1.0.0b1 - testing remains

Reviewed-on: #111

README.md

@@ -7,13 +7,6 @@ services, durably stores them, and delivers them to configured targets
 with retry support, logging, and observability. Category: infrastructure
 / web service. License: MIT.
 
-Each entrypoint is a version 4 UUID served at `/webhook/{uuid}`, and
-that UUID is the entrypoint's only credential. webhooker does not use
-shared secrets, HMAC signatures or token headers on the receiver, and
-will not add them — read
-[The entrypoint URL is the authentication secret](#the-entrypoint-url-is-the-authentication-secret)
-before deploying one.
-
 ## Getting Started
 
 ### Prerequisites
@@ -92,8 +85,7 @@ them at once. A variable already present in the real environment wins
 over the file's value for the same name.
 
 The environment is selected by setting `WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT` to `dev`
-or `prod` (default: `prod`; `dev` must be set explicitly). The setting
-controls exactly one behavior:
+or `prod` (default: `dev`). The setting controls exactly one behavior:
 
 | Behavior | `dev`                   | `prod`           |
 | -------- | ----------------------- | ---------------- |
@@ -135,7 +127,7 @@ TTY detection, and security headers are always applied.
 
 | Variable                | Description                         | Default  |
 | ----------------------- | ----------------------------------- | -------- |
-| `WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT` | `dev` or `prod`                     | `prod`   |
+| `WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT` | `dev` or `prod`                     | `dev`    |
 | `PORT`                  | HTTP listen port                    | `8080`   |
 | `BIND_ADDRESS`          | IP address the HTTP listener binds. Loopback by default, so the cleartext listener is not published on every interface. The Docker image ships `0.0.0.0` instead. See [Bind address](#bind-address) | `127.0.0.1` (image: `0.0.0.0`) |
 | `DATA_DIR`              | Directory for all SQLite databases  | `/var/lib/webhooker` |
@@ -401,9 +393,9 @@ the bucket is. See [Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting).
 The remedy is to set `TRUSTED_PROXIES` to your reverse proxy's
 address, which restores per-client buckets. webhooker logs a warning
 at startup whenever `TRUSTED_PROXIES` is empty, in every environment —
-the warning does not depend on `WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT`, because an
-operator who never configured the deployment is precisely the one at
-risk. The warning is informational when nothing proxies to the
+not only when `WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT=prod`, because that variable
+defaults to `dev` and an operator who never set it is precisely the
+one at risk. The warning is informational when nothing proxies to the
 process: with no proxy in front, the peer address is the client's own
 and the buckets are already per-client. See
 [Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting) for what each limit shares.
@@ -755,15 +747,15 @@ reports.
    that.
 2. **Set `WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT=prod`, and make sure the proxy sends
    `X-Forwarded-Proto`.** These are two requirements, not one. The
-   environment setting decides CORS and nothing else: `dev` answers
-   every origin with `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` (without
-   credentials), which a server-rendered production deployment has no
-   use for, and `prod` — the default — disables it. Cookie `Secure`
-   and the strict Origin/Referer mode are **not** tied to it — they
-   are decided per request from the transport, which behind a proxy
-   means the `X-Forwarded-Proto` header. The block below sets it;
-   without it every request is read as plaintext and cookies ship
-   without `Secure`. See [Configuration](#configuration).
+   environment setting decides CORS and nothing else: the default
+   `dev` answers every origin with `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`
+   (without credentials), which a server-rendered production
+   deployment has no use for. Cookie `Secure` and the strict
+   Origin/Referer mode are **not** tied to it — they are decided per
+   request from the transport, which behind a proxy means the
+   `X-Forwarded-Proto` header. The block below sets it; without it
+   every request is read as plaintext and cookies ship without
+   `Secure`. See [Configuration](#configuration).
 3. **Set `TRUSTED_PROXIES` to the proxy's address.** Unset, every rate
    limiter keys on the connecting peer, which behind a proxy is the
    proxy on every request: all clients collapse into one global bucket
@@ -1157,38 +1149,14 @@ backups at rest and restrict who can read them.
 
 ## The entrypoint URL is the authentication secret
 
-**The entrypoint UUID is the credential, and it is the only one.**
-webhooker mints a version 4 UUID per entrypoint and serves it at
-`/webhook/{uuid}`. Possession of that URL is the authentication:
-anyone who holds it can submit events to the entrypoint, and the
-receiver verifies nothing else about the sender.
+The receiver verifies nothing about an inbound request. The UUID in an
+entrypoint's URL is its credential: anyone who holds that URL can
+submit events to it, and the receiver checks nothing else about the
+sender. Treat an entrypoint URL the way you would treat an API token.
 
