnscrubbed pins the premise the
-// hook exists for. Without it the SDK ships the whole POST body, the
-// raw query, the CSRF header and the concrete request path, none of
-// which SendDefaultPII=false suppresses.
-func TestSentryScrub_SDKCollectsTheRequestUnscrubbed(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	event := onlyEvent(t, sentryCase{
-		panics:  true,
-		request: sentryLoginRequest,
-	}.capture(t))
-
-	assert.Contains(
-		t, event.Request.Data, sentryBodyMarker,
-		"the SDK is expected to collect the POST body; if it no "+
-			"longer does, the scrub hook's premise changed",
-	)
-	assert.Contains(t, event.Request.QueryString, sentryQueryMarker)
-	assert.Contains(
-		t, marshalEvent(t, event), sentryHeaderMarker,
-	)
-
-	receiver := onlyEvent(t, sentryCase{
-		panics:  true,
-		request: sentryReceiverRequest,
-	}.capture(t))
-
-	assert.Contains(
-		t, receiver.Request.URL, sentryReceiverUUID,
-		"the SDK is expected to build Request.URL from the "+
-			"concrete path; if it no longer does, the route "+
-			"pattern rewrite's premise changed",
-	)
-}
-
-// TestSentryScrub_RedactsTheCapturedRequest is the regression test: no
-// byte of any planted credential may survive into the marshalled event
-// that leaves the process.
-func TestSentryScrub_RedactsTheCapturedRequest(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	event := onlyEvent(t, sentryCase{
-		scrub:   true,
-		panics:  true,
-		request: sentryLoginRequest,
-	}.capture(t))
-
-	encoded := marshalEvent(t, event)
-
-	assert.NotContains(t, encoded, sentryBodyMarker)
-	assert.NotContains(t, encoded, sentryQueryMarker)
-	assert.NotContains(t, encoded, sentryHeaderMarker)
-	assert.NotContains(t, encoded, "hooks.slack.com")
-
-	assert.Equal(t, "(redacted)", event.Request.Data)
-	assert.Equal(t, "(redacted)", event.Request.QueryString)
-	assert.Empty(t, event.Request.Cookies)
-	assert.Empty(t, event.Request.Env)
-}
-
-// TestSentryScrub_ReplacesTheCapabilityPathWithTheRoutePattern is the
-// regression test for the receiver URL: the entrypoint UUID is a write
-// capability and may not reach the tracker, while the route it names
-// must still be readable there.
-func TestSentryScrub_ReplacesTheCapabilityPathWithTheRoutePattern(
-	t *testing.T,
-) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	event := onlyEvent(t, sentryCase{
-		scrub:   true,
-		panics:  true,
-		request: sentryReceiverRequest,
-	}.capture(t))
-
-	assert.NotContains(
-		t, marshalEvent(t, event), sentryReceiverUUID,
-	)
-	assert.Equal(
-		t, "http://example.com/webhook/{uuid}", event.Request.URL,
-	)
-}
-
-// TestSentryScrub_KeepsTheRoutingContext checks the hook does not cost
-// the debugging signal: the route, its scheme and host, the method and
-// the metadata headers still identify what failed. On a static route
-// the pattern is the path, so the URL is unchanged there.
-func TestSentryScrub_KeepsTheRoutingContext(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	event := onlyEvent(t, sentryCase{
-		scrub:   true,
-		panics:  true,
-		request: sentryLoginRequest,
-	}.capture(t))
-
-	assert.Equal(
-		t, "http://example.com/pages/login", event.Request.URL,
-	)
-	assert.Equal(t, http.MethodPost, event.Request.Method)
-	assert.Equal(
-		t,
-		sentryKeptUserAgent,
-		event.Request.Headers["User-Agent"],
-	)
-	assert.Equal(
-		t,
-		"application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
-		event.Request.Headers["Content-Type"],
-	)
-}
-
-// TestSentryScrub_RedactsTheTransactionDispatch covers the other hook.
-// Span.doFinish captures with a nil hint, so BeforeSendTransaction
-// gets one with no context and no request: the route pattern is out of
-// reach and both the URL and the SDK-built transaction name have to
-// fall back. Tracing is off in this service, so no transaction event
-// is produced today; the hook is a floor against that changing.
-func TestSentryScrub_RedactsTheTransactionDispatch(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	events := sentryCase{
-		scrub:   true,
-		tracing: true,
-		request: sentryReceiverRequest,
