On the receiver route the access log and the per-entrypoint 429 line
name the route pattern whatever the status. A request chi never routed,
such as a dev-mode CORS preflight to the receiver, logs (unmatched).
The access log keeps only the scheme and host of a Referer. The
received line names the entrypoint and webhook IDs, and the
unknown-entrypoint line logs no path. The pattern is
middleware.ReceiverRoute, which routes.go registers the receiver with.
The README says the proxy's access log holds the UUID and must be
protected like the URL, and that a log target writes the request's
headers as received. Its access-log, rate-limit, Sentry and log-size
passages now match the code.
Model: opus-5-5
Behind a trusted proxy every log line named only the proxy, so abuse could not be traced from webhooker's own logs although the rate limiters already knew the client. The access log, the rate-limit rejection lines, the CSRF warning and the receiver's request line now carry clientIP next to remoteIP. remoteIP still means the connecting peer; clientIP is the address the rate limiters key on, the forwarded client when the peer is inside TRUSTED_PROXIES, worked out once per request by the same code. The README says the field is only as trustworthy as TRUSTED_PROXIES. The access log's 2,560-byte line ceiling holds with the field charged, and a size case with an oversized X-Forwarded-For pins it.
Model: opus-5-5
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