Enforce the body size limit before CSRF parses the form (closes #90)

chi runs Use middleware in registration order, and every form route
group registered CSRF() before MaxBodySize(). gorilla/csrf calls
r.PostFormValue, so the form was parsed under net/http's 10 MB default
and the intended 1 MB cap never applied to form fields. The
/user/{username} group, which carries POST /password, had no
MaxBodySize registration at all.

- Register MaxBodySize ahead of CSRF in /pages, /sources, and
  /source/{sourceID}, and add it to /user/{username}.
- Reject a declared-oversize body up front with 413. Reordering alone
  cannot produce one: http.MaxBytesReader surfaces its error on Read,
  so the form parse fails and gorilla/csrf answers 403 "no token" for
  what is really an oversized body. MaxBytesReader is still installed
  afterwards so chunked or length-lying clients stay hard-capped.
- Drop the handler-local MaxBytesReader calls in auth.go, profile.go,
  and source_management.go now that the middleware is the single
  enforcement point. maxBodyShift stays; webhook.go still uses it.

The /webhook/{uuid} receiver is untouched: it bounds itself with
io.LimitReader in readWebhookBody and is neither CSRF-protected nor
form-parsed.

Tests cover the middleware in isolation (declared oversize is rejected
without reaching a sentinel handler; at-limit and under-limit bodies
pass through intact; GET is unaffected; an undeclared oversize body is
truncated at the cap) and the real router built by SetupRoutes, so the
registration order itself is guarded: an oversized POST to
/pages/login returns 413 with no gorilla/csrf cookie issued, an
oversized POST /password with a valid session and CSRF token returns
413 and leaves the stored hash unchanged, and under-limit requests
still complete through the normal CSRF path.

README.md

@@ -636,18 +636,6 @@ This means:
    durable fallback that ensures no retry is permanently lost, even under
    extreme backpressure.
 
-**Changing a target's type does not migrate in-flight deliveries.** Only
-`http` and `slack` targets own durable retries; `database` and `log`
-targets are fire-and-forget and never produce a `retrying` delivery. If a
-target's `type` is edited from a retrying type to a non-retrying (or
-unknown) one while one of its deliveries is still `retrying`, both
-recovery paths above terminally mark that delivery `failed` and record a
-`DeliveryResult` naming the current target type as the reason, logging it
-at warn level. The delivery is not re-dispatched under the new type — the
-operator never asked for that delivery — and the event itself remains
-stored in the per-webhook event database, so it can be redelivered
-manually.
-
 ### Circuit Breaker (HTTP Targets with Retries)
 
 HTTP targets with `max_retries` > 0 are protected by a **per-target circuit breaker** that
@@ -879,9 +867,17 @@ Applied to all routes in this order:
 8. **Sentry** — Error reporting to Sentry (if `SENTRY_DSN` is set;
    configured with `Repanic: true` so panics still reach Recoverer)
 
-Additionally, form endpoints (`/pages`, `/sources`, `/source/*`) apply a
+Additionally, form endpoints (`/pages`, `/user/*`, `/sources`,
-**MaxBodySize** middleware that limits POST/PUT/PATCH request bodies to
+`/source/*`) apply a **MaxBodySize** middleware that limits
-1 MB using `http.MaxBytesReader`, preventing oversized form submissions.
+POST/PUT/PATCH request bodies to 1 MB. It is registered ahead of the
+CSRF middleware in every one of those route groups, because
+gorilla/csrf parses the form; if the cap were installed after it, form
+parsing would run under net/http's 10 MB default and the 1 MB limit
+would never apply. A request that declares a `Content-Length` over the
+limit is answered with `413 Request Entity Too Large` before any other
+middleware or handler runs; a chunked request, or one that lies about
+its length, is hard-capped by `http.MaxBytesReader` and fails
+downstream at form-parse time.
 
 ### Authentication
 
@@ -903,7 +899,8 @@ Additionally, form endpoints (`/pages`, `/sources`, `/source/*`) apply a
 - Production security headers on all responses: HSTS, X-Content-Type-Options
   (`nosniff`), X-Frame-Options (`DENY`), Content-Security-Policy, Referrer-Policy,
   and Permissions-Policy
-- Request body size limits (1 MB) on all form POST endpoints
+- Request body size limits (1 MB) on all form POST endpoints, enforced
+  by middleware that runs before CSRF parses the form
 - **CSRF protection** via [gorilla/csrf](https://github.com/gorilla/csrf)
   on all state-changing forms (cookie-based double-submit tokens with
   HMAC authentication). Applied to `/pages`, `/sources`, `/source`, and

TODO.md

@@ -28,10 +28,13 @@ databases currently grow without bound.
 
