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929bb35bb0 .. prod
Author SHA1 Message Date
sneak 1647b43aa6 deploy (#365)
check / check (push) Canceled after 0s
Details 
Reviewed-on: #365
 2026-09-29 13:06:27 +02:00
sneakandclawbot f7151f0168 deployment to prod (#357)
check / check (push) Successful in 10s
Details 
Co-authored-by: clawbot <35+clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Reviewed-on: #357
 2026-09-29 12:01:56 +02:00
sneak 3cc05a36eb deployment (#355)
check / check (push) Successful in 4m11s
Details 
Reviewed-on: #355
 2026-09-29 11:54:06 +02:00
sneak 7316f0a7e2 Merge branch 'main' into prod
check / check (push) Successful in 7s
Details
2026-09-29 11:49:18 +02:00
clawbotandsneak 5f84d891cf Deploy: main into prod (#343)
check / check (push) Successful in 3m32s
Details 
Brings `prod`, which upaas deploys, up to `main` at `9cf9cdd`, the merge of #321. `prod` was cut from `main` at `251cb3d` (1.0.0b1).

What it deploys is everything listed in #321. For running it:

- With `WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT` unset, the instance runs as `prod` and sends no `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`.
- Each event database gains its new indexes the first time it is opened after the upgrade.
- `webhooker_delivery_retries_total` no longer counts a circuit breaker holding back a delivery that is already `retrying`.

Not in this PR yet: #340, in which the container sets its own data directory owner and mode before start. It is in progress on `next`. Once it reaches `main`, this PR carries it, because the PR follows `main`.

Model: opus-5-5
Co-authored-by: Jeffrey Paul <1+sneak@noreply.example.org>
Reviewed-on: #343
 2026-09-29 02:48:03 -07:00
126 changed files with 1485 additions and 6031 deletions
Expand all files Collapse all files
.dockerignore
+8 -12
View File
@@ -1,20 +1,16 @@
# .git is sent so the build can derive the version it stamps into the binary
# (script/version). Its config, which can hold a remote URL carrying a
# credential and which `git describe` does not need, is left out of a
# directory context. A context sent as a tar is not filtered by this file, so
# it carries .git/config unless its sender leaves it out.
.git/config
# No tracked file may be listed here: git in the build would see it as
# deleted and mark the version -dirty.
#
# .ci-fingerprint is deliberately NOT excluded: it is the CI cache barrier
# that keeps the check stages from replaying a cached pass. See the lint
# stage of the Dockerfile.
.git/
bin/
# Extracted from 3p/ by `make assets` inside the build; a host copy is not
# needed. The tarball in 3p/ must stay in the context.
# Third-party browser assets are fetched and hash-verified inside the build by
# script/fetch-assets. Excluding any host copy keeps a developer's working tree
# from supplying the bytes that get shipped. The script and its
# static/vendor.sha256 manifest stay in the context.
static/js/alpine.min.js
*.md
LICENSE
.editorconfig
.env
.env.*
*.db
.gitea/workflows/check.yml
+13 -7
View File
@@ -12,8 +12,9 @@ jobs:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2 2024-10-23
with:
# The superseded-status step needs history to walk ancestors (it
# aborts on a shallow clone).
# The fingerprint step below needs history to find the last commit
# that touched the Docker build context, and the superseded-status
# step needs it to walk ancestors (it aborts on a shallow clone).
fetch-depth: 0
- name: Mark superseded run statuses
@@ -27,11 +28,16 @@ jobs:
run: script/ci-mark-superseded
- name: Fingerprint the build context
# Writes the hash of the commit being checked into the context, which
# invalidates the `COPY . .` layer of both check stages: a commit
# that was never linted, format-checked, tested and built cannot
# report success from cache.
run: git rev-parse HEAD > .ci-fingerprint
# `.dockerignore` keeps docs out of the build context, so a docs-only
# commit legitimately replays the whole image from cache and stays
# cheap. Every other commit writes a new fingerprint into the context,
# which invalidates the `COPY . .` layer of both check stages: a
# commit that was never linted, formatted-checked, tested and built
# cannot report success from cache.
run: |
set -eu
fp="$(git log -1 --format=%H -- . ':!*.md' ':!LICENSE' ':!.editorconfig')"
printf '%s\n' "${fp:-$GITHUB_SHA}" > .ci-fingerprint
- name: Build Docker image (runs make check)
run: script/cibuild
.gitignore
+3 -2
View File
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ temp/
# CI cache barrier, written into the build context by the check workflow
.ci-fingerprint
# Alpine.js, extracted by `make assets` from its tarball in 3p/, which is
# what is committed.
# Third-party browser assets, fetched and hash-verified by
# script/fetch-assets against static/vendor.sha256. Not committed:
# REPO_POLICIES.md forbids minified bundles in version control.
/static/js/alpine.min.js
3p/alpinejs-3.14.9.tgz
BIN
View File
Binary file not shown.
Dockerfile
+20 -26
View File
@@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ WORKDIR /src
COPY go.mod go.sum ./
RUN go mod download
# Copy source code. In CI the context also carries .ci-fingerprint, which
# holds the hash of the commit being checked (see
# Copy source code. In CI the context also carries .ci-fingerprint, whose
# value changes with every commit that touches the build context (see
# .gitea/workflows/check.yml). That invalidates this layer, so the checks
# below cannot report success by replaying a cached pass. Do not add it to
# .dockerignore.
@@ -38,13 +38,8 @@ FROM golang:1.26.1-bookworm@sha256:4465644228bc2857a954b092167e12aa59c006a349228
COPY --from=lint /src/go.sum /dev/null
# jq is a runtime dependency of script/ci-mark-superseded, which the test
# suite executes. git is what script/version derives the version with.
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends make curl ca-certificates jq git && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
# A build context sent as a tar archive keeps its files' owners, and git
# refuses to read a checkout owned by another user. Trust this one
# whoever owns it.
RUN git config --system --add safe.directory /build
# suite executes.
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends make curl ca-certificates jq && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
WORKDIR /build
@@ -56,26 +51,25 @@ RUN go mod download
# the lint stage above.
COPY . .
# Run tests and build. Both first run script/assets, which extracts Alpine.js
# from its tarball in 3p/.
# Fetch the third-party browser assets the UI serves. They are not committed
# (REPO_POLICIES.md forbids minified bundles in version control) and
# .dockerignore keeps any host copy out of the build context, so this step is
# the only way they enter the image. Each download is checked against a
# hardcoded sha256 and the build fails on mismatch; make test re-checks the
# hashes against the bytes go:embed actually put in the binary.
RUN script/fetch-assets
# Run tests and build
RUN make test
# Version stamped into the binary: the VERSION build arg when one is
# given, otherwise what script/version derives from the .git the build
# context carries, so any `docker build .` of a clone stamps its commit.
# With neither, as from a source tarball, it is "unknown".
# Version stamped into the binary. .dockerignore excludes .git/, so
# nothing in this stage can derive it: script/docker resolves it on the
# host and passes it in. The default is what a bare `docker build .`
# with no --build-arg gets, and it names no tag the tree may not be at.
#
# Declared here, below the test step, so a changed version does not
# invalidate its cached layer.
ARG VERSION
# A context that carries .git must not stamp "unknown": that means git is
# missing here or could not read the checkout, and the image could not be
# traced back to its commit.
RUN if [ -d .git ] && [ "$(make version VERSION="$VERSION")" = unknown ]; then \
echo "version is unknown although the build context carries .git" >&2; \
exit 1; \
fi
# Declared here, below the test and asset steps, so a changed version
# does not invalidate their cached layers.
ARG VERSION=unknown
RUN make build VERSION="$VERSION"
Makefile
+7 -7
View File
@@ -4,12 +4,12 @@
.DEFAULT_GOAL := check
# Version stamped into the binary. Derived from git by script/version;
# override it (`make build VERSION=v1.2.3`) to stamp a given value, which is
# how the Dockerfile passes its build arg in.
# override it (`make build VERSION=v1.2.3`) where git metadata is
# unavailable, which is how the Dockerfile passes its build arg in.
VERSION ?= $(shell script/version)
# An empty override (`make build VERSION=`, or the Dockerfile's `make build
# VERSION="$VERSION"` when no VERSION build arg was given) means unset,
# An empty override (`make build VERSION=`, or a `--build-arg VERSION=`
# landing on the Dockerfile's `make build VERSION="$VERSION"`) means unset,
# exactly as it does in script/version -- stamping "" would leave the binary
# reporting no version and the footer back on its "dev" fallback. `override`
# is required: a plain assignment loses to the command-line definition it
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ setup:
@script/setup
assets:
@script/assets
@script/fetch-assets
test:
@script/test
@@ -45,13 +45,13 @@ fmt-check:
check:
@script/check
build: assets
build:
go build -ldflags '$(strip -X main.version=$(VERSION) $(GO_LDFLAGS))' -o bin/webhooker ./cmd/webhooker
run: build
./bin/webhooker
dev: assets
dev:
go run ./cmd/webhooker
deps:
README.md
+215 -295
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ services, durably stores them, and delivers them to configured targets
with retry support, logging, and observability. Category: infrastructure
/ web service. License: MIT.
Each entrypoint is a version 4 UUID served at `/h/{uuid}`, and
Each entrypoint is a version 4 UUID served at `/webhook/{uuid}`, and
that UUID is the entrypoint's only credential. webhooker does not use
shared secrets, HMAC signatures or token headers on the receiver, and
will not add them — read
@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@ before deploying one.
- Go 1.26.1+ (the version in `go.mod`)
- Docker (for linting, for the test stage of the CI gate, and for
containerized deployment)
- `curl`, used by `script/fetch-assets` to download the third-party
browser assets, which are not committed (`make bootstrap` installs
it if missing)
golangci-lint is not a prerequisite and must not be installed on the
host: `script/bootstrap` does not install it, and `make lint` runs the
@@ -33,7 +36,9 @@ digest-pinned linter image via `Dockerfile.lint`.
git clone https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker.git
cd webhooker
# Install the Go toolchain if missing, and the Go dependencies
# Install Go dependencies and the third-party browser assets.
# `make deps` alone is not enough: it only runs go mod download/tidy,
# and the checks below need the fetched assets.
make bootstrap
# Run all checks (test, lint, format check)
@@ -53,7 +58,7 @@ make docker
```bash
make bootstrap # Install all dependencies (idempotent)
make setup # Bootstrap + install git pre-commit hook
make assets # Extract Alpine.js from 3p/ (test, check, build, dev run it)
make assets # Fetch + verify third-party browser assets
make fmt # Format code (gofmt + goimports)
make fmt-check # Fail if gofmt would change anything (writes nothing)
make lint # Run golangci-lint in Docker (Dockerfile.lint)
@@ -142,7 +147,7 @@ TTY detection, and security headers are always applied.
| `RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL` | How often the retention reaper and archive sweeper run (Go duration, must be positive) | `1h` |
| `SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT` | Idle session timeout (Go duration) | `24h` |
| `RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT` | Receiver requests/minute per IP per entrypoint (10x that per IP across the route) | `120` |
| `TRUSTED_PROXIES` | CIDRs whose forwarded headers are trusted. A set value replaces the default. If any client can reach webhooker, or the proxy in front of it, from an RFC 1918 source address, set it to the proxy's address alone. See [Trusted proxies](#trusted-proxies) | `10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16` (RFC 1918) |
| `TRUSTED_PROXIES` | CIDRs whose forwarded headers are trusted (unset: all clients behind a proxy share one rate-limit bucket; a correct login password is never throttled either way) | `""` (none) |
| `ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS` | CIDRs that delivery targets may reach despite the SSRF blocklist. Read [Allowing egress to your own network](#allowing-egress-to-your-own-network) before setting it | `""` (none) |
#### Allowing egress to your own network
@@ -157,21 +162,6 @@ public cloud metadata addresses: currently only `168.63.129.16`, Azure's
WireServer, which serves an Azure VM its credentials. Because it is a
public address, listing it in `ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS` reopens it.
That is all the default blocklist covers: the IPv4 private and reserved
ranges; of IPv6, only loopback (`::1`), unique local addresses
(`fc00::/7`) and link-local addresses (`fe80::/10`); and certain public
addresses. A public address belongs on the default blocklist only if it
hands credentials, user data or bootstrap material to whatever can reach
it, without the caller presenting anything. A provider's other public
addresses are not refused. IBM Cloud, for example, serves its package
mirrors, time servers and object storage on `161.26.0.0/16`, and the
private endpoints of its own cloud services on `166.8.0.0/14`. Neither
range hands out credentials that way: the token service among those
endpoints issues a token only in exchange for something the caller
presents, such as an API key. Reaching these services can be a
legitimate delivery, and every cloud has some, so a partial list would
promise coverage it does not give.
That default is also inconvenient for the thing webhooker is mostly
for: taking a public webhook and forwarding it to something on your own
network. A container on the same Docker network, a box on `10.x`, a
@@ -389,37 +379,41 @@ unlocked.
`TRUSTED_PROXIES` is a comma-separated list of CIDR blocks (a bare
address such as `192.168.1.7` is accepted and treated as a single
host), for example `192.168.1.7, 2001:db8::5`. It decides whose
`X-Forwarded-For` header the rate limiters believe, so it should cover
the addresses of your reverse proxies.
`X-Forwarded-For` header the rate limiters believe, so it should name
the addresses of your reverse proxies and nothing else.
`X-Forwarded-For` is honoured **only** when the connecting peer is
inside one of these blocks; for every other peer the client identity is
the connection's own address and the header is ignored. Unset (or
empty), the list is the RFC 1918 private ranges: `10.0.0.0/8`,
`172.16.0.0/12` and `192.168.0.0/16`. A set value replaces the default
entirely. A set but unparseable value aborts startup.
the connection's own address and the header is ignored. The default is
the empty list, which trusts nobody — anything else would let any
client pick its own rate limit bucket, minting a fresh one per request
or draining someone else's. Set it to the address of your reverse
proxy, and to nothing wider. A set but unparseable value aborts
startup.
If any client can reach webhooker, or the proxy in front of it, from an
RFC 1918 source address (directly, or through anything that can
rewrite source addresses, such as NAT or a published container port),
set `TRUSTED_PROXIES` to the proxy's address alone, or every rate
limit, the webhook receiver's included, can be bypassed by those
clients. The address to set is the `remoteIP` field of the
`http request` log line for a request that came through the proxy.
Behind a proxy the list does not cover, every request keys on the
proxy's own address and all clients share a single bucket per limit.
The receiver limits become service-wide ceilings, and the login
endpoint's failure counting collapses onto one key, so a stranger's
wrong passwords throttle every other client's wrong passwords. Set
`TRUSTED_PROXIES` to that proxy's address to restore per-client
buckets.
That default is safe against forged headers, but leaving it unset in
production has a cost you must know about. Production runs behind a
TLS-terminating reverse proxy, so with `TRUSTED_PROXIES` unset every
request keys on the proxy's own address and all clients share a single
bucket per limit. The receiver limits become service-wide ceilings,
and the login endpoint's failure counting collapses onto one key, so a
stranger's wrong passwords throttle every other client's wrong
passwords.
What it cannot do is lock the operator out. The login endpoint
verifies credentials **before** it consults any limit and charges only
failures, so a correct password is never throttled no matter how full
the bucket is. See [Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting).
The remedy is to set `TRUSTED_PROXIES` to your reverse proxy's
address, which restores per-client buckets. webhooker logs a warning
at startup whenever `TRUSTED_PROXIES` is empty, in every environment,
because behind a proxy every client shares one bucket in `dev` and
`prod` alike. The warning is informational when nothing proxies to the
process: with no proxy in front, the peer address is the client's own
and the buckets are already per-client. See
[Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting) for what each limit shares.
`X-Real-IP` and `True-Client-IP` are **never** read, from any peer.
Reverse proxies append to `X-Forwarded-For` but forward other client
headers verbatim, so a single-valued header is client-controlled even
@@ -435,10 +429,20 @@ instead, since past such an entry the chain is not the shape assumed
here. The peer address is likewise used when the header is absent or
every hop in it is a trusted proxy.
Your proxy must therefore **append** the peer address to
`X-Forwarded-For` (nginx `$proxy_add_x_forwarded_for`, HAProxy
`option forwardfor`, Caddy and AWS ALB by default), and must append a
bare address with no port.
Two operator requirements follow:
- Your proxy must **append** the peer address to `X-Forwarded-For`
(nginx `$proxy_add_x_forwarded_for`, HAProxy `option forwardfor`,
Caddy and AWS ALB by default), and must append a bare address with
no port.
- List proxy hosts **only**. Any address inside `TRUSTED_PROXIES`
chooses its own rate-limit key: its `X-Forwarded-For` is walked, so
it can name a different address on every request to get a fresh
bucket each time, or name another client's address to drain that
client's bucket. Never list a block that also covers clients — a
broad `10.0.0.0/8` on a network where clients live in the same range
makes all three limits, including the unauthenticated webhook
receiver, silently bypassable by every client in the block.
#### Sessions
@@ -737,15 +741,10 @@ repository's `Dockerfile` and runs it. The app needs:
- **Volume:** one host directory mounted at `/var/lib/webhooker`.
- **Environment variables:**
- `WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT=prod`
- `TRUSTED_PROXIES`: unset, it is the RFC 1918 ranges. Set it to
your reverse proxy's address alone if that address is outside
those ranges, or if any client can reach webhooker, or the proxy,
from an RFC 1918 source address (directly, or through anything
that can rewrite source addresses, such as NAT or a published
container port). The `remoteIP` field of the `http request` log
line for a request that came through the proxy shows that
address; the health check's own lines show `::1`. See
[Trusted proxies](#trusted-proxies).
- `TRUSTED_PROXIES`: your reverse proxy's address on that Docker
network. The `remoteIP` field of the `http request` log line for a
request that came through the proxy shows it; the health check's
own lines show `::1`. See [Trusted proxies](#trusted-proxies).
- Leave `BIND_ADDRESS` and `DATA_DIR` unset: the image sets
`BIND_ADDRESS` to `0.0.0.0`, and `DATA_DIR` defaults to
`/var/lib/webhooker`.
@@ -808,16 +807,12 @@ reports.
behind a proxy means the `X-Forwarded-Proto` header. The block below
sets it; without it every request is read as plaintext and cookies
ship without `Secure`. See [Configuration](#configuration).
3. **Make sure `TRUSTED_PROXIES` covers the proxy's address.** For a
proxy it does not cover, every rate limiter keys on the proxy, so
all clients share one bucket per limit. Unset, the list is the RFC
1918 ranges, which do not cover a proxy that reaches the binary
itself over loopback (the binary bound to `127.0.0.1`). With the
image, the address to check is the `remoteIP` field of the
`http request` log line for a request that came through the proxy.
If any client can reach webhooker, or the proxy, from an RFC 1918
source address, set the list to the proxy's address alone. See
[Trusted proxies](#trusted-proxies).
3. **Set `TRUSTED_PROXIES` to the proxy's address.** Unset, every rate
limiter keys on the connecting peer, which behind a proxy is the
proxy on every request: all clients collapse into one global bucket
per limit and the receiver's per-IP limits become service-wide
ceilings. See [Trusted proxies](#trusted-proxies). List the proxy
and nothing else.
4. **Send `Host` as `$http_host`, not `$host`.** `$host` strips the
port. webhooker's Origin/Referer check compares against the host it
was given, so on any port other than 443 `$host` makes every form
@@ -1075,7 +1070,7 @@ unconditionally against whatever files it finds:
- the main database on connect — `Setting`, `User`, `APIKey`, `Webhook`,
`Entrypoint`, `Target`
- each event database when it is lazily opened — `Event`, `Delivery`,
`DeliveryResult`, `EventTotals`, `TargetTotals`
`DeliveryResult`
- each archive database on every open and reopen
There is no schema version table, no migration ledger, and no down
@@ -1133,29 +1128,13 @@ build itself.
| Uncommitted changes | the above with a `-dirty` suffix |
| No git metadata | `unknown` |
The image derives it the same way, from the `.git` that the build
context carries, so any `docker build .` of a clone, with no build
arguments, stamps the commit it was built from; a shallow clone of one
branch has no tags and stamps the short SHA. `.dockerignore` must
therefore leave out neither `.git` nor any tracked file, which git in
the build would see as deleted, marking the version `-dirty`. It does
leave `.git/config`, which can hold a remote URL carrying a credential
and which `git describe` does not need, out of a directory context. A
context sent as a tar is not filtered by `.dockerignore`, so it carries
`.git/config` unless its sender leaves it out; for upaas, that is
https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/upaas/issues/274. git in the build
reads the checkout whoever owns its files, since a context sent as a tar
archive keeps the sender's owners and git otherwise refuses a checkout
owned by another user. A `VERSION` build arg (`--build-arg VERSION=...`)
takes precedence; `script/docker` (and so `make docker`) passes the one
`script/version` resolves on the host. The image build fails if its
context carries `.git` and the version still comes out `unknown`, which
means git is missing from the build or could not read the checkout.
`unknown` is what a source tarball, or a `docker build` with no `.git`
in its context and no `VERSION` build arg, reports. A build that reports
`unknown` is a build nobody told what it was; it is not a failure, but
it cannot be traced back to a commit.
`unknown` is what a source tarball or a `docker build .` with no
`--build-arg VERSION=...` reports. `.dockerignore` excludes `.git/`, so
the build context carries no git metadata and the image cannot derive
the version itself: `script/docker` (and so `make docker`) resolves it
on the host and passes it in as the `VERSION` build arg. A build that
reports `unknown` is a build nobody told what it was; it is not a
failure, but it cannot be traced back to a commit.
`make version` prints what the current checkout would stamp, and
`make build VERSION=v1.2.3` overrides it. An empty override — from
@@ -1204,7 +1183,7 @@ backups at rest and restrict who can read them.
**The entrypoint UUID is the credential, and it is the only one.**
webhooker mints a version 4 UUID per entrypoint and serves it at
`/h/{uuid}`. Possession of that URL is the authentication:
`/webhook/{uuid}`. Possession of that URL is the authentication:
anyone who holds it can submit events to the entrypoint, and the
receiver verifies nothing else about the sender.
@@ -1242,15 +1221,14 @@ This repository adheres to the
standard: normalized scripts in `script/` are the entrypoints for the
development workflow. Ten of the Makefile's seventeen targets are thin
shims that call them; `build`, `run`, `dev`, `deps`, `clean`, `css` and
`version` are inline commands with no script behind them, though `build`,
`run` and `dev` first run `script/assets`, and `build` and `version` both
take their value from `script/version`.
`version` are inline commands with no script behind them, though
`build` and `version` both take their value from `script/version`.
`script/test`, `make build` and `make dev` each run `script/assets`
first, which writes the ignored `static/js/alpine.min.js` (see
[Third-party browser assets](#third-party-browser-assets)), so
`make test`, `make check` and the pre-commit hook work on a fresh clone
without a separate step.
`make check` needs the third-party browser assets in `static/`, which
are not committed, so run `make bootstrap` (or just `make assets`) once
after cloning. Without them the tests fail with a message naming that
remedy. `make check` does not fetch them itself because it must not
change any files in the repo.
We provide:
@@ -1258,8 +1236,8 @@ We provide:
- `script/setup` — make a fresh clone ready for development
(bootstrap, then install-precommit)
- `script/projectname` — output the project name ("webhooker")
- `script/assets` — extract Alpine.js from its tarball in `3p/` (see
[Third-party browser assets](#third-party-browser-assets))
- `script/fetch-assets` — download the third-party browser assets into
`static/`, verifying each against its pinned sha256
- `script/test` — run the test suite
- `script/lint` — run golangci-lint in Docker (see Linting below)
- `script/fmt` — format all code (writes)
@@ -1281,25 +1259,24 @@ We provide:
## Third-party browser assets
The web UI serves one third-party script, Alpine.js. Its npm package tarball
is committed as `3p/alpinejs-3.14.9.tgz`, byte for byte as the npm registry
publishes it. It is a dependency, not this repo's build output, so
`REPO_POLICIES.md`'s rule against committed build artifacts does not apply.
The directory is `3p/` rather than `vendor/` because Go treats a root
`vendor/` directory as its module vendor directory.
The web UI serves one third-party script, Alpine.js. It is **not** committed:
a minified bundle in the tree is unreviewable, and `REPO_POLICIES.md` bars
both committed build artifacts and unpinned external references.
`script/assets` (`make assets`) extracts the browser build,
`package/dist/cdn.min.js`, from the tarball to `static/js/alpine.min.js`,
where `go:embed` picks it up. `script/test`, `make build` and `make dev` run
it first, and the Dockerfile builds through `make test` and `make build`, so
nothing downloads Alpine.js. The extracted file is not committed, and
`.dockerignore` keeps any host copy out of the build context.
Instead `script/fetch-assets` downloads it from a pinned URL, checks the
download against a hardcoded sha256, and installs it under `static/`. The
sha256 of every installed asset is recorded in `static/vendor.sha256`, and
`static/vendor_test.go` re-hashes the bytes `go:embed` put in the binary
against that manifest — so the pin is enforced on what actually ships, not
merely written down. Any mismatch fails the build.
To move to a new version: download
`https://registry.npmjs.org/alpinejs/-/alpinejs-<version>.tgz`, check it
against the `dist.integrity` hash listed at
`https://registry.npmjs.org/alpinejs/<version>`, replace the tarball in `3p/`
with it, update its file name in `script/assets`, and run `make check`.
`make bootstrap` runs the fetch for local development, and the Dockerfile
runs it in the build stage; `.gitignore` and `.dockerignore` keep the
artifact out of both the repo and the build context.
To move to a new version: update the version, URL, and tarball sha256 in
`script/fetch-assets` and the asset sha256 in `static/vendor.sha256`, then
run `make assets && make check`.
## Rationale
@@ -1386,11 +1363,10 @@ It uses:
- **[go-chi/httprate](https://github.com/go-chi/httprate)** for
sliding-window rate limiting of the password-change and webhook
receiver endpoints. The bucket is per client IP only when
`TRUSTED_PROXIES` covers the reverse proxy (by default it covers the
RFC 1918 private ranges); otherwise every client behind that proxy
shares one bucket per limit. The login endpoint counts failed
attempts itself instead, so that a correct password is never
throttled (see [Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting))
`TRUSTED_PROXIES` names the reverse proxy; unset, every client
behind that proxy shares one bucket per limit. The login endpoint
counts failed attempts itself instead, so that a correct password is
never throttled (see [Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting))
- **[Prometheus](https://prometheus.io)** for metrics, served at
`/metrics` behind basic auth
- **[Sentry](https://sentry.io)** for optional error reporting
@@ -1408,7 +1384,7 @@ The codebase uses consistent naming throughout (rename completed in
### Data Model
webhooker's data model has eleven entities organized into two tiers: the
webhooker's data model has nine entities organized into two tiers: the
**application tier** (user and webhook configuration) and the **event
tier** (event ingestion, delivery, and logging).
@@ -1437,13 +1413,6 @@ tier** (event ingestion, delivery, and logging).
│ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌─────────────────┐ │
│ │ Event │──1:N──│ Delivery │──1:N──│ DeliveryResult │ │
│ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ └─────────────────┘ │
│ │
│ ┌──────────────┐ (one row: running counts of events) │
│ │ EventTotals │ │
│ └──────────────┘ │
│ ┌──────────────┐ (one row per target: running counts │
│ │ TargetTotals │ of its deliveries) │
│ └──────────────┘ │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```
@@ -1470,7 +1439,7 @@ A registered user of the webhooker service.
| Field | Type | Description |
| ---------- | -------- | ----------- |
| `id` | UUID | Primary key |
| `username` | string | Unique login name, at most 1024 bytes so that it fits in the session cookie |
| `username` | string | Unique login name |
| `password` | string | Argon2id hash (never exposed via API) |
**Relations:** Has many Webhooks. Has many APIKeys.
@@ -1546,7 +1515,7 @@ the full request and creates an Event.
| -------------- | ------- | ----------- |
| `id` | UUID | Primary key |
| `webhook_id` | UUID | Foreign key → Webhook |
| `path` | string | Unique bare UUID, generated at creation. The `/h/` prefix is route only and is not stored: the receiver matches this column against the raw `{uuid}` path segment. It is also the entrypoint's credential; see [The entrypoint URL is the authentication secret](#the-entrypoint-url-is-the-authentication-secret) |
| `path` | string | Unique bare UUID, generated at creation. The `/webhook/` prefix is route only and is not stored: the receiver matches this column against the raw `{uuid}` path segment. It is also the entrypoint's credential; see [The entrypoint URL is the authentication secret](#the-entrypoint-url-is-the-authentication-secret) |
| `description` | string | Optional description |
| `active` | boolean | Whether this entrypoint accepts events (default: true) |
@@ -1676,7 +1645,6 @@ data for auditing, for replay, and for resubmission.
| `headers` | JSON | Complete request headers |
| `body` | text | Raw request body |
| `content_type` | string | Content-Type header value |
| `body_bytes` | integer | The body's size in bytes, recorded when the event is stored, on receipt and on resubmit |
| `resubmitted_from_id` | UUID | The event this one was copied from by a resubmit (nullable; empty for an event that arrived on the receiver). Not a foreign key: the source event can be reaped by retention while its copies remain |
**Relations:** Belongs to Webhook. Belongs to Entrypoint. Has many
@@ -1697,7 +1665,6 @@ status across potentially multiple attempts.
| `event_id` | UUID | Foreign key → Event |
| `target_id`| UUID | Foreign key → Target |
| `status` | DeliveryStatus | One of: `pending`, `delivered`, `failed`, `retrying` |
| `finished_at` | timestamp | When the delivery became `delivered` or `failed` (nullable; empty while `pending` or `retrying`) |
**Relations:** Belongs to Event. Belongs to Target. Has many
DeliveryResults.
@@ -1765,70 +1732,33 @@ retries) is individually logged for full observability.
**Relations:** Belongs to Delivery.
#### EventTotals and TargetTotals
Running counts in each event database, read by the statistics pane at the
top of the webhook page. `EventTotals` is one row:
| Field | Type | Description |
| ---------------- | --------- | ----------- |
| `events` | integer | Events ever stored, resubmitted copies included |
| `events_removed` | integer | Events retention has deleted |
| `last_event_at` | timestamp | When the newest event arrived (nullable; empty before the first); retention leaves it as it is |
`TargetTotals` is one row per target, created by the first delivery to it:
| Field | Type | Description |
| -------------------- | ------- | ----------- |
| `target_id` | UUID | The target (primary key) |
| `deliveries` | integer | Deliveries to it ever created, replays included |
| `delivered` | integer | Of those, how many became `delivered` |
| `failed` | integer | Of those, how many became `failed` |
| `deliveries_removed` | integer | Its deliveries retention has deleted |
| `failed_removed` | integer | Its failed deliveries retention has deleted |
Each count changes in the transaction that writes or deletes the rows it
counts. The pane's lifetime events are `events`, and its lifetime
deliveries and failures are `deliveries` and `failed` summed over the
targets; each figure within retention is the same less what retention
removed, so neither needs the rows themselves. Its last event is
`last_event_at`, written in the transaction that stores the event, so it
still shows once retention has removed every event. Its last-10-minutes and
last-24-hours figures are counted from the `events` and `deliveries`
indexes over just that window, the deliveries in one query grouped by
target. Its failure percentage for a window is the deliveries that became
`failed` in it out of all that became `delivered` or `failed` in it, and
a dash when none did.
#### Event-tier indexes
These indexes on the per-webhook event databases are declared in the model
tags, so `AutoMigrate` creates them on a fresh database:
tags, so `AutoMigrate` creates them on a fresh and on an existing database:
| Table | Columns | Serves |
| ------------------ | --------------------------- | ------ |
| `deliveries` | `status`, `deleted_at`, `finished_at`, `target_id` | Startup recovery, the retry and pending sweeps every 60 seconds and the queue-depth sampler every 30 seconds, which select deliveries by status, and the webhook page's statistics, which count each target's deliveries by status and when they finished |
| `deliveries` | `event_id`, `deleted_at` | The event log, which loads each event's deliveries, and retention, which counts and deletes the deliveries of expired events |
| `deliveries` | `status`, `deleted_at` | Startup recovery, the retry and pending sweeps every 60 seconds and the queue-depth sampler every 30 seconds, which select deliveries by status |
| `deliveries` | `event_id`, `deleted_at` | The event log, which loads each event's deliveries, and retention, which selects and deletes the deliveries of expired events |
| `delivery_results` | `delivery_id`, `deleted_at` | The event log, which loads the attempts of a page's deliveries, and retention, which deletes the attempts of expired events |
| `events` | `deleted_at`, `created_at` | The webhook page's statistics, which count recent events |
| `events` | `created_at` | Retention, which selects expired events by age |
| `events` | `deleted_at`, `created_at` | Retention, which selects expired events by age |
| `events` | `created_at` | Retention's delete of the expired events themselves |
GORM's soft delete adds `deleted_at IS NULL` to these queries; retention
leaves it out. SQLite keeps no statistics on these tables, and without them it
rates the `deleted_at` index, which every live row matches, above an index on
a column matched against several values or compared with a range. So every
index but the last also covers `deleted_at`. It comes second, so that
retention can use the index without it, except in `events`, where the
statistics compare `created_at` with a range (`>=`) and SQLite narrows by a
range only on the last column it uses.
GORM's soft delete adds `deleted_at IS NULL` to these queries; retention's
deletes leave it out, but their lookups of expired rows keep it. SQLite keeps
no statistics on these tables, and without them it rates the `deleted_at`
index, which every live row matches, above an index on a column matched
against several values or compared with `<`. So every index but the last also
covers `deleted_at`. It comes second, so that retention's deletes can use the
index without it, except in `events`, where `created_at` is compared with `<`
and SQLite narrows by a `<` only on the last column it uses.
#### Common Fields
Every entity except `Setting`, `EventTotals` and `TargetTotals` includes
these fields from `BaseModel`. `Setting` is a bare key-value row with no
`id`, no timestamps and no soft delete, and the two totals tables hold
counts, plus `last_event_at` in `event_totals`, keyed by a numeric `id`
and by `target_id`:
Every entity except `Setting` includes these fields from `BaseModel`.
`Setting` is a bare key-value row with no `id`, no timestamps and no
soft delete:
| Field | Type | Description |
| ------------ | --------- | ----------- |
@@ -1870,8 +1800,6 @@ encryption key is generated and stored, and an `admin` user is created.
- **Events** — captured incoming webhook payloads
- **Deliveries** — event-to-target pairings and their status
- **DeliveryResults** — individual delivery attempt logs
- **EventTotals** and **TargetTotals** — running counts of the above,
the deliveries per target, kept through retention
Per-webhook databases are created automatically when a webhook is
created (and lazily on first access for webhooks that predate this
@@ -1968,7 +1896,7 @@ runtime, though CGO is required at build time due to the transitive
```
External Service
│
│ POST /h/{uuid}
│ POST /webhook/{uuid}
▼
┌─────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐
│ chi Router │────►│ Middleware │────►│ Webhook │
@@ -2194,7 +2122,7 @@ The middleware records three more on the same registry:
Two of those labels are written once per request from bytes the client
chose, so both are bounded to something this service registers:
- `handler` is the chi route pattern — `/h/{uuid}`, never the
- `handler` is the chi route pattern — `/webhook/{uuid}`, never the
concrete path. A request matching no route carries `(unmatched)`,
and no entrypoint UUID ever reaches a label.
- `method` is the request method when the router can route it, and
@@ -2224,7 +2152,7 @@ unpredictable rates, and blanket limits shared with other routes would
cause legitimate deliveries to be dropped.
The receiver instead has its own dedicated abuse limit, scoped to the
`/h/{uuid}` route only and keyed per client IP per request path
`/webhook/{uuid}` route only and keyed per client IP per request path
(`httprate.KeyByEndpoint`): one misbehaving sender is throttled without
affecting other senders of the same entrypoint or the same sender's
other entrypoints. Keying on the path rather than on the entrypoint
@@ -2261,7 +2189,7 @@ log spends. The access log is bounded by neither limit: every request
is recorded once at `INFO`, served or rejected alike.
What the access log does bound is the _content_ of those lines. A 3xx
or 4xx response logs the chi route pattern — `/h/{uuid}`,
or 4xx response logs the chi route pattern — `/webhook/{uuid}`,
`/user/{username}//`, or the literal `(unmatched)` when the request hit
no route at all — in place of the concrete URL. Those are the outcomes
an unauthenticated client can drive for free: 404 and 429 on any
@@ -2295,12 +2223,12 @@ reduces the headers to a fixed allowlist — `Accept`, `Content-Length`,
The same hook rewrites the request URL. The SDK builds it as
`scheme://host/path` from the concrete path, which on the receiver
route is `/h/<uuid>` in full — and that UUID is a write
route is `/webhook/<uuid>` in full — and that UUID is a write
capability, not an identifier: anyone holding it can post events this
service accepts and its targets then deliver. A tracker has its own
retention, access control and deletion policy, so the rule the access
log follows above does not carry across that boundary. What is sent is
the chi route pattern instead: `http://host/h/{uuid}`.
the chi route pattern instead: `http://host/webhook/{uuid}`.
The scheme and the host are kept, and everything else in the URL is
discarded rather than edited, so a future SDK version that starts
@@ -2344,8 +2272,8 @@ fallback is never the concrete path. The path becomes the literal
rewrite cannot parse into a scheme is withheld whole. A transaction
event additionally carries the SDK's own `METHOD /path` name, built
from the concrete path as well; it is rewritten on the same terms, to
`POST /h/{uuid}` where the pattern is known and `POST /(redacted)`
where it is not.
`POST /webhook/{uuid}` where the pattern is known and `POST
/(redacted)` where it is not.
The headers are an allowlist for the same reason the rules above are
unconditional: the SDK's own filter removes four names and passes
@@ -2451,14 +2379,14 @@ Removing either cap fails 14 subtests.
`internal/middleware/logbound_test.go` and
`internal/handlers/logbound_test.go` drive 8 KB of client-chosen text
at each of these — just under 1 KB at `invalid password`, whose
accounts are shared with the successful-login line and so must stay
within the 1024-byte username limit — through both handlers, and
through seven fills: plain text as the baseline, and then the
quotation mark, backslash, tab, newline, C0 control and astral
non-printable, six characters the wider of the two handlers spends
more on than the client spent sending them. Every case holds each
line to the 2,560-byte ceiling. That per-line ceiling
at each of these — 1 KB at `invalid password`, whose accounts are
shared with the successful-login line, where a username past 4 KB
overflows the session cookie and answers 500 before that line is
written — through both handlers, and through seven fills: plain text
as the baseline, and then the quotation mark, backslash, tab, newline,
C0 control and astral non-printable, six characters the wider of the
two handlers spends more on than the client spent sending them. Every
case holds each line to the 2,560-byte ceiling. That per-line ceiling
is what the figure above states, and every row establishes it.
Three of the sites go further and bound the whole flood's output — the
@@ -2480,7 +2408,7 @@ logger printed the fully interpolated SQL — parameters and all — to
standard output on every statement that returned an error, including a
plain record-not-found, at a level no operator setting reached. Two of
this service's lookups miss by design on unauthenticated routes: the
entrypoint lookup behind `/h/{uuid}` and the user lookup behind
entrypoint lookup behind `/webhook/{uuid}` and the user lookup behind
the login form, whose path segment and submitted username the client
picks outright. Every
`gorm.Open` in the service now installs the adapter in
@@ -2608,44 +2536,47 @@ the tree is checked out: four checkouts have reported 3,959, 3,961,
client-supplied field was cut, and that the shipped chain's stack
arrived uncut — never the numbers.
Every limiter here — receiver, login, password change, delivery replay
and event resubmit — identifies the client the same way, through one
shared key function: the connection's own address, unless the peer is
inside `TRUSTED_PROXIES`, in which case the forwarded client address is
used instead. That address becomes a bucket by family: IPv4 keys on
the full address, IPv6 on its `/64` prefix. A routed `/64` is the normal
Every limiter here — receiver, login, and password change — identifies
the client the same way, through one shared key function: the
connection's own address, unless the peer is listed in
`TRUSTED_PROXIES`, in which case the forwarded client address is used
instead. That address becomes a bucket by family: IPv4 keys on the full
address, IPv6 on its `/64` prefix. A routed `/64` is the normal
residential and mobile IPv6 allocation, so keying IPv6 per address would
let one subscriber rotate source addresses and mint a fresh bucket per
request, evading these limits at the network layer without spoofing
anything; the cost is that distinct clients inside one `/64` share a
bucket. IPv4-mapped addresses (`::ffff:1.2.3.4`) key as the IPv4 address
they carry. See [Trusted proxies](#trusted-proxies). When that variable
does not cover the reverse proxy, a client behind it shares one bucket
with every other client behind the same proxy. Set `TRUSTED_PROXIES` to
the proxy's address to get per-client limits back. What the shared bucket
they carry. See [Trusted proxies](#trusted-proxies). Deployed without that
variable set, a client behind a reverse proxy shares one bucket with
every other client behind the same proxy. Set `TRUSTED_PROXIES` to the
proxy's address to get per-client limits back. What the shared bucket
costs is not the same for every limiter, and the two cases pull in
opposite directions:
- For the **receiver** limits it costs throughput, which is the safe
direction to be wrong in: sharing can only make a limit bind sooner,
never let a sender past it. It matters more for the aggregate limit
than for the per-entrypoint one: with every request keyed on the
proxy, the aggregate limit becomes a service-wide ceiling of 1200
requests per minute across all senders and all entrypoints, where the
per-entrypoint limit's capacity still grows with the number of
entrypoints.
than for the per-entrypoint one: with `TRUSTED_PROXIES` unset behind
the reverse proxy a production deployment is required to run behind,
every request keys on the proxy, so the aggregate limit becomes a
service-wide ceiling of 1200 requests per minute across all senders
and all entrypoints, where the per-entrypoint limit's capacity still
grows with the number of entrypoints. Any deployment with more than a
handful of busy entrypoints must set `TRUSTED_PROXIES`.
- For the **login and password-change** limits it costs precision, not
availability. Login failures from every client land in one counter,
so a stranger's wrong passwords make the operator's own wrong
passwords answer `429` sooner; the operator's _correct_ password is
never affected, because it is never counted.
never affected, because it is never counted. Production deployments
should still set `TRUSTED_PROXIES`; webhooker warns at startup
whenever it is empty, in any environment.
#### The login endpoint
The login `POST` is the one endpoint with no pre-emptive limiter in
front of it, and that is deliberate. A limiter that spends budget on
arrival is a lockout wherever clients share one bucket, as they do
behind a reverse proxy that `TRUSTED_PROXIES` does not cover: a
arrival is a lockout in this deployment shape: sharing one bucket, a
stranger sending five POSTs a minute — about 0.08 requests per second,
from anywhere — keeps it permanently full, and the operator has no
second administrative path. So the handler inverts the order:
@@ -2742,10 +2673,8 @@ re-fills both verification slots on its first two requests. The
remedies are to block the source at the reverse proxy, or to
rate-limit `POST /pages/login` there — the one place a limit can be
applied without reintroducing the lockout, because the proxy sees the
real client address. `TRUSTED_PROXIES` does not stop the saturation.