-There is no shared secret, no HMAC signature, no bearer token and no
-second factor on the receiver, and none will be added. This was
-considered and rejected; the implementation that existed was removed
-in [PR #279](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/pulls/279), closing
-[issue #67](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/67) and
-[issue #241](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/241). A
-proposal to reintroduce any of them — including as "defence in depth"
-alongside the UUID — is answered by this section. Inbound signature
-headers a sender sends anyway (`X-Hub-Signature` and its
-per-provider equivalents) are stored and forwarded as ordinary
-headers; nothing checks them.
-
-What that means for an operator:
-
-- **The URL is a capability, so treat it as a secret.** Keep it out of
-  logs, ticket bodies, chat messages and screenshots. Anyone who reads
-  it anywhere can post events as that sender.
-- **Rotating means minting a new entrypoint, not changing a key.**
-  There is no way to rotate the UUID in place. To retire one, delete
-  the entrypoint (or deactivate it, which answers `410`) and create a
-  new one, then point the sender at the new URL.
-- **A sender that cannot be given a secret URL is a constraint on that
-  integration, not a reason to change this.** If a service only
-  supports signed payloads to a well-known URL, raise it as its own
-  problem — pick a different integration path, or accept that it
-  cannot be used. It is not grounds to reintroduce shared secrets.
+There is no way to rotate the UUID in place. To retire one, delete the
+entrypoint (or deactivate it, which answers `410`) and create a new
+one, then point the sender at the new URL.
 
 ## Entrypoints
 
@@ -2899,10 +2867,6 @@ check, see [The login endpoint](#the-login-endpoint).
 
 ### Authentication
 
-- **Webhook receiver:** the entrypoint UUID in the URL, and nothing
-  else. No shared secret, no HMAC signature, no token header, and none
-  will be added — see
-  [The entrypoint URL is the authentication secret](#the-entrypoint-url-is-the-authentication-secret).
 - **Web UI:** Cookie-based sessions using gorilla/sessions with
   encrypted cookies. Sessions are configured with HttpOnly, SameSite
   Lax, and Secure whenever the request is on TLS — the flag follows the
@@ -2942,8 +2906,7 @@ check, see [The login endpoint](#the-login-endpoint).
   mode
 - **The entrypoint URL is the receiver's only credential.** Nothing
   about an inbound request is verified; possession of the UUID
-  authorises submission, and no shared secret or signature check will
-  be added alongside it (see
+  authorises submission (see
   [The entrypoint URL is the authentication secret](#the-entrypoint-url-is-the-authentication-secret))
 - **SSRF prevention** for HTTP delivery targets: private/reserved IP
   ranges (RFC 1918, loopback, link-local, cloud metadata) are blocked

internal/config/config.go

@@ -585,14 +585,12 @@ func resolveMetricsAuth() (string, string, error) {
 	)
 }
 
-// resolveEnvironment reads WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT, defaulting to prod
-// when it is unset so a deployment that forgets the variable is not
-// silently permissive; dev must be set explicitly. It rejects
-// unrecognised values.
+// resolveEnvironment reads WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT, defaulting to
+// dev, and rejects unrecognised values.
 func resolveEnvironment() (string, error) {
 	environment := os.Getenv("WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT")
 	if environment == "" {
-		environment = EnvironmentProd
+		environment = EnvironmentDev
 	}
 
 	if environment != EnvironmentDev &&
@@ -774,10 +772,10 @@ func (c *Config) warnEgressAllowlist(log *slog.Logger) {
 // everyone else's wrong passwords, and the receiver's limits become
 // service-wide ceilings.
 //
-// The warning is deliberately not gated on WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT: an
-// operator who never configured the deployment is exactly the case it
-// exists to catch, so the exposure it announces is independent of the
-// environment setting.
+// The warning is deliberately not gated on WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT. That
+// variable defaults to dev, so gating on it would silence the warning
+// for exactly the operator who forgot to configure the deployment —
+// the case it exists to catch.
 //
 // The default of trusting nobody is deliberate — trusting forwarded
 // headers from arbitrary peers lets any client choose its own bucket —

