Author SHA1 Message Date
sneak 433fdceee2 Say max_retries is the total attempt count, not a retry count (closes #316)
check / check (push) Failing after 1s
The delivery core makes max_retries attempts in total: a fresh delivery
starts at attempt one and gives up once the attempt number reaches
max_retries, so 3 is three attempts, not four, and 0 is special-cased to
a single fire-and-forget attempt with no retries and no circuit breaker.
The create and edit target forms called it "Max retries" with no total,
and the README data-model row called it "maximum retry attempts", so an
operator wanting "try, then retry twice" would enter the wrong number.

Both forms and the README rows now state the number is the total number
of delivery attempts, with the 0 case spelled out. The delivery
arithmetic is unchanged. A UI copy test renders both forms and pins the
shared wording so it cannot drift back to a retry count.

Model: opus-4-8
2026-09-21 07:55:07 +00:00
clawbotandsneak 888eaf526b State the UUID-is-the-credential rule as a rule (closes #301) (#302)
check / check (push) Successful in 4m28s
Closes #301. Docs-only apart from one test comment; no behaviour change.

The receiver has authenticated on the entrypoint UUID alone since inbound signature verification was removed in #279. The README described that as the current state. It did not say it is the decision, which leaves a future contributor free to propose HMAC as an improvement rather than as a reversal.

What changed:

- `## The entrypoint URL is the authentication secret` now states the rule: the v4 UUID at `/webhook/{uuid}` is the credential and the only one; no shared secret, HMAC signature, bearer token or second factor will be added, including as defence in depth. It names the removal that settled it, and it says explicitly that signature headers a sender sends anyway are stored and forwarded but never checked — the previous text left that ambiguous.
- The same section carries the two consequences an operator has to act on: the URL is a capability, so keep it out of logs, tickets and screenshots; and rotation means minting a new entrypoint, not changing a key.
- It also handles the case the rule will next be argued from: a sender that only supports signed payloads to a well-known URL is a constraint on that integration, to be raised on its own terms, not grounds to reintroduce shared secrets.
- The rule is reachable without scrolling 1,100 lines: a pointer in the intro, a new first bullet under Authentication (which previously listed the web UI, the API and `/metrics` and said nothing about the receiver at all), and a sharpened bullet under Security.

Stale language found and corrected: one, in `internal/delivery/redirect_test.go`. Its comment justified same-origin header retention partly by "the inbound signature the receiver verifies" — in this repo's vocabulary "the receiver" is `/webhook/{uuid}`, which verifies nothing. The endpoint that verifies it is the delivery target's, and the comment now says so.

Two places that read like stale signing language were checked and left alone as accurate: `internal/delivery/redirect.go` and `internal/server/sentry.go` describe signature headers senders put on the receiver route, which do arrive and are forwarded — neither claims webhooker checks them.

`REPO_POLICIES.md` was deliberately not touched. It is the cross-project policy document synced from `sneak/prompts` and carries `last_modified` front matter for that purpose, so a webhooker-specific carve-out does not belong in it. Worth knowing: its hardening section ends "if a standard security hardening measure exists for HTTP services and is not listed here, it is still expected. When in doubt, harden" — that is the sentence a future HMAC proposal will cite, and only the README now answers it.

`TODO.md` is untouched per its own Workflow section (issue branches do not touch it).