 # Completed Steps
 
-- 2026-08-09 Restart recovery and the 60s retry sweep terminally fail an
+- 2026-08-09 Enforce the request body size limit before the CSRF
-  orphaned `retrying` delivery whose target type no longer supports
+  middleware parses the form (#90): `MaxBodySize` is now registered
-  retries, recording a `DeliveryResult` with the reason instead of
+  ahead of `CSRF()` in every form route group, the `/user/{username}`
-  leaving the delivery stuck forever (#82)
+  group gained the cap it never had (which is where `POST /password`
+  lives), the middleware rejects a declared-oversize body with a real
+  413 up front, and the redundant handler-local
+  `http.MaxBytesReader` calls were removed
 - 2026-08-07 Update golangci-lint to v2.12.2 (Docker image digest in
   `Dockerfile`, release-archive sha256 pins in `script/bootstrap`),
   adopt the canonical `.golangci.yml` (v2 `linters.settings` layout so

internal/delivery/engine.go

@@ -453,9 +453,8 @@ func (e *Engine) recoverRetryingDeliveries(
 // recoverSingleRetry hands an orphaned retrying delivery back
 // to its target to recompute the remaining backoff, then
 // reschedules it. Targets that do not own durable retries
-// (fire-and-forget) never produce retrying deliveries, so a
+// (fire-and-forget) never produce retrying deliveries, so
-// delivery found in that state has had its target's type
+// they are skipped.
-// changed underneath it and is terminally failed.
 func (e *Engine) recoverSingleRetry(
 	webhookDB *gorm.DB,
 	webhookID string,
@@ -476,10 +475,6 @@ func (e *Engine) recoverSingleRetry(
 
 	rs, ok := e.targets[target.Type].(rescheduler)
 	if !ok {
-		e.failUnretryableRetry(
-			webhookDB, webhookID, d, &target,
-		)
-
 		return
 	}
 
@@ -654,8 +649,8 @@ func (e *Engine) sweepWebhookRetries(
 
 // sweepSingleRetry re-enqueues an orphaned retrying delivery
 // whose backoff window has elapsed, delegating the backoff
-// decision to the delivery's target. A delivery whose target
+// decision to the delivery's target. Targets that do not own
-// no longer owns durable retries is terminally failed.
+// durable retries are skipped.
 func (e *Engine) sweepSingleRetry(
 	webhookDB *gorm.DB,
 	webhookID string,
@@ -675,10 +670,6 @@ func (e *Engine) sweepSingleRetry(
 
 	rs, ok := e.targets[target.Type].(rescheduler)
 	if !ok {
-		e.failUnretryableRetry(
-			webhookDB, webhookID, d, &target,
-		)
-
 		return
 	}
 
@@ -719,59 +710,6 @@ func (e *Engine) sweepSingleRetry(
 	}
 }
 
-// failUnretryableRetry terminally fails an orphaned retrying
-// delivery whose target type no longer supports retries. Both
-// restart recovery and the periodic sweep call it, so the
-// terminal transition exists once.
-//
-// This is only reachable when a target's type has been changed
-// out from under an in-flight retrying delivery (or the type is
-// unknown to the registry): fire-and-forget targets never set
-// status retrying themselves. Re-dispatching under the new type
-// would be a delivery the operator never asked for, and leaving
-// the row retrying strands it forever, so the delivery is
-// failed with a recorded reason and can be redelivered
-// manually. Logged at warn, not error: this is operator-caused
-// state, not a system fault.
-func (e *Engine) failUnretryableRetry(
-	webhookDB *gorm.DB,
-	webhookID string,
-	d *database.Delivery,
-	target *database.Target,
-) {
-	e.log.Warn(
-		"failing orphaned retrying delivery: target "+
-			"type no longer supports retries",
-		"webhook_id", webhookID,
-		"delivery_id", d.ID,
-		"target_id", target.ID,
-		"target_name", target.Name,
-		"target_type", target.Type,
-	)
-
-	reason := fmt.Sprintf(
-		"target type %q does not support retries; "+
-			"delivery was left retrying by a previous "+
-			"target type and has been failed terminally",
-		target.Type,
-	)
-
-	e.recordResult(
-		webhookDB,
-		d,
-		e.countAttempts(webhookDB, d.ID)+1,
-		false,
-		0,
-		"",
-		reason,
-		0,
-	)
-
-	e.updateDeliveryStatus(
-		webhookDB, d, database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
-	)
-}
-
 // processDelivery dispatches a delivery to the target that
 // owns its type. Unknown target types fail the delivery.
 func (e *Engine) processDelivery(

