Commit Graph

7 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
9bfd033a29 Bound X-Forwarded-For scanning allocation to the hop cap (closes #133)
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forwardedClientAddr now walks the header values in reverse with strings.LastIndexByte instead of joining and splitting, so allocation is bounded by the 64-hop cap rather than by header length: 1.6 MB per call becomes 16 bytes for a 1 MB chain. Semantics are unchanged, verified by differential testing against the previous implementation.
2026-08-12 12:19:14 +02:00
fd6397154a Cap the X-Forwarded-For hop walk at 64 entries (closes #124)
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The walk now keeps only the rightmost 64 hops, so an attacker-supplied chain cannot burn unbounded CPU in the rate-limit key function. Running off the end of the truncated slice falls back to the peer address, the same fail-closed direction the rest of the function takes. Also corrects the unparseable-RemoteAddr comment, which overclaimed about Unix-socket peers.
2026-08-12 11:53:48 +02:00
d19e33671c Gate forwarded-header trust behind trusted-proxy config (closes #88)
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All three rate limiters (receiver, login, password change) now key on the connection's own address unless the direct peer is inside the new TRUSTED_PROXIES CIDR list, in which case X-Forwarded-For is walked right to left for the first non-proxy hop. Default is the empty list, which trusts nothing. A set-but-unparseable value aborts startup.
2026-08-12 11:36:10 +02:00
84b758b785 Rate-limit the public webhook receiver endpoint (closes #64)
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The receiver was the one unauthenticated, internet-facing endpoint with no
rate limit, so a misbehaving or hostile sender could flood a webhook
without bound. RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT (default 120/min) now caps it, keyed on
client IP plus entrypoint path so one entrypoint cannot exhaust another's
budget. Over-limit requests get 429 with Retry-After.

The limiter deliberately does not reuse postRateLimit: that helper is
POST-only and keys on IP alone, whereas the receiver must count every
method. A test locks that property in.

Config parsing follows the fail-loudly idiom: a set-but-unparseable or
non-positive value aborts startup rather than falling back to the default.

Known limitation, tracked in #88: the key still trusts forwarded headers
unconditionally, so the limit is evadable by rotating X-Forwarded-For until
trusted-proxy gating lands.
2026-08-11 14:47:21 +02:00
4f5ecb18e5 Add admin password change flow (closes #65) (#83)
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Adds an authenticated, CSRF-protected flow that lets a user change their own password from the profile page.

## Route

- New `POST /password` under the `/user/{username}` group in `setupUserRoutes` (`internal/server/routes.go`). That group already applies `CSRF`, `NoCache`, and `RequireAuth`, so the new endpoint inherits all three.

## Handler (`internal/handlers/profile.go`)

- `HandlePasswordChange` enforces own-user access: the `{username}` path parameter must equal the session username (same 403 rule `HandleProfile` uses). This check plus the session lookup is factored into a shared `profileOwnerOrDeny` helper now used by both handlers.
- Parses `current_password`, `new_password`, and `confirm_password` (body size limited via `http.MaxBytesReader`).
- Verifies the current password with `database.VerifyPassword` against the stored hash.
- Requires the new password to be non-empty and equal to the confirmation.
- Hashes the new password with `database.HashPassword` — the same Argon2id helper used to bootstrap the admin user — and persists it on the user row. No new crypto.
- Re-renders the profile page with a clear success or error message. Wrong current password, empty new password, and mismatched confirmation are each rejected with their own message and leave the stored hash unchanged.

## Template (`templates/profile.html`)

- Adds a "Change Password" card with current / new / confirm password fields plus the hidden `csrf_token` (matching the login form's CSRF embedding).
- Renders success/error alerts using the existing `alert-success` / `alert-error` styles. No new CSS classes, so no Tailwind rebuild is required.

## Tests (`internal/handlers/profile_test.go`)

- `TestHandlePasswordChange_Success`: seeds a user, posts a valid change, asserts success message and that the stored hash changed and verifies against the new password.
- `TestHandlePasswordChange_WrongCurrentPassword`: posts a wrong current password, asserts the rejection message and that the stored hash is unchanged.

Validated with `docker build .` (fmt-check, lint, test, build) — exit 0.

Closes #65

Co-authored-by: sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin>
Co-authored-by: Jeffrey Paul <sneak@noreply.example.org>
Reviewed-on: #83
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
2026-08-07 23:23:05 +02:00
afe88c601a refactor: use pinned golangci-lint Docker image for linting (#55)
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Closes [issue #50](#50)

## Summary

Refactors the Dockerfile to use a separate lint stage with a pinned golangci-lint Docker image, following the pattern used by [sneak/pixa](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/pixa). This replaces the previous approach of installing golangci-lint via curl in the builder stage.