The flood's source is in the proxy's access log: webhooker's own logs
record the proxy's address, not the client's (see
[Deployment behind a reverse proxy](#deployment-behind-a-reverse-proxy)).
real client address. Setting `TRUSTED_PROXIES` does not stop the
saturation, but it makes the source visible in the failure logs.
Finer-grained per-webhook rate limits (configured in the web UI and
enforced in the webhook handler) can layer on top of this env-level
@@ -2757,48 +2686,44 @@ abuse limit later; they are tracked as future work.
| Method | Path | Description |
| ------ | --------------------------- | ----------- |
| `GET` | `/` | Root redirect, 303 (authenticated → `/hooks`, unauthenticated → `/pages/login`) |
| `GET` | `/` | Root redirect, 303 (authenticated → `/sources`, unauthenticated → `/pages/login`) |
| `GET` | `/.well-known/healthcheck` | Health check (JSON: `status`, `now`, `uptimeSeconds`, `uptimeHuman`, `version`, `appname`, `maintenanceMode`) |
| `GET`, `HEAD` | `/s/*` | Static file serving (embedded CSS, JS). `GET` and `HEAD` only — `POST`, `PUT`, `PATCH`, `DELETE`, `OPTIONS`, `TRACE` and `CONNECT` are answered `405 Method Not Allowed` with `Allow: GET, HEAD`. Any other method (such as `PROPFIND`) is refused by chi before it reaches this route, and gets `405` without an `Allow` header. Pinned by `TestStaticServesOnlyGetAndHead` |
| `POST` | `/h/{uuid}` | Webhook receiver endpoint. `POST` only — every other method is answered `405 Method Not Allowed` with `Allow: POST`. Rate limited (see [Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting)) |
| `POST` | `/webhook/{uuid}` | Webhook receiver endpoint. `POST` only — every other method is answered `405 Method Not Allowed` with `Allow: POST`. Rate limited (see [Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting)) |
#### Authentication Endpoints
| Method | Path | Description |
| ------ | --------------- | ----------- |
| `GET` | `/pages/login` | Login page (not rate limited). Its `next` parameter names the page to return to after login; anything but a path on this site is replaced with `/` |
| `POST` | `/pages/login` | Login form submission. On success, redirects to the form's `next` when it is a path on this site, otherwise to `/`. Credentials are verified before any limit is consulted, so a correct password is never throttled; 5 FAILED attempts per minute per bucket per submitted username, then `429`. `503` if no verification slot frees up within 5s, or immediately if 16 requests are already queued for one (see [Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting)) |
| `GET` | `/pages/login` | Login page (not rate limited) |
| `POST` | `/pages/login` | Login form submission. Credentials are verified before any limit is consulted, so a correct password is never throttled; 5 FAILED attempts per minute per bucket per submitted username, then `429`. `503` if no verification slot frees up within 5s, or immediately if 16 requests are already queued for one (see [Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting)) |
| `POST` | `/pages/logout` | Logout (destroys session) |
#### Authenticated Endpoints
A logged-out `GET` of any of these is redirected to `/pages/login` with
its path and query as `next` when they fit in 2048 bytes, so logging in
returns to the page that was asked for.
| Method | Path | Description |
| ------ | ------------------------ | ----------- |
| `GET` | `/user/{username}` | User profile page |
| `POST` | `/user/{username}/password` | Change the user's password (5 per minute per bucket, then `429`; `503` if no verification slot frees up within 5s, or immediately if 16 requests are already queued for one) |
| `GET` | `/hooks` | List user's webhooks |
| `GET` | `/hooks/new` | Create webhook form |
| `POST` | `/hooks/new` | Create webhook submission |
| `GET` | `/hook/{id}` | Webhook detail view |
| `GET` | `/hook/{id}/edit` | Edit webhook form |
| `POST` | `/hook/{id}/edit` | Edit webhook submission |
| `POST` | `/hook/{id}/delete` | Delete webhook |
| `GET` | `/hook/{id}/events` | Full Event Log |
| `GET` | `/hook/{id}/events/{eventID}/body` | Download an event's full stored body. The log page renders each body only up to its cap, so this is the only route that serves a whole one; it is offered wherever a body is shown truncated |
| `POST` | `/hook/{id}/deliveries/{deliveryID}/replay` | Replay a finished delivery: creates a new delivery for the same event against the target's current configuration (30 per minute per bucket, then `429`) |
| `POST` | `/hook/{id}/events/{eventID}/resubmit` | Resubmit a stored event: creates a new event copying it and fans that out to every currently active target (30 per minute per bucket, then `429`) |
| `POST` | `/hook/{id}/entrypoints` | Add entrypoint to webhook |
| `POST` | `/hook/{id}/entrypoints/{entrypointID}/delete` | Delete an entrypoint |
| `POST` | `/hook/{id}/entrypoints/{entrypointID}/toggle` | Enable or disable an entrypoint |
| `POST` | `/hook/{id}/targets` | Add target to webhook |
| `GET` | `/hook/{id}/targets/{targetID}/edit` | Edit target form. The one page that renders a target's destination URL and header values in full, rather than masked |
| `POST` | `/hook/{id}/targets/{targetID}/edit` | Edit target submission |
| `POST` | `/hook/{id}/targets/{targetID}/delete` | Delete a target |
| `POST` | `/hook/{id}/targets/{targetID}/toggle` | Enable or disable a target |
| `GET` | `/sources` | List user's webhooks |
| `GET` | `/sources/new` | Create webhook form |
| `POST` | `/sources/new` | Create webhook submission |
| `GET` | `/source/{id}` | Webhook detail view |
| `GET` | `/source/{id}/edit` | Edit webhook form |
| `POST` | `/source/{id}/edit` | Edit webhook submission |
| `POST` | `/source/{id}/delete` | Delete webhook |
| `GET` | `/source/{id}/logs` | Webhook event logs |
| `GET` | `/source/{id}/logs/{eventID}/body` | Download an event's full stored body. The log page renders each body only up to its cap, so this is the only route that serves a whole one; it is offered wherever a body is shown truncated |
| `POST` | `/source/{id}/deliveries/{deliveryID}/replay` | Replay a finished delivery: creates a new delivery for the same event against the target's current configuration (30 per minute per bucket, then `429`) |
| `POST` | `/source/{id}/events/{eventID}/resubmit` | Resubmit a stored event: creates a new event copying it and fans that out to every currently active target (30 per minute per bucket, then `429`) |
| `POST` | `/source/{id}/entrypoints` | Add entrypoint to webhook |
| `POST` | `/source/{id}/entrypoints/{entrypointID}/delete` | Delete an entrypoint |
| `POST` | `/source/{id}/entrypoints/{entrypointID}/toggle` | Enable or disable an entrypoint |
| `POST` | `/source/{id}/targets` | Add target to webhook |
| `GET` | `/source/{id}/targets/{targetID}/edit` | Edit target form. The one page that renders a target's destination URL and header values in full, rather than masked |
| `POST` | `/source/{id}/targets/{targetID}/edit` | Edit target submission |
| `POST` | `/source/{id}/targets/{targetID}/delete` | Delete a target |
| `POST` | `/source/{id}/targets/{targetID}/toggle` | Enable or disable a target |
#### Infrastructure Endpoints
@@ -2830,8 +2755,6 @@ imports. The entry point is `cmd/webhooker/main.go`.
```
webhooker/
├── 3p/
│ └── alpinejs-3.14.9.tgz # Alpine.js npm package, extracted by make assets
├── cmd/webhooker/
│ └── main.go # Entry point: subcommand dispatch; no args locks DATA_DIR and wires fx
├── internal/
@@ -2855,7 +2778,6 @@ webhooker/
│ │ ├── model_event.go # Event entity (per-webhook DB)
│ │ ├── model_delivery.go # Delivery entity (per-webhook DB)
│ │ ├── model_delivery_result.go # DeliveryResult entity (per-webhook DB)
│ │ ├── model_totals.go # EventTotals and TargetTotals (per-webhook DB)
│ │ ├── model_apikey.go # APIKey entity
│ │ ├── password.go # Argon2id hashing and verification
│ │ ├── retention.go # Retention reaper (per-webhook event expiry)
@@ -2926,7 +2848,8 @@ webhooker/
│ ├── css/tailwind.css # Generated stylesheet the pages load
│ ├── css/style.css # Older hand-written stylesheet, no longer loaded
│ ├── js/app.js # Progressive-enhancement copy-to-clipboard
│ └── js/alpine.min.js # Alpine.js, extracted from 3p/ by make assets, not committed
│ ├── js/alpine.min.js # Alpine.js, fetched by script/fetch-assets, not committed
│ └── vendor.sha256 # Pinned hashes the fetched assets are verified against
├── templates/ # Go HTML templates (base, login, sources, etc.)
├── script/ # Scripts to Rule Them All entrypoints
├── Dockerfile # Three stages: lint, test+build, Alpine runtime
@@ -2951,15 +2874,13 @@ Components are wired via Uber fx in this order:
7. `healthcheck.New` — Health check service
8. `session.New` — Cookie-based session manager (key from database)
9. `handlers.New` — HTTP handlers
10. `metrics.NewRegistry` — The registry `/metrics` serves
11. `metrics.New` — The delivery collectors, registered on that registry
12. `middleware.New` — HTTP middleware
13. `delivery.New` — Event-driven delivery engine
14. `delivery.NewArchiveSweeper` — Periodic pruning of idle archives
15. `delivery.Engine` → `delivery.Notifier` — interface bridge
16. `delivery.Engine` → `delivery.WebhookEvictor` — interface bridge so
10. `middleware.New` — HTTP middleware
11. `delivery.New` — Event-driven delivery engine
12. `delivery.NewArchiveSweeper` — Periodic pruning of idle archives
13. `delivery.Engine` → `delivery.Notifier` — interface bridge
14. `delivery.Engine` → `delivery.WebhookEvictor` — interface bridge so
deleting a webhook releases its archive writer
17. `server.New` — HTTP server and router
15. `server.New` — HTTP server and router
The server starts via `fx.Invoke(func(*server.Server, *delivery.Engine,
*database.RetentionReaper, *delivery.ArchiveSweeper) {})`, which
@@ -3002,14 +2923,8 @@ local record instead of nothing. What that placement gives up is
recovery of a panic in the six entries above it, none of which does
more than set a header or start a timer.
Each admin page route group (`/pages`, `/user/*`, `/hooks`,
`/hook/*`) starts with its own **Recoverer** and, if `SENTRY_DSN` is
set, its own **Sentry** error reporting. That Recoverer answers a panic
with the `500` error page in the normal layout; the global one keeps
the plain-text `500` for every other route.
Additionally, form endpoints (`/pages`, `/user/*`, `/hooks`,
`/hook/*`) apply a **MaxBodySize** middleware that limits
Additionally, form endpoints (`/pages`, `/user/*`, `/sources`,
`/source/*`) apply a **MaxBodySize** middleware that limits
POST/PUT/PATCH request bodies to 1 MB. It is registered ahead of the
CSRF middleware in every one of those route groups, because
gorilla/csrf parses the form; if the cap were installed after it, form
@@ -3033,7 +2948,7 @@ Those same four route groups then apply **CSRF** and **NoCache**
`/pages` applies **RequireAuth**. The rate limiters are per-route
rather than global: **PasswordChangeRateLimit** on
`/user/{username}/password` and **ReceiverRateLimit** on
`/h/{uuid}`. There is deliberately none on `/pages/login` — that
`/webhook/{uuid}`. There is deliberately none on `/pages/login` — that
endpoint counts failures inside the handler, after the credential
check, see [The login endpoint](#the-login-endpoint).
@@ -3074,8 +2989,8 @@ check, see [The login endpoint](#the-login-endpoint).
by middleware that runs before CSRF parses the form
- **CSRF protection** via [gorilla/csrf](https://github.com/gorilla/csrf)
on all state-changing forms (cookie-based double-submit tokens with
HMAC authentication). Applied to `/pages`, `/hooks`, `/hook`, and
`/user` routes. Excluded from `/h` (inbound webhook POSTs) and
HMAC authentication). Applied to `/pages`, `/sources`, `/source`, and
`/user` routes. Excluded from `/webhook` (inbound webhook POSTs) and
`/api` (stateless API). The middleware detects TLS per-request through
`internal/reqtls.IsTLS` — the same predicate the session cookie uses —
to set appropriate cookie security flags and Origin/Referer validation
@@ -3116,9 +3031,10 @@ check, see [The login endpoint](#the-login-endpoint).
It runs behind session auth, so only a client already holding a
valid session reaches it, and an operator throttled out of changing
a password can still log in. The bucket is per client IP only when
`TRUSTED_PROXIES` covers the reverse proxy; otherwise every client
`TRUSTED_PROXIES` names the reverse proxy; unset, every client
shares one bucket, which costs precision rather than availability
(see [Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting))
(see [Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting)). webhooker warns at startup
whenever `TRUSTED_PROXIES` is empty
- Prometheus metrics behind basic auth
- Static assets embedded in binary (no filesystem access needed at
runtime)
@@ -3128,8 +3044,7 @@ check, see [The login endpoint](#the-login-endpoint).
before the app starts; the image's health check; and `docker exec`,
unless given `--user`
- GORM soft deletes on every entity that carries `BaseModel`, which is
all of them but `Setting`, `EventTotals` and `TargetTotals` (data
preserved for audit)
all of them but `Setting` (data preserved for audit)
### Shutdown
@@ -3246,15 +3161,14 @@ version is fixed independently of the compiler's:
`make fmt-check`, then `golangci-lint config verify` and
`golangci-lint run`, both with `--network=none`.
2. **Builder stage** (`golang:1.26.1-bookworm`) — depends on the lint
stage passing (it copies a file from it), runs `make test` and
`make build` (both extract Alpine.js from `3p/` first), and finally
rebuilds the binary with `CGO_ENABLED=1` and static linking so it
runs on musl. Both builds go through `make build`, the relink adding
its `-extldflags` via `GO_LDFLAGS`, so neither can drop the `-X` that
stamps the version. The version is the `VERSION` build arg if one is
given, otherwise derived from the `.git` in the context, and the
stage fails if a context with `.git` would stamp `unknown` (see
[Version stamping](#version-stamping)).
stage passing (it copies a file from it), runs `script/fetch-assets`
to download and verify the third-party browser assets, then runs
`make test` and `make build`, and finally rebuilds the binary with
`CGO_ENABLED=1` and static linking so it runs on musl. Both builds
go through `make build`, the relink adding its `-extldflags` via
`GO_LDFLAGS`, so neither can drop the `-X` that stamps the version.
The version arrives as the `VERSION` build arg, since the context
has no `.git` (see [Version stamping](#version-stamping)).
3. **Runtime stage** (`alpine:3.21`) — copies the static binary and
`deploy/docker-entrypoint.sh`, creates the `/var/lib/webhooker`
directory for all SQLite databases, exposes port 8080, and includes
@@ -3285,13 +3199,19 @@ A layer cache lets `docker build .` exit 0 in seconds with the lint and
test stages replayed rather than executed, which would make a green
check meaningless. The `check` workflow therefore writes
`.ci-fingerprint` into the build context before building. Its value is
the hash of the commit being checked, so every commit, docs-only ones
and a squash merge whose tree matches an already-built branch included,
gets a new fingerprint, invalidates the `COPY . .` layer of both check
stages, and really runs `make fmt-check`, `golangci-lint`, `make test`,
and `make build`. A run that reports success ran them.
the hash of the last commit that touched the build context, so:
The module download layer sits above `COPY . .` and stays cached.
- Any commit that changes code (including a squash merge whose tree
matches an already-built branch) gets a new fingerprint, invalidates
the `COPY . .` layer of both check stages, and really runs
`make fmt-check`, `golangci-lint`, `make test`, and `make build`. A
run that reports success ran them.
- A docs-only commit leaves the fingerprint unchanged — `.dockerignore`
excludes `*.md`, `LICENSE` and `.editorconfig` from the context
anyway — so the image replays from cache and costs seconds.
The module download layer sits above `COPY . .` and stays cached either
way.
A separate workflow step, run before the fingerprint is written, covers
a second way the gate lied: Gitea cancels an in-flight run when a newer
TODO.md
+7 -1
View File
@@ -40,6 +40,12 @@ duplicate. That is deliberate — the alternative is a silent lost
delivery — and the README says so under Rationale. It is not a defect
to re-file.
One caveat on reading a green check: a docs-only commit deliberately
replays from the layer cache
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/119), so a green status on
such a commit evidences a replay rather than an executed run. A code
commit invalidates the `COPY` layer and genuinely executes.
# Next Step
Clear the rest of the open 1.0.0 milestone
@@ -381,7 +387,7 @@ point of the branch.
- 2026-03-05 security headers middleware, session regeneration on
login, request body size limits (#41)
- 2026-03-04 tests for delivery, middleware, and session packages
(#32); removed the build-architecture global (#31)
(#32); removed globals.Buildarch (#31)
- 2026-03-04 1.0 MVP merge: Webhook/Entrypoint/Target rename, core
delivery engine with bounded worker pool and circuit breaker,
parallel fan-out, per-webhook event databases, management UI (#16)
cmd/webhooker/main.go
-5
View File
@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/healthcheck"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/metrics"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/resetpw"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/server"
@@ -178,10 +177,6 @@ func newApp() *fx.App {
healthcheck.New,
session.New,
handlers.New,
// The registry /metrics serves, and the delivery
// collectors registered on it.
metrics.NewRegistry,
metrics.New,
middleware.New,
// The one SSRF guard both target-creation validation
// and the delivery dialer consult, so they cannot
go.mod
+1 -1
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ go 1.26.1
require (
github.com/99designs/basicauth-go v0.0.0-20230316000542-bf6f9cbbf0f8
github.com/dustin/go-humanize v1.0.1
github.com/getsentry/sentry-go v0.25.0
github.com/go-chi/chi v1.5.5
github.com/go-chi/cors v1.2.1
@@ -30,6 +29,7 @@ require (
github.com/beorn7/perks v1.0.1 // indirect
github.com/cespare/xxhash/v2 v2.2.0 // indirect
github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.2-0.20180830191138-d8f796af33cc // indirect
github.com/dustin/go-humanize v1.0.1 // indirect
github.com/gorilla/securecookie v1.1.2 // indirect
github.com/jinzhu/inflection v1.0.0 // indirect
github.com/jinzhu/now v1.1.5 // indirect
internal/config/config.go
+60 -22
View File
@@ -75,11 +75,6 @@ const (
// internet-exposed endpoint.
defaultReceiverRateLimit = 120
// defaultTrustedProxies is TRUSTED_PROXIES when it is unset: the
// RFC 1918 private ranges, which a reverse proxy reaching the
// process over a Docker network or a private LAN connects from.
defaultTrustedProxies = "10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16"
// maxPort is the highest valid TCP port number. The lower
// bound (at least 1) is enforced by envPositiveInt.
maxPort = 65535
@@ -177,14 +172,13 @@ type Config struct {
// TrustedProxies is the set of networks whose members are
// allowed to speak for the client with X-Forwarded-For, the
// only forwarded header read. Unless TRUSTED_PROXIES is set it
// is the RFC 1918 private ranges (defaultTrustedProxies); a set
// value replaces them. If any client can reach the process, or
// the proxy in front of it, from an RFC 1918 source address
// (directly, or through anything that can rewrite source
// addresses, such as NAT or a published container port), it
// must be set to the proxy's address alone, or every rate limit
// can be bypassed by those clients.
// only forwarded header read. It is empty unless
// TRUSTED_PROXIES is set, and empty means no peer is
// trusted: forwarded headers are then ignored entirely and
// clients are identified by the connection's own address.
// Members can choose their own rate-limit key, so this must
// name proxy hosts only, never a block that also covers
// clients.
TrustedProxies []netip.Prefix
// AllowedEgressCIDRs is the set of networks a delivery target
@@ -466,15 +460,14 @@ func parseCIDR(entry string) (netip.Prefix, error) {
// envPrefixList returns the value of the named environment variable
// parsed as a comma-separated list of CIDR blocks (bare addresses
// allowed). An unset, empty, or blank value is read as defaultValue
// instead. A set value containing an unparseable entry is a hard
// error naming the key and the bad entry, so startup fails loudly
// rather than silently running with a list the operator did not
// intend.
func envPrefixList(key, defaultValue string) ([]netip.Prefix, error) {
// allowed). An unset, empty, or blank value yields an empty list. A
// set value containing an unparseable entry is a hard error naming
// the key and the bad entry, so startup fails loudly rather than
// silently running with a list the operator did not intend.
func envPrefixList(key string) ([]netip.Prefix, error) {
v := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(key))
if v == "" {
v = defaultValue
return nil, nil
}
var prefixes []netip.Prefix
@@ -688,12 +681,12 @@ func loadFromEnv() (*Config, error) {
return nil, err
}
trustedProxies, err := envPrefixList("TRUSTED_PROXIES", defaultTrustedProxies)
trustedProxies, err := envPrefixList("TRUSTED_PROXIES")
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
allowedEgressCIDRs, err := envPrefixList("ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS", "")
allowedEgressCIDRs, err := envPrefixList("ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS")
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -767,6 +760,50 @@ func (c *Config) warnEgressAllowlist(log *slog.Logger) {
)
}
// warnSharedRateLimitBucket logs a startup warning whenever
// TRUSTED_PROXIES is empty, in any environment.
//
// With no trusted proxies every rate limiter keys on the connecting
// peer's address. Whether that is harmless or dangerous depends on
// what is in front of the process, which this code cannot observe:
// with nothing in front, the peer is the client and the limits are
// per-client as intended; behind a reverse proxy the peer is the proxy
// for every request, so all clients share one bucket per limiter.
//
// The login endpoint no longer spends budget on arrival — it verifies
// credentials first and charges only failures — so a shared bucket
// cannot deny the operator a correct password. What it does collapse
// is the failure counting: one client's wrong passwords throttle
// everyone else's wrong passwords, and the receiver's limits become
// service-wide ceilings.
//
// The warning is deliberately not gated on WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT:
// behind a proxy every client shares one bucket in dev and prod alike.
//
// The default of trusting nobody is deliberate — trusting forwarded
// headers from arbitrary peers lets any client choose its own bucket —
// so this warns rather than failing startup or changing the key.
func (c *Config) warnSharedRateLimitBucket(log *slog.Logger) {
if len(c.TrustedProxies) > 0 {
return
}
log.Warn(
"TRUSTED_PROXIES is empty: every rate limit keys on the "+
"connecting peer's address. With nothing proxying to "+
"this process that is the client itself and the limits "+
"are per-client as intended. Behind a reverse proxy the "+
"peer is the proxy on every request, so all clients "+
"share one bucket per limit: the receiver limits become "+
"service-wide ceilings, and one client's failed logins "+
"throttle every other client's failed logins — a "+
"correct password still gets in. If anything proxies to "+
"this process, set TRUSTED_PROXIES to its address.",
"environment", c.Environment,
"trustedProxies", len(c.TrustedProxies),
)
}
// New creates a Config by reading environment variables.
//
//nolint:revive // lc parameter is required by fx even if unused.
@@ -812,6 +849,7 @@ func New(lc fx.Lifecycle, params ConfigParams) (*Config, error) {
"hasMetricsAuth", s.MetricsAuthEnabled(),
)
s.warnSharedRateLimitBucket(log)
s.warnEgressAllowlist(log)
return s, nil
internal/config/config_test.go
+101 -14
View File
@@ -551,11 +551,6 @@ func testReceiverRateLimitSuccess(
}
func TestTrustedProxies(t *testing.T) {
// Unset, the RFC 1918 private ranges are trusted, so a reverse
// proxy on a Docker network or a private LAN is covered without
// configuration.
defaultProxies := []string{cidrPrivateV4, "172.16.0.0/12", "192.168.0.0/16"}
tests := []struct {
name string
set bool
@@ -564,21 +559,18 @@ func TestTrustedProxies(t *testing.T) {
expected []string
}{
{
// The default must be "trust nobody": an empty list
// means forwarded headers are ignored, never that
// every peer may speak for the client.
name: caseUnsetUsesDefault,
set: false,
expected: defaultProxies,
expected: []string{},
},
{
name: "blank value uses default",
name: "blank value trusts nothing",
set: true,
value: " ",
expected: defaultProxies,
},
{
name: "set value replaces the default entirely",
set: true,
value: "203.0.113.7",
expected: []string{"203.0.113.7/32"},
expected: []string{},
},
{
name: caseValidValueParsed,
@@ -853,6 +845,101 @@ func TestEgressAllowlistWarning(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestSharedRateLimitBucketWarning covers the startup warning that
// tells an operator a deployment behind a reverse proxy shares one
// rate-limit bucket between every client, which turns the receiver
// limits into service-wide ceilings and collapses login failure
// counting. It must fire whenever TRUSTED_PROXIES is empty, in any
// environment, because behind a proxy every client shares one bucket
// in dev and prod alike. It stays quiet once proxies are named.
func TestSharedRateLimitBucketWarning(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
environment string
trustedProxies string
expectWarning bool
}{
{
name: "prod without trusted proxies warns",
environment: config.EnvironmentProd,
expectWarning: true,
},
{
name: "prod with trusted proxies is quiet",
environment: config.EnvironmentProd,
trustedProxies: cidrPrivateV4,
expectWarning: false,
},
{
name: "dev without trusted proxies warns",
environment: config.EnvironmentDev,
expectWarning: true,
},
{
name: "dev with trusted proxies is quiet",
environment: config.EnvironmentDev,
trustedProxies: cidrPrivateV4,
expectWarning: false,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Cannot use t.Parallel() here because t.Setenv
// is incompatible with parallel subtests.
t.Setenv("WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT", tt.environment)
if tt.trustedProxies == "" {
require.NoError(
t, os.Unsetenv("TRUSTED_PROXIES"),
)
} else {
t.Setenv("TRUSTED_PROXIES", tt.trustedProxies)
}
var buf bytes.Buffer
log := slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(
&buf, &slog.HandlerOptions{
Level: slog.LevelDebug,
},
))
require.NoError(
t,
config.WarnSharedRateLimitBucketForTest(log),
)
if !tt.expectWarning {
assert.Empty(t, buf.String())
return
}
logged := buf.String()
assert.Contains(t, logged, `"level":"WARN"`)
assert.Contains(t, logged, "TRUSTED_PROXIES")
assert.Contains(t, logged, "share one bucket")
assert.Contains(
t, logged, "throttle every other client's failed logins",
)
// The warning must not claim a lockout the login
// endpoint no longer permits: credentials are verified
// before any budget is spent.
assert.Contains(
t, logged, "a correct password still gets in",
)
// The text must stay accurate for a developer with
// nothing in front of the process, where an empty
// list costs nothing.
assert.Contains(
t, logged, "nothing proxying to this process",
)
})
}
}
// metricsEnv describes what one subtest below puts in the
// environment for a single METRICS_ variable. A variable that is
// set to the empty string and one that is not set at all are
internal/config/export_test.go
+15
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,21 @@ import "log/slog"
// the external config_test package so each helper can be covered by
// its own table-driven test without weakening the package API.
// WarnSharedRateLimitBucketForTest loads a Config from the current
// environment and emits its startup warnings to log. The real logger
// writes to stdout, so this lets the warning's firing condition be
// asserted against a handler the test controls.
func WarnSharedRateLimitBucketForTest(log *slog.Logger) error {
c, err := loadFromEnv()
if err != nil {
return err
}
c.warnSharedRateLimitBucket(log)
return nil
}
// WarnEgressAllowlistForTest loads a Config from the current
// environment and emits its egress-allowlist startup warning to
// log, so a test can assert both that the warning fires only when
internal/database/event_tier_indexes_test.go
+17 -72
View File
@@ -93,11 +93,11 @@ func TestEventTierQueriesUseTheirIndexes(t *testing.T) {
deliveries []database.Delivery
results []database.DeliveryResult
depths []struct{ Depth int }
removed []database.TargetTotals
)
byStatus := "idx_deliveries_status (status=? AND deleted_at=?)"
byEvent := "idx_deliveries_event_id (event_id=? AND deleted_at=?)"
byAge := "idx_events_deleted_at_created_at (deleted_at=? AND created_at<?)"
// The delivery engine: recovery and the retry sweep, the sweep for
// stranded pending deliveries, and the queue depth count.
@@ -123,80 +123,25 @@ func TestEventTierQueriesUseTheirIndexes(t *testing.T) {
Order("attempt_num ASC").Find(&results),
"idx_delivery_results_delivery_id (delivery_id=? AND deleted_at=?)")
// Retention (reapExpired, deleteEvents): one batch of expired
// events, then their attempts, deliveries and the events.
var expired []string
// Retention's three deletes (reapExpired), whose subqueries are built
// afresh for each statement as it builds them.
expiredEventIDs := func() *gorm.DB {
return dry.Model(&database.Event{}).Select("id").
Where("created_at < ?", cutoff)
}
assertPlanUses(t, db, dry.Unscoped().Model(&database.Event{}).
Where("created_at < ?", cutoff).
Limit(database.ExportReapBatchSize).Pluck("id", &expired),
"idx_events_created_at (created_at<?)")
assertPlanUses(t, db, dry.Unscoped().Where(
"delivery_id IN (?)", dry.Unscoped().Model(&database.Delivery{}).
Select("id").Where("event_id IN ?", ids),
"delivery_id IN (?)", dry.Model(&database.Delivery{}).
Select("id").Where("event_id IN (?)", expiredEventIDs()),
).Delete(&database.DeliveryResult{}),
"idx_delivery_results_delivery_id (delivery_id=?)",
"idx_deliveries_event_id (event_id=?)")
assertPlanUses(t, db, dry.Unscoped().Model(&database.Delivery{}).
Select("target_id, count(*) AS deliveries_removed, "+
"count(CASE WHEN status = ? THEN 1 END) AS failed_removed",
database.DeliveryStatusFailed).
Where("event_id IN ?", ids).Group("target_id").Find(&removed),
"idx_deliveries_event_id (event_id=?)")
assertPlanUses(t, db, dry.Unscoped().Where("event_id IN ?", ids).
Delete(&database.Delivery{}), "idx_deliveries_event_id (event_id=?)")
assertPlanUses(t, db, dry.Unscoped().Where("id IN ?", ids).
Delete(&database.Event{}), "sqlite_autoindex_events_1 (id=?)")
}
// TestStatisticsQueriesUseTheirIndexes does the same for the webhook
// page's statistics (readEventStats in the handlers): deliveries in
// progress, each target's deliveries finished since a time, which must
// come from the index alone, and events received since a time.
func TestStatisticsQueriesUseTheirIndexes(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
mgr, lc := setupTestWebhookDBManager(t)
ctx := context.Background()
require.NoError(t, lc.Start(ctx))
defer func() { require.NoError(t, lc.Stop(ctx)) }()
db, err := mgr.GetDB(uuid.New().String())
require.NoError(t, err)
dry := db.Session(&gorm.Session{DryRun: true})
since := time.Now()
var (
count int64
byTarget []struct{ TargetID string }
)
assertPlanUses(t, db, dry.Model(&database.Delivery{}).
Where("status IN ?", []database.DeliveryStatus{
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
}).Count(&count),
"idx_deliveries_status (status=? AND deleted_at=?)")
assertPlanUses(t, db, dry.Model(&database.Delivery{}).
Select("target_id, "+
"count(CASE WHEN status = ? THEN 1 END) AS delivered, "+
"count(CASE WHEN status = ? THEN 1 END) AS failed",
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
database.DeliveryStatusFailed).
Where("status IN ? AND finished_at >= ?",
[]database.DeliveryStatus{
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
}, since).
Group("target_id").Find(&byTarget),
"COVERING INDEX idx_deliveries_status "+
"(status=? AND deleted_at=? AND finished_at>?)")
assertPlanUses(t, db, dry.Model(&database.Event{}).
Where("created_at >= ?", since).Count(&count),
"idx_events_deleted_at_created_at "+
"(deleted_at=? AND created_at>?)")
"idx_delivery_results_delivery_id (delivery_id=?)", byEvent, byAge)
assertPlanUses(t, db, dry.Unscoped().Where(
"event_id IN (?)", expiredEventIDs(),
).Delete(&database.Delivery{}),
"idx_deliveries_event_id (event_id=?)", byAge)
assertPlanUses(t, db, dry.Unscoped().Where(
"created_at < ?", cutoff,
).Delete(&database.Event{}), "idx_events_created_at (created_at<?)")
}
// assertPlanUses asserts that SQLite's plan for a statement GORM built
internal/database/export_test.go
-16
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ import (
"io"
"log/slog"
"os"
"testing"
"time"
"go.uber.org/fx"
@@ -29,10 +28,6 @@ func NewTestRetentionReaper(
}
}
// ExportReapBatchSize exposes how many expired events one retention
// transaction deletes.
const ExportReapBatchSize = reapBatchSize
// ExportSweep runs a single retention sweep synchronously for tests.
func (r *RetentionReaper) ExportSweep(ctx context.Context) {
r.sweep(ctx)
@@ -84,14 +79,3 @@ func (d *Database) ExportSetBannerOut(w io.Writer) {
func DummyPasswordHashForTest() string {
return dummyPasswordHash()
}
// HashAtShippedCostForTest makes HashPassword hash at the shipped
// memory cost until t ends. t must not run in parallel with other
// tests, which would hash at that cost alongside it.
func HashAtShippedCostForTest(t *testing.T) {
t.Helper()
hashAtShippedCostInTest = true
t.Cleanup(func() { hashAtShippedCostInTest = false })
}
internal/database/model_delivery.go
+2 -13
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,6 @@
package database
import (
"time"
"gorm.io/gorm"
)
import "gorm.io/gorm"
// DeliveryStatus represents the status of a delivery
type DeliveryStatus string
@@ -41,7 +37,7 @@ type Delivery struct {
BaseModel
EventID string `gorm:"type:uuid;not null;index:idx_deliveries_event_id,priority:1" json:"eventId"`
TargetID string `gorm:"type:uuid;not null;index:idx_deliveries_status,priority:4" json:"targetId"`
TargetID string `gorm:"type:uuid;not null" json:"targetId"`
Status DeliveryStatus `gorm:"not null;default:'pending';index:idx_deliveries_status,priority:1" json:"status"`
// DeletedAt repeats the BaseModel field only to be the second column
@@ -49,13 +45,6 @@ type Delivery struct {
// gives.
DeletedAt gorm.DeletedAt `gorm:"index:idx_deliveries_event_id,priority:2;index:idx_deliveries_status,priority:2" json:"deletedAt,omitzero"`
// FinishedAt is when the delivery became delivered or failed, and
// nil while it is pending or retrying. It and then TargetID end the
// status index, so the webhook page counts each target's deliveries
// that finished in a recent window by reading just that window from
// the index.
FinishedAt *time.Time `gorm:"index:idx_deliveries_status,priority:3" json:"finishedAt,omitempty"`
// Relations
Event Event `json:"event,omitzero"`
Target Target `json:"target,omitzero"`
internal/database/model_event.go
-5
View File
@@ -31,11 +31,6 @@ type Event struct {
Body string `gorm:"type:text" json:"body"`
ContentType string `json:"contentType"`
// BodyBytes is the size of Body in bytes, recorded when the event
// is stored so the recent events list can show it without reading
// the body.
BodyBytes int64 `gorm:"not null" json:"bodyBytes"`
// ResubmittedFromID names the event this one was copied from by
// an operator resubmit. It is nil for an event that arrived on
// the receiver, which is every event created before the column
internal/database/model_totals.go
-99
View File
@@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
package database
import (
"fmt"
"time"
"gorm.io/gorm"
)
// The running totals in a webhook's event database keep the webhook
// page's lifetime figures right after retention has removed the rows
// they count, and let the page show them without counting every row.
// Each total changes in the transaction that writes or deletes the
// rows it counts.
// EventTotals is the single row counting a webhook's events: every
// event ever stored, how many of them retention has deleted, and when
// the newest arrived, which retention leaves as it is.
type EventTotals struct {
ID int64 `gorm:"primaryKey"`
Events int64 `gorm:"not null"`
EventsRemoved int64 `gorm:"not null"`
// LastEventAt is when the newest event arrived, or nil before the
// first.
LastEventAt *time.Time
}
// TableName names the table AddEventTotals updates.
func (EventTotals) TableName() string {
return "event_totals"
}
// TargetTotals is one row per target counting its deliveries: every
// delivery ever created, how many became delivered and how many
// failed, and how many deliveries and failed deliveries retention has
// deleted. The webhook's delivery figures are these rows summed.
type TargetTotals struct {
TargetID string `gorm:"type:uuid;primaryKey"`
Deliveries int64 `gorm:"not null"`
Delivered int64 `gorm:"not null"`
Failed int64 `gorm:"not null"`
DeliveriesRemoved int64 `gorm:"not null"`
FailedRemoved int64 `gorm:"not null"`
}
// TableName names the table AddTargetTotals updates.
func (TargetTotals) TableName() string {
return "target_totals"
}
// AddEventTotals adds each count in add to the webhook's event totals,
// and records add.LastEventAt as when the newest event arrived if it is
// set. Call it on the transaction that writes or deletes the events it
// counts.
func AddEventTotals(tx *gorm.DB, add EventTotals) error {
err := tx.Exec(
`UPDATE event_totals SET
events = events + ?,
events_removed = events_removed + ?,
last_event_at = coalesce(?, last_event_at)`,
add.Events, add.EventsRemoved, add.LastEventAt,
).Error
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("adding to event totals: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// AddTargetTotals adds each count in add to the totals of the target
// add.TargetID names, creating its row the first time. Call it on the
// transaction that writes or deletes the deliveries it counts.
func AddTargetTotals(tx *gorm.DB, add TargetTotals) error {
err := tx.Exec(
`INSERT INTO target_totals (target_id, deliveries, delivered,
failed, deliveries_removed, failed_removed)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
ON CONFLICT (target_id) DO UPDATE SET
deliveries = deliveries + excluded.deliveries,
delivered = delivered + excluded.delivered,
failed = failed + excluded.failed,
deliveries_removed =
deliveries_removed + excluded.deliveries_removed,
failed_removed = failed_removed + excluded.failed_removed`,
add.TargetID, add.Deliveries, add.Delivered,
add.Failed, add.DeliveriesRemoved, add.FailedRemoved,
).Error
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf(
"adding to totals of target %s: %w", add.TargetID, err,
)
}
return nil
}
internal/database/model_user.go
+2 -47
View File
@@ -1,58 +1,13 @@
package database
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"gorm.io/gorm"
)
// MaxUsernameBytes is the longest username, in bytes, that a user may
// have. The same number appears in the check constraint on
// User.Username, because a struct tag cannot reference a constant.
//
// A login stores the username in the session cookie, and both
// securecookie and browsers refuse a cookie value past about 4096
// bytes. That value is the session base64-encoded twice, so it holds
// 4096 × 3/4 × 3/4 = 2304 bytes of session, and the signature,
// timestamp and the session's other values take about 270 of those: a
// username longer than about 2030 bytes can never log in. The limit is
// about half that, so the session can carry more values later without
// locking out an account whose username is already at the limit.
const MaxUsernameBytes = 1024
// ErrUsernameTooLong is returned when a user is saved with a username
// longer than MaxUsernameBytes.
var ErrUsernameTooLong = errors.New("username is too long")
// User represents a user of the webhooker service
//
//nolint:lll // a struct tag cannot wrap
type User struct {
BaseModel
Username string `gorm:"uniqueIndex;not null;check:length(CAST(username AS BLOB)) <= 1024" json:"username"`
Password string `gorm:"not null" json:"-"` // Argon2 hashed
Username string `gorm:"uniqueIndex;not null" json:"username"`
Password string `gorm:"not null" json:"-"` // Argon2 hashed
// Relations
Webhooks []Webhook `json:"webhooks,omitempty"`
APIKeys []APIKey `json:"apiKeys,omitempty"`
}
// BeforeSave rejects a username longer than MaxUsernameBytes when a whole
// User is created or saved, so those calls get ErrUsernameTooLong rather
// than the database's constraint error. A column update such as
// Update("username", ...) is caught only by the check constraint, as is
// any path that writes the table without this model.
func (u *User) BeforeSave(_ *gorm.DB) error {
if len(u.Username) > MaxUsernameBytes {
return fmt.Errorf(
"%w: %d bytes, limit is %d",
ErrUsernameTooLong,
len(u.Username),
MaxUsernameBytes,
)
}
return nil
}
internal/database/model_user_test.go
-65
View File
@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
package database_test
import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
// usernameAtLimit is exactly MaxUsernameBytes long, built from a
// two-byte character. A check that counted characters rather than bytes
// would see half the length and let the one-byte-longer name through.
func usernameAtLimit() string {
return strings.Repeat("é", database.MaxUsernameBytes/2)
}
func TestUserCreate_RejectsOverlongUsername(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
db := startedTestDB(t)
err := db.Create(&database.User{
Username: usernameAtLimit() + "x",
Password: "hash",
}).Error
require.ErrorIs(t, err, database.ErrUsernameTooLong)
}
func TestUserCreate_AcceptsUsernameAtLimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
db := startedTestDB(t)
require.NoError(t, db.Create(&database.User{
Username: usernameAtLimit(),
Password: "hash",
}).Error)
}
// TestUsersTable_EnforcesUsernameLimitWithoutTheModel inserts with raw
// SQL, as a path that bypassed User.BeforeSave would, so only the
// table's check constraint stands between it and an over-long
// username. Accepting the name at the limit and refusing the next byte
// also pins the constraint's number to MaxUsernameBytes.
func TestUsersTable_EnforcesUsernameLimitWithoutTheModel(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
db := startedTestDB(t)
insert := "INSERT INTO users (id, username, password) VALUES (?, ?, ?)"
require.NoError(t, db.Exec(
insert, uuid.New().String(), usernameAtLimit(), "hash",
).Error)
err := db.Exec(
insert, uuid.New().String(), usernameAtLimit()+"x", "hash",
).Error
require.Error(t, err)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "CHECK constraint failed")
}
internal/database/models.go
+1 -2
View File
@@ -2,8 +2,7 @@ package database
// Migrate runs database migrations for the main application database.
// Only configuration-tier models are stored in the main database.
