The form's reason and values now come from the targetForm component,
loaded from the section's data attributes after a refusal and emptied
by Cancel, which also resets the form. Each type's fields used to be
recreated with the refused values written into the markup, so they
came back after Cancel. The browser test checks this after a refusal.
A target configuration that cannot be encoded is again a logged 500
with the generic error page, on the add and the edit path; only
refusals of submitted values come back on the form.
The README paragraph on the browser test is re-wrapped at 80 columns
and names Cancel at the type step.
Model: opus-5-5
The webhook page's targets section lists only its targets until Add is
clicked. Add shows a choice of target type with Next; Next shows only
that type's fields, with Save and Cancel. The `database` and `log`
types have no URL field, and the `slack` form gains max retries.
A refused target now shows the webhook page again with the form open on
its type, the values entered and the reason, instead of a bare text
page. Target validation returns that message rather than writing the
response; newTarget validates a whole new target for reuse by the
new-webhook page. The edit page still answers a refusal in plain text.
Model: opus-5-5
Each event now has its own page at /hook/ID/events/EVENTID, behind the login, showing its details, its whole body and every delivery; a resubmitted copy links to its original's page. The recent events on the webhook page link there and expand to show their bodies, only the newest expanded on load. One renderer and one template show a body the same way in the recent events, the event log and the event's page: whole up to 32 KiB, cut there in the two lists with links to the event's page and the download; JSON pretty-printed unless that would grow it past four times plus 1 KiB; over 200 lines in a scrolling box; a body holding NUL or control characters treated as binary and never dumped raw.
Model: opus-5-5
An entrypoint's description was set when it was added and could never change, so renaming one meant deleting it and adding a new one with a new URL every sender had to be given again. Each entrypoint on the webhook page now has an Edit button, in the shared secondary style, that opens its description in place with Save and Cancel and keeps its URL. The save goes through the same login, CSRF and ownership checks as the other entrypoint actions; an empty description shows as "Entrypoint". Activate and deactivate now write only the active column, so they cannot undo an edit. Tests cover each, through the router and the browser.
Model: opus-5-5
Every page's Content-Security-Policy forbids eval, which the standard Alpine.js build needs, so no directive ran in a browser: both add forms on the webhook page showed open, and events in the event log could not be collapsed. The UI now loads Alpine's CSP build (@alpinejs/csp 3.14.9 in 3p/); the policy is unchanged. Each directive names a property or method of a component registered in static/js/app.js (collapsible, targetForm), and each card holds its own x-data. A browser test, built only with the browser tag, loads the webhook page and the event log under the real headers; make test-browser runs it in Docker. New test-only dependency chromedp, which raises golang.org/x/sys to 0.47.0.
Model: opus-5-5
static/js/alpine.min.js was a committed minified bundle, which
REPO_POLICIES forbids, referenced by no content hash at all. A minified
blob is unreviewable, which is the shape a supply-chain compromise
takes.
script/fetch-assets now downloads Alpine 3.14.9 from the npm registry
and verifies sha256 on both the tarball and the extracted file, and
static/vendor_test.go re-hashes the bytes go:embed actually placed in
the binary. The shipped bytes are byte-identical to the blob that was
committed, so the served asset does not change.
Independently reviewed. Five negative controls reproduced by the
reviewer: flipped expected hash, repointed URL, post-fetch tampering,
asset absent, and manifest inconsistencies — each fails closed with
static/js/ left clean. Registry hashes confirmed against the pins, and
the runtime image was built, run and curled to confirm the asset is
still served and the login page still loads it.
Known gap, filed separately: static/static.go embeds the js directory
rather than named files, so a missing fetched asset is not a compile
error on ungated local build paths. Every gated path fails loudly, so
the release artifact is unaffected.
check / check (push) Superseded by a newer commit; never tested
The README env table was missing RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL, TODO.md omitted five landed units, and three passages sold manual redelivery in the present tense when nothing implements it. The same false claim was corrected in the doc comment on failUnretryableRetry, which was its source text. Also removes a console.log from the shipped static asset.
Unifies user-visible copy on "Webhook" (routes and URLs unchanged), drops
the placeholder Profile settings section, and adds a copy-to-clipboard
affordance for the entrypoint URL as progressive enhancement — the button
stays hidden unless both the target element and the Clipboard API resolve,
so no dead control appears without JavaScript and the URL stays selectable.
Retention copy now matches what the code does: deletion is permanent, 0
retains forever, and a blank field means the default on create or the
current value on edit. The permanent-deletion sentence is suppressed for a
retain-forever webhook, which the reaper exempts before computing a cutoff.
Template tests gained a render-completed assertion. Without it, a page that
aborted mid-render still satisfied assertions matching the already-flushed
prefix, because renderTemplate streams to the ResponseWriter (#123).
clawbot
sneak