internal/delivery/engine_integration_test.go

@@ -748,193 +748,6 @@ func TestRecoverWebhookDeliveries_RetryingDeliveries(
 	case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
 		t.Fatal("expected retry task from recovery")
 	}
-
-	// Regression guard: a target that still supports retries
-	// must be rescheduled, never terminally failed, and must
-	// not gain a synthetic result row.
-	iAssertStatus(
-		t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID,
-		database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
-	)
-
-	assert.Len(t, iResults(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID), 1)
-}
-
-// --- Retrying deliveries whose target type changed ---
-
-// iSeedRetryingWithType seeds a retrying delivery with one
-// recorded failed attempt against a target of the given type,
-// standing in for a target whose type was edited in the main
-// database while the delivery was still retrying.
-func iSeedRetryingWithType(
-	t *testing.T,
-	s iSetup,
-	targetType database.TargetType,
-) string {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	targetID := uuid.New().String()
-
-	iCreateTarget(t, s.MainDB, targetID,
-		s.WebhookID, "mutated-target", targetType,
-		iHTTPConfig("http://example.com/hook"), 5,
-	)
-
-	event := iSeedEvent(
-		t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID,
-		`{"orphaned":"retry"}`,
-	)
-
-	d := iSeedDelivery(
-		t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
-		database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
-	)
-
-	iSeedFailedResult(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID)
-
-	return d.ID
-}
-
-// iResults loads a delivery's results in attempt order.
-func iResults(
-	t *testing.T, db *gorm.DB, deliveryID string,
-) []database.DeliveryResult {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	var results []database.DeliveryResult
-
-	require.NoError(t, db.
-		Where("delivery_id = ?", deliveryID).
-		Order("attempt_num").
-		Find(&results).Error)
-
-	return results
-}
-
-// iAssertTerminallyFailed asserts the delivery ended failed
-// with a result row recording why, and was not rescheduled.
-func iAssertTerminallyFailed(
-	t *testing.T,
-	s iSetup,
-	deliveryID string,
-	targetType database.TargetType,
-) {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	iAssertStatus(
-		t, s.WebhookDB, deliveryID,
-		database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
-	)
-
-	results := iResults(t, s.WebhookDB, deliveryID)
-	require.Len(t, results, 2)
-
-	last := results[1]
-
-	assert.False(t, last.Success)
-	assert.Equal(t, 2, last.AttemptNum)
-
-	assert.Contains(
-		t, last.Error, string(targetType),
-	)
-
-	assert.Contains(
-		t, last.Error, "does not support retries",
-	)
-
-	assert.Empty(t, s.Engine.ExportRetryCh())
-}
-
-func TestRecoverSingleRetry_TypeNoLongerRetries(
-	t *testing.T,
-) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	s := newISetup(t)
-
-	iCreateWebhook(
-		t, s.MainDB, s.WebhookID, "mutated-type",
-	)
-
-	deliveryID := iSeedRetryingWithType(
-		t, s, database.TargetTypeLog,
-	)
-
-	s.Engine.ExportRecoverWebhookDeliveries(
-		context.Background(), s.WebhookID,
-	)
-
-	iAssertTerminallyFailed(
-		t, s, deliveryID, database.TargetTypeLog,
-	)
-}
-
-func TestSweepSingleRetry_TypeNoLongerRetries(
-	t *testing.T,
-) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	s := newISetup(t)
-
-	iCreateWebhook(
-		t, s.MainDB, s.WebhookID, "mutated-type-sweep",
-	)
-
-	deliveryID := iSeedRetryingWithType(
-		t, s, database.TargetTypeDatabase,
-	)
-
-	s.Engine.ExportSweepWebhookRetries(
-		context.Background(), s.WebhookID,
-	)
-
-	iAssertTerminallyFailed(
-		t, s, deliveryID, database.TargetTypeDatabase,
-	)
-}
-
-func TestRecoverSingleRetry_UnknownTargetType(
-	t *testing.T,
-) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	s := newISetup(t)
-
-	iCreateWebhook(
-		t, s.MainDB, s.WebhookID, "unknown-type",
-	)
-
-	unknown := database.TargetType("not-a-target-type")
-
-	deliveryID := iSeedRetryingWithType(t, s, unknown)
-
-	s.Engine.ExportRecoverWebhookDeliveries(
-		context.Background(), s.WebhookID,
-	)
-
-	iAssertTerminallyFailed(t, s, deliveryID, unknown)
-}
-
-func TestSweepSingleRetry_UnknownTargetType(
-	t *testing.T,
-) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	s := newISetup(t)
-
-	iCreateWebhook(
-		t, s.MainDB, s.WebhookID, "unknown-type-sweep",
-	)
-
-	unknown := database.TargetType("not-a-target-type")
-
-	deliveryID := iSeedRetryingWithType(t, s, unknown)
-
-	s.Engine.ExportSweepWebhookRetries(
-		context.Background(), s.WebhookID,
-	)
-
-	iAssertTerminallyFailed(t, s, deliveryID, unknown)
 }
 
 // iSeedFailedResult creates a failed delivery result.

internal/delivery/export_test.go

@@ -188,13 +188,6 @@ func (e *Engine) ExportRecoverInFlight(
 	e.recoverInFlight(ctx)
 }
 