// Event-tier models (Event, Delivery, DeliveryResult, EventTotals,
// TargetTotals) live in
// Event-tier models (Event, Delivery, DeliveryResult) live in
// per-webhook dedicated databases managed by WebhookDBManager.
func (d *Database) Migrate() error {
return d.db.AutoMigrate(
internal/database/password.go
+1 -22
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ import (
"math/big"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
"golang.org/x/crypto/argon2"
)
@@ -64,30 +63,10 @@ func DefaultPasswordConfig() *PasswordConfig {
}
}
// testArgon2Memory is the Argon2id memory cost, in KiB, that a test
// binary hashes with: 1 MB instead of the shipped 64 MB. Every test
// that starts a database hashes the bootstrap admin password, dozens
// of them run in parallel, and under the race detector each 64 MB hash
// holds about 150 MB. VerifyPassword reads the cost from the hash it
// checks, so verification follows.
const testArgon2Memory = 1024
// hashAtShippedCostInTest makes a test binary hash at the shipped
// memory cost. Only TestHashPassword_ShippedParameters sets it.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // set by one test, see above
var hashAtShippedCostInTest bool
// HashPassword generates an Argon2id hash of the password. A binary
// built by go test hashes at testArgon2Memory; one built by go build
// always hashes at the defaults.
// HashPassword generates an Argon2id hash of the password
func HashPassword(password string) (string, error) {
config := DefaultPasswordConfig()
if testing.Testing() && !hashAtShippedCostInTest {
config.Memory = testArgon2Memory
}
// Generate a salt
salt := make([]byte, config.SaltLen)
internal/database/password_test.go
-33
View File
@@ -192,39 +192,6 @@ func TestHashPasswordUniqueness(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestHashPassword_ShippedParameters hashes and verifies through
// HashPassword at the shipped Argon2id parameters. Every other test
// hashes at the lower memory cost a test binary uses, so this is the
// one that keeps production hashing covered. One hash and one
// verification: each costs 64 MB.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // changes the hashing cost for the whole binary
func TestHashPassword_ShippedParameters(t *testing.T) {
database.HashAtShippedCostForTest(t)
password := "correct horse battery staple"
hash, err := database.HashPassword(password)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("hashing with the shipped parameters: %v", err)
}
const shipped = "$argon2id$v=19$m=65536,t=1,p=4$"
if !strings.HasPrefix(hash, shipped) {
t.Errorf("hash = %q, want prefix %q", hash, shipped)
}
valid, err := database.VerifyPassword(password, hash)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("VerifyPassword() error = %v", err)
}
if !valid {
t.Error("VerifyPassword() returned false for correct password")
}
}
// TestVerifyDummyPassword_DoesRealWork covers the anti-enumeration
// path. Login charges an unknown username a verification against a
// dummy hash so that a nonexistent account is not answered in
internal/database/retention.go
+46 -111
View File
@@ -18,19 +18,6 @@ import (
// computation.
const hoursPerDay = 24
// reapBatchSize is how many expired events one retention transaction
// deletes. A transaction holds the event database's write lock, which
// the receiver and the delivery workers wait for, so a large prune is
// split into transactions each short enough to finish well inside the
// busy timeout.
const reapBatchSize = 1000
// reapBatchPause is how long retention waits after one batch before
// starting the next. A writer waiting for the write lock checks for it
// again after at most 100 ms, so a longer pause lets it in between two
// batches instead of only after the whole prune.
const reapBatchPause = 200 * time.Millisecond
// RetentionReaperParams holds the fx dependencies for the
// RetentionReaper.
type RetentionReaperParams struct {
@@ -200,15 +187,13 @@ func (r *RetentionReaper) sweep(ctx context.Context) {
continue
}
r.reapWebhook(ctx, wh.ID, wh.RetentionDays)
r.reapWebhook(wh.ID, wh.RetentionDays)
}
}
// reapWebhook removes every expired event (and its dependents) from a
// single webhook's database, or as many as it reaches before ctx is
// cancelled.
// single webhook's database.
func (r *RetentionReaper) reapWebhook(
ctx context.Context,
webhookID string,
retentionDays int,
) {
@@ -228,7 +213,7 @@ func (r *RetentionReaper) reapWebhook(
return
}
deleted, err := reapExpired(ctx, db, cutoff)
deleted, err := reapExpired(db, cutoff)
if err != nil {
r.log.Error(
"retention sweep: failed to reap expired events",
@@ -280,107 +265,57 @@ func retentionCutoff(
), true
}
// reapExpired hard-deletes the events older than cutoff, with their
// deliveries and delivery results, reapBatchSize events per
// transaction with reapBatchPause between transactions, until none is
// left. Once ctx is cancelled it returns after the batch in hand,
// leaving the rest to the next sweep, so stopping the app does not
// wait for a long prune. It returns the number of events deleted.
func reapExpired(
ctx context.Context, db *gorm.DB, cutoff time.Time,
) (int64, error) {
var total int64
for {
var eventIDs []string
err := db.Transaction(func(tx *gorm.DB) error {
err := tx.Unscoped().Model(&Event{}).
Where("created_at < ?", cutoff).
Limit(reapBatchSize).
Pluck("id", &eventIDs).Error
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("selecting expired events: %w", err)
}
if len(eventIDs) == 0 {
return nil
}
return deleteEvents(tx, eventIDs)
})
if err != nil {
return total, err
}
total += int64(len(eventIDs))
if len(eventIDs) < reapBatchSize {
return total, nil
}
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return total, nil
case <-time.After(reapBatchPause):
}
}
}
// deleteEvents hard-deletes the given events and, in foreign-key-safe
// order before them, their delivery results and deliveries, then adds
// what it deleted to the running totals. It runs on reapExpired's
// transaction, so the totals change exactly when the rows do. Deletes
// are unscoped so rows are physically removed rather than
// soft-deleted, reclaiming disk.
func deleteEvents(tx *gorm.DB, eventIDs []string) error {
// 1. The delivery results of the events' deliveries.
err := tx.Unscoped().
Where("delivery_id IN (?)", tx.Unscoped().Model(&Delivery{}).
// reapExpired hard-deletes, in foreign-key-safe order, the delivery
// results, deliveries, and events associated with events older than
// cutoff. Deletes are unscoped so rows are physically removed rather
// than soft-deleted, reclaiming disk. It returns the number of events
// deleted.
func reapExpired(db *gorm.DB, cutoff time.Time) (int64, error) {
// Fresh subqueries are built per statement to avoid reusing a
// mutated builder across executions.
expiredEventIDs := func() *gorm.DB {
return db.Model(&Event{}).
Select("id").
Where("event_id IN ?", eventIDs)).
Delete(&DeliveryResult{}).Error
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("deleting expired delivery results: %w", err)
Where("created_at < ?", cutoff)
}
expiredDeliveryIDs := func() *gorm.DB {
return db.Model(&Delivery{}).
Select("id").
Where("event_id IN (?)", expiredEventIDs())
}
// 2. The events' deliveries, after counting them, and the failed
// ones among them, per target. The status is tested in the select
// list rather than the WHERE clause: there, SQLite would read every
// failed delivery the webhook has through the status index,
// instead of only these through the event_id index.
var removed []TargetTotals
err = tx.Unscoped().Model(&Delivery{}).
Select("target_id, count(*) AS deliveries_removed, "+
"count(CASE WHEN status = ? THEN 1 END) AS failed_removed",
DeliveryStatusFailed).
Where("event_id IN ?", eventIDs).
Group("target_id").
Find(&removed).Error
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("counting expired deliveries: %w", err)
// 1. Delivery results whose delivery belongs to an expired event.
res := db.Unscoped().
Where("delivery_id IN (?)", expiredDeliveryIDs()).
Delete(&DeliveryResult{})
if res.Error != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf(
"deleting expired delivery results: %w",
res.Error,
)
}
err = tx.Unscoped().
Where("event_id IN ?", eventIDs).
Delete(&Delivery{}).Error
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("deleting expired deliveries: %w", err)
// 2. Deliveries belonging to an expired event.
del := db.Unscoped().
Where("event_id IN (?)", expiredEventIDs()).
Delete(&Delivery{})
if del.Error != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf(
"deleting expired deliveries: %w",
del.Error,
)
}
// 3. The events themselves.
ev := tx.Unscoped().Where("id IN ?", eventIDs).Delete(&Event{})
// 3. The expired events themselves.
ev := db.Unscoped().
Where("created_at < ?", cutoff).
Delete(&Event{})
if ev.Error != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("deleting expired events: %w", ev.Error)
return 0, fmt.Errorf(
"deleting expired events: %w",
ev.Error,
)
}
for i := range removed {
err = AddTargetTotals(tx, removed[i])
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
return AddEventTotals(tx, EventTotals{EventsRemoved: ev.RowsAffected})
return ev.RowsAffected, nil
}
internal/database/totals_test.go
-410
View File
@@ -1,410 +0,0 @@
package database_test
import (
"context"
"net/http"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
// readEventTotals reads a webhook database's row of event totals,
// asserting that it has exactly one.
func readEventTotals(t *testing.T, db *gorm.DB) database.EventTotals {
t.Helper()
var rows []database.EventTotals
require.NoError(t, db.Find(&rows).Error)
require.Len(t, rows, 1)
return rows[0]
}
// readTargetTotals reads a webhook database's target totals, keyed by
// target.
func readTargetTotals(
t *testing.T, db *gorm.DB,
) map[string]database.TargetTotals {
t.Helper()
var rows []database.TargetTotals
require.NoError(t, db.Find(&rows).Error)
byTarget := make(map[string]database.TargetTotals, len(rows))
for _, row := range rows {
byTarget[row.TargetID] = row
}
return byTarget
}
// TestWebhookDBManager_TotalsSurviveReopen verifies that a new event
// database starts with one row of zero event totals and no target
// totals, that adding to a target twice adds to the one row, and that
// opening the database again keeps everything added.
func TestWebhookDBManager_TotalsSurviveReopen(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
mgr, lc := setupTestWebhookDBManager(t)
ctx := context.Background()
require.NoError(t, lc.Start(ctx))
defer func() { require.NoError(t, lc.Stop(ctx)) }()
webhookID := uuid.New().String()
db, err := mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
fresh := readEventTotals(t, db)
assert.Equal(t, database.EventTotals{ID: fresh.ID}, fresh)
assert.Empty(t, readTargetTotals(t, db))
first, second := uuid.New().String(), uuid.New().String()
require.NoError(t, database.AddEventTotals(db, database.EventTotals{
Events: 2,
}))
require.NoError(t, database.AddTargetTotals(db, database.TargetTotals{
TargetID: first, Deliveries: 2, Delivered: 1,
}))
require.NoError(t, database.AddTargetTotals(db, database.TargetTotals{
TargetID: first, Failed: 1,
}))
require.NoError(t, database.AddTargetTotals(db, database.TargetTotals{
TargetID: second, Deliveries: 1,
}))
// Drop the cached connection so the next open reopens the file,
// as a restart would.
require.NoError(t, mgr.CloseAll())
db, err = mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, database.EventTotals{ID: fresh.ID, Events: 2},
readEventTotals(t, db))
assert.Equal(t, map[string]database.TargetTotals{
first: {
TargetID: first, Deliveries: 2, Delivered: 1, Failed: 1,
},
second: {TargetID: second, Deliveries: 1},
}, readTargetTotals(t, db))
}
// seedExpiredEvents stores count events created at the given time,
// each with a delivered delivery to one target and a failed delivery
// to the other, and one attempt for each delivery.
func seedExpiredEvents(
t *testing.T,
db *gorm.DB,
webhookID string,
count int,
createdAt time.Time,
delivered, failed string,
) {
t.Helper()
events := make([]database.Event, count)
deliveries := make([]database.Delivery, 0, 2*count)
for i := range events {
events[i] = database.Event{
WebhookID: webhookID,
EntrypointID: uuid.New().String(),
Method: http.MethodPost,
}
events[i].ID = uuid.New().String()
events[i].CreatedAt = createdAt
deliveries = append(deliveries,
database.Delivery{
EventID: events[i].ID,
TargetID: delivered,
Status: database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
},
database.Delivery{
EventID: events[i].ID,
TargetID: failed,
Status: database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
},
)
}
require.NoError(t, db.CreateInBatches(events, 500).Error)
require.NoError(t, db.CreateInBatches(deliveries, 500).Error)
results := make([]database.DeliveryResult, len(deliveries))
for i := range deliveries {
results[i] = database.DeliveryResult{
DeliveryID: deliveries[i].ID, AttemptNum: 1,
}
}
require.NoError(t, db.CreateInBatches(results, 500).Error)
}
// seedBareEvents stores count events created at the given time, with
// no deliveries.
func seedBareEvents(
t *testing.T,
db *gorm.DB,
webhookID string,
count int,
createdAt time.Time,
) {
t.Helper()
events := make([]database.Event, count)
for i := range events {
events[i] = database.Event{
WebhookID: webhookID,
EntrypointID: uuid.New().String(),
Method: http.MethodPost,
}
events[i].CreatedAt = createdAt
}
require.NoError(t, db.CreateInBatches(events, 500).Error)
}
// TestRetentionReaper_PrunesMoreThanOneBatch verifies that a prune
// larger than one transaction's batch removes every expired event with
// its deliveries and delivery results, keeps the recent event, and
// adds what it removed to the event and target totals, so the totals
// within retention match the rows still stored.
func TestRetentionReaper_PrunesMoreThanOneBatch(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupRetentionTest(t)
webhookID := createWebhook(t, env.mainDB.DB(), 30)
db, err := env.mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
expired := database.ExportReapBatchSize + 1
delivered, failed := uuid.New().String(), uuid.New().String()
seedExpiredEvents(t, db, webhookID, expired,
time.Now().Add(-40*24*time.Hour), delivered, failed)
// One recent event, delivered to the first target.
recent := seedEventChain(t, db, webhookID, time.Now())
require.NoError(t, db.Model(&database.Delivery{}).
Where("id = ?", recent.deliveryID).
Update("target_id", delivered).Error)
// The totals storing those rows would have left.
n := int64(expired)
require.NoError(t, database.AddEventTotals(db, database.EventTotals{
Events: n + 1,
}))
require.NoError(t, database.AddTargetTotals(db, database.TargetTotals{
TargetID: delivered, Deliveries: n + 1, Delivered: n + 1,
}))
require.NoError(t, database.AddTargetTotals(db, database.TargetTotals{
TargetID: failed, Deliveries: n, Failed: n,
}))
env.reaper.ExportSweep(context.Background())
// Only the recent event's rows are left.
for _, model := range []any{
&database.Event{}, &database.Delivery{}, &database.DeliveryResult{},
} {
var count int64
require.NoError(t, db.Model(model).Count(&count).Error)
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), count, "%T rows left", model)
}
assertChainPresent(t, db, recent)
eventTotals := readEventTotals(t, db)
assert.Equal(t, database.EventTotals{
ID: eventTotals.ID, Events: n + 1, EventsRemoved: n,
}, eventTotals)
targetTotals := readTargetTotals(t, db)
assert.Equal(t, map[string]database.TargetTotals{
delivered: {
TargetID: delivered, Deliveries: n + 1, Delivered: n + 1,
DeliveriesRemoved: n,
},
failed: {
TargetID: failed, Deliveries: n, Failed: n,
DeliveriesRemoved: n, FailedRemoved: n,
},
}, targetTotals)
// A sweep with nothing left to remove changes nothing.
env.reaper.ExportSweep(context.Background())
assert.Equal(t, eventTotals, readEventTotals(t, db))
assert.Equal(t, targetTotals, readTargetTotals(t, db))
}
// TestRetentionReaper_WriteDuringPruneSucceeds verifies that a prune
// of several batches lets other writers in between its batches: an
// event stored once the first batch is deleted is stored while expired
// events are still left, not only after the prune has finished.
func TestRetentionReaper_WriteDuringPruneSucceeds(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupRetentionTest(t)
webhookID := createWebhook(t, env.mainDB.DB(), 30)
db, err := env.mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Three batches of expired events, with nothing else stored: only
// the number of batches matters here.
expired := 3 * database.ExportReapBatchSize
seedBareEvents(t, db, webhookID, expired,
time.Now().Add(-40*24*time.Hour))
cutoff := time.Now().Add(-30 * 24 * time.Hour)
countExpired := func() int64 {
var count int64
require.NoError(t, db.Model(&database.Event{}).
Where("created_at < ?", cutoff).
Count(&count).Error)
return count
}
pruned := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
defer close(pruned)
env.reaper.ExportSweep(context.Background())
}()
t.Cleanup(func() { <-pruned })
// Every stored event is expired until the write below.
require.Eventually(t, func() bool {
var count int64
err := db.Model(&database.Event{}).Count(&count).Error
return err == nil && count < int64(expired)
}, 10*time.Second, 10*time.Millisecond)
event := &database.Event{
WebhookID: webhookID,
EntrypointID: uuid.New().String(),
Method: http.MethodPost,
}
require.NoError(t, db.Create(event).Error)
assert.Positive(t, countExpired(),
"the event was stored only after the whole prune")
<-pruned
assert.Zero(t, countExpired())
var stored database.Event
require.NoError(t, db.First(&stored, "id = ?", event.ID).Error)
}
// TestRetentionReaper_StopDuringPruneLeavesTheRest verifies that
// stopping the reaper during a prune of several batches returns
// between two batches, well inside the stop timeout, leaving the
// remaining expired events for the next sweep, and that the totals
// match the rows left.
func TestRetentionReaper_StopDuringPruneLeavesTheRest(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupRetentionTest(t)
webhookID := createWebhook(t, env.mainDB.DB(), 30)
db, err := env.mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Two batches and one more of expired events, a few of them with a
// delivered and a failed delivery for the target totals to count.
// Most carry nothing else, to keep the test quick.
const withDeliveries = 10
expiredAt := time.Now().Add(-40 * 24 * time.Hour)
delivered, failed := uuid.New().String(), uuid.New().String()
seedExpiredEvents(t, db, webhookID, withDeliveries, expiredAt,
delivered, failed)
seedBareEvents(t, db, webhookID,
2*database.ExportReapBatchSize+1-withDeliveries, expiredAt)
n := int64(2*database.ExportReapBatchSize + 1)
require.NoError(t, database.AddEventTotals(db, database.EventTotals{
Events: n,
}))
require.NoError(t, database.AddTargetTotals(db, database.TargetTotals{
TargetID: delivered, Deliveries: withDeliveries,
Delivered: withDeliveries,
}))
require.NoError(t, database.AddTargetTotals(db, database.TargetTotals{
TargetID: failed, Deliveries: withDeliveries,
Failed: withDeliveries,
}))
env.reaper.ExportSetInterval(time.Millisecond)
env.reaper.ExportStart()
// Stop once the first batch is deleted. The stop lands in the pause
// after it, or at worst during the second batch, so at least the
// last event is left.
require.Eventually(t, func() bool {
var count int64
err := db.Model(&database.Event{}).Count(&count).Error
return err == nil && count < n
}, 10*time.Second, 10*time.Millisecond)
// The app's stop timeout.
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
require.NoError(t, env.reaper.ExportStop(ctx))
var events int64
require.NoError(t, db.Model(&database.Event{}).Count(&events).Error)
assert.Positive(t, events, "the stop waited for the whole prune")
eventTotals := readEventTotals(t, db)
assert.Equal(t, events, eventTotals.Events-eventTotals.EventsRemoved)
targetTotals := readTargetTotals(t, db)
require.Len(t, targetTotals, 2)
for target, totals := range targetTotals {
var deliveries, failures int64
require.NoError(t, db.Model(&database.Delivery{}).
Where("target_id = ?", target).
Count(&deliveries).Error)
require.NoError(t, db.Model(&database.Delivery{}).
Where("target_id = ? AND status = ?",
target, database.DeliveryStatusFailed).
Count(&failures).Error)
assert.Equal(t, deliveries,
totals.Deliveries-totals.DeliveriesRemoved, target)
assert.Equal(t, failures, totals.Failed-totals.FailedRemoved,
target)
}
}
internal/database/webhook_db_manager.go
+1 -15
View File
@@ -35,8 +35,7 @@ var errInvalidCachedDBType = errors.New(
// WebhookDBManager manages per-webhook SQLite database files
// for event storage. Each webhook gets its own dedicated
// database containing Events, Deliveries, DeliveryResults and the
// running totals of them (EventTotals, TargetTotals).
// database containing Events, Deliveries, and DeliveryResults.
// Database connections are opened lazily and cached.
type WebhookDBManager struct {
dataDir string
@@ -296,7 +295,6 @@ func (m *WebhookDBManager) openDB(
// Run migrations for event-tier models only
err = db.AutoMigrate(
&Event{}, &Delivery{}, &DeliveryResult{},
&EventTotals{}, &TargetTotals{},
)
if err != nil {
_ = sqlDB.Close()
@@ -307,18 +305,6 @@ func (m *WebhookDBManager) openDB(
)
}
// A new database gets its row of event totals, all zero. Target
// totals rows are created by the first delivery to each target.
err = db.FirstOrCreate(&EventTotals{}).Error
if err != nil {
_ = sqlDB.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"creating event totals for webhook database %s: %w",
webhookID, err,
)
}
m.log.Info(
"opened per-webhook database",
"webhook_id", webhookID,
internal/delivery/delivery_totals_test.go
-177
View File
@@ -1,177 +0,0 @@
package delivery_test
import (
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
// targetTotals reads one target's totals from a webhook database, all
// zero when it has no row.
func targetTotals(
t *testing.T, db *gorm.DB, targetID string,
) database.TargetTotals {
t.Helper()
var rows []database.TargetTotals
require.NoError(t, db.Where("target_id = ?", targetID).
Find(&rows).Error)
if len(rows) == 0 {
return database.TargetTotals{TargetID: targetID}
}
return rows[0]
}
// TestUpdateDeliveryStatus_FinishTimeAndTargetTotals pins what a status
// write records for the webhook page's statistics: the time a delivery
// finished, set only when it becomes delivered or failed, and one more
// on its target's delivered or failed total.
func TestUpdateDeliveryStatus_FinishTimeAndTargetTotals(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
status database.DeliveryStatus
finished bool
delivered int64
failed int64
}{
{database.DeliveryStatusRetrying, false, 0, 0},
{database.DeliveryStatusDelivered, true, 1, 0},
{database.DeliveryStatusFailed, true, 0, 1},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(string(tt.status), func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
db := testWebhookDB(t)
e := testEngine(t, 1)
event := seedEvent(t, db, `{}`)
targetID := uuid.New().String()
d := seedDelivery(
t, db, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
before := time.Now()
require.NoError(t, e.ExportUpdateDeliveryStatus(
db, &d, tt.status,
))
var stored database.Delivery
require.NoError(t, db.First(&stored, "id = ?", d.ID).Error)
assert.Equal(t, tt.status, stored.Status)
if tt.finished {
require.NotNil(t, stored.FinishedAt)
assert.False(t, stored.FinishedAt.Before(before))
} else {
assert.Nil(t, stored.FinishedAt)
}
assert.Equal(t, database.TargetTotals{
TargetID: targetID,
Delivered: tt.delivered,
Failed: tt.failed,
}, targetTotals(t, db, targetID))
})
}
}
// TestUpdateDeliveryStatus_DeletedDeliveryIsNotCounted covers a
// delivery retention deleted while the engine still held it. Failing
// it afterwards writes no row, so it adds no failure either: retention
// has already counted what it removed.
func TestUpdateDeliveryStatus_DeletedDeliveryIsNotCounted(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
db := testWebhookDB(t)
e := testEngine(t, 1)
event := seedEvent(t, db, `{}`)
targetID := uuid.New().String()
d := seedDelivery(
t, db, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
)
require.NoError(t, db.Unscoped().
Delete(&database.Delivery{}, "id = ?", d.ID).Error)
require.NoError(t, e.ExportUpdateDeliveryStatus(
db, &d, database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
))
assert.Equal(t, database.TargetTotals{TargetID: targetID},
targetTotals(t, db, targetID))
}
// TestUpdateDeliveryStatus_FinishedDeliveryIsNotSettledAgain covers a
// delivery settled a second time, as recovery can do when a worker has
// settled it since recovery read it. Neither status writes over the
// first, and the totals do not move.
func TestUpdateDeliveryStatus_FinishedDeliveryIsNotSettledAgain(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
finished := []database.DeliveryStatus{
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
}
for _, first := range finished {
t.Run(string(first), func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
db := testWebhookDB(t)
e := testEngine(t, 1)
event := seedEvent(t, db, `{}`)
targetID := uuid.New().String()
d := seedDelivery(
t, db, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
)
// The delivery as recovery read it, before the worker
// settled it.
readBefore := d
require.NoError(t, e.ExportUpdateDeliveryStatus(
db, &d, first,
))
var settled database.Delivery
require.NoError(t, db.First(&settled, "id = ?", d.ID).Error)
require.NotNil(t, settled.FinishedAt)
totals := targetTotals(t, db, targetID)
for _, again := range finished {
stale := readBefore
require.NoError(t, e.ExportUpdateDeliveryStatus(
db, &stale, again,
))
}
var stored database.Delivery
require.NoError(t, db.First(&stored, "id = ?", d.ID).Error)
assert.Equal(t, first, stored.Status)
require.NotNil(t, stored.FinishedAt)
assert.True(t, settled.FinishedAt.Equal(*stored.FinishedAt))
assert.Equal(t, totals, targetTotals(t, db, targetID))
})
}
}
internal/delivery/engine.go
+9 -65
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ import (
"go.uber.org/fx"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/globals"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/lifecycle"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/metrics"
@@ -147,10 +146,8 @@ type EngineParams struct {
DB *database.Database
DBManager *database.WebhookDBManager
Globals *globals.Globals
Logger *logger.Logger
SSRFGuard *Guard
Metrics *metrics.Set
}
// Engine processes queued deliveries in the background
@@ -170,14 +167,10 @@ type Engine struct {
retryCh chan Task
workers int
// version is the running build's version, the one the web UI
// footer shows. userAgent puts it on every outbound request.
version string
// mtr is the delivery metric set. Production wires the one
// registered on the registry /metrics serves; a test can
// substitute a set registered on a registry it holds, so it can
// gather what its own deliveries recorded.
// mtr is the delivery metric set. Production wires the
// process-wide one; a test can substitute a set registered on
// a private registry so its assertions are not disturbed by
// deliveries other tests are making at the same time.
mtr *metrics.Set
// targets maps each target type to its implementation.
@@ -211,8 +204,7 @@ func New(
deliveryCh: make(chan Task, deliveryChannelSize),
retryCh: make(chan Task, retryChannelSize),
workers: defaultWorkers,
version: params.Globals.Version,
mtr: params.Metrics,
mtr: metrics.Default(),
}
e.initTargets(&http.Client{
@@ -308,13 +300,6 @@ func (e *Engine) ScheduleRetry(
})
}
// userAgent is the User-Agent header of every http and slack
// delivery request: the program name and the running build's
// version.
func (e *Engine) userAgent() string {
return "webhooker/" + e.version
}
// registerHooks wires the engine's start and stop into the fx
// lifecycle. The start hook's context is deliberately ignored
// (see start for why the worker pool must not inherit it); the
@@ -546,11 +531,6 @@ func (e *Engine) processRetryTask(
return
}
// Set before anything below can fail the delivery: the failure is
// added to this target's totals.
d.EventID = task.EventID
d.TargetID = task.TargetID
if d.Status != database.DeliveryStatusRetrying {
e.log.Debug(
"skipping retry for delivery "+
@@ -582,6 +562,8 @@ func (e *Engine) processRetryTask(
}
target := buildTargetFromTask(task)
d.EventID = task.EventID
d.TargetID = task.TargetID
d.Event = event
d.Target = target
@@ -1572,9 +1554,8 @@ func (e *Engine) updateDeliveryStatus(
targetType database.TargetType,
status database.DeliveryStatus,
) error {
err := webhookDB.Transaction(func(tx *gorm.DB) error {
return writeDeliveryStatus(tx, d, status)
})
err := webhookDB.Model(d).
Update("status", status).Error
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf(
"updating delivery %s to status %s: %w",
@@ -1593,43 +1574,6 @@ func (e *Engine) updateDeliveryStatus(
return nil
}
// writeDeliveryStatus writes a delivery's new status. A delivery that
// becomes delivered or failed also gets the time it finished, and is
// added to its target's delivered or failed total. That write changes
// only a delivery not yet delivered or failed, and the total moves
// only when it changed a row: retention may have deleted the delivery
// while the engine was working on it, and a recovery path may settle
// a delivery that a worker has already settled.
func writeDeliveryStatus(
tx *gorm.DB,
d *database.Delivery,
status database.DeliveryStatus,
) error {
if !status.Terminal() {
return tx.Model(d).Update("status", status).Error
}
res := tx.Model(d).
Where("status NOT IN ?", []database.DeliveryStatus{
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
}).
Updates(map[string]any{
"status": status,
"finished_at": time.Now(),
})
if res.Error != nil || res.RowsAffected == 0 {
return res.Error
}
add := database.TargetTotals{TargetID: d.TargetID, Delivered: 1}
if status == database.DeliveryStatusFailed {
add = database.TargetTotals{TargetID: d.TargetID, Failed: 1}
}
return database.AddTargetTotals(tx, add)
}
// settleStatus moves a delivery to its outcome status and reports a
// failed write through bookkeepingFailed, which leaves the row
// recoverable. It exists so the target call sites read as one
internal/delivery/engine_test.go
+5 -4
View File
@@ -57,10 +57,7 @@ func testWebhookDB(t *testing.T) *gorm.DB {
&database.Event{},
&database.Delivery{},
&database.DeliveryResult{},
&database.EventTotals{},
&database.TargetTotals{},
))
require.NoError(t, db.Create(&database.EventTotals{}).Error)
return db
}
@@ -1247,6 +1244,11 @@ func TestDoHTTPRequest_ForwardsHeaders(t *testing.T) {
testContentType,
receivedHeaders.Get("Content-Type"),
)
assert.Equal(t,
"webhooker/1.0",
receivedHeaders.Get("User-Agent"),
)
}
// The event's stored inbound headers carry the same Content-Type the
@@ -1315,7 +1317,6 @@ func TestApplyRequestHeaders_SendsOneContentType(t *testing.T) {
ContentType: tc.event,
},
cfg,
"webhooker/dev",
)
assert.Equal(t,
internal/delivery/export_test.go
+11 -22
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ import (
"net/url"
"time"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus"
"go.uber.org/fx"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
@@ -41,6 +40,11 @@ const (
ExportPendingSweepMinAge = pendingSweepMinAge
)
// ExportIsBlockedIP exposes isBlockedIP for testing.
func ExportIsBlockedIP(ip net.IP) bool {
return isBlockedIP(ip)
}
// NewTestGuard builds an SSRF Guard from an explicit egress
// allowlist, without going through config. Passing no prefixes
// yields the default guard, which blocks every private/reserved
@@ -66,11 +70,6 @@ func ExportBlockedNetworks() []*net.IPNet {
return blockedNetworks
}
// ExportBlockedPublicNetworks exposes blockedPublicNetworks.
func ExportBlockedPublicNetworks() []*net.IPNet {
return blockedPublicNetworks
}
// ExportIsForwardableHeader exposes isForwardableHeader.
func ExportIsForwardableHeader(name string) bool {
return isForwardableHeader(name)
@@ -83,9 +82,8 @@ func ExportApplyRequestHeaders(
req *http.Request,
event *database.Event,
cfg *HTTPTargetConfig,
userAgent string,
) []string {
return applyRequestHeaders(req, event, cfg, userAgent)
return applyRequestHeaders(req, event, cfg)
}
// ExportTruncate exposes truncate for testing.
@@ -152,16 +150,6 @@ func (e *Engine) ExportDeliverSlack(
)
}
// ExportUpdateDeliveryStatus exposes updateDeliveryStatus. It passes no
// target type, so no metric moves.
func (e *Engine) ExportUpdateDeliveryStatus(
webhookDB *gorm.DB,
d *database.Delivery,
status database.DeliveryStatus,
) error {
return e.updateDeliveryStatus(webhookDB, d, "", status)
}
// ExportProcessNewTask exposes processNewTask.
func (e *Engine) ExportProcessNewTask(
ctx context.Context, task *Task,
@@ -401,7 +389,7 @@ func NewTestEngine(
deliveryCh: make(chan Task, deliveryChannelSize),
retryCh: make(chan Task, retryChannelSize),
workers: workers,
mtr: metrics.New(prometheus.NewRegistry()),
mtr: metrics.Default(),
}
e.initTargets(client)
@@ -416,7 +404,7 @@ func NewTestEngineSmallRetry(
e := &Engine{
log: log,
retryCh: make(chan Task, 1),
mtr: metrics.New(prometheus.NewRegistry()),
mtr: metrics.Default(),
}
e.initTargets(nil)
@@ -439,7 +427,7 @@ func NewTestEngineWithDB(
deliveryCh: make(chan Task, deliveryChannelSize),
retryCh: make(chan Task, retryChannelSize),
workers: workers,
mtr: metrics.New(prometheus.NewRegistry()),
mtr: metrics.Default(),
}
e.initTargets(client)
@@ -447,7 +435,8 @@ func NewTestEngineWithDB(
}
// ExportSetMetrics substitutes the engine's metric set, so a test can
// assert on collectors registered on a registry it holds.
// assert on collectors registered on a private registry instead of
// the process-wide ones every other test is also moving.
func (e *Engine) ExportSetMetrics(mtr *metrics.Set) {
e.mtr = mtr
}
internal/delivery/metrics_test.go
+3 -2
View File
@@ -35,8 +35,9 @@ const (
)
// mIsolate gives the setup's engine a metric set registered on a
// registry this test holds, so its exact assertions can gather from
// it.
// private registry. The process-wide collectors are moved by every
// other delivery test running in parallel, so exact assertions are
// only possible against a registry this test owns.
func mIsolate(
t *testing.T, s iSetup,
) *prometheus.Registry {
internal/delivery/redirect_test.go
-1
View File
@@ -375,7 +375,6 @@ func TestApplyRequestHeaders_ReportsOriginScopedNames(t *testing.T) {
"Content-Type": testContentType,
},
},
"webhooker/dev",
)
assert.Equal(t,
internal/delivery/ssrf.go
+19 -47
View File
@@ -25,16 +25,8 @@ var (
errNoIPs = errors.New(
"hostname resolved to no IP addresses",
)
// ErrBlockedPrivateOrReservedIP reports an address in the
// default blocklist's private and reserved ranges,
// blockedNetworks.
ErrBlockedPrivateOrReservedIP = errors.New(
"blocked private or reserved address",
)
// errBlockedPublicMetadata reports a public address on the
// default blocklist, one in blockedPublicNetworks.
errBlockedPublicMetadata = errors.New(
"blocked cloud metadata address",
errBlockedIP = errors.New(
"blocked private, reserved or cloud metadata address",
)
errBlockedMetadata = errors.New(
"blocked link-local or cloud instance metadata " +
@@ -45,32 +37,15 @@ var (
)
)
// blockedNetworks and blockedPublicNetworks together are the
// default blocklist: the private and reserved IP ranges, plus
// the public cloud metadata addresses, that are blocked to
// prevent SSRF attacks. An operator can permit specific blocks
// out of this set with ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS; see Guard.
//
// blockedNetworks holds the private and reserved IP ranges.
// blockedNetworks is the default blocklist: the private and
// reserved IP ranges, plus the public cloud metadata addresses,
// that are blocked to prevent SSRF attacks. An operator can
// permit specific blocks out of this set with
// ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS; see Guard.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // package-level network list is appropriate here
var blockedNetworks []*net.IPNet
// blockedPublicNetworks holds the default blocklist's public
// addresses, kept apart from blockedNetworks so that they are
// refused as cloud metadata addresses, never as private or
// reserved ones.
//
// A public address belongs on the default blocklist only if it
// hands credentials, user data or bootstrap material to whatever
// can reach it, without the caller presenting anything; it goes
// in this list. A provider's other public addresses are not
// refused, since reaching them can be legitimate and no list of
// them could be complete.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // package-level network list is appropriate here
var blockedPublicNetworks []*net.IPNet
// alwaysBlockedNetworks are the ranges no configuration can
// open: the link-local blocks and the cloud instance metadata
// endpoints that live outside them. Reaching one is credential
@@ -106,8 +81,8 @@ var blockedPublicNetworks []*net.IPNet
// when it clears both halves. Nothing in this list can be
// reopened, so putting a public address here leaves the operator
// no escape hatch at all — the condition ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS
// exists to remove. Default-block it in blockedPublicNetworks
// instead, which an allowlist can override.
// exists to remove. Default-block it in blockedNetworks instead,
// which an allowlist can override.
//
// This is a criterion, not an enumeration of every metadata
// address in existence.
@@ -148,9 +123,6 @@ func init() {
"::1/128",
"fc00::/7",
"fe80::/10",
})
blockedPublicNetworks = mustParseCIDRs([]string{
// Azure WireServer, a public address that serves VM credentials.
"168.63.129.16/32",
})
@@ -246,6 +218,13 @@ func matchesAny(networks []*net.IPNet, ip net.IP) bool {
return false
}
// isBlockedIP checks whether an IP address falls within
// the default blocklist, before any operator allowlist is
// considered.
func isBlockedIP(ip net.IP) bool {
return matchesAny(blockedNetworks, ip)
}
// Guard makes every SSRF decision in the process.
//
// It holds the operator's ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS allowlist and
@@ -346,8 +325,7 @@ func (g *Guard) allows(ip net.IP) bool {
// consulted, so no configured CIDR reaches link-local or a
// cloud metadata endpoint at a non-public address.
// 2. The allowlist is consulted next, so a listed private
// network, or a listed public address on the default
// blocklist, becomes reachable.
// network becomes reachable.
// 3. Everything else keeps the default blocklist's answer.
func (g *Guard) checkIP(ip net.IP) error {
if matchesAny(alwaysBlockedNetworks, ip) {
@@ -360,15 +338,9 @@ func (g *Guard) checkIP(ip net.IP) error {
return nil
}
if matchesAny(blockedNetworks, ip) {
if isBlockedIP(ip) {
return fmt.Errorf(
"target IP %s: %w", ip, ErrBlockedPrivateOrReservedIP,
)
}
if matchesAny(blockedPublicNetworks, ip) {
return fmt.Errorf(
"target IP %s: %w", ip, errBlockedPublicMetadata,
"target IP %s: %w", ip, errBlockedIP,
)
}
internal/delivery/ssrf_allowlist_test.go
+2 -93
View File
@@ -23,10 +23,6 @@ const (
metadataIP = "169.254.169.254"
metadataURL = "http://" + metadataIP + "/latest/meta-data/"
// linkLocalIPv4 is the IPv4 link-local block, which holds
// metadataIP.
linkLocalIPv4 = "169.254.0.0/16"
// loopbackHookURL is a target on this host: blocked by
// default, reachable only once an operator allowlists
// loopback.
@@ -241,7 +237,7 @@ func linkLocalRefusedCases() []metadataAlwaysRefusedCase {
},
{
name: "whole link-local block",
allow: linkLocalIPv4,
allow: "169.254.0.0/16",
target: metadataURL,
},
{
@@ -416,9 +412,6 @@ func TestGuardAllowlist_AzureWireServerReopenable(t *testing.T) {
"WireServer must be refused by the default blocklist, "+
"which an allowlist can override",
)
require.NotErrorIs(t, err, delivery.ErrBlockedPrivateOrReservedIP,
"WireServer is public, not private or reserved",
)
assertDialRefused(t, defaultGuard, target)
@@ -503,7 +496,7 @@ func TestAlwaysBlockedNetworks_PinnedSet(t *testing.T) {
want := []string{
// IPv4 link-local: the 169.254.169.254 metadata
// service on AWS, Azure and others.
linkLocalIPv4,
"169.254.0.0/16",
// IPv6 link-local.
"fe80::/10",
// AWS IPv6 IMDS, inside the ULA space an operator may
@@ -533,90 +526,6 @@ func TestAlwaysBlockedNetworks_PinnedSet(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, want, got)
}
// TestDefaultBlocklist_PinnedSet pins each list of the default
// blocklist on its own, the private and reserved ranges in
// blockedNetworks and the public addresses in
// blockedPublicNetworks, so moving an entry from one list to the
// other fails it. For the first address of each entry it then
// checks that the default guard refuses it, and that listing the
// entry in ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS opens it unless the unconditional
// set holds that address.
func TestDefaultBlocklist_PinnedSet(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// public marks an entry of blockedPublicNetworks; every other
// entry belongs in blockedNetworks.
tests := []struct {
cidr string
public bool
reopenable bool
}{
{cidr: "127.0.0.0/8", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "10.0.0.0/8", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "172.16.0.0/12", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "192.168.0.0/16", reopenable: true},
{cidr: linkLocalIPv4, reopenable: false},
{cidr: "0.0.0.0/8", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "100.64.0.0/10", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "192.0.0.0/24", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "192.0.2.0/24", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "198.18.0.0/15", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "198.51.100.0/24", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "203.0.113.0/24", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "224.0.0.0/4", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "240.0.0.0/4", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "::1/128", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "fc00::/7", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "fe80::/10", reopenable: false},
{cidr: "168.63.129.16/32", public: true, reopenable: true},
}
wantPrivate := make([]string, 0, len(tests))
wantPublic := make([]string, 0, len(tests))
for _, tt := range tests {
if tt.public {
wantPublic = append(wantPublic, tt.cidr)
} else {
wantPrivate = append(wantPrivate, tt.cidr)
}
}
gotPrivate := make([]string, 0, len(tests))
for _, n := range delivery.ExportBlockedNetworks() {
gotPrivate = append(gotPrivate, n.String())
}
gotPublic := make([]string, 0, len(tests))
for _, n := range delivery.ExportBlockedPublicNetworks() {
gotPublic = append(gotPublic, n.String())
}
assert.ElementsMatch(t, wantPrivate, gotPrivate, "blockedNetworks")
assert.ElementsMatch(t, wantPublic, gotPublic, "blockedPublicNetworks")
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.cidr, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
prefix := netip.MustParsePrefix(tt.cidr)
ip := net.IP(prefix.Addr().AsSlice())
require.Error(t,
delivery.NewTestGuard().ExportCheckIP(ip),
"the default guard must refuse %s", ip,
)
err := delivery.NewTestGuard(prefix).ExportCheckIP(ip)
if tt.reopenable {
assert.NoError(t, err, "listing %s must open it", tt.cidr)
} else {
assert.Error(t, err, "listing %s must not open it", tt.cidr)
}
})
}
}
// requireLoopback fails the test unless rawURL's host is a
// loopback address, so the allowlist test cannot silently stop
// exercising a blocked range.
internal/delivery/ssrf_test.go
+4 -6
View File
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
)
func TestGuardCheckIP_PrivateRanges(t *testing.T) {
func TestIsBlockedIP_PrivateRanges(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
@@ -56,14 +56,12 @@ func TestGuardCheckIP_PrivateRanges(t *testing.T) {
"failed to parse IP %s", tt.ip,
)
refused := delivery.NewTestGuard().ExportCheckIP(ip) != nil
assert.Equal(t,
tt.blocked,
refused,
"default guard refuses %s = %v, want %v",
delivery.ExportIsBlockedIP(ip),
"isBlockedIP(%s) = %v, want %v",
tt.ip,
refused,
delivery.ExportIsBlockedIP(ip),
tt.blocked,
)
})
internal/delivery/target_http.go
+2 -7
View File
@@ -442,9 +442,7 @@ func (t *httpTarget) doHTTPRequest(
)
}
originScoped := applyRequestHeaders(
req, event, cfg, t.eng.userAgent(),
)
originScoped := applyRequestHeaders(req, event, cfg)
client := t.clientForRequest(cfg, originScoped)
@@ -564,13 +562,10 @@ func isForwardableHeader(name string) bool {
// Content-Type goes out once: a Content-Type configured on the target
// wins, otherwise the event's ContentType, otherwise none. The inbound
// Content-Type in the event's headers is never forwarded.