internal/config/config_test.go

@@ -44,9 +44,9 @@ func TestEnvironmentConfig(t *testing.T) {
 		isProd      bool
 	}{
 		{
-			name:   "default is prod",
-			isDev:  false,
-			isProd: true,
+			name:   "default is dev",
+			isDev:  true,
+			isProd: false,
 		},
 		{
 			name:     "explicit dev",
@@ -848,10 +848,10 @@ func TestEgressAllowlistWarning(t *testing.T) {
 // tells an operator a deployment behind a reverse proxy shares one
 // rate-limit bucket between every client, which turns the receiver
 // limits into service-wide ceilings and collapses login failure
-// counting. It must fire whenever TRUSTED_PROXIES is empty, in any
-// environment: the warning does not depend on WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT,
-// since an operator who never configured the deployment is exactly the
-// one it exists to catch. It stays quiet once proxies are named.
+// counting. It must fire whenever TRUSTED_PROXIES is empty,
+// in any environment: WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT defaults to dev, so gating
+// on it would silence the warning for exactly the operator who never
+// configured the deployment. It stays quiet once proxies are named.
 func TestSharedRateLimitBucketWarning(t *testing.T) {
 	tests := []struct {
 		name           string
@@ -871,9 +871,10 @@ func TestSharedRateLimitBucketWarning(t *testing.T) {
 			expectWarning:  false,
 		},
 		{
-			// An internet-exposed deployment whose operator set
-			// WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT=dev has exactly the exposure
-			// the warning announces.
+			// The default environment. An internet-exposed
+			// deployment whose operator never set
+			// WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT lands here and has exactly
+			// the exposure the warning announces.
 			name:          "dev without trusted proxies warns",
 			environment:   config.EnvironmentDev,
 			expectWarning: true,

internal/database/database.go

@@ -17,12 +17,12 @@ import (
 	"gorm.io/gorm"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/banner"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/datadir"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/gormlog"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
 )
 
 const (
+	dataDirPerm       = 0750
 	randomPasswordLen = 16
 	sessionKeyLen     = 32
 )
@@ -185,9 +185,7 @@ func (d *Database) connect() error {
 // caller's decision.
 func (d *Database) connectTo(dataDir string) error {
 	// Ensure the data directory exists before opening the database.
-	// datadir.DirPerm is the single source of the directory mode; this
-	// package creates the directory too, since either may run first.
-	err := os.MkdirAll(dataDir, datadir.DirPerm)
+	err := os.MkdirAll(dataDir, dataDirPerm)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf(
 			"creating data directory %s: %w",

internal/database/webhook_db_manager.go

@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ import (
 	"gorm.io/driver/sqlite"
 	"gorm.io/gorm"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/datadir"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/gormlog"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
 )
@@ -54,9 +53,8 @@ func NewWebhookDBManager(
 		log:     params.Logger.Get(),
 	}
 
-	// Create data directory if it doesn't exist. datadir.DirPerm is the
-	// single source of the directory mode; either package may run first.
-	err := os.MkdirAll(m.dataDir, datadir.DirPerm)
+	// Create data directory if it doesn't exist
+	err := os.MkdirAll(m.dataDir, dataDirPerm)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf(
 			"creating data directory %s: %w",

internal/datadir/lock.go

@@ -29,11 +29,9 @@ import (
 // process that was killed with SIGKILL blocks nothing.
 const LockFileName = "webhooker.lock"
 
-// DirPerm is the mode DATA_DIR is created with. It is the single
-// source of that mode: internal/database consumes it rather than
-// keeping its own copy, so the two packages that both create the
-// directory cannot drift into disagreeing about its permissions.
-const DirPerm = 0o750
+// dirPerm is the mode Acquire creates DATA_DIR with. It matches what
+// internal/database uses, since whichever runs first creates it.
+const dirPerm = 0o750
 
 // ErrLocked reports that another live process holds the data
 // directory. Callers that need to know whether a deployment is running
@@ -66,7 +64,7 @@ func Acquire(dir string) (*Lock, error) {
 		return nil, ErrNoDir
 	}
 
-	err := os.MkdirAll(dir, DirPerm)
+	err := os.MkdirAll(dir, dirPerm)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf(
 			"creating data directory %s: %w", dir, err,

internal/delivery/redirect_test.go

@@ -170,8 +170,7 @@ func TestDelivery_CrossOriginRedirectDropsOriginScopedHeaders(
 // Stripping must not fire within the configured origin, or every
 // destination that redirects its own path would lose its
 // credential and start answering 401 — and would lose the inbound
-// signature header the target endpoint verifies. webhooker's own
-// receiver verifies no signature; it only forwards the header.
+// signature the receiver verifies.
 func TestDelivery_SameOriginRedirectKeepsOriginScopedHeaders(
 	t *testing.T,
 ) {

internal/middleware/csrf_test.go

@@ -380,8 +380,9 @@ func csrfTookStrictPath(
 
 // TestCSRF_ForwardedProtoSpellingsTakeStrictPath runs the header
 // spellings a real proxy emits through the middleware. The environment
-// is set to dev -- the permissive setting -- to pin that the routing is
-// a per-request transport decision and owes nothing to configuration.
+// is dev -- the DEFAULT when WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT is unset -- to pin
+// that the routing is a per-request transport decision and owes
+// nothing to configuration.
 func TestCSRF_ForwardedProtoSpellingsTakeStrictPath(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()