-// ExportSweepWebhookRetries exposes sweepWebhookRetries.
-func (e *Engine) ExportSweepWebhookRetries(
-	ctx context.Context, webhookID string,
-) {
-	e.sweepWebhookRetries(ctx, webhookID)
-}
-
 // ExportStart exposes start for testing.
 func (e *Engine) ExportStart(ctx context.Context) {
 	e.start(ctx)

internal/handlers/auth.go

@@ -29,10 +29,8 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleLoginPage() http.HandlerFunc {
 // HandleLoginSubmit handles the login form submission (POST)
 func (h *Handlers) HandleLoginSubmit() http.HandlerFunc {
 	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-		// Limit request body to prevent memory exhaustion
+		// The body size cap is enforced by the MaxBodySize
-		r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, 1<<maxBodyShift)
+		// middleware, which runs before CSRF parses the form.
-
-		// Parse form data
 		err := r.ParseForm()
 		if err != nil {
 			h.log.Error("failed to parse form", "error", err)

internal/handlers/profile.go

@@ -31,9 +31,8 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandlePasswordChange() http.HandlerFunc {
 			return
 		}
 
-		// Limit request body to prevent memory exhaustion.
+		// The body size cap is enforced by the MaxBodySize
-		r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, 1<<maxBodyShift)
+		// middleware, which runs before CSRF parses the form.
-
 		err := r.ParseForm()
 		if err != nil {
 			h.log.Error("failed to parse form", "error", err)

internal/handlers/source_management.go

@@ -127,10 +127,8 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleSourceCreateSubmit() http.HandlerFunc {
 			return
 		}
 
-		r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(
+		// The body size cap is enforced by the MaxBodySize
-			w, r.Body, 1<<maxBodyShift,
+		// middleware, which runs before CSRF parses the form.
-		)
-
 		err := r.ParseForm()
 		if err != nil {
 			http.Error(
@@ -386,10 +384,8 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleSourceEditSubmit() http.HandlerFunc {
 			return
 		}
 
-		r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(
+		// The body size cap is enforced by the MaxBodySize
-			w, r.Body, 1<<maxBodyShift,
+		// middleware, which runs before CSRF parses the form.
-		)
-
 		err = r.ParseForm()
 		if err != nil {
 			http.Error(
@@ -409,10 +405,8 @@ func (h *Handlers) applyWebhookEdit(
 	r *http.Request,
 	webhook *database.Webhook,
 ) {
-	r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(
+	// The body size cap is enforced by the MaxBodySize middleware,
-		w, r.Body, 1<<maxBodyShift,
+	// which runs before CSRF parses the form.
-	)
-
 	name := r.FormValue("name")
 	if name == "" {
 		data := map[string]any{
@@ -725,10 +719,8 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleEntrypointCreate() http.HandlerFunc {
 			return
 		}
 
-		r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(
+		// The body size cap is enforced by the MaxBodySize
-			w, r.Body, 1<<maxBodyShift,
+		// middleware, which runs before CSRF parses the form.
-		)
-
 		err = r.ParseForm()
 		if err != nil {
 			http.Error(
@@ -785,10 +777,8 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleTargetCreate() http.HandlerFunc {
 			return
 		}
 
-		r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(
+		// The body size cap is enforced by the MaxBodySize
-			w, r.Body, 1<<maxBodyShift,
+		// middleware, which runs before CSRF parses the form.
-		)
-
 		err = r.ParseForm()
 		if err != nil {
 			http.Error(
@@ -808,10 +798,8 @@ func (h *Handlers) processTargetCreate(
 	r *http.Request,
 	webhook database.Webhook,
 ) {
-	r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(
+	// The body size cap is enforced by the MaxBodySize middleware,
-		w, r.Body, 1<<maxBodyShift,
+	// which runs before CSRF parses the form.
-	)
-
 	name := r.FormValue("name")
 	targetType := database.TargetType(r.FormValue("type"))
 	targetURL := r.FormValue("url")

internal/middleware/middleware.go

@@ -285,10 +285,36 @@ func (s *Middleware) NoCache() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
 	}
 }
 