//
// userAgent is set last, over any configured or inbound User-Agent.
func applyRequestHeaders(
req *http.Request,
event *database.Event,
cfg *HTTPTargetConfig,
userAgent string,
) []string {
if event.ContentType != "" {
req.Header.Set(
@@ -585,7 +580,7 @@ func applyRequestHeaders(
originScoped[http.CanonicalHeaderKey(k)] = struct{}{}
}
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", userAgent)
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "webhooker/1.0")
// A Content-Type configured on the target describes the body
// being sent rather than the sender. A 307/308 preserves the
internal/delivery/target_slack.go
+1 -1
View File
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ func (t *slackTarget) attempt(
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", t.eng.userAgent())
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "webhooker/1.0")
resp, doErr := executeHTTPRequest(t.client, req)
durationMs := time.Since(start).Milliseconds()
internal/delivery/terminal_state_test.go
-32
View File
@@ -418,38 +418,6 @@ func TestProcessRetryTask_TargetDeleted_MakesNoAttempt(
assert.Zero(t, s.Engine.ExportInflightHeld())
}
// TestProcessRetryTask_TargetDeleted_CountsFailureOnTarget verifies
// that the failure of a retry abandoned because its target is gone is
// added to that target's own totals, not to a row with no target.
func TestProcessRetryTask_TargetDeleted_CountsFailureOnTarget(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
var hits atomic.Int64
task, targetID := tRetryChainSetup(
t, s, "gone-counted", &hits,
)
require.NoError(t, s.MainDB.Delete(
&database.Target{}, "id = ?", targetID,
).Error)
s.Engine.ExportProcessRetryTask(
context.Background(), &task,
)
var rows []database.TargetTotals
require.NoError(t, s.WebhookDB.Find(&rows).Error)
assert.Equal(t, []database.TargetTotals{
{TargetID: targetID, Failed: 1},
}, rows)
}
// TestProcessRetryTask_TargetPresent_StillDelivers is the guard's
// mutation check: a liveness check that refused every retry would pass
// the test above and break every retry there is.
internal/delivery/user_agent_test.go
-91
View File
@@ -1,91 +0,0 @@
package delivery_test
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/netip"
"testing"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"go.uber.org/fx/fxtest"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/globals"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/metrics"
)
// Both the http and the slack target send webhooker/ and the version
// in Globals, the value the web UI footer shows. A User-Agent
// configured on the target or carried in by the sender does not
// replace it.
func TestUserAgent_IsTheBuildVersion(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const want = "webhooker/1.2.3-test"
userAgents := make(chan string, 1)
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
userAgents <- r.Header.Get("User-Agent")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
},
))
defer ts.Close()
g := &globals.Globals{Version: "1.2.3-test"}
lc := fxtest.NewLifecycle(t)
log, err := logger.New(lc, logger.LoggerParams{Globals: g})
require.NoError(t, err)
e := delivery.New(lc, delivery.EngineParams{
Globals: g,
Logger: log,
// httptest listens on loopback, which the default guard
// refuses.
SSRFGuard: delivery.NewTestGuard(
netip.MustParsePrefix("127.0.0.0/8"),
),
Metrics: metrics.New(prometheus.NewRegistry()),
})
statusCode, _, _, err := e.ExportDoHTTPRequest(
context.Background(),
&delivery.HTTPTargetConfig{
URL: ts.URL,
Headers: map[string]string{"User-Agent": "configured/1"},
},
&database.Event{Headers: `{"User-Agent":["curl/8"]}`},
)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, statusCode)
require.Len(t, userAgents, 1, "the http target sent no request")
assert.Equal(t, want, <-userAgents, "http target")
db := testWebhookDB(t)
targetID := uuid.New().String()
slackCfg, err := json.Marshal(
delivery.SlackTargetConfig{WebhookURL: ts.URL},
)
require.NoError(t, err)
event := seedEvent(t, db, `{"action":"test"}`)
dlv := seedDelivery(
t, db, event.ID, targetID, database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
e.ExportDeliverSlack(context.Background(), db, buildSlackDelivery(
dlv, event, targetID, "test-slack", string(slackCfg),
))
require.Len(t, userAgents, 1, "the slack target sent no request")
assert.Equal(t, want, <-userAgents, "slack target")
}
internal/gormlog/gormlog.go
+1 -1
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
// SQL — parameters and all — for every statement that returns an
// error, including gorm.ErrRecordNotFound. Two of this service's
// lookups miss by design on unauthenticated routes: the entrypoint
// lookup on /h/{uuid}, whose path segment the client picks
// lookup on /webhook/{uuid}, whose path segment the client picks
// outright, and the user lookup behind the login form, whose username
// the client picks outright. Under the default logger each of those
// misses printed an unbounded, attacker-chosen string, at no level the
internal/handlers/auth.go
+31 -62
View File
@@ -2,56 +2,19 @@ package handlers
import (
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strconv"
"strings"
"unicode"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logfield"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
)
// loginDestination returns where a successful login sends the
// browser: next when it is a path on this site, otherwise "/", which
// leads to the webhook list.
//
// A browser reads "//host" as another site, reads "\" as "/", and
// drops tabs and newlines before reading at all. So the value must
// start with exactly one "/" and hold no "\" or control character
// anywhere: http.Redirect cleans "/a/../\host" down to "/\host". It
// is checked after percent-decoding, so an encoded form of any of
// these is refused too.
func loginDestination(next string) string {
if len(next) > middleware.MaxNextBytes {
return "/"
}
decoded, err := url.PathUnescape(next)
if err != nil ||
!strings.HasPrefix(decoded, "/") ||
strings.HasPrefix(decoded, "//") ||
strings.Contains(decoded, `\`) ||
strings.ContainsFunc(decoded, unicode.IsControl) {
return "/"
}
return next
}
// HandleLoginPage returns a handler for the login page (GET)
func (h *Handlers) HandleLoginPage() http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
next := loginDestination(
r.URL.Query().Get(middleware.NextParam),
)
// Check if already logged in
sess, err := h.session.Get(r)
if err == nil && h.session.IsAuthenticated(sess) {
http.Redirect( //nolint:gosec // checked by loginDestination
w, r, next, http.StatusSeeOther,
)
http.Redirect(w, r, "/", http.StatusSeeOther)
return
}
@@ -59,7 +22,6 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleLoginPage() http.HandlerFunc {
// Render login page
data := map[string]any{
tmplKeyError: "",
tmplKeyNext: next,
}
h.renderTemplate(w, r, "login.html", data)
@@ -74,7 +36,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleLoginSubmit() http.HandlerFunc {
err := r.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
h.log.Error("failed to parse form", "error", err)
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest)
http.Error(w, "Bad request", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
@@ -115,13 +77,8 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleLoginSubmit() http.HandlerFunc {
"user_id", user.ID,
)
// The form value is the client's to set, so it is checked
// again here rather than trusted from the rendered page.
http.Redirect( //nolint:gosec // checked by loginDestination
w, r,
loginDestination(r.PostFormValue(middleware.NextParam)),
http.StatusSeeOther,
)
// Redirect to home page
http.Redirect(w, r, "/", http.StatusSeeOther)
}
}
@@ -134,9 +91,6 @@ func (h *Handlers) renderLoginError(
) {
data := map[string]any{
tmplKeyError: msg,
tmplKeyNext: loginDestination(
r.PostFormValue(middleware.NextParam),
),
}
w.WriteHeader(status)
@@ -149,10 +103,9 @@ func (h *Handlers) renderLoginError(
// The credential check runs BEFORE any rate-limit budget is
// consulted, and only a failed check spends budget. That is what
// keeps the single administrative path reachable: behind the reverse
// proxy this deployment requires, when TRUSTED_PROXIES does not cover
// it, every client shares one bucket, so a limiter spent on arrival
// lets any stranger deny the operator's own correct password
// indefinitely.
// proxy this deployment requires, with TRUSTED_PROXIES unset, every
// client shares one bucket, so a limiter spent on arrival lets any
// stranger deny the operator's own correct password indefinitely.
//
// Verifying first means every login POST costs an Argon2id hash, so
// the work is taken under a bounded number of verification slots.
@@ -212,7 +165,11 @@ func (h *Handlers) authenticateUser(
valid, err := database.VerifyPassword(password, user.Password)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to verify password", err)
h.log.Error("failed to verify password", "error", err)
http.Error(
w, "Internal server error",
http.StatusInternalServerError,
)
return user, err
}
@@ -284,14 +241,24 @@ func (h *Handlers) createAuthenticatedSession(
) error {
oldSess, err := h.session.Get(r)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to get session", err)
h.log.Error("failed to get session", "error", err)
http.Error(
w, "Internal server error",
http.StatusInternalServerError,
)
return err
}
sess, err := h.session.Regenerate(r, w, oldSess)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to regenerate session", err)
h.log.Error(
"failed to regenerate session", "error", err,
)
http.Error(
w, "Internal server error",
http.StatusInternalServerError,
)
return err
}
@@ -300,7 +267,11 @@ func (h *Handlers) createAuthenticatedSession(
err = h.session.Save(r, w, sess)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to save session", err)
h.log.Error("failed to save session", "error", err)
http.Error(
w, "Internal server error",
http.StatusInternalServerError,
)
return err
}
@@ -333,9 +304,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleLogout() http.HandlerFunc {
)
}
http.Redirect(
w, r, withNotice("/pages/login", signedOut),
http.StatusSeeOther,
)
// Redirect to login page
http.Redirect(w, r, "/pages/login", http.StatusSeeOther)
}
}
internal/handlers/auth_test.go
+6 -232
View File
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ const (
// sharedProxyPeer is the whole point of this file. Production is
// required to run behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy, and
// when TRUSTED_PROXIES does not cover it every client — attacker
// TRUSTED_PROXIES defaults to empty, so every client — attacker
// and operator alike — reaches the process from the proxy's
// address and shares one rate-limit bucket. Both parties in
// these tests therefore use the same RemoteAddr.
@@ -115,11 +115,11 @@ func floodFailures(
// done-criterion of https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/150.
//
// The attacker and the operator share one rate-limit bucket, because
// behind the mandated reverse proxy, when TRUSTED_PROXIES does not
// cover it, every client keys on the proxy's address. The attacker
// floods the operator's own username — a single-admin product has a
// predictable one — far past the failure limit. The operator must
// still be able to log in with the correct password.
// behind the mandated reverse proxy with TRUSTED_PROXIES unset every
// client keys on the proxy's address. The attacker floods the
// operator's own username — a single-admin product has a predictable
// one — far past the failure limit. The operator must still be able
// to log in with the correct password.
//
// This fails if credentials stop being verified ahead of the limiter.
func TestLogin_StrangersFloodCannotLockOutTheOperator(t *testing.T) {
@@ -453,229 +453,3 @@ func TestLogin_SuccessCreatesSession(t *testing.T) {
"the issued cookie must carry an authenticated session",
)
}
// TestLogin_ReturnsOnlyToAPathOnThisSite is the security half of
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/384: the page a login
// returns to is client-chosen, so anything that is not a path on this
// site, plain or percent-encoded, must land on "/", the webhook list.
func TestLogin_ReturnsOnlyToAPathOnThisSite(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
db *database.Database
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &db)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
seedOperator(t, db)
cases := []struct{ next, want string }{
{"/hook/abc/events?page=2", "/hook/abc/events?page=2"},
{"", "/"},
{"https://evil.example/", "/"},
{"https%3A%2F%2Fevil.example%2F", "/"},
{"//evil.example/", "/"},
{"%2F%2Fevil.example/", "/"},
{"/%2Fevil.example/", "/"},
{`/\evil.example/`, "/"},
{"%2F%5Cevil.example/", "/"},
{"/%5Cevil.example/", "/"},
{`/a/../\evil.example/`, "/"},
{"/\t/evil.example/", "/"},
{"/%09/evil.example/", "/"},
{"/\n/evil.example/", "/"},
{"/%0A/evil.example/", "/"},
{"/\r/evil.example/", "/"},
{"/%0D/evil.example/", "/"},
{"/%00/evil.example/", "/"},
{"/%7F/evil.example/", "/"},
{"%252F%252Fevil.example/", "/"},
{"https%253A%252F%252Fevil.example%252F", "/"},
{"/" + strings.Repeat("a", 4096), "/"},
}
for _, c := range cases {
form := url.Values{}
form.Set("username", operatorUser)
form.Set("password", operatorPassword)
form.Set("next", c.next)
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(),
http.MethodPost,
"/pages/login",
strings.NewReader(form.Encode()),
)
req.Header.Set(
"Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
)
req.RemoteAddr = sharedProxyPeer
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.HandleLoginSubmit().ServeHTTP(w, req)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code, "next %q", c.next)
assert.Equal(
t, c.want, w.Header().Get("Location"), "next %q", c.next,
)
}
}
// TestLogin_WrongPasswordKeepsTheRequestedPage: after a wrong
// password the login page is shown again with the same next, so the
// next attempt still returns to the page that was asked for.
func TestLogin_WrongPasswordKeepsTheRequestedPage(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
db *database.Database
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &db)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
seedOperator(t, db)
form := url.Values{}
form.Set("username", operatorUser)
form.Set("password", "wrong")
form.Set("next", "/hook/abc")
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(),
http.MethodPost,
"/pages/login",
strings.NewReader(form.Encode()),
)
req.Header.Set(
"Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
)
req.RemoteAddr = sharedProxyPeer
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.HandleLoginSubmit().ServeHTTP(w, req)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, w.Code)
assert.Contains(
t, w.Body.String(), `name="next" value="/hook/abc"`,
)
}
// loginPageGet renders the login page as a GET with the given next
// value and cookies.
func loginPageGet(
h *handlers.Handlers, next string, cookies []*http.Cookie,
) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(), http.MethodGet,
"/pages/login?"+url.Values{"next": {next}}.Encode(), nil,
)
for _, c := range cookies {
req.AddCookie(c)
}
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.HandleLoginPage().ServeHTTP(w, req)
return w
}
// TestLoginPage_CarriesOnlyAPathOnThisSite covers the login page
// itself: its form carries the requested page only when it is a path
// on this site, and a browser already logged in goes straight there,
// or to "/" when it is not.
func TestLoginPage_CarriesOnlyAPathOnThisSite(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
sess *session.Session
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
assert.Contains(
t, loginPageGet(h, "/hook/abc", nil).Body.String(),
`name="next" value="/hook/abc"`,
)
assert.Contains(
t, loginPageGet(h, "//evil.example/", nil).Body.String(),
`name="next" value="/"`,
)
cookies := authenticatedCookies(t, sess, "test-user-id", "testuser")
cases := []struct{ next, want string }{
{"/hook/abc", "/hook/abc"},
{"//evil.example/", "/"},
{`/\evil.example/`, "/"},
}
for _, c := range cases {
w := loginPageGet(h, c.next, cookies)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code, "next %q", c.next)
assert.Equal(
t, c.want, w.Header().Get("Location"), "next %q", c.next,
)
}
}
// TestLoginPage_HasNoLinkToItself: the navigation bar on the login
// page offers no link to the login page.
func TestLoginPage_HasNoLinkToItself(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var h *handlers.Handlers
app := newTestApp(t, &h)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
w := loginPageGet(h, "", nil)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
assert.NotContains(t, w.Body.String(), `href="/pages/login"`)
}
// TestLogin_UsernameAtLimitCanLogIn shows that a username of exactly
// database.MaxUsernameBytes still fits in the session cookie. Past
// what the cookie can carry, a correct login answers 500.
func TestLogin_UsernameAtLimitCanLogIn(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
db *database.Database
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &db)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
username := strings.Repeat("a", database.MaxUsernameBytes)
hash, err := database.HashPassword(operatorPassword)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, db.DB().Create(&database.User{
Username: username,
Password: hash,
}).Error)
w := submitLogin(h, sharedProxyPeer, username, operatorPassword)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
}
internal/handlers/delivery_replay.go
+67 -39
View File
@@ -11,37 +11,72 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
)
// The outcomes of a replay POST, as the notice codes its redirect
// carries. noticeFor holds the line each one shows.
// replayOutcomeParam is the query parameter the replay POST redirects
// with and the event log page reads its banner from.
const replayOutcomeParam = "replay"
// replayOutcomeCode is the outcome of a replay POST. The redirect
// carries one of these fixed codes rather than a message, so nothing a
// client submits can reach the rendered page through it.
type replayOutcomeCode string
const (
// replayQueued reports that a new delivery was created and handed
// to the delivery engine.
replayQueued noticeCode = "replay-queued"
replayQueued replayOutcomeCode = "queued"
// replayTargetDeleted reports a target that once existed and has
// since been deleted. Deletes are soft and deliveries carry no
// foreign key to the target row, so the history survives its
// target and this is the ordinary case for an old event.
replayTargetDeleted noticeCode = "replay-target-deleted"
replayTargetDeleted replayOutcomeCode = "target-deleted"
// replayTargetMissing reports a target id that names no row at
// all, deleted or otherwise.
replayTargetMissing noticeCode = "replay-target-missing"
replayTargetMissing replayOutcomeCode = "target-missing"
// replayTargetInactive reports a target the operator has
// deactivated. A deactivated target receives no new deliveries, so
// a replay to it would be a delivery they switched off.
replayTargetInactive noticeCode = "replay-target-inactive"
replayTargetInactive replayOutcomeCode = "target-inactive"
// replayNotTerminal reports a delivery the engine has not finished
// with.
replayNotTerminal noticeCode = "replay-not-terminal"
replayNotTerminal replayOutcomeCode = "not-terminal"
// replayInFlight reports that an earlier replay of this event to
// this target is still running.
replayInFlight noticeCode = "replay-in-flight"
replayInFlight replayOutcomeCode = "in-flight"
)
// replayOutcome returns the banner the event log page shows for an
// outcome code, and whether the replay was queued. An unrecognised
// code yields no banner.
func replayOutcome(code string) (string, bool) {
switch replayOutcomeCode(code) {
case replayQueued:
return "Replay queued: a new delivery was created against " +
"the target's current configuration.", true
case replayTargetDeleted:
return "Not replayed: the target this delivery was for has " +
"been deleted. Recreate the target, then replay.", false
case replayTargetMissing:
return "Not replayed: the target this delivery was for no " +
"longer exists.", false
case replayTargetInactive:
return "Not replayed: the target this delivery was for is " +
"deactivated. Activate it, then replay.", false
case replayNotTerminal:
return "Not replayed: this delivery has not finished yet.",
false
case replayInFlight:
return "Not replayed: a delivery of this event to this " +
"target is already in flight.", false
default:
return "", false
}
}
// HandleDeliveryReplay re-sends a finished delivery's event to its
// target.
//
@@ -70,7 +105,9 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleDeliveryReplay() http.HandlerFunc {
// middleware, which runs before CSRF parses the form.
err := r.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest)
http.Error(
w, "Bad request", http.StatusBadRequest,
)
return
}
@@ -87,14 +124,14 @@ func (h *Handlers) replayDelivery(
webhook database.Webhook,
) {
if !h.dbMgr.DBExists(webhook.ID) {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusNotFound)
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
webhookDB, err := h.dbMgr.GetDB(webhook.ID)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to get webhook database", err)
h.serverError(w, "failed to get webhook database", err)
return
}
@@ -105,14 +142,14 @@ func (h *Handlers) replayDelivery(
}
if !original.Status.Terminal() {
redirectToEventLog(w, r, webhook, replayNotTerminal)
h.finishReplay(w, r, webhook, replayNotTerminal)
return
}
target, code := h.replayTarget(webhook.ID, original.TargetID)
if target == nil {
redirectToEventLog(w, r, webhook, code)
h.finishReplay(w, r, webhook, code)
return
}
@@ -136,7 +173,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) loadReplaySource(
&original, "id = ?", chi.URLParam(r, "deliveryID"),
).Error
if err != nil {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusNotFound)
http.NotFound(w, r)
return nil, false
}
@@ -158,14 +195,14 @@ func (h *Handlers) queueReplay(
)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(
w, r, "failed to count in-flight deliveries", err,
w, "failed to count in-flight deliveries", err,
)
return
}
if inFlight > 0 {
redirectToEventLog(w, r, webhook, replayInFlight)
h.finishReplay(w, r, webhook, replayInFlight)
return
}
@@ -175,7 +212,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) queueReplay(
err = webhookDB.
First(&event, "id = ?", original.EventID).Error
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to load event for replay", err)
h.serverError(w, "failed to load event for replay", err)
return
}
@@ -185,7 +222,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) queueReplay(
)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(
w, r, "failed to create replay delivery", err,
w, "failed to create replay delivery", err,
)
return
@@ -203,7 +240,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) queueReplay(
"delivery_id", task.DeliveryID,
)
redirectToEventLog(w, r, webhook, replayQueued)
h.finishReplay(w, r, webhook, replayQueued)
}
// replayTarget loads the delivery's target as it stands now.
@@ -216,7 +253,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) queueReplay(
// with the returned code saying why.
func (h *Handlers) replayTarget(
webhookID, targetID string,
) (*database.Target, noticeCode) {
) (*database.Target, replayOutcomeCode) {
var target database.Target
err := h.db.DB().Unscoped().Where(
@@ -262,9 +299,8 @@ func countInFlightDeliveries(
return count, err
}
// createReplayDelivery writes the new pending delivery row, adds it to
// its target's totals in the same transaction, and returns the task
// that carries it to the delivery engine.
// createReplayDelivery writes the new pending delivery row and returns
// the task that carries it to the delivery engine.
//
// The row is written with associations omitted, and neither Event nor
// Target is populated on it: GORM's SaveBeforeAssociations would
@@ -283,16 +319,7 @@ func createReplayDelivery(
Status: database.DeliveryStatusPending,
}
err := webhookDB.Transaction(func(tx *gorm.DB) error {
err := tx.Omit(clause.Associations).Create(dlv).Error
if err != nil {
return err
}
return database.AddTargetTotals(tx, database.TargetTotals{
TargetID: dlv.TargetID, Deliveries: 1,
})
})
err := webhookDB.Omit(clause.Associations).Create(dlv).Error
if err != nil {
return delivery.Task{}, err
}
@@ -326,16 +353,17 @@ func replayBody(body string) *string {
return &body
}
// redirectToEventLog redirects a replay or resubmit back to the event
// log it was triggered from, carrying the outcome as its notice and
// the page number the form submitted.
func redirectToEventLog(
// finishReplay redirects back to the event log the replay was
// triggered from, carrying the outcome code the page turns into a
// banner and the page number the form submitted.
func (h *Handlers) finishReplay(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
webhook database.Webhook,
code noticeCode,
code replayOutcomeCode,
) {
dest := withNotice("/hook/"+webhook.ID+"/events", code)
dest := "/source/" + webhook.ID + "/logs?" +
replayOutcomeParam + "=" + string(code)
// The page is read from the form rather than the query string:
// this is a POST, and its query string is what logs and Referer
internal/handlers/delivery_replay_test.go
+10 -10
View File
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ func postReplay(
t.Helper()
req := postRequest(
"/hook/"+webhookID+"/deliveries/"+
"/source/"+webhookID+"/deliveries/"+
deliveryID+"/replay",
authenticatedCookies(
t, sess, deleteTestUserID, deleteTestUsername,
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ func TestHandleDeliveryReplay_AppendsDeliveryAndLeavesOriginal(
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(
t,
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/events?notice=replay-queued",
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/logs?replay=queued",
w.Header().Get("Location"),
)
@@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ func TestHandleDeliveryReplay_RefusesDeletedTarget(t *testing.T) {
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(
t,
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/events?notice=replay-target-deleted",
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/logs?replay=target-deleted",
w.Header().Get("Location"),
)
@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ func TestHandleDeliveryReplay_RefusesDeletedTarget(t *testing.T) {
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, missing.Code)
assert.Equal(
t,
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/events?notice=replay-target-missing",
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/logs?replay=target-missing",
missing.Header().Get("Location"),
)
}
@@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ func TestHandleDeliveryReplay_RefusesWhileEarlierReplayInFlight(
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, first.Code)
require.Equal(
t,
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/events?notice=replay-queued",
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/logs?replay=queued",
first.Header().Get("Location"),
)
@@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ func TestHandleDeliveryReplay_RefusesWhileEarlierReplayInFlight(
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, second.Code)
assert.Equal(
t,
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/events?notice=replay-in-flight",
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/logs?replay=in-flight",
second.Header().Get("Location"),
)
@@ -465,7 +465,7 @@ func TestHandleDeliveryReplay_RefusesWhileEarlierReplayInFlight(
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, pending.Code)
assert.Equal(
t,
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/events?notice=replay-not-terminal",
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/logs?replay=not-terminal",
pending.Header().Get("Location"),
)
}
@@ -501,7 +501,7 @@ func TestHandleSourceLogs_RendersReplayControlAndBanner(t *testing.T) {
assert.Contains(
t, body,
`action="/hook/`+wh.ID+`/deliveries/`+
`action="/source/`+wh.ID+`/deliveries/`+
original.ID+`/replay"`,
)
assert.Contains(t, body, `method="POST"`)
@@ -509,7 +509,7 @@ func TestHandleSourceLogs_RendersReplayControlAndBanner(t *testing.T) {
assert.Contains(t, body, ">Replay<")
refused := renderSourceLogsPageWithQuery(
t, h, sess, wh.ID, "?notice=replay-target-deleted",
t, h, sess, wh.ID, "?replay=target-deleted",
)
assert.Contains(t, refused, "alert-error")
@@ -517,7 +517,7 @@ func TestHandleSourceLogs_RendersReplayControlAndBanner(t *testing.T) {
// An outcome code nobody issued renders no banner at all.
unknown := renderSourceLogsPageWithQuery(
t, h, sess, wh.ID, "?notice=made-up",
t, h, sess, wh.ID, "?replay=made-up",
)
assert.NotContains(t, unknown, "alert-error")
internal/handlers/error_page_test.go
-53
View File
@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
package handlers_test
import (
"context"
"html/template"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
)
// TestErrorPage_RenderFailureKeepsStatus proves that an error page
// which cannot render answers with the status it was reporting, as
// plain text, and is not attempted again: a page whose own render
// fails reaches the error page, and the error page failing as well
// ends there with the 500.
func TestErrorPage_RenderFailureKeepsStatus(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var h *handlers.Handlers
app := newTestApp(t, &h)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
// .Status is an int, so asking it for a field fails the render.
failing := `{{.Status.Missing}}`
h.AddTemplateForTest("error.html", template.Must(
template.New("error").Parse(failing),
))
h.AddTemplateForTest("failing.html", template.Must(
template.New("failing").Parse(`{{.Data.Missing}}`),
))
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil,
)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.HandleErrorPage(http.StatusNotFound).ServeHTTP(w, req)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusNotFound, w.Code)
assert.Equal(t, "Not Found\n", w.Body.String())
w = httptest.NewRecorder()
h.RenderTemplateForTest(w, req, "failing.html", 0)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusInternalServerError, w.Code)
assert.Equal(t, "Internal Server Error\n", w.Body.String())
}
internal/handlers/event_body.go
+5 -5
View File
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleEventBodyDownload() http.HandlerFunc {
// steered by a client.
eventID, err := uuid.Parse(chi.URLParam(r, "eventID"))
if err != nil {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusNotFound)
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
@@ -103,21 +103,21 @@ func (h *Handlers) serveEventBody(
eventID string,
) {
if !h.dbMgr.DBExists(webhook.ID) {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusNotFound)
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
webhookDB, err := h.dbMgr.GetDB(webhook.ID)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to get webhook database", err)
h.serverError(w, "failed to get webhook database", err)
return
}
body, found, err := eventBody(webhookDB, webhook.ID, eventID)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to read event body", err)
h.serverError(w, "failed to read event body", err)
return
}
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) serveEventBody(
// row and the whole body is served, or it does not and the
// response is a clean 404.
if !found {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusNotFound)
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
internal/handlers/event_body_test.go
+4 -4
View File
@@ -64,8 +64,8 @@ func fetchEventBody(
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(),
http.MethodGet,
"/hook/"+url.PathEscape(sourceID)+
"/events/"+url.PathEscape(eventID)+"/body",
"/source/"+url.PathEscape(sourceID)+
"/logs/"+url.PathEscape(eventID)+"/body",
nil,
)
@@ -490,7 +490,7 @@ func TestHandleSourceLogs_TruncationMarkerLinksToDownload(
page := renderSourceLogsPage(t, h, sess, big.ID)
assert.Contains(
t, page,
"/hook/"+big.ID+"/events/"+bigEvt.ID+"/body",
"/source/"+big.ID+"/logs/"+bigEvt.ID+"/body",
)
small := seedWebhook(t, db)
@@ -501,6 +501,6 @@ func TestHandleSourceLogs_TruncationMarkerLinksToDownload(
page = renderSourceLogsPage(t, h, sess, small.ID)
assert.NotContains(
t, page,
"/hook/"+small.ID+"/events/"+smallEvt.ID+"/body",
"/source/"+small.ID+"/logs/"+smallEvt.ID+"/body",
)
}
internal/handlers/event_resubmit.go
+62 -13
View File
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package handlers
import (
"errors"
"net/http"
"strconv"
"github.com/go-chi/chi"
"github.com/google/uuid"
@@ -10,19 +11,43 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
// The outcomes of a resubmit POST, as the notice codes its redirect
// carries. noticeFor holds the line each one shows.
// resubmitOutcomeParam is the query parameter the resubmit POST
// redirects with and the event log page reads its banner from.
const resubmitOutcomeParam = "resubmit"
// resubmitOutcomeCode is the outcome of a resubmit POST. The redirect
// carries one of these fixed codes rather than a message, so nothing a
// client submits can reach the rendered page through it.
type resubmitOutcomeCode string
const (
// resubmitQueued reports that a new event was stored and its
// deliveries handed to the delivery engine.
resubmitQueued noticeCode = "resubmit-queued"
resubmitQueued resubmitOutcomeCode = "queued"
// resubmitNoTargets reports a source with no active targets. The
// new event is stored either way, exactly as a received event
// with no targets is.
resubmitNoTargets noticeCode = "resubmit-no-targets"
resubmitNoTargets resubmitOutcomeCode = "no-targets"
)
// resubmitOutcome returns the banner the event log page shows for an
// outcome code, and whether the resubmit was queued. An unrecognised
// code yields no banner.
func resubmitOutcome(code string) (string, bool) {
switch resubmitOutcomeCode(code) {
case resubmitQueued:
return "Resubmitted: a new event was created from the stored " +
"one and queued to every active target.", true
case resubmitNoTargets:
return "Resubmitted: a new event was created, but this " +
"source has no active targets, so nothing was queued.",
true
default:
return "", false
}
}
// resubmitSource is the stored event a resubmit copies. Its body is
// read as bytes rather than as a string so the copy is byte-identical
// to what was received, whatever the payload's encoding.
@@ -74,7 +99,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleEventResubmit() http.HandlerFunc {
// middleware, which runs before CSRF parses the form.
err := r.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest)
http.Error(w, "Bad request", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
@@ -95,20 +120,20 @@ func (h *Handlers) resubmitEvent(
// alphabet rather than from the request.
eventID, err := uuid.Parse(chi.URLParam(r, "eventID"))
if err != nil {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusNotFound)
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
if !h.dbMgr.DBExists(webhook.ID) {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusNotFound)
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
webhookDB, err := h.dbMgr.GetDB(webhook.ID)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to get webhook database", err)
h.serverError(w, "failed to get webhook database", err)
return
}
@@ -122,7 +147,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) resubmitEvent(
webhookDB, webhook.ID, eventID.String(),
)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to load event to resubmit", err)
h.serverError(w, "failed to load event to resubmit", err)
return
}
@@ -130,7 +155,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) resubmitEvent(
// A miss is a 404 whether the event was reaped, belongs to
// another webhook, or never existed.
if !found {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusNotFound)
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
@@ -182,7 +207,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) queueResubmit(
// inactive one is skipped rather than refused.
targets, err := h.loadActiveTargets(webhook.ID)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to query targets", err)
h.serverError(w, "failed to query targets", err)
return
}
@@ -200,7 +225,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) queueResubmit(
targets,
)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to store resubmitted event", err)
h.serverError(w, "failed to store resubmitted event", err)
return
}
@@ -220,5 +245,29 @@ func (h *Handlers) queueResubmit(
code = resubmitNoTargets
}
redirectToEventLog(w, r, webhook, code)
h.finishResubmit(w, r, webhook, code)
}
// finishResubmit redirects back to the event log the resubmit was
// triggered from, carrying the outcome code the page turns into a
// banner and the page number the form submitted.
func (h *Handlers) finishResubmit(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
webhook database.Webhook,
code resubmitOutcomeCode,
) {
dest := "/source/" + webhook.ID + "/logs?" +
resubmitOutcomeParam + "=" + string(code)
// The page is read from the form rather than the query string:
// this is a POST, and its query string is what logs and Referer
// headers record.
if page := pageOrFirst(
r.PostFormValue("page"),
); page > 1 {
dest += "&page=" + strconv.Itoa(page)
}
http.Redirect(w, r, dest, http.StatusSeeOther)
}
internal/handlers/event_resubmit_test.go
+6 -7
View File
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ func postResubmit(
t.Helper()
req := postRequest(
"/hook/"+webhookID+"/events/"+eventID+"/resubmit",
"/source/"+webhookID+"/events/"+eventID+"/resubmit",
authenticatedCookies(
t, sess, deleteTestUserID, deleteTestUsername,
),
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ func TestHandleEventResubmit_DeliversToTargetCreatedAfterTheEvent(
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(
t,
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/events?notice=resubmit-queued",
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/logs?resubmit=queued",
w.Header().Get("Location"),
)
@@ -204,7 +204,6 @@ func assertEventCopy(
assert.Equal(t, original.Method, fresh.Method)
assert.Equal(t, original.Headers, fresh.Headers)
assert.Equal(t, original.Body, fresh.Body)
assert.Equal(t, int64(len(original.Body)), fresh.BodyBytes)
assert.Equal(t, original.ContentType, fresh.ContentType)
assert.Equal(t, original.EntrypointID, fresh.EntrypointID)
assert.Equal(t, original.WebhookID, fresh.WebhookID)
@@ -282,7 +281,7 @@ func TestHandleEventResubmit_IsRepeatable(t *testing.T) {
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(
t,
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/events?notice=resubmit-queued",
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/logs?resubmit=queued",
w.Header().Get("Location"),
"a resubmit must not be refused while an earlier "+
"one is in flight",
@@ -436,7 +435,7 @@ func TestHandleEventResubmit_SkipsInactiveTarget(t *testing.T) {
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(
t,
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/events?notice=resubmit-queued",
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/logs?resubmit=queued",
w.Header().Get("Location"),
"an inactive target is skipped, not an error",
)
@@ -482,7 +481,7 @@ func TestHandleEventResubmit_NoActiveTargetsStillStoresEvent(
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(
t,
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/events?notice=resubmit-no-targets",
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/logs?resubmit=no-targets",
w.Header().Get("Location"),
)
@@ -598,7 +597,7 @@ func TestHandleSourceLogs_ShowsResubmitProvenance(t *testing.T) {
)
assert.Contains(
t, body,
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/events/"+original.ID+"/resubmit",
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/events/"+original.ID+"/resubmit",
"the log must offer the resubmit action per event",
)
}
internal/handlers/export_test.go
+2 -37
View File
@@ -1,14 +1,10 @@
package handlers
import (
"context"
"html/template"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"time"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
@@ -67,43 +63,12 @@ func (s *Handlers) LoadEventLogViewsForTest(
page int,
) []EventLogView {
views, _, _ := s.loadEventsWithDeliveries(
w, newRequestForTest(), webhook, nil, page,
w, webhook, nil, page,
)
return views
}
// WebhookStatsForTest returns the figures the statistics pane on a
// webhook's page shows, from the webhook's entrypoints and targets
// loaded as that page loads them.
func (s *Handlers) WebhookStatsForTest(webhookID string) *WebhookStats {
var entrypoints []database.Entrypoint
s.db.DB().Where("webhook_id = ?", webhookID).Find(&entrypoints)
var targets []database.Target
s.db.DB().Where("webhook_id = ?", webhookID).Find(&targets)
return s.loadWebhookStats(webhookID, entrypoints, targets)
}
// FinishedByTargetForTest exposes finishedByTarget for use in the
// handlers_test package.
func FinishedByTargetForTest(
webhookDB *gorm.DB, since time.Time,
) ([]TargetFinished, error) {
return finishedByTarget(webhookDB, since)
}
// newRequestForTest is the request the helpers here pass on for
// callers that have none: it is used only to render the error page.
func newRequestForTest() *http.Request {
return httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil,
)
}
// AddTemplateForTest registers a template under a page name so that
// the handlers_test package can drive the render path with a
// template of its own.
@@ -157,5 +122,5 @@ func (s *Handlers) BuildDatabaseTargetConfigForTest(
w http.ResponseWriter,
expiry string,
) (string, error) {
return s.buildDatabaseTargetConfig(w, newRequestForTest(), expiry)
return s.buildDatabaseTargetConfig(w, expiry)
}
internal/handlers/gormlogbound_test.go
+1 -1
View File
@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ func postWebhook(
t.Helper()
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(), http.MethodPost, "/h/x",
context.Background(), http.MethodPost, "/webhook/x",
strings.NewReader("{}"),
)
internal/handlers/handlers.go
+33 -122
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ import (
"net/http"
"sync/atomic"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus"
"go.uber.org/fx"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
@@ -29,7 +28,7 @@ const (
// maxBodyShift is the bit shift for 1 MB body limit.
maxBodyShift = 20
// recentEventLimit is the number of recent events to show.
recentEventLimit = 50
recentEventLimit = 20
// paginationPerPage is the number of items per page.
paginationPerPage = 25
@@ -37,9 +36,6 @@ const (
tmplKeyError = "Error"
// tmplKeyWebhook is the template data key for a webhook.
tmplKeyWebhook = "Webhook"
// tmplKeyNext is the template data key for the page to return
// to after login.
tmplKeyNext = "Next"
)
// errInvalidPassword is returned when a password does not match.
@@ -65,8 +61,6 @@ type HandlersParams struct {
Notifier delivery.Notifier
Evictor delivery.WebhookEvictor
SSRFGuard *delivery.Guard
Metrics *metrics.Set
Registry *prometheus.Registry
}
// Handlers provides HTTP handler methods for all application
@@ -97,23 +91,18 @@ type Handlers struct {
// parsePageTemplate parses a page-specific template set from the
// embedded FS. Each page template is combined with the shared
// base, htmlheader, navbar and notice templates, and with any further
// files the page includes. The page file must be listed first so that
// its root action ({{template "base" .}}) becomes the template set's
// entry point.
func parsePageTemplate(
pageFile string, included ...string,
) *template.Template {
files := append([]string{
pageFile,
"base.html",
"htmlheader.html",
"navbar.html",
"notice.html",
}, included...)
// base, htmlheader, and navbar templates. The page file must be
// listed first so that its root action ({{template "base" .}})
// becomes the template set's entry point.
func parsePageTemplate(pageFile string) *template.Template {
return template.Must(
template.ParseFS(templates.Templates, files...),
template.ParseFS(
templates.Templates,
pageFile,
"base.html",
"htmlheader.html",
"navbar.html",
),
)
}
@@ -133,7 +122,7 @@ func New(
s.mw = params.Middleware
s.notifier = params.Notifier
s.evictor = params.Evictor
s.mtr = params.Metrics
s.mtr = metrics.Default()
s.ssrf = params.SSRFGuard
// Parse all page templates once at startup
@@ -142,11 +131,10 @@ func New(
"profile.html": parsePageTemplate("profile.html"),
"sources_list.html": parsePageTemplate("sources_list.html"),
"sources_new.html": parsePageTemplate("sources_new.html"),
"source_detail.html": parsePageTemplate("source_detail.html", "webhook_stats.html"),
"source_detail.html": parsePageTemplate("source_detail.html"),
"source_edit.html": parsePageTemplate("source_edit.html"),
"source_logs.html": parsePageTemplate("source_logs.html"),
"target_edit.html": parsePageTemplate("target_edit.html"),
"error.html": parsePageTemplate("error.html"),
}
lc.Append(fx.Hook{
@@ -158,16 +146,6 @@ func New(
return s, nil
}
// HandleErrorPage returns a handler that answers every request with
// the error page for status. The router uses it for unknown paths, the
// CSRF middleware for a refused form, and each admin page route
// group's recoverer for a panic.
func (s *Handlers) HandleErrorPage(status int) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
s.renderError(w, r, status)
}
}
func (s *Handlers) respondJSON(
w http.ResponseWriter,
_ *http.Request,
@@ -185,78 +163,15 @@ func (s *Handlers) respondJSON(
}
}
// serverError logs an error and answers with the 500 error page.
// serverError logs an error and sends a 500 response.
func (s *Handlers) serverError(
w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, msg string, err error,
w http.ResponseWriter, msg string, err error,
) {
s.log.Error(msg, "error", err)
s.renderError(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError)
}
// renderError answers with status and the error page: the normal
// layout, one fixed line explaining the status, and a link back to the
// webhook list, or to sign-in when nobody is signed in.
//
// It renders the page itself rather than through renderTemplate,
// whose own failure comes here. If the error page cannot render
// either, the answer is the same status in plain text: never a second
// attempt, and never a different status.
func (s *Handlers) renderError(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
status int,
) {
// The page names the signed-in user, and some error pages are
// served outside the routes where NoCache runs.
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
// No notice: one would say an action worked above a page saying
// the request failed.
data := s.pageData(r, map[string]any{
"Status": status,
"StatusText": http.StatusText(status),
"Message": errorPageText(status),
}, nil)
var buf bytes.Buffer
err := s.templates["error.html"].Execute(&buf, data)
if err != nil {
s.log.Error("failed to render error page", "error", err)
http.Error(w, http.StatusText(status), status)
return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
w.WriteHeader(status)
_, err = buf.WriteTo(w)
if err != nil {
s.log.Error("failed to write error page", "error", err)
}
}
// errorPageText is the line the error page shows for status. It is
// fixed per status, so the page tells the reader no more than the
// plain-text answers it replaced did.
func errorPageText(status int) string {
switch status {
case http.StatusBadRequest:
return "The request could not be read."
case http.StatusForbidden:
return "The request was refused. If it came from a form " +
"left open for a long time, reload the page and try " +
"again."
case http.StatusNotFound:
return "There is nothing here. It may have been deleted, " +
"or the address may be wrong."
case http.StatusServiceUnavailable:
return "The server is busy. Please try again in a moment."
default: // http.StatusInternalServerError
return "Something went wrong on the server. Please try " +
"again."
