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TODO.md
78
TODO.md
@@ -24,8 +24,9 @@ event retention (#63), the database archiving target (#43), the admin
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password change flow (#65), policy compliance (#6), pinned lint tooling
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(#55), and fail-loud configuration parsing (#80).
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`next` holds the completed 1.0.0 milestone: every issue in it is closed,
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and it is verified green by cache-defeated container runs
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`next` holds the 1.0.0 milestone less its final four issues (#176, #178,
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#186, #187 — all in review or held on merge order), and is verified
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green by cache-defeated container runs
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(`docker build --no-cache-filter=lint --no-cache-filter=builder`). The
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CI status is not independently claimed here: a superseded run is
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recorded as `skipped` and still rolls up green, so a commit status on
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@@ -39,15 +40,78 @@ of 2026-07-06.
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# Next Step
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Merge the milestone PR to `main` and tag 1.0.0 from it.
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Land the last four 1.0.0 issues, then merge the milestone PR to `main`
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and tag 1.0.0 from it. Merge order is forced by a real conflict on
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`README.md` and `internal/middleware/middleware.go`: #186, then #176,
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then #178, then #187.
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Two decisions are open and belong to the owner, neither blocking the
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tag: #115 (mask the `http` target's destination URL, implemented
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speculatively and awaiting a yes or no) and #125 (whether IPv6
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rate-limit keys should bucket by `/64`).
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Two items belong to the owner, neither blocking the tag. #150 was
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decided by the manager rather than left to stall the queue and is
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flagged on the issue for reversal if that call was wrong. #112 (whether
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`Completed Steps` should exist at all, given it once conflicted on every
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unit) is unanswered; the provisional ruling in force is that issue
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branches do not touch this file.
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# Completed Steps
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- 2026-08-18 Send the chi route pattern to Sentry rather than the
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concrete path. The receiver's path carries the entrypoint capability
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token, so every Sentry event from `/webhook/{uuid}` shipped a live
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credential to a third party. Request `Data`, `QueryString`, `Cookies`
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and `Env` are dropped and headers reduced to an allowlist (#179)
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- 2026-08-18 Read form fields from the POST body only. `r.FormValue`
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merges the query string, so a login could be driven by URL parameters
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— putting the password somewhere that lands in access logs, proxy
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logs and browser history (#160)
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- 2026-08-18 Verify login credentials before spending rate-limit
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budget, so a flood of wrong passwords cannot lock out the account it
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is guessing at. The manager took this decision rather than stall the
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queue; it is flagged on the issue for reversal (#150)
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- 2026-08-18 Run all linting in Docker via `Dockerfile.lint`. Host lint
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was wrong in both directions from version skew and shared caches.
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`script/lint` asserts the summary line, because `--no-cache-filter`
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silently ignores a stage name it does not match — the flag that makes
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the gate meaningful fails open (#109)
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- 2026-08-18 Serve an event's full stored body over HTTP. The list
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query truncates for rendering, and that truncated value was the only
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way to read a body, so the full payload was unreachable (#157)
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- 2026-08-18 Bound the access log line against client-chosen text.
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`internal/logfield` budgets by *encoded* bytes, not runes, so a
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handler's JSON escaping cannot multiply a field past its allowance
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(#146)
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- 2026-08-18 Mark superseded CI commits `failure` rather than
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`skipped`. A skipped run rolls up green, so a commit that was never
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tested reported success (#152)
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- 2026-08-18 Set `fx.StopTimeout` inside the container stop grace, so
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shutdown hooks are bounded by a deadline the orchestrator will
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actually honour rather than being killed mid-flush (#134)
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- 2026-08-17 Bucket IPv6 rate-limit keys by `/64`. A single allocation
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hands out 2^64 addresses, so per-address keying let one client mint
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unlimited buckets. Manager decision, recorded on the issue (#125)
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- 2026-08-17 Correct release-blocking README and startup-warning
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inaccuracies, including claims about behaviour the code does not have
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(#151)
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- 2026-08-17 Fetch and verify Alpine.js at build time against
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`static/vendor.sha256` instead of committing the minified blob, so
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the dependency is pinned by hash rather than by trust (#145)
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- 2026-08-17 Bound the event log's rendered bodies in the query itself,
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so a large stored payload cannot be read into memory just to be
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truncated for display (#135)
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- 2026-08-17 Mask the `http` target's destination URL in the UI: it can
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carry a bearer credential in its path or query, and was rendered
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verbatim. Manager decision to mask unconditionally (#115)
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- 2026-08-14 Bound shutdown hooks by their stop context, so a hook that
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hangs cannot hold the process past its grace period (#102)
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- 2026-08-14 Render templates via a buffer rather than the
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`ResponseWriter`, so a template error part-way through cannot commit
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a 200 and then fail — the response is written only once it is whole
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(#123)
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- 2026-08-14 Align the session codec's max-age with the 7-day absolute
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cap. The codec accepted cookies the session layer considered expired,
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so the cap was enforced in one place and not the other (#108)
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- 2026-08-12 Warn when `TRUSTED_PROXIES` is empty in production, where
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the safe default silently discards forwarded headers and every client
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rate-limits as the proxy's address (#149)
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- 2026-08-12 Bound the receiver rate limit per client IP across the
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whole `/webhook/*` route. The existing limiter keyed on the request
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path and `/webhook/{uuid}` matches any single segment, so a client
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