-// MaxBodySize returns middleware that limits the request body size
+// bodyLimitedMethod reports whether the request method carries a
-// for POST requests. If the body exceeds the given limit in
+// body that the MaxBodySize middleware should cap.
-// bytes, the server returns 413 Request Entity Too Large. This
+func bodyLimitedMethod(method string) bool {
-// prevents clients from sending arbitrarily large form bodies.
+	return method == http.MethodPost ||
+		method == http.MethodPut ||
+		method == http.MethodPatch
+}
+
+// MaxBodySize returns middleware that limits the size of
+// POST/PUT/PATCH request bodies to maxBytes. It must be registered
+// before any middleware that parses the body — notably CSRF, which
+// calls r.PostFormValue — so that form parsing happens under this
+// cap rather than net/http's 10 MB default.
+//
+// Two enforcement paths exist, because http.MaxBytesReader alone
+// cannot produce a 413: it reports the overflow as an error from
+// Read, by which point the body parser downstream has already
+// converted that error into its own response.
+//
+//   - Declared oversize: the request announces a Content-Length
+//     greater than maxBytes. The middleware answers 413 Request
+//     Entity Too Large immediately and does not call the next
+//     handler, so neither CSRF nor the endpoint handler runs.
+//   - Undeclared oversize: the request is chunked (Content-Length
+//     of -1) or lies about its Content-Length. There is nothing to
+//     check up front, so http.MaxBytesReader hard-caps the body at
+//     maxBytes and the request fails downstream — the form parse
+//     errors out and CSRF rejects it with 403. The response is less
+//     precise than a 413, but the body is still never buffered
+//     beyond the cap, which is the property that matters.
 func (s *Middleware) MaxBodySize(
 	maxBytes int64,
 ) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
@@ -297,14 +323,31 @@ func (s *Middleware) MaxBodySize(
 			w http.ResponseWriter,
 			r *http.Request,
 		) {
-			if r.Method == http.MethodPost ||
+			if !bodyLimitedMethod(r.Method) {
-				r.Method == http.MethodPut ||
+				next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
-				r.Method == http.MethodPatch {
+
-				r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(
+				return
-					w, r.Body, maxBytes,
-				)
 			}
 
+			if r.ContentLength > maxBytes {
+				s.log.Warn(
+					"request body exceeds limit",
+					"method", r.Method,
+					"path", r.URL.Path,
+					"content_length", r.ContentLength,
+					"limit", maxBytes,
+				)
+				http.Error(
+					w,
+					"Request Entity Too Large",
+					http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge,
+				)
+
+				return
+			}
+
+			r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, maxBytes)
+
 			next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
 		})
 	}

internal/middleware/middleware_test.go

@@ -3,10 +3,12 @@ package middleware_test
 import (
 	"context"
 	"encoding/base64"
+	"io"
 	"log/slog"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
 	"os"
+	"strings"
 	"testing"
 
 	"github.com/gorilla/sessions"
@@ -426,6 +428,153 @@ func TestNoCache_SetsHeaders(t *testing.T) {
 	)
 }
 
+// --- MaxBodySize Middleware Tests ---
+
+const testBodyLimit int64 = 64
+
+// maxBodySizeHandler wraps a sentinel handler in MaxBodySize with
+// testBodyLimit. The sentinel records whether it ran and how much of
+// the body it managed to read, so tests can distinguish "never
+// reached" from "reached but truncated".
+type maxBodySizeResult struct {
+	called   bool
+	read     int
+	readErr  error
+	response *httptest.ResponseRecorder
+}
+
+func runMaxBodySize(
+	t *testing.T,
+	req *http.Request,
+) *maxBodySizeResult {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	m, _ := testMiddleware(t, config.EnvironmentDev)
+	res := &maxBodySizeResult{response: httptest.NewRecorder()}
+
+	handler := m.MaxBodySize(testBodyLimit)(http.HandlerFunc(
+		func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+			res.called = true
+
+			body, err := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
+			res.read = len(body)
+			res.readErr = err
+
+			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+		},
+	))
+
+	handler.ServeHTTP(res.response, req)
+
+	return res
+}
+
+// postWithBody builds a POST request whose Content-Length is
+// accurate for the given payload size.
+func postWithBody(size int) *http.Request {
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(),
+		http.MethodPost, "/pages/login",
+		strings.NewReader(strings.Repeat("a", size)),
+	)
+	req.Header.Set(
+		"Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
+	)
+
+	return req
+}
+
+func TestMaxBodySize_DeclaredOversize_413AndHandlerNotReached(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	res := runMaxBodySize(t, postWithBody(int(testBodyLimit)+1))
+
+	assert.False(
+		t, res.called,
+		"handler must not be reached for an oversized body",
+	)
+	assert.Equal(
+		t, http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, res.response.Code,
+	)
+}
+
+func TestMaxBodySize_AtLimit_PassesThrough(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	res := runMaxBodySize(t, postWithBody(int(testBodyLimit)))
+
+	assert.True(
+		t, res.called,
+		"handler should be reached for a body at the limit",
+	)
+	require.NoError(t, res.readErr)
+	assert.Equal(t, int(testBodyLimit), res.read)
+	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, res.response.Code)
+}
+
+func TestMaxBodySize_UnderLimit_PassesThrough(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	res := runMaxBodySize(t, postWithBody(1))
+
+	assert.True(t, res.called)
+	require.NoError(t, res.readErr)
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, res.read)
+	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, res.response.Code)
+}
+
+func TestMaxBodySize_GetWithOversizeBody_NotCapped(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(),
+		http.MethodGet, "/pages/login",
+		strings.NewReader(
+			strings.Repeat("a", int(testBodyLimit)+1),
+		),
+	)
+
+	res := runMaxBodySize(t, req)
+
+	assert.True(
+		t, res.called,
+		"GET requests are not subject to the POST body cap",
+	)
+	require.NoError(t, res.readErr)
+	assert.Equal(t, int(testBodyLimit)+1, res.read)
+}
+
+// TestMaxBodySize_UndeclaredOversize_TruncatedAtCap covers the
+// chunked / lying-Content-Length case: there is nothing to check up
+// front, so the request reaches the handler but MaxBytesReader
+// hard-caps the body and the read fails at the limit.
+func TestMaxBodySize_UndeclaredOversize_TruncatedAtCap(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	req := postWithBody(int(testBodyLimit) + 1)
+	// Simulate a chunked request: no declared length.
+	req.ContentLength = -1
+
+	res := runMaxBodySize(t, req)
+
+	assert.True(
+		t, res.called,
+		"an undeclared oversize body cannot be rejected up front",
+	)
+	require.Error(
+		t, res.readErr,
+		"reading past the cap must fail",
+	)
+	assert.Equal(
+		t, int(testBodyLimit), res.read,
+		"the handler must not see more than the cap",
+	)
+}
+
 // --- Helper Tests ---
 