}
http.Error(
w, "Internal server error",
http.StatusInternalServerError,
)
}
// UserInfo represents user information for templates
@@ -270,7 +185,6 @@ type templateDataWrapper struct {
User *UserInfo
CSRFToken string
Version string
Notice *notice
Data any
}
@@ -310,20 +224,14 @@ func (s *Handlers) renderTemplate(
"template not found",
"template", pageTemplate,
)
s.renderError(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError)
http.Error(
w, "Internal server error",
http.StatusInternalServerError,
)
return
}
s.executeTemplate(w, r, tmpl, s.pageData(r, data, noticeFor(r)))
}
// pageData adds the fields the shared layout renders to a page's own
// data. The layout shows the notice, when there is one, above the
// page.
func (s *Handlers) pageData(
r *http.Request, data any, pageNotice *notice,
) any {
userInfo := s.getUserInfo(r)
csrfToken := middleware.CSRFToken(r)
@@ -337,18 +245,19 @@ func (s *Handlers) pageData(
m["User"] = userInfo
m["CSRFToken"] = csrfToken
m["Version"] = version
m["Notice"] = pageNotice
s.executeTemplate(w, tmpl, m)
return m
return
}
return templateDataWrapper{
wrapper := templateDataWrapper{
User: userInfo,
CSRFToken: csrfToken,
Version: version,
Notice: pageNotice,
Data: data,
}
s.executeTemplate(w, tmpl, wrapper)
}
// executeTemplate renders the template into a buffer and writes to
@@ -361,7 +270,6 @@ func (s *Handlers) pageData(
// this reason.
func (s *Handlers) executeTemplate(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
tmpl *template.Template,
data any,
) {
@@ -372,7 +280,10 @@ func (s *Handlers) executeTemplate(
s.log.Error(
"failed to execute template", "error", err,
)
s.renderError(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError)
http.Error(
w, "Internal server error",
http.StatusInternalServerError,
)
return
}
internal/handlers/handlers_test.go
+3 -10
View File
@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/healthcheck"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/metrics"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
)
@@ -110,8 +109,6 @@ func newTestApp(
func(r *recordingEvictor) delivery.WebhookEvictor {
return r
},
metrics.NewRegistry,
metrics.New,
middleware.New,
delivery.NewGuard,
handlers.New,
@@ -179,7 +176,7 @@ func TestHandleIndex_Authenticated(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w2.Code)
assert.Equal(
t, "/hooks", w2.Header().Get("Location"),
t, "/sources", w2.Header().Get("Location"),
)
}
@@ -310,14 +307,10 @@ func TestRenderTemplateMidRenderErrorSendsNoPartialBody(t *testing.T) {
t, http.StatusInternalServerError, w.Code,
"a failed render must report a 500",
)
assert.NotContains(
t, w.Body.String(), partialPageMarker,
assert.Equal(
t, "Internal server error\n", w.Body.String(),
"the response must carry no part of the aborted page",
)
assert.Contains(
t, w.Body.String(), "500 Internal Server Error",
"a failed render must answer with the error page",
)
}
func TestBuildDatabaseTargetConfig_Valid(t *testing.T) {
internal/handlers/index.go
+2 -2
View File
@@ -5,13 +5,13 @@ import (
)
// HandleIndex returns a handler for the root path that redirects
// based on authentication state: authenticated users go to /hooks
// based on authentication state: authenticated users go to /sources
// (the dashboard), unauthenticated users go to the login page.
func (s *Handlers) HandleIndex() http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
sess, err := s.session.Get(r)
if err == nil && s.session.IsAuthenticated(sess) {
http.Redirect(w, r, "/hooks", http.StatusSeeOther)
http.Redirect(w, r, "/sources", http.StatusSeeOther)
return
}
internal/handlers/logbound_test.go
+10 -8
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ package handlers_test
// this package reach a value an UNAUTHENTICATED client picks outright
// and of a length it picks outright:
//
// - the unknown-entrypoint DEBUG line on /h/{uuid}, whose
// - the unknown-entrypoint DEBUG line on /webhook/{uuid}, whose
// path segment matched no stored entrypoint and so is bounded by
// nothing;
// - the failed-login DEBUG lines, whose username is a form field.
@@ -190,12 +190,12 @@ func assertNoClientText(t *testing.T, buf *bytes.Buffer) {
// route pattern.
func receiverRouter(h *handlers.Handlers) *chi.Mux {
router := chi.NewRouter()
router.Post("/h/{uuid}", h.HandleWebhook())
router.Post("/webhook/{uuid}", h.HandleWebhook())
return router
}
// postReceiver sends one POST at /h/<segment>.
// postReceiver sends one POST at /webhook/<segment>.
//
// RawPath is cleared after parsing so chi routes on the decoded path
// and the handler sees the raw bytes rather than their percent-escaped
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ func postReceiver(
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(),
http.MethodPost,
"/h/"+url.PathEscape(segment),
"/webhook/"+url.PathEscape(segment),
strings.NewReader(""),
)
req.URL.RawPath = ""
@@ -339,9 +339,11 @@ const storedUserPassword = "correct-horse-battery-staple"
// storedFillBytes is the raw length of the client-chosen value in
// those accounts' usernames. It is well past the 512-byte field
// budget, so the line is still truncated, but short enough that the
// whole username, markers and fill name included, stays within
// database.MaxUsernameBytes.
const storedFillBytes = 960
// session cookie a successful login writes stays inside
// securecookie's 4 KB limit: the cookie is written BEFORE the
// "user logged in" line, so an 8 KB username answers 500 and never
// reaches it.
const storedFillBytes = 1024
// storedFill builds a username fill of storedFillBytes raw bytes out
// of repetitions of ch, with both markers at its far end.
@@ -507,7 +509,7 @@ func TestVerificationCapacity_LogLineDoesNotTrackPathSize(
http.StatusServiceUnavailable,
postLoginAtPath(
t, h,
"/hook/"+url.PathEscape(
"/source/"+url.PathEscape(
oversizedFill(fill),
)+"/login",
),
internal/handlers/metrics.go
-21
View File
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
package handlers
import (
"net/http"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus/promhttp"
)
// HandleMetrics returns the Prometheus scrape handler for the
// registry built by metrics.NewRegistry, which the HTTP, delivery, Go
// runtime and process collectors register on. It is what
// promhttp.Handler builds for the global default registry, including
// the promhttp_metric_handler_* series that count scrapes, pointed at
// that registry instead.
func (s *Handlers) HandleMetrics() http.HandlerFunc {
reg := s.params.Registry
return promhttp.InstrumentMetricHandler(
reg, promhttp.HandlerFor(reg, promhttp.HandlerOpts{}),
).ServeHTTP
}
internal/handlers/notice.go
-109
View File
@@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
package handlers
import "net/http"
// noticeParam is the query parameter an action's redirect carries its
// notice code in.
const noticeParam = "notice"
// noticeCode names one of the fixed lines noticeFor knows. An action
// redirects with the code rather than the line, so nothing a client
// puts in the URL reaches the page: a code noticeFor does not know
// shows nothing.
type noticeCode string
// The codes of the actions on the webhook pages and of signing out.
// Replay's codes, with the reasons a replay can be refused, and
// resubmit's codes are defined beside those actions.
const (
webhookCreated noticeCode = "webhook-created"
webhookSaved noticeCode = "webhook-saved"
webhookDeleted noticeCode = "webhook-deleted"
entrypointAdded noticeCode = "entrypoint-added"
entrypointDeleted noticeCode = "entrypoint-deleted"
entrypointActivated noticeCode = "entrypoint-activated"
entrypointDeactivated noticeCode = "entrypoint-deactivated"
targetAdded noticeCode = "target-added"
targetSaved noticeCode = "target-saved"
targetDeleted noticeCode = "target-deleted"
targetActivated noticeCode = "target-activated"
targetDeactivated noticeCode = "target-deactivated"
signedOut noticeCode = "signed-out"
)
// notice is the line templates/notice.html shows above a page to say
// what an action did.
type notice struct {
Text string
// Failed shows the line as an error: the action was refused.
Failed bool
}
// noticeFor returns the notice the request's URL names, or nil when it
// names none or an unknown code.
func noticeFor(r *http.Request) *notice {
n, ok := map[noticeCode]notice{
webhookCreated: {Text: "Webhook created."},
webhookSaved: {Text: "Webhook saved."},
webhookDeleted: {Text: "Webhook deleted."},
entrypointAdded: {Text: "Entrypoint added."},
entrypointDeleted: {Text: "Entrypoint deleted."},
entrypointActivated: {Text: "Entrypoint activated."},
entrypointDeactivated: {Text: "Entrypoint deactivated."},
targetAdded: {Text: "Target added."},
targetSaved: {Text: "Target saved."},
targetDeleted: {Text: "Target deleted."},
targetActivated: {Text: "Target activated."},
targetDeactivated: {Text: "Target deactivated."},
signedOut: {Text: "Signed out."},
replayQueued: {
Text: "Replay queued: a new delivery was created " +
"against the target's current configuration.",
},
replayTargetDeleted: {
Text: "Not replayed: the target this delivery was for " +
"has been deleted. Recreate the target, then replay.",
Failed: true,
},
replayTargetMissing: {
Text: "Not replayed: the target this delivery was for " +
"no longer exists.",
Failed: true,
},
replayTargetInactive: {
Text: "Not replayed: the target this delivery was for " +
"is deactivated. Activate it, then replay.",
Failed: true,
},
replayNotTerminal: {
Text: "Not replayed: this delivery has not finished yet.",
Failed: true,
},
replayInFlight: {
Text: "Not replayed: a delivery of this event to this " +
"target is already in flight.",
Failed: true,
},
resubmitQueued: {
Text: "Resubmitted: a new event was created from the " +
"stored one and queued to every active target.",
},
resubmitNoTargets: {
Text: "Resubmitted: a new event was created, but this " +
"source has no active targets, so nothing was queued.",
},
}[noticeCode(r.URL.Query().Get(noticeParam))]
if !ok {
return nil
}
return &n
}
// withNotice returns path with code added as its notice.
func withNotice(path string, code noticeCode) string {
return path + "?" + noticeParam + "=" + string(code)
}
internal/handlers/profile.go
+28 -16
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
package handlers
import (
"context"
"net/http"
"github.com/go-chi/chi"
@@ -36,14 +37,14 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandlePasswordChange() http.HandlerFunc {
err := r.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
h.log.Error("failed to parse form", "error", err)
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest)
http.Error(w, "Bad request", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
successMessage, errorMessage, handled := h.applyPasswordChange(
r.Context(),
w,
r,
sessionUsername,
// PostFormValue, not FormValue: the credential must
// come from the body, never from the query string.
@@ -65,12 +66,12 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandlePasswordChange() http.HandlerFunc {
// applyPasswordChange verifies the current password and, on success,
// persists a fresh hash for the user, reusing the same helpers that
// bootstrap the admin user. It returns the success and error messages
// to display on the profile page. On an internal failure it writes the
// error page itself and returns handled=false, signalling the caller
// to display on the profile page. On an internal failure it writes a
// 500 response itself and returns handled=false, signalling the caller
// to stop without re-rendering the page.
func (h *Handlers) applyPasswordChange(
ctx context.Context,
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
username, currentPassword, newPassword, confirmPassword string,
) (string, string, bool) {
// This endpoint verifies one password and hashes another, at
@@ -78,10 +79,15 @@ func (h *Handlers) applyPasswordChange(
// endpoint uses. The bound is per hash, not per endpoint: leaving
// this path outside it would leave a hole in it. The slot is held
// across both hashes.
release, ok := h.mw.BeginPasswordVerification(r.Context())
release, ok := h.mw.BeginPasswordVerification(ctx)
if !ok {
h.log.Warn("password verification capacity exhausted")
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
http.Error(
w,
"The server is busy verifying credentials. "+
"Please try again.",
http.StatusServiceUnavailable,
)
return "", "", false
}
@@ -97,7 +103,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) applyPasswordChange(
).First(&user).Error
if err != nil {
h.serverError(
w, r, "failed to load user for password change", err,
w, "failed to load user for password change", err,
)
return "", "", false
@@ -107,7 +113,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) applyPasswordChange(
currentPassword, user.Password,
)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to verify password", err)
h.serverError(w, "failed to verify password", err)
return "", "", false
}
@@ -126,7 +132,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) applyPasswordChange(
hashedPassword, err := database.HashPassword(newPassword)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to hash new password", err)
h.serverError(w, "failed to hash new password", err)
return "", "", false
}
@@ -135,7 +141,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) applyPasswordChange(
"password", hashedPassword,
).Error
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to update password", err)
h.serverError(w, "failed to update password", err)
return "", "", false
}
@@ -156,7 +162,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) profileOwnerOrDeny(
) (string, string, bool) {
requestedUsername := chi.URLParam(r, "username")
if requestedUsername == "" {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusNotFound)
http.NotFound(w, r)
return "", "", false
}
@@ -166,7 +172,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) profileOwnerOrDeny(
// unexpected retrieval error.
sess, err := h.session.Get(r)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to get session", err)
h.serverError(w, "failed to get session", err)
return "", "", false
}
@@ -174,7 +180,10 @@ func (h *Handlers) profileOwnerOrDeny(
sessionUsername, ok := h.session.GetUsername(sess)
if !ok {
h.log.Error("authenticated session missing username")
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError)
http.Error(
w, "Internal server error",
http.StatusInternalServerError,
)
return "", "", false
}
@@ -182,14 +191,17 @@ func (h *Handlers) profileOwnerOrDeny(
sessionUserID, ok := h.session.GetUserID(sess)
if !ok {
h.log.Error("authenticated session missing user ID")
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError)
http.Error(
w, "Internal server error",
http.StatusInternalServerError,
)
return "", "", false
}
// Only allow users to act on their own profile.
if requestedUsername != sessionUsername {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusForbidden)
http.Error(w, "Forbidden", http.StatusForbidden)
return "", "", false
}
internal/handlers/profile_test.go
+3 -10
View File
@@ -88,8 +88,6 @@ func TestHandleProfile_OwnProfile_OK(t *testing.T) {
h.HandleProfile().ServeHTTP(w, req)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
assert.Contains(t, w.Body.String(), "Account Information")
assert.NotContains(t, w.Body.String(), "Account Type")
}
func TestHandleProfile_OtherProfile_Forbidden(t *testing.T) {
@@ -128,9 +126,7 @@ func TestUserRoute_Unauthenticated_RedirectedByMiddleware(t *testing.T) {
var sess *session.Session
var h *handlers.Handlers
app := newTestApp(t, &log, &cfg, &sess, &h)
app := newTestApp(t, &log, &cfg, &sess)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
@@ -141,7 +137,7 @@ func TestUserRoute_Unauthenticated_RedirectedByMiddleware(t *testing.T) {
router := chi.NewRouter()
router.Route("/user/{username}", func(r chi.Router) {
r.Use(mw.CSRF(h.HandleErrorPage(http.StatusForbidden)))
r.Use(mw.CSRF())
r.Use(mw.RequireAuth())
r.Get("/", func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
handlerReached = true
@@ -162,10 +158,7 @@ func TestUserRoute_Unauthenticated_RedirectedByMiddleware(t *testing.T) {
"handler must not be reached for unauthenticated request",
)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(
t, "/pages/login?next=%2Fuser%2Ftestuser",
w.Header().Get("Location"),
)
assert.Equal(t, "/pages/login", w.Header().Get("Location"))
}
// passwordChangeRequest builds a POST request to the password-change
internal/handlers/recent_events.go
-293
View File
@@ -1,293 +0,0 @@
package handlers
import (
"net/http"
"slices"
"strconv"
"time"
"github.com/dustin/go-humanize"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
// recentEventColumns is the recent events list's projection. It
// leaves out the body, for the reason maxRenderedBodyBytes gives,
// and reads its size from body_bytes, recorded when the event was
// stored.
const recentEventColumns = "id, created_at, method, content_type, " +
"resubmitted_from_id, body_bytes"
// recentAttemptColumns is the part of a recorded attempt the list
// uses. The event log's deliveryResultColumns also reads response
// bodies, which the list does not show.
const recentAttemptColumns = "delivery_id, status_code, created_at"
// RecentEventView is one row of the recent events list on a
// webhook's page.
type RecentEventView struct {
Method string
ContentType string
// ResubmittedFromID names the event this one was copied from,
// empty for an event that arrived on the receiver.
ResubmittedFromID string
// Received is how long ago the event arrived, and ReceivedUTC
// the full timestamp the page shows on hover.
Received string
ReceivedUTC string
// Size is the size of the stored body.
Size string
// ProcessingTime is how long the event's slowest delivery
// took; see processingTime.
ProcessingTime string
// Status is what the webhook's HTTP target answered, and
// StatusClass its colour; see targetStatus. Both are empty
// unless the webhook has exactly one HTTP target.
Status string
StatusClass string
}
// recentEventRow is one row of recentEventColumns.
type recentEventRow struct {
ID string
CreatedAt time.Time
Method string
ContentType string
ResubmittedFromID *string
BodyBytes uint64
}
// recentAttemptRow is one row of recentAttemptColumns. CreatedAt is
// when the attempt's result was recorded, which is when the attempt
// finished.
type recentAttemptRow struct {
DeliveryID string
StatusCode int
CreatedAt time.Time
}
// singleHTTPTargetID returns the ID of the webhook's HTTP target
// when it has exactly one, and "" when it has none or several.
func singleHTTPTargetID(targets []database.Target) string {
id := ""
count := 0
for i := range targets {
if targets[i].Type == database.TargetTypeHTTP {
id = targets[i].ID
count++
}
}
if count != 1 {
return ""
}
return id
}
// loadRecentEvents loads the webhook's recentEventLimit newest
// events for its page, newest first. statusTargetID is the
// webhook's only HTTP target, or "" when the list shows no status.
func loadRecentEvents(
webhookDB *gorm.DB, webhookID, statusTargetID string,
) ([]RecentEventView, error) {
var rows []recentEventRow
err := webhookDB.Model(&database.Event{}).
Select(recentEventColumns).
Where("webhook_id = ?", webhookID).
Order("created_at DESC").
Limit(recentEventLimit).
Find(&rows).Error
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
eventIDs := make([]string, len(rows))
for i := range rows {
eventIDs[i] = rows[i].ID
}
// Oldest first, so an event's last delivery to a target is its
// newest: a replay adds a delivery rather than changing the
// earlier one.
var deliveries []database.Delivery
err = webhookDB.
Select("id, event_id, target_id, status, created_at").
Where("event_id IN ?", eventIDs).
Order("created_at ASC").
Find(&deliveries).Error
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
byEvent := make(map[string][]database.Delivery, len(rows))
deliveryIDs := make([]string, len(deliveries))
for i := range deliveries {
eventID := deliveries[i].EventID
byEvent[eventID] = append(byEvent[eventID], deliveries[i])
deliveryIDs[i] = deliveries[i].ID
}
attempts, err := loadRecentAttempts(webhookDB, deliveryIDs)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
views := make([]RecentEventView, len(rows))
for i := range rows {
views[i] = rows[i].view(
byEvent[rows[i].ID], attempts, statusTargetID,
)
}
return views, nil
}
// loadRecentAttempts loads the recorded attempts of the listed
// events' deliveries, keyed by delivery ID, each delivery's in
// attempt order. The IDs go in chunks for the reason
// deliveryIDChunkSize gives.
func loadRecentAttempts(
webhookDB *gorm.DB, deliveryIDs []string,
) (map[string][]recentAttemptRow, error) {
byDelivery := make(map[string][]recentAttemptRow)
for chunk := range slices.Chunk(deliveryIDs, deliveryIDChunkSize) {
var rows []recentAttemptRow
err := webhookDB.Model(&database.DeliveryResult{}).
Select(recentAttemptColumns).
Where("delivery_id IN ?", chunk).
Order("attempt_num ASC").
Find(&rows).Error
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
for i := range rows {
id := rows[i].DeliveryID
byDelivery[id] = append(byDelivery[id], rows[i])
}
}
return byDelivery, nil
}
// view projects a loaded row for rendering. deliveries is the
// event's deliveries, oldest first, and attempts their recorded
// attempts keyed by delivery ID.
func (r *recentEventRow) view(
deliveries []database.Delivery,
attempts map[string][]recentAttemptRow,
statusTargetID string,
) RecentEventView {
v := RecentEventView{
Method: r.Method,
ContentType: r.ContentType,
Received: humanize.Time(r.CreatedAt),
ReceivedUTC: r.CreatedAt.UTC().Format(time.DateTime) + " UTC",
Size: humanize.Bytes(r.BodyBytes),
ProcessingTime: processingTime(deliveries, attempts),
}
if r.ResubmittedFromID != nil {
v.ResubmittedFromID = *r.ResubmittedFromID
}
if statusTargetID != "" {
v.Status, v.StatusClass = targetStatus(
deliveries, attempts, statusTargetID,
)
}
return v
}
// processingTime is how long the event's slowest delivery took,
// from being queued to its last recorded attempt, time spent
// waiting between retries included. A delivery is queued when its
// event is received, or when an operator replays it, so a replay
// is timed from the replay rather than from the event's arrival.
// It is "in progress" while any delivery is pending or retrying,
// and empty for an event with no deliveries.
func processingTime(
deliveries []database.Delivery,
attempts map[string][]recentAttemptRow,
) string {
if len(deliveries) == 0 {
return ""
}
var slowest time.Duration
for i := range deliveries {
if !deliveries[i].Status.Terminal() {
return "in progress"
}
tries := attempts[deliveries[i].ID]
if len(tries) == 0 {
continue
}
last := tries[len(tries)-1].CreatedAt
slowest = max(slowest, last.Sub(deliveries[i].CreatedAt))
}
return slowest.Round(time.Millisecond).String()
}
// targetStatus is what the target answered for the event, and the
// colour to show it in: the HTTP status code of the last attempt of
// the event's newest delivery to the target. Without a code it is
// "no response" when that attempt failed before a response
// arrived, the delivery's status ("pending") before any attempt,
// and "not sent" when the event has no delivery to the target.
func targetStatus(
deliveries []database.Delivery,
attempts map[string][]recentAttemptRow,
targetID string,
) (string, string) {
newest := -1
for i := range deliveries {
if deliveries[i].TargetID == targetID {
newest = i
}
}
if newest < 0 {
return "not sent", "text-gray-400"
}
tries := attempts[deliveries[newest].ID]
if len(tries) == 0 {
return string(deliveries[newest].Status), "text-gray-400"
}
code := tries[len(tries)-1].StatusCode
switch {
case code == 0:
return "no response", "text-red-600"
case code >= http.StatusInternalServerError:
return strconv.Itoa(code), "text-red-600"
case code >= http.StatusBadRequest:
return strconv.Itoa(code), "text-yellow-600"
case code >= http.StatusMultipleChoices:
return strconv.Itoa(code), "text-gray-500"
case code >= http.StatusOK:
return strconv.Itoa(code), "text-green-600"
default:
return strconv.Itoa(code), "text-gray-500"
}
}
internal/handlers/recent_events_test.go
-362
View File
@@ -1,362 +0,0 @@
package handlers_test
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/go-chi/chi"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"gorm.io/gorm/clause"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
)
// statusTitle marks the status column's cell in a recent events
// row; it is absent from the page when the column is not shown.
const statusTitle = `title="HTTP status from the HTTP target"`
// recentEventsFixture is one started app and a webhook whose
// recent events list a test fills.
type recentEventsFixture struct {
h *handlers.Handlers
sess *session.Session
db *database.Database
webhook *database.Webhook
webhookDB *gorm.DB
}
func newRecentEventsFixture(t *testing.T) *recentEventsFixture {
t.Helper()
f := &recentEventsFixture{}
var dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager
app := newTestApp(t, &f.h, &f.sess, &f.db, &dbMgr)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
f.webhook = seedWebhook(t, f.db)
webhookDB, err := dbMgr.GetDB(f.webhook.ID)
require.NoError(t, err)
f.webhookDB = webhookDB
return f
}
func (f *recentEventsFixture) render(t *testing.T) string {
t.Helper()
return renderSourceDetailPage(t, f.h, f.sess, f.webhook.ID)
}
// event records an event received at receivedAt, with its body's
// size as the receiver records it.
func (f *recentEventsFixture) event(
t *testing.T, contentType, body string, receivedAt time.Time,
) *database.Event {
t.Helper()
event := &database.Event{
WebhookID: f.webhook.ID,
Method: http.MethodPost,
Body: body,
BodyBytes: int64(len(body)),
ContentType: contentType,
}
event.CreatedAt = receivedAt
require.NoError(t, f.webhookDB.Omit(
clause.Associations,
).Create(event).Error)
return event
}
// delivery records a delivery of the event to the target, queued
// when the event was received.
func (f *recentEventsFixture) delivery(
t *testing.T,
event *database.Event,
targetID string,
status database.DeliveryStatus,
) *database.Delivery {
t.Helper()
return f.deliveryQueuedAt(
t, event, targetID, status, event.CreatedAt,
)
}
// deliveryQueuedAt records a delivery of the event to the target,
// queued at queuedAt, as a replay is.
func (f *recentEventsFixture) deliveryQueuedAt(
t *testing.T,
event *database.Event,
targetID string,
status database.DeliveryStatus,
queuedAt time.Time,
) *database.Delivery {
t.Helper()
dlv := &database.Delivery{
EventID: event.ID,
TargetID: targetID,
Status: status,
}
dlv.CreatedAt = queuedAt
require.NoError(t, f.webhookDB.Omit(
clause.Associations,
).Create(dlv).Error)
return dlv
}
// attempt records one attempt of the delivery that finished took
// after the delivery was queued, with HTTP status code (0 for no
// response).
func (f *recentEventsFixture) attempt(
t *testing.T, dlv *database.Delivery, code int, took time.Duration,
) {
t.Helper()
result := &database.DeliveryResult{
DeliveryID: dlv.ID,
AttemptNum: 1,
StatusCode: code,
}
result.CreatedAt = dlv.CreatedAt.Add(took)
require.NoError(t, f.webhookDB.Omit(
clause.Associations,
).Create(result).Error)
}
// statusCell is the status column's cell as the page renders it.
func statusCell(class, text string) string {
return `<span class="font-medium ` + class + `" ` + statusTitle +
`>` + text + `</span>`
}
// TestHandleSourceDetail_ShowsFiftyNewestEvents proves the list is
// headed "50 Most Recent Events" and holds the 50 newest events,
// newest first, and not one more.
func TestHandleSourceDetail_ShowsFiftyNewestEvents(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
f := newRecentEventsFixture(t)
base := time.Now().Add(-time.Hour)
for i := range 51 {
f.event(
t, fmt.Sprintf("application/x-recent-%02d", i), "{}",
base.Add(time.Duration(i)*time.Second),
)
}
body := f.render(t)
assert.Contains(t, body, ">50 Most Recent Events</h2>")
assert.Equal(t, 50, strings.Count(body, `title="Body size"`))
assert.NotContains(t, body, "application/x-recent-00")
assert.Contains(t, body, "application/x-recent-01")
assert.Less(
t,
strings.Index(body, "application/x-recent-50"),
strings.Index(body, "application/x-recent-49"),
)
}
// TestHandleSourceDetail_RecentEventColumns proves a row shows its
// time relative with the UTC timestamp on hover, its body size,
// and its processing time once every delivery has finished.
func TestHandleSourceDetail_RecentEventColumns(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
f := newRecentEventsFixture(t)
logTarget := seedTarget(t, f.db, f.webhook.ID, database.TargetTypeLog)
receivedAt := time.Now().Add(-210 * time.Second).
UTC().Truncate(time.Second)
done := f.event(
t, contentTypeJSON, strings.Repeat("x", 2048), receivedAt,
)
f.attempt(
t,
f.delivery(t, done, logTarget.ID, database.DeliveryStatusDelivered),
0, 1500*time.Millisecond,
)
waiting := f.event(t, "text/plain", "{}", receivedAt)
f.delivery(t, waiting, logTarget.ID, database.DeliveryStatusPending)
body := f.render(t)
assert.Contains(
t, body,
`<span title="`+receivedAt.Format(time.DateTime)+
` UTC">3 minutes ago</span>`,
)
assert.Contains(t, body, `<span title="Body size">2.0 kB</span>`)
assert.Contains(t, body, ">1.5s</span>")
assert.Contains(t, body, ">in progress</span>")
}
// TestHandleSourceDetail_StatusWithSingleHTTPTarget proves that a
// webhook with exactly one HTTP target shows, colour-coded, what
// that target answered for each event. The log target beside it
// does not count against "exactly one".
func TestHandleSourceDetail_StatusWithSingleHTTPTarget(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
f := newRecentEventsFixture(t)
target := seedTarget(t, f.db, f.webhook.ID, database.TargetTypeHTTP)
seedTarget(t, f.db, f.webhook.ID, database.TargetTypeLog)
now := time.Now()
for _, code := range []int{204, 302, 404, 503, 0} {
dlv := f.delivery(
t, f.event(t, contentTypeJSON, "{}", now), target.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
)
f.attempt(t, dlv, code, time.Second)
}
f.delivery(
t, f.event(t, contentTypeJSON, "{}", now), target.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
f.event(t, contentTypeJSON, "{}", now)
// A replay is a newer delivery, and its answer is the one shown.
replayed := f.event(t, contentTypeJSON, "{}", now)
f.attempt(t, f.delivery(
t, replayed, target.ID, database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
), 502, time.Second)
f.attempt(t, f.deliveryQueuedAt(
t, replayed, target.ID, database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
now.Add(time.Minute),
), 200, time.Second)
body := f.render(t)
assert.Contains(t, body, statusCell("text-green-600", "204"))
assert.Contains(t, body, statusCell("text-gray-500", "302"))
assert.Contains(t, body, statusCell("text-yellow-600", "404"))
assert.Contains(t, body, statusCell("text-red-600", "503"))
assert.Contains(t, body, statusCell("text-red-600", "no response"))
assert.Contains(t, body, statusCell("text-gray-400", "pending"))
assert.Contains(t, body, statusCell("text-gray-400", "not sent"))
assert.Contains(t, body, statusCell("text-green-600", "200"))
assert.NotContains(t, body, ">502<")
}
// TestHandleSourceDetail_NoStatusWithoutSingleHTTPTarget proves the
// status column is absent when the webhook has no HTTP target or
// more than one.
func TestHandleSourceDetail_NoStatusWithoutSingleHTTPTarget(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
cases := map[string][]database.TargetType{
"none": {database.TargetTypeLog},
"several": {database.TargetTypeHTTP, database.TargetTypeHTTP},
}
for name, types := range cases {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
f := newRecentEventsFixture(t)
event := f.event(t, contentTypeJSON, "{}", time.Now())
for _, tt := range types {
target := seedTarget(t, f.db, f.webhook.ID, tt)
f.attempt(t, f.delivery(
t, event, target.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
), 200, time.Second)
}
body := f.render(t)
assert.Contains(t, body, `title="Body size"`)
assert.NotContains(t, body, statusTitle)
})
}
}
// TestHandleWebhook_RecordsBodySize proves the receiver records the
// body's size in bytes, not characters, with the event it stores.
func TestHandleWebhook_RecordsBodySize(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
f := newRecentEventsFixture(t)
seedEntrypoint(t, f.db, f.webhook.ID)
// Two bytes per character.
body := strings.Repeat("é", 1024)
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(), http.MethodPost, "/h/x",
strings.NewReader(body),
)
rctx := chi.NewRouteContext()
rctx.URLParams.Add("uuid", "ep-"+f.webhook.ID)
req = req.WithContext(context.WithValue(
req.Context(), chi.RouteCtxKey, rctx,
))
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
f.h.HandleWebhook().ServeHTTP(w, req)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
var stored database.Event
require.NoError(t, f.webhookDB.First(&stored).Error)
assert.Equal(t, int64(2048), stored.BodyBytes)
}
// TestHandleSourceDetail_FailedLoadIsAnError proves that when the
// list cannot be loaded the page answers with an error, rather than
// an empty list claiming the webhook has no events.
func TestHandleSourceDetail_FailedLoadIsAnError(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
f := newRecentEventsFixture(t)
target := seedTarget(t, f.db, f.webhook.ID, database.TargetTypeHTTP)
f.attempt(t, f.delivery(
t, f.event(t, contentTypeJSON, "{}", time.Now()), target.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
), 200, time.Second)
// The attempts are the list's last query, so its events and
// deliveries have already loaded when it fails.
require.NoError(t, f.webhookDB.Exec(
"DROP TABLE delivery_results",
).Error)
w := serveSourceDetailPage(t, f.h, f.sess, f.webhook.ID)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusInternalServerError, w.Code)
assert.NotContains(t, w.Body.String(), "No events received yet.")
}
internal/handlers/source_delete_test.go
+9 -11
View File
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ func TestHandleSourceDelete_EvictsArchiveWriter(t *testing.T) {
)
req := postRequest(
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/delete",
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/delete",
cookies,
map[string]string{paramSourceID: wh.ID},
)
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ func TestHandleSourceDelete_KeepsArchiveFile(t *testing.T) {
)
req := postRequest(
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/delete",
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/delete",
cookies,
map[string]string{paramSourceID: wh.ID},
)
@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ func TestHandleSourceDelete_FailedDeleteKeepsEverything(
)
req := postRequest(
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/delete",
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/delete",
cookies,
map[string]string{paramSourceID: wh.ID},
)
@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ func TestHandleSourceDelete_FailedDeleteKeepsEverything(
)
assert.Empty(
t, w.Header().Get("Location"),
"a failed deletion must not redirect to /hooks",
"a failed deletion must not redirect to /sources",
)
assert.Equal(
@@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ func TestHandleSourceDelete_RemovesConfigAndEventDatabase(
)
req := postRequest(
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/delete",
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/delete",
cookies,
map[string]string{paramSourceID: wh.ID},
)
@@ -411,9 +411,7 @@ func TestHandleSourceDelete_RemovesConfigAndEventDatabase(
h.HandleSourceDelete().ServeHTTP(w, req)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(
t, "/hooks?notice=webhook-deleted", w.Header().Get("Location"),
)
assert.Equal(t, "/sources", w.Header().Get("Location"))
assert.Equal(
t, int64(0),
@@ -467,7 +465,7 @@ func TestHandleTargetDelete_EvictsWhenLastDatabaseTargetGone(
)
req := postRequest(
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/targets/"+tgt.ID+"/delete",
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/targets/"+tgt.ID+"/delete",
cookies,
map[string]string{
paramSourceID: wh.ID,
@@ -517,7 +515,7 @@ func TestHandleTargetDelete_KeepsWriterWhenDatabaseTargetRemains(
)
req := postRequest(
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/targets/"+doomed.ID+"/delete",
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/targets/"+doomed.ID+"/delete",
cookies,
map[string]string{
paramSourceID: wh.ID,
@@ -565,7 +563,7 @@ func TestHandleTargetDelete_KeepsWriterWhenOtherTypeDeleted(
)
req := postRequest(
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/targets/"+other.ID+"/delete",
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/targets/"+other.ID+"/delete",
cookies,
map[string]string{
paramSourceID: wh.ID,
internal/handlers/source_detail_baseurl_test.go
+4 -4
View File
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ func (f *baseURLFixture) entrypointURL(
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(),
http.MethodGet,
"/hook/"+f.webhook,
"/source/"+f.webhook,
nil,
)
req.Host = host
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ func TestSourceDetailBaseURL_ForwardedProtoSpellings(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(
t,
tc.scheme+"://"+host+"/h/"+fixture.path,
tc.scheme+"://"+host+"/webhook/"+fixture.path,
fixture.entrypointURL(
t, host, forwardedProto(tc.header),
),
@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ func TestSourceDetailBaseURL_DirectTLSBeatsPlaintextHeader(
assert.Equal(
t,
"https://"+host+"/h/"+fixture.path,
"https://"+host+"/webhook/"+fixture.path,
got,
"a connection this process terminated with TLS "+
"outranks a header claiming plaintext",
@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ func TestSourceDetailBaseURL_KeepsHostAuthority(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(
t,
"https://"+host+"/h/"+fixture.path,
"https://"+host+"/webhook/"+fixture.path,
fixture.entrypointURL(
t, host, forwardedProto("HTTPS"),
),
internal/handlers/source_detail_test.go
+4 -53
View File
@@ -62,27 +62,10 @@ func renderSourceDetailPage(
) string {
t.Helper()
w := serveSourceDetailPage(t, h, sess, webhookID)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
return w.Body.String()
}
// serveSourceDetailPage runs the real source detail handler for a
// webhook and returns its response, whatever its status.
func serveSourceDetailPage(
t *testing.T,
h *handlers.Handlers,
sess *session.Session,
webhookID string,
) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
t.Helper()
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(),
http.MethodGet,
"/hook/"+webhookID,
"/source/"+webhookID,
nil,
)
@@ -104,7 +87,9 @@ func serveSourceDetailPage(
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.HandleSourceDetail().ServeHTTP(w, req)
return w
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
return w.Body.String()
}
// TestHandleSourceDetail_MasksSlackWebhookURL is the
@@ -241,37 +226,3 @@ func TestHandleSourceDetail_RendersNamedTargetFields(
assert.Contains(t, body, "(unavailable)")
assert.NotContains(t, body, "beak")
}
// TestHandleSourceDetail_FitsWideAndNarrowWindows pins the webhook
// page's maximum width at 108rem (1728 px), half again the 72rem of
// max-w-6xl that the webhook list and the event log use, so an
// entrypoint URL fits on one line in a 1920-pixel window; and the
// wrapping of its title row, so the buttons beside the title do not
// push a phone-width window into scrolling sideways.
func TestHandleSourceDetail_FitsWideAndNarrowWindows(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
sess *session.Session
db *database.Database
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
wh := seedWebhook(t, db)
body := renderSourceDetailPage(t, h, sess, wh.ID)
assert.Contains(
t, body,
`<div class="mx-auto px-6 py-8" style="max-width: 108rem"`,
)
assert.Contains(
t, body,
`<div class="flex flex-wrap justify-between items-center gap-2 mt-2">`,
)
}
internal/handlers/source_logs_deleted_target_test.go
+1 -1
View File
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ func deleteTargetThroughHandler(
t.Helper()
req := postRequest(
"/hook/"+webhookID+"/targets/"+targetID+"/delete",
"/source/"+webhookID+"/targets/"+targetID+"/delete",
authenticatedCookies(
t, sess, deleteTestUserID, deleteTestUsername,
),
internal/handlers/source_logs_test.go
+1 -1
View File
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ func renderSourceLogsPageWithQuery(
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(),
http.MethodGet,
"/hook/"+webhookID+"/events"+query,
"/source/"+webhookID+"/logs"+query,
nil,
)
internal/handlers/source_management.go
+115 -117
View File
@@ -149,7 +149,13 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleSourceList() http.HandlerFunc {
"user_id = ?", userID,
).Order("created_at DESC").Find(&webhooks).Error
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to list webhooks", err)
h.log.Error(
"failed to list webhooks", "error", err,
)
http.Error(
w, "Internal server error",
http.StatusInternalServerError,
)
return
}
@@ -243,7 +249,9 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleSourceCreateSubmit() http.HandlerFunc {
// middleware, which runs before CSRF parses the form.
err := r.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest)
http.Error(
w, "Bad request", http.StatusBadRequest,
)
return
}
@@ -303,7 +311,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) createWebhookWithEntrypoint(
err := h.commitWebhook(webhook)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to create webhook", err)
h.serverError(w, "failed to create webhook", err)
return
}
@@ -322,8 +330,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) createWebhookWithEntrypoint(
)
http.Redirect(
w, r, withNotice("/hook/"+webhook.ID, webhookCreated),
http.StatusSeeOther,
w, r, "/source/"+webhook.ID, http.StatusSeeOther,
)
}
@@ -381,7 +388,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleSourceDetail() http.HandlerFunc {
"id = ? AND user_id = ?", sourceID, userID,
).First(&webhook).Error
if err != nil {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusNotFound)
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
@@ -408,23 +415,16 @@ func (h *Handlers) renderSourceDetail(
"webhook_id = ?", webhook.ID,
).Find(&targets)
var events []RecentEventView
var events []database.Event
if h.dbMgr.DBExists(webhook.ID) {
webhookDB, err := h.dbMgr.GetDB(webhook.ID)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to get webhook database", err)
return
}
events, err = loadRecentEvents(
webhookDB, webhook.ID, singleHTTPTargetID(targets),
)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to load recent events", err)
return
webhookDB, dbErr := h.dbMgr.GetDB(webhook.ID)
if dbErr == nil {
webhookDB.Where(
"webhook_id = ?", webhook.ID,
).Order("created_at DESC").Limit(
recentEventLimit,
).Find(&events)
}
}
@@ -450,7 +450,6 @@ func (h *Handlers) renderSourceDetail(
"Targets": delivery.NewTargetViews(targets),
"Events": events,
"BaseURL": baseURL,
"Stats": h.loadWebhookStats(webhook.ID, entrypoints, targets),
}
h.renderTemplate(w, r, "source_detail.html", data)
@@ -476,7 +475,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleSourceEdit() http.HandlerFunc {
"id = ? AND user_id = ?", sourceID, userID,
).First(&webhook).Error
if err != nil {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusNotFound)
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
@@ -511,7 +510,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleSourceEditSubmit() http.HandlerFunc {
"id = ? AND user_id = ?", sourceID, userID,
).First(&webhook).Error
if err != nil {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusNotFound)
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
@@ -520,7 +519,9 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleSourceEditSubmit() http.HandlerFunc {
// middleware, which runs before CSRF parses the form.
err = r.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest)
http.Error(
w, "Bad request", http.StatusBadRequest,
)
return
}
@@ -574,14 +575,13 @@ func (h *Handlers) applyWebhookEdit(
err := h.db.DB().Save(webhook).Error
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to update webhook", err)
h.serverError(w, "failed to update webhook", err)
return
}
http.Redirect(
w, r, withNotice("/hook/"+webhook.ID, webhookSaved),
http.StatusSeeOther,
w, r, "/source/"+webhook.ID, http.StatusSeeOther,
)
}
@@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleSourceDelete() http.HandlerFunc {
"id = ? AND user_id = ?", sourceID, userID,
).First(&webhook).Error
if err != nil {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusNotFound)
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
@@ -632,7 +632,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) deleteWebhookResources(
// be removed by hand; deleted history cannot be recovered.
err := h.commitWebhookDeletion(&webhook)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to delete webhook", err)
h.serverError(w, "failed to delete webhook", err)
return
}
@@ -658,15 +658,13 @@ func (h *Handlers) deleteWebhookResources(
// redirecting as though everything succeeded: the file
// needs removing by hand, and the logged error names it.
h.serverError(
w, r, "failed to delete webhook event database", err,
w, "failed to delete webhook event database", err,
)
return
}
http.Redirect(
w, r, withNotice("/hooks", webhookDeleted), http.StatusSeeOther,
)
http.Redirect(w, r, "/sources", http.StatusSeeOther)
}
// commitWebhookDeletion soft-deletes a webhook's entrypoints,
@@ -804,7 +802,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) ownedWebhook(
"id = ? AND user_id = ?", sourceID, userID,
).First(&webhook).Error
if err != nil {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusNotFound)
http.NotFound(w, r)
return database.Webhook{}, false
}
@@ -826,7 +824,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleSourceLogs() http.HandlerFunc {
// Without the map every delivery renders through a
// zero redactor, so failing the page is the only
// safe answer.
