Fix two resubmit comments and test the resubmit route's middleware (closes #252)

loadResubmitSource credited GORM's soft-delete scope for refusing a
reaped event; the reaper deletes the row outright. createAndFanOut
claimed to be the only path that creates deliveries; per-delivery
replay creates one too.

New tests drive the resubmit route through the production router:
CSRF refuses a missing, malformed or foreign token; another user's
webhook and another webhook's event are 404; the rate limit refuses
once spent; and signed-out requests never reach that rate limit. The
handler refuses a signed-out request with the same redirect itself,
so keeping such requests off the budget is what RequireAuth adds.

Model: opus-5-5

internal/handlers/event_resubmit.go

@@ -145,8 +145,9 @@ func (h *Handlers) resubmitEvent(
 // per-webhook database files — a sibling webhook's event is not in the
 // database being queried at all — and is there so the scoping survives
 // any future change that puts more than one webhook's events in one
-// file. Going through Model applies GORM's soft-delete scope, which is
+// file. A reaped event is not found because the retention reaper
-// what stops a reaped event being resubmitted.
+// deletes its row outright rather than marking it deleted; see
+// deleteEvents in internal/database/retention.go.
 func loadResubmitSource(
 	webhookDB *gorm.DB,
 	webhookID, eventID string,

internal/handlers/webhook.go

@@ -272,10 +272,12 @@ func requestEventSource(
 
 // createAndFanOut writes the event and one pending delivery per target,
 // and adds them to the webhook's running totals, in a single
-// transaction, then hands the tasks to the delivery engine. It is the
+// transaction, then hands the tasks to the delivery engine. Every
-// only path by which an event and its deliveries are created, so a
+// event is created here, received or resubmitted, so a resubmitted
-// resubmitted event is retried, SSRF-guarded and circuit-broken
+// event is retried, SSRF-guarded and circuit-broken exactly as a
-// exactly as a received one is.
+// received one is. Per-delivery replay is the one other path that
+// creates a delivery: it adds one to an existing event without
+// coming through here.
 //
 // The tasks are returned as well as queued, so a caller can report how
 // many targets the event went to.