-	}.capture(t)
-
-	event := onlyEvent(t, events)
-	require.Equal(t, "transaction", event.Type)
-
-	assert.NotContains(
-		t, marshalEvent(t, event), sentryReceiverUUID,
-	)
-	assert.Equal(
-		t, "http://example.com/(redacted)", event.Request.URL,
-	)
-	assert.Equal(t, "POST /(redacted)", event.Transaction)
-}
-
-// TestSentryScrub_TransactionDispatchIsUnscrubbedWithoutTheHook pins
-// that dispatch's premise the same way, since it is the one the
-// service does not exercise today.
-func TestSentryScrub_TransactionDispatchIsUnscrubbedWithoutTheHook(
-	t *testing.T,
-) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	event := onlyEvent(t, sentryCase{
-		tracing: true,
-		request: sentryReceiverRequest,
-	}.capture(t))
-
-	require.Equal(t, "transaction", event.Type)
-	assert.Contains(t, event.Request.URL, sentryReceiverUUID)
-	assert.Contains(t, event.Transaction, sentryReceiverUUID)
-}
-
-// TestSentryScrub_FallsBackWithoutARoutePattern covers every way the
-// pattern can be missing. None of them may fall back to the concrete
-// path, and all of them keep the scheme, which is the CSRF TLS
-// decision.
-func TestSentryScrub_FallsBackWithoutARoutePattern(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	concrete := "https://example.com/webhook/" + sentryReceiverUUID
-
-	// A request with no chi routing context on it at all, which is
-	// what an event captured outside the router would carry.
-	unrouted := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
-		context.Background(), http.MethodPost, concrete, nil,
-	)
-
-	for name, hint := range map[string]*sentry.EventHint{
-		"no hint":    nil,
-		"no context": {},
-		"no request": {Context: context.Background()},
-		"unrouted request": {
-			Context: context.WithValue(
-				context.Background(),
-				sentry.RequestContextKey,
-				unrouted,
-			),
-		},
-	} {
-		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			t.Parallel()
-
-			event := sentry.NewEvent()
-			event.Request = &sentry.Request{URL: concrete}
-			event.Transaction = "POST /webhook/" +
-				sentryReceiverUUID
-
-			scrubbed := server.ScrubSentryRequestForTest(
-				event, hint,
-			)
-			require.NotNil(t, scrubbed)
-
-			assert.Equal(
-				t,
-				"https://example.com/(redacted)",
-				scrubbed.Request.URL,
-			)
-			assert.Equal(
-				t, "POST /(redacted)", scrubbed.Transaction,
-			)
-			assert.NotContains(
-				t,
-				marshalEvent(t, scrubbed),
-				sentryReceiverUUID,
-			)
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// TestSentryScrub_WithholdsUnparseableValues covers the shapes the
-// rewrite cannot take apart. Withholding them whole is the safe
-// answer, since nothing can be said about which part is a path.
-func TestSentryScrub_WithholdsUnparseableValues(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
 	event := sentry.NewEvent()
-	event.Request = &sentry.Request{
+	event.Request = sentry.NewRequest(req)
-		URL: "/webhook/" + sentryReceiverUUID,
+
-	}
+	return event
-	event.Transaction = "/webhook/" + sentryReceiverUUID
+}
+
+// TestSentryScrub_QueryStringIsCollectedUnscrubbed pins the reason the
+// hook exists: the SDK copies the raw query into the event on its own,
+// independently of the access log, which records only the route
+// pattern or a redacted query for the same request.
+func TestSentryScrub_QueryStringIsCollectedUnscrubbed(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	event := sentryEventFor(
+		t, "url=https://hooks.slack.com/services/"+sentrySecretSegment,
+	)
+
+	require.Contains(
+		t, event.Request.QueryString, sentrySecretSegment,
+		"the SDK is expected to collect the raw query; "+
+			"if it no longer does, the scrub hook's premise changed",
+	)
+}
+
+// TestSentryScrub_RedactsQueryString is the regression test: the hook
+// installed on both BeforeSend and BeforeSendTransaction must leave no
+// byte of the query in the event that goes off-host.
+func TestSentryScrub_RedactsQueryString(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	event := sentryEventFor(
+		t, "url=https://hooks.slack.com/services/"+sentrySecretSegment,
+	)
 