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to load targets", err)
h.serverError(w, "failed to load targets", err)
return
}
@@ -834,7 +832,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleSourceLogs() http.HandlerFunc {
page := h.parsePage(r)
evts, total, ok := h.loadEventsWithDeliveries(
w, r, webhook, targets, page,
w, webhook, targets, page,
)
if !ok {
return
@@ -845,16 +843,31 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleSourceLogs() http.HandlerFunc {
totalPages++
}
// The banner a replay or resubmit POST redirected back
// with. The message comes from a fixed set keyed by the
// outcome code, never from the query string itself.
replayMsg, replayOK := replayOutcome(
r.URL.Query().Get(replayOutcomeParam),
)
resubmitMsg, resubmitOK := resubmitOutcome(
r.URL.Query().Get(resubmitOutcomeParam),
)
data := map[string]any{
tmplKeyWebhook: &webhook,
"Events": evts,
"Page": page,
"TotalPages": totalPages,
"TotalEvents": total,
"HasPrev": page > 1,
"HasNext": page < totalPages,
"PrevPage": page - 1,
"NextPage": page + 1,
tmplKeyWebhook: &webhook,
"Events": evts,
"ReplayMessage": replayMsg,
"ReplayQueued": replayOK,
"ResubmitMessage": resubmitMsg,
"ResubmitQueued": resubmitOK,
"Page": page,
"TotalPages": totalPages,
"TotalEvents": total,
"HasPrev": page > 1,
"HasNext": page < totalPages,
"PrevPage": page - 1,
"NextPage": page + 1,
}
h.renderTemplate(w, r, "source_logs.html", data)
@@ -929,7 +942,6 @@ func (h *Handlers) parsePage(r *http.Request) int {
// caller must then render nothing further.
func (h *Handlers) loadEventsWithDeliveries(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
webhook database.Webhook,
targetMap map[string]eventLogTarget,
page int,
@@ -943,7 +955,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) loadEventsWithDeliveries(
webhookDB, err := h.dbMgr.GetDB(webhook.ID)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(
w, r, "failed to get webhook database", err,
w, "failed to get webhook database", err,
)
return nil, 0, false
@@ -980,7 +992,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) loadEventsWithDeliveries(
)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(
w, r, "failed to load delivery attempts", err,
w, "failed to load delivery attempts", err,
)
return nil, 0, false
@@ -989,7 +1001,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) loadEventsWithDeliveries(
resubmits, err := resubmitCounts(webhookDB, eventIDs)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(
w, r, "failed to count event resubmissions", err,
w, "failed to count event resubmissions", err,
)
return nil, 0, false
@@ -1212,7 +1224,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleEntrypointCreate() http.HandlerFunc {
"id = ? AND user_id = ?", sourceID, userID,
).First(&webhook).Error
if err != nil {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusNotFound)
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
@@ -1221,7 +1233,9 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleEntrypointCreate() http.HandlerFunc {
// middleware, which runs before CSRF parses the form.
err = r.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest)
http.Error(
w, "Bad request", http.StatusBadRequest,
)
return
}
@@ -1237,14 +1251,13 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleEntrypointCreate() http.HandlerFunc {
err = h.db.DB().Create(entrypoint).Error
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to create entrypoint", err)
h.serverError(w, "failed to create entrypoint", err)
return
}
http.Redirect(
w, r, withNotice("/hook/"+webhook.ID, entrypointAdded),
http.StatusSeeOther,
w, r, "/source/"+webhook.ID, http.StatusSeeOther,
)
}
}
@@ -1269,7 +1282,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleTargetCreate() http.HandlerFunc {
"id = ? AND user_id = ?", sourceID, userID,
).First(&webhook).Error
if err != nil {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusNotFound)
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
@@ -1278,7 +1291,9 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleTargetCreate() http.HandlerFunc {
// middleware, which runs before CSRF parses the form.
err = r.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest)
http.Error(
w, "Bad request", http.StatusBadRequest,
)
return
}
@@ -1298,7 +1313,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) processTargetCreate(
//
// Every field here is read with PostFormValue, not FormValue.
// FormValue falls back to the query string, which would let
// `POST /hook/{id}/targets?url=https://hooks.slack.com/...`
// `POST /source/{id}/targets?url=https://hooks.slack.com/...`
// configure a target from a value the request line carries — and
// the request line, unlike the body, is what logs, proxies,
// Referer headers and error trackers record.
@@ -1349,14 +1364,13 @@ func (h *Handlers) processTargetCreate(
err = h.db.DB().Create(target).Error
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to create target", err)
h.serverError(w, "failed to create target", err)
return
}
http.Redirect(
w, r, withNotice("/hook/"+webhook.ID, targetAdded),
http.StatusSeeOther,
w, r, "/source/"+webhook.ID, http.StatusSeeOther,
)
}
@@ -1414,7 +1428,7 @@ type targetFormInput struct {
//
// Every field is read with PostFormValue, not FormValue. FormValue
// falls back to the query string, which would let
// `POST /hook/{id}/targets?url=https://hooks.slack.com/...`
// `POST /source/{id}/targets?url=https://hooks.slack.com/...`
// configure a target from a value the request line carries — and the
// request line, unlike the body, is what logs, proxies, Referer
// headers and error trackers record. The headers field is under the
@@ -1444,7 +1458,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) buildTargetConfig(
case database.TargetTypeSlack:
return h.buildSlackTargetConfig(w, r, in.URL)
case database.TargetTypeDatabase:
return h.buildDatabaseTargetConfig(w, r, in.Expiry)
return h.buildDatabaseTargetConfig(w, in.Expiry)
case database.TargetTypeLog:
return "", nil
default:
@@ -1494,7 +1508,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) buildHTTPTargetConfig(
return "", err
}
return h.marshalTargetConfig(w, r, delivery.HTTPTargetConfig{
return marshalTargetConfig(w, delivery.HTTPTargetConfig{
URL: in.URL,
Headers: headers,
Timeout: timeout,
@@ -1516,7 +1530,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) buildSlackTargetConfig(
return "", err
}
return h.marshalTargetConfig(w, r, delivery.SlackTargetConfig{
return marshalTargetConfig(w, delivery.SlackTargetConfig{
WebhookURL: targetURL,
})
}
@@ -1556,22 +1570,11 @@ func (h *Handlers) validateTargetURL(
"url", delivery.MaskURL(targetURL),
"error", err,
)
msg := "Invalid target URL: " + err.Error()
// Only a private or reserved address's refusal says how
// to allow it. Metadata refusals never do: link-local and
// the other unconditional metadata addresses cannot be
// opened, and the default blocklist's public addresses,
// which listing does open, hand out credentials.
if errors.Is(err, delivery.ErrBlockedPrivateOrReservedIP) {
msg += ". Private and reserved addresses are refused " +
"by default; the server's ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS " +
"setting allows named networks (see \"Allowing " +
"egress to your own network\" in the README)."
}
http.Error(w, msg, http.StatusBadRequest)
http.Error(
w,
"Invalid target URL: "+err.Error(),
http.StatusBadRequest,
)
return err
}
@@ -1581,14 +1584,16 @@ func (h *Handlers) validateTargetURL(
// marshalTargetConfig serialises a target configuration for storage,
// writing a 500 itself if it cannot.
func (h *Handlers) marshalTargetConfig(
func marshalTargetConfig(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
cfg any,
) (string, error) {
configBytes, err := json.Marshal(cfg)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to encode target config", err)
http.Error(
w, "Internal server error",
http.StatusInternalServerError,
)
return "", err
}
@@ -1604,7 +1609,6 @@ func (h *Handlers) marshalTargetConfig(
// expiry yields an empty config (the keep-forever default).
func (h *Handlers) buildDatabaseTargetConfig(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
expiry string,
) (string, error) {
expiry = strings.TrimSpace(expiry)
@@ -1623,8 +1627,8 @@ func (h *Handlers) buildDatabaseTargetConfig(
return "", err
}
return h.marshalTargetConfig(
w, r, map[string]any{"expiry": expiry},
return marshalTargetConfig(
w, map[string]any{"expiry": expiry},
)
}
@@ -1634,7 +1638,6 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleEntrypointDelete() http.HandlerFunc {
"entrypointID", &database.Entrypoint{},
"failed to delete entrypoint",
nil,
entrypointDeleted,
)
}
@@ -1647,21 +1650,18 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleTargetDelete() http.HandlerFunc {
"targetID", &database.Target{},
"failed to delete target",
h.evictArchiveWriterIfUnused,
targetDeleted,
)
}
// deleteChildResource returns a handler that deletes a child
// resource (entrypoint or target) belonging to a webhook. The
// optional afterDelete hook runs with the webhook's id once the
// delete has succeeded, before the redirect, which carries done as
// its notice.
// delete has succeeded, before the redirect.
func (h *Handlers) deleteChildResource(
idParam string,
model any,
errMsg string,
afterDelete func(webhookID string),
done noticeCode,
) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
userID, ok := h.getUserID(r)
@@ -1682,7 +1682,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) deleteChildResource(
"id = ? AND user_id = ?", sourceID, userID,
).First(&webhook).Error
if err != nil {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusNotFound)
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
@@ -1692,7 +1692,11 @@ func (h *Handlers) deleteChildResource(
childID, webhook.ID,
).Delete(model)
if result.Error != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, errMsg, result.Error)
h.log.Error(errMsg, "error", result.Error)
http.Error(
w, "Internal server error",
http.StatusInternalServerError,
)
return
}
@@ -1703,7 +1707,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) deleteChildResource(
http.Redirect(
w, r,
withNotice("/hook/"+webhook.ID, done),
"/source/"+webhook.ID,
http.StatusSeeOther,
)
}
@@ -1714,7 +1718,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) deleteChildResource(
func (h *Handlers) HandleEntrypointToggle() http.HandlerFunc {
return h.toggleChildResource(
"entrypointID",
func(webhookID, childID string) (bool, error) {
func(webhookID, childID string) error {
var ep database.Entrypoint
err := h.db.DB().Where(
@@ -1722,15 +1726,14 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleEntrypointToggle() http.HandlerFunc {
childID, webhookID,
).First(&ep).Error
if err != nil {
return false, err
return err
}
ep.Active = !ep.Active
return ep.Active, h.db.DB().Save(&ep).Error
return h.db.DB().Save(&ep).Error
},
"failed to toggle entrypoint",
entrypointActivated, entrypointDeactivated,
)
}
@@ -1738,7 +1741,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleEntrypointToggle() http.HandlerFunc {
func (h *Handlers) HandleTargetToggle() http.HandlerFunc {
return h.toggleChildResource(
"targetID",
func(webhookID, childID string) (bool, error) {
func(webhookID, childID string) error {
var tgt database.Target
err := h.db.DB().Where(
@@ -1746,27 +1749,23 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleTargetToggle() http.HandlerFunc {
childID, webhookID,
).First(&tgt).Error
if err != nil {
return false, err
return err
}
tgt.Active = !tgt.Active
return tgt.Active, h.db.DB().Save(&tgt).Error
return h.db.DB().Save(&tgt).Error
},
"failed to toggle target",
targetActivated, targetDeactivated,
)
}
// toggleChildResource returns a handler that toggles the active
// state of a child resource belonging to a webhook. toggleFn returns
// the new state, and the redirect carries activated or deactivated as
// its notice to match.
// state of a child resource belonging to a webhook.
func (h *Handlers) toggleChildResource(
idParam string,
toggleFn func(webhookID, childID string) (bool, error),
toggleFn func(webhookID, childID string) error,
errMsg string,
activated, deactivated noticeCode,
) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
userID, ok := h.getUserID(r)
@@ -1787,26 +1786,25 @@ func (h *Handlers) toggleChildResource(
"id = ? AND user_id = ?", sourceID, userID,
).First(&webhook).Error
if err != nil {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusNotFound)
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
active, err := toggleFn(webhook.ID, childID)
err = toggleFn(webhook.ID, childID)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, errMsg, err)
h.log.Error(errMsg, "error", err)
http.Error(
w, "Internal server error",
http.StatusInternalServerError,
)
return
}
done := deactivated
if active {
done = activated
}
http.Redirect(
w, r,
withNotice("/hook/"+webhook.ID, done),
"/source/"+webhook.ID,
http.StatusSeeOther,
)
}
internal/handlers/source_management_test.go
+7 -7
View File
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ func submitCreate(
form.Set("retention_days", *retention)
}
req := formRequest("/hooks/new", cookies, form, nil)
req := formRequest("/sources/new", cookies, form, nil)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.HandleSourceCreateSubmit().ServeHTTP(w, req)
@@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ func TestHandleSourceCreate_PrefillsDefaultFromConstant(t *testing.T) {
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
env.handlers.HandleSourceCreate().ServeHTTP(
w, getRequest(t, "/hooks/new", env.cookies, nil),
w, getRequest(t, "/sources/new", env.cookies, nil),
)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
@@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ func TestHandleSourceCreateSubmit_RejectedFormKeepsUserInput(
form.Set("description", description)
form.Set("retention_days", "nonsense")
req := formRequest("/hooks/new", env.cookies, form, nil)
req := formRequest("/sources/new", env.cookies, form, nil)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
env.handlers.HandleSourceCreateSubmit().ServeHTTP(w, req)
@@ -430,7 +430,7 @@ func submitEdit(
form.Set("retention_days", retention)
req := formRequest(
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/edit",
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/edit",
env.cookies,
form,
map[string]string{sourceIDParam: wh.ID},
@@ -512,7 +512,7 @@ func TestSourceEditForm_ForeverWebhookRoundTrips(t *testing.T) {
)
req := getRequest(
t, "/hook/"+wh.ID+"/edit", env.cookies,
t, "/source/"+wh.ID+"/edit", env.cookies,
map[string]string{sourceIDParam: wh.ID},
)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
@@ -567,7 +567,7 @@ func TestSourceListAndDetail_ShowForeverNotTheSentinelNumber(
listW := httptest.NewRecorder()
env.handlers.HandleSourceList().ServeHTTP(
listW, getRequest(t, "/hooks", env.cookies, nil),
listW, getRequest(t, "/sources", env.cookies, nil),
)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, listW.Code)
@@ -578,7 +578,7 @@ func TestSourceListAndDetail_ShowForeverNotTheSentinelNumber(
env.handlers.HandleSourceDetail().ServeHTTP(
detailW,
getRequest(
t, "/hook/"+wh.ID, env.cookies,
t, "/source/"+wh.ID, env.cookies,
map[string]string{sourceIDParam: wh.ID},
),
)
internal/handlers/target_create_query_test.go
+3 -3
View File
@@ -76,11 +76,11 @@ func postTargetCreate(
router := chi.NewRouter()
router.Use(mw.Logging())
router.Post(
"/hook/{sourceID}/targets",
"/source/{sourceID}/targets",
env.handlers.HandleTargetCreate(),
)
target := "/hook/" + webhookID + "/targets"
target := "/source/" + webhookID + "/targets"
if query != "" {
target += "?" + query
}
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ func postTargetCreate(
// regression test for the ingress leak. r.FormValue falls back to the
// query string when a field is absent from the POST body, so
//
// POST /hook/{id}/targets?url=https://hooks.slack.com/services/...
// POST /source/{id}/targets?url=https://hooks.slack.com/services/...
//
// with an empty url field used to create a working target from a value
// carried on the request line — where logs, proxies, Referer headers
internal/handlers/target_edit.go
+7 -6
View File
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ type targetEditView struct {
//
// This page is the one place the full destination URL and header
// values are shown. It is reachable only through the
// /hook/{sourceID} route group, which supplies RequireAuth and
// /source/{sourceID} route group, which supplies RequireAuth and
// NoCache, and only for a target of a webhook the session's user
// owns; masking (delivery.TargetView) is unchanged everywhere else.
func (h *Handlers) HandleTargetEdit() http.HandlerFunc {
@@ -88,7 +88,9 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleTargetEditSubmit() http.HandlerFunc {
// middleware, which runs before CSRF parses the form.
err := r.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest)
http.Error(
w, "Bad request", http.StatusBadRequest,
)
return
}
@@ -155,14 +157,13 @@ func (h *Handlers) applyTargetEdit(
err = h.db.DB().Save(target).Error
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, r, "failed to update target", err)
h.serverError(w, "failed to update target", err)
return
}
http.Redirect(
w, r, withNotice("/hook/"+webhook.ID, targetSaved),
http.StatusSeeOther,
w, r, "/source/"+webhook.ID, http.StatusSeeOther,
)
}
@@ -219,7 +220,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) ownedTarget(
chi.URLParam(r, "targetID"), webhook.ID,
).First(&target).Error
if err != nil {
h.renderError(w, r, http.StatusNotFound)
http.NotFound(w, r)
return database.Webhook{}, nil, false
}
internal/handlers/target_edit_test.go
+9 -9
View File
@@ -42,15 +42,15 @@ const (
func targetRouter(env *sourceTestEnv) *chi.Mux {
router := chi.NewRouter()
router.Post(
"/hook/{sourceID}/targets",
"/source/{sourceID}/targets",
env.handlers.HandleTargetCreate(),
)
router.Get(
"/hook/{sourceID}/targets/{targetID}/edit",
"/source/{sourceID}/targets/{targetID}/edit",
env.handlers.HandleTargetEdit(),
)
router.Post(
"/hook/{sourceID}/targets/{targetID}/edit",
"/source/{sourceID}/targets/{targetID}/edit",
env.handlers.HandleTargetEditSubmit(),
)
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ func seedHTTPTarget(
w := serveTarget(
env, http.MethodPost,
"/hook/"+webhook.ID+"/targets", form,
"/source/"+webhook.ID+"/targets", form,
)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code, w.Body.String())
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ func submitTargetEdit(
) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
return serveTarget(
env, http.MethodPost,
"/hook/"+webhookID+"/targets/"+targetID+"/edit",
"/source/"+webhookID+"/targets/"+targetID+"/edit",
form,
)
}
@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ func TestHandleTargetEdit_PrefillsTheStoredValuesUnmasked(
w := serveTarget(
env, http.MethodGet,
"/hook/"+webhook.ID+"/targets/"+target.ID+"/edit",
"/source/"+webhook.ID+"/targets/"+target.ID+"/edit",
nil,
)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
@@ -508,7 +508,7 @@ func assertEditIgnoresQueryString(
w := serveTarget(
env, http.MethodPost,
"/hook/"+webhook.ID+"/targets/"+target.ID+
"/source/"+webhook.ID+"/targets/"+target.ID+
"/edit?url="+url.QueryEscape(editReplacedURL)+
"&headers="+url.QueryEscape(editAuthHeader),
form,
@@ -592,7 +592,7 @@ func assertTargetOfAnotherWebhook404s(
get := serveTarget(
env, http.MethodGet,
"/hook/"+mine.ID+"/targets/"+target.ID+"/edit", nil,
"/source/"+mine.ID+"/targets/"+target.ID+"/edit", nil,
)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusNotFound, get.Code)
@@ -630,7 +630,7 @@ func assertWebhookOfAnotherUser404s(
w := serveTarget(
env, http.MethodGet,
"/hook/"+other.ID+"/targets/"+target.ID+"/edit", nil,
"/source/"+other.ID+"/targets/"+target.ID+"/edit", nil,
)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusNotFound, w.Code)
internal/handlers/target_private_refusal_test.go
-116
View File
@@ -1,116 +0,0 @@
package handlers_test
import (
"net/http"
"net/url"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
// privateRefusalHint is the sentence that tells an operator a private
// destination is refused on purpose, and how to allow one.
const privateRefusalHint = "Private and reserved addresses are " +
"refused by default; the server's ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS setting " +
"allows named networks (see \"Allowing egress to your own " +
"network\" in the README)."
// TestTargetRefusal_PrivateDestinationSaysHowToAllowIt covers both
// target types that take a URL, on add and on edit.
func TestTargetRefusal_PrivateDestinationSaysHowToAllowIt(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSourceTest(t)
targetTypes := []database.TargetType{
database.TargetTypeHTTP,
database.TargetTypeSlack,
}
for _, targetType := range targetTypes {
t.Run(string(targetType), func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
webhook := seedWebhookWithRetention(t, env.db, 30)
targetsPath := "/hook/" + webhook.ID + "/targets"
form := url.Values{}
form.Set("name", "private")
form.Set("type", string(targetType))
form.Set("url", editBlockedURL)
added := serveTarget(
env, http.MethodPost, targetsPath, form,
)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, added.Code)
assert.Contains(
t, added.Body.String(), privateRefusalHint,
)
form.Set("url", editOriginalURL)
created := serveTarget(
env, http.MethodPost, targetsPath, form,
)
require.Equal(
t, http.StatusSeeOther, created.Code,
created.Body.String(),
)
targets := targetsForWebhook(t, env.db, webhook.ID)
require.Len(t, targets, 1)
form.Set("url", editBlockedURL)
edited := submitTargetEdit(
env, webhook.ID, targets[0].ID, form,
)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, edited.Code)
assert.Contains(
t, edited.Body.String(), privateRefusalHint,
)
})
}
}
// TestTargetRefusal_MetadataDestinationDoesNotSayHowToAllowIt: no
// setting opens a link-local address, and Azure's WireServer hands out
// VM credentials, so neither refusal points at the setting.
func TestTargetRefusal_MetadataDestinationDoesNotSayHowToAllowIt(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSourceTest(t)
metadataURLs := map[string]string{
"link-local": "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/",
"wireserver": "http://168.63.129.16/?comp=versions",
}
for name, metadataURL := range metadataURLs {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
webhook := seedWebhookWithRetention(t, env.db, 30)
form := url.Values{}
form.Set("name", "metadata")
form.Set("type", string(database.TargetTypeHTTP))
form.Set("url", metadataURL)
w := serveTarget(
env, http.MethodPost,
"/hook/"+webhook.ID+"/targets", form,
)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, w.Code)
assert.NotContains(
t, w.Body.String(), privateRefusalHint,
)
})
}
}
internal/handlers/target_retries_test.go
+1 -1
View File
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ func createWithRetries(
w := serveTarget(
env, http.MethodPost,
"/hook/"+webhook.ID+"/targets",
"/source/"+webhook.ID+"/targets",
createRetriesForm(retries),
)
internal/handlers/ui_copy_test.go
+10 -55
View File
@@ -54,7 +54,8 @@ func renderPage(
}
// TestNavbarUsesWebhookTerminology pins the user-visible navigation
// label to "Webhooks" and its link to the webhook list at /hooks.
// label to "Webhooks". The /sources route is deliberately unchanged, so
// the assertion targets the link text rather than the href.
func TestNavbarUsesWebhookTerminology(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -94,11 +95,15 @@ func TestNavbarUsesWebhookTerminology(t *testing.T) {
t, body, ">Sources<",
"no user-visible element may still be labelled Sources",
)
assert.Contains(t, body, `href="/hooks"`)
assert.Contains(
t, body, `href="/sources"`,
"the /sources route itself must not change",
)
}
// TestEditPageUsesWebhookTerminology pins the edit page's heading and
// its back link to the webhook page at /hook/{id}.
// its back link. The link's href still points at /source/{id}, which is
// intentional: only user-visible copy changes.
func TestEditPageUsesWebhookTerminology(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -125,57 +130,7 @@ func TestEditPageUsesWebhookTerminology(t *testing.T) {
assert.Contains(t, body, "Edit Webhook")
assert.NotContains(t, body, ">Sources<")
assert.Contains(t, body, `href="/hook/wh-1"`)
}
// TestEventLogPageIsCalledFullEventLog pins the one name the event log
// page at /hook/{id}/events goes by: both links to it on the webhook
// page, and its own heading, read "Full Event Log".
func TestEventLogPageIsCalledFullEventLog(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var h *handlers.Handlers
var sess *session.Session
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
// A pointer, as in the handlers: source_detail.html calls
// Webhook.RetentionLabel, a pointer method. Both pages only range
// over their lists, and a list left out renders as empty, so the
// lists are left out.
webhook := &database.Webhook{Name: "wh", RetentionDays: 14}
webhook.ID = testWebhookID
detailBody := renderPage(
t, h, sess, "source_detail.html", map[string]any{
dataKeyWebhook: webhook,
},
)
assert.Contains(
t, detailBody,
`<a href="/hook/wh-1/events" class="btn-secondary">Full Event Log</a>`,
"the button at the top of the webhook page",
)
assert.Contains(
t, detailBody,
`<a href="/hook/wh-1/events" class="btn-text text-sm">Full Event Log</a>`,
"the link under recent events",
)
logBody := renderPage(t, h, sess, "source_logs.html", map[string]any{
dataKeyWebhook: webhook,
"TotalEvents": int64(0),
})
assert.Contains(
t, logBody,
`<h1 class="text-2xl font-medium text-gray-900">Full Event Log</h1>`,
)
assert.Contains(t, body, `href="/source/wh-1"`)
}
// TestCreateFormRetentionCopyMatchesBehaviour pins the create form's
@@ -328,7 +283,7 @@ func TestEntrypointCopyButtonIsProgressiveEnhancement(t *testing.T) {
t, body,
`<code id="entrypoint-url-ep-1"`,
)
assert.Contains(t, body, "https://hooks.example.com/h/abc123")
assert.Contains(t, body, "https://hooks.example.com/webhook/abc123")
assert.Contains(
t, body,
`hidden data-copy-target="entrypoint-url-ep-1"`,
internal/handlers/webhook.go
+11 -43
View File
@@ -88,14 +88,14 @@ func (h *Handlers) processWebhookRequest(
headersJSON, err := json.Marshal(r.Header)
if err != nil {
h.receiverError(w, "failed to serialize headers", err)
h.serverError(w, "failed to serialize headers", err)
return
}
targets, err := h.loadActiveTargets(entrypoint.WebhookID)
if err != nil {
h.receiverError(w, "failed to query targets", err)
h.serverError(w, "failed to query targets", err)
return
}
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) lookupEntrypoint(
"path = ?", entrypointUUID,
).First(&entrypoint)
if result.Error != nil {
// The receiver is unauthenticated and /h/{uuid}
// The receiver is unauthenticated and /webhook/{uuid}
// matches any single segment, so this value is entirely
// client-chosen on exactly the branch where the lookup
// failed. DEBUG is off by default; the cap is what keeps
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) createAndDeliverEvent(
targets,
)
if err != nil {
h.receiverError(w, "failed to store webhook event", err)
h.serverError(w, "failed to store webhook event", err)
return
}
@@ -204,19 +204,6 @@ func (h *Handlers) createAndDeliverEvent(
h.finishWebhookResponse(w, event, entrypoint, tasks)
}
// receiverError logs an error and answers the sender with a plain-text
// 500. The receiver's answers are for programs, so it never sends the
// error page the web UI uses.
func (h *Handlers) receiverError(
w http.ResponseWriter, msg string, err error,
) {
h.log.Error(msg, "error", err)
http.Error(
w, "Internal server error",
http.StatusInternalServerError,
)
}
// eventSource carries the fields a new event is built from. The
// receiver fills it from the live request; the resubmit handler fills
// it from a stored event. Both then go through createAndFanOut, so an
@@ -243,7 +230,6 @@ func (s eventSource) event() *database.Event {
Method: s.Method,
Headers: s.HeadersJSON,
Body: string(s.Body),
BodyBytes: int64(len(s.Body)),
ContentType: s.ContentType,
ResubmittedFromID: s.ResubmittedFromID,
}
@@ -266,12 +252,11 @@ func requestEventSource(
}
}
// createAndFanOut writes the event and one pending delivery per target,
// and adds them to the webhook's running totals, in a single
// transaction, then hands the tasks to the delivery engine. It is the
// only path by which an event and its deliveries are created, so a
// resubmitted event is retried, SSRF-guarded and circuit-broken
// exactly as a received one is.
// createAndFanOut writes the event and one pending delivery per target
// in a single transaction, then hands the tasks to the delivery
// engine. It is the only path by which an event and its deliveries are
// created, so a resubmitted event is retried, SSRF-guarded and
// circuit-broken exactly as a received one is.
//
// The tasks are returned as well as queued, so a caller can report how
// many targets the event went to.
@@ -311,15 +296,6 @@ func (h *Handlers) createAndFanOut(
return nil, nil, err
}
err = database.AddEventTotals(tx, database.EventTotals{
Events: 1, LastEventAt: &event.CreatedAt,
})
if err != nil {
tx.Rollback()
return nil, nil, err
}
err = tx.Commit().Error
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf(
@@ -378,9 +354,8 @@ func (h *Handlers) finishWebhookResponse(
}
// buildDeliveryTasks creates one pending delivery per target in the
// transaction, adds each to its target's totals, and returns the tasks
// for the delivery engine. The caller owns the transaction and rolls
// it back on error.
// transaction and returns the tasks for the delivery engine. The
// caller owns the transaction and rolls it back on error.
func buildDeliveryTasks(
tx *gorm.DB,
event *database.Event,
@@ -404,13 +379,6 @@ func buildDeliveryTasks(
)
}
err = database.AddTargetTotals(tx, database.TargetTotals{
TargetID: targets[i].ID, Deliveries: 1,
})
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
tasks = append(tasks, delivery.Task{
DeliveryID: dlv.ID,
EventID: event.ID,
internal/handlers/webhook_stats.go
-259
View File
@@ -1,259 +0,0 @@
package handlers
import (
"fmt"
"time"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
// The spans of the two recent windows the statistics pane reports on:
// the last 10 minutes and the last 24 hours.
const (
shortWindow = 10 * time.Minute
longWindow = 24 * time.Hour
)
// percent turns a fraction into a percentage.
const percent = 100
// WebhookStats holds the figures in the statistics pane at the top of
// the webhook page.
type WebhookStats struct {
Entrypoints int
ActiveEntrypoints int
Targets int
ActiveTargets int
// Lifetime counts every event, delivery and failure the webhook
// has had, and WithinRetention those still stored.
Lifetime Counts
WithinRetention Counts
// InProgress counts the deliveries still pending or retrying.
InProgress int64
// LastEventAt is when the newest event arrived, or nil when none
// has. Retention does not change it.
LastEventAt *time.Time
Last10Minutes RecentWindow
Last24Hours RecentWindow
}
// Counts holds a number of events, of deliveries and of failed
// deliveries.
type Counts struct {
Events int64
Deliveries int64
Failures int64
}
// RecentWindow holds what happened in one recent window: the events
// received in it, and the deliveries that became delivered or failed in
// it.
type RecentWindow struct {
Events int64
Delivered int64
Failed int64
}
// TargetFinished is how many of one target's deliveries became
// delivered, and how many failed, in a recent window.
type TargetFinished struct {
TargetID string
Delivered int64
Failed int64
}
// FailurePercent is the share of the deliveries finished in the window
// that failed, or a dash when none finished. Deliveries still pending
// or retrying are not counted either way.
func (w RecentWindow) FailurePercent() string {
finished := w.Delivered + w.Failed
if finished == 0 {
return "—"
}
return fmt.Sprintf(
"%.1f%%", percent*float64(w.Failed)/float64(finished),
)
}
// loadWebhookStats gathers the figures for the statistics pane from the
// webhook's entrypoints and targets, as the page has already loaded
// them, and from its event database. It returns nil, and logs why, when
// the event database cannot be read.
func (h *Handlers) loadWebhookStats(
webhookID string,
entrypoints []database.Entrypoint,
targets []database.Target,
) *WebhookStats {
stats := &WebhookStats{
Entrypoints: len(entrypoints),
Targets: len(targets),
}
for i := range entrypoints {
if entrypoints[i].Active {
stats.ActiveEntrypoints++
}
}
for i := range targets {
if targets[i].Active {
stats.ActiveTargets++
}
}
// Opening an event database that does not exist would create it,
// and it would hold nothing to count.
if !h.dbMgr.DBExists(webhookID) {
return stats
}
webhookDB, err := h.dbMgr.GetDB(webhookID)
if err == nil {
err = readEventStats(webhookDB, time.Now(), stats)
}
if err != nil {
h.log.Error(
"failed to read webhook statistics",
"webhook_id", webhookID,
"error", err,
)
return nil
}
return stats
}
// readEventStats fills in the figures that come from the webhook's
// event database. None of them reads every stored row: the totals are
// one row for the events and one per target for the deliveries, and
// every other figure is read from an index, over only the rows it
// counts.
func readEventStats(
db *gorm.DB, now time.Time, stats *WebhookStats,
) error {
err := readTotals(db, stats)
if err != nil {
return err
}
err = db.Model(&database.Delivery{}).
Where("status IN ?", []database.DeliveryStatus{
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
}).
Count(&stats.InProgress).Error
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("counting deliveries in progress: %w", err)
}
stats.Last10Minutes, err = readRecentWindow(
db, now.Add(-shortWindow),
)
if err != nil {
return err
}
stats.Last24Hours, err = readRecentWindow(
db, now.Add(-longWindow),
)
return err
}
// readTotals fills in the lifetime and within-retention figures, and
// when the last event arrived, from the running totals: the events'
// row, and the targets' rows summed.
func readTotals(db *gorm.DB, stats *WebhookStats) error {
var events database.EventTotals
err := db.Take(&events).Error
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("reading event totals: %w", err)
}
var targets []database.TargetTotals
err = db.Find(&targets).Error
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("reading target totals: %w", err)
}
stats.Lifetime.Events = events.Events
stats.WithinRetention.Events = events.Events - events.EventsRemoved
stats.LastEventAt = events.LastEventAt
for _, t := range targets {
stats.Lifetime.Deliveries += t.Deliveries
stats.Lifetime.Failures += t.Failed
stats.WithinRetention.Deliveries += t.Deliveries - t.DeliveriesRemoved
stats.WithinRetention.Failures += t.Failed - t.FailedRemoved
}
return nil
}
// readRecentWindow counts the events received, and the deliveries that
// became delivered or failed, since the given time.
func readRecentWindow(
db *gorm.DB, since time.Time,
) (RecentWindow, error) {
var w RecentWindow
err := db.Model(&database.Event{}).
Where("created_at >= ?", since).
Count(&w.Events).Error
if err != nil {
return w, fmt.Errorf("counting recent events: %w", err)
}
byTarget, err := finishedByTarget(db, since)
if err != nil {
return w, err
}
for _, f := range byTarget {
w.Delivered += f.Delivered
w.Failed += f.Failed
}
return w, nil
}
// finishedByTarget counts, for each target, the deliveries that became
// delivered and those that failed since the given time, in one query
// over just that window of the deliveries' status index. A target with
// neither is left out.
func finishedByTarget(
db *gorm.DB, since time.Time,
) ([]TargetFinished, error) {
var byTarget []TargetFinished
err := db.Model(&database.Delivery{}).
Select("target_id, "+
"count(CASE WHEN status = ? THEN 1 END) AS delivered, "+
"count(CASE WHEN status = ? THEN 1 END) AS failed",
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
database.DeliveryStatusFailed).
Where("status IN ? AND finished_at >= ?",
[]database.DeliveryStatus{
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
}, since).
Group("target_id").
Find(&byTarget).Error
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"counting deliveries finished by target: %w", err,
)
}
return byTarget, nil
}
internal/handlers/webhook_stats_test.go
-569
View File
@@ -1,569 +0,0 @@
package handlers_test
import (
"net/http"
"regexp"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"go.uber.org/fx/fxtest"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"gorm.io/gorm/clause"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
)
// statsEntrypoint adds an entrypoint to a webhook and returns its path.
func statsEntrypoint(
t *testing.T, db *database.Database, webhookID string, active bool,
) string {
t.Helper()
ep := &database.Entrypoint{
WebhookID: webhookID,
Path: uuid.New().String(),
}
require.NoError(t, db.DB().Omit(clause.Associations).Create(ep).Error)
require.NoError(t, db.DB().Model(ep).Update("active", active).Error)
return ep.Path
}
// statsDelivery returns an event's delivery to a target.
func statsDelivery(
t *testing.T, webhookDB *gorm.DB, eventID, targetID string,
) database.Delivery {
t.Helper()
var d database.Delivery
require.NoError(t, webhookDB.Where(
"event_id = ? AND target_id = ?", eventID, targetID,
).First(&d).Error)
return d
}
// statsFinish settles a delivery as the delivery engine does: its
// final status and the time it finished, and one more on its target's
// delivered or failed total, in one transaction.
func statsFinish(
t *testing.T,
webhookDB *gorm.DB,
d database.Delivery,
status database.DeliveryStatus,
at time.Time,
) {
t.Helper()
add := database.TargetTotals{TargetID: d.TargetID, Delivered: 1}
if status == database.DeliveryStatusFailed {
add = database.TargetTotals{TargetID: d.TargetID, Failed: 1}
}
require.NoError(t, webhookDB.Transaction(func(tx *gorm.DB) error {
err := tx.Model(&database.Delivery{}).
Where("id = ?", d.ID).
Updates(map[string]any{"status": status, "finished_at": at}).
Error
if err != nil {
return err
}
return database.AddTargetTotals(tx, add)
}))
}
// statsAge moves an event's arrival back to the given time.
func statsAge(
t *testing.T, webhookDB *gorm.DB, eventID string, at time.Time,
) {
t.Helper()
require.NoError(t, webhookDB.Model(&database.Event{}).
Where("id = ?", eventID).
Update("created_at", at).Error)
}
// statsTargetTotals reads a webhook database's target totals, keyed by
// target.
func statsTargetTotals(
t *testing.T, webhookDB *gorm.DB,
) map[string]database.TargetTotals {
t.Helper()
var rows []database.TargetTotals
require.NoError(t, webhookDB.Find(&rows).Error)
byTarget := make(map[string]database.TargetTotals, len(rows))
for _, row := range rows {
byTarget[row.TargetID] = row
}
return byTarget
}
// statsHistory is the webhook seedStatsHistory builds: its event
// database, its newest event, and its two active targets.
type statsHistory struct {
webhook *database.Webhook
webhookDB *gorm.DB
newest database.Event
first, second string
}
// seedStatsHistory builds the webhook the statistics test checks: 14
// days of retention, twelve entrypoints (one inactive) and six targets
// (four inactive). Ten events arrive through the receiver, and so each
// has a delivery to the two active targets. The oldest event is past
// retention, the next 30 hours old, the next six hours old, the other
// seven just in. Six deliveries are settled as the delivery engine
// would, two of them inside a recent window though their event arrived
// before it. The newest event's delivery to the second target is
// retrying, the rest are left pending, and a replay adds a pending
// delivery to the oldest event. Once retention has removed the oldest
// event, every figure in the pane differs from every other.
func seedStatsHistory(
t *testing.T,
h *handlers.Handlers,
sess *session.Session,
db *database.Database,
dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager,
) statsHistory {
t.Helper()
wh := &database.Webhook{UserID: deleteTestUserID, Name: "stats", RetentionDays: 14}
require.NoError(t, db.DB().Omit(clause.Associations).Create(wh).Error)
path := statsEntrypoint(t, db, wh.ID, true)
for range 10 {
statsEntrypoint(t, db, wh.ID, true)
}
statsEntrypoint(t, db, wh.ID, false)
first := seedConfiguredTarget(
t, db, wh.ID, database.TargetTypeHTTP,
`{"url":"`+replayTargetURL+`"}`,
)
second := seedTarget(t, db, wh.ID, database.TargetTypeLog)
for range 4 {
inactive := seedTarget(t, db, wh.ID, database.TargetTypeLog)
require.NoError(t, db.DB().Model(inactive).
Update("active", false).Error)
}
router := receiverRouter(h)
for range 10 {
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, postReceiver(t, router, path))
}
webhookDB, err := dbMgr.GetDB(wh.ID)
require.NoError(t, err)
events := listEvents(t, webhookDB)
require.Len(t, events, 10)
oldest, yesterday, middle, newest := events[0], events[1], events[2], events[9]
now := time.Now()
statsAge(t, webhookDB, oldest.ID, now.Add(-15*24*time.Hour))
statsAge(t, webhookDB, yesterday.ID, now.Add(-30*time.Hour))
statsAge(t, webhookDB, middle.ID, now.Add(-6*time.Hour))
oldestFailure := statsDelivery(t, webhookDB, oldest.ID, first.ID)
statsFinish(t, webhookDB, oldestFailure,
database.DeliveryStatusFailed, now.Add(-14*24*time.Hour))
statsFinish(t, webhookDB,
statsDelivery(t, webhookDB, yesterday.ID, first.ID),
database.DeliveryStatusFailed, now.Add(-29*time.Hour))
statsFinish(t, webhookDB,
statsDelivery(t, webhookDB, yesterday.ID, second.ID),
database.DeliveryStatusFailed, now.Add(-23*time.Hour))
statsFinish(t, webhookDB,
statsDelivery(t, webhookDB, middle.ID, second.ID),
database.DeliveryStatusFailed, now.Add(-5*time.Hour))
statsFinish(t, webhookDB,
statsDelivery(t, webhookDB, middle.ID, first.ID),
database.DeliveryStatusFailed, now.Add(-time.Minute))
statsFinish(t, webhookDB,
statsDelivery(t, webhookDB, newest.ID, first.ID),
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered, now.Add(-2*time.Minute))
retrying := statsDelivery(t, webhookDB, newest.ID, second.ID)
require.NoError(t, webhookDB.Model(&retrying).
