The access log, the rate-limit rejection lines, the CSRF warning and
the receiver's "webhook request received" line now carry clientIP,
the address the rate limiters key on, next to remoteIP, the
connecting peer. Logging works it out once per request from the same
code the rate limiters use and stores it on the request context for
the other lines. The CSRF and receiver lines name the peer as
remoteIP instead of remote_addr. The README documents the field and
that it is only as trustworthy as TRUSTED_PROXIES.
Model: opus-5-5
The webhook page and everything under it move from /source/ID to /hook/ID; the list and new-webhook form from /sources to /hooks and /hooks/new; the event log from .../logs to /hook/ID/events; entrypoint URLs, the ones senders post to, from /webhook/UUID to /h/UUID. The old paths are simply gone, per the owner's ruling. Every link, redirect, form action, test, comment and README mention follows; every link to the event log, and its title and heading, read "Full Event Log".
Keeping the UUID out of logs, metrics labels and error reports, and the receiver rate limits, key on the route itself, so they cover /h/ unchanged. Routed tests follow every link and form the pages render to a moved page.
Model: opus-5-5
The access log wrote one INFO line per request carrying the full
attacker-controlled URL, on the unauthenticated public receiver, so a
client inventing paths wrote unbounded arbitrary text into the
operator's logs.
Rejected requests now log the chi route pattern instead of the concrete
URL — extended to 3xx as well as 4xx, because RequireAuth answers 303
and so /user/<anything> was an unauthenticated path-varying vector. The
query is redacted on the branches that keep a concrete path, and every
client-supplied field is capped: url, useragent and referer at 512
bytes, request_id at 128, method at 32. The caps are spent in ENCODED
bytes, so escaping cannot multiply them.
One INFO line per request, at most 2,560 bytes — a figure derived
arithmetically rather than observed, with the fixed portion measured at
336 (JSON) and 286 (text).
Independently reviewed four times, and broken three of those times on
the same class of defect: a stated bound the code did not have. Round 1
left the 2xx query and the headers unbounded; round 2 counted raw bytes
against an encoded ceiling and broke at 2,611; round 3 charged 6 bytes
for every non-printable when strconv.Quote spells astral ones as
\UXXXXXXXX, and broke at 2,676. Two independent exhaustive audits over
all 1,112,064 code points, built by different methods, now both report
zero undercharged runes on either handler. Measured worst case over a
real TCP socket is 1,972 bytes, 77% of the ceiling.
Follow-up filed to assert that charge against every code point in the
suite, so the ceiling defends itself rather than resting on one
hand-picked rune.
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