 func TestIpFromHostPort(t *testing.T) {

internal/server/export_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+package server
+
+import (
+	"log/slog"
+	"net/http"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
+)
+
+// MaxFormBodySizeForTest exposes the form body cap so tests can
+// build requests that sit exactly at, below, and above it.
+const MaxFormBodySizeForTest = maxFormBodySize
+
+// NewRouterForTest builds the real route tree via SetupRoutes with
+// the supplied middleware and handlers, bypassing the fx lifecycle
+// and the HTTP listener. Tests use it so that route-group middleware
+// registration order is exercised exactly as it ships, rather than
+// against a hand-rebuilt chain that could drift from routes.go.
+func NewRouterForTest(
+	log *slog.Logger,
+	cfg *config.Config,
+	mw *middleware.Middleware,
+	h *handlers.Handlers,
+) http.Handler {
+	s := &Server{
+		log:    log,
+		mw:     mw,
+		h:      h,
+		params: ServerParams{Config: cfg},
+	}
+	s.SetupRoutes()
+
+	return s.router
+}

internal/server/routes.go

@@ -90,9 +90,11 @@ func (s *Server) setupRoutes() {
 
 func (s *Server) setupPageRoutes() {
 	s.router.Route("/pages", func(r chi.Router) {
+		// MaxBodySize must precede CSRF: gorilla/csrf parses the
+		// form, so the cap has to be installed before it runs.
+		r.Use(s.mw.MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize))
 		r.Use(s.mw.CSRF())
 		r.Use(s.mw.NoCache())
-		r.Use(s.mw.MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize))
 
 		r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
 			r.Use(s.mw.LoginRateLimit())
@@ -106,6 +108,9 @@ func (s *Server) setupPageRoutes() {
 
 func (s *Server) setupUserRoutes() {
 	s.router.Route("/user/{username}", func(r chi.Router) {
+		// MaxBodySize must precede CSRF: gorilla/csrf parses the
+		// form, so the cap has to be installed before it runs.
+		r.Use(s.mw.MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize))
 		r.Use(s.mw.CSRF())
 		r.Use(s.mw.NoCache())
 		r.Use(s.mw.RequireAuth())
@@ -118,20 +123,24 @@ func (s *Server) setupUserRoutes() {
 
 func (s *Server) setupSourceRoutes() {
 	s.router.Route("/sources", func(r chi.Router) {
+		// MaxBodySize must precede CSRF: gorilla/csrf parses the
+		// form, so the cap has to be installed before it runs.
+		r.Use(s.mw.MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize))
 		r.Use(s.mw.CSRF())
 		r.Use(s.mw.NoCache())
 		r.Use(s.mw.RequireAuth())
-		r.Use(s.mw.MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize))
 		r.Get("/", s.h.HandleSourceList())
 		r.Get("/new", s.h.HandleSourceCreate())
 		r.Post("/new", s.h.HandleSourceCreateSubmit())
 	})
 
 	s.router.Route("/source/{sourceID}", func(r chi.Router) {
+		// MaxBodySize must precede CSRF: gorilla/csrf parses the
+		// form, so the cap has to be installed before it runs.
+		r.Use(s.mw.MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize))
 		r.Use(s.mw.CSRF())
 		r.Use(s.mw.NoCache())
 		r.Use(s.mw.RequireAuth())
-		r.Use(s.mw.MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize))
 		r.Get("/", s.h.HandleSourceDetail())
 		r.Get("/edit", s.h.HandleSourceEdit())
 		r.Post("/edit", s.h.HandleSourceEditSubmit())