 	scrubbed := server.ScrubSentryRequestForTest(event, nil)
 	require.NotNil(t, scrubbed)
 
-	assert.Equal(t, "(redacted)", scrubbed.Request.URL)
+	encoded, err := json.Marshal(scrubbed)
-	assert.Equal(t, "(redacted)", scrubbed.Transaction)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	assert.NotContains(t, string(encoded), sentrySecretSegment)
+	assert.NotContains(t, string(encoded), "hooks.slack.com")
+}
+
+// TestSentryScrub_KeepsTheRoutingContext checks the hook does not cost
+// the debugging signal: the path still identifies the failing route.
+func TestSentryScrub_KeepsTheRoutingContext(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	event := sentryEventFor(t, "page=2")
+
+	scrubbed := server.ScrubSentryRequestForTest(event, nil)
+	require.NotNil(t, scrubbed)
+
+	assert.Contains(t, scrubbed.Request.URL, "/source/abc/targets")
+	assert.Equal(t, http.MethodPost, scrubbed.Request.Method)
 }
 
 // TestSentryScrub_ToleratesEventsWithoutARequest covers the events the
@@ -475,12 +95,11 @@ func TestSentryScrub_WithholdsUnparseableValues(t *testing.T) {
 func TestSentryScrub_ToleratesEventsWithoutARequest(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
-	scrubbed := server.ScrubSentryRequestForTest(
+	event := sentry.NewEvent()
-		sentry.NewEvent(), nil,
+
-	)
+	scrubbed := server.ScrubSentryRequestForTest(event, nil)
 
 	require.NotNil(t, scrubbed)
 	assert.Nil(t, scrubbed.Request)
-	assert.Empty(t, scrubbed.Transaction)
 	assert.Nil(t, server.ScrubSentryRequestForTest(nil, nil))
 }

internal/server/server.go

@@ -141,14 +141,18 @@ func (s *Server) enableSentry() {
 		return
 	}
 
-	err := sentry.Init(sentryClientOptions(
+	err := sentry.Init(sentry.ClientOptions{
-		s.params.Config.SentryDSN,
+		Dsn: s.params.Config.SentryDSN,
-		fmt.Sprintf(
+		Release: fmt.Sprintf(
 			"%s-%s",
 			s.params.Globals.Appname,
 			s.params.Globals.Version,
 		),
-	))
+		// Both hooks, because the SDK runs one for error events
+		// and the other for transactions.
+		BeforeSend:            scrubSentryRequest,
+		BeforeSendTransaction: scrubSentryRequest,
+	})
 	if err != nil {
 		s.log.Error("sentry init failure", "error", err)
 		// Don't use fatal since we still want the service to run

script/bootstrap

@@ -3,14 +3,20 @@
 # this repo. Idempotent: every install is guarded by a check so already
 # installed tools are skipped. Base tooling comes from nix, apt, brew,
 # or apk (detected in that order); assumes NOTHING is present (not git,
-# make, or go). golangci-lint is deliberately not installed: linting runs
+# make, or go). golangci-lint is packaged in nix, brew, and apk; on apt
-# only in docker, via script/lint and Dockerfile.lint. Finishes by running
+# it is installed from a hash-verified GitHub release archive (never
-# script/fetch-assets, which installs the hash-pinned third-party browser
+# curl | sh). Finishes by running script/fetch-assets, which installs the
-# assets the repo does not commit.
+# hash-pinned third-party browser assets the repo does not commit.
 set -eu
 
 ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
 
+# Pinned versions, 2026-08-07. Never "latest"; exact versions only.
+GOLANGCI_LINT_VERSION="2.12.2"
+# sha256 of golangci-lint-2.12.2-linux-<arch>.tar.gz release archives
+GOLANGCI_LINT_SHA256_AMD64="8df580d2670fed8fa984aac0507099af8df275e665215f5c7a2ae3943893a553"
+GOLANGCI_LINT_SHA256_ARM64="44cd40a8c76c86755375adfeea52cfd3533cb43d7bd647771e0ae065e166df3a"
+
 PKGMGR=""
 SUDO=""
 
@@ -51,6 +57,52 @@ missing() {
     ! command -v "$1" >/dev/null 2>&1
 }
 
+# verify_sha256 <file> <expected-hash>
+verify_sha256() {
+    if command -v sha256sum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        actual="$(sha256sum "$1" | cut -d' ' -f1)"
+    else
+        actual="$(shasum -a 256 "$1" | cut -d' ' -f1)"
+    fi
+    if [ "$actual" != "$2" ]; then
+        echo "bootstrap: sha256 mismatch for $1" >&2
+        echo "  expected: $2" >&2
+        echo "  actual:   $actual" >&2
+        exit 1
+    fi
+}
+
+# apt has no golangci-lint package: install a pinned release archive
+# from GitHub, verified by hardcoded sha256 (never curl | sh).
+install_golangci_lint_release() {
+    case "$(uname -m)" in
+        x86_64) goarch="amd64"; sha="$GOLANGCI_LINT_SHA256_AMD64" ;;
+        aarch64|arm64) goarch="arm64"; sha="$GOLANGCI_LINT_SHA256_ARM64" ;;
+        *)
+            echo "bootstrap: unsupported architecture $(uname -m)" >&2
+            exit 1
+            ;;
+    esac
+    if missing curl; then pkg_install curl curl curl curl; fi
+    name="golangci-lint-${GOLANGCI_LINT_VERSION}-linux-${goarch}"
+    tmp="$(mktemp -d)"
+    curl -fsSL -o "$tmp/$name.tar.gz" \
+        "https://github.com/golangci/golangci-lint/releases/download/v${GOLANGCI_LINT_VERSION}/${name}.tar.gz"
+    verify_sha256 "$tmp/$name.tar.gz" "$sha"
+    tar -xzf "$tmp/$name.tar.gz" -C "$tmp"
+    $SUDO install -m 0755 "$tmp/$name/golangci-lint" /usr/local/bin/golangci-lint
+    rm -rf "$tmp"
+}
+
+ensure_golangci_lint() {
+    if ! missing golangci-lint; then return 0; fi
+    detect_pkgmgr
+    case "$PKGMGR" in
+        apt) install_golangci_lint_release ;;
+        *) pkg_install golangci-lint golangci-lint golangci-lint golangci-lint ;;
+    esac
+}
+
 main() {
     cd "$ROOT"
 
@@ -58,14 +110,9 @@ main() {
     if missing git; then pkg_install git git git git; fi
     if missing make; then pkg_install gnumake make make make; fi
 
-    # Go toolchain
+    # Go toolchain and linter
     if missing go; then pkg_install go golang go go; fi
-
+    ensure_golangci_lint
-    # Not installed here: docker is platform-specific and out of scope for a
-    # package-manager bootstrap, but script/lint needs it.
-    if missing docker; then
-        echo "bootstrap: docker not found; script/lint requires it" >&2
-    fi
 