Co-authored-by: sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin>
Reviewed-on: #302
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
2026-08-30 04:05:38 +02:00
5 changed files with 137 additions and 20 deletions
+51 -15
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,13 @@ services, durably stores them, and delivers them to configured targets
with retry support, logging, and observability. Category: infrastructure with retry support, logging, and observability. Category: infrastructure
/ web service. License: MIT. / web service. License: MIT.
Each entrypoint is a version 4 UUID served at `/webhook/{uuid}`, and
that UUID is the entrypoint's only credential. webhooker does not use
shared secrets, HMAC signatures or token headers on the receiver, and
will not add them — read
[The entrypoint URL is the authentication secret](#the-entrypoint-url-is-the-authentication-secret)
before deploying one.
## Getting Started ## Getting Started
### Prerequisites ### Prerequisites
@@ -1149,14 +1156,38 @@ backups at rest and restrict who can read them.
## The entrypoint URL is the authentication secret ## The entrypoint URL is the authentication secret
The receiver verifies nothing about an inbound request. The UUID in an **The entrypoint UUID is the credential, and it is the only one.**
entrypoint's URL is its credential: anyone who holds that URL can webhooker mints a version 4 UUID per entrypoint and serves it at
submit events to it, and the receiver checks nothing else about the `/webhook/{uuid}`. Possession of that URL is the authentication:
sender. Treat an entrypoint URL the way you would treat an API token. anyone who holds it can submit events to the entrypoint, and the
receiver verifies nothing else about the sender.
There is no way to rotate the UUID in place. To retire one, delete the There is no shared secret, no HMAC signature, no bearer token and no
entrypoint (or deactivate it, which answers `410`) and create a new second factor on the receiver, and none will be added. This was
one, then point the sender at the new URL. considered and rejected; the implementation that existed was removed
in [PR #279](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/pulls/279), closing
[issue #67](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/67) and
[issue #241](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/241). A
proposal to reintroduce any of them — including as "defence in depth"
alongside the UUID — is answered by this section. Inbound signature
headers a sender sends anyway (`X-Hub-Signature` and its
per-provider equivalents) are stored and forwarded as ordinary
headers; nothing checks them.
What that means for an operator:
- **The URL is a capability, so treat it as a secret.** Keep it out of
logs, ticket bodies, chat messages and screenshots. Anyone who reads
it anywhere can post events as that sender.
- **Rotating means minting a new entrypoint, not changing a key.**
There is no way to rotate the UUID in place. To retire one, delete
the entrypoint (or deactivate it, which answers `410`) and create a
new one, then point the sender at the new URL.
- **A sender that cannot be given a secret URL is a constraint on that
integration, not a reason to change this.** If a service only
supports signed payloads to a well-known URL, raise it as its own
problem — pick a different integration path, or accept that it
cannot be used. It is not grounds to reintroduce shared secrets.
## Entrypoints ## Entrypoints
@@ -1476,7 +1507,7 @@ events should be forwarded.
| `type` | TargetType | One of: `http`, `slack`, `database`, `log` | | `type` | TargetType | One of: `http`, `slack`, `database`, `log` |
| `active` | boolean | Whether deliveries are enabled (default: true) | | `active` | boolean | Whether deliveries are enabled (default: true) |
| `config` | JSON text | Type-specific configuration | | `config` | JSON text | Type-specific configuration |
| `max_retries` | integer | Maximum retry attempts for `http` and `slack` targets (0 = fire-and-forget, >0 = retries with backoff and a circuit breaker). Ignored by `database` and `log` targets | | `max_retries` | integer | Total delivery attempts for `http` and `slack` targets, not retries on top of the first: 0 is a single fire-and-forget attempt with no retries and no circuit breaker, and a value of N makes N attempts in all, with exponential backoff and a per-target circuit breaker. Ignored by `database` and `log` targets |