Update("status", database.DeliveryStatusRetrying).Error)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther,
postReplay(t, h, sess, wh.ID, oldestFailure.ID).Code)
return statsHistory{
webhook: wh, webhookDB: webhookDB, newest: newest,
first: first.ID, second: second.ID,
}
}
// statsPrune runs the real retention reaper until it has removed one
// event from the webhook's database, then stops it.
func statsPrune(
t *testing.T,
db *database.Database,
dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager,
log *logger.Logger,
webhookDB *gorm.DB,
) {
t.Helper()
lc := fxtest.NewLifecycle(t)
database.NewRetentionReaper(lc, database.RetentionReaperParams{
Config: &config.Config{
RetentionSweepInterval: 10 * time.Millisecond,
},
Database: db,
DBManager: dbMgr,
Logger: log,
})
lc.RequireStart()
require.Eventually(t, func() bool {
var totals database.EventTotals
err := webhookDB.Take(&totals).Error
return err == nil && totals.EventsRemoved == 1
}, 10*time.Second, 10*time.Millisecond)
lc.RequireStop()
}
// statsPane returns the text of the statistics pane in a rendered
// webhook page, everything from its heading to the next heading on the
// page, with the markup taken out and each run of space made one
// space. A table then reads header by header and row by row, each
// row's label followed by its figures in column order.
func statsPane(t *testing.T, page string) string {
t.Helper()
_, pane, found := strings.Cut(page, ">Statistics</h2>")
require.True(t, found, "the page has no statistics pane")
pane, _, _ = strings.Cut(pane, "<h2")
pane = regexp.MustCompile(`<[^>]*>`).ReplaceAllString(pane, " ")
return strings.Join(strings.Fields(pane), " ")
}
// assertStatsTargets checks, for the history seedStatsHistory builds,
// each target's totals and its deliveries finished in the last 24
// hours. The first target has ten deliveries and the replay, the
// second ten; the inactive targets have none and so no row.
func assertStatsTargets(t *testing.T, hist statsHistory) {
t.Helper()
first, second := hist.first, hist.second
assert.Equal(t, map[string]database.TargetTotals{
first: {TargetID: first, Deliveries: 11, Delivered: 1, Failed: 3},
second: {TargetID: second, Deliveries: 10, Failed: 2},
}, statsTargetTotals(t, hist.webhookDB))
lastDay, err := handlers.FinishedByTargetForTest(
hist.webhookDB, time.Now().Add(-24*time.Hour),
)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.ElementsMatch(t, []handlers.TargetFinished{
{TargetID: first, Delivered: 1, Failed: 1},
{TargetID: second, Failed: 2},
}, lastDay)
}
// assertStatsPaneAfterPrune checks the rendered statistics pane for the
// history seedStatsHistory builds, once retention has removed the
// oldest event: each figure after its label, in its column.
func assertStatsPaneAfterPrune(
t *testing.T,
h *handlers.Handlers,
sess *session.Session,
hist statsHistory,
) {
t.Helper()
pane := statsPane(t, renderSourceDetailPage(t, h, sess, hist.webhook.ID))
lastEvent := hist.newest.CreatedAt.UTC().Format("2006-01-02 15:04:05 UTC")
assert.Contains(t, pane, "Entrypoints 12 (11 active) "+
"Targets 6 (2 active) "+
"Deliveries in progress 13 "+
"Last event "+lastEvent+" "+
"Retention 14 days")
assert.Contains(t, pane, "Lifetime Within retention "+
"Events 10 9 "+
"Deliveries 21 18 "+
"Failures 5 4")
assert.Contains(t, pane, "Last 10 minutes Last 24 hours "+
"Events 7 8 "+
"Failures 1 3 "+
"Failure percentage 50.0% 75.0%")
}
// TestWebhookStats_EveryFigureAcrossRetentionPrune checks every figure
// the statistics pane shows for the history seedStatsHistory builds,
// and each target's totals and recent figures, before and after the
// real retention reaper removes the oldest event.
func TestWebhookStats_EveryFigureAcrossRetentionPrune(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
sess *session.Session
db *database.Database
dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager
log *logger.Logger
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db, &dbMgr, &log)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
hist := seedStatsHistory(t, h, sess, db, dbMgr)
first, second := hist.first, hist.second
stats := h.WebhookStatsForTest(hist.webhook.ID)
require.NotNil(t, stats)
assert.Equal(t, 12, stats.Entrypoints)
assert.Equal(t, 11, stats.ActiveEntrypoints)
assert.Equal(t, 6, stats.Targets)
assert.Equal(t, 2, stats.ActiveTargets)
assert.Equal(t, handlers.Counts{Events: 10, Deliveries: 21, Failures: 5},
stats.Lifetime)
assert.Equal(t, stats.Lifetime, stats.WithinRetention)
assert.Equal(t, int64(15), stats.InProgress)
require.NotNil(t, stats.LastEventAt)
assert.True(t, hist.newest.CreatedAt.Equal(*stats.LastEventAt))
assert.Equal(t, handlers.RecentWindow{
Events: 7, Delivered: 1, Failed: 1,
}, stats.Last10Minutes)
assert.Equal(t, handlers.RecentWindow{
Events: 8, Delivered: 1, Failed: 3,
}, stats.Last24Hours)
assert.Equal(t, "50.0%", stats.Last10Minutes.FailurePercent())
assert.Equal(t, "75.0%", stats.Last24Hours.FailurePercent())
assertStatsTargets(t, hist)
// Retention removes the oldest event with its three deliveries:
// the first target's failed one and the pending replay, and the
// second target's pending one.
statsPrune(t, db, dbMgr, log, hist.webhookDB)
after := h.WebhookStatsForTest(hist.webhook.ID)
require.NotNil(t, after)
assert.Equal(t, stats.Lifetime, after.Lifetime)
assert.Equal(t, handlers.Counts{Events: 9, Deliveries: 18, Failures: 4},
after.WithinRetention)
assert.Equal(t, int64(13), after.InProgress)
assert.Equal(t, stats.LastEventAt, after.LastEventAt)
assert.Equal(t, stats.Last10Minutes, after.Last10Minutes)
assert.Equal(t, stats.Last24Hours, after.Last24Hours)
assert.Equal(t, map[string]database.TargetTotals{
first: {
TargetID: first, Deliveries: 11, Delivered: 1, Failed: 3,
DeliveriesRemoved: 2, FailedRemoved: 1,
},
second: {
TargetID: second, Deliveries: 10, Failed: 2,
DeliveriesRemoved: 1,
},
}, statsTargetTotals(t, hist.webhookDB))
assertStatsPaneAfterPrune(t, h, sess, hist)
}
// TestWebhookStats_LastEventSurvivesPruningEveryEvent checks that once
// retention has removed every event, the pane still shows when the last
// one arrived rather than "none".
func TestWebhookStats_LastEventSurvivesPruningEveryEvent(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
sess *session.Session
db *database.Database
dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager
log *logger.Logger
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db, &dbMgr, &log)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
wh := &database.Webhook{
UserID: deleteTestUserID, Name: "pruned", RetentionDays: 1,
}
require.NoError(t, db.DB().Omit(clause.Associations).Create(wh).Error)
path := statsEntrypoint(t, db, wh.ID, true)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK,
postReceiver(t, receiverRouter(h), path))
webhookDB, err := dbMgr.GetDB(wh.ID)
require.NoError(t, err)
events := listEvents(t, webhookDB)
require.Len(t, events, 1)
arrived := events[0].CreatedAt
statsAge(t, webhookDB, events[0].ID, time.Now().Add(-50*time.Hour))
statsPrune(t, db, dbMgr, log, webhookDB)
require.Empty(t, listEvents(t, webhookDB))
stats := h.WebhookStatsForTest(wh.ID)
require.NotNil(t, stats)
require.NotNil(t, stats.LastEventAt)
assert.True(t, arrived.Equal(*stats.LastEventAt))
pane := statsPane(t, renderSourceDetailPage(t, h, sess, wh.ID))
assert.Contains(t, pane,
"Last event "+arrived.UTC().Format("2006-01-02 15:04:05 UTC"))
}
// TestWebhookStats_LastEventInUTC checks that the pane shows when the
// last event arrived in UTC, as the event list does, when the time was
// stored in another zone, as it is on a host whose local time is not
// UTC.
func TestWebhookStats_LastEventInUTC(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
sess *session.Session
db *database.Database
dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db, &dbMgr)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
wh := seedWebhook(t, db)
webhookDB, err := dbMgr.GetDB(wh.ID)
require.NoError(t, err)
arrived := time.Date(2026, time.March, 4, 22, 30, 0, 0,
time.FixedZone("EST", -5*60*60))
require.NoError(t, database.AddEventTotals(webhookDB,
database.EventTotals{Events: 1, LastEventAt: &arrived}))
pane := statsPane(t, renderSourceDetailPage(t, h, sess, wh.ID))
assert.Contains(t, pane, "Last event 2026-03-05 03:30:00 UTC")
}
// TestWebhookStats_PaneShowsRetentionPeriod checks that the statistics
// pane itself, not only the line at the foot of the page, shows the
// webhook's retention period, for a finite one and for forever.
func TestWebhookStats_PaneShowsRetentionPeriod(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
sess *session.Session
db *database.Database
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
tests := []struct {
retentionDays int
want string
}{
{30, "30 days"},
{database.RetentionForeverDays, "forever"},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
wh := &database.Webhook{
UserID: deleteTestUserID,
Name: "retention",
RetentionDays: tt.retentionDays,
}
require.NoError(t,
db.DB().Omit(clause.Associations).Create(wh).Error)
pane := statsPane(t, renderSourceDetailPage(t, h, sess, wh.ID))
assert.Contains(t, pane, "Retention "+tt.want)
}
}
// TestWebhookStats_WebhookWithNoEvents covers a webhook whose event
// database has never been opened: every count is zero, the
// percentages are a dash, and showing the page does not create the
// database.
func TestWebhookStats_WebhookWithNoEvents(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
sess *session.Session
db *database.Database
dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db, &dbMgr)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
wh := seedWebhook(t, db)
assert.Equal(t, &handlers.WebhookStats{}, h.WebhookStatsForTest(wh.ID))
assert.Equal(t, "—", handlers.RecentWindow{}.FailurePercent())
pane := statsPane(t, renderSourceDetailPage(t, h, sess, wh.ID))
assert.Contains(t, pane, "Last event none")
assert.Contains(t, pane, "Failure percentage — —")
assert.False(t, dbMgr.DBExists(wh.ID))
}
// TestRecentWindow_FailurePercent pins the percentage: failed
// deliveries out of all that finished in the window.
func TestRecentWindow_FailurePercent(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
window handlers.RecentWindow
want string
}{
{handlers.RecentWindow{}, "—"},
{handlers.RecentWindow{Events: 4}, "—"},
{handlers.RecentWindow{Delivered: 3, Failed: 1}, "25.0%"},
{handlers.RecentWindow{Failed: 2}, "100.0%"},
{handlers.RecentWindow{Delivered: 2}, "0.0%"},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
assert.Equal(t, tt.want, tt.window.FailurePercent(), tt.window)
}
}
internal/logfield/logfield_test.go
+1 -1
View File
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ func TestTruncate_LeavesShortValuesAlone(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, s := range []string{
"", "GET", "/hook/abc/edit", "Mozilla/5.0 (X11)",
"", "GET", "/source/abc/edit", "Mozilla/5.0 (X11)",
} {
assert.Equal(t, s, logfield.Truncate(s, budget))
}
internal/metrics/metrics.go
+20 -27
View File
@@ -3,18 +3,17 @@
// deliveries are attempted, how they end, how long they take, how
// deep the queues are, and how many circuit breakers are open.
//
// It also builds the registry the authenticated /metrics route
// serves. In production, these collectors, the inbound HTTP metrics
// recorded in internal/middleware, and the Go runtime and process
// collectors all register on that one registry, never on Prometheus's
// global default.
// The inbound HTTP metrics come from the go-http-metrics recorder in
// internal/middleware and land on prometheus.DefaultRegisterer. These
// collectors register there too, so both surfaces are gathered by the
// one promhttp handler mounted on the authenticated /metrics route.
package metrics
import (
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus/collectors"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus/promauto"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
@@ -58,31 +57,25 @@ var knownTargetTypes = []database.TargetType{
database.TargetTypeSlack,
}
// NewRegistry returns the registry /metrics serves, carrying the Go
// runtime and process collectors that Prometheus's global default
// registry carries, so the go_* and process_* series stay in the
// scrape.
// defaultSet is the process-wide metric set, registered on the same
// registry the HTTP middleware and the /metrics handler already use.
// It is built on first use rather than in an init so that a test
// binary that never touches metrics never registers them.
//
// A registry of its own, rather than the global default, is what lets
// two dependency graphs in one process — two tests, say — each
// register their collectors without the second registration
// panicking.
func NewRegistry() *prometheus.Registry {
reg := prometheus.NewRegistry()
reg.MustRegister(
collectors.NewGoCollector(),
collectors.NewProcessCollector(
collectors.ProcessCollectorOpts{},
),
)
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // one process-wide registration, by design
var defaultSet = sync.OnceValue(func() *Set {
return New(prometheus.DefaultRegisterer)
})
return reg
// Default returns the process-wide metric set.
func Default() *Set {
return defaultSet()
}
// Set is one registered group of webhooker's delivery collectors.
// Production builds one on the registry /metrics serves; tests build
// one on a registry of their own so they can gather what their own
// deliveries recorded.
// Production uses the single Default set; tests build their own
// against a private registry so assertions are not disturbed by
// deliveries other tests are making concurrently.
type Set struct {
eventsReceived prometheus.Counter
deliveryAttempts *prometheus.CounterVec
@@ -100,7 +93,7 @@ type Set struct {
// New registers a full set of delivery collectors on reg and returns
// it. It panics if reg already holds them, which is the intended
// behaviour for a duplicate registration.
func New(reg *prometheus.Registry) *Set {
func New(reg prometheus.Registerer) *Set {
factory := promauto.With(reg)
s := &Set{
internal/middleware/accesslog_test.go
+8 -8
View File
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ func accessLogRouter(m *middleware.Middleware) *chi.Mux {
)
router.HandleFunc(
"/h/{uuid}",
"/webhook/{uuid}",
func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Stands in for the real handler: an unknown entrypoint
// UUID 404s, a known one succeeds.
@@ -271,11 +271,11 @@ func TestAccessLog_InventedReceiverPathsLogRoutePattern(t *testing.T) {
assertFloodIsBounded(
t,
func(i int) string {
return "/h/" + attackerMarker +
return "/webhook/" + attackerMarker +
strings.Repeat("x", i) + "?q=" + attackerMarker
},
http.StatusNotFound,
"/h/{uuid}",
"/webhook/{uuid}",
)
}
@@ -346,10 +346,10 @@ type sizeCase struct {
func lineSizeCases() map[string]sizeCase {
cases := map[string]sizeCase{
"oversized path segment": {
target: "/h/" + attackerMarker +
target: "/webhook/" + attackerMarker +
strings.Repeat("x", oversizedSegmentBytes),
wantStatus: http.StatusNotFound,
wantURL: "/h/{uuid}",
wantURL: "/webhook/{uuid}",
bound: maxLineBytes,
},
// /.well-known/healthcheck answers 200 to anyone and has no
@@ -605,14 +605,14 @@ func TestAccessLog_SuccessKeepsConcretePathAndRedactsQuery(
router := accessLogRouter(m)
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusOK, get(t, router, "/h/known?src=ci"),
t, http.StatusOK, get(t, router, "/webhook/known?src=ci"),
)
// The path resolved against a stored entrypoint, so it stays. The
// query never does: see TestAccessLog_UnauthenticatedSuccess...
entries := accessLogEntries(t, buf)
require.Len(t, entries, 1)
assert.Equal(t, "/h/known?(redacted)", entries[0]["url"])
assert.Equal(t, "/webhook/known?(redacted)", entries[0]["url"])
assert.NotContains(t, buf.String(), "src=ci")
}
@@ -640,7 +640,7 @@ func TestAccessLog_RetainsEveryOtherField(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(
t,
http.StatusNotFound,
get(t, router, "/h/"+attackerMarker),
get(t, router, "/webhook/"+attackerMarker),
)
entries := accessLogEntries(t, buf)
internal/middleware/csrf.go
+4 -6
View File
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ func CSRFToken(r *http.Request) string {
// key to sign a CSRF cookie and validates a masked token submitted via
// the "csrf_token" form field (or the "X-CSRF-Token" header) on
// POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE requests. Requests with an invalid or missing
// token are logged and answered by forbidden, which must write the 403.
// token receive a 403 Forbidden response.
//
// The middleware detects the client-facing transport protocol
// per-request via reqtls.IsTLS, the single TLS predicate the session
@@ -36,14 +36,12 @@ func CSRFToken(r *http.Request) string {
// Two gorilla/csrf instances are maintained — one with Secure cookies
// (for TLS) and one without (for plaintext HTTP) — because the
// csrf.Secure option is set at creation time, not per-request.
func (m *Middleware) CSRF(
forbidden http.Handler,
) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
func (m *Middleware) CSRF() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
csrfErrorHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// CSRF is registered ahead of RequireAuth on every route
// group that uses it, so this WARN is reachable by an
// unauthenticated client: a POST with no token to
// /hook/<any length of any text>/edit lands here. The
// /source/<any length of any text>/edit lands here. The
// method and path are capped against the same budgets as
// the access log. remote_addr is set by net/http from the
// accepted connection rather than by the client, and
@@ -59,7 +57,7 @@ func (m *Middleware) CSRF(
"remote_addr", r.RemoteAddr,
"reason", csrf.FailureReason(r),
)
forbidden.ServeHTTP(w, r)
http.Error(w, "Forbidden - invalid CSRF token", http.StatusForbidden)
})
key := m.session.GetKey()
internal/middleware/csrf_test.go
+9 -15
View File
@@ -18,12 +18,6 @@ import (
// csrfCookieName is the gorilla/csrf cookie name.
const csrfCookieName = "_gorilla_csrf"
// forbidden stands in for the error page the server hands CSRF to
// answer a refused request with.
func forbidden(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden)
}
// csrfGetToken performs a GET request through the CSRF middleware
// and returns the token and cookies.
func csrfGetToken(
@@ -104,7 +98,7 @@ func TestCSRF_GETSetsToken(t *testing.T) {
var gotToken string
handler := m.CSRF(http.HandlerFunc(forbidden))(http.HandlerFunc(
handler := m.CSRF()(http.HandlerFunc(
func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
gotToken = middleware.CSRFToken(r)
},
@@ -126,7 +120,7 @@ func TestCSRF_POSTWithValidToken(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
m, _ := testMiddleware(t, config.EnvironmentDev)
csrfMW := m.CSRF(http.HandlerFunc(forbidden))
csrfMW := m.CSRF()
getReq := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(),
@@ -158,7 +152,7 @@ func csrfPOSTWithoutTokenTest(
t.Helper()
m, _ := testMiddleware(t, env)
csrfMW := m.CSRF(http.HandlerFunc(forbidden))
csrfMW := m.CSRF()
// GET to establish the CSRF cookie
getHandler := csrfMW(http.HandlerFunc(
@@ -215,7 +209,7 @@ func TestCSRF_POSTWithInvalidToken(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
m, _ := testMiddleware(t, config.EnvironmentDev)
csrfMW := m.CSRF(http.HandlerFunc(forbidden))
csrfMW := m.CSRF()
// GET to establish the CSRF cookie
getHandler := csrfMW(http.HandlerFunc(
@@ -271,7 +265,7 @@ func TestCSRF_GETDoesNotValidate(t *testing.T) {
var called bool
handler := m.CSRF(http.HandlerFunc(forbidden))(http.HandlerFunc(
handler := m.CSRF()(http.HandlerFunc(
func(_ http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
called = true
},
@@ -334,7 +328,7 @@ func csrfTookStrictPath(
t.Helper()
m, _ := testMiddleware(t, env)
csrfMW := m.CSRF(http.HandlerFunc(forbidden))
csrfMW := m.CSRF()
newReq := func(method string) *http.Request {
r := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
@@ -483,7 +477,7 @@ func TestCSRF_ProdMode_PlaintextHTTP_POSTWithValidToken(
t.Parallel()
m, _ := testMiddleware(t, config.EnvironmentProd)
csrfMW := m.CSRF(http.HandlerFunc(forbidden))
csrfMW := m.CSRF()
getReq := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(),
@@ -523,7 +517,7 @@ func TestCSRF_ProdMode_BehindProxy_POSTWithValidToken(
t.Parallel()
m, _ := testMiddleware(t, config.EnvironmentProd)
csrfMW := m.CSRF(http.HandlerFunc(forbidden))
csrfMW := m.CSRF()
getReq := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(),
@@ -568,7 +562,7 @@ func TestCSRF_ProdMode_DirectTLS_POSTWithValidToken(
t.Parallel()
m, _ := testMiddleware(t, config.EnvironmentProd)
csrfMW := m.CSRF(http.HandlerFunc(forbidden))
csrfMW := m.CSRF()
getReq := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(),
internal/middleware/export_test.go
+2 -1
View File
@@ -10,7 +10,8 @@ import (
// MetricsMiddlewareForTest builds the metrics recording middleware
// against a caller-supplied recorder, so a test can gather from its
// own Prometheus registry without building a whole Middleware.
// own Prometheus registry rather than the process-wide default one
// that Middleware.Metrics uses.
func MetricsMiddlewareForTest(
rec httpmetrics.Recorder,
) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
internal/middleware/logbound_test.go
+4 -6
View File
@@ -260,9 +260,7 @@ func logSites() map[string]logSite {
) http.Handler {
t.Helper()
return m.CSRF(http.HandlerFunc(forbidden))(
unreachable(t),
)
return m.CSRF()(unreachable(t))
},
send: postNoToken,
wantStatus: http.StatusForbidden,
@@ -385,7 +383,7 @@ func TestLogLines_ClientChosenPathDoesNotSizeTheLine(t *testing.T) {
t, newHandler,
)
path := "/hook/" +
path := "/source/" +
oversizedPathSegment(fill) + "/edit"
assert.Equal(
@@ -436,7 +434,7 @@ func TestLoginThrottle_LogLineDoesNotTrackPathSize(t *testing.T) {
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(),
http.MethodPost,
"/hook/"+
"/source/"+
oversizedPathSegment(fill)+"/login",
nil,
)
@@ -501,7 +499,7 @@ func TestMaxBodySize_FloodOfOversizePathsDoesNotGrowTheLog(
http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge,
postOversize(
h,
"/hook/"+segment(i)+"/edit",
"/source/"+segment(i)+"/edit",
),
)
}
internal/middleware/loginguard.go
+4 -4
View File
@@ -108,10 +108,10 @@ type failureWindow struct {
//
// A limiter that spends budget on arrival cannot protect a
// single-admin product: behind the reverse proxy the deployment
// requires, when TRUSTED_PROXIES does not cover it, every client
// keys on the proxy, so a stranger trickling five POSTs a minute
// keeps the one bucket full and the operator's own correct password
// is answered 429 forever. There is no second administrative path.
// requires, with TRUSTED_PROXIES unset, every client keys on the
// proxy, so a stranger trickling five POSTs a minute keeps the one
// bucket full and the operator's own correct password is answered 429
// forever. There is no second administrative path.
//
// So budget is spent only by a FAILED verification. A correct
// password is never throttled, whatever the counters say, which is
internal/middleware/metrics.go
+9 -8
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (
"github.com/go-chi/chi"
httpmetrics "github.com/slok/go-http-metrics/metrics"
prommetrics "github.com/slok/go-http-metrics/metrics/prometheus"
ghmm "github.com/slok/go-http-metrics/middleware"
"github.com/slok/go-http-metrics/middleware/std"
)
@@ -39,7 +40,7 @@ const unmatchedMethod = unmatchedRoute
//
// The pattern is what bounds the label's domain to the routes the
// service registers. The path does not bound it at all — every byte
// after /h/ is client-chosen, so labelling by path lets any
// after /webhook/ is client-chosen, so labelling by path lets any
// unauthenticated client mint permanent series at will, and publishes
// the entrypoint UUID (the receiver's only credential) in the scrape
// while doing it.
@@ -150,17 +151,17 @@ func (r boundedLabelRecorder) AddInflightRequests(
var _ httpmetrics.Recorder = boundedLabelRecorder{}
// Metrics returns middleware that records Prometheus HTTP metrics
// with the Middleware's one recorder, which New builds on the registry
// the /metrics route serves and NewForTest on a registry of its own.
// Every call reuses that recorder, so any number of routers can
// install it.
// Metrics returns middleware that records Prometheus HTTP metrics on
// the default registry, which is the one the /metrics route gathers.
func (s *Middleware) Metrics() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return metricsMiddleware(s.metricsRecorder)
return metricsMiddleware(
prommetrics.NewRecorder(prommetrics.Config{}),
)
}
// metricsMiddleware builds the recording middleware against a given
// recorder, so tests can gather from a registry of their own.
// recorder, so tests can gather from a registry of their own instead
// of the process-wide default.
func metricsMiddleware(
rec httpmetrics.Recorder,
) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
internal/middleware/metrics_method_test.go
+1 -1
View File
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ func realMethods() []string {
// dimension varying, so any series growth a probe produces is the
// method label's and nothing else's.
func methodProbePath() string {
return "/h/" + uuid.NewString()
return "/webhook/" + uuid.NewString()
}
// inventedMethods returns n distinct RFC 9110 method tokens that no
internal/middleware/metrics_test.go
+9 -34
View File
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ const (
// receiverRoutePattern is the one handler label every receiver
// request must produce, however the client varies the path.
receiverRoutePattern = "/h/{uuid}"
receiverRoutePattern = "/webhook/{uuid}"
// okRoute is a static route used to pin that the response-writer
// interceptor still reports status and size after the handler id
@@ -57,8 +57,9 @@ const (
// Server.setupWebhookRoutes inside it. That ordering is the whole
// defect, so a test that flattens it would prove nothing.
//
// The recorder writes to a registry of the test's own, so each test
// observes only its own traffic.
// The recorder writes to a registry of the test's own rather than the
// process-wide default one, so each test observes only its own
// traffic.
func metricsTestRouter(
t *testing.T,
receiverLimit int,
@@ -142,13 +143,13 @@ func drivePaths(
return drive(t, h, probes)
}
// receiverPaths returns n distinct /h/ paths, each naming a
// receiverPaths returns n distinct /webhook/ paths, each naming a
// fresh UUID exactly as an unauthenticated flood would.
func receiverPaths(n int) []string {
paths := make([]string, 0, n)
for range n {
paths = append(paths, "/h/"+uuid.NewString())
paths = append(paths, "/webhook/"+uuid.NewString())
}
return paths
@@ -219,7 +220,7 @@ func keys(set map[string]struct{}) []string {
// TestMetrics_DistinctReceiverPathsMintOneLabelSet is the direct
// assertion the issue asks for: N requests to N distinct
// /h/<uuid> paths must produce exactly ONE handler label, the
// /webhook/<uuid> paths must produce exactly ONE handler label, the
// route pattern. Before the fix this produced N of them.
func TestMetrics_DistinctReceiverPathsMintOneLabelSet(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -249,7 +250,7 @@ func TestMetrics_DistinctReceiverPathsMintOneLabelSet(t *testing.T) {
// The scrape must not republish the UUIDs it was driven with.
// They are the receiver's only credential.
for _, p := range paths {
id := strings.TrimPrefix(p, "/h/")
id := strings.TrimPrefix(p, "/webhook/")
for label := range labels {
assert.NotContains(
t, label, id,
@@ -353,7 +354,7 @@ func TestMetrics_UnmatchedPathsCollapseToTheSentinel(t *testing.T) {
if i%2 == 0 {
paths = append(paths, "/"+id)
} else {
paths = append(paths, "/h/"+id+"/"+id)
paths = append(paths, "/webhook/"+id+"/"+id)
}
}
@@ -454,29 +455,3 @@ func TestMetrics_StatusAndSizeStillRecorded(t *testing.T) {
"the interceptor must still count written bytes",
)
}
// TestMetrics_WorksOnNewForTestMiddleware pins that a Middleware built
// by NewForTest has a recorder of its own: its Metrics() serves a
// request instead of panicking, and a second one does not collide
// with the first.
func TestMetrics_WorksOnNewForTestMiddleware(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
log := slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler)
cfg := &config.Config{Environment: "prod"}
ok := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(okBody))
})
for range 2 {
h := middleware.NewForTest(log, cfg, nil).Metrics()(ok)
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
t.Context(), http.MethodGet, okRoute, nil,
)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(w, req)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
}
}
internal/middleware/middleware.go
+8 -48
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import (
"log/slog"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"sync"
"time"
@@ -14,9 +13,6 @@ import (
"github.com/go-chi/chi"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/middleware"
"github.com/go-chi/cors"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus"
httpmetrics "github.com/slok/go-http-metrics/metrics"
prommetrics "github.com/slok/go-http-metrics/metrics/prometheus"
"go.uber.org/fx"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/globals"
@@ -152,11 +148,10 @@ const (
type MiddlewareParams struct {
fx.In
Logger *logger.Logger
Globals *globals.Globals
Config *config.Config
Session *session.Session
Registry *prometheus.Registry
Logger *logger.Logger
Globals *globals.Globals
Config *config.Config
Session *session.Session
}
// Middleware provides HTTP middleware for logging, CORS, auth, and
@@ -166,14 +161,6 @@ type Middleware struct {
params *MiddlewareParams
session *session.Session
// metricsRecorder records the inbound HTTP metrics. New builds
// it on the registry /metrics serves, NewForTest on a registry
// of its own. Either way it is built once per Middleware and
// Metrics reuses it, because building it registers its
// collectors, and a second registration on the same registry
// panics.
metricsRecorder httpmetrics.Recorder
// loginGuard counts failed credential verifications and bounds
// concurrent password hashing. It is built on first use so that
// every construction path gets one; see guard().
@@ -192,9 +179,6 @@ func New(
s.params = &params
s.log = params.Logger.Get()
s.session = params.Session
s.metricsRecorder = prommetrics.NewRecorder(
prommetrics.Config{Registry: params.Registry},
)
return s, nil
}
@@ -273,7 +257,7 @@ func concreteLogURL(r *http.Request) string {
//
// 3xx and 4xx responses get the chi route pattern instead. Those are
// the outcomes an unauthenticated client drives for free: 404 or 429
// on any invented /h/ path, 303 to the login page on any
// on any invented /webhook/ path, 303 to the login page on any
// invented /user/ path. Logging the concrete URL there lets a flood
// write attacker-chosen text, of attacker-chosen length, into the
// operator's log at one line per request. The pattern comes from the
@@ -382,30 +366,6 @@ func (s *Middleware) CORS() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
}
}
// NextParam is the query parameter on the login redirect, and the
// login form field, that holds the page to return to after login.
const NextParam = "next"
// MaxNextBytes bounds the NextParam value. The login page writes it
// into its form, and every page is rendered into a buffer first, so
// without a bound a request would choose the size of that buffer.
const MaxNextBytes = 2048
// loginURL is the login page RequireAuth redirects to. A GET carries
// its own path and query in NextParam so that logging in returns to
// it, unless they are longer than MaxNextBytes; loginDestination in
// the handlers package checks whether that value is safe to follow.
// Other methods carry nothing, since a redirect cannot repeat them.
func loginURL(r *http.Request) string {
next := r.URL.RequestURI()
if r.Method != http.MethodGet || len(next) > MaxNextBytes {
return "/pages/login"
}
return "/pages/login?" + url.Values{NextParam: {next}}.Encode()
}
// RequireAuth returns middleware that checks for a valid session.
// Unauthenticated users are redirected to the login page.
func (s *Middleware) RequireAuth() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
@@ -421,7 +381,7 @@ func (s *Middleware) RequireAuth() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
"error", err,
)
http.Redirect(
w, r, loginURL(r), http.StatusSeeOther,
w, r, "/pages/login", http.StatusSeeOther,
)
return
@@ -449,7 +409,7 @@ func (s *Middleware) RequireAuth() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
),
)
http.Redirect(
w, r, loginURL(r), http.StatusSeeOther,
w, r, "/pages/login", http.StatusSeeOther,
)
return
@@ -600,7 +560,7 @@ func (s *Middleware) MaxBodySize(
// internal/server/routes.go), so an
// unauthenticated client reaches it with a path
// of its own choosing and its own length —
// POST /hook/<8 KB>/edit with an oversize
// POST /source/<8 KB>/edit with an oversize
// declared Content-Length costs nothing to
// send. At WARN, on by default, that is a
// write into the operator's log sized by the
internal/middleware/middleware_test.go
+3 -77
View File
@@ -338,76 +338,6 @@ func TestRequireAuth_NoSession_RedirectsToLogin(t *testing.T) {
"unauthenticated request",
)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(
t, "/pages/login?next=%2Fdashboard", w.Header().Get("Location"),
)
}
// TestRequireAuth_LoginRedirectCarriesOnlyAGet pins what the login
// redirect carries: a GET's path and query, so logging in can return
// there, and nothing for a POST, which a redirect cannot repeat.
func TestRequireAuth_LoginRedirectCarriesOnlyAGet(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
m, _ := testMiddleware(t, config.EnvironmentDev)
handler := m.RequireAuth()(http.HandlerFunc(
func(_ http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {},
))
get := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(),
http.MethodGet, "/hook/abc/events?page=2", nil,
)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(w, get)
assert.Equal(
t, "/pages/login?next=%2Fhook%2Fabc%2Fevents%3Fpage%3D2",
w.Header().Get("Location"),
)
post := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(),
http.MethodPost, "/hook/abc/delete", nil,
)
w = httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(w, post)
assert.Equal(t, "/pages/login", w.Header().Get("Location"))
}
// TestRequireAuth_LoginRedirectLeavesOutALongURL: a GET whose path
// and query are longer than the login page accepts goes to the plain
// login page, so a long URL does not make the redirect long.
func TestRequireAuth_LoginRedirectLeavesOutALongURL(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
m, _ := testMiddleware(t, config.EnvironmentDev)
handler := m.RequireAuth()(http.HandlerFunc(
func(_ http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {},
))
atLimit := "/" + strings.Repeat("a", middleware.MaxNextBytes-1)
get := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(), http.MethodGet, atLimit, nil,
)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(w, get)
assert.Equal(
t, "/pages/login?next=%2F"+atLimit[1:],
w.Header().Get("Location"),
)
get = httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(), http.MethodGet, atLimit+"a", nil,
)
w = httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(w, get)
assert.Equal(t, "/pages/login", w.Header().Get("Location"))
}
@@ -513,9 +443,7 @@ func TestRequireAuth_UnauthenticatedSession_RedirectsToLogin(
"unauthenticated session",
)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(
t, "/pages/login?next=%2Fdashboard", w.Header().Get("Location"),
)
assert.Equal(t, "/pages/login", w.Header().Get("Location"))
}
// --- RequireAuth Session Expiry Tests ---
@@ -613,9 +541,7 @@ func TestRequireAuth_IdleExpiredSession_RedirectsToLogin(
"handler should not run for an idle-expired session",
)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(
t, "/pages/login?next=%2Fdashboard", w.Header().Get("Location"),
)
assert.Equal(t, "/pages/login", w.Header().Get("Location"))
assert.Empty(
t, sessionCookies(w),
"an expired session must not be refreshed",
@@ -714,7 +640,7 @@ func TestNoCache_SetsHeaders(t *testing.T) {
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(),
http.MethodGet, "/hooks", nil,
http.MethodGet, "/sources", nil,
)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
internal/middleware/ratelimit.go
+5 -4
View File
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ const (
// receiverAggregateMultiplier scales the configured
// per-entrypoint receiver limit into the aggregate limit one
// client IP may spend across the whole /h/* route. Ten
// client IP may spend across the whole /webhook/* route. Ten
// entrypoints' worth lets a single sender address drive several
// entrypoints at their full rate, while still capping what one
// address costs the unauthenticated receiver.
@@ -123,8 +123,9 @@ func bucketKey(addr netip.Addr) string {
return prefix.String()
}
// isTrustedProxy reports whether addr belongs to a network in
// TRUSTED_PROXIES, which by default is the RFC 1918 private ranges.
// isTrustedProxy reports whether addr belongs to a network the
// operator listed in TRUSTED_PROXIES. The list is empty by default,
// so by default nothing is trusted.
func (m *Middleware) isTrustedProxy(addr netip.Addr) bool {
for _, prefix := range m.params.Config.TrustedProxies {
if prefix.Contains(addr) {
@@ -389,7 +390,7 @@ func (m *Middleware) postRateLimit(
// It is Config.ReceiverRateLimit requests per minute.
//
// That limit alone bounds nothing in aggregate. The route pattern
// /h/{uuid} matches any single segment, so a client that
// /webhook/{uuid} matches any single segment, so a client that
// invents a fresh path per request mints a fresh bucket per request
// and never refills one — and every such request still reaches the
// handler's entrypoint lookup before it 404s. The outer limit is
internal/middleware/ratelimit_test.go
+21 -22
View File
@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ func TestReceiverRateLimit_LimitsPerIPAndPath(t *testing.T) {
// pass.
for i := range limit {
w := receiverPost(
handler, "9.9.9.9:1234", "/h/uuid-a",
handler, "9.9.9.9:1234", "/webhook/uuid-a",
)
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusOK, w.Code,
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ func TestReceiverRateLimit_LimitsPerIPAndPath(t *testing.T) {
// The next request over the limit is rejected with a 429
// carrying a Retry-After header.
w := receiverPost(
handler, "9.9.9.9:1234", "/h/uuid-a",
handler, "9.9.9.9:1234", "/webhook/uuid-a",
)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, w.Code)
assert.NotEmpty(
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ func TestReceiverRateLimit_LimitsPerIPAndPath(t *testing.T) {
// The same IP is not limited on a different entrypoint.
w = receiverPost(
handler, "9.9.9.9:1234", "/h/uuid-b",
handler, "9.9.9.9:1234", "/webhook/uuid-b",
)
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusOK, w.Code,
@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ func TestReceiverRateLimit_LimitsPerIPAndPath(t *testing.T) {
// A different IP is not limited on the same entrypoint.
w = receiverPost(
handler, "8.8.8.8:1234", "/h/uuid-a",
handler, "8.8.8.8:1234", "/webhook/uuid-a",
)
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusOK, w.Code,
@@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ func TestReceiverRateLimit_CountsEveryMethod(t *testing.T) {
const (
limit = 2
ip = "7.7.7.7:1234"
path = "/h/uuid-c"
path = "/webhook/uuid-c"
)
handler := receiverLimitedHandler(t, limit)
@@ -384,8 +384,8 @@ const (
// trustedProxyCIDR is the proxy network the forwarded-path
// tests configure, and trustedPeer an address inside it. A
// production deployment is required to run behind a reverse
// proxy that TRUSTED_PROXIES covers, either by the default or by
// a set value, so this is the shape the bucketing has to hold in.
// proxy with TRUSTED_PROXIES set, so this is the shape the
// bucketing has to hold in.
trustedProxyCIDR = "10.0.0.0/8"
trustedPeer = "10.0.0.1:44444"
)
@@ -426,8 +426,8 @@ func assertSharedBucket(
}
// TestRateLimitKey_SpoofedForwardedFromUntrustedPeer is the test
// this gating exists for: from a peer that is not a trusted
// proxy, a client that rotates a forwarded header on every
// this gating exists for: with no trusted proxies configured (the
// default), a client that rotates a forwarded header on every
// request must stay in one bucket. If forwarded headers were
// trusted unconditionally, each spoofed value would mint a fresh
// bucket and the limit would stop no one.
@@ -715,7 +715,7 @@ func TestReceiverRateLimit_LimitsAggregateAcrossInventedPaths(
// none of them shares a per-entrypoint bucket with another.
for i := range aggregate {
w := receiverPost(
handler, ip, fmt.Sprintf("/h/invented-%d", i),
handler, ip, fmt.Sprintf("/webhook/invented-%d", i),
)
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusOK, w.Code,
@@ -724,17 +724,17 @@ func TestReceiverRateLimit_LimitsAggregateAcrossInventedPaths(
}
w := receiverPost(
handler, ip, fmt.Sprintf("/h/invented-%d", aggregate),
handler, ip, fmt.Sprintf("/webhook/invented-%d", aggregate),
)
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, w.Code,
"a client must not be able to raise its aggregate rate "+
"against /h/* by varying the path",
"against /webhook/* by varying the path",
)
// The aggregate limit is still per client IP: exhausting one
// address must not throttle another.
w = receiverPost(handler, "6.6.6.7:1234", "/h/invented-0")
w = receiverPost(handler, "6.6.6.7:1234", "/webhook/invented-0")
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusOK, w.Code,
"a different client IP must not be affected",
@@ -771,7 +771,7 @@ func TestReceiverRateLimit_RejectedRequestsCountTowardAggregate(
// limit requests are served; the rest are rejected by the
// per-entrypoint limiter but still count against the aggregate.
for i := range aggregate {
w := receiverPost(handler, ip, "/h/exhausted")
w := receiverPost(handler, ip, "/webhook/exhausted")
want := http.StatusTooManyRequests
if i < limit {
@@ -784,7 +784,7 @@ func TestReceiverRateLimit_RejectedRequestsCountTowardAggregate(
)
}
w := receiverPost(handler, ip, "/h/never-used")
w := receiverPost(handler, ip, "/webhook/never-used")
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, w.Code,
"requests rejected per entrypoint must still count "+
@@ -823,7 +823,7 @@ func TestReceiverRateLimit_IgnoresForwardedFromUntrustedPeer(
const (
limit = 3
peer = "203.0.113.10:44444"
path = "/h/uuid-d"
path = "/webhook/uuid-d"
)
handler := receiverLimitedHandler(t, limit)
@@ -1097,9 +1097,8 @@ func TestPostRateLimit_IPv4IndependentPerAddress(t *testing.T) {
// that arrives from trustedPeer — a configured trusted proxy — and
// names forwarded as its client in X-Forwarded-For. That is the
// production path: a deployment is required to run behind a reverse
// proxy that TRUSTED_PROXIES covers, either by the default or by a
// set value, so the forwarded address, not the peer, is what the
// limiters bucket on there.
// proxy with TRUSTED_PROXIES set, so the forwarded address, not the
// peer, is what the limiters bucket on there.
func forwardedKeyFor(
t *testing.T, m *middleware.Middleware, forwarded string,
) string {
@@ -1179,9 +1178,9 @@ func TestRateLimitKey_ForwardedIPv6BucketsByPrefix(t *testing.T) {
//
// Every existing test of this fallback uses an IPv4 proxy, where
// bucketKey is the identity function, so replacing the call with
// peer.String() leaves the whole suite green. Only addresses inside
// TRUSTED_PROXIES reach this line and the fallback is fail-closed, so
// this pins behaviour rather than fixing a defect.
// peer.String() leaves the whole suite green. Only operator-listed
// addresses reach this line and the fallback is fail-closed, so this
// pins behaviour rather than fixing a defect.
func TestRateLimitKey_TrustedPeerUnusableForwardedMasksPeer(
t *testing.T,
) {
internal/middleware/recoverer.go
+3 -37
View File
@@ -109,8 +109,7 @@ func (w *recoverResponseWriter) Unwrap() http.ResponseWriter {
// Recoverer returns middleware that turns a handler panic into one
// structured ERROR record and a 500, rather than a dropped
// connection. The 500 is page when page is not nil, and plain text
// when it is nil or when page panics before writing anything.
// connection.