     go mod download
 

script/lint

@@ -1,55 +1,12 @@
 #!/bin/sh
-# script/lint: run the linter. golangci-lint is never installed locally: it
+# script/lint: run the linter.
-# runs via docker only, one way, everywhere — script/lint builds
-# Dockerfile.lint, which COPYs the repo into the pinned golangci-lint image
-# and lints as a build step. This works even when the docker daemon is remote
-# and bind mounts are impossible, and it removes the host linter's shared
-# cache, which has attributed other checkouts' findings to this one.
-#
-# --no-cache-filter=lint forces the lint stage to re-execute on every run; a
-# cached lint stage exits 0 in under a second having linted nothing. The deps
-# stage keeps its cache, so module downloads are not repeated.
-# --progress=plain keeps the linter's own output visible on success, so a
-# passing run shows the issue count rather than nothing.
-# --output=type=cacheonly leaves no image behind to clean up.
-#
-# docker silently ignores --no-cache-filter for a stage name that does not
-# match, so a rename or a typo would restore the cached false green with no
-# warning and a fast exit 0. The flag is therefore not trusted: the build
-# output is teed to a log and a run is only a pass if golangci-lint's own
-# summary line ("N issues." / "N issues:") is in it. No summary, no lint,
-# whatever the exit code says.
 set -eu
 
 ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
 
 main() {
     cd "$ROOT"
-
+    golangci-lint run --config .golangci.yml ./...
-    log="$(mktemp -t webhooker-lint.XXXXXXXX)"
-    rcfile="$(mktemp -t webhooker-lint-rc.XXXXXXXX)"
-    trap 'rm -f "$log" "$rcfile"' EXIT INT TERM
-
-    # The pipeline's status is tee's, and POSIX sh has no pipefail, so the
-    # build's status travels via a file. Output still streams live.
-    {
-        docker build \
-            -f Dockerfile.lint \
-            --no-cache-filter=lint \
-            --progress=plain \
-            --output=type=cacheonly \
-            . 2>&1 && echo 0 >"$rcfile" || echo $? >"$rcfile"
-    } | tee "$log" >&2
-
-    rc="$(cat "$rcfile")"
-    [ "$rc" -eq 0 ] || exit "$rc"
-
-    if ! grep -qE '[0-9]+ issues[.:]' "$log"; then
-        echo "script/lint: golangci-lint printed no summary line; the linter" >&2
-        echo "  did not run. Check that the stage named in --no-cache-filter" >&2
-        echo "  still matches a stage in Dockerfile.lint." >&2
-        exit 1
-    fi
 }
 
 main "$@"

script/test

@@ -1,34 +1,12 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 # script/test: run the test suite.
-#
-# -timeout is applied by `go test` per package, not to the run as a whole, so
-# it only has to clear the slowest single package. That is internal/handlers,
-# measured in a cache-defeated builder stage on the 48-core shared build host
-# (2026-08-18); load- and host-dependent, not invariants:
-#
-#   16.9s                  host load 5-20, GOMAXPROCS 48
-#   45.9s / 47.3s / 49.0s  three runs at deliberate host load 31-73
-#   30.6s / 39.7s          host load 5-20, GOMAXPROCS 6 / 4
-#   67.3s / 97.5s          host load 5-20, GOMAXPROCS 2 / 1
-#   67.3s                  GOMAXPROCS 4 at deliberate host load 52-68
-#
-# The old 30s budget was breached by every loaded run and by every GOMAXPROCS
-# at or below 6; at GOMAXPROCS 4 it failed outright ("panic: test timed out
-# after 30s"), reproduced on 33e4fa4 with no other change.
-#
-# 90s matches the org-wide backstop in REPO_POLICIES.md and is sized here
-# against the figures above: the worst case under native parallelism is 49.0s,
-# and the compound GOMAXPROCS-4-under-load case at 67.3s sits at 75% of it.
-# The one figure above 90s is GOMAXPROCS 1, a synthetic core floor rather than
-# a condition CI runs under. If a CPU-limited runner ever puts a real run near
-# 67s, that is the datum to revisit the org figure with.
 set -eu
 
 ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
 
 main() {
     cd "$ROOT"
-    go test -v -race -timeout 90s ./...
+    go test -v -race -timeout 30s ./...
 }
 
 main "$@"