| `max_queue_size` | integer | Stored and shown on the target's detail view, but not enforced anywhere yet: nothing in the delivery engine consults it. Queue depth is set by the two fixed 10,000-entry channels | | `max_queue_size` | integer | Stored and shown on the target's detail view, but not enforced anywhere yet: nothing in the delivery engine consults it. Queue depth is set by the two fixed 10,000-entry channels |
**Relations:** Belongs to Webhook. Has many Deliveries. **Relations:** Belongs to Webhook. Has many Deliveries.
@@ -1484,12 +1515,12 @@ events should be forwarded.
**Target types:** **Target types:**
- **`http`** — Forward the event as an HTTP POST to a configured URL. - **`http`** — Forward the event as an HTTP POST to a configured URL.
Behavior depends on `max_retries`: when `max_retries` is 0 (the `max_retries` is the total number of delivery attempts, not retries on
default), the target operates in fire-and-forget mode — a single top of the first: when `max_retries` is 0 (the default), the target
attempt with no retries and no circuit breaker. When `max_retries` is operates in fire-and-forget mode, a single attempt with no retries and
greater than 0, failed deliveries are retried with exponential backoff no circuit breaker; a value of N makes up to N attempts in all,
up to `max_retries` attempts, protected by a per-target circuit retrying failed deliveries with exponential backoff and protecting them
breaker. with a per-target circuit breaker.
- **`slack`** — Post the event as a formatted message to a - **`slack`** — Post the event as a formatted message to a
Slack-compatible incoming webhook URL (`webhookUrl` in `config`). It Slack-compatible incoming webhook URL (`webhookUrl` in `config`). It
is built on the same HTTP core as `http` and honours `max_retries` is built on the same HTTP core as `http` and honours `max_retries`
@@ -2867,6 +2898,10 @@ check, see [The login endpoint](#the-login-endpoint).
### Authentication ### Authentication
- **Webhook receiver:** the entrypoint UUID in the URL, and nothing
else. No shared secret, no HMAC signature, no token header, and none
will be added — see
[The entrypoint URL is the authentication secret](#the-entrypoint-url-is-the-authentication-secret).
- **Web UI:** Cookie-based sessions using gorilla/sessions with - **Web UI:** Cookie-based sessions using gorilla/sessions with
encrypted cookies. Sessions are configured with HttpOnly, SameSite encrypted cookies. Sessions are configured with HttpOnly, SameSite
Lax, and Secure whenever the request is on TLS — the flag follows the Lax, and Secure whenever the request is on TLS — the flag follows the
@@ -2906,7 +2941,8 @@ check, see [The login endpoint](#the-login-endpoint).
mode mode
- **The entrypoint URL is the receiver's only credential.** Nothing - **The entrypoint URL is the receiver's only credential.** Nothing
about an inbound request is verified; possession of the UUID about an inbound request is verified; possession of the UUID
authorises submission (see authorises submission, and no shared secret or signature check will
be added alongside it (see
[The entrypoint URL is the authentication secret](#the-entrypoint-url-is-the-authentication-secret)) [The entrypoint URL is the authentication secret](#the-entrypoint-url-is-the-authentication-secret))
- **SSRF prevention** for HTTP delivery targets: private/reserved IP - **SSRF prevention** for HTTP delivery targets: private/reserved IP
ranges (RFC 1918, loopback, link-local, cloud metadata) are blocked ranges (RFC 1918, loopback, link-local, cloud metadata) are blocked
+2 -1
View File
@@ -170,7 +170,8 @@ func TestDelivery_CrossOriginRedirectDropsOriginScopedHeaders(
// Stripping must not fire within the configured origin, or every // Stripping must not fire within the configured origin, or every
// destination that redirects its own path would lose its // destination that redirects its own path would lose its
// credential and start answering 401 — and would lose the inbound // credential and start answering 401 — and would lose the inbound
// signature the receiver verifies. // signature header the target endpoint verifies. webhooker's own
// receiver verifies no signature; it only forwards the header.
func TestDelivery_SameOriginRedirectKeepsOriginScopedHeaders( func TestDelivery_SameOriginRedirectKeepsOriginScopedHeaders(
t *testing.T, t *testing.T,
) { ) {
+77
View File
@@ -300,3 +300,80 @@ func TestEntrypointCopyButtonIsProgressiveEnhancement(t *testing.T) {
"the page must render to completion, not abort partway", "the page must render to completion, not abort partway",
) )
} }
// maxRetriesHelp is the wording both target forms must carry. The
