1 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
sneak 8f0129d421 Send only the Referer's scheme and host to Sentry (closes #548)
check / check (push) Canceled after 0s
A Sentry event kept the Referer header verbatim, and a Referer can be
an entrypoint URL: a sender that follows the README's http:// to
https:// redirect sends the URL it was redirected from, and a browser
sends the 404 page's URL under /h/ when it fetches that page's
stylesheet. The Sentry hook now keeps only the Referer's scheme and
host. The access log's reduction moves, unchanged, into a new package,
internal/referer, as SchemeAndHost; the access log and the Sentry hook
both call it there. The comment above sentryKeepsHeader and the
README's Sentry passage say so.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-15 14:54:55 +00:00
6 changed files with 157 additions and 35 deletions
+6 -2
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@@ -2496,6 +2496,9 @@ are both taken unconditionally, the body precisely because these handlers call
body with `(redacted)`, drops cookies and the remote-address environment, and
reduces the headers to a fixed allowlist — `Accept`, `Content-Length`,
`Content-Type`, `Host`, `Origin`, `Referer`, `User-Agent` and `X-Request-Id`.
`Referer` is sent as its scheme and host only, because its path can be an
entrypoint URL; `internal/referer.SchemeAndHost` does that reduction for both
the access log's `referer` field and this hook.
The same hook rewrites the request URL. The SDK builds it as
`scheme://host/path` from the concrete path, which on the receiver route is
@@ -2566,8 +2569,9 @@ receiver route. What survives still names the failing route — scheme, host,
route pattern, method — and `X-Request-Id` ties the event to the local access
log line that holds the rest. Nothing dropped is needed for the likeliest use,
debugging a CSRF rejection. Its three inputs are the TLS decision, `Origin` and
`Referer`; the latter two are kept, and the first is the scheme of the retained
URL, because the SDK derives that scheme from
`Referer`; the latter two are kept (`Referer` as its scheme and host, which is
all the check compares), and the first is the scheme of the retained URL,
because the SDK derives that scheme from
`r.TLS != nil || r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto") == "https"`. That predicate
is the SDK's own and is stricter than `internal/reqtls.IsTLS`, which this
service now uses everywhere it decides transport: the SDK reports `http` for the
+3 -26
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@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/globals"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logfield"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/referer"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
)
@@ -48,10 +49,6 @@ const (
// pick the size of the line it writes.
redactedQuery = "?(redacted)"
// redactedReferer stands in for a Referer the access log cannot
// reduce to its scheme and host; see accessLogReferer.
redactedReferer = "(redacted)"
// maxLogRequestIDBytes bounds the request id, which is also
// client-supplied: chi's RequestID middleware passes an inbound
// X-Request-Id header through verbatim. Its generated form is an
@@ -342,27 +339,6 @@ func accessLogURL(r *http.Request, status int) string {
return pattern
}
// accessLogReferer returns the value for the access log's referer
// field: the Referer's scheme and host, never its path or query. The
// path can be an entrypoint URL, which carries the UUID: a sender that
// follows a redirect from http:// to https:// sends the URL it was
// redirected from, and a browser sends the 404 page's URL under /h/
// when it fetches that page's stylesheet. A Referer without both a
// scheme and a host is logged as redactedReferer.
func accessLogReferer(r *http.Request) string {
referer := r.Referer()
if referer == "" {
return ""
}
parsed, err := url.Parse(referer)
if err != nil || parsed.Scheme == "" || parsed.Host == "" {
return redactedReferer
}
return parsed.Scheme + "://" + parsed.Host
}
// Logging returns middleware that logs each HTTP request with
// timing and metadata.
func (s *Middleware) Logging() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
@@ -413,7 +389,8 @@ func (s *Middleware) Logging() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
requestID, maxLogRequestIDBytes,
),
"referer", logfield.Truncate(
accessLogReferer(r), logfield.MaxBytes,
referer.SchemeAndHost(r.Referer()),
logfield.MaxBytes,
),
"proto", r.Proto,
"remoteIP", RemoteIP(r),
+32
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@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
// Package referer reduces a Referer header to its scheme and host, so
// that a URL path, which on the receiver route carries the entrypoint
// UUID, never reaches a log line or an error report.
package referer
import "net/url"
// redacted stands in for a Referer that cannot be reduced to its
// scheme and host.
const redacted = "(redacted)"
// SchemeAndHost returns a Referer's scheme and host, never its path or
// query. The path can be an entrypoint URL, which carries the UUID: a
// sender that follows a redirect from http:// to https:// sends the
// URL it was redirected from, and a browser sends the 404 page's URL
// under /h/ when it fetches that page's stylesheet. A Referer without
// both a scheme and a host comes back as "(redacted)".