internal/server/resubmit_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
+package server_test
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"net/url"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+// maxResubmits bounds the requests the tests below send to the
+// resubmit route. The route's rate limit belongs to the middleware;
+// this only has to sit well above it, so that a route without the
+// limiter fails its test instead of looping.
+const maxResubmits = 100
+
+// resubmitPath is the resubmit route for one stored event.
+func resubmitPath(webhookID, eventID string) string {
+	return "/hook/" + webhookID + "/events/" + eventID + "/resubmit"
+}
+
+// csrfForm is a resubmit form carrying the given CSRF token.
+func csrfForm(token string) url.Values {
+	form := url.Values{}
+	form.Set("csrf_token", token)
+
+	return form
+}
+
+// TestEventResubmit_SignedOutRequestsNeverReachTheRateLimit pins
+// RequireAuth on the resubmit route. The handler also turns away a
+// request without a session, with the same redirect, so a refusal
+// alone would pass without RequireAuth. What RequireAuth adds is that
+// it refuses such a request before the route's rate limit, so a
+// signed-out client cannot spend the budget a signed-in user
+// resubmits from. Each request carries a CSRF token valid for its own
+// cookie, so CSRF lets it through to RequireAuth.
+func TestEventResubmit_SignedOutRequestsNeverReachTheRateLimit(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := newTestEnv(t)
+
+	userID, _ := env.seedUser(t, "resubmitter", "somepassword")
+	wh := env.seedWebhook(t, userID)
+	evt := env.seedEvent(t, wh.ID, `{"resubmit":"me"}`)
+	path := resubmitPath(wh.ID, evt.ID)
+	logsPath := "/hook/" + wh.ID + "/events"
+
+	token, signedOut := env.csrfFrom(t, "/pages/login", nil)
+
+	for i := range maxResubmits {
+		w := env.post(path, csrfForm(token), signedOut)
+		require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code, "request %d", i)
+		require.Equal(
+			t, "/pages/login", w.Header().Get("Location"),
+			"request %d", i,
+		)
+	}
+
+	require.Equal(
+		t, int64(1), env.countEvents(t, wh.ID),
+		"a signed-out request must store nothing",
+	)
+
+	token, cookies := env.csrfFrom(
+		t, logsPath, env.authCookies(t, userID, "resubmitter"),
+	)
+
+	env.requireNotice(
+		t, env.post(path, csrfForm(token), cookies),
+		logsPath, "resubmit-no-targets",
+		"this source has no active targets", cookies,
+	)
+}
+
+// TestEventResubmit_RefusedWithoutAValidCSRFToken pins CSRF on the
+// resubmit route: a signed-in user's POST is refused with 403, and
+// stores nothing, unless it carries the token issued to that user's
+// own browser.
+func TestEventResubmit_RefusedWithoutAValidCSRFToken(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := newTestEnv(t)
+
+	userID, _ := env.seedUser(t, "resubmitter", "somepassword")
+	wh := env.seedWebhook(t, userID)
+	evt := env.seedEvent(t, wh.ID, `{"resubmit":"me"}`)
+	path := resubmitPath(wh.ID, evt.ID)
+	logsPath := "/hook/" + wh.ID + "/events"
+
+	token, cookies := env.csrfFrom(
+		t, logsPath, env.authCookies(t, userID, "resubmitter"),
+	)
+	otherBrowsers, _ := env.csrfFrom(t, "/pages/login", nil)
+
+	for name, form := range map[string]url.Values{
+		"no token":                {},
+		"a malformed token":       csrfForm("not-a-token"),
+		"another browser's token": csrfForm(otherBrowsers),
+	} {
+		assert.Equal(
+			t, http.StatusForbidden,
+			env.post(path, form, cookies).Code, name,
+		)
+	}
+
+	assert.Equal(
+		t, int64(1), env.countEvents(t, wh.ID),
+		"a refused request must store nothing",
+	)
+
+	// The same request with the user's own token goes through, so the
+	// refusals above were the token's doing.
+	env.requireNotice(
+		t, env.post(path, csrfForm(token), cookies),
+		logsPath, "resubmit-no-targets",
+		"this source has no active targets", cookies,
+	)
+}
+
+// TestEventResubmit_AnotherWebhooksEvent404s pins the ownership check
+// the resubmit handler makes, on the route as registered: a signed-in
+// user gets 404, and nothing is stored, for an event of a webhook
+// another user owns, and for another webhook's event posted under a
+// webhook the user does own.
+func TestEventResubmit_AnotherWebhooksEvent404s(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := newTestEnv(t)
+
+	ownerID, _ := env.seedUser(t, "owner", "somepassword")
+	owners := env.seedWebhook(t, ownerID)
+	ownersEvent := env.seedEvent(t, owners.ID, `{"owner":"only"}`)
+
+	intruderID, _ := env.seedUser(t, "intruder", "somepassword")
+	intruders := env.seedWebhook(t, intruderID)
+	// An event of its own gives the intruder's webhook its database,
+	// so the second request below gets as far as the event lookup.
+	env.seedEvent(t, intruders.ID, `{"intruder":"own"}`)
+
+	token, cookies := env.csrfFrom(
+		t, "/hook/"+intruders.ID+"/events",
+		env.authCookies(t, intruderID, "intruder"),
+	)
+
+	for name, path := range map[string]string{
+		"another user's webhook": resubmitPath(
+			owners.ID, ownersEvent.ID,
+		),
+		"another webhook's event": resubmitPath(
+			intruders.ID, ownersEvent.ID,
+		),
+	} {
+		w := env.post(path, csrfForm(token), cookies)
+		assert.Equal(t, http.StatusNotFound, w.Code, name)
+	}
+
+	assert.Equal(t, int64(1), env.countEvents(t, owners.ID))
+	assert.Equal(t, int64(1), env.countEvents(t, intruders.ID))
+}
+
+// TestEventResubmit_RateLimited pins the rate limit on the resubmit
+// route: a signed-in user's resubmits are accepted until the budget
+// is spent, and then refused with 429.
+func TestEventResubmit_RateLimited(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := newTestEnv(t)
+
+	userID, _ := env.seedUser(t, "resubmitter", "somepassword")
+	wh := env.seedWebhook(t, userID)
+	evt := env.seedEvent(t, wh.ID, `{"resubmit":"me"}`)
+	path := resubmitPath(wh.ID, evt.ID)
+
+	token, cookies := env.csrfFrom(
+		t, "/hook/"+wh.ID+"/events",
+		env.authCookies(t, userID, "resubmitter"),
+	)
+
+	limited := false
+
+	for range maxResubmits {
+		code := env.post(path, csrfForm(token), cookies).Code
+		if code == http.StatusTooManyRequests {
+			limited = true
+
+			break
+		}
+
+		require.Equal(
+			t, http.StatusSeeOther, code,
+			"a resubmit within the budget must be accepted",
+		)
+	}
+
+	assert.True(
+		t, limited, "repeated resubmits must eventually be refused",
+	)
+}

internal/server/routes_test.go

@@ -444,6 +444,23 @@ func (e *testEnv) countDeliveries(
 	return count
 }
 
+// countEvents reports how many events a webhook's database holds.
+func (e *testEnv) countEvents(t *testing.T, webhookID string) int64 {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	webhookDB, err := e.dbMgr.GetDB(webhookID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	var count int64
+
+	require.NoError(
+		t,
+		webhookDB.Model(&database.Event{}).Count(&count).Error,
+	)
+
+	return count
+}
+
 // storedHash reads the current password hash for a username.
 func (e *testEnv) storedHash(t *testing.T, username string) string {
 	t.Helper()