// delivery core makes max_retries attempts in total, not that many
// retries on top of a first try (a fresh delivery starts at attempt 1
// and target_http gives up once the attempt number reaches
// max_retries), and 0 is special-cased to a single fire-and-forget
// attempt with no circuit breaker.
const maxRetriesHelp = "This is the total number of delivery attempts, " +
"not retries on top of the first: a value of 3 makes three attempts " +
"in all. 0 means a single attempt with no retries and no circuit " +
"breaker."
// TestTargetFormMaxRetriesCopyMatchesBehaviour pins the max_retries
// help text on both the create form (the add-target form on the webhook
// detail page) and the edit form, so the copy cannot drift back to
// calling the number a retry count.
func TestTargetFormMaxRetriesCopyMatchesBehaviour(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var h *handlers.Handlers
var sess *session.Session
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
webhook := &database.Webhook{Name: "wh", RetentionDays: 14}
webhook.ID = testWebhookID
entrypoint := database.Entrypoint{Path: "abc123"}
entrypoint.ID = "ep-1"
createBody := renderPage(
t, h, sess, "source_detail.html", map[string]any{
dataKeyWebhook: webhook,
"Entrypoints": handlers.NewEntrypointViews(
[]database.Entrypoint{entrypoint},
),
"Targets": delivery.NewTargetViews(nil),
"Events": []database.Event{},
"BaseURL": "https://hooks.example.com",
},
)
assert.Contains(
t, createBody, maxRetriesHelp,
"the add-target form must explain max_retries as total attempts",
)
// A slack target exercises the same max_retries field while needing
// only Config.URL from the edit template, so the test data stays
// minimal. The Target key mirrors the field names the template reads
// off the handler's view value.
editBody := renderPage(
t, h, sess, "target_edit.html", map[string]any{
dataKeyWebhook: webhook,
"Target": map[string]any{
"ID": "tg-1",
"Name": "t",
"Type": "slack",
"Active": true,
"MaxRetries": 3,
"Config": map[string]any{
"URL": "https://hooks.slack.com/services/x",
},
},
dataKeyError: "",
},
)
assert.Contains(
t, editBody, maxRetriesHelp,
"the target edit form must explain max_retries as total attempts",
)
}
+6 -3
View File
@@ -120,9 +120,12 @@
<label class="text-sm text-gray-700">Timeout (seconds, blank = default):</label> <label class="text-sm text-gray-700">Timeout (seconds, blank = default):</label>
<input type="number" name="timeout" min="0" max="300" :disabled="targetType !== 'http'" class="input text-sm w-24"> <input type="number" name="timeout" min="0" max="300" :disabled="targetType !== 'http'" class="input text-sm w-24">
</div> </div>
<div x-show="targetType === 'http'" class="flex gap-2 items-center"> <div x-show="targetType === 'http'">
<label class="text-sm text-gray-700">Max retries (0 = fire-and-forget):</label> <div class="flex gap-2 items-center">
<input type="number" name="max_retries" value="0" min="0" max="20" class="input text-sm w-24"> <label class="text-sm text-gray-700">Max retries:</label>
<input type="number" name="max_retries" value="0" min="0" max="20" class="input text-sm w-24">
</div>
<p class="text-xs text-gray-500 mt-1">This is the total number of delivery attempts, not retries on top of the first: a value of 3 makes three attempts in all. 0 means a single attempt with no retries and no circuit breaker.</p>
</div> </div>
<div x-show="targetType === 'slack'"> <div x-show="targetType === 'slack'">
<input type="url" name="url" placeholder="https://hooks.slack.com/services/..." :disabled="targetType !== 'slack'" class="input text-sm"> <input type="url" name="url" placeholder="https://hooks.slack.com/services/..." :disabled="targetType !== 'slack'" class="input text-sm">
+1 -1
View File
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@
<div class="form-group"> <div class="form-group">
<label for="max_retries" class="label">Max retries</label> <label for="max_retries" class="label">Max retries</label>
<input type="number" id="max_retries" name="max_retries" value="{{.Target.MaxRetries}}" min="0" max="20" class="input"> <input type="number" id="max_retries" name="max_retries" value="{{.Target.MaxRetries}}" min="0" max="20" class="input">
<p class="text-xs text-gray-500 mt-1">0 is fire-and-forget: one attempt, no circuit breaker.</p> <p class="text-xs text-gray-500 mt-1">This is the total number of delivery attempts, not retries on top of the first: a value of 3 makes three attempts in all. 0 means a single attempt with no retries and no circuit breaker.</p>
</div> </div>
{{end}} {{end}}