internal/server/routes_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,375 @@
+package server_test
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"html"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"net/url"
+	"regexp"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"go.uber.org/fx"
+	"go.uber.org/fx/fxtest"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/globals"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/healthcheck"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/server"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
+)
+
+// csrfCookieName is the cookie gorilla/csrf issues when it runs. Its
+// presence or absence on a response is how these tests tell whether
+// the CSRF middleware executed.
+const csrfCookieName = "_gorilla_csrf"
+
+type noopNotifier struct{}
+
+func (n *noopNotifier) Notify([]delivery.Task) {}
+
+// testEnv is the real router from routes.go plus the collaborators
+// tests need to seed users and forge sessions.
+type testEnv struct {
+	router http.Handler
+	sess   *session.Session
+	db     *database.Database
+}
+
+// newTestEnv wires the dependency graph with fx and builds the
+// production route tree, so middleware registration order is
+// exercised exactly as it ships.
+func newTestEnv(t *testing.T) *testEnv {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	var (
+		log  *logger.Logger
+		cfg  *config.Config
+		mw   *middleware.Middleware
+		hnd  *handlers.Handlers
+		sess *session.Session
+		db   *database.Database
+	)
+
+	app := fxtest.New(
+		t,
+		fx.Provide(
+			globals.New,
+			logger.New,
+			func() *config.Config {
+				return &config.Config{
+					DataDir:     t.TempDir(),
+					Environment: config.EnvironmentDev,
+				}
+			},
+			database.New,
+			database.NewWebhookDBManager,
+			healthcheck.New,
+			session.New,
+			func() delivery.Notifier { return &noopNotifier{} },
+			middleware.New,
+			handlers.New,
+		),
+		fx.Populate(&log, &cfg, &mw, &hnd, &sess, &db),
+	)
+	app.RequireStart()
+	t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
+
+	return &testEnv{
+		router: server.NewRouterForTest(log.Get(), cfg, mw, hnd),
+		sess:   sess,
+		db:     db,
+	}
+}
+
+// oversizeValue returns a form value one byte past the route-group
+// body cap, so an encoded form containing it is guaranteed oversize.
+func oversizeValue() string {
+	return strings.Repeat("a", int(server.MaxFormBodySizeForTest)+1)
+}
+
+// csrfCookieSet reports whether the response issued a gorilla/csrf
+// cookie, which only happens if the CSRF middleware ran.
+func csrfCookieSet(w *httptest.ResponseRecorder) bool {
+	for _, c := range w.Result().Cookies() {
+		if c.Name == csrfCookieName {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+
+	return false
+}
+
+// get issues a GET through the router with the supplied cookies.
+func (e *testEnv) get(
+	path string,
+	cookies []*http.Cookie,
+) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodGet, path, nil,
+	)
+
+	for _, c := range cookies {
+		req.AddCookie(c)
+	}
+
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	e.router.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+	return w
+}
+
+// post issues a urlencoded form POST through the router. The body is
+// a strings.Reader, so the request carries an accurate
+// Content-Length — the signal MaxBodySize checks up front.
+func (e *testEnv) post(
+	path string,
+	form url.Values,
+	cookies []*http.Cookie,
+) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodPost, path,
+		strings.NewReader(form.Encode()),
+	)
+	req.Header.Set(
+		"Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
+	)
+
+	for _, c := range cookies {
+		req.AddCookie(c)
+	}
+
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	e.router.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+	return w
+}
+
+// csrfFrom renders the page at path and returns the CSRF token from
+// its form together with every cookie needed for the follow-up POST.
+func (e *testEnv) csrfFrom(
+	t *testing.T,
+	path string,
+	cookies []*http.Cookie,
+) (string, []*http.Cookie) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	w := e.get(path, cookies)
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
+
+	pattern := regexp.MustCompile(
+		`name="csrf_token" value="([^"]+)"`,
+	)
+
+	match := pattern.FindStringSubmatch(w.Body.String())
+	require.Len(t, match, 2, "form must embed a CSRF token")
+
+	// html/template escapes "+" and "=" in attribute values, and
+	// gorilla/csrf tokens are standard base64, so the value read
+	// out of the markup has to be unescaped before it is submitted.
+	token := html.UnescapeString(match[1])
+
+	combined := make([]*http.Cookie, 0, len(cookies))
+	combined = append(combined, cookies...)
+	combined = append(combined, w.Result().Cookies()...)
+
+	return token, combined
+}
+
+// authCookies forges an authenticated session for the given user.
+func (e *testEnv) authCookies(
+	t *testing.T,
+	userID, username string,
+) []*http.Cookie {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+		context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/setup", nil,
+	)
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+	s, err := e.sess.Get(req)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	e.sess.SetUser(s, userID, username)