//
// It replaces chi's middleware.Recoverer, which does neither on a
// current Go release. chi v1.5.5's pretty-printer scans the stack for
@@ -137,13 +136,9 @@ func (w *recoverResponseWriter) Unwrap() http.ResponseWriter {
//
// Unlike http.Error on its own, it deletes any Set-Cookie the handler
// set before panicking, because a request that failed must not hand
// the client a credential. It touches no other header: when page
// answers, every other header the handler set goes out with it, apart
// from any page sets itself; otherwise they are left to http.Error.
// the client a credential; every other header is left to http.Error.
// See https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/193.
func (s *Middleware) Recoverer(
page http.Handler,
) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
func (s *Middleware) Recoverer() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(
w http.ResponseWriter,
@@ -176,14 +171,6 @@ func (s *Middleware) Recoverer(
rw.Header().Del("Set-Cookie")
if page != nil {
s.servePage(rw, r, page)
}
if rw.committed {
return
}
http.Error(
rw,
http.StatusText(
@@ -198,27 +185,6 @@ func (s *Middleware) Recoverer(
}
}
// servePage answers with page. A panic in page itself is logged and
// recovered here, so the Recoverer can still send its plain 500.
func (s *Middleware) servePage(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
page http.Handler,
) {
defer func() {
rvr := recover()
if rvr != nil {
s.log.Error("error page panic",
"panic", logfield.Truncate(
fmt.Sprint(rvr), maxPanicValueBytes,
),
)
}
}()
page.ServeHTTP(w, r)
}
// logPanic writes the record. Every field it can grow is truncated to
// a fixed budget, so MaxPanicLogLineBytes holds.
//
internal/middleware/recoverer_test.go
+2 -58
View File
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ func newRecovererProbe(
// Logging outside so the recovered 500 is the status it records.
router.Use(chimw.RequestID)
router.Use(m.Logging())
router.Use(m.Recoverer(nil))
router.Use(m.Recoverer())
router.Get("/probe", handler)
serverErrors := new(bytes.Buffer)
@@ -637,7 +637,7 @@ func TestRecovererKeepsResponseControllerWorking(t *testing.T) {
m, _ := capturingMiddleware(t)
handler := m.Recoverer(nil)(http.HandlerFunc(
handler := m.Recoverer()(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
_, _ = w.Write([]byte("chunk"))
@@ -672,59 +672,3 @@ func TestRecovererKeepsResponseControllerWorking(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, resp.StatusCode)
assert.Equal(t, "chunk", string(body))
}
// TestRecovererAnswersWithThePage covers a recoverer given a page:
// the panic is logged as before, and the 500 is that page.
func TestRecovererAnswersWithThePage(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
m, logs := capturingMiddleware(t)
page := http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte("the error page"))
},
)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
m.Recoverer(page)(http.HandlerFunc(panicProbe)).ServeHTTP(
w, httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
t.Context(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil,
),
)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusInternalServerError, w.Code)
assert.Equal(t, "the error page", w.Body.String())
assert.Contains(t, logs.String(), `"msg":"handler panic"`)
assert.Contains(t, logs.String(), panicMarker)
}
// TestRecovererFallsBackWhenThePagePanics covers a page that panics
// before writing anything: both panics are logged, and the client
// still gets the plain 500.
func TestRecovererFallsBackWhenThePagePanics(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
m, logs := capturingMiddleware(t)
const pagePanic = "QQERRORPAGEPANICQQ"
page := http.HandlerFunc(
func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
panic(pagePanic)
},
)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
m.Recoverer(page)(http.HandlerFunc(panicProbe)).ServeHTTP(
w, httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
t.Context(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil,
),
)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusInternalServerError, w.Code)
assert.Equal(t, "Internal Server Error\n", w.Body.String())
assert.Contains(t, logs.String(), panicMarker)
assert.Contains(t, logs.String(), pagePanic)
}
internal/middleware/testing.go
-8
View File
@@ -3,17 +3,12 @@ package middleware
import (
"log/slog"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus"
prommetrics "github.com/slok/go-http-metrics/metrics/prometheus"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
)
// NewForTest creates a Middleware with the minimum dependencies
// needed for testing. This bypasses the fx lifecycle.
//
// Its metrics recorder writes to a fresh registry of its own, so
// Metrics() works on it and two of them never collide.
func NewForTest(
log *slog.Logger,
cfg *config.Config,
@@ -25,8 +20,5 @@ func NewForTest(
Config: cfg,
},
session: sess,
metricsRecorder: prommetrics.NewRecorder(
prommetrics.Config{Registry: prometheus.NewRegistry()},
),
}
}
internal/resetpw/resetpw_test.go
+1 -4
View File
@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/healthcheck"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/metrics"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/resetpw"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
@@ -141,7 +140,7 @@ func (n *noopEvictor) EvictWebhook(string) {}
// and the database, exactly as internal/handlers builds them.
//
// One application per test function, not per case: every start that
// finds no account seeds one with an Argon2id hash, and this package's
// finds no account seeds one at 64 MB of Argon2id, and this package's
// budget is not the place to spend that repeatedly.
func newServerApp(
t *testing.T, dir string,
@@ -164,8 +163,6 @@ func newServerApp(
session.New,
func() delivery.Notifier { return &noopNotifier{} },
func() delivery.WebhookEvictor { return &noopEvictor{} },
metrics.NewRegistry,
metrics.New,
middleware.New,
delivery.NewGuard,
handlers.New,
internal/server/error_page_test.go
-238
View File
@@ -1,238 +0,0 @@
package server_test
import (
"context"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"strconv"
"testing"
"github.com/getsentry/sentry-go"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/server"
)
// The link back the error page offers: to the webhook list for a
// signed-in user, to sign-in for anyone else.
const (
backToWebhooks = `<a href="/hooks" class="btn-secondary">` +
`Back to webhooks</a>`
backToSignIn = `<a href="/pages/login" class="btn-primary">` +
`Sign in</a>`
)
// assertErrorPage checks that w is the error page for status, in the
// normal layout, offering link.
func assertErrorPage(
t *testing.T,
w *httptest.ResponseRecorder,
status int,
link string,
) {
t.Helper()
body := w.Body.String()
assert.Equal(t, status, w.Code)
assert.Equal(
t, "text/html; charset=utf-8", w.Header().Get("Content-Type"),
)
assert.Equal(t, "no-store", w.Header().Get("Cache-Control"))
assert.Contains(t, body, `<nav class="app-bar"`)
assert.Contains(
t, body, strconv.Itoa(status)+" "+http.StatusText(status),
)
assert.Contains(t, body, link)
}
func TestErrorPage_DeletedWebhook(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := newTestEnv(t)
userID, _ := env.seedUser(t, "owner", "somepassword")
cookies := env.authCookies(t, userID, "owner")
wh := env.seedWebhook(t, userID)
require.NoError(t, env.db.DB().Delete(wh).Error)
w := env.get("/hook/"+wh.ID, cookies)
assertErrorPage(t, w, http.StatusNotFound, backToWebhooks)
}
func TestErrorPage_DeletedTarget(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := newTestEnv(t)
userID, _ := env.seedUser(t, "owner", "somepassword")
cookies := env.authCookies(t, userID, "owner")
wh := env.seedWebhook(t, userID)
tgt := env.seedTarget(t, wh.ID)
require.NoError(t, env.db.DB().Delete(tgt).Error)
w := env.get(
"/hook/"+wh.ID+"/targets/"+tgt.ID+"/edit", cookies,
)
assertErrorPage(t, w, http.StatusNotFound, backToWebhooks)
}
// TestErrorPage_ShowsNoNotice pins that a notice code in the URL of a
// page that fails is not shown above the error.
func TestErrorPage_ShowsNoNotice(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := newTestEnv(t)
userID, _ := env.seedUser(t, "owner", "somepassword")
cookies := env.authCookies(t, userID, "owner")
w := env.get("/hook/no-such-webhook?notice=webhook-saved", cookies)
assertErrorPage(t, w, http.StatusNotFound, backToWebhooks)
assert.NotContains(t, w.Body.String(), "Webhook saved.")
}
func TestErrorPage_UnknownPath(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := newTestEnv(t)
userID, _ := env.seedUser(t, "owner", "somepassword")
cookies := env.authCookies(t, userID, "owner")
assertErrorPage(
t, env.get("/no-such-page", nil),
http.StatusNotFound, backToSignIn,
)
// Outside every route group there is no form token, so the
// page leaves out the logout form rather than offer one that
// would be refused.
w := env.get("/no-such-page", cookies)
assertErrorPage(t, w, http.StatusNotFound, backToWebhooks)
assert.NotContains(t, w.Body.String(), `action="/pages/logout"`)
// Inside a route group the page has a token, and logout works.
wh := env.seedWebhook(t, userID)
w = env.get("/hook/"+wh.ID+"/no-such-page", cookies)
assertErrorPage(t, w, http.StatusNotFound, backToWebhooks)
assert.Contains(t, w.Body.String(), `action="/pages/logout"`)
}
func TestErrorPage_BadCSRFToken(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := newTestEnv(t)
form := url.Values{}
form.Set("username", "someone")
form.Set("password", "irrelevant")
form.Set("csrf_token", "not-a-token")
assertErrorPage(
t, env.post("/pages/login", form, nil),
http.StatusForbidden, backToSignIn,
)
userID, _ := env.seedUser(t, "owner", "somepassword")
cookies := env.authCookies(t, userID, "owner")
wh := env.seedWebhook(t, userID)
edit := url.Values{}
edit.Set("name", "renamed")
assertErrorPage(
t, env.post("/hook/"+wh.ID+"/edit", edit, cookies),
http.StatusForbidden, backToWebhooks,
)
}
// TestErrorPage_PanicOnAdminPage sends a panicking handler in an
// admin page route group through the real router, with error
// tracking on: the client gets the 500 error page, and the tracker
// still gets the panic, once. The same panic outside the admin page
// route groups keeps the plain 500.
func TestErrorPage_PanicOnAdminPage(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := newTestEnv(t)
transport := &captureTransport{}
opts := server.SentryClientOptionsForTest(
"https://public@sentry.invalid/1", "webhooker-test",
)
opts.Transport = transport
client, err := sentry.NewClient(opts)
require.NoError(t, err)
serve := func(router http.Handler, path string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
sentry.SetHubOnContext(
context.Background(),
sentry.NewHub(client, sentry.NewScope()),
),
http.MethodGet, path, nil,
)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
router.ServeHTTP(w, req)
return w
}
w := serve(
server.NewRouterWithPageProbeForTest(
env.log.Get(), env.cfg, env.mw, env.hnd,
true, panicProbeHandler,
),
server.PageProbePattern,
)
assertErrorPage(t, w, http.StatusInternalServerError, backToSignIn)
w = serve(
server.NewRouterWithProbeForTest(
env.log.Get(), env.cfg, env.mw, env.hnd,
true, panicProbeHandler,
),
server.ProbePattern,
)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusInternalServerError, w.Code)
assert.Equal(t, "Internal Server Error\n", w.Body.String())
require.Len(t, transport.events, 2)
for _, event := range transport.events {
assert.Contains(t, marshalEvent(t, event), panicProbeMarker)
}
}
// TestErrorPage_ReceiverStaysPlain pins that the error page is for
// the web UI only: a sender posting to an entrypoint that does not
// exist still gets the plain-text answer.
func TestErrorPage_ReceiverStaysPlain(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// newTestEnv leaves the receiver rate limit at zero, which
// refuses every request before it reaches the receiver.
env := newTestEnvWithConfig(t, &config.Config{
DataDir: t.TempDir(),
Environment: config.EnvironmentDev,
ReceiverRateLimit: 10,
})
w := env.post(
"/h/0b8f3c1e-7d2a-4e6b-9f15-3a9c2d4e6f70", url.Values{}, nil,
)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusNotFound, w.Code)
assert.Equal(t, "404 page not found\n", w.Body.String())
}
internal/server/export_test.go
-37
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ import (
"net/http"
"github.com/getsentry/sentry-go"
"github.com/go-chi/chi"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
@@ -102,39 +101,3 @@ func NewRouterWithProbeForTest(
return s.router
}
// PageProbePattern is where NewRouterWithPageProbeForTest serves its
// probe: inside the /pages route group, the admin page group a
// request reaches without signing in.
const PageProbePattern = "/pages/probe"
// NewRouterWithPageProbeForTest is NewRouterWithProbeForTest with the
// probe added to the /pages route group once SetupRoutes has built
// it, so the probe runs behind that group's own middleware exactly as
// the group's real routes do.
func NewRouterWithPageProbeForTest(
log *slog.Logger,
cfg *config.Config,
mw *middleware.Middleware,
h *handlers.Handlers,
sentryEnabled bool,
probe http.HandlerFunc,
) http.Handler {
s := &Server{
log: log,
mw: mw,
h: h,
params: ServerParams{Config: cfg},
}
s.sentryEnabled.Store(sentryEnabled)
s.SetupRoutes()
for _, route := range s.router.Routes() {
pages, ok := route.SubRoutes.(chi.Router)
if ok && route.Pattern == "/pages/*" {
pages.Get("/probe", probe)
}
}
return s.router
}
internal/server/routes.go
+30 -56
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (
sentryhttp "github.com/getsentry/sentry-go/http"
"github.com/go-chi/chi"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/middleware"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus/promhttp"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/static"
)
@@ -14,10 +15,9 @@ import (
// bytes) for form POST endpoints. 1 MB is generous for any form
// submission while preventing abuse from oversized payloads.
//
// The four admin page route groups below (/pages, /user/{username},
// /hooks and /hook/{sourceID}) install MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize)
// right after their recoverer and error reporting, ahead of both CSRF
// and RequireAuth. Both orderings are deliberate.
// Every route group below installs MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize) as
// its FIRST middleware, ahead of both CSRF and RequireAuth. Both
// orderings are deliberate.
//
// Ahead of CSRF because gorilla/csrf parses the form. The cap has to
// be installed before anything reads the body, or the parse runs
@@ -46,14 +46,6 @@ const requestTimeout = 60 * time.Second
// server's router.
func (s *Server) SetupRoutes() {
s.router = chi.NewRouter()
// An unknown path gets the error page. Registered before the
// global middleware, because chi wraps a not-found handler in the
// middleware already on its router, which would then run twice.
// The route groups below wrap it in their own middleware the same
// way; running theirs twice is harmless.
s.router.NotFound(s.h.HandleErrorPage(http.StatusNotFound))
s.setupGlobalMiddleware()
s.setupRoutes()
}
@@ -77,33 +69,23 @@ func (s *Server) setupGlobalMiddleware() {
// Panic recovery, deliberately here rather than first. It has to
// run inside every middleware that observes the response, so the
// 500 it writes is the status the access log records and the
// metrics count, and outside the sentryhttp handler, whose
// metrics count, and outside the sentryhttp handler below, whose
// Repanic option needs something further out to catch what it
// re-raises. chi's own middleware.Recoverer held the first slot
// until it was measured: on a current Go release it crashes
// inside its stack pretty-printer instead of recovering, so the
// connection dropped and the original panic was never reported.
// See https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/187.
s.recoverPanics(s.router, nil)
}
// recoverPanics installs on r the recoverer, answering a panic with
// page (a plain 500 when page is nil), and inside it the Sentry error
// reporting (if SENTRY_DSN is set). Repanic is true so panics still
// bubble up to the recoverer.
//
// Each admin page route group installs its own, with the error page,
// as its first middleware. A panic there is logged, reported and
// answered inside the group and never reaches the global recoverer,
// which keeps the plain 500 for every other route.
func (s *Server) recoverPanics(r chi.Router, page http.Handler) {
r.Use(s.mw.Recoverer(page))
s.router.Use(s.mw.Recoverer())
// Sentry error reporting (if SENTRY_DSN is set). Repanic is
// true so panics still bubble up to the Recoverer middleware
// registered immediately above.
if s.sentryEnabled.Load() {
sentryHandler := sentryhttp.New(sentryhttp.Options{
Repanic: true,
})
r.Use(sentryHandler.Handle)
s.router.Use(sentryHandler.Handle)
}
}
@@ -148,7 +130,12 @@ func (s *Server) setupRoutes() {
if s.params.Config.MetricsAuthEnabled() {
s.router.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
r.Use(s.mw.MetricsAuth())
r.Get("/metrics", s.h.HandleMetrics())
r.Get(
"/metrics",
http.HandlerFunc(
promhttp.Handler().ServeHTTP,
),
)
})
}
@@ -160,22 +147,18 @@ func (s *Server) setupRoutes() {
func (s *Server) setupPageRoutes() {
s.router.Route("/pages", func(r chi.Router) {
s.recoverPanics(
r, s.h.HandleErrorPage(http.StatusInternalServerError),
)
// MaxBodySize precedes CSRF and RequireAuth deliberately;
// see maxFormBodySize for why, and for what it costs.
r.Use(s.mw.MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize))
r.Use(s.mw.CSRF(s.h.HandleErrorPage(http.StatusForbidden)))
r.Use(s.mw.CSRF())
r.Use(s.mw.NoCache())
// The login POST carries no pre-emptive rate limiter. Behind
// the reverse proxy production requires, when TRUSTED_PROXIES
// does not cover it, every client shares one bucket, so a
// limiter spent on arrival lets any stranger deny the operator
// the only administrative path. The handler verifies
// credentials first and charges only failures; see
// Handlers.authenticateUser.
// the reverse proxy production requires, with TRUSTED_PROXIES
// unset, every client shares one bucket, so a limiter spent
// on arrival lets any stranger deny the operator the only
// administrative path. The handler verifies credentials first
// and charges only failures; see Handlers.authenticateUser.
r.Get("/login", s.h.HandleLoginPage())
r.Post("/login", s.h.HandleLoginSubmit())
@@ -185,13 +168,10 @@ func (s *Server) setupPageRoutes() {
func (s *Server) setupUserRoutes() {
s.router.Route("/user/{username}", func(r chi.Router) {
s.recoverPanics(
r, s.h.HandleErrorPage(http.StatusInternalServerError),
)
// MaxBodySize precedes CSRF and RequireAuth deliberately;
// see maxFormBodySize for why, and for what it costs.
r.Use(s.mw.MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize))
r.Use(s.mw.CSRF(s.h.HandleErrorPage(http.StatusForbidden)))
r.Use(s.mw.CSRF())
r.Use(s.mw.NoCache())
r.Use(s.mw.RequireAuth())
r.Get("/", s.h.HandleProfile())
@@ -202,14 +182,11 @@ func (s *Server) setupUserRoutes() {
}
func (s *Server) setupSourceRoutes() {
s.router.Route("/hooks", func(r chi.Router) {
s.recoverPanics(
r, s.h.HandleErrorPage(http.StatusInternalServerError),
)
s.router.Route("/sources", func(r chi.Router) {
// MaxBodySize precedes CSRF and RequireAuth deliberately;
// see maxFormBodySize for why, and for what it costs.
r.Use(s.mw.MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize))
r.Use(s.mw.CSRF(s.h.HandleErrorPage(http.StatusForbidden)))
r.Use(s.mw.CSRF())
r.Use(s.mw.NoCache())
r.Use(s.mw.RequireAuth())
r.Get("/", s.h.HandleSourceList())
@@ -217,28 +194,25 @@ func (s *Server) setupSourceRoutes() {
r.Post("/new", s.h.HandleSourceCreateSubmit())
})
s.router.Route("/hook/{sourceID}", func(r chi.Router) {
s.recoverPanics(
r, s.h.HandleErrorPage(http.StatusInternalServerError),
)
s.router.Route("/source/{sourceID}", func(r chi.Router) {
// MaxBodySize precedes CSRF and RequireAuth deliberately;
// see maxFormBodySize for why, and for what it costs.
r.Use(s.mw.MaxBodySize(maxFormBodySize))
r.Use(s.mw.CSRF(s.h.HandleErrorPage(http.StatusForbidden)))
r.Use(s.mw.CSRF())
r.Use(s.mw.NoCache())
r.Use(s.mw.RequireAuth())
r.Get("/", s.h.HandleSourceDetail())
r.Get("/edit", s.h.HandleSourceEdit())
r.Post("/edit", s.h.HandleSourceEditSubmit())
r.Post("/delete", s.h.HandleSourceDelete())
r.Get("/events", s.h.HandleSourceLogs())
r.Get("/logs", s.h.HandleSourceLogs())
// The log page renders each body only up to its cap, so
// this is the only route that serves a whole one. It
// belongs to this group for its RequireAuth and
// NoCache; see HandleEventBodyDownload for the headers
// that keep the bytes it returns inert.
r.Get(
"/events/{eventID}/body",
"/logs/{eventID}/body",
s.h.HandleEventBodyDownload(),
)
// Replay is the one page action that queues outbound work:
@@ -305,7 +279,7 @@ func (s *Server) setupSourceRoutes() {
func (s *Server) setupWebhookRoutes() {
s.router.With(s.mw.ReceiverRateLimit()).HandleFunc(
"/h/{uuid}",
"/webhook/{uuid}",
s.h.HandleWebhook(),
)
}
internal/server/routes_test.go
+15 -564
View File
@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/healthcheck"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/metrics"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/server"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
@@ -48,8 +47,8 @@ type noopNotifier struct{}
func (n *noopNotifier) Notify([]delivery.Task) {}
// noopEvictor satisfies handlers.New's delivery.WebhookEvictor
// dependency. No test here checks what gets evicted, so it records
// nothing.
// dependency. These tests never delete a webhook, so there is
// nothing to record.
type noopEvictor struct{}
func (e *noopEvictor) EvictWebhook(string) {}
@@ -114,8 +113,6 @@ func newTestEnvWithConfig(
session.New,
func() delivery.Notifier { return &noopNotifier{} },
func() delivery.WebhookEvictor { return &noopEvictor{} },
metrics.NewRegistry,
metrics.New,
middleware.New,
delivery.NewGuard,
handlers.New,
@@ -243,44 +240,6 @@ func (e *testEnv) csrfFrom(
return token, combined
}
// urlFrom renders the page at path and returns the link or form
// action that pattern's one group captures, so a test requests the
// URL the template emitted rather than one it wrote itself.
func (e *testEnv) urlFrom(
t *testing.T,
path, pattern string,
cookies []*http.Cookie,
) string {
t.Helper()
w := e.get(path, cookies)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
match := regexp.MustCompile(pattern).
FindStringSubmatch(w.Body.String())
require.Len(t, match, 2, "%s should render %s", path, pattern)
return html.UnescapeString(match[1])
}
// requireNotice requires w to redirect to dest carrying the notice
// code, then renders that page and requires it to show text.
func (e *testEnv) requireNotice(
t *testing.T,
w *httptest.ResponseRecorder,
dest, code, text string,
cookies []*http.Cookie,
) {
t.Helper()
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
require.Equal(t, dest+"?notice="+code, w.Header().Get("Location"))
page := e.get(w.Header().Get("Location"), cookies)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, page.Code)
assert.Contains(t, page.Body.String(), text)
}
// authCookies forges an authenticated session for the given user.
func (e *testEnv) authCookies(
t *testing.T,
@@ -715,75 +674,12 @@ func TestPagesLogin_CookiesFromAnEarlierDatabase(t *testing.T) {
require.NotNil(t, fresh, "login must set a session cookie")
assert.Equal(
t, "/hooks",
t, "/sources",
env.get("/", []*http.Cookie{fresh}).Header().Get("Location"),
"the new session cookie must authenticate",
)
}
// TestPagesLogin_ReturnsToTheRequestedPage is
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/384: a page opened while
// logged out leads to the login page, and logging in from there lands
// on that page, query included.
func TestPagesLogin_ReturnsToTheRequestedPage(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const (
username = "operator"
password = "correct-horse-battery-staple"
)
env := newTestEnv(t)
userID, _ := env.seedUser(t, username, password)
asked := "/hook/" + env.seedWebhook(t, userID).ID + "/events?page=2"
bounced := env.get(asked, nil)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, bounced.Code)
loginPage := bounced.Header().Get("Location")
match := regexp.MustCompile(`name="next" value="([^"]*)"`).
FindStringSubmatch(env.get(loginPage, nil).Body.String())
require.Len(t, match, 2, "the login form must carry the page")
token, cookies := env.csrfFrom(t, loginPage, nil)
form := url.Values{}
form.Set("csrf_token", token)
form.Set("username", username)
form.Set("password", password)
form.Set("next", html.UnescapeString(match[1]))
w := env.post("/pages/login", form, cookies)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(t, asked, w.Header().Get("Location"))
}
// TestPagesLogout_SaysSignedOut signs out with the navbar's form and
// lands on the sign-in page, which says so.
func TestPagesLogout_SaysSignedOut(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := newTestEnv(t)
userID, _ := env.seedUser(t, "leaver", "somepassword")
token, cookies := env.csrfFrom(
t, "/hooks", env.authCookies(t, userID, "leaver"),
)
form := url.Values{}
form.Set("csrf_token", token)
w := env.post(
env.urlFrom(t, "/hooks", `action="(/pages/logout)"`, cookies),
form, cookies,
)
// The sign-in page is requested without the session cookie, which
// the logout told the browser to delete.
env.requireNotice(t, w, "/pages/login", "signed-out", "Signed out.", nil)
}
// --- /user/{username} group ---
// TestPasswordChange_OversizeBody_RejectedAndPasswordUnchanged
@@ -845,355 +741,7 @@ func TestPasswordChange_UnderLimit_Succeeds(t *testing.T) {
)
}
// --- /hooks group ---
// TestHooks_ListAndNewWebhookForm gets the webhook list through the
// production router, follows both of its links to the new-webhook
// form, then submits the form to the action and with the token the
// page rendered. A mistyped route, link or form action fails here;
// the handler tests cannot catch any of them, because they never
// route a request.
func TestHooks_ListAndNewWebhookForm(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := newTestEnv(t)
userID, _ := env.seedUser(t, "lister", "somepassword")
cookies := env.authCookies(t, userID, "lister")
// The list shows its "Create Webhook" link only while it is empty.
createLink := env.urlFrom(
t, "/hooks", `href="([^"]+)"[^>]*>Create Webhook<`, cookies,
)
existing := env.seedWebhook(t, userID)
list := env.get("/hooks", cookies)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, list.Code)
assert.Contains(
t, list.Body.String(), `href="/hook/`+existing.ID+`"`,
"the list should link the user's webhook",
)
// The "New Webhook" link has an icon between its href and its text.
newLink := env.urlFrom(
t, "/hooks", `href="([^"]+)"[^>]*>(?:\s*<[^>]*>)*\s*New Webhook`,
cookies,
)
token, cookies := env.csrfFrom(t, newLink, cookies)
action := env.urlFrom(t, newLink, `action="(/hooks[^"]*)"`, cookies)
assert.Equal(
t, action,
env.urlFrom(t, createLink, `action="(/hooks[^"]*)"`, cookies),
"both links should open the new-webhook form",
)
form := url.Values{}
form.Set("csrf_token", token)
form.Set("name", "created")
w := env.post(action, form, cookies)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
var created database.Webhook
require.NoError(t,
env.db.DB().Where("name = ?", "created").First(&created).Error,
)
env.requireNotice(
t, w, "/hook/"+created.ID, "webhook-created", "Webhook created.",
cookies,
)
}
// --- /hook/{sourceID} group ---
// TestHook_EditFormAndDelete follows the webhook page's Edit link to
// the edit form and submits it, then deletes the webhook with the
// form on its page, every URL and token taken from the rendered
// pages.
func TestHook_EditFormAndDelete(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := newTestEnv(t)
userID, _ := env.seedUser(t, "editor", "somepassword")
cookies := env.authCookies(t, userID, "editor")
wh := env.seedWebhook(t, userID)
page := "/hook/" + wh.ID
editPage := env.urlFrom(t, page, `href="(/hook/[^/"]+/edit)"`, cookies)
token, cookies := env.csrfFrom(t, editPage, cookies)
form := url.Values{}
form.Set("csrf_token", token)
form.Set("name", "renamed")
w := env.post(
env.urlFrom(t, editPage, `action="(/hook/[^/"]+/edit)"`, cookies),
form, cookies,
)
env.requireNotice(t, w, page, "webhook-saved", "Webhook saved.", cookies)
var edited database.Webhook
require.NoError(t, env.db.DB().First(&edited, "id = ?", wh.ID).Error)
assert.Equal(t, "renamed", edited.Name)
form = url.Values{}
form.Set("csrf_token", token)
w = env.post(
env.urlFrom(t, page, `action="(/hook/[^/"]+/delete)"`, cookies),
form, cookies,
)
env.requireNotice(
t, w, "/hooks", "webhook-deleted", "Webhook deleted.", cookies,
)
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusNotFound, env.get(page, cookies).Code,
"a deleted webhook's page should be gone",
)
}
// TestHook_EntrypointActions adds, deactivates, activates and deletes
// an entrypoint with the forms on the webhook page, each submitted to
// the action and with the token the page rendered.
func TestHook_EntrypointActions(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := newTestEnv(t)
userID, _ := env.seedUser(t, "epuser", "somepassword")
cookies := env.authCookies(t, userID, "epuser")
wh := env.seedWebhook(t, userID)
page := "/hook/" + wh.ID
token, cookies := env.csrfFrom(t, page, cookies)
form := url.Values{}
form.Set("csrf_token", token)
// submit posts the webhook page's form whose action pattern
// captures, and requires the redirect back to that page with the
// notice code, and the page to show text.
submit := func(pattern, code, text string) {
t.Helper()
w := env.post(env.urlFrom(t, page, pattern, cookies), form, cookies)
env.requireNotice(t, w, page, code, text, cookies)
}
toggle := `action="(/hook/[^/"]+/entrypoints/[^/"]+/toggle)"`
submit(`action="(/hook/[^/"]+/entrypoints)"`,
"entrypoint-added", "Entrypoint added.")
var added database.Entrypoint
require.NoError(t,
env.db.DB().First(&added, "webhook_id = ?", wh.ID).Error,
)
require.True(t, added.Active)
submit(toggle, "entrypoint-deactivated", "Entrypoint deactivated.")
var toggled database.Entrypoint
require.NoError(t,
env.db.DB().First(&toggled, "id = ?", added.ID).Error,
)
assert.False(t, toggled.Active, "the toggle should deactivate it")
submit(toggle, "entrypoint-activated", "Entrypoint activated.")
submit(`action="(/hook/[^/"]+/entrypoints/[^/"]+/delete)"`,
"entrypoint-deleted", "Entrypoint deleted.")
var left int64
require.NoError(t, env.db.DB().Model(&database.Entrypoint{}).
Where("webhook_id = ?", wh.ID).Count(&left).Error)
assert.Zero(t, left, "the delete should remove the entrypoint")
}
// TestHook_TargetActions adds a target with the form on the webhook
// page, follows its Edit link to the target edit form and submits
// it, then deactivates, activates and deletes it, every URL and token
// taken from the rendered pages.
func TestHook_TargetActions(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := newTestEnv(t)
userID, _ := env.seedUser(t, "tgtuser", "somepassword")
cookies := env.authCookies(t, userID, "tgtuser")
wh := env.seedWebhook(t, userID)
page := "/hook/" + wh.ID
token, cookies := env.csrfFrom(t, page, cookies)
// submit posts form, with the token, to the action pattern
// captures on the page at from, and requires the redirect back to
// the webhook page with the notice code, and that page to show
// text.
submit := func(from, pattern string, form url.Values, code, text string) {
t.Helper()
form.Set("csrf_token", token)
w := env.post(env.urlFrom(t, from, pattern, cookies), form, cookies)
env.requireNotice(t, w, page, code, text, cookies)
}
toggle := `action="(/hook/[^/"]+/targets/[^/"]+/toggle)"`
submit(page, `action="(/hook/[^/"]+/targets)"`, url.Values{
"name": {"added"},
"type": {string(database.TargetTypeLog)},
}, "target-added", "Target added.")
editPage := env.urlFrom(
t, page, `href="(/hook/[^/"]+/targets/[^/"]+/edit)"`, cookies,
)
submit(editPage, `action="(/hook/[^/"]+/targets/[^/"]+/edit)"`,
url.Values{"name": {"renamed"}}, "target-saved", "Target saved.")
var edited database.Target
require.NoError(t,
env.db.DB().First(&edited, "webhook_id = ?", wh.ID).Error,
)
assert.Equal(t, "renamed", edited.Name)
require.True(t, edited.Active)
submit(page, toggle, url.Values{},
"target-deactivated", "Target deactivated.")
var toggled database.Target
require.NoError(t,
env.db.DB().First(&toggled, "id = ?", edited.ID).Error,
)
assert.False(t, toggled.Active, "the toggle should deactivate it")
submit(page, toggle, url.Values{},
"target-activated", "Target activated.")
submit(page, `action="(/hook/[^/"]+/targets/[^/"]+/delete)"`,
url.Values{}, "target-deleted", "Target deleted.")
var left int64
require.NoError(t, env.db.DB().Model(&database.Target{}).
Where("webhook_id = ?", wh.ID).Count(&left).Error)
assert.Zero(t, left, "the delete should remove the target")
}
// TestHook_ResubmitFromEventLog follows the webhook page's "Full
// Event Log" link, then resubmits a stored event with the form on
// that page, submitted to the action and with the token the page
// rendered.
func TestHook_ResubmitFromEventLog(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := newTestEnv(t)
userID, _ := env.seedUser(t, "resubmitter", "somepassword")
cookies := env.authCookies(t, userID, "resubmitter")
wh := env.seedWebhook(t, userID)
env.seedEvent(t, wh.ID, `{"resubmit":"me"}`)
logsPath := env.urlFrom(
t, "/hook/"+wh.ID, `href="([^"]+)"[^>]*>Full Event Log<`, cookies,
)
token, cookies := env.csrfFrom(t, logsPath, cookies)
form := url.Values{}
form.Set("csrf_token", token)
w := env.post(
env.urlFrom(t, logsPath, `action="(/hook/[^"]+/resubmit)"`, cookies),
form, cookies,
)
env.requireNotice(
t, w, logsPath, "resubmit-no-targets",
"this source has no active targets", cookies,
)
webhookDB, err := env.dbMgr.GetDB(wh.ID)
require.NoError(t, err)
var events int64
require.NoError(t,
webhookDB.Model(&database.Event{}).Count(&events).Error,
)
assert.Equal(t, int64(2), events, "the resubmit stores a new event")
}
// TestHook_LinksBetweenPages follows each link to a webhook page that
// the tests above do not: the navbar's "Webhooks" links, the back and
// Cancel links, the list's link to a webhook, the "Full Event Log"
// link beside the recent events, and the event log's page links. Each
// must point where it should, and that page must render.
func TestHook_LinksBetweenPages(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := newTestEnv(t)
userID, _ := env.seedUser(t, "navigator", "somepassword")
cookies := env.authCookies(t, userID, "navigator")
wh := env.seedWebhook(t, userID)
tgt := env.seedTarget(t, wh.ID)
// The event log shows 25 events a page; one more gives it a second
// page, so it renders its Next and Previous links.
for range 26 {
env.seedEvent(t, wh.ID, "paged")
}
list := "/hooks"
newForm := list + "/new"
page := "/hook/" + wh.ID
targetEdit := page + "/targets/" + tgt.ID + "/edit"
events := page + "/events"
back := `href="([^"]+)"[^>]*>&larr; Back to `
cancel := `href="([^"]+)"[^>]*>Cancel<`
for _, link := range []struct{ from, pattern, want string }{
// The navbar on the profile page: its desktop link, then its
// mobile menu link.
{
"/user/navigator/",
`href="([^"]+)" class="btn-text">Webhooks<`,
list,
},
{
"/user/navigator/",
`href="([^"]+)" class="btn-text w-full[^"]*">Webhooks<`,
list,
},
{list, `href="(/hook/[^"]+)"`, page},
{newForm, back, list},
{newForm, cancel, list},
{page, back, list},
{page, `Recent Events</h2>\s*<a href="([^"]+)"`, events},
{page + "/edit", back, page},
{page + "/edit", cancel, page},
{targetEdit, back, page},
{targetEdit, cancel, page},
{events, back, page},
{events, `href="([^"]+)"[^>]*>Next &rarr;<`, events + "?page=2"},
{events + "?page=2", `href="([^"]+)"[^>]*>&larr; Previous<`, events + "?page=1"},
} {
got := env.urlFrom(t, link.from, link.pattern, cookies)
assert.Equal(t, link.want, got, "%s: %s", link.from, link.pattern)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, env.get(got, cookies).Code, got)
}
}
// --- /source/{sourceID} group ---
// TestSourceLogs_TruncationLinkDownloadsTheBody walks the whole
// feature the way a user does: render the event log page through
@@ -1221,11 +769,11 @@ func TestSourceLogs_TruncationLinkDownloadsTheBody(t *testing.T) {
wh := env.seedWebhook(t, userID)
env.seedEvent(t, wh.ID, stored)
page := env.get("/hook/"+wh.ID+"/events", cookies)
page := env.get("/source/"+wh.ID+"/logs", cookies)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, page.Code)
link := regexp.MustCompile(
`href="(/hook/[^"]+/body)"`,
`href="(/source/[^"]+/body)"`,
).FindStringSubmatch(page.Body.String())
require.Len(
t, link, 2,
@@ -1271,7 +819,7 @@ func TestSourceLogsBody_OtherUser404s(t *testing.T) {
const payload = "OWNERS-PAYLOAD-77c1"
evt := env.seedEvent(t, wh.ID, payload)
path := "/hook/" + wh.ID + "/events/" + evt.ID + "/body"
path := "/source/" + wh.ID + "/logs/" + evt.ID + "/body"
intruderID, _ := env.seedUser(t, "intruder", "somepassword")
intruder := env.authCookies(t, intruderID, "intruder")
@@ -1282,10 +830,7 @@ func TestSourceLogsBody_OtherUser404s(t *testing.T) {
anon := env.get(path, nil)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, anon.Code)
assert.Equal(
t, "/pages/login?next="+url.QueryEscape(path),
anon.Header().Get("Location"),
)
assert.Equal(t, "/pages/login", anon.Header().Get("Location"))
}
// TestDeliveryReplay_PostOnlyAndCSRFProtected walks the replay action
@@ -1308,7 +853,7 @@ func TestDeliveryReplay_PostOnlyAndCSRFProtected(t *testing.T) {
evt := env.seedEvent(t, wh.ID, `{"replay":"me"}`)
dlv := env.seedFailedDelivery(t, wh.ID, evt.ID, tgt.ID)
path := "/hook/" + wh.ID + "/deliveries/" + dlv.ID +
path := "/source/" + wh.ID + "/deliveries/" + dlv.ID +
"/replay"
assert.Equal(
@@ -1334,7 +879,7 @@ func TestDeliveryReplay_PostOnlyAndCSRFProtected(t *testing.T) {
// The token and the action URL both come out of the rendered
// page, so a typo in either the route pattern or the template
// fails here.
logsPath := "/hook/" + wh.ID + "/events"
logsPath := "/source/" + wh.ID + "/logs"
token, cookies := env.csrfFrom(t, logsPath, cookies)
@@ -1342,7 +887,7 @@ func TestDeliveryReplay_PostOnlyAndCSRFProtected(t *testing.T) {
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, page.Code)
action := regexp.MustCompile(
`action="(/hook/[^"]+/replay)"`,
`action="(/source/[^"]+/replay)"`,
).FindStringSubmatch(page.Body.String())
require.Len(
t, action, 2,
@@ -1356,8 +901,10 @@ func TestDeliveryReplay_PostOnlyAndCSRFProtected(t *testing.T) {
html.UnescapeString(action[1]), form, cookies,
)
env.requireNotice(
t, w, logsPath, "replay-queued", "Replay queued:", cookies,
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(
t, logsPath+"?replay=queued",
w.Header().Get("Location"),
)
assert.Equal(
t, int64(2), env.countDeliveries(t, wh.ID),
@@ -1365,59 +912,6 @@ func TestDeliveryReplay_PostOnlyAndCSRFProtected(t *testing.T) {
)
}
// --- /h/{uuid} receiver ---
// TestReceiver_EntrypointURLIsRateLimited takes the entrypoint URL
// the webhook page shows and posts to it through the production
// router until the receiver rate limit refuses it. The URL has to
// reach the receiver, and the limit has to apply to it.
func TestReceiver_EntrypointURLIsRateLimited(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const limit = 2
env := newTestEnvWithConfig(t, &config.Config{
DataDir: t.TempDir(),
Environment: config.EnvironmentDev,
ReceiverRateLimit: limit,
})
userID, _ := env.seedUser(t, "receiver", "somepassword")
cookies := env.authCookies(t, userID, "receiver")
wh := env.seedWebhook(t, userID)
require.NoError(t, env.db.DB().Omit(clause.Associations).Create(
&database.Entrypoint{
WebhookID: wh.ID,
Path: "6f1e2a9c-4b7d-4e3a-9c2f-1d8b5a7e3c60",
Active: true,
},
).Error)
page := env.get("/hook/"+wh.ID, cookies)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, page.Code)
shown := regexp.MustCompile(`(/h/[^<]+)</code>`).
FindStringSubmatch(page.Body.String())
require.Len(
t, shown, 2, "the webhook page should show the entrypoint URL",
)
for i := range limit {
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusOK,
env.post(shown[1], url.Values{}, nil).Code,
"request %d should reach the receiver", i,
)
}
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusTooManyRequests,
env.post(shown[1], url.Values{}, nil).Code,
"the receiver rate limit must apply to the entrypoint URL",
)
}
// metricsConfig is a Config differing from the routing default only
// in the two /metrics credentials.
func metricsConfig(
@@ -1533,46 +1027,3 @@ func TestMetricsRouteUnmountedOnHalfSetConfig(t *testing.T) {
})
}
}
// TestTwoMetricsRoutersInOneProcess pins
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/227: a second
// metrics-enabled router in one process used to panic, because the
// HTTP metrics registered on Prometheus's global default registry.
// Two routers are built over separate dependency graphs and a third
// over the first graph again, and each must still serve the HTTP,
// delivery, Go runtime and process series, and the series counting
// scrapes of /metrics itself.
func TestTwoMetricsRoutersInOneProcess(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
first := newTestEnvWithConfig(
t, metricsConfig(t, metricsUser, metricsAuthValue),
)
second := newTestEnvWithConfig(
t, metricsConfig(t, metricsUser, metricsAuthValue),
)
third := &testEnv{
router: server.NewRouterForTest(
first.log.Get(), first.cfg, first.mw, first.hnd,
),
}
for _, env := range []*testEnv{first, second, third} {
env.get("/", nil)
scrape := env.metricsRequest(metricsUser, metricsAuthValue)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, scrape.Code)
for _, series := range []string{
"http_request_duration_seconds",
"http_response_size_bytes",
"http_requests_inflight",
"webhooker_events_received_total",
"go_goroutines",
"process_start_time_seconds",
"promhttp_metric_handler_requests_total",
} {
assert.Contains(t, scrape.Body.String(), series)
}
}
}

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