//
// It is the access log's referer field, and the Referer header the
// Sentry hook sends.
func SchemeAndHost(referer string) string {
if referer == "" {
return ""
}
parsed, err := url.Parse(referer)
if err != nil || parsed.Scheme == "" || parsed.Host == "" {
return redacted
}
return parsed.Scheme + "://" + parsed.Host
}
+67
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@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
package referer_test
import (
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/referer"
)
// entrypointUUID is the secret part of an entrypoint URL; no case may
// return it.
const entrypointUUID = "0b6f7d3e-6a39-4e3c-9f0a-2c4d8e1b5a77"
// redacted is what SchemeAndHost returns for a Referer it cannot
// reduce to a scheme and host.
const redacted = "(redacted)"
func TestSchemeAndHost(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
referer string
want string
}{
{
name: "no Referer",
referer: "",
want: "",
},
{
name: "entrypoint URL with a query",
referer: "http://webhooker.example/h/" + entrypointUUID +
"?src=ci",
want: "http://webhooker.example",
},
{
name: "host with a port",
referer: "https://webhooker.example:8443/h/" + entrypointUUID,
want: "https://webhooker.example:8443",
},
{
name: "path without a scheme or host",
referer: "/h/" + entrypointUUID,
want: redacted,
},
{
name: "host without a scheme",
referer: "webhooker.example/h/" + entrypointUUID,
want: redacted,
},
{
name: "not a URL",
referer: "http://[::1/h/" + entrypointUUID,
want: redacted,
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
got := referer.SchemeAndHost(tc.referer)
assert.Equal(t, tc.want, got)
assert.NotContains(t, got, entrypointUUID)
})
}
}
+18 -7
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
"github.com/getsentry/sentry-go"
"github.com/go-chi/chi"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/referer"
)
// sentryRedacted stands in for a withheld field on every event shipped
@@ -253,6 +254,7 @@ func sentryTransactionName(name, pattern string) string {
// gorilla/csrf accepts in place of the form field — and the shared
// secrets senders put on the receiver route (X-Gitlab-Token and the
// per-provider signature headers) would otherwise ship verbatim.
// The Referer it keeps is cut down to its scheme and host.
func keptSentryHeaders(headers map[string]string) map[string]string {
if len(headers) == 0 {
return headers
@@ -261,9 +263,15 @@ func keptSentryHeaders(headers map[string]string) map[string]string {
kept := make(map[string]string, len(headers))
for name, value := range headers {
if sentryKeepsHeader(name) {
kept[name] = value
if !sentryKeepsHeader(name) {
continue
}
if http.CanonicalHeaderKey(name) == "Referer" {
value = referer.SchemeAndHost(value)
}
kept[name] = value
}
return kept
@@ -271,11 +279,14 @@ func keptSentryHeaders(headers map[string]string) map[string]string {
// sentryKeepsHeader reports whether a request header is routing or
// content metadata rather than client-chosen payload. Referer is kept
// on the reasoning that it is browser-set, that the only query
// parameters in this service's own URLs are the login page's `next`,
// `notice` and the event log's `show`, and that Referrer-Policy is set to
// strict-origin-when-cross-origin. X-Request-Id ties the event to the
// local access log line, which holds the rest of the detail.
// only as its scheme and host, through referer.SchemeAndHost, which
// the access log uses too: its path can be an entrypoint URL, which
// carries the UUID, as when a sender follows a redirect from http://
// to https:// or a browser fetches the 404 page's stylesheet from
// under /h/. The scheme and host are all gorilla/csrf compares a
// Referer by, so a CSRF rejection is still readable from the event.
// X-Request-Id ties the event to the local access log line, which
// holds the rest of the detail.
func sentryKeepsHeader(name string) bool {
switch http.CanonicalHeaderKey(name) {
case "Accept",
+31
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@@ -325,6 +325,37 @@ func TestSentryScrub_ReplacesTheCapabilityPathWithTheRoutePattern(
)
}
// TestSentryScrub_KeepsOnlyTheRefererSchemeAndHost sends a receiver
// request whose Referer is the entrypoint URL, as a sender's is after
// it follows the README's redirect from http:// to https://. The event
// keeps the Referer's scheme and host, and carries the UUID nowhere.
func TestSentryScrub_KeepsOnlyTheRefererSchemeAndHost(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
event := onlyEvent(t, sentryCase{
scrub: true,
panics: true,
request: func(client *sentry.Client) *http.Request {
req := sentryReceiverRequest(client)
req.Header.Set(
"Referer",
"http://webhooker.example/h/"+sentryReceiverUUID,
)
return req
},
}.capture(t))
assert.NotContains(
t, marshalEvent(t, event), sentryReceiverUUID,
)
assert.Equal(
t,
"http://webhooker.example",
event.Request.Headers["Referer"],
)
}
// TestSentryScrub_KeepsTheRoutingContext checks the hook does not cost
// the debugging signal: the route, its scheme and host, the method and
// the metadata headers still identify what failed. On a static route