## Changes

### Dockerfile
- **New `lint` stage** using `golangci/golangci-lint:v2.11.3` (Debian-based, pinned by sha256 digest) as a separate build stage
- **Builder stage** depends on lint via `COPY --from=lint /src/go.sum /dev/null` — build won't proceed unless linting passes
- **Go bumped** from 1.24 to 1.26.1 (`golang:1.26.1-bookworm`, pinned by sha256)
- **golangci-lint bumped** from v1.64.8 to v2.11.3
- All three Docker images (golangci-lint, golang, alpine) pinned by sha256 digest
- Debian-based golangci-lint image used (not Alpine) because mattn/go-sqlite3 CGO does not compile on musl (off64_t)

### Linter Config (.golangci.yml)
- Migrated from v1 to v2 format (`version: "2"` added)
- Removed linters no longer available in v2: `gofmt` (handled by `make fmt-check`), `gosimple` (merged into `staticcheck`), `typecheck` (always-on in v2)
- Same set of linters enabled — no rules weakened

### Code Fixes (all lint issues from v2 upgrade)
- Added package comments to all packages
- Added doc comments to all exported types, functions, and methods
- Fixed unchecked errors flagged by `errcheck` (sqlDB.Close, os.Setenv in tests, resp.Body.Close, fmt.Fprint)
- Fixed unused parameters flagged by `revive` (renamed to `_`)
- Fixed `gosec` G120 warnings: added `http.MaxBytesReader` before `r.ParseForm()` calls
- Fixed `staticcheck` QF1012: replaced `WriteString(fmt.Sprintf(...))` with `fmt.Fprintf`
- Fixed `staticcheck` QF1003: converted if/else chain to tagged switch
- Renamed `DeliveryTask` → `Task` to avoid package stutter (`delivery.Task` instead of `delivery.DeliveryTask`)
- Renamed shadowed builtin `max` parameter to `upperBound` in `cryptoRandInt`
- Used `t.Setenv` instead of `os.Setenv` in tests (auto-restores)

### README.md
- Updated version requirements: Go 1.26+, golangci-lint v2.11+
- Updated Dockerfile description in project structure

## Verification

`docker build .` passes cleanly — formatting check, linting, all tests, and build all succeed.

Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.git.eeqj.de>
Reviewed-on: #55
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
2026-03-25 02:16:38 +01:00
60786c5019 feat: add CSRF protection, SSRF prevention, and login rate limiting (#42)
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## Security Hardening

This PR implements three security hardening issues:

### CSRF Protection (closes #35)

- Session-based CSRF tokens with cryptographically random 256-bit generation
- Constant-time token comparison to prevent timing attacks
- CSRF middleware applied to `/pages`, `/sources`, `/source`, and `/user` routes
- Hidden `csrf_token` field added to all 12+ POST forms in templates
- Excluded from `/webhook` (inbound webhook POSTs) and `/api` (stateless API)

### SSRF Prevention (closes #36)

- `ValidateTargetURL()` blocks private/reserved IP ranges at target creation time
- Blocked ranges: `127.0.0.0/8`, `10.0.0.0/8`, `172.16.0.0/12`, `192.168.0.0/16`, `169.254.0.0/16`, `::1`, `fc00::/7`, `fe80::/10`, plus multicast, reserved, test-net, and CGN ranges
- SSRF-safe HTTP transport with custom `DialContext` in the delivery engine for defense-in-depth (prevents DNS rebinding attacks)
- Only `http` and `https` schemes allowed

### Login Rate Limiting (closes #37)

- Per-IP rate limiter using `golang.org/x/time/rate`
- 5 attempts per minute per IP on `POST /pages/login`
- GET requests (form rendering) pass through unaffected
- Automatic cleanup of stale per-IP limiter entries every 5 minutes
- `X-Forwarded-For` and `X-Real-IP` header support for reverse proxies

### Files Changed

**New files:**
- `internal/middleware/csrf.go` + tests — CSRF middleware
- `internal/middleware/ratelimit.go` + tests — Login rate limiter
- `internal/delivery/ssrf.go` + tests — SSRF validation + safe transport

**Modified files:**
- `internal/server/routes.go` — Wire CSRF and rate limit middleware
- `internal/handlers/handlers.go` — Inject CSRF token into template data
- `internal/handlers/source_management.go` — SSRF validation on target creation
- `internal/delivery/engine.go` — SSRF-safe HTTP transport for production
- All form templates — Added hidden `csrf_token` fields
- `README.md` — Updated Security section and TODO checklist

`docker build .` passes (lint + tests + build).

Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.git.eeqj.de>
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@eeqj.de>
Co-authored-by: Jeffrey Paul <sneak@noreply.example.org>
Reviewed-on: #42
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
2026-03-17 12:38:45 +01:00