4 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
clawbot	d88948a1c3	Name each database target's archive for its webhook and target (closes #376) ... Each database target now has its own archive file, archive-WEBHOOKNAME-TARGETNAME-TARGETID.db, instead of one archive-WEBHOOKID.db per webhook. delivery.ArchiveFileName builds the name: each name is lowercased, keeps ASCII letters and digits, turns every other run of characters into one dash, and is cut to 40 characters. Renaming a webhook or a target renames its archive files under the archive writer's lock, before the new name is saved, and back again if the save fails. Deleting a target evicts only that target's writer. Archive files are never deleted, and nothing looks for files under the old name. Model: opus-5-5	2026-10-02 05:10:15 +00:00
clawbot	bfdbc937c6	Keep make test under 2 GB of memory (closes #344) ... Every test that starts a database seeds the admin account, hashing its password with Argon2id at 64 MB, about 150 MB under -race, and internal/handlers and internal/database ran dozens of those at once. That was the memory, and most of internal/handlers' run time; the product code does not leak. HashPassword now hashes at a 1 MB cost only when testing.Testing() reports a test binary, so every test package gets it with nothing to add and a binary built by go build always hashes at the shipped parameters. TestHashPassword_ShippedParameters still hashes and verifies through HashPassword at the shipped cost. script/test adds -p 4 -parallel 8. Model: opus-5-5	2026-10-02 03:02:28 +02:00
clawbot	03cd1859d7	Add an egress CIDR allowlist to the SSRF guard (closes #204) (#217)	2026-08-20 10:34:42 +02:00
clawbot	9969694a47	Add a webhooker resetpw subcommand and a bootstrap banner (closes #208) (#239) ... The admin bootstrap password was printed once, as one line among roughly 45 fx lines, and under docker run -d went to container logs subject to rotation. There was no reset path at all -- no subcommand, no forgot-password flow, no env override -- so recovery meant hand-deleting the users row from webhooker.db, which was documented nowhere. Adds webhooker resetpw [-generate] <username>. The password is read from stdin or generated with the existing crypto/rand helper, never taken from argv where /proc would publish it. It reuses the existing Argon2id hashing rather than reimplementing the parameters, and writes a single UPDATE only after the hash is complete, so no failure can leave an account with no usable password. An unknown username is a hard error and never creates an account. It refuses to run against a DATA_DIR held by a live instance, via the exclusive lock from #201. DATA_DIR and webhooker.db are checked to exist before the lock is acquired, so a mistyped path creates nothing -- neither a directory tree nor a stray lock file. The bootstrap password now appears exactly once, in a distinct banner written straight to a caller-named writer rather than as an fx log line.	2026-08-20 08:01:42 +02:00