+	require.NoError(t, e.sess.Save(req, w, s))
+
+	cookies := w.Result().Cookies()
+	require.NotEmpty(t, cookies, "session cookie should be set")
+
+	return cookies
+}
+
+// seedUser creates a user with the given password and returns the
+// stored hash so tests can assert whether it later changed.
+func (e *testEnv) seedUser(
+	t *testing.T,
+	username, password string,
+) (string, string) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	hash, err := database.HashPassword(password)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	user := &database.User{Username: username, Password: hash}
+	require.NoError(t, e.db.DB().Create(user).Error)
+
+	return user.ID, hash
+}
+
+// storedHash reads the current password hash for a username.
+func (e *testEnv) storedHash(t *testing.T, username string) string {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	var user database.User
+
+	require.NoError(t,
+		e.db.DB().Where("username = ?", username).
+			First(&user).Error,
+	)
+
+	return user.Password
+}
+
+// --- /pages group ---
+
+// TestPagesLogin_OversizeBody_RejectedBeforeCSRF proves the cap runs
+// ahead of gorilla/csrf: the response is a clean 413 and no CSRF
+// cookie was issued, so neither the CSRF middleware nor the login
+// handler ran.
+func TestPagesLogin_OversizeBody_RejectedBeforeCSRF(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := newTestEnv(t)
+
+	form := url.Values{}
+	form.Set("username", oversizeValue())
+	form.Set("password", "irrelevant")
+
+	w := env.post("/pages/login", form, nil)
+
+	assert.Equal(
+		t, http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, w.Code,
+	)
+	assert.False(
+		t, csrfCookieSet(w),
+		"CSRF middleware must not run for an oversized body",
+	)
+}
+
+// TestPagesLogin_UnderLimit_NoToken_CSRFRejects is the control for
+// the test above: an identically shaped but under-limit POST does
+// reach gorilla/csrf, which rejects it and issues its cookie. Without
+// this, the missing-cookie assertion above would prove nothing.
+func TestPagesLogin_UnderLimit_NoToken_CSRFRejects(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := newTestEnv(t)
+
+	form := url.Values{}
+	form.Set("username", "someone")
+	form.Set("password", "irrelevant")
+
+	w := env.post("/pages/login", form, nil)
+
+	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusForbidden, w.Code)
+	assert.True(
+		t, csrfCookieSet(w),
+		"CSRF middleware should run for an under-limit body",
+	)
+}
+
+// TestPagesLogin_UnderLimit_ValidToken_ReachesHandler proves the
+// reorder did not break CSRF token handling: a token harvested from
+// the rendered login form is still accepted and the request lands in
+// the handler.
+func TestPagesLogin_UnderLimit_ValidToken_ReachesHandler(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := newTestEnv(t)
+
+	token, cookies := env.csrfFrom(t, "/pages/login", nil)
+
+	form := url.Values{}
+	form.Set("csrf_token", token)
+	form.Set("username", "nosuchuser")
+	form.Set("password", "wrongpassword")
+
+	w := env.post("/pages/login", form, cookies)
+
+	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, w.Code)
+	assert.Contains(
+		t, w.Body.String(), "Invalid username or password",
+		"request should reach the login handler",
+	)
+}
+
+// --- /user/{username} group ---
+
+// TestPasswordChange_OversizeBody_RejectedAndPasswordUnchanged
+// covers the route that previously had no middleware body cap at
+// all. The request carries a valid session and a valid CSRF token,
+// so the only thing that can stop it is the size cap; the unchanged
+// password hash is the observable proof the handler never ran.
+func TestPasswordChange_OversizeBody_RejectedAndPasswordUnchanged(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := newTestEnv(t)
+
+	userID, originalHash := env.seedUser(t, "pwuser", "oldpassword")
+	cookies := env.authCookies(t, userID, "pwuser")
+	token, cookies := env.csrfFrom(t, "/user/pwuser/", cookies)
+
+	form := url.Values{}
+	form.Set("csrf_token", token)
+	form.Set("current_password", "oldpassword")
+	form.Set("new_password", oversizeValue())
+	form.Set("confirm_password", oversizeValue())
+
+	w := env.post("/user/pwuser/password", form, cookies)
+
+	assert.Equal(
+		t, http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, w.Code,
+	)
+	assert.Equal(
+		t, originalHash, env.storedHash(t, "pwuser"),
+		"handler must not run, so the password must be unchanged",
+	)
+}
+
+// TestPasswordChange_UnderLimit_Succeeds proves that adding the cap
+// to the /user/{username} group did not break the route it guards.
+func TestPasswordChange_UnderLimit_Succeeds(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := newTestEnv(t)
+
+	userID, originalHash := env.seedUser(t, "okuser", "oldpassword")
+	cookies := env.authCookies(t, userID, "okuser")
+	token, cookies := env.csrfFrom(t, "/user/okuser/", cookies)
+
+	form := url.Values{}
+	form.Set("csrf_token", token)
+	form.Set("current_password", "oldpassword")
+	form.Set("new_password", "brandnewpassword")
+	form.Set("confirm_password", "brandnewpassword")
+
+	w := env.post("/user/okuser/password", form, cookies)
+
+	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
+	assert.NotEqual(
+		t, originalHash, env.storedHash(t, "okuser"),
+		"an under-limit password change should still